The Interpretation of Trust in Empirical Research
Two examples: trust in ethnic and social conflicts in Eastern and
Central Europe
Mária Székelyi - Antal Örkény - Ildikó Barna1
For the sociologist, the radical social change which took place in Central and Eastern
European countries in the last ten years sharply raises the question what mental
consequences the structural and ideological changes after 1989 had on everyday thinking
and whether the patterns of values and behavior, attitudes and cultural conventions
required by altered social relations have developed.
This analysis focuses on the issue of the trust principle. The aim of this study is to
illustrate, on some possible examples, how the phenomenon of trust in society can be
operationalized and analyzed by the means of empirical sociology.
Spheres of Interpretations for Trust
Trust is understood as a social (socialpsychological) mechanism, which can influence our
social behavior significantly and can serve as a psychic link between our motives, beliefs
and the goal to be achieved. The counterpart of trust is the psychological status of
distrust, which detaches and questions the reciprocal relationship between the individual
and the society (or simply, others) and undermines the actor’s belief in the meaning and
success of his or her actions.
Instead of further definition we accept as a work hypothesis Barbara Misztral’s
interpretation, which defines three spheres within the phenomenon of trust:
a) Firstly, trust is a common good (and social value) which ensures the cohesion of
society and is a prerequisite for community existence based on reciprocality. Such an
interpretation of trust carries ideological connotations and is an essential element of
idealized community status as a moral principle: “civic community as marked by a
social fabric of trust and cooperation and reliant upon the activities of the public
spirited citizenry” (Tocqueville, 1968). In this interpretation the principle of trust is
theoretically related to the notion of social order. This tradition can be discerned in
Toennies’ works, for whom trust, like respect and belonging, is a virtue which
penetrates the personal and familiar nature of traditional (Gemeinschaft) communities,
compared to the impersonalized and formalized trust relation within Gesellschaft
societies. A counterexample is Durkheim’s theory, which states that it is the very
characteristic of modern societies that society run by a moral order, which derives
from individual interests and which is able to integrate society on the basis of
personal commitment to collective standards and rules. This order assumes
1
Paper prepared for the workshop on "Trust and Honesty", Collegium Budapest, 25-26 May, 2001.
2
cooperation between the members of society at all levels which certainly requires
regularity across institutions and customs, predictability, order and trustworthiness.
b) Secondly, trust is an important building block of collective behavior as well as the
operation of social organizations and institutions. “For Weber, one of the
preconditions for the success of modern capitalism was the transition from personal
trust to impersonal trust. It is exemplified in the abstract and universal trust of the
Puritan entrepreneurs, who were loyal to their calling, without considering what
benefits it would secure for them… This mutual trustworthiness was their social
capital, which benefited the group and in the longer run established the framework
underlying capitalist relationships.” (Misztral, 1996:55) The Weberian objective- and
value-rational behavior relies on the existence of trust, deriving from individual and
collective interests and can have an important role in various types of legitimation of
relations and institutions. In contrast with manifestations of trust permeting
traditional and charismatic social relations and thus basically deriving from irrational
considerations, trust working in capitalism essentially relies on rational
considerations, permeates both objective- and value-rational behavior, assumes the
mutuality of obligations and relations, and strengthens the reciprocity-based nature of
relations. Apparently, the increasing bureaucratization of modern society and the
widening of its formal rational operation could mean that the subjective, affective
resources of relations, including trust, lose ground. Weber emphasized, however, that
simultaneously or, in fact, complementing and supporting this process, “the mutual
agreement gradually establishes itself as an order based on a belief in its legitimacy.
Consequently, this belief in the binding power of the rule or trust in the validity of
the rule becomes routinized as a universal trust in the principle of the legal-rational
bases of associative relationship.” (Misztral, 1996:59). An example of a different
interpretation of instrumental trust is Talcott Parsons’ theory. Parsons interpreted the
problem of trust as an integrative mechanism for the social system. The stability of
the social system is seen as a result from conceptualizing role sets in terms of
inherent reciprocity and tendencies toward equilibrium. Trust is an instrumental
mechanism of the social system, an essential source of social integration, and an
attitudinal base for individual and institutional solidaristic relations which interweave
this system. “As an aspect of actors’ value-orientations which commits them to
norms of reciprocity and complementarity, trust also plays an integrative role. An
integrated system is thus a system in which actors are trustworthy in the performance
of their role, which in turn contributes to the stability and orderliness of the system.
