The successes and failures of the United Nations in conflict management have been
subject to increased scrutiny in recent years. There have been countless studies conducted that
have tested the abilities of the United Nations in managing conflict at the crisis level and beyond.
This paper seeks to broaden this scrutiny to another area of international relations at a less hostile
stage of the conflict process: that of enduring rivalries at the level of militarized disputes. Does
the involvement of the United Nations within the militarized disputes of enduring rivalries lead
to positive results in managing/preventing conflict? The objective of this research is to answer
this question for the most recent time period for which data is readily available (1975-1995) in
order to provide a picture of what the United Nations has done most recently in this area of
conflict. The Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes data set provided data useful in this inquiry,
but only after a UN involvement variable was added to the set (UNINVOL). The results show
that United Nations involvement has no statistically significant effects on the variables tested.
UN involvement does not decrease the hostility levels of futures disputes; it does not delay the
outbreak of future disputes; and it is no more likely to result in a clear outcome or settlement
than if the body remained uninvolved.
Purpose and Importance
The fundamental question that guides my research is: to what effect does the United Nations
contribute to the reduction of international armed conflict? I do not seek to fully answer this
question, but to merge two growing fields of study to provide a small piece of evidence that will
move the political science community one step closer to reaching a conclusion about the
pacifying effects of the United Nations. The focus of my paper is the United Nations’
management of conflict (at the militarized dispute level) within the confines of enduring
rivalries.
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The importance of enduring rivalries in international relations has come to the fore in
recent years because of the disproportionate number of disputes that occur between rivals.
Goertz and Diehl (1993) report that 45 percent of all militarized disputes and more than half of
all wars take place within enduring rivalries. They further report that the most serious enduring
rivalries are eight times more likely to experience war than other dyads in conflict (p. 148).
These are amazing statistics if you consider that there have only existed 45 pairs of countries
since 1816 that can be classified as enduring rivalries according to the definition offered by
Goertz and Diehl (1995, p. 33). Because the average lifespan of an enduring rivalry is 43 years
(p. 33), the United Nations has ample time to recognize when an enduring rivalry has formed and
put all of its resources into resolving the issues responsible for the conflict. UN conflict
management should be at its best in these cases. The UN knows that enduring rivalries account
for a disproportionate number of disputes that are disproportionately likely to involve high levels
of violence, but are they successful in utilizing this knowledge? Does United Nations
involvement have a noticeable pacifying effect within enduring rivalries (in both the short-term
and long-term)?
What is an Enduring Rivalry?
When one thinks of a rivalry, one thinks of a heated, recurring conflict between two parties in
which each side attempts to gain the upper hand in the relationship. The term “enduring,” when
added to the notion of rivalry, leads one to believe that this recurring conflict takes place over a
number of years. A good operational definition of enduring rivalry needs to reflect these
intuitions (length, severity, recurrence) of the terms “enduring” and “rivalry.” I will now
consider four widely used operational definitions of enduring rivalry, in the end choosing one
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that best exemplifies the intuitions just discussed. This definition will be used to identify a
population of enduring rivalries that will serve the focus of my research.
The four definitions to be discussed were all born out of the Correlates of War list of
militarized disputes (MID) developed by Gochman & Maoz (1984). It is, therefore, appropriate
to consider Gochman and Maoz’s own definition of enduring rivalry stemming from their list of
MID. Gochman and Maoz consider enduring rivalries to be dyads that have most often been
involved in disputes with one another. This turns out to require a minimum of seven militarized
disputes occurring within a dyad for it to be considered an enduring rivalry. The Gochman and
Maoz definition offers no temporal constraints to their conception of enduring rivalry, so
disputes may be separated by vast amounts of time and involve unrelated issues.
The second definition is that of Frank Wayman (1982). Frank Wayman assumes that a
militarized dispute has a 10-year effect on a dyadic relationship. If a militarized dispute is
reinforced by a second, then the two states involved can be considered an enduring rivalry. The
rivalry continues until there is a 10-year period in which no militarized disputes occur within the
dyad.
Paul Diehl in his 1985 definition classifies an enduring rivalry as a condition in which
two states engage in three militarized disputes within a 15-year time period. Once an enduring
rivalry is established, it can be maintained through less frequent occurrences of disputes. Diehl,
like Wayman, requires 10 years to pass without a militarized dispute for an enduring rivalry to
end. Diehl specifically leaves out disputes related to “ongoing world wars so as not to confuse
their effects with those of an enduring rivalry” (Goertz and Diehl, 1993, p. 159).
