1
106751405
THOMAS AQUINAS’S COMMENTARY
ON ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS:
PROLEGOMENA TO THE STUDY OF THE TEXT
LUCA GILI*
In this paper I present some preliminary observations that should
be made, in order to understand Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on
Aristotle’s Metaphsysics.
1. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
1.1 The date of composition of Aquinas’ commentary
Before I outline the context in which Aquinas wrote his
commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, it is necessary to establish
when he commented on this work. It is rather difficult, however, to
answer this question1. One way to estimate when Aquinas made this
commentary is to observe whether or not he refers to Lambda as the
* Dottorando all’Istituto di filosofia della Università cattolica di Leuven (Belgio).
1 On the problem of the date of composition of Aquinas’ commentary see J. J.
Duin, Nouvelle precision sur la cronologie du Commentum in Metaphysicam de s.
Thomas, in Revue philosophique de Louvain, 33, 1955, pp. 511-524.
2
106751405
eleventh or twelfth book of Metaphysics2. Before William of
Moerbeke’s translation was known, the ancient Latin translations3 of
Metaphysics omitted book Kappa, making Lambda the eleventh book.
According to R.A. Gauthier, Aquinas first read William’s translation
in 1271, which was completed – in both its versions – between 1266
and 12684. If we find a reference to Lambda as book XII, we could
date Aquinas’ commentary after 1271; but if Aquinas would continue
to speak of Lambda as the eleventh book, it must be dated before
1271. Aquinas uses the right reference from the beginning of his
commentary on book VII (Zeta) to the end of book XII (Lambda), and
in books II and III (Alpha elatton and Beta). Consequently, it is
tempting to think that Aquinas did not follow the order of the books
in completing his commentary. Otherwise, the only other possibility
is that he was not able to read William’s translation until he started
commenting on book VII, and then revised his commentary on books
II-III after completing the entire commentary. It is therefore
2
3
4
Cf. R.-A. Gauthier, Préface to Thomas Aquinas, Expositio libri Peryermeneias,
Editio altera retractata, curavit R.-A. Gauthier, Editio leonina I*, 1, Roma-Paris,
Editori di san Tommaso, 1989, pp. 85*-86*.
For a detailed discussion of the translations employed by Aquinas see
paragraph 1.2.
William of Moerbeke was accustomed to date his translations, but
unfortunately we are not in possess of any date of its translation of the
Metaphysics – either because he omitted this note, or because it has not been
copied in the extant manuscripts. However, Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem has been
able to date that translation. On the basis of a careful analysis of some key
terms, Vuillemin Diem has suggested that William should have drafted the
translation when he was translating the same terms in the same way in other
translations of his. It is possible to infer that William completed the two
versions of his translation of the Metaphysics between 1266 and 1268; cf. on this
the impressive analysis conducted by Vuillemin-Diem in Aristoteles Latinus.
XXV 3.1 Metaphysica. Lib. I-XIV. Recensio et translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka.
Praefatio, edidit G. Vuillemin-Diem, Leiden-New York-Köln, Brill, 1995, pp.
249-254.
3
106751405
reasonable to date the commentary to the academic year 1270-12715.
In that period, Aquinas was magister in sacra pagina in Paris.
1.2 The text commented upon
When Aquinas completed his commentary on Aristotle’s
Metaphysics, five Latin translations of this text became available. I will
briefly present them.
A. Translatio Iacobi (Vetustissima): I
This fragmentary translation (I-IV, 4, 1007 a31) was attributed to
James of Venice by L. Minio-Paluello, based on stylistic analysis.
James was active in the second quarter of the XII century, and also
translated Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Physics, De anima (James’ was
the first Latin translation of this work) and some treatises of the Parva
naturalia. Aquinas often quotes this translation, though it is highly
probable that he did not read it in a single manuscript, but in
marginal glosses6. Like other translations by James7, this was
commonly attributed to Boethius, and even Aquinas made this
mistake. James’ translation of the Metaphysics has been edited by G.
Vuillemin-Diem in the series Aristoteles Latinus8.
5
See on this J.-P. Torrell, Initiation à saint Thomas d’Aquin. Sa personne et son œuvre,
Fribourg (CH)-Paris, Éditions universitaires Fribourg Suisse – Éditions du
Cerf, 1993, pp. 337-340.
6 Cf. Aristoteles Latinus. XXV 3.1 Metaphysica. Lib. I-XIV. Recensio et translatio
Guillelmi de Moerbeka. Praefatio, edidit G. Vuillemin-Diem, Leiden-New YorkKöln, Brill, 1995, p. 3.
7 Cf. Aristoteles Latinus IV 1-4. Analytica Posteriora. Translationes Iacobi, Anonymi
sive Ioannis, Gerardi et recensio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, ediderunt L. MinioPaluello et B. Dod, Bruges-Paris, Desclée De Brouwer, 1969, pp. XII-XV;
Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri de anima, edidit R.-A. Gauthier, Editio Leonina,
t. XLV, 1, Roma-Paris, Commissio Leonina-Vrin, 1984, pp. 201*-204*.
8 Aristoteles Latinus. XXV 1.1a Metaphysica. Lib. I-IV, 4. Translatio Iacobi sive
“vetustissima” cum scholiis et translatio composita sive “vetus”, edidit G.
Vuillemin-Diem, Bruxelles-Paris, Desclée De Brouwer, 1970.
4
106751405
B. Translatio composita (Vetus): C
This translation has the same extension of translatio Iacobi and
ends at IV, 4, 1007 a31. The section from book I to book III (3, 998 b23)
is a revision of James’ translation, whilst the remaining part is simply
a reproduction. We do not know the author’s name, even though it is
clear that it was composed after James’ version and was conducted
on the basis of the Greek text. This translation has been edited by G.
Vuillemin-Diemas well9.
C. Translatio anonyma (Media): M
This translation was divided into thirteen books, omitting Kappa
and the beginning (up to 1, 2, 982, a23). It was attributed to Gerard of
Cremona, even though L. Minio-Paluello demonstrated that the
translator was probably the same translator of the Physica Vaticana,
that was completed before the end of the XII century10.
D. Translatio Scoti (Nova): S
Between 1220 and 1224, Michael Scotus (+1236) translated
Averroes’ commentary on Metaphysics. As is well known, Averroes
made a lemmatic commentary, and hence all the lemmata, on which
the commentary dwells, contain the whole of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
Consequently, they were successively ordered and put together: this
was to have a new translation of Aristotle’s work, even though in this
case the translation was from an Arabic translation of the Greek
original. Translatio nova is a fragmentary translation. It begins with
book II, followed by a section of book I (from chapter 5, 987 a9 to
chapter 10, 993 a27: it is a part of Aristotle’s survey of the
philosophies of his predecessors), then books III-X, and finally the
9
See previous note.
The edition has been critically edited by G. Vuillemin-Diem: Aristoteles Latinus.
Metaphysica. Lib. I-X, XII-XIV. Translatio anonyma sive “media”, edidit G.
Vuillemin-Diem, Leiden, Brill, 1976.
10
5
106751405
majority of the twelfth book (from chapter 1, 1069 a18 to chapter 10,
1075 b11).
E. Recensio et translatio Guillelmi (in two versions: G1 and G2)
Between 1266 and 1268, William of Moerbeke11 revised M (books:
I-X, XII-XIII, 2, 1076 b9), including a comparison with the original
Greek text in addition to the newly translated book XI and book XIII
11
William, a Flemish Dominican friar, who was later archbishop of Corinth
(from 1278), was born between 1220 and 1235 and died presumably before the
end of 1286 (on the 26th of October of that year a different archbishop is elected
for Corinth). For a biography of William see E. Panella, Nuove testimonianze su
Guglielmo di Moerbeke, in Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 56, 1986, pp. 49-55;
A. Paravicini-Bagliani, Guillame de Moerbeke et la cour pontificale, in J. Brams, W.
Vanhamel (edd.), Guillame de Moerbeke. Recueil d’études à l’occasion du 700e
anniversaire de sa mort (1286), Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1986, pp. 23-52.
It was a commonplace among scholars to think that William translated
Aristotle’s work upon Aquinas’ request: see, e.g., P. Mandonnet, Siger de
Brabant et l’averroïsme latin au XIIIe siècle. Première Partie: étude critique, Institut
Supérieur de Philosophie de l'Université, Louvain, 1911, pp. 39-41; M.