They are trustworthy because of the solidarity of their collectivity, which imposes
discipline upon them but also helps them to ‘live up to these kind of expectations’
and cope with the uncertainty of less clear situations.” (Parsons, 1951:193) The most
important areas within the instrumental form of trust are the prominent institutions
of social integration, i.e., trust and distrust manifesting in the operation of the
political system, trust existing or absent in law, in rule of law and in respect for law,
trust/distrust underlying economic (market) exchange relations and trust or distrust
toward state institutions and roles (police, army, state administration, welfare
systems). Moreover, trust runs the solidaristic organizations and institutions of this
system, finally, the principle of trust interweaves the venues of collective identity as
well as the various mechanisms of socialization.
c) Thirdly, trust can be also interpreted as an individual personality trait and a
psychological device which provides safety for people in their interactions with
others (people or institutions), increasing the predictability of their actions. This
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approach explains the notion of trust from the aspect of individual behavior, and
considers individuals’ manifestations of trust to be an important element of futureoriented micro-level social decisions. Micro-level personal trust is closely related to
the person’s motives, the maximum realization of personal objectives and interests,
the maximum concentration of existing – material and psychological – resources and
the demand that the individual’s expectations and the behavior of other people
should meet in the course of cooperation with others. The interpretation of personal
trust is closely related to the patterns of social behavior described by utilitarianism,
rational choice and game theory, and particularly to the reduction of the risk factor
which always underlies interactions and exchange relations. “Rational individuals
place trust only, when both potential gains are bigger than potential losses and trust
relations are supported by negative sanctions.” (Misztral, 1996:78) It is the trust
element of exchange relations, which offsets the constrained nature of formal and
legal sanctions. On the other hand, if the rational calculation of goal achievement is
not able to reduce the role of risk factors to the minimum, or the rational actor sees
factors of uncertainty which exceed the aspects of rational action, trust can be a
psychological resource which not only expands the pool of resources for the actor
but also poses moral obligations for his partner. However, personal trust can also be
mutual, when it works as social capital, which ensures the regulation and
predictability of relations (Coleman, 1990). Finally, what we call self-confidence is a
specific manifestation of personal trust. In this case trust is directed toward
ourselves, strengthening and confirming other resources used in achieving our goals
and works as an important drive for success and self-realization.
The three different interpretations correspond to the macro-, mezzo- and micro-level
manifestations of distrust, or, to put it in another way, to the normative, instrumental and
personal levels of trust.
For empirical research, the three above-mentioned levels above can be grasped with
different approaches and models.
a) The first level models mainly the general trust potential of systems, which is closely
related to the question of legitimacy and macro-level value-choices. In Central and
Eastern European a lot of researches have been being carried out since the 1990s to
measure and examine the level of social trust toward institutions which are most
characteristic of public choices, policy making, the value system, the value choices
and the existing structure.
b) As to the second level the scope of empirical surveys is much more limited. Two
areas are worth mentioning as examples: on the one hand, all analyses which aim to
explore behaviors with respect to the institutionalization of social norms (normconforming or norm-breaking) and the trust or distrust which manifests in such
behaviors; on the other hand, surveys which see the occurrence of trust and distrust
in relation to social solidarity. An example of the first area can be some research
projects related to respect for and conformity to law, or, indirectly, researches on the
black and gray economies, the question of corruption, gratuity, etc.
c) We have the least empirical sources on the personal manifestation of trust. Maybe
we can rely most on network researches in this area, or socialsychological
experiments which aim to explore the social micro-world can be also put into this
category.
Trust plays an important role in the routine-like functioning of social contacts and
relations, making interactions and social institutions predictable. This is true when the
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principle of trust manifests under consolidated social circumstances. In this aspect the
routine-like operation of everyday relations or institutions seems to be the best venue for
analysis.
Trust can have a particularly great role under circumstances when social change reaches a
critical mass, and the risks (or haphazard events) caused by these changes make the
situation of either the individual or society unpredictable. Regime changes in Central and
Eastern Europe provide a good field for analysis from this aspect: on the one hand, a
hypotheses testing the prevalence of the trust principle in altered interpersonal or social
relations can be created; on the other hand, trust can be analyzed in light of the role it
had in reducing the risk factors and distrust brought about by the radical
transformations.
There is a third aspect, however, which should be noted when observing the prevalence
of trust in Central and Eastern Europe. If trust is defined as a kind of individual or
collective resource or social capital, it can have an important role in alleviating the
scarcity of resources, which manifests in social, political and economic relations. This
scarcity of resources was particularly characteristic of the economic, political and social
changes which took place after 1989, therefore it may be worth analyzing the prevalence
(or, on the contrary, the absence) of trust in the light of this fact.
Two Examples
Below we are going to illustrate with the examples of two empirical analyses how trust or
distrust interweaves social changes which occurred in this region and the resulting new
social relations. The two examples share the property that originally the researches did
not focus on the examination of the trust/distrust phenomenon. However, rethinking
the research design gives an opportunity to define and operationalize the phenomenon of
trust in a different context, and construct, in both contexts, explanatory models reflecting
the complex nature of the manifestation of trust.
1. Ethno-Trust
Our first example analyzes the reciprocal relation and conflict between ethnic and
political trust in an ethnically mixed environment. The survey took place in Transylvania,
where tensions within the functioning of collective trust are observed in the relation
between majority Romanians and minority Hungarians.
