ARKANSAS HISTORICAL QUARTERLY,
Volume 1, December 1942,
ARKANSAS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
BY DUVON CLOUGH CORBITT,
Professor of History in
Chandler College, Havana, Cuba
The campaigns in the upper Mississippi Valley have long been a favorite
topic with writers on the American Revolution. In recent years exploration
in Spanish archives has drawn attention to events along the lower banks
of the river and to the use of the river as a lifeline of the colonies in revolt
(1). Emphasis has been laid largely on the parts of the river below
Natchez and above the Ohio. It is the purpose of this paper to stress the
events in the almost uninhabited country lying between these points.
When the American Revolution began in 1775, Spanish and English
garrisons glowered at each other across the river along the two inhabited
stretches. Between them England had only a couple of small stations
called Arkansas and Concordia (2). Spanish authority was represented
only by Fort Varlos Tercero de Arkansas, or Arkansas Post, Located a
few miles up the Arkansas River, this post controlled navigation on that
stream and White River, furnished a point of departure for hunters and
trappers on those rivers, served as a center of diplomatic relations with
the Arkansas, Osage, Caddo and Chickasaw Indians (3), and provided a
convenient break in the journey between New Orleans and the Illinois
country.
This post consisted of a fort and stockade of liveoak, and a small village
inhabited (in 1783) by "four principal inhabitants" and their families, six of
lower category, (4) some three of four Negroes, probably slaves (5), and
about two hundred wives and children of the hunters and trappers (6).
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Near the mouth of the Arkansas was the village of the "Great Chief
Angaska" of the Arkansas nation, a village which was part of the defenses
of the post, since Angaska was obligated to report suspicious activities in
the vicinity, and to furnish warriors to escort Spanish boats (7). Across
the Mississippi lay the territory of the Chickasaws, and to the South that
of the Choctaws, both within British domains and nominally under British
influence. As war between Spain and Great Britain became imminent, each
bid for the support of the Indians living in the territory of the other. As
early as December, 1777, a British agent named Andres Nore, operating
among the Arkansas, was captured and sent to Havana with a request that
the captain general "order him sent to some other place from which it
would be difficult for him to return to this Province (8)."
The Choctaws showed a decided bent toward the Spaniards, and on
several occasions sent delegations offering to give up their British medals
in exchange for Spanish flags and medals. Galvez was careful to
encourage them, but in a way that would not hasten complications with his
British neighbors. A request for trade with the Spaniards gave him the
opportunity to introduce his agents among them (9), and when in March of
1778 another delegation visited him (10), he learned that two whole tribes
had moved from the English to the Spanish side of the Mississippi, giving
up the "three Medals and the Gorget" presented to their chiefs by the
British. Galvez promised them others of equal size as soon as his king
could send them (11).
The Chickasaws, on the other hand, were attached to the British, a
circumstance that proved very disagreeable when hostilities broke out in
1779 (12). The fidelity of these Indians to the British, threatening as they
did the supply line to the North and East, gave to Arkansas Post strategic
importance out of all proportion to its garrison and equipment.
In August, 1776, Captain George Gibson from Fort Pitt appeared in New
Orleans along with Lieutenant William Linn and fifteen soldiers, seeking
supplies for the American army. Through the influence of Oliver Pollock,
an Irish-American who had built up a large trade with the West Indies, the
Atlantic coast and the Illinois country, he was favorably received by
Governor Luis de Unzaga and allowed to purchase ten thousand pounds of
powder. Linn set off up the Mississippi with nine thousand pounds of it,
and soon afterward Gibson embarked for Philadelphia with the remainder.
Linn was obliged to winter at Arkansas Post, where he paid for his food
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with a draft on Pollock. He departed in the spring, reaching Fort Pitt in
May (13).
Unzaga's sale of powder to the Americans received royal approval in an
order of December 4, 1778, which instructed his successor, Bernardo de
Galvez, to use "the wisest and most Secret means possible to Supply them
[the Americans] with the Arms, Munitions, Clothes and Quinine that they
request," suggesting that he "appear to sell them to private merchants,"
who would pass the goods on to the Americans.