Grabmann, Guglielmo di Moerbeke O.P., il traduttore delle opere di Aristotele,
Roma, Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1946, pp. 62-84. This hypothesis was
probably grounded on the affirmation of one of the first catalogues of Aquinas’
works, the Catalogus Stamsensis (composed presumably in 1312), which was
edited by G. Meersseman: cf. Laurentii Pignon Catalogi et cronica. Accedunt
catalogi Stamsensis et Upsalensis scriptorum O. P., in Monumenta Ordinis
Praedicatorum Historica, XVIII, 1936, Roma, p. 62, n. 33: “fr. Wilhelmus
Brabantinus, Corinthiensis, transtulit omnes libros naturalis et moralis
philosophiae de graeco in latinum ad instantiam fratris Thomae”. This
notwithstanding, scholars maintain that this hypothesis was mistaken, because
we know that Moerbeke did not work in Aquinas’ team, nor under the
direction of his Dominican fellow. William was certainly an autonomous
researcher, whose translations Aquinas had in high consideration (it has been
shown that Aquinas consistently gave preference to William’s translations: cf.
J. P. Reilly Jr., The alia littera in Thomas Aquinas’s Sententia libri metaphysicae,
in Medieval Studies, 50, 1988, pp. 568-569).
6
106751405
(2, 1076 b10-XIV). The first version of this translation, and revision of
a previous translation, is preserved by a single manuscript.12
Contaminated parts of the original text are preserved by a second
manuscript.13 William made a detailed revision of his first work,
which is contained in more than 200 manuscripts. It is worth noting
that the Greek text employed by William was the Codex
Vindobonensis phil. gr. 100 (IX century). This is one of the two
manuscripts that are testimonies to (one of the two branches of) the
manuscript tradition of the Greek text of Aristotle’s Metaphysics14.
Recensio and translatio have been edited by G. Vuillemin-Diem15.
1.3 Which particular translation was used by Aquinas in
composing his commentary?
During his work at Commissio Leonina, A. Judy compiled this
schema16, which shows the translations to which Aquinas referenced:
12
Cod. Vaticanus, bibl. apost., Palat. lat. 1060, saec. XIII ex.. This codex is listed as
Da in Vuillemin-Diem’s edition.
13 Cod. Patavinus, bibl. Univ. 453, saec. XIVin.: codex Op in Vuillemin-Diem’s
edition.
14 Cf. D. Harlfinger, Zur Überlieferungsgeschichte der Metaphysik, in P. Aubenque
(ed.), Études sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote. Actes du VIe Symposium Aristotelicum,
Paris, Vrin, 1979, pp. 7-36. This information is particularly important for those
who are engaged with the study of the text of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: William’s
translation is no more to be taken as a source of independent variants: it is
worth noting that both W. D. Ross and W. Jaeger, who prepared the two
critical editions of the Metaphysics that are actually in use, thought that
William’s translation contained readings worth being included in their
respective recensiones.
15 Aristoteles Latinus. XXV 3.1 Metaphysica. Lib. I-XIV. Recensio et translatio
Guillelmi de Moerbeka, edidit G. Vuillemin-Diem, Leiden-New York-Köln, Brill,
1995 (2 voll.).
16 Cf. J. P. Reilly Jr., The alia littera in Thomas Aquinas’s Sententia libri metaphysicae,
in Medieval Studies, 50, 1988, pp. 559-583; G. Vuillemin Diem, Aristoteles Latinus.
XXV 3.1 Metaphysica. Lib. I-XIV. Recensio et translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka.
Praefatio, Leiden-New York-Köln, Brill, 1995, pp. 269. In the second column, I
7
106751405
Thomas Aquinas, In Met. I-XII
Translation
Sections of the commentary directly
dictated by Aquinas to his
secretaries, and preserved
in ms. Neapolitanus, bibl. Nat.,
VIII f. 16 (= ms. N)17
I
M, [G], [I, C]
II
G
dict.
III
G
dict.
IV, 1-6 (up to n. 595 of the
I, C, [M]
Marietti edition = 1005 b8)
IV, 7-12
M, (G), [I, C]
V, 1-16 (up to n. 953 of the
M, (G)
Marietti edition = 1019 a14)
dict. from V, ch. 6
(n. 856 Marietti = 1016 a7)
V, 17-36
G, (M)
dict.
VI
G, (M)
dict.
VII, 1-15
G, (M)
dict. up to VII, 14
(n. 1647 Marietti = 1041 a5)
VIII
M, (G)
IX
G, (M)
X
G, (M)
XI
G
XII
G, (M)
put in round brackets the (eventual) second translation, that is most frequently
referred to, and in square brackets the more rarely used translation(s).
17 A discussion of Aquinas’ dictating activity, as it may be understood on the
basis of this manuscript, may be found in J. Cos, Evidences of St. Thomas’s
Dictating Activity in the Naples Manuscript of His Scriptum in Metaphysicam
(Naples BN VIII, F. 16), in Scriptorium, 38, 1984, pp. 231-253.
On Aquinas’ working method, and on his relationship towards his secretaries
see the classical book by father A. Dondaine, Secrétaires de saint Thomas, Roma,
Publications de la Commission Léonine pour l’édition des œuvres de saint
Thomas d’Aquin, 1956.
8
106751405
It is possible to conclude that Aquinas paid a considerable
attention not only to the theoretical hermeneutics of a text but also to
the text itself. But why did Aquinas search for different translations?
Why was it necessary to register variants among the translations? In
his brilliant analysis of Aquinas’ discussion of aliae litterae, J. P. Reilly
Jr. has distinguished four types of uses: “(1) some are simply
synonymous or alternate readings; (2) others are explanatory in
character; (3) fifteen of the aliae litterae are said to express better or
more clearly (melius uel planius) the Aristotle’s text as Aquinas
understands it; and (4) five aliae litterae are explicit corrections”18.
This observation by Reilly Jr. yields the conclusion that Aquinas did
make use of certain philological skills in writing his commentaries,
because we are faced not only with a list of variant readings, but also
with an attempt of selection among them. This indication helps us
situate Aquinas’ exegetical activity within its historical context.
2. THE CONTEXT IN WHICH AQUINAS WROTE HIS COMMENTARY
ON METAPHYSICS
As I have stated above, it is highly probable that Aquinas wrote
his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics during his second stay in
Paris (1268-127219). The atmosphere was difficult at the university, for
Aquinas was involved in the controversy with secular ecclesiastics
and wrote shorts pamphlets in defense of religious life20. In the
controversy over aeternitas mundi, in which he held that only faith
18
The alia littera in Thomas Aquinas’s Sententia libri metaphysicae, in Medieval
Studies, 50, 1988, p. 569.
19 These dates have been proposed by J.-P. Torrell, Initiation à saint Thomas
d’Aquin. Sa personne et son œuvre, Fribourg (CH)-Paris, Éditions universitaires
Fribourg Suisse – Éditions du Cerf, 1993, pp. 287-340.
20 De perfection spiritualis uitae (composed at the beginning of 1270) and Contra
retrahentes (1271); these texts have been critically edited by father H.-F.
Dondaine in the XLI volume of the Leonine edition of Aquinas’s works (Roma,
Editori di san Tommaso, 1970).
9
106751405
may guarantee that the world has been created in time21, and in the
controversy against the so-called Averroists22, who held that there
will be only a single soul for all men after their death, Aquinas
claimed that this was false not only on the basis of Christian doctrine,
but also if one tries to be faithful to Aristotle’s philosophical teaching,
21
Aquinas expounds his views in the treatise De aeternitate mundi, probably
written in Paris in 1271; this text has been edited by father H.-F. Dondaine, in
the XLIII volume of the Leonine edition (Roma, Editori di san Tommaso, 1976).
22 The controversy became more heated after Aquinas’ death, when many
propositions held by Averroist Masters of the Faculty of Art were condemned
by Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, on March 7, 1277. This ecclesiastical
condemnation had important consequences on the philosophy and on the
theology that were taught in Paris; the bibliography on the topic is abundant:
see R. Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277,
Leuven-Paris, 1977; L. Bianchi, Il vescovo e i filosofi. La condanna parigina del 1277
e l’evoluzione dell’aristotelismo scolastico, Bergamo, 1990; A. De Libera, Philosophie
et censure. Remarques sur la crise universitaire pariesienne de 1270-1277, in J. A.
Aertsen, A. Speer (Hrsg.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X.
Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société nternationale
pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, Berlin-New York, De Gruyter, 1998, pp.
71-89; L. Bianchi, 1277: A Turning Point in Medieval Philosophy?, in A. Aertsen,
A. Speer (Hrsg.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen
Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société nternationale pour l’Étude de la
Philosophie Médiévale, Berlin-New York, De Gruyter, 1998, pp. 90-110; B. C.
Bazàn, Was there ever a “First Averroism”?, in J. A. Aertsen, A. Speer (Hrsg.),
Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert, Berlin-New York, De Gruyter, 2000, pp. 31-53.
The relationship between Aquinas and the Averroists has been largely dealt
with by scholars: see S. Gomez Nogales, Saint Thomas, Averroès et l’averroïsme,
in G. Verbeke, D. Verhelst (edd.), Aquinas and Problems of his Time, Leuven-The
Hague, 1976, pp. 161-177; J. F. Wippel, Thomas Aquinas and the condemnation of
1277, in The Modern Schoolman 72, 1995, pp. 233-272; R. Hissette, L’implication de
Thomas d’Aquin dans la censure parisienne de 1277, in Recherches de Théologie et de
Philosophie médiévales, 64, 1997, pp. 3-31.
