MM - LaFeber continually refers to Teddy Roosevelt as a "policy maker" in his book. He certainly was NOT in the
McKinley administration.
Second LaFeber wrongly refers to "The Review of Reviews" as the paper of his friend Albert Shaw - without noting
that it was NOT Shaw - but Shaw acting on behalf of William T. Stead (whom Rosenberg credits). Finally (and this is
just page 91-92 which is the only pages I have looked at) He refers to TR's review of Mahan's book without noting
that Mahan sent him a note expressing concern that TR had "completely misread" his book.
JD - "Roosevelt also communicated such thoughts, no doubt with characteristic vigor, to President McKinley when
the two men enjoyed long rides through Washington parks on warm autumn afternoons. The President and the
Assistant Secretary became close friends in late 1897. In a conversation in 1898 McKinley, as hoary legend relates,
could not estimate within a couple thousand miles where those "darn" islands were. He nevertheless could, after
his long conversations with Roosevelt, judge their location closely enough to agree to Navy Department orders of
December, 1897, which instructed Commodore Dewey to strike the Philippines should war occur between the
United States and Spain.51
Papers in the McKinley manuscripts indicate that the White House followed the course of the Philippine
insurrection in early 1898. Thus when Roosevelt, taking advantage of Long's absence on the afternoon of
February 25, ordered Dewey to prepare for war, it is not strange that McKinley and Long did not bother to
countermand the orders. Historians have too long overlooked this crucial aspect of Roosevelt's order-sending
spree. Although the President and the Secretary of the Navy rescinded more than half of Roosevelt's other plans,
they allowed Dewey to prepare to strike Manila. The Assistant Secretary's actions, moreover, did not result from a
sudden inspiration; Roosevelt acted after months of conversations with Mahan, Adams, Lodge, and, be it not
forgotten, McKinley.52" Page 361.
I'll let you haggle over the sources as you're more familiar with their credibility than I. But given this "evidence",
the intelligence and political moxie of McKinley, and the likelihood that if Mahan is influencing Lodge, Roosevelt,
and whoever else in government, there is a solid "concordance of evidence" that suggests there's some merit to
his claim. And let it be further suggested that the similar strategies formed by others prior to Mahan (Harrison and
Tracy on pg. 126), the rise of the American battleship navy between 1890 and 1896 (pg. 229) and the annexation of
Hawaii for military and commercial reasons all point to a general ideological consensus something along the lines
of Mahan's argument.
MM - The order to go to war was a standing order prepared by the President and the Secretary of the Navy 3
months prior and could have been issued by the janitor had he been there. If you go to the archives and look up
the order it is not signed by Roosevelt - only the cover letter has Roosevelt's signature. LaFeber, was unfamiliar
with the nature of the Navy Department command structure and took Teddy's bragging as fact. This whole section
of LaFeber is based ultimately upon Teddy Roosevelt's account of the action. Teddy Roosevelt, as he did with the
Rough riders charge up San Juan Hill, did what he did with an eye on his personal prestige. Again, LaFeber is
projecting Roosevelt (the source of much of this research) back upon McKinley. The reason for that is that
McKinley left very little documentation, nor did the actual policy makers in the McKinley administration.
Roosevelt, on the other hand left lots. Roosevelt went out of his way both then and later as president when he
could manage the government documents, to make himself look more involved than he could possibly have been.
JD - Lafeber saw what the Harrison administration (with Tracy) did to build up the navy, the build up of the
battleship navy, etc... read the Teddy stuff, doubled back and tripped over Mahan. From there he found his
intellectual narrative. He made a couple attempts to qualify his evidence, but in the end, I think you're right that he
bought into Teddy and let Mahan drive his narrative. Convenient!
MM - Here are some other histories - all of whom take TR's story for the fact:
"It was in this context that Theodore Roosevelt, in virtual control of the Navy, began to unfold his plot to engage
slumbering America in a war with Spain. With the support of Senator Cabot Lodge, he supervised the naval
buildup. He assigned his friend Admiral Dewey to head the Navy in the Western Pacific and gave him specific
orders to strike the Spanish in Manila Harbor in the event of war. He wrote, “”Whenever I was left as Acting
Secretary (of the Navy), I did everything in my power to put us in readiness. I knew that in the event of war Dewey
could be slipped like a wolf-hound from a leash, I was sure that if he were given half a chance he would strike
instantly and with telling effect.”
Teddy Roosevelt, Dewey, Lodge, Mahan were friends and talked a lot about this. The people in charge, Long,
McKinley etc did not and were actually opposed to this more imperialist push of the younger crew.
But McKinley left very few papers and little or nothing of his ideas. So, historians who need evidence start digging
and find LOTS of evidence for TR who was there and claims to know. So, TR wins. LaFeber is a VERY smart guy. He
is a terrific historian. He was also a grad student when he did this research originally. It made sense, it had
evidence, it fit his narrative he wrote it and it stuck. The problem is that TR never had the kind of authority in the
Navy department that he claimed. He was never in "virtual control of the Navy" except in his own head. The flurry
of orders were standing orders in case of a war. TR rushed them out while Long was away. So, LaFeber has a case,
the evidence is there. Roosevelt, who does believe everything LaFeber says he does, does issue the orders, does
issue them for the reasons LaFeber says - BUT does not have the actual power or authority other than just
bureaucratic to do so.
Then after the war, McKinley seems to concede what has happened and talks of the imperialism of righteousness
and seems to confirm it all. The question, why does the US GO to war with Spain is still one that has to deal with
McKinley and Long - not TR, Lodge and Mahan. McKinley was, in the end, pushed till he felt he had no other
alternative. Also, Spainish officials needed an honorable way to get out of their expensive rebellious colonies and
losing to the US seemed to allow them that out.