The captain general of Cuba was instructed to send [to New Orleans]
without delay . . . . the Remainder of the powder that he had received from
the factory in Mexico and whatever rifles he might have on hand," besides
quinine and clothing (14). One Miguel Eduardo accompanied the shipment
to New Orleans. The secret of the mission had leaked out on the voyage,
so Galvez very ingeniously had the report circulated that the clothing was
for the troops in the city and that the quinine was for the military hospital.
He then complained loudly about the "moth-eaten" condition of the
clothing and had it sold at public auction, taking care that an agent should
outbid all competitors. Meanwhile, Santiago Beauregard, the contractor of
the supplies for New Orleans, landed the powder and rifles by night as
though they were contraband, and in due time all the articles werre
delivered through Pollock to Captain James Willing, who sent them up the
Mississippi (15).
Pollock now appointed American agent in New Orleans, was so active in
purchasing and dispactching supplies to the Americans that he strained his
resources to the bereaking point. He was assisted greatly by his friend
Galvez, who advanced large sums from the treasury in order to injure
Great Britain. This assistance together with some given by Fernando de
Leyba at St. Louis, went far toward making possible the conquest of
British Illinois by George Rogers Clark, as well as other operations in the
East (16).
Arkansas Post was an important link in the Mississippi supply chain. There
the upstream expeditions stopped for fresh meat and other supplies (17),
and received escorts of Indians and soldiers (18).
There, on instructions from Pollock, American boats stopped on the way
to New Orleans to take orders for evading the British and their Indian
allies on the lower river. Sometimes a timely warning sent the expeditions
back up the river (19). Arkansas Post increased in strategic importance
292
when, in 1778, the raid by the American Captain James Willing threw the
whole region to the South into confusion. Willing's party, after having
raided Natchez, Manchak, Baton Rouge and the British stations of
Arkansas and Concordia, was received and protected at New Orleans by
Governor Galvez. British forces soon recaptured the posts, however, and
proceeded to close the river. Pollock then hurried messengers to
Arkansas Post (probably by the overland trail that led by that fort to St.
Louis) (20) to warn American boats coming downstream (21). Twenty-five
Americans with a boat-load of supplies for Willing from Fort Pitt were
saved by being turned back.
In revenge for the assistance given to Willing the British had threatened
an attack on New Orleans. In order to prevent such an attack, Galvez very
astutely spread, by means of a circular letter, to all commandaants of
Spanish posts news about the arrival of these Americans at Arkansas
Post. A false statement that this was the advance guard of a force of two
thousand on its way to take West Florida was so effective that rumors
soon spread among the English of the coming of any army of three
thousand Americans. The Indian supporters of the British began to fall
away, and some even asked for Spanish protection (21).
By this time Spanish-English relations were delicate, not only in Louisiana
and West Florida, but in London and Madrid as well, with France exciting
Spain to action. Galvez in Louisiana expected hourly to hear of the
declaration of war and made preparations accordingly.
His principal fear was that of the British receiving the news first (23), but,
luckily for him, this was not the case. Late in July, 1779, the news came at
last, accompanied by instructions for the governor's conduct. Plans were
made immediately for an attack on the British river posts, and orders were
sent to the Spanish commanders as far up the river as Punta Cortada to
gather their forces for participations (24).
The Spanish garrison at Arkansas Post took no part in the attack on the
British along the lower Mississippi, but the capture of those enemy forts
gave the post renewed importance as a stopping place for river traffic. On
October 15, 1779, Galvez reported to his superiors, "The Mississippi is
free of enemies (25)." The commander of Fort Carlos Tercero de
Arkansas, Captain Balthasar de Villiers, had not been idle, either. As soon
as he heard of the declaration of war, he crossed to the other side of the
Mississippi in front of the post and "took possession of all that country in
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the name of His Majesty." This was a simple act with no opposition, and
apparently of little moment, military or otherwise, but it was the principal
basis for Spanish claims to the east bank of the Mississippi when the war
was over (26).