10
106751405
as Averroes presumed to do23. Aquinas commented upon the Gospel
of Matthew during the academic year 1269-1270, whilst between 1270
and 1272 he commented on John. Besides these texts, Aquinas
composed a number of quodlibetales, of quaestiones disputatae and the
entire Second Part of the Summa Theologiae (which Torrell dates to
years 1271-1272). It is impossible not to be astonished in considering
the number of works, their speculative profundity, and the rapidity
of their composition; many scholars have rightfully stressed this
point. I want to underline, however, that the circumstances of his
academic and religious life lead Aquinas to practice exegetical
methods to a wide number of texts in these few years, even though
this practice had different purposes: a) he has to show that the
Averroists’ interpretation of Aristotle was frail; b) he has to expound
the literal and spiritual senses of two Gospels; c) he desires to
provide a clear explanation of Aristotle’s major philosophical works.
It is therefore worth asking whether he singled out some general
exegetical strategies that he thus applied in his commentary on the
Metaphysics, or whether each type of text required a unique method
of interpretation. I do claim that Aquinas had a clear grasping of
some philological methods but that he used them in different ways
with respect to Scripture and Aristotle.
First, it is necessary to specify what we consider to be a
“philological strategy.” Philology is commonly said to consist of two
aspects: recensio codicum and emendatio24 (the latter may be an
emendatio ope ingenii or ope codicum). In this sense, philology is a
modern discipline, and Aquinas certainly did not practice recensio. In
a broader sense, however, if we consider philology as the art of
making conjectures, it is known that it was widespread in antiquity25,
23
Aquinas’ treatise De unitate intellectus has been edited by father H.-F.
Dondaine in the XLIII volume of the Leonine edition (Roma, Editori di san
Tommaso, 1976).
24 Cf., e.g., S. Timpanaro, La genesi del metodo del Lachmann, Torino, Utet, 2004.
25 Cf. R. Pfeiffer, History of classical scholarship from the beginnings to the end of
Hellenistic age, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968.
11
106751405
and also that it was in the Middle Ages26. Furthermore, Aquinas
could read in the Decretum Gratiani a sort of canonical disposition
concerning the necessity of an accurate study of the biblical text27 – a
26
A famous medieval philologist was Nicola Maniacutia, whose theory of
ecdotic practice has been dealt with in a few studies (cf. V. Peri, Nicola
Maniacutia: un testimone della filologia romana del XII secolo, in Aevum, XLI, 1967,
pp. 67-90; V. Peri “Correctores immo corruptores”. Un saggio di critica testuale nella
Roma del XII secolo, in Italia medioevale e umanistica, XX, 1977, pp. 19-125). It is
perhaps more relevant to understand Aquinas’ exegetical strategy to pay
attention to Hugh of St. Cher. Hugh understood the importance of a
“philological” study of a text. Hugh was a Dominican friar like Aquinas, and
was master of theology in Paris between 1230 and 1235 – twenty years before
Thomas Aquinas. The two friars have been in contact, as is clear from Aquinas’
treatise De emptione et uenditione ad tempus (edited by H. F. Dondaine, volume
XLII of the Leonine edition, Roma, Editori di san Tommaso, 1979). Hugh wrote
with his team a Correctio Biblie that has been preserved by a dozen manuscripts
(cf. the manuscripts’ list in T. Kappaeli, E. Panella, Scriptores Ordinis
Praedicatorum Medii Aevii, 4 voll., Roma, 1970-1993, vol. II, p. 273, n. 1986; on
this topic see also H. Denifle, Die Handschriften der Bibel-Correctorien des 13.
Jahrhunderts, in Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, 4,
1888, pp. 263-311; pp. 471-701: this article traces a history of the fortune of
Hugh’s Correctorium). In the prologue to his correctorium, Hugh said “quoniam
super omnes scripturas uerba sacri eloquii necesse est ut fundamento ueritatis
firmiter innitantur, quatinus super texum littere certioris sanctorum studiorum
edificia securius componantur...” (the text is quoted from G. Dahan, La critique
textuelle dans les correctoires de la Bible du XIIIe siècle, in A. De Libera, A.
Elamrani-Jamal, A. Galonnier (edd.), Langage et philosophie. Hommage à Jean
Jolivet, Paris, Vrin, 1997, p. 386). This short passage shows that Hugh was
persuaded that the critical study of the Biblical text was necessary. For a
description of Aquinas’ ‘philology’ and of context see L. Gili, Renouantur
studia, et homines perueniunt ad opiniones ueras quae prius fuerant. Alcuni aspetti
dell’attività filologica di Tommaso d’Aquino, in Appunti Romani di Filologia. Studi e
comunicazioni di filologia, linguistica e letteratura greca e latina, XIV, 2012, pp. 1542.
27 “Libris ueterum ebrea uolumina, nouis greca auctoritatem impendunt. Idem
[scilicet: Augustinus; sed revera: Hyeronimus]. Ut ueterum librorum fides de
12
106751405
canon which appears to be compulsory for a master of theology, as
he was. From the books he was acquainted with, Aquinas could thus
infer that certain “philological inquiries” were useful in order to
expound a text. However, Aquinas did not know Hebrew and
Ancient Greek – the languages in which the texts he commented
upon were written28; therefore, he was not able to make conjectures
ebreis uoluminibus examinanda est, ita nouorum greci sermonis normam
desiderat. Nichil auctoritatis canonicis remanebit scripturis, si ad eas mendacia
fuerint admissa. Idem [scilicet: Augustinus] in Epistola I. ad Ieronimum. [epist.
IX]. Si ad scripturas sanctas admissa fuerint uel offitiosa mendacia, quid in eis
remanebit auctoritatis? Que tandem de scripturis illis sententia proferetur,
cuius pondere contentiosæ falsitatis obteretur improbitas?” (Decretum Magistri
Gratiani, pars I, dist. IX, cc.6-7, edidit Aemilius Friedberg, Lipsiae: Tauchnitz,
1879 = PL 187, coll. 50-51). In his De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine was even
more explicit on this point: “nunc de incognitis agimus, quorumduae formae
sunt, quantum ad uerba pertinet. Namque aut ignotum uerbum facit haerere
lectorem, aut ignota locutio. Quae si ex alienis linguis ueniunt, aut quaerenda
sunt ab earum linguarum hominibus, aut eadem linguae, si et otium est et
ingenium, ediscendae, aut plurium interpretum consulenda collatio est. [...]
Plurimum hic quoque iuuat interpretum numerositas collatis codicibus
inspecta atque discussa ; tantum absit falsitas, nam codicibus emendandis
primitus debet inuigilare sollertia eorum qui Scripturas diuinas nosse
desiderant, ut emendatis non emendati cedant, ex uno dumtaxat
interpretationis genere uenientes” (De doctr. chr. II, 14, 21).
28 Aquinas’ linguistic knowledge has been object of dispute among scholars. A.
Gardeil maintained that Aquinas was able to read Greek texts, but that he
could not autonomously grasp their content (cf. A. Gardeil, Les procédés
exégétique de saint Thomas d'Aquin, in Revue Thomiste, 1903, pp. 428-457); more
recently, R.-A. Gauthier said “nihil est dubii quin re vera Thomas litteras
graecas nec leviter quidem adtingerit” (Praefatio, to Thomae Aquinatis, Opera
omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 47/1: Sententia libri Ethicorum. Libri I-III,
Romae, 1969, pp. 192-195). A brief presentation of the scholarly debate on
Aquinas’ alleged knowledge of Greek may be found in A. Caparello, Esegesi
aristotelico-tomista e terminologia greca, Roma, Pontificia Accademia di san
Tommaso – Coletti editore, 1979, pp. 24-30. As far as Hebrew is concerned, we
could suppose that Aquinas knew the alphabet (on the basis of texts like Super
13
106751405
on the original text29. However, there was a second and derivative
field in which he could perform certain philological research, namely
the comparison of different translations of the same text, in order to
single out the one which better expressed the meaning intended by
the author. Aquinas compares quite frequently the translations on his
desk, but we are faced with a different attitude: whilst commenting
upon the Bible, Aquinas always tries to make sense of the alternative
readings, which may eventually suggest competitive interpretations.