Under the title “Carpathian Project” an empirical sociological research was carried out
between 1997 and 1998 in order to explore the relationships between ethnic minorities
living in the Carpathian Basin and the majority groups of the given countries. The prime
dimension of the researches had been the conflict potential which exists between
majority and minority groups in each country. Besides the standard socio-demographic
measures, dimensions serving as explanations for conflict potential were auto- and
hetero-stereotypes, ethnocentrism, national identity, prospects and the perception of
social distance.
The description of research dimensions shows that the survey did not focus directly on
measuring and explaining trust. It can be assumed, however, that distrust deriving from
ethnic differences is a source of ethnic conflict.
In the model to be described next we are going to attempt to explain the development of
mezzo-level trust and distrust on the basis of general trust in institutions, ethnocentrism
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which is assigned to ethnicity, social distance from groups embodying ethnic dissimilarity
and the perception of anomie reflecting the ‘mental status’ of the country.
Numerous empirical studies justified that the lack of fulfillment for heightened
expectations resulted in radical loss of trust in political and social institutions in the
Central and Eastern European countries which went through regime change. In contrast,
ethnic divideness may result that the general trend of losing trust is broken by trust in the
institutions representing the interests of one’s own ethnic group. We wish to make the
picture of general political trust loss more detailed by describing the factors underlying
institutional trust which can be characterized with contradictory trends,. In this model we
also try to operationalize trust/distrust manifesting in different venues of society.2
This example is limited to one country or region of the original Carpathian Project
survey, namely, to Transylvania.3
The dimensions of the model are:
a) Spheres of trust
 Trust in institutions. Respondents were asked to judge the effects of various politicians
and organizations on the conflict between Romanians and Hungarians. It is
considered a sign of general loss of trust if the respondent said that each or most of
the five offered Hungarian or Romanian agents induced the ethnic conflict. We
should ask, however, whether the loss of trust is symmetrical in the ethnic
dimensions, i.e., Hungarians and Romanians can be characterized with equal loss of
trust when they speak about the political agents which can be assigned to either their
own or to the other ethnic group.
 Micro-level trust capital. Using the standard method in network research, it was
measured in three different ‘life situations’ how many people the respondent could
rely on. One situation enumerated acquaintances and friends who could be asked to
have an eye on their flat temporarily left empty, the second enumerated those who
could be asked to lend money in need, finally, the third one enumerated those whose
advice and influential participation to help in difficulties the respondent could count
on.
 Trust in ethnic groups. This aspect was measured in two dimensions. One of them was
limited to the relationship between Romanians and Hungarians, including
ethnocentrism (increased trust in one’s own group and increased distrust in the other
group). The other dimension represents social distance perceived from the other
ethnic groups living in Transylvania.
 Macro-level trust. In this dimension three questions were used to create an aggregate
variable, which indicates judgment on the anomic status of society. These questions
tested people’s trust in the rule of law and impartial justice.
 Political trust. This dimension is applicable to Hungarians only since the relevant
questions were asked from them only. In this dimension it should be noted that (1)
the political priorities of the respondents’ personal and the most important political
organization of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ) are mirror images to each other,
and (2) political trust in RMDSZ is of a very high degree, although the order of its
political objectives diverts from that of people whom it aims to represent.
This attempt is necessarily constrained, since for micro-level trust, trust capital embodied in the
personal network will be measured with network size. Macro-level trust will be grasped through
the perception of anomie.
3 The sample consisted 717 Romanians and 1090 Hungarians living in Transylvania.
2
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b)






Dimensions of personal life situation
ethnic group membership
local majority or minority position
age
settlement type of habitation
social status
satisfaction/frustration
In the first step we sought the answer to the question whether Hungarians and
Romanians living in Transylvania constitute groups in similar ways if the concept of
grouping is trust in agents who are committed to represent one’s own or the other
ethnicity. The answer was given through cluster analysis.
Table 1: Trust in agents representing one’s own or the other group (cluster centers and cluster size)
Distrust in the other
group
Distrust in one’s own
group
Proportion of clusters,
percent
General distrust
3.66
3.17
2.6
Asymmetrical
3.30
0.40
60.1
Hungarians Self-accusing
1.79
2.57
1.3
General trust
0.59
0.01
36.1
Total
2.31
0.36
100.0
General distrust
4.44
3.48
11.4
Asymmetrical
4.16
1.31
24.6
Romanians Self-accusing
0.98
2.78
7.5
General trust
0.03
0.03
56.5
Total
1.62
0.94
100.0
The first group is characterized by general distrust, since respondents included in this
group have no trust in more than three of the 5 agents offered for each group, which
also have a significant role in ethnic policy-making.4 Members of the fourth group,
characterized by general trust, represent the counterpoint to the first group. It is
characteristic of the second group, which received the label ‘asymmetrical’, that they have
trust in agents representing their own ethnic group, while they have no trust in the agents
of the other ethnic group. A counterpoint to this group can be found in the group of the
‘self-accusing’, who show stronger trust in agents of the other ethnic group than in their
own representatives.