The “Correlates of War definition” of enduring rivalry is the final definition to be
discussed in this paper. There are many versions of the Correlates of War definition of enduring
3
rivalry, but the one that is most widely accepted by scholars (as well as the one that will be used
throughout this paper) is that of Goertz and Diehl (1993, 1995). An enduring rivalry, according
to this definition requires six or more disputes within a dyad over a period of 20 years. The
rivalry has ended when 15 years pass without a dispute between the states involved (1995, 33).
While all four definitions were designed for different purposes and are relevant for
certain studies, the Goertz and Diehl Correlates of War definition is preferable for this study
because it is the one that best meets the intuitions of length (at least 20 years), severity (six or
more militarized disputes), and recurrence (six disputes in 20 years without a 15 year hiatus)
discussed previously. The Gochman and Maoz definition requires a large number of disputes,
but contains no termination requirements. With no termination requirements, there is no end to a
rivalry. According to their definition the United States-United Kingdom rivalry is still ongoing,
even though the last militarized dispute between the two countries took place in 1940 and the
rivalry ended in the 1860s. Because my study requires knowledge of active rivalries in 1975,
some sort of end date is necessary for a useful definition. The Wayman definition also falls short
of meeting the intuitions discussed earlier. Because his definition only requires two disputes in a
relatively short time period (10 years) it leaves us with a large number of “rivalries,” many of
which would not meet the idea of long periods of recurring disputes that most have in mind when
discussing enduring rivalries. Diehl’s early definition, like that of Wayman, used a relatively
few number of disputes with a relatively short time requirement for the rivalry to exist. Thus, the
same objection that applies to Wayman applies to Diehl’s early definition. Goertz and Diehl’s
version of the Correlates of War definition does not fall to the same criticisms as the other three
because it requires a large number of disputes over a large amount of time, and also provides a
way to recognize when the rivalry has ended. Because of the length and number requirements
4
the definition leaves us with a relatively short list of the most enduring and dangerous of
rivalries. This list of rivalries (see table 3) and the United Nations track record of dealing with
them is the focus of my study.
***Tables 1, 2, and 3 here***
Theoretical Perspectives of Enduring Rivalries
The term rivalry implies that there is some kind of connection between the disputes that break
out within the dyad over time (Goertz and Diehl, 2000, pp. 197-8). The disputes are not random
occurrences that, due to probability, fit the definition for rivalry. Some scholars assert that
rivalries form and endure because of unresolved and deeply ingrained issues between the states
involved (Thompson, 1995, p. 196; Wayman, 2000, p. 230). The disputes within the rivalry
usually revolve around a single contentious issue and in some cases by the time that a
compromise can be reached on that issue, another issue surfaces, prolonging the rivalry. In
addition to the issues approach, Goertz and Diehl (1993) outline four theories of international
conflict that relate enduring rivalries to important areas of the study of international relations.
These theories will be useful in helping us to understand why the United Nations does or does
not have success when dealing with enduring rivalries.
Diffusion Theories
Diffusion theories in political science have mainly been concerned with conflict diffusing
through space, from one country to another, rather than from one time period to another as is
hypothesized by the concept of enduring rivalries. The few studies of temporal diffusion have
focused on a broad range of cases, and were unsuccessful in showing that there exists a strong
5
temporal connection between disputes. Goertz and Diehl believe that these results would be
stronger if a study were to focus solely on rivalries (1993, p. 150).
Rational Actor Models
The concept of enduring rivalries seems to call into question some parts of the rational actor
models. Rational actor models posit that the history of conflict is not considered when a state
calculates the costs of entering conflict because history is considered a “sunk cost.” States will
continue to quarrel as long as it remains rational to do so – the history of the conflict between the
states does not matter (p. 153). If this model is correct then there is no reason to suspect that
dyads with a history of conflict are more likely to engage in future conflict, or that future conflict
will be more hostile than past conflicts (making the study of rivalries irrelevant). However,
some rational actor studies do consider the effects that a history of conflict might have on future
conflict through the idea of preferences. Current preferences are partly affected by prior conflict,
making it plausible even under the rational actor model that enduring rivalries may come to exist
and end because of a change in preferences due to a history of conflict (p. 151). When the
rational actor model is used to study the impact of past disputes on future disputes it is shown
that hostility escalates as disputes recur (p. 151).
System Structure
The system structure model postulates that system structures can explain the behavior of states.
If the structures remain unchanged, it is expected that the same behavior would repeat within
dyads, in some cases leading to rivalry. According to this theory enduring rivalries will begin
when the system is altered, and will not end until the structure is changed again (p. 152).