When he exposes Aristotle or other non-biblical texts, he sometimes
chooses the reading that he considers better than the other(s)
preserved by the tradition. Sometimes he even rejects some
translations as infelicitous30. Why did he endorse this different
approach towards these texts? Given the Chruch’s guarantee that it is
the inspiration of the Bible, my impression is that Aquinas was
probably persuaded that a text may be considered inspirited, or, at
least, authoritative, if it is employed by the Church. Because the
Church accepted different translations at different points in time,
each translation was once considered a genuine bearer of the Word of
God31. It is thus virtually impossible to choose among equally
Ps. 2, n. 1: “in Hebraeo Psalmi secundum ordinem literarum ordinantur, ut
quotus sit Psalmus statim occurrat: nam in primo est aleph, ad designandum
quod sit primus; in secundo est Beth, ut designetur quod sit secundus; in tertio
est gimel, et sic est in aliis. Quia ergo Beth, quae littera est secunda in ordine
alphabeti, ponitur in principio hujus Psalmi, patet quod est secundus Psalmus,
et hoc tenet Augustinus”).
29 Aquinas seldom notes the existence of variant readings; these observations,
however, are always taken from other commentaries: the evidence is discussed
in L. Gili, Renouantur studia, et homines perueniunt ad opiniones ueras quae prius
fuerant. Alcuni aspetti dell’attività filologica di Tommaso d’Aquino, in Appunti
Romani di Filologia. Studi e comunicazioni di filologia, linguistica e letteratura greca e
latina, XIV, 2012, pp. 15-42.
30 Cf. J. P. Reilly Jr., The alia littera in Thomas Aquinas’s Sententia libri
metaphysicae, in Medieval Studies, 50, 1988, p. 569-570.
31 See Aquinas’s Prologue to his (incomplete) commentary on the Psalms: “Sed
antequam ad litteram veniamus circa hunc librum, tria in generali
consideranda sunt. Primo de translatione huius operis. [...] Translationes sunt
14
106751405
authoritative translations. As far as philosophical texts are concerned,
this is plainly not the case. Aquinas searched for the better reading,
namely the reading that, according to him, better expressed
Aristotle’s thought. In other words, Aquinas shows himself to freely
bear on the many translations of the text he is commenting upon, and
has an analogous attitude towards the other sources he draws from,
namely Averroes and the passages of Alexander quoted by Averroes.
This critical approach to the tradition, however, must not urge us to
stress the analogies among Aquinas’ commentary and contemporary
readings of Metaphysics, since the Dominican Master shares with the
scholars of his time some crucial prejudices. The most meaningful of
the prejudices is probably the assumption that Aristotle wrote the
Metaphysics as a unitarian treatise. This was not done by collecting
heterogeneous tracts, which have some overlap in content, whose
arrangement is not always clear, and whose doctrine is sometimes
incompatible. Though it has convincingly been argued that Aquinas
wrote his commentary on Aristotle chiefly for private purposes –
such as clarifying his ideas on the themes tackled by Aristotle32 –, it
tres. Una a principio Ecclesiae terrenae tempore apostolorum, et haec vitiata
erat tempore Hieronymi propter scriptores. Unde ad preces Damasi Papae
Hieronymus Psalterium correxit, et hoc legitur in Italia. Sed quia haec
translatio discordabat a Graeco, transtulit rursus Hieronymus ad preces Paulae
de Graeco in Latinum, et hoc Damasus Papa fecit cantari in Francia, et
concordat de verbo ad verbum cum Graeco. Post quidam Sophronius
aliquando disputans cum Iudaeis, cum dicerent Iudaei aliqua non sic se
habere, sicut ex secunda translatione Psalterii introduxerat, dictus Sophronius
rogavit Hieronymum, ut Psalterium de Hebraeo in Latinum transferret. Cuius
petitioni annuit Hieronymus: quae translatio concordat omnino cum Hebraeo,
sed non cantatur in aliqua Ecclesia; habetur tamen a multis” (Thom. Aq., In
Psalmos Davidis expositio, Prologus).
32 Fr. R.A. Gauthier maintained that Aquinas’ commentaries on Aristotle’s texts
‘était [...] l’équivalent d’une lecture personnelle faite plume à la main pour
s’astreindre à bien pénétrer le texte d’Aristote afin de se préparer à la
rédaction’ of his autonomous treatises (R.-A. Gauthier, Saint Thomas et l’Étique
à Nicomaque, in Thomas Aquinas, Sententia Libri Politicorum; Tabula Libri
Ethicorum, Roma, Editori di San Tommaso – Commissio Leonina, 1971, t.
15
106751405
would be misleading to suggest that Aquinas’ prolific activity was by
no means influenced by the cultural atmosphere of the time period. It
is thus not surprising that Aquinas’ philological talent, which led him
to rightfully deny the previously accepted Aristotelian authorship of
the so-called Liber de causis, has not suggested what appears to be
self-evident to modern readers of the Metaphysics: its composite
structure. Aquinas probably overlooks this aspect because he shares
an opinion commonly held in his times: it is at that time violent
XLVIII, appendix, p. XXIV-XXV). From this premise, fr. Gauthier concludes
that Aquinas must have considered these semi-public commentaries as
preparatory works for his theological reflections: ‘[…] si quelques-uns des
commentaires aristotéliciens de saint Thomas, comme quelques-unes de ses
œuvres théologiques, peuvent être des œuvres de circonstance, ce n’est pas le
cas général. Ecrits pour affiner l’instrument de la réflexion théologique, les
commentaires d’Aristote font partie intégrante de l’œuvre du théologien’ (R.A. Gauthier, L’intention: le commentaire au De anima dans l’œuvre théologique de
saint Thomas, in Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia Libri de Anima, Editio Leonina,
t.XLV.1, Roma – Paris, Commissio Leonina - Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin,
1984, Préface, p. 289*). As should be clear from the aforementioned quotations,
Gauthier endorses the interpretation according to which Aquinas is
fundamentally a theologian, whose interest in philosophical texts should be
seen in the light of his principal activity as a Master at the Faculty of Theology.
As an example of an approach similar to that of Gauthier see J. Owens, Aquinas
as an Aristotelian Commentator, in AA.VV., St. Thomas Aquinas. 1274-1974.
Commemorative Studies, Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974,
vol. 1, pp. 213-238. Other scholars suggested that Aquinas’ commentaries are
introductions to philosophy designed for his students or Masters at the Faculty
of Arts: cf. J. Isaac, Saint Thomas interprète des œuvres d’Aristote, in Acta
Congressus Scholastici Internationalis, Roma, Pontificium Athenaeum
Antonianum, 1951, pp. 353-363; J. A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D’Aquino: his Life,
Thought, and Work, New York City, Doubleday, 1974, pp. 280-285: according to
Weisheipl, Aquinas wanted to write a guide “to understand Aristotelian
philosophy in harmony with the actual text and guideline of faith, where
necessary” (p. 281); due to lack of textual evidence, Wisheipl’s claim, however,
seems to be weaker than Gauthier’s attempt to present Thomas as mainly
concerned with theological preoccupations.
16
106751405
against the Averroists, and perhaps that was present to Aquinas’
mind; therefore, he employs his philological skills to argue that
Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle’s text is often not compatible
with Aristotle’s own text. This point has already been stressed by
scholarly literature, but it has not paid much attention to the
consequences of Aquinas’ desire of elucidating Aristotle’s own
doctrine against Averroes’ misconceptions. In my opinion, Aquinas’
polemic effort has three main effects, which are remarkable for a
modern reader.
(a) Aquinas implicitly claims that he is a faithful interpreter of
Aristotle – an interpreter who is able to detect the misunderstanding
of whom was considered the Commentator par excellence in
Aristotle’s time. This is the case at least with respect to the works that
Aquinas composed for a wider circulation, such as the two Summae,
the polemic treatises like the De unitate intellectus, and finally
Quaestiones. His commentaries on Aristotle, being semi-public, may
be said to have this aim of reassessing the interpretation of Aristotle’s
text, at least for all the doctrines that Aquinas also expounds in the
works. As a confirmation of this claim, it should be noticed that
Aquinas sometimes recalls the explanation given by Averroes, often
criticizing it. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that, while
commenting on Aristotle, Aquinas’ priority was to outline what
Aristotle really intended. In some sense, Thomas Aquinas acts as a
historian of philosophy, whose attention is paid to clarity and
faithfulness to the intention of the author commented upon.
(b) However, if Aquinas thought that it was urgent to defend
Aristotle’s doctrine from his alleged supporters, then it is obvious
that there was something worth preserving in Aristotle’s own ideas.
As is well known, much attention has been paid to the alleged
‘Aristotelicity’ of Aquinas’ thought. Scholars have divided
themselves into three fields: 1) those who claimed for Aquinas’
substantial endorsement of Aristotle’s system33, 2) those who said
33
This was the traditional view of the authors of handbooks of ‘Thomistic’
philosophy. A similar approach may be found also in P.T. Geach and G. E.