Cluster centers in the above table also show that significant differences can be found
between Hungarian and Romanian group-means of distrust, although the four groups
were formed among Hungarians and Romanians along a similar logic. Generally, it is true
that Hungarians tend to have more distrust (2.31) than Romanians (1.62) if they are
asked about agents of the other group, while Romanians are more self-critical toward the
4
Again, it should be emphasized that basically the survey aimed to explore ethnic relations.
Consequently, testing was performed on political actors (agents) who have a decisive role in
political public life in general as well as in an ethnic aspect.
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representatives of their own group (.94). Therefore Hungarians living in minority tend to
be asymmetrical, while Romanians living in majority tend to be self-critical in their
judgments.
It seems that the dimension of trust/distrust is less deformed by the ethnic motive for
Romanians, while trust feeds on ethnic identity for Hungarians. It is also supported by
the fact that 60 percent of Hungarians fall into the asymmetrical group, while self-critical
people can be hardly found among them. In contrast, most Romanians (57 percent) are
permeated by general trust (in both Romanian and Hungarian agents), and the
proportion of the self-accusing (8 percent) cannot be disregarded either.
The strength of general trust and distrust organized on an ethnic base is related in
different ways for Romanians and Hungarians, therefore the explanatory models below,
which aim to explore sources of trust, should be formed separately for the majority and
minority groups.
Romanians
The table below shows the marked groups found within Romanians in Transylvania
when the frame of reference is specified as trust in agents committed to represent one’s
own ethnic group and trust in agents representing the other ethnic group.
Table 2: Clusters drawn along institutional trust in one’s own and the other group among Romanians
(cluster centers and cluster size)
Distrust in the other
group
Distrust in one’s own
group
Cluster size, percent
General trust
0.03
0.03
56.5
Self-accusing
1.25
2.66
9.3
General distrust
4.35
1.99
34.2
Total
1.62
0.94
100.0
It is clear that with this technique we come to the well-known picture: the majority of
Romanians tend to have trust in institutions, while the proportion of those who tend to
have general distrust toward political institutions cannot be disregarded (nearly onethird).
In this analysis we also sought the answer to the question what fuels trust or distrust
among Romanians in Transylvania and what makes them turn self-critically toward the
political representatives of their own group. The method used to seek answers was
discriminant analysis.5 Trust in institutions, tinted with ethnic motives, is explained
through a combination of variables, one of which grasps sentiments and the other
describes social status. Ethnocentrism had the greatest weight on the discriminant
function expressing sentiments, followed by social distance perceived from other ethnic
groups living in Transylvania, finally, a dissatisfaction indicator for general frustration
also appeared here.
5
Like factor analysis, this procedure creates aggregate variables which compress explanatory
variables in discriminant functions (aggregate indicators) on the basis of the best estimation of
which groups the respondents should belong to.
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Table 3: Structure of the discriminant function aggregating the sentiments of Romanian respondents,
structure matrix
Function
Ethnocentrism
.860
Social distance
.463
Satisfaction
–.315
Naturally, the high values of this function demonstrate a sentiment full of ethnocentrism,
dejecting dissimilarity and dissatisfaction with life in general characterizing respondents
who have no trust in political institutions. People who are free from these sentiments,
which we can justifiably call negative sentiments, have increased general trust; however,
this can lead to self-accusation in extreme cases. This model serves as a pragmatic
political moral: if political forces in an ethnically divided society make efforts to
strengthen ethnocentric sentiments and the rejection of dissimilarity in certain groups,
they have to consider that general trust in institutions may lose ground.
Table 4: Means of the sentiment-aggregating discriminant function in Romanian groups representing
different degrees of trust
Function
General trust
–.141
Self-accusing
–.590
General distrust
.379
However, the degree of trust may be influenced by not only sentiments but also objective
social position, which was aggregated from social status, age and the settlement type of
habitation, again, by discriminant analysis.
Table 5: Structure of the discriminant function aggregating the social position of Romanian respondents,
structure matrix
Function
Local majority position
.603
Social status
.438
Age
Settlement type (+ village)
–.402
.296
According to the model, the prime determinant of social position is whether Romanians
live in local majority or minority. Social status and age also have great weight on the
function. The settlement type of habitation has a lesser role. Therefore the discriminant
function represents a scale whose positive extreme shows Romanians who live in a
settlement with Romanian majority, have high social status, are young and tend to live in
an urban milieu.
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Table 6: Means of the discriminant function aggregating social position in Romanian groups
representing different degrees of trust
Function
General trust
.000
Self-accusing
–.397
General distrust
.237
The table shows well that, while sentiments had a significant role in the development of
general trust, social position does not specify the existence of trust: among respondents
who tend to have general trust we can found people from any segment of the social
space. However, the group that shows general distrust can be definitely characterized
with young respondents who have high status and live in cities with Romanian majority.
The latter group has a counterpoint in the self-accusing, who have more trust in the
Hungarian than the Romanian agents, which can be significantly attributed to their local
minority position.