The original Spanish war plans called for an attack on Pensacola as soon
as the Mississippi was cleared of the enemy. When, however, the program
was drawn up and subtmitted to Galvez in New Orleans, he recommended
an attack on Mobile instead. Pensacola, he said, had just been reenforced
with heavy guns, so that an assault would be extremely costly, while
Mobile could be taken with less expense, and, as a center from which
attacks could easily be launched against the Mississippi posts, Louisiana
would unsafe as long as it was in British hands.
But with Mobile under Spanish control, the Choctaws and even the
Chickasaws could be more readily won over, and the Mississippi would be
made a safe artery for supplies to New Orleans (27).
Mobile was captured in March of 1780, and a year later Pensacola was
taken, but the Chickasaws did not turn from the British as Galvez had
expected. That they did not was due largely to James Colbert, a Scot, who
had resided in the nation for many years. At the head of a band of whites,
Indians and half-breeds, Colbert took part in the defense of Mobile and
Pensacola. After the fall of the latter he withdrew to the Chickasaw
country and began organizing a group of marauders with his eleven halfbreed sons as a nucleus. A supply of ammunition had been stored in the
nation against just such a possibility, and Carlos Grand-Pre, the
commander at Natchez, unwittingly furnished Colbert with a number of
recruits by his unwanted severity in putting down a revolt among the
residents of that district before the fate of Pensacola was decided. Upon
learning that the West Florida capital had fallen, the majority of rebels
started overland to Georgia, a few being captured by Grand-Pre and
subjected to severe treatment. Still others took refuge in the Indian
nations where they not only joined Colbert's band but, in the manner of
reasoning, furnished him with a good excuse for plundering the Spaniards
on the Mississippi. The latter, being unaware of Colbert's activities, and
flattering themselves on having cleared the river of the British from New
Orleans to St. Louis, went about using the river with a minimum of
precaution. This attitude is illustrated by the following incident: In the
spring of 1782 an unescorted keel-boat was sent up the river with money
and supplies for the garrison at St. Louis. There were some 6,000 pesos
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on board, 4,900 of which were destined to pay the wages of the soldiers.
The rest belonged to private individuals.
Overmuch confidence was responsible for the presence on board of Dona
Anicanora Ramos, the wife of Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Cruzat, th
newly-appointed governor of St. Louis, and her four children. On May 2,
while passing Chickasaw Bluffs (now Memphis), the boat was hailed in
French from the Arkansas side of the river by one Thomas Prince, under
pretense oif delivering some letters to Madame Cruzat. Silvestre l'Abadie,
the unsuspecting master of the boat, turned toward the shore and the boat
with its passengers was seized by forty Englishman and half-breeds under
the leadership of Colbert, who appeared and assured the prisoners that
they would receive no harm.
Madame Cruzat, her children and the crew of the keel-boat were released
after nineteen days of captivity, upon a promise to pay a ransom of 400
pesos for the boat. The cargo had been divided among members of the
band and some Chickasaws. During the voyage of eight days back to New
Orleans the released captives were able to warn other boats of the
impending danger, While a prisoner, Madame Cruzat ascertained that
Colbert's party had made several captures before the attack on her boat.
They were the Bercha of Thomas Prince who had been forced to take part
in her capture, an American flatboat loaded with flour, and a pirogue from
Arkansas Post. The pirogue was carrying several soldiers and the baker
of the garrison. The captors, some of whom had been hunters living at
Arkansas Post, justified thier attacks by the injustice of Commandant
Villiers to them. They claimed that he had stolen their furs, and had
charged exhorbitant prices for supplies. Furthermore, rebel property at
Natchez had been confiscated by Grand-Pre (28).
Villiers, however, had not prospered from the fur trade that passed
through his hands. At the very time that Madame Cruzat was listening to
complaints against him by members of Colbert's band (May 6, 1782),
Governor Miro was sending to Galvez a list of fourteen persons to whom
the commandant owed a total of 23,736 pesos, with a hint that there were
many persons willing to relieve him of his command (29).