17
106751405
that the Dominican Master made an original synthesis between
Platonic elements (such as the notion of participation, the ascent to
Gob by means of the degrees of perfection, etc.) and Aristotelian
elements – the first ones being known to him through the mediation
of pseudo-Dionysius, Boethius and Avicenna and the latter by direct
acquaintance with Aristotle’s texts34, and 3) scholars who stressed the
difference between Aquinas’ own thinking (which would have been
basically theologically focused, according to them) and his
commentaries on Aristotle. These scholars’ value lies in their being
insightful elucidations of someone else’s thought, but adding nothing
to our knowledge of Aquinas’ own doctrine35. Of these three
opinions, the third is most likely to be opposed to any attempt of
defending Aquinas’ appreciation of Aristotle’s philosophy as
something which deserves attention in and of itself. In particular, an
eminent scholar like E. Gilson, who was indeed meritorious for his
studies on Medieval philosophy, wrote that Aquinas’ commentaries
on Aristotle are the less interesting part of his production: “the
Commentaries of St. Thomas on Aristotle are very precious documents
and their loss would have been deplorable. Nevertheless, if they had
all perished, the two Summae would still preserve all that is most
personal and most profound in his philosophical thought, whereas, if
the theological works of St. Thomas Aquinas had been lost, we
Anscombe, Three Philosophers. Aristotle, Aquinas, Frege, Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1973.
34 This idea was first presented by C. Fabro in his monograph La nozione
metafisica di partecipazione secondo san Tommaso d’Aquino, Milano, Vita e
Pensiero, 1939, and was developed – albeit with radically different conclusions
– by fr. L. B. Geiger in his book La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas
d’Aquin, Paris, Vrin, 1947. The idea is at work also in T. Tyn, Metafisica della
sostanza. Partecipazione e analogia entis, Bologna, Edizioni Studio Domenicano,
1991.
35 This the position was defended by E. Gilson. Gilson’s ideas generated a large
debate. A useful guide to it may be found in J. F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes
in Thomas Aquinas, Washington, D.C., the Catholic University of America
Press, 1984, pp. 1-33 (ch. 1: ‘Thomas Aquinas and the problem of Christian
philosophy’). Wippel offers also good arguments against Gilson’s claim.
18
106751405
should be deprived of his most important contribution to the
common treasure of metaphysical knowledge.”36 One would
probably say that Gilson is completely wrong in making this point,
assuming it is true that Aquinas pays attention to Aristotle’s text, and
thinks that such an attention was mandatory even for a theologian:
Aquinas’ commentaries, according to this view, are thus a valuable
source for understanding the Dominican Master’s assessment of
Aristotelianism. Therefore, it may be claimed that the French scholar
maintains the opposed view to the one I would suggest, even if, of
course, it is reasonable to consider the two Summae as Aquinas’
masterpieces. However, what I would rather stress is that the
question may be addressed in a way that is radically different from
the path along which Gilson develops his reflections. If Aquinas
wants first of all to restate and expound Aristotle’s own doctrine
against Averroes’ misunderstandings (and on the basis of its intrinsic
philosophical value), then Aquinas’ commentaries offer an excellent
test case for exploring Aquinas’ ideas as an Aristotelian – namely, as
an expositor of Aristotle’s thought, which is fascinated by what he is
commenting upon. It seems to me that this way of interpreting
Aquinas abandons the traditional way of assessing his Aristotelicity
(as well as his Platonism, Augustinianism, etc.), deflates traditional
debates about the purpose of Aquinas while he commented on
Aristotle. This interpretation offers a fresh start for a new assessment
of Aquinas’ philosophy. As is well known, scholars debated decades
ago about Aquinas’ goal in commenting on Aristotle’s text; was he
merely doing exegesis without assuming the claims he ascribes to
Aristotle, or was he expounding his own philosophical views while
commenting upon the Greek philosopher?37 Of course, scholars who
stressed Aquinas’ Aristotelicity tend to embrace the latter view,
36
E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, New York City,
Random House, 1956, p. 8. The same claim is made in E. Gilson, Le Thomisme.
Introduction à la philosophie de saint Thomas d’Aquin, Cinquième édition revue et
augmentée, Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 1947, pp. 15-16.
37 J. F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas. From Finite Being to
Uncreated Being, Washington, D. C., the Catholic University of America Press,
2000, pp. xix-xx.
19
106751405
whilst those who maintained he was original and autonomous in his
reflections and those who view Aquinas as a theologian rather than a
philosopher seem to be more comfortable with the first position.
Recent scholarship, however, may help us to see the issue under a
slightly different light. The tradition of commentaries on Aristotle in
late antiquity has been deeply investigated in the last few decades, so
that now it is no longer questionable that Aristotle’s commentators
were philosophers in their full dignity, rather than mere scholars
who repeated previous commentary without any new contribution to
Aristotle’s doctrine.38 Consequently, someone has said that we are
not faced with a history of ‘Aristotelianism’, but with the history of
‘Aristotelianisms.’39 Since Aristotle’s system may be arranged in
many ways, each of them could be called an “Aristotelianism” – if, of
course, the philosopher who arrange the system claims to be
“Aristotelian”. Thus, opposite systems – like those of Boethos of
Sidon and Alexander of Aphrodisias – could easily be said to be
“Aristotelian” as well, and original at the same time. This perspective
would deflate all the discussions about Aquinas’ “originality” or
“Aristotelicity.” Since he never explicitly claimed to be
“Aristotelian,” his system could hardly be labeled as a version of
Aristotelianism, even though the idea that the history of the reception
of Aristotle’s philosophy is made by different Aristotelianisms
certainly makes room to the possibility of employing this label for
Aquinas’ system too, without readdressing the question on whether
Aquinas’ Aristotelianism is genuine, and if so, to what extent. This
label, thus, could be preserved for practical use, though its
inappropriateness should be remembered.
38
On the original contributions of late antique Aristotelian philosophers see R.
Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient Commentators and their Influence,
Ithaca: New York, Cornell University Press, 1990; P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus
bei den Griechen, Band 1: Berlin, De Gruyter, 1973; Band 2: Berlin, De Gruyter,
1984; Band 3 (hrsg. von J. Wiesner): Berlin-New York, De Gruyter, 2001.
39 This claim is defended by M. Rashed in his Essentialisme. Alexandre d’Aphrodise
entre logique, physique et cosmologie, Berlin-New York, De Gruyter, 2007, pp. 610.
20
106751405
It is important to stress that Aquinas, Aristotelian or not, decided
to write commentaries on Aristotle, and however things may be with
respect to his autonomy from the texts he commented upon, his work
in exegesis is in and of itself an original task. Because this task was
carried out with cleverness and depth, it is undoubtedly worth
studying separately, despite Gilson’s limitative remarks on the
originality and philosophical value of Aquinas’ commentaries on
Aristotle.
(c) This brings me to state the third point of this discussion.
I think that the short discussion presented in this point should
bring us to the conclusion that Aquinas’ commentaries on Aristotle’s
texts may be first looked at as exegetical works, and therefore
Aquinas’ claims should be expounded and assessed according to this
perspective. This is somehow a new way of approaching Aquinas’
work. Its basis lies on the conviction that the genre of the
commentary is worth being examined in and of itself, in order to find
original doctrine40. The interest of a commentary lies not merely in
the digressions that the commentator may insert for presenting his
own opinions on a given topic, but in the divisio textus, which
implicitly states which logical structure lays on the basis of the text in
the commentator’s eyes. This is the way in which the commentator
maintains that the work should be read and the way in which he
tackles the difficulties of the text, or the doctrinal discrepancies
between the text commented upon and other passages by the same
author.
Even though Del Punta’s claim that medieval commentaries on
philosophical texts are worth studying in and of themselves has not
been contested, it is somehow curious to notice that the possibilities
that this approach could open have not been extensively explored.
40
Cf. F. Del Punta, The Genre of the Commentaries in the Middle Ages and its Relation
to the Nature and Originality of Medieval Thought, in J. A. Aertsen, A. Speer
(hrsg.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses
für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société nternationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie
Médiévale, Berlin-New York, De Gruyter, 1998, pp. 138-151.
21
106751405
There are, of course, many expositions of Aquinas’ metaphysical
thought41, but they take into consideration Aquinas’ commentary on
Aristotle’s Metaphysics only cursorily, and as a basis for the scholar’s
representation of Aquinas’ own metaphysical thinking. Of course, we
can no longer state that Aquinas’ commentaries on Aristotle are
almost forgotten by scholarly research42, since more attention has
been paid to Aquinas’ commentary on Metaphysics IV, and, more
recently, to his commentary on book II43 and VII44. Gabriele Galluzzo,
in particular, has clearly pointed out the methodological turn which
is implied by looking at Aquinas’ commentaries as pieces of
41
Cf., e.g., J. F. Wippell, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas. From Finite
Being to Uncreated Being, Washington, D. C., the Catholic University of America
Press, 2000.