Finally, we seek the answer to the question whether sentiments or social position has a
stronger effect on the degree of trust. Again, the answer can be sought through
discriminant analysis by embedding the discriminant functions, which aggregate
sentiments and social position into this new model.
Table 7: Structure of the secondary discriminant function for sentiments and social position among
Romanian respondents, structure matrix
Function
.793
.529
Dissatisfied, ethnocentric, great social distance
Local majority position, high status, younger, living in a village
The positive extreme of the secondary discriminant function represents urban youth with
high social status and who see relations from the safety of local majority full of hostile
sentiments, while the negative extreme represents contrary features. It should be noted
that sentiments have a greater weight on this function than social position, i.e.,
sentiments have a stronger effect on degrees of trust than social position.
Table 8: Means of the secondary discriminant function in Romanian groups representing different
degrees of trust
Function
General trust
–.177
Self-accusing
–.767
General distrust
.427
Through the secondary discriminant function we can give a real profile to spheres of
trust: the group which tends to have general distrust can be characterized with hostile
sentiments and, unfortunately, high social status, local majority position, and relatively
young age. The counterpoint to this group is not the group blessed with general trust but
the group which sees its own political system self-critically. The profile of respondents
with general trust is not very marked, due to the fact that people from every social level
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can be found in this group. The rejection of negative sentiments, however, is more
markedly present in this group.
Hungarians
Trust interwoven with ethnic motives works in an entirely different way among
Hungarians living in a global minority position than seen among Romanians who belong
to the majority society. It is proven by cluster analysis, through which we sought groups
with different degrees of trust among Hungarians in Transylvania.
Table 9: Clusters drawn along institutional trust in one’s own and the other group among Hungarians
(cluster centers and cluster size)
Distrust in the other
group
Distrust in one’s own
group
Cluster size, percent
Asymmetry
3.11
0.26
66.1
General trust
0.09
0.03
26.9
General distrust
3.24
2.53
7.1
2.31
0.36
100.0
The most populous group is that of people who have asymmetrical trust, i.e., they have
almost the maximum trust in Hungarian agents, while they have absolutely no trust in
Romanian agents. A group with general trust can be also found among Hungarians,
although their proportion is somewhat smaller than among Romanians. The proportion
of the group, which shows general distrust, is small like among Romanians
The variables of the discriminant analysis, which aggregates Hungarian sentiments, differ
from the former Romanian model. Satisfaction and social distance perceived from other
ethnic groups living in Transylvania did not fit on any of the discriminant functions and
therefore were omitted from the model. In contrast, national identity had a significant
role. Hungarians in Transylvania got into the diaspora-position. Partly because of this
fact they live in the dual grip of national identity, and are forced to experience the
conflicts between culture- and state-national identity every single day, since they are
Romanian citizens and belong to the Hungarian ethnicity at the same time. 6 If
respondents think in the state-national dimension, they exclude themselves from the
‘body’ of the Hungarian nation; if they follow principles of the cultural nation, they
question their status in Romania.
The variable, which compares the respondent’s political priorities with RMDSZ
objectives, is also an important building block of the discriminant functions. It can be
considered a general tendency that Hungarians in Transylvania think that the most
important objectives of RMDSZ are the expansion of education in the Hungarian
mother tongue, and achieving cultural and territorial autonomy, although the objectives
which they set for themselves are reducing inflation, eliminating unemployment,
improving living standards and weakening corruption. Within this general tendency there
6
National identity was operationalized in 9 questions. Factor analysis showed two latent
dimensions underlying these questions. One of them was culture-national identity, defined by
self-definition, love of Hungarian culture, Hungarian mother tongue, membership of a church
with Hungarian liturgical language, descent and respect for the Hungarian flag; the other one
was state-national identity, determined by citizenship, birthplace and habitation.
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are groups, however, which see RMDSZ objectives to be closer to their own priorities,
while others perceive a greater distance from them. This distance, perceived between
one’s own political priority and that of RMDSZ, was built into discriminant analysis as
one of the explanatory variables. (Note: Positive judgment on the actions of RMDSZ
within the Romanian government and its effect on the position of Hungarians in
Romania was so unanimous that the model dropped these two variables.)
Finally, principal component, which aggregated negative stereotypes about Romanians,
was also included in the model.
Table 10: Structure of the discriminant functions aggregating the sentiments of Hungarian respondents,
structure matrix
Function 1
Function 2
Support of RMDSZ objectives
.188
.519
Ethnocentrism
.662
–.016
Culture-national identity
.489
.337
–.181
.450
.208
–.690
State-national identity
Negative stereotypes about Romanians
The first function of discriminant analysis drew a ‘separatist’ axis whose positive extreme
represents ethnocentrism, the exclusiveness of culture-national identity, contempt of
Romanians and moderate acceptance for the political objectives of RMDSZ, which had
an active role in the Romanian government when interviews were made. The second
discriminant function shows an ethnically cooperative view: its positive extreme
represents the rejection of negative stereotypes about Romanians, a structure of dual
national identity and aloofness toward RMDSZ objectives, which is accompanied by a
slight rejection of ethnocentrism.
