“COMMUNITY” ACTION FOR COLLECTIVE GOODS1
Formal and informal cooperation in Hungarian condominiums
after transition
Annamária Orbán, Political Science Department, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
Modern people live in communities of different levels, ranging from families through
local communities to nation states or even international “communities”. Consequently, they
are not living isolated on an island but are “exposed to” continuous social interaction with
their fellow people. However, human interaction - by definition - breeds conflicts, unresolved
problems, which – fortunately- ‘give food’ for social sciences in general. And especially for
political science, which can be regarded as a “melting pot” of different branches of social
sciences, like philosophy, economics, sociology, psychology etc. Political science tries to
“use” all of them when examining how people, as a collective, try to resolve their conflicts
and to make decisions.
One particular field of research in political science, the theory of collective action, is
concerned with the question: how people behave and act in groups when pursuing their
common goals, how collective action for a collective good, that is cooperation can (or
cannot!) take place. As Jon Elster put it, a “group has a collective action problem if it is better
for all if some do it than if nobody does, but better for each not to do it. It may or may not be
better for all if all do it than if nobody does. And it may or may not be best if all do it. To
cooperate is to act against one’s self-interest in a way that benefits all if some, or possibly all,
act in that way.”2 Nevertheless, I have to add that in my interpretation, groups are not
necessarily only political or interest groups and organizations – originally assumed by the
founders of group theories in politics -, but any social groups of individuals whose members
share a common interest. This kind of broadening the scope of groups allowed me to apply the
analytical devices of the theory of collective action in such a particular case, which has never
been examined in this way, at least to my best knowledge. I tried to find such a field of social
life where collective action problems do occur very often. These sometimes call for urgent
solutions, otherwise the “life” of these micro communities would be ‘unbearable’ and the
consequences of not solving them would not only penetrate the people themselves living in
these communities, but would affect a larger segment of the society or even cause fierce
political debates. My research topic was also ”embedded” in a larger set of political end
economic problems, namely the time period of the Hungarian transition and privatization,
which had a significant impact on these micro communities' life as well.
Thus, my special field of interest was examining the “life” of condominiums in
Hungary after the transitory period - especially in Budapest, where most of these community
houses are located -, where people are “randomly” bound together into groups, having
common properties, interests and goals. The very question, which interested me was how
cooperation could evolve among the members of these groups, what were those so called
external – coercive and non-coercive - and internal – spontaneous and voluntary - factors3,
which induced people to cooperate with each other in order to override their collective action
1
The paper proposal is based on my Ph.D. research work at the Central European University, Political Science
Department
2
Elster, Jon. 1990. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.126
I made a difference between two sorts of solutions to the collective action problem: external and internal ones,
using – in a somewhat extended manner- Michael Taylor’s “structuring” (Taylor, M. 1987. The Possibility of
Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). On the other hand, someone could call external
solutions as formal cooperation and internal solutions as informal cooperation as well.
3
(or I could say free-riding) problems. In my interpretation, external (or institutionalized)
solutions were those, where the “rules of the game” were changed, meaning peoples’
possibilities, attitudes and beliefs were changed (but not necessarily from outside of the
group), while internal or spontaneous solutions were those, which neither involved nor
presupposed changes in the “game”.4
Condominiums can be regarded as “loose communities”5 based on their externally
defined “constitution”, the Condominium Law. Nonetheless, this Law provides only the
general framework of their life, the basic rules of the “game”. In these special communities
people are “destined “ to live together for an unspecified period of time, therefore the “game”
is not “one-shot” but “iterated”. People in condominiums – by definition – have their private
properties – e.g. flats, garages - but also share different common properties and facilities (e.g.
garden, basement, attic, shops, common water supply and heating etc.). The usage and
maintenance of these common properties and facilities necessarily induce conflicts among the
members of these groups, which can be resolved only by their collective decision making and
action. Therefore condominiums are special communities “governing the commons” on the
one hand, and group of individuals who are part of an organization with common interests and
goals on the other. In both aspects, in order to pursue their common goals they have to act
collectively and to reach them successfully, they have to cooperate with each other.
Thus my research agenda was an empirical research on these special social groups, by
using and applying theoretical devices and empirical findings relevant to the problem of
collective action. By the help of deep and many sided investigation into the life and history of
condominiums, I attempted to draw some general conclusions both theoretically with
reference to the universal problem of collective action6 and empirically with regard to further
sophistication of the existing laws and rules in question. As far as this latter is concerned I
hope that by pointing to some problematic topics and issues in the Hungarian condominium
regulation needing further remedies I would be able to contribute to a better functioning and
consequently, life of these micro communities.
4
For instance external and coercive solutions were laws and regulations or non-coercive the political
entrepreneurs. On the other hand, I treated altruism or trust as an internal solution to the collective action
problem.
5
In my terminology these are such groups, where people are necessarily bound together and have to interact
with each other, that is to live some social life together. Consequently, they can (only the probability is there, not
necessarily) develop such social relations, which can already be characterized by the definition of “true”
communities.
6
As Elinor Ostrom said: ”…Much more work will be needed to develop the theory of collective action into a
reliable and useful foundation for policy analysis.” Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of
Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.7.