42 This observation had been made by fr. J. Isaac in a conference on philosophia
perennis held in Rome in 1950, as is reported by H.-D. Saffrey, in Sancti Thomae
de Aquino Super Librum De Causis Expositio, edidit H.-D. Saffrey, Fribourg (CH)
– Leuven, Société Philosophique – Éditions E. Nauwelaerts, 1954, p. viii, n. 3.
43 See the twin papers by G. Galluzzo Aquinas on the Structure of Aristotle’s
Metaphysics, in Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale XV, 2004, pp.
353-386, and Aquinas’s Interpretation of Metaphysics Book Beta, in Quaestio 5,
2005, pp. 413-427.
44 See F. Amerini, Il problema dell’essenza delle sostanze e degli accidenti nel
Commento alla Metafisica di Tommaso d’Aquino, in Documenti e studi sulla
tradizione filosofica medievale XII, 2001, pp. 359-416; F. Amerini, Aristotle,
Averroes and Thomas Aquinas on the Nature of Essence, in Documenti e studi sulla
tradizione filosofica medievale, XIV, 2003, pp. 79-122, G. Galluzzo, Il problema
dell’oggetto della definizione nel commento di Tommaso d'Aquino a Metafisica Z 1011, in Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, XII, 2001, pp. 417-465;
G. Galluzzo, Aristotele e Tommaso d'Aquino sul problema dell'unità della
definizione, in Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, XIII, 2002, pp.
137-191; G. Galluzzo, Met. Z 13 in the Contemporary Debate and in Aquinas’s
Interpretation, in Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, XIV, 2003,
pp. 159-226; G. Galluzzo, Aquinas on Common Nature and Universals, in
Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales, 70, 2004, pp. 131-17, G.
Galluzzo, Aquinas’s Interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Zeta, in
Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales, 74, 2007, pp. 423-481.
22
106751405
Aristotelian scholarship rather than as pieces of his (either
philosophical or theological) doctrine. Galluzzo thinks that “such an
approach aims to deflate the importance of a question often disputed
in connection with Aquinas’s commentaries on Aristotle […], i.e.
whether they merely represent exegetical works […] or must be taken
as good testimonies for Aquinas’s philosophical convictions;” 45
however, according to Galluzzo, “there is in fact no tension between
Aquinas’s understanding of the structure of the Metaphysics and his
view on the subject of the metaphysical science. The two things, on
the contrary, go hand in hand, in so far as Aquinas’s view on the
subject of the metaphysical science strongly affects his general
comprehension of the Metaphysics as an Aristotelian work.”46 This
claim may also be strengthened in my opinion. I think that Aquinas
was perfectly aware of the difference between his own philosophy
and Aristotle’s47; however, he sees the history of philosophy not as a
series of systems which are linked only in so far as one philosopher
discusses or shares the opinions of one of his antecessors (as is clear
from is late treatise De Substantiis Separatis48, but as the progressive
45
G. Galluzzo, Aquinas on the Structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in Documenti e
studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale XV, 2004, p. 354, n. 3.
46 G. Galluzzo, Aquinas on the Structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in Documenti e
studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale XV, 2004, p. 354.
47 There is solid evidence in favor of this claim: Aquinas often ‘corrects’
Aristotle’s opinions, by adding his own. Cf. In Met. XII, 5, nn. 2496-2499; In
Phys. VIII, 2, nn. 2041-2044; In Eth. I, 9, n. 113; In Periherm. l. 14, nn. 195-197; In
De An. III, 9, n. 726; In De Caelo et Mundo, I, 6, nn. 64-66.
48 The short treatise was composed between 1270-1273 (cf. H.-F. Dondain, Préface
to Thomae de Aquino, De substantiis separatis, in Thomae de Aquino, Opera
Omnia, t. XL, Opuscula, Romae, Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1969, p. D 7). Aquinas
explains his method as follows: ‘Intendentes […] sanctorum angelorum
excellentiam utcumque depromere, incipiendum videtur ab his quae de
angelis antiquitus humana coniectura aestimavit; ut si quis invenerimus fidei
consonum accipiamus, quae vero doctrinae repugnant catholicae refutemus’
(De Sub. Sep., p. D 41, a4-10). Commenting on Anaxagoras’ claims on the
intellect, Aquinas makes some remarks concerning his understanding of the
history of philosophy: ‘eius opinio, etsi in veritate alios praecessit qui solum
23
106751405
discovery of the philosophical truth, which all philosophers are faced
with. Therefore, this history has a progress inasmuch as the mistakes
of the ancient are proved to be wrong. It cannot be said, however,
that completely new perspectives are set forth. Inasmuch as Aristotle
has discovered and explained some philosophical theses, and these
theses are true, then he has made some steps along the path that we
already know from a deeper perspective, since there has been some
progress in philosophy49. This idea of history of philosophy goes
hand in hand with the concept of philosophia perennis, which was
certainly a Neothomist formulation50, but which undoubtedly has its
roots in Aquinas’ thought. What does this imply for the readers of
Aquinas’ commentaries on Aristotle? I think that Aquinas thinks of
corporalem naturam ponebant, invenitur tamen a veritate deficere in duobus
[…]’ (De Sub. Sep., p. D 41, b46-48). In other words, Aquinas thinks that there is
an eternal truth, accessible to human reasoning, that has been progressively
discovered by philosophers, but not without many mistakes. The cure of the
historian of philosophy lies thus in distinguishing their discoveries of eternal
truths from the mistakes they made. This idea of philosophical progress
emerges when Thomas Aqiunas compares both Plato and Aristotle to their
immediate predecessors: ‘Plato sufficientiori via processit ad opinionem
priorum Naturalium evacuandam’ (De Sub. Sep. p. D 42, a66-67), ‘ideo
Aristotelis manifestiori et certiori via processit ad investigandum substantias a
materia separatas, scilicet per viam motus’ (De Sub. Sep. p. D 44, a10-13).
49 It is perhaps worth noting that Aristotle seemed to have subscribed to an
analogous concept of ‘history of philosophy’. On this topic there is a vast
bibliography. W. K. C. Guthrie, Aristotle as a Historian of Philosophy: some
Preliminaries, in: Journal of Hellenic Studies, 77, 1957, pp. 35-41; C. Collobert,
Aristotle’s Review of the Presocratics: Is Aristotle finally an Historian of Philosophy?,
in Journal of History of Philosophy, 40, 2002, pp. 281-295; M. Frede, Aristotle’s
account of the Origins of Philosophy, in Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and
Science, 1/2004, pp. 9-44.
50 E. Gilson endorsed this understanding of the history of philosophy (cf. for
example his The Unity of Philosophical Experience, New York City, C. Scribner’s
Sons, 1937). For a well-known criticism of this perspective, see E. Garin, La
filosofia come sapere storico, Bari, Laterza, 1959, in particular pp. 19-21, in which
Gilson’s approach is addressed.
24
106751405
his enterprise as a ‘historical’ reconstruction of Aristotle’s thought. It
is ‘historical,’ however, in the sense outlined above: by looking at
what Aristotle thinks of substances and of separate substance in Met.
XII, Aquinas directly deals with Aristotle’s own thinking and
indirectly aims to present the extent to which the true doctrine of
substance and of separate substance was expounded by Aristotle. By
remarking what he thinks is virtually present in Aristotle’s thought,
Aquinas does not present his own philosophy – and thus it is right to
claim, with M.D. Chenu, that Aquinas’ commentaries are not directly
original expositions of the Dominican Master’s own doctrine.
However, it should be clear at this stage that they are worth being
analyzed either because of the intrinsic interest of Aquinas’
Aristotelian scholarship, or because the Dominican Master is
indirectly proposing views that he would willingly share, in so far as
Aquinas thinks that Aristotle’s doctrine contains (part of) the true
and eternal philosophical doctrine on substance and separate
substance.
3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE METAPHYSICS
As is well known, Aristotle was never aware of writing the
Metaphysics, nor of writing on ‘metaphysics’, since the term wasn’t
introduced until the late edition of the Aristotelian corpus51; for at
least two centuries, the unity of Aristotle’s treatise has been
questioned. Most scholars endorse a developmental approach,
51
Drawing on the narration present in Strabo’s Geographica, XIII, 1, 54, it has
been traditionally maintained that this edition was made by Andronicus of
Rhodes, at the beginning of the first century BC. This reconstruction has been
persuasively contested by J. Barnes, in his ‘Roman Aristotle’, in J. Barnes and
M. Griffin (eds.), Philosophia Togata II, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 1-70
and by M. Frede, Epilogue, in K Algra et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of
Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 771797. A recent attempt at defending the traditional narrative may be found in O.
Primavesi, Ein Blick in den Stollen von Skepsis: Vier Kaptiel zur frühen
Überlieferung des Corpus Aristotelicum, in Philologus 151 (2007), pp. 51-77.