Table 11: Means of discriminant functions aggregating sentiments in Hungarian groups representing
different degrees of trust
Function 1
Function 2
Asymmetry
.151
.000
General trust
–.406
.243
General distrust
–.435
–.553
Separatism is characteristic of respondents with asymmetrical trust capital who trust
Hungarians only and have no trust in Romanians. They see themselves to be superior to
Romanians, and are in fact able to force back their material difficulties, which certainly
became more severe with the regime change. This group is more or less identifying itself
with the objectives of RMDSZ, which are rich in ideological motives.
Ethnic cooperation is the coexistence strategy of people blessed with general trust. On
the other hand the small group which can be characterized with general distrust does not
find source of strengthening trust in either ethnic separatism or the strategy based on
ethnic cooperation.
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The constituents of the discriminant function, which aggregates social position, are the
same as variables found in the explanatory model for Romanians.
Table 12: Structure of the discriminant function aggregating the social position of Hungarian
respondents, structure matrix
Function
Social status
.974
Settlement type (+ village)
–.468
Local majority position
–.191
Age
–.062
The discriminant function embodies a scale whose positive extreme represents citydwellers who have high social status, most of them living in local minority position. The
role of age on the discriminant function is not too significant – the positive extreme
represents respondent who are slightly younger than the average.
Table 13: Means of the discriminant factor aggregating social position in Hungarian groups representing
different degrees of trust
Function
Asymmetry
.000
General trust
–.210
General distrust
.422
Only groups showing general distrust and general trust can be characterized with a
profile, which is marked with respect to social position. The entire spectrum of the social
space can be found in the most populous group showing asymmetrical trust. People who
have low social status and live in villages with Hungarian majority support general trust,
while respondents with high status, mostly living in cities with local minority show
general distrust.
Testing the effect of functions aggregating sentiments and social position on trust, it can
be found that, unlike Romanians, social position has an insignificant role for Hungarians.
Table 14: Structure of the secondary discriminant function for sentiments and social position among
Hungarian respondents, structure matrix
Function 1
Function 2
Ethnic separatism
.996
.002
Ethnic cooperation
–.039
.973
High status, minority position, city-dweller
–.284
–.368
With the combination of sentiments and social position one of the discriminant
functions draws the separatist axis, while the other draws the cooperative axis, and both
of them are complemented with low social status and majority position of relatively little
weight. Accordingly, the differences in dispersion of the secondary discriminant
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functions among groups representing different degrees of trust are very similar to what
we had when aggregating sentiments.
Table 15: Means of the secondary discriminant function in Hungarian groups representing different
degrees of trust
Function 1
Function 2
.137
.000
General trust
–.408
.202
General distrust
–.396
–.519
Asymmetry
Cooperation is the source of general trust, or, conversely, trust is the source of
cooperation, while general distrust underlies the overvaluation of one’s own group.
We can conclude that for Hungarians who live in a global minority position the variables
describing social and demographic heterogeneity are not able to cut across effects which
derive from the homogeneity of ethnicity or nationality, e.g., trust potential. It indicates
that in the background - provided by the sociology of knowledge of the trust relationship
- between majority and minority we can find considerations which may seem to be
irrational, and which are stronger than the considerations of everyday rationality relying
on social status, settlement type and age.
Levels of Trust in Transylvania
In relation to the models describing how the micro-, mezzo- and macro-levels of trust
are built on each other we would like to emphasize again that the survey did not deal
with the topic of trust directly, thus the operationalization of various levels of trust is
quite occasional. We hold that the description of models is important because they can
illustrate how various levels of trust are built on each other if the ethnic dimension is
included as an independent variable.
Within this combination of models micro-level trust was measured by the size of
personal networks, the mezzo-level was measured by trust in different political agents
and institutions, finally, macro-level was measured by views about the anomic condition
of society. At the mezzo- and micro-levels an ethnic motive was also included: at the
mezzo-level political agents committed to represent one’s own and the other ethnic
group were distinguished, while the micro-level model included the number of network
members who come from the other ethnic group. Models show how these three trust
levels are built on each other.
14
Figure 1: Path model of anomie among Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania
Hungarians
.09
.96
Distrust in the
Hungarian agents
Hungarian network
–.09
.09
.24
Romanian network
Anomie
.28
.20
.23
Distrust in the
Romanian agents
–.14
Romanians
–.05
.32
.06
60
Hungarian network
Distrust in the
Romanian agents
.04
Romanian network
.05
–.12
.99
.05
.67
Distrust in the
Hungarian agents
Anomie
.05
.04
The explanatory power of the path models is extremely modest, however, the beta values
of the indicated paths are always significant. In this analysis we do not wish to go all the
way or analyze both models to the end; we would like only to direct attention to the
relationship indicating how and to what degree the presence of the ethnic motive can
deform the stratification of trust levels.