Something more pressing than debts, however, was bringing about a
change at Arkansas Post. When Madame Cruzat landed there on her way
back to New Orleans, she found a detachment of troops under Lieutenant
Luis de Villars en route to reenforce the garrsion at St. Louis which was
295
under the command of her husband. Silvestre l'Abadie had been
dispatched overland to St. Louis to inform the governor of the activities of
the enemy, and Villars, who had found Captain Villiers at the point of
death, had taken it upon himself to remain there with his troops upon
hearing from Madame Cruzat of Colbert's threats to destroy Arkansas Post
(30).
In Governor Miro's report to his superior about the danger at Arkansas
Post, he suggested in regard to the defenses of the Mississippi, the
abandonment of Baton Rouge, Manchak and Arkansas Post, the
strengthening of Natchez as a substitute for the first two, and the
construction of a fort at Chickasaw Bluffs and another on the east side of
the river above Natchez. Galvez, however, insisted on maintaining Baton
Rouge and Manchak (31).
Arkansas Post, far from being abandoned, was destined to last out the
Spanish period, and to be the scene of some rousing events. The Colbert
menace became so imminent that Miro himself made a special trip to
Natchez with reenforcements. From there he dispatched Antonio Soler, a
second lieutenant of artillery, to the garrison at Arkansas Post with thirty
men, a supply of ammunition, two swivels, and orders to put the fort in a
state of defense. At the same time Miro sent two "Choctaw Chiefs of the
Great Medal" to negotiate a peace with the Chickasaws and to induce them
to join in an attack on Colbert.
The reply of ther Indians was unsatisfactory, but a heartening report was
brought by some residents of Natchez who had taken advantage of a
general pardon to return to their homes. It was to the effect that Colbert
had failed to persuade two hundred Chickasaw warriors to join him in an
attack on Arkansas Post and he had not dared to attempt it with only white
followers (32).
This decision of the Chicasaws was due in part to measures adopted by
Governor Cruzat, who, having heard of the capture of l'Abadie's boat, had
dispatched Captain Jacobo Dubreuil and a small detachment of troops with
some Loup, Peoria and Kaskasia Indians to do what they could towards its
rescue. The governor had evidently not yet heard that his wife was among
the captives. Dubreuil went as far south as Chickasaw Bluffs, but found
nothing except Colbert's deserted camp. The soldiers then returned with
Dubreuil to St. Genivieve while the Indians pushed on into the Chickasaw
nation. Governor Cruzat, meanwhile, was bringing pressure to bear on the
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Chicksaws by setting the Kickapoos and Mascutens against them with
tales of how the Chickasaws were helping Colbert's band steal the annual
presents as they were coming up the river.
Late in July the Indians left by Dubreuil in the Chickasw nation arrived at
St. Genivieve with six penitent chiefs, thirty-five warriors, and three
soldiers from Arkansas Post, captured on the St. Francis River in January
by Colbert's men. The Chickasaw chiefs and warriors came complaining
about the attacks on their towns. The governor promised to intervene on
condition that they would expel the bandits from their nation and clear the
Mississippi of all marauders. To this the chiefs acquiesced (33), but either
they were lax about living up to their promises or they encountered
overmuch opposition, for Colbert's band continued to operate during the
winter of 1782-1783, howbeit with less vigor.
With the coming of spring Colbert gathered his forces for the longthreatened attack on Arkansas Post and, early in April, set out down the
Mississippi with a group of nearly a hundred followers, largely English and
American, but containing other nationalities among, which were one
Frenchman, five Negroes and Colbert's metizo sons and nephews. The
guerilla cheif, having learned of the preliminary peace between Britain and
her revolted colonies, gave up his persecution of Americans. When,
therefore, he overtook sixteen boat-loads of American settlers on the way
to Natchez, he simply ordered them to tie up and wait for six days,
although a Spanish pirogue loaded with rum and sugar for Arkansas Post,
and two others from there with cargoes of grease and beaver skins, were
treated as legitimate prey.
On the night of April 16, 1783, the band left its hiding place near the
mouth of White River and slipped up the Arkansas past the Indian guards
to within a short distance of the Post. Here the boats were left to the care
of seven men, the others making their way overland to the fort. Accounts
of the attack from both besiegers and besieged are remarkably alike, the
principal difference being on the number of persons engaged. Malcom
Clark, one of the seven guards, placed the number of attackers at 82,
while Jacobo Dubreuil, recently made commander of the post, estimated
them at one hundred whites and fourteen Chickasaws (34).