25
106751405
according to which Aristotle’s Metaphysics is the result of the
conjunction of treatises which Aristotle wrote at different stages of
his philosophical career, without intention of merging them in the
arrangement that we now read. This position, although challenged
by some scholars52, is said to be rather commonly shared by
Aristotelian scholarship and it indeed has many good arguments on
its side. As far as book XII is concerned, most scholars suggest that it
should be considered an independent treatise, which was later
inserted in what we know as Metaphysics, either by Aristotle himself
or someone else.
The book contains some materials which may be found in the
Physics and in the central books of the Metaphysics (especially VIIVIII): the first five chapters of book XII are indeed devoted to the
discussion of the structure of sensible substances, which is discussed
in the previously mentioned books too. This repetition of the same
theme – a repetition which seems not to be justified in any way –
suggests that books VII-IX and book XII have been conceived as
independent treatises. However, XII now belongs to the treatise
which has been labeled Metaphysics, but not without reason. Aristotle
promised to discuss the ontological status of separate substances in
the third book (B), and he usually renewed this promise in the course
of the central books, in which, however, this doctrine seems to not
have been tackled. In particular, the third and fourth aporia listed in
52
J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, Toronto,
Pontifical Insitute of Medieval Studies, 1951; G. Reale, Il concetto di ‘filosofia
prima’ e l’unità della Metafisica di Aristotele, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1961; E. C.
Halper, One and Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Alpha-Delta, Las Vegas,
Parmenides Publishing, 2008. On Hasper’s book see review article by L. M.
Castelli, Recensione di E. C. Halper, One and Many in Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’
Alpha-Delta, in Elenchos, 2009/1, pp. 177-188: Castelli rightly observes that
according to Halper ‘l’assunzione che il testo aristotelico non possa essere
trattato come un intero compiuto e rifinito è […] un’ipotesi interpretativa […].
In un certo senso, questo è vero, ma in un altro non lo è. Non è sulla base di
preferenze personali che molti studiosi assumono una prospettiva opposta alla
sua: ci sono ragioni storiche e filologiche per sostenere che, in un certo senso,
Aristotele non ha scritto la Metafisica come oggi la leggiamo’.
26
106751405
book III, 1, seems to be answered in book XII (or at least they are not
answered in the previous books, so that it could be urged that book
XII is meant to provide an answer to them). According to W. D. Ross’
reconstruction, the previously mentioned aporiae53 may be
expounded as follows:
Aporia 3 (III, 1, 995 b10-13 = III, 2, 997 a15-25). Does one
science study all substances? If more than one, are they all akin, or
are only some of them and to be called forms of Wisdom?
Aporia 4 (III, 1, 995 b13-18 = III, 2, 997 a25-34). Are there nonsensible substances? If so, are they of more than one kind (e.g. Forms
and mathematical objects)?
These questions are clearly not addressed in books IV-XI, and thus
it seems reasonable to look for an answer to each of them in book XII
(even though the issue of mathematical objects is dealt with in books
XIII-XIV too).
Thus, book XII fills the lack of a discussion of separate substances,
even though it is still quite generally a book on substance. The book
does not address the question of the unity of metaphysical wisdom,
hence it is difficult to see it as a direct answer to the aporiae raised in
the third book. However, it seems rather reasonable to think that the
author of what we now call Metaphysics understood the necessity of
providing an answer to these questions, and book XII – presumably
conceived by Aristotle as an independent treatise – was the best
available Aristotelian writing to fill the gap.
This scenario obviously presupposes that Aristotle composed the
various books of the Metaphysics at various stages, but it does not aim
to date book XII – an attempt which now seems to be pointless. As is
well known, the relative chronology of this book among Aristotle’s
writings has been object of dispute among scholars for a long time.
Jaeger notoriously claimed Aristotle began his philosophical career as
a Platonist (thus committed to the theory which posits separate
substances), and ended as an empiricist. This claim is of course
53
Cf. F. A. J. De Haas, Aporiai 3-5 in M. Crubellier, A. Laks (eds.), Aristotle:
Metaphysics Beta. Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2009, pp. 73-104. De Haas suggests that Aristotle, in setting these aporiae, has
in mind the model of science outlined in the Posterior Analytics.
27
106751405
consistent with the idea that Aristotle wrote Metaphysics XII rather
early, even though Jaeger maintained also that XII, 8 was a later
addition to the original book. Although Jaeger’s works are still
influential in the sense that contemporary scholars agree in
maintaining that Aristotle’s thought cannot be considered a
simultaneous encyclopedia of sciences - with no internal tensions
(tensions which can arguably be caused by some developments in his
philosophical commitments) - Jaeger’s precise outline of Aristotle’s
intellectual path is no longer as influential as it was in the first
decades after 1923 (the year in which appeared his Aristoteles54).
Consequently, it seems much more prudent to not choose a date for
book XII, which seems to expound the very ideas developed in the
central books of the Metaphysics, though with less care. To sum up,
M. Frede acutely observes that ‘we do not know, and we may never
know, whether Λ is earlier or later than Zff., whether it is a summary
or a synopsis or sketch of the enterprise envisaged by Z, or whether it
is engaged in a different enterprise, and whether it takes the same
approach to the material as envisaged by Z. There is the attractive,
supported by literary features of the text, that Λ was written in some
haste’55.. Consequently, it is rather difficult to exclude a later date for
the composition of the book – an earlier date for book XII could
otherwise have been supported by the less detailed discussion of the
topics that we find in books VII-IX too, but, as Frede points, there is
also a further reason that may explain this lack of detail.
What seems reasonable to conclude, from this cursorily
discussion, is that the discussion developed in XII does not properly
answer the questions advanced in book III, nor does it belong to the
same treatise as books VII-IX.
54
For the many attempts at dating book XII, which followed Jaeger’s claim, see
L. Elders, Aristotle’s Theology. A Commentary on Book Λ of the Metaphysics, Assen,
Van Gorkum, 1972, pp. 50-56.
55 M. Frede, Introduction, in M. Frede, D. Charles (eds.), Aristotle’s Metaphysics
Lambda. Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000, pp. 3-4.
28
106751405
3.1 Aquinas’ idea of the structure of the Metaphysics
As is well known, Aquinas – with later ancient and medieval
commentators on Aristotle – does not take into consideration the
possibility of a composition of the Metaphysics similar to that which is
now defended by scholars, for Aquinas, Aristotle’s Metaphysics is a
treatise with an internal unity.
In the prologue to his commentary, Aquinas makes clear that, in
his opinion, the whole treatise is devoted to the exposition of the
science. The subject is ‘ens commune’, namely ‘being generally
understood’, and the aim is to discover the causes of ‘ens commune’
– causes which are said to be separate substances – and its properties
(‘passiones’) that Aquinas identifies with that follows the notion of
being (viz. one and many, potentiality and actuality, etc.):
‘quamvis ista scientia tria consideret, non tamen considerat
quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum solum ens
commune. Hoc enim est subiectum in scientia, cuius causas et
passiones quaerimus, non autem ipsae causae alicuius generis
quaesiti. Nam cognitio causarum alicuius generis, est finis ad
quem consideratio scientiae pertingit. […] Secundum igitur tria
praedicta, ex quibus perfectio huius scientiae attenditur,
sortitur tria nomina. Dicitur enim scientia divina sive theologia,
inquantum praedictas substantias considerat. Metaphysica,
inquantum considerate ns et ea quae consequuntur ipsum.
Haec enim trans physicam inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut
magis communia post minus communia. Dicitur autem prima
philosophia, inquantum primas rerum causas considerat. Sic
igitur patet quid sit subiectum huius scientiae, et qualiter se
habeat ad alias scientias, et quo nomine nominetur’ 56.
In this programmatic prologue, Aquinas makes several claims in
his usual concise and clear prose. Let me briefly single them out:
a) Against Averroes’ claim according to which separate
substances are the proper subject of metaphysical inquiry, Aquinas
56
Thomae de Aquino, In Met., Prooemium, p. 2.
29
106751405
maintains from the very beginning of his commentary that the
subject matter is ‘ens commune’, thus sharply distinguishing himself
from the major available commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics of
his times;
b) the Dominican Master holds that metaphysics is a science and
he implicitly makes reference to the model of science outlined in the
Posterior Analytics by appealing to the fact that the aim of this science
– like every other science – is to demonstrate the causes (‘causae’)
and properties (‘passiones’) of its subject matter;
c) from this it follows that the treatise Metaphysics, in which this
science is addressed, should offer a treatment of both causes and
properties of being generally conceived (‘ens commune’);
d) it is therefore implicit in Aquinas’ Prologue that the whole
corpus aristotelicum is conceived as an organic and unitarian system,
in which the Posterior Analytics provide a general outline of the
features of science. These features are to be founded even in the
exposition of metaphysics, as it is offered by Aristotle in his
homonymous treatise. Its structure is thus to be understood
according to this scheme of scientific inquiry.