For Romanians, institutional-level distrust increases the perception of social anomie,
which is not influenced by the ethnic motive: when trust in institutions - representing
either one’s own or the other group - is absent, it will equally strongly increase the
anomic sentiment. For Hungarians, the situation is different. If they trust their own
agents, then it is less likely that they see Romanian society to be anomic, and if they have
no trust in Romanian agents, they are much more likely to perceive anomie.
For Romanians, judgments on agents committed to represent one’s own and the other
group strongly correlate (trust in one’s own institutions influences trust in Hungarian
agents with a strength of beta=0.67). For Hungarians, this connection is much weaker,
since the beta value here is only 0.28.
15
Micro-level trust is loosely related to the perception of social anomie, and we can find a
significant direct path for Romanians only. It indicates that openness in the micro-sphere
(extensive personal network) decreases the perception of anomie. For Romanians, the
micro-level is hardly related to the institutional level. We can pinpoint only one tendency,
which also applies to Hungarians: ethnic trust manifesting at the micro-level also
increases trust in the agents of the other ethnicity at the institutional level. For
Hungarians, the openness of the personal sphere strengthens distrust in the agents of the
other ethnic group (beta=0.20), unless it is combined with mixed ethnic composition of
the network.
We can conclude that Hungarians’ living in global minority indicates trust capitals with
ethnically asymmetrical organization. In contrasts, for Romanians, due to their majority
position the anomic sentiment could be hardly grasped with trust levels, tinted with
ethnic motives, which implies that their structures of thinking are much less deformed by
the ethnic motive.
2. Social Trust
The second example describes the sphere of personal trust and examines reasons for
trust (or distrust) in the uncertainty relations generated by regime changes in Central and
Eastern Europe. Changes, which occurred after 1989 can be also interpreted as
increased, distrust in the previously existed social and political relations and trust in the
new political and economic values. The legitimacy of the new political and economic
order relied mostly on this trust capital: people were not able to calculate the predictable
consequences of regime change rationally, but their trust in new values, institutions and
political actors helped to alleviate the tensions and weaken uncertainty. Numerous
empirical analyses proved that the political elite which led regime change and the values
of regime change which they represented (such as liberalism, democracy, pluralism or
market economy) had significant trust capital within the majority part of the society in
the early 1990s. (It is not altered by the fact that the severe social consequences of regime
change significantly eroded this trust capital later.)
In contrast, a cross-national comparative survey on the judgment on social justice carried
out in 19917 had already shown that a high degree of distrust in people who most
successfully benefited from changes, i.e., new entrepreneurs, managers and bourgeoisie,
manifested in almost all Central and Eastern European countries. In the following
analysis we seek the roots of this contradiction and try to find out whether distrust,
which manifested very early and is still characteristic, has material-existential
explanations, or value conflict or socialpsychological reasons. Moreover, we try to find
the answer to the question whether distrust in the ‘conspicuous’ winners of regime
change undermines political legitimation for the entire system.
According to the various trends of sociological theory, the interrelation of trust and
political legitimation is not self-evident. In the concept of rational legitimation, which
7
The survey covered 5 countries: the Eastern part of Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Bulgaria and Russia. Data were first collected in 1991 and then, in the second phase, in 1996.
(In the original survey of 1991 eight other Western and Eastern European countries were also
included.) The explanatory model underlying the relationship of trust and political legitimation
was created for the entire Central and Eastern European region so that changes over time
could be also tracked.
16
derives from the Weberian tradition, trust is not considered as the sine qua non of political
legitimacy, while the interpretation attempts deriving from Durkheim’s traditions start
from the importance of moral order, and thus they attribute outstanding importance to
trust in everyday social interactions.
This model is not able to grasp general social trust but operationalizes only a segment of
it: to what extent the enrichment mechanisms manifesting in society, i.e. ways to material
success can be considered legitimate. The model contrasts this aspect with political
legitimation, defined with approval/rejection of the new system of political institutions
and principles, which emerged after the regime change.
The elements of the model were as follows.







Political legitimacy. Respondents were asked to judge whether (1) democratic elections
really mean alternative choices and (2) the principle of equality before the law
prevails, and finally (3) to what extent ‘the powerful’ care about the opinions of
ordinary people. From the answers given to the three questions an indicator was
created whose great positive values represent the approval of the system, while great
negative values represent the rejection of it.
Trust in ways of enrichment under market economy conditions. Respondents were asked to
judge the role of personal efforts (hard work), talent, or uninhibited behavior and
unjust external economic conditions in enrichment. From the four answers a trust
indicator was created whose positive values show the approval of ways to enrichment
and negative values show distrust in the way of enrichment.