So unexpected was the attack, launched at two-thirty in the morning, that
the patrol---a sergeant, a corporal and eight men---was taken off guard.
Lieutenant Luis de Villars and his family, who were occupying a house
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outside the stockade, their cabin inside having been blown down four days
before, were captured along with the four principal inhabitants of the
village.
The other six, and the families of the hunters who were up the river on
the annual hunt, escaped into the fort. The efforts of the patrol to rescue
the lieutenant and his family were frustrated by the superior number of
guerillas. In the skirmish two soldiers were killed (one of them losing his
scalp) and another wounded, while the corporal, five soldiers and a Negro
belonging to one of the inhabitants were taken prisoners. Three of the
attackers laid hands on Alexo Pastor, the sergeant, but he escaped into
the fort through a loophole.
Within the fort, at the first alarm, the soldiers occupied their places
hurriedly, but Dubreuil, the commander, did not give the order to fire until
the arrival of the sergeant with the news of the captures outside. The
attack upon the fort lasted until nine in the morning, but the rifle bullets of
the invaders and the three hundred cannon shots from the fort did very
little damage. The long duration of the attack led to the commandant to
believe that Colbert was waiting to bring up the artillery for a regular
seige. He felt himself obliged, therefore, to drive the enemy away before a
battery could be planted, and accordingly sent out fourteen men, including
four Arkansas Indians, under the command of Sergeant Pastor. As this
party sallied from one side of the fort a flag of truce was seen
approaching from the other. This was bourne by one of Colbert's officers,
accompanied by Dona Maria Luisa Vale, wife of LieutenantVillars. The
officer, however, took to the woods, leaving Madame Villars to deliver a
formal demand from his chief for a surrender of the fort, to which Dubreuil
did not design a reply.
Meanwhile Pastor's detachment pushed on, concealed from the enemy,
and with a volly and a shout frightened the attackers into a precipate flight
toward their camp, crying out that the Spaniards had Indian allies. The
guerillas fled from their camp to the boats, taking their prisoners with
them and stopping only for a short interval when it seemed possible to cut
off their pursuers from the fort.
Before embarking Colbert released the women and children among the
prisoners, sending by them a note to Dubreuil threatening an attack at
noon with reenforcements of five hundred Chickasaws and two boat-loads
of whites with four pieces of artillery. His terms were surrender before
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the assault or murder by the Indians, whom, he said, he would not be able
to restrain.
Colbert's men, however, did not act with so much confidence, for while
preparing them to bark, they showed many signs of uneasiness. When
shots from a Spanish rifle killed one of the band and wounded another, one
of Colbert's half-breed sons aimed at Villars and pulled the trigger.
Luckily the rifle failed to fire and his father prevented a repetition of the
attempt. The band hurriedly departed soon afterward when one of Pastor's
four Arkansans got near enough to throw a tomahawk into their midst. Far
from returning to the attack, the party rowed until dawn, disregarding a
heavy downpour of rain.
At noon on the day of the attack the Great Chief Angaska of the Arkansas
had arrived at the fort and was severely reprimanded by Dubreuil for
having allowed the enemy to get up the Arkansas River without his having
been warned. The chief gave as his justification that the Chickasaws had
deceived him about a group of twelve Americans who were going up to the
post to salute the commandant, whom Angaska was to advise of the
proposed visit. Angaska's suspicion thus lulled, the guerillas slipped past
his village with muffled oars under cover of darkness. As soon as the
news of the attack reached the chief, he assembled his warriors from their
hunting and root gathering in the woods and hastened to the aid of the
post.
Commandant Dubreuil gave Angaska a chance to redeem himself by
sending him with one hundred warriors and twenty soldiers to recapture
the prisoners and destroy the whole enemy band. Following instructions,
Angaska approached Colbert's camp, which he found some three leagues
above the mouth of the Arkansas River, unobserved, hid his warriors and
soldiers, and entered with one or two followers.