One might wonder whether I am overemphasizing the sketchy
observations of Aquinas, and indeed, it is not particularly prudent to
infer these conclusions from his Prologue; however, I am rather
confident in the fact that Aquinas’ commentary provides abundant
evidence in favor of these claims.
According to Aquinas, the Metaphysics has a bipartite structure:
the first six books (I-VI) set the stage and are preparatory to the
exposition of metaphysical science, which is carried out in the
remaining six books (VII-XII), in which being is examined in order to
demonstrate its properties and find its causes (Aquinas does not
consider in his commentary books XIII-XIV, which are probably to be
understood as an appendix to the treatment of separate substances,
according to his perspective).
The first sentences of Aquinas’ commentary on each book of the
Metaphysics always provide the divisio textus, which is extremely
useful in order to understand Aquinas’ idea of the structure of the
whole treatise. His opinions may be summarized as follows:
30
106751405
a) Book I. Aristotle first offers a Prologue, (I, 1-2, 980 a21-983 a23)
where he presents the things that this science deals with, and its core
characteristics. After that, he begins his exposition discussing and
criticizing the opinions of his predecessors on the causes of things (I,
3-10).
b) Book II. After having criticized the opinion of his
predecessors concerning the causes of reality, here Aristotle starts
dealing with truth with respect to metaphysical issues. And he first
considers the topic of the knowledge of truth (this is the general
object of the book).
1. Aristotle considers how human beings obtain the knowledge
of truth (II, 1);
2. He shows that first philosophy deals with truth (II, 2);
3. He expounds the more effective way for acquiring the
knowledge of truth (II, 3).
c) Book III. This book is crucial for understanding Aquinas’
assessment of the structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics57. I think it is
worth quoting his opening remarks: “Postquam philosophus in
secundo libro ostendit modum considerandae veritatis, hic procedit
ad veritatis considerationem. Et primo procedit modo disputativo,
ostendens ea quae sunt dubitabilia circa rerum veritatem. Secundo
incipit determinare veritatem. Et hoc in quarto libro, qui incipit ibi,
est scientia quaedam quae speculator” 58.Thus, Aquinas suggests that
Aristotle starts exposing his metaphysical doctrine in the third book,
where he proceeds modo disputativo, viz. by raising questions; then,
from the fourth, Aristoteles ‘incipit determinare veritatem’. He does
not say that Aristotle goes on in his treatise ‘demontrative’, but –
more cautiously – that he starts giving some answer to the questions
raised in book III. Hence, book III sets in some sense the agenda of
Aristotle’s enterprise, according to Aquinas’ reconstruction.
57
On the importance of Aquinas’s commentary on this book, see G. Galluzzo,
Aquinas on the Structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in Documenti e studi sulla
tradizione filosofica medievale XV, 2004, pp. 353-386 and Aquinas’s Interpretation of
Metaphysics Book Beta, in Quaestio 5, 2005, pp. 413-427.
58 Thom. Aq., In Met., III, l. 1, n. 338, p. 96.
31
106751405
d) Book IV. Aquinas suggests that Aristotle first clarifies the
subject matter of metaphysical inquiry (IV, 1-2), then he solves some
questions raised in book III concerning what object should be
considered by this science (IV, 3-8).
e) Book V. Aristotle has determined the subject of this science,
and what in general is considered by metaphysics. From book V
onwards, Aristotle proves the conclusions of this science. It is thus
useful as a preliminary clarification of the terms employed by
metaphysics. This explains the discussions of book V, and its
collocation within the general context of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
f) Book VI. Here Aristotle establishes how metaphysical science
should deal with being, and which senses of being are excluded by
this exposition.
g) Book VII. ‘hic [philosophus] incipit determinare de ente per
se, quod est extra animam, de quo est principalis consideratio huius
scientiae’59. This is the last section of Aristotle’s treatise, according to
Aquinas. It is divided in a first section, which deals with beings
(quite generally book VII-XI), and in a section which expounds the
principles of beings. In the first part of the first section (books VIIVIII), Aristotle deals with beings as they are divided into the ten
categories. In book VII, Aristotle explores substance from a ‘logical’
point of view (‘per rationem’).
h) Book VIII. In this second section devoted to substance,
Aquinas says that Aristotle’s inquiry touches the principles of
sensible substances. After a brief summary of the ‘logical’ enquiry
into the principles of substance (VIII, 1), Aquinas says that Aristotle
exposes the concrete principles of substance, namely matter and
form.
i) Book IX. After having dealt with beings and how they are
distributed into the ten categories, here Aristotle considers being as
being in actuality or potentiality. Aquinas divides this book into
three parts. In the first (IX, 1-5), Aristotle deals with potentiality, then
(IX, 6-7) he addresses actuality, and finally, he considers the
relationship between potentiality and actuality (IX, 8-10).
59
Thom. Aq, In Met. VII, l. 1, n. 1245, p. 315.
32
106751405
j) Book X. Aquinas says that, since Aristotle has discussed in
the previous books the notion of being, here he tackles that of ‘one’,
and what follows its notion. In the first part of the book, Aristotle
speaks of the one in and of itself, and first he distinguishes the ways
in which something is said to be ‘one’ (X, 1, 1052 a15-1052 b18), then
he specifies a property of the one, namely that of being a measure (X,
1, 1052 b18-1053 b8), and finally he explains how this notion may be
employed for a better understanding of substance (X, 2). In the
second section of the book, Aristotle compares the notion of one and
many, and he considers them as opposites (X, 3-10).
k) Book XI. This book, its authenticity having been persuasively
rejected by contemporary scholars60, is considered authentic by
Aquinas. He takes it to be a summary of Aristotle’s preliminary
discussions before the exposition of the doctrine of substance, and
particularly of separate substances. The summary includes thus the
aporiai (the subject of this science), the properties of imperfect being
(namely, of accident), and some aspects of the theory substance.
l) Book XII. According to Aquinas, Aristotle first summarizes
what he has already said on substance, adding what was missing in
previous expositions of this doctrine, thereby adding a treatment of
separate substances. The book is thus divided into two parts: in XII,
1-5 we find a summary of the doctrine of sensible substances, whilst
in XII, 6-10 he deals with separate substances, demonstrating their
existence and their properties, and arguing against the false opinions
of the predecessors about this topic.
Books XIII and XIV were not commented upon by Aquinas.
From this scheme of the structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics – that I
draw from Aquinas’ divisiones textus – it is clear that (a) the doctrine
of substance plays a central role in Aquinas’ understanding of
60
Cf. P. Aubenque, Sur l’inautenticité du livre K de la Métaphysique, in P. Moraux, J.
Wiesner (edd.), Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum. Akten des 9. Symposium
Aristotelicum, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1983, pp. 318-344. Against Aubenque’s claim,
Décaire defended the traditional attribution of K to Aristotle: cf. V. Décaire,
L’authenticité du livre K de la Métaphysique, in P. Moraux, J. Wiesner (edd.),
Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum. Akten des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum,
Berlin, De Gruyter, 1983, pp. 295-217.
33
106751405
Aristotle; (b) the central books are seen as a part of the same
exposition to which book XII belongs (XII completes the treatise on
substance, which has been opened in book VII-VIII); and (c) the
doctrine of separate substances is crucial in Aquinas’ view on
Aristotelian metaphysics.
4. CONCLUSION
This lengthy analysis has shown that the study of Aquinas’
commentary needs to start from the consideration of the literary
genre of the work, and from the analysis of the divisio textus. Once
these considerations have been made it is possible to appreciate the
originality of Aquinas’ doctrine and the philosophical depth of this
text. These preliminary remarks to the study of Aquinas’
commentary on the Metaphysics were aimed at promoting a new
attention to the study of this text that contains many philosophical
riches.
RIASSUNTO
Questo articolo mostra che lo studio del commento di Tommaso
alla Metafisica deve iniziare dall’analisi del genere letterario
dell’opera e da una considerazione della sua divisio textus. Queste
considerazioni ci conducono ad apprezzare l’originalità della
dottrina tommasiana e l’acume filosofico che emerge dal testo.
Questo articolo contiene osservazioni preliminari utili allo studio del
commento di Tommaso alla Metafisica e tali osservazioni intendono
promuovere una rinnovata attenzione a un testo ricco di profonde
analisi filosofiche.
ABSTRACT
This paper shows that the study of Aquinas’ commentary on
Aristotle’s Metaphysics needs to start from the consideration of the
34
106751405
literary genre of the work, and from the analysis of the divisio textus.
Once these considerations have been made it is possible to appreciate
the originality of Aquinas’ doctrine and the philosophical depth of
this text. The paper contains preliminary remarks to the study of
Aquinas’ commentary on the Metaphysics. These remarks are aimed
at promoting a new attention to the study of this text that contains
many philosophical riches.