Macro-level value preferences. Since macro-level meritocratic values became a decisive
element of social relations and institutions after the regime change, it was assumed
that the approval or rejection of these values is closely related to the political
legitimation and to trust in success. The indicator was created from four variables by
principal component analysis. The positive values of the principal component
express that the respondent thinks that the prevalence of meritocratic values (respect
for hard work, free inheritableness of personal and private property and achievement
based distribution) is desirable (sollen), and thus radical changes in value preferences
are also desirable (difference of sollen and sein).
Micro-level value preferences. Like at the macro-level, support for micro-level meritocratic
principles was tested through this indicator. The principal component included four
variables: wages should correspond to abilities and efforts and the desirable degree of
change as opposed to current income distribution, which is not meritocratic enough.
Satisfaction/frustration. Numerous empirical studies proved that satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with one’s personal life situation considerably influences the degree of
legitimacy. Satisfaction was measured with four items: satisfaction with income, living
standards, the current political system and life in general were aggregated into a
principal component.
Social status. It is assumed that the degree of political legitimacy depends on whether
regime change provided status advantages or disadvantages for respondents. Social
status was measured through the aggregation of education, occupational prestige and
income.
Finally, we also wanted to track changes over time in the model, thus two dates of the
research were included (1991 and 1996).
The above described dimensions were drawn in a path model explaining the intensity of
political legitimation in Eastern and Central Europe.
17
Figure 2: Path model of political legitimation in Central and Eastern Europe
Status
–.11
.13
.88
–.07
Macro-level meritocratic
preferences
.17
Satisfaction
.20
.23
Trust
–.08
Year
.09
Micro-level meritocratic
preferences
-.09
–.13
.20
Political
legitimation
18
The model successfully explained the development of political legitimation (R²=0.12).
Although it is not the most important connection, it should be concluded that the degree
of political legitimation, if the effects of all other factor are controlled, decreased between
1991 and 1996 in the region. This political legitimation, which weakens over time, most
strongly connects to trust in ways to success and enrichment. The more one thinks that
personal merits underlie enrichment, the more he can identify with the new political
system. Personal satisfaction also has an advantageous effect on the degree of political
legitimation. The approval/rejection of meritocratic values does not influence political
legitimation directly. However, the path model clearly shows that both macro- and
micro-level preferences for meritocratic values weaken trust in the rich and thus in
political legitimation. These indirect effects are not self-evident, since we would expect
that the approval of meritocratic values have a favorable effect on the legitimacy of the
entire system because the system overtly relies on meritocratic values. The key to
understand this phenomenon is hidden in the degree of personal satisfaction. However,
there are more complex paths from satisfaction to political legitimation: personal
dissatisfaction (which tends to characterize respondents with lower status) increases
affinity toward both macro- and micro-level meritocratic values. We can possibly find its
explanation in the socialpsychological phenomenon that respondents’ dissatisfaction
seems to be associated with the belief that they would deserve more – because they are
talented, make great efforts, carry great responsibility and because achievement based
distribution should prevail at the macro-level. And if so, they would get more and would
not be dissatisfied. However, the world is unjust, and those who raid and seize and are
corrupt, whom injustices in the economic system allow to play their tricks, will be rich
instead of the worthy (respondents themselves). It leads to distrust in enrichment and
consequently it increases political de-legitimation.
This picture is not essentially influenced but only tinted by the path, which leads from
status through meritocratic values to political legitimation. High status, behind which
satisfaction has no marked profile, i.e., we can find both satisfied and dissatisfied people
in this group, makes the approval of micro-level meritocratic values more likely. It
certainly reduces trust whether it goes along the approval of macro-level meritocratic
principles or affects trust directly.
Therefore we have to say that in the region value preferences and the coordinates of
relationship with social stratification had not crystallized by 1996 so that people could be
able to take stands without assigning a key role to satisfaction with personal life situation
in forming their opinions. We can expect an increase in trust only if it is supported by the
personal satisfaction of the respondent. Trust, which is one of the major explanations of
political legitimation, relies primarily on personal satisfaction rather than value
preferences.
This model also pinpointed a particular effect, which is independent of the status and
satisfaction of people living in the region. By 1996 the proportion of opinions that
macro-level meritocratic value did not prevail decreased, which increased, although
moderately, trust in the rich.
From the model describing the combination of trust and political legitimation, we also
tried to elaborate a pragmatic message. We examined whether trust capital influences
‘political action’. Political action means only that the respondent would vote in the
parliamentary elections to be held that weekend.8
8
The model was tested for one year only, namely 1996.
19
Figure 3: Path model of electoral behavior in Eastern and Central Europe
.26
Trust
.16
Political legitimation
.97
Voting in parliamentary
elections
In this model the relationship between trust and political legitimation is stronger than it
was in the former path model because this model does not include the variables which
strengthen political legitimacy through increasing trust. However, the relationship which
shows that stronger political legitimation encourages participation in the elections is
much more important. Trust has no direct effect on electoral behavior, however, its
indirect effect is remarkable. If the rich are seen as a pack of tricksters and corrupt
people, than it casts a shadow on the legitimacy of the entire system and makes people
indifferent toward political actions.
20
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