Colbert asked the chief how many men he brought with him, and was told
two hundred and fifty, all armed. But deceit was a weapon in the use of
which both sides were skilled. Lieutenant Villars was released along with
all other prisoners except four soldiers, a son of one of the residents at
Arkansas Post, and three slaves. Before he knew of the presence of
Angaska's party, he was induced to sign an agreement to obtain the
release of five of the Natchez rebels---William Blommart, Jacob Winfret,
William Iston, Jean Olsen and William Williams (35). Angaska, in spite of
repeated efforts to obtain the release of the other prisoners, was forced
299
to return to the post without them and without having destroyed the
"infamous Piratical Scoundrels," as Dubreuil called them. Furthermore,
Governor Miro, when the occasion presented itself, refused to recognize
the validity of Villars' agreement with Colbert on the grounds that the
latter was a pirate and not a British officer, although he had carried the
British flag in his attack on Arkansas Post and claimed to hold a captain's
commission. The release of the British prisoners was effected,
nevertheless, by the arrival of the English warship, the Ajax, in New
Orleans, bringing news to the governor of a preliminary treaty of peace
which provided for an exchange of all prisoners, and they were taken to
Jamaica on board the same ship (36).
Dubreull at Arkansas Post, however, was slow in hearing of the treaty and
was spending some anxious weeks in expectation of Colbert's return with
reenforcements, an event for which the post was ill-prepared. His
greatest problem was that of ammunition. He had supplemented the scanty
stock on hand by requisitioning that of the residents of the post, but this
was insufficient. Food for the soldiers, the inhabitants, and the Indian
allies who protected the fort from boats, or for supplies to passing
convoys, was very scarce. The convoy going up with the spring supplies
for St. Louis found him with no food except eight barrels of flour.
A messenger, dispatched overland to St. Louis for supplies, reached his
destination and returned to report, but Dubreull feared that Colbert would
intercept the boats and decided to send a similar request to Colonel Pedro
Piernas at Natchez. For this purpose the commandant bought a boat on a
promise that Miro would pay the master twenty-five pesos, the oarsmen
ten pesos each, and fifteen more for the boat (37).
Dubreuil urged on his superiors the necessity of reenforcing the post
because the good hunting on the Arkansas River made it useful to the
capital, and because thirty thousand families could be settled in the
district around it. He further urged that no foreigners be permitted to
settle in such a colony because it would constitute a vulnerable spot on
the Mexican frontier. He made a plea for a new fort at the post to replace
the old one which was being undermined by the river, and occupied an
otherwise unfavorable location. At the distance of a cannon shot there was
an advantageous site. He, Dubreuil, "having studied a little the
construction of fortifications," could direct the work, if Miro approved and
would send up some laborers.
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The commandant delayed until May 5 his express to New Orleans telling
of the attack in order to be able to inclose news of the upstream convoy
which he was expecting. It arrived ten days after the attack and he
detained it until May 4, trying to arrange an Indian escort to strengthen
the three hundred men on the boats in case of necessity. Only twenty-four
Indians were available, however, since a shortage of food made the
absence of the others imperative.
Lieutenant Villars received instructions by the convoy to proceed to St.
Louis to which he had been ordered the year before (1782) when the
existence of Colbert's band was yet unknown in New Orleans. Dubreuil,
however, took it upon himself to keep the lieutenant at the post until
further orders because he was short of men and expected Colbert's return
daily (38).
This did not take place, however, for even at the time of the attack on
Fort Carlos Tercero de Arkansas messengers were on the way from St.
Augustine to inform the partisan leader that the war was over.
Nevertheless, one more battle was destined to be fought. Shortly after
leaving Arkansas Post, Captain Joseph Valliere, the commander of.the
upstream convoy, received word from his scouts that Colbert's party was
coming up the river behind him. Valliere was then encamped opposite the
mouth of the St. Francis River. With a hundred volunteers and the escort
of twenty-four Arkansans, the captain started downstream to the attack.
About a half league in his rear he sighted the enemy approaching up the
middle of the river in three pirogues and a flat-boat, the latter loaded with
four hundred barrels of flour. The three pirogues escaped, but Valliere
had the satisfaction of capturing the flat-boat with its cargo as well as
three prisoners taken by Colbert at Arkansas Post. One McGillivray,
Colbert's second in command, was killed in the fray.
This was not only Colbert's last fight, but probably the last skirmish of the
American Revolution within the present boundaries of the United States. In
spite of Valliere's promise in a letter of May 11 (39) to do everything
possible to effect the capture of the remainder of Colbert's men, the party
escaped into the Chickasaw nation unharmed. There the chieftain was
informed by Miro that peace had been signed, and was requested to
release all prisoners in accord with its terms (40).
Colbert replied on August 3 that he was going to St. Augustine to report to
his superiors and would take up the matter with him on his return (41). On
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his way to the East Florida capital he was thrown from his horse and
killed. Three years later Miro was still trying to obtain the release of the
prisoners retained by Colbert's band (42) .
302
Endnotes
1. John Walton Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez in Louisiana, 1776-1783
(1934); James Alton James,
Oliver Pollock, the Life and Times of an Unknown Patriot (1937); Herminio
Portell Vila, Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con Espana y los Estados
Unidos, 4 (1938-1941); and Lawrence Kinnaird, "The Clark-Leyba
Papers," American Historical Review, October, 1935, are a few of the
works on the subject.
2. See the report on the capture of these posts by Captain James Willing in
Galvez to Navarro, March 11,
1778 (Letter No. 61), Archivo Nacional de Cuba (hereinafter cited as A. N.
C.). Floridas, legajo 15, no. 77.
3. See the Proposal for an Indian congress at the post in 1786 in Dubreuil
to Miro, June 4, 1786, ibid.,
legajo 7, no. 2. Spanish relations with the Choctaws were handled at this
time from lower down the river, Bernardo de Galvez to Jose de Gilvez,
December 30, 1777, ibid., legajo 15, no. 79.
4. Dubreuil to Miro, May 5, 1783, ibid., legajo 3, no. 8.
5. Declaration of Malcom Clark, May 13, 1783, ibid. Clark took part in an
attack on the fort on April 17,
1783, when the Negroes were captured.
6. Dubreuil to Miro, May 5, 1783 (cited in note 4), and same to same, June
1784 (cited in note 3).
7. Dubreuil to Miro, May 5, 1783.
8. Galvez to Navarro, December 3, 1777, A. N. C., Floridas, legajo 15, no.
71.
9. Bernardo de Galvez to Jose de Galvez, December 30, 1777, ibid., legajo
15, No. 79.
10. Same to same, March 24, 1778, ibid.
11. Same to same, April 12, 1778, ibid.
12. As early as May, 1778, for instance, Galvez was in dread of an English
attack on New Orleans
supported by one thousand Chickasaws, same to same, May 16, 1778, ibid.
13. James, op. cit., pp. 61-70. See also Portell Vila op. cit., I, 75-78. In
August of 1777 Galvez received a
letter from Colonel George at Fort Pitt, thanking him for the powder,
Galvez to Galvez, August 9, 1777, A. N. C., Floridas, legajo 15, no. 79.
Galvez succeeded Unzaga in January of 1777.
14. Galvez to Galvez, May 12, 1777 (letter No. 41), ibid., legajo 15, no. 79.
303
15. Same to Same, June 10, 1777 (No. 61), ibid., legato 15, no. 79, and the
Marqus de la Torre, June 21
1777, legato 15, n. 79. See also Galvez to Galvez, June 9, 1778, legato 15,
no. 79.
16. Pollock's part in the work is the central theme of the excellent
biography of the American agent by
Professor James, already cited. Cuba's part in it is stressed by Portell
Vila, op. cit., I, 67-101. See also Kinnard, op. cit. Numerous letters on the
subject are in the Galvez letterbook found in A. N. C., Floridas, legato 15,
nos. 77 and 79.
17. James, op. cit., pp. 69, 83.
18. Debreuil to Miro, May 5, 1783, A. N. C., Floridas, legajo 3, no. 8.
19. James op. cit., pp. 83. 126.
20. For mention of this trail see Miro to Galvez, June 5, 1782, A. N. C.,
Floridas, legajo 3, no. 8.
21. Galvez to Navarro, July 28, 1778, ibid., legajo 15, no. 77, and Galvez to
Galvez, March 11, 1778, ibid.,
legajo 15, no. 79. For accounts of the Willing expedition see James, op.
cit., chapter VIII, and James Walton Caughey, "Willing's Expedition Down
the Mississippi, 1778," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XV, No. 1.
22. Galvez to Navarro, July 28, 1778. See note 20.
23. Details of his preparations and statements concerning his fears are
found in A. N. C., Floridas, legajo 15,
nos. 77 nd 79.
24. Galvez to Navarro, August 17, 1779, ibid., legajo 15, no. 77.
25. Same to same, October 15, 1779, ibid., legajo 15, no. 77. Natchez had
surrendered on September 21.
26. Miro to Galvez, March 12, 1784, Archivo General de Indias, Papeles de
Cuba, legajo 3 (photostat in the
McClung Collection, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville). There is a
translation of this letter in East Tennessee Historical Society's
Publications, No. 9 (1937). See also D. C. Corbitt, "James Colbert and the
Spanish Claims to the East Bank of the Mississippi," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, March. 1937, pp. 457-472.
27. Galvez to Navarro, October 16, 1779, A. N. C. , Floridas, legajo 15,
no. 77.
28. For Colbert's activities see Corbitt, op. cit. Madame Cruzat made a
declaration in New Orleans on May
30, 1782. Miro reported the attack to Galvez on June 5, 1782. Both papers
are in A. N. C., Floridas, legajo 3, no. 8.
29. Ibid., legajo 3, no. 7.
304
30. Miro to Galvez, June 5, 1782, ibid., legajo 3, no. 8.
31. Ibid. See also Glavez to Miro, July 21, 1782, draft in ibid. In this letter
Galvez approved the action of
Villars.
32. Miro to Galvez, November 7, 1782, ibid., legajo 3, no. 8. Corbitt, op.
cit., pp. 463-464.
33. Cruzat described his efforts in a letter to Miro of November 7, 1782,
A. N. C., Floridas, legajo 3, no. 8.
It is summarized in Corbitt, op. cit., pp. 464-466.
34. Declaration of Malcom Clark, New Orleans, May 13, 1783, and
Dubreuil to Miro, May 5, 1783. Copies
of these documents are in A. N. C., Floridas, legajo 3, no. 8. In a letter of
May 13, 1783, to Galvez, Miro gave a composit account based on those of
Clark and Dubreuil. See account based on all three in Corbitt, op. cit., pp.
466-470.
35. A copy in French of Villar's agreement dated April 22, 1783, is in A. N.
C., Floridas, legajo 3, no. 8.
36. A. N. C., Floridas, legajo 3, no. 7.
37. Dubreuil to Miro, May 5, 1783, cited in note 34.
38. Ibid.
39. A copy of Valliere's letter (to either Dubreuil or Miro) is found in A. N.
C., Floridas, legajo 3, no. 7. A
translation is printed in Corbitt, op. cit., pp. 470-471.
40. Miro's dispatch to Colbert left New Orleans on May 16, 1783, under a
flag of truce. Unless there was an
unreported skirmish with some of Colbert's followers before this reached
him, that mentioned in Valliere's letter of May 11 was the last of the
Revolution. It seems unlikely that there was any subsequent fighting of the
war anywhere in the Americas. Even the attack on Nassau from East
Florida took place as early as April 14, 1783, and this would not have
taken place if the expedition had not left St. Augustine before the news of
the treaty arrived. It is interesting to note that, on the very day this attack
took place, Prince William of England landed in Havana where he received
a royal welcome lasting three days.
41. Colbert to Miro, August 3, 1783, Archivo General de Indias, Papeles de
Cuba, legajo 196 (photostat in
the McClung Collection, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville, Tennessee).
42. Miro to Favrot, October 3, 1786, A. G. I., Papeles de Cuba, legajo 4
(photostat in the McClung
305
Collection). Miro asked Favrot, the commandant at Mobile, to try to secure
the release of a daughter of one Madame Bautista, who was being held
among the relatives of Colbert's sons.
306