Power Transition
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The power transition model views war as the result of a challenger state surpassing a status quo
state in capability. The model implicitly assumes that a rivalry exists between the two states
involved, because the status quo state will risk violence to remain more powerful than the
challenger state. If the states involved are not part of a rivalry, the challenger will peacefully
surpass the status quo state in power. We can use the framework of enduring rivalries to help
predict which dyads will lead to war in these situations (p. 152).
From the above discussion emerge four ways of explaining enduring rivalries. First,
some simple rational actor models show rivalries to be irrelevant, and the issue of repeated
conflict to be false because actors will continue to fight as long as it is rational to do so.
Enduring rivalries might be explained through the changing of preferences due to the history of
previous conflicts. A state may prefer hostility to peace when dealing with a state with which it
has been violently involved with in the recent past. The structure of the international system
may explain enduring rivalries. When the system is stable for long periods of time, rivalries will
result that cannot be resolved without a change in the system. Finally, unresolved, highly
contentious issues might be responsible for the rivalry between states. So long as the issue
remains unresolved the rivalry will endure.
Realist and Liberal Perspectives of United Nations Conflict Management
Since the inception of the League of Nations at the close of World War I, realism and Wilsonian
Liberalism have been at odds over the issue of collective security and conflict management by
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Because liberals conceive human nature as
fundamentally good, a liberal theory predicts that states will choose to pool together resources in
order to effectively and efficiently eliminate violent conflict. They will choose to do this
because conflict, according to the liberal perspective, is viewed as an international problem, not
7
just a problem for the states involved (Kegley, 1995, p. 4). The best way to deal with conflict is
to create a preponderance of power between the organization and an aggressor, leaving the
aggressor no choice but to accept a compromise to end a dispute. Any bad behavior on the part
of a state results due to the existence of structural arrangements that are conducive to violence (p.
4). The liberal perspective expects that, given the right systemic structure, the United Nations
will be extremely successful in managing disputes because it is not in any actor’s interest
(including the states involved) for a dispute to escalate to violence. However if the over-all
structure of the international system is conducive to violence or noncompliance, the United
Nations may have only marginal success.
Realist theories, on the other hand, offer a state-centered world-view that leaves little
hope for any organization like the UN to have success in managing conflict. Realist theories
characterize human nature as concerned only for the lust for power; men and states are inherently
evil because of it. States seek only to further their own interests and will do anything that is
deemed necessary to achieve their goals. Stability in the system will be achieved when a balance
of power results from all states seeking their own interests (pp. 4-5). The realist perspective
expects that the United Nations will enjoy a large membership because states will join to
increase their standing in the world. The UN might even have some marginal successes when
states feel as if it is in their best interests to work with them. For the most part, however, a realist
expects that the UN will not make a noticeable difference in managing conflict.
The Conflict Process in United Nations Research
The conflict process is the process by which wars evolve. It is a rare, if not impossible,
occurrence for a war to erupt with no prior history of conflict between the warring parties. Most
of the time conflicts follow a specific pattern of escalation. They begin as conflicts of interest
8
and if a conflict is to reach the highest level of escalation (world war), it usually must first
become a militarized dispute (MID) involving the threat or use of force, then a crisis, a local war,
a regional war, which may finally escalate into a world war (Tillema, 1991, pp. 3-4).
Conflict of interest → MIDs → Crisis → Local War → Regional War → World
War
Some might feel that my placing MIDs before crises is a mistake given the International Crisis
Behavior (ICB) Project definition of crisis only requires the “heightened probability of
involvement in military hostilities” (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000, p. 3), and an MID is
classified as the “explicit threat, display, or use of force” (Hewitt, Forthcoming, p. 7). It seems
as if it might be possible to put crises before MIDs. However Hewitt found, using the Diehl and
Goertz dispute severity measure (ranging from 1 to 200 with 100 being the midpoint that
separates disputes resulting in no fatalities from those that do) that “crises are significantly more
severe than MIDs” (p. 9). MIDs that escalate to the crisis stage are 40% more severe than those
that do not (p. 9). Hewitt also reports that the there exist three times more MIDs than crises (p.
10), evidence that also suggests that MIDs are less severe. This distinction is important because
the objective of my research is to focus on an earlier stage of the conflict process than does the
bulk of prior research on this topic.
The conflict process is important to most studies of international relations, but especially
so when dealing with the effectiveness of the United Nations in resolving conflict. For example,
the UN may be more effective in ending regional wars than they are at resolving crises – to
determine this, one would have to focus on separate stages of the conflict process. As I
9
mentioned previously, this study will focus on the effectiveness of the UN at the militarized
dispute stage of the conflict process.
Nearly all previous studies of United Nations involvement in the conflict process focus
on the crisis stage or later of the conflict process. The majority of studies have found the actions
of the United Nations to have very little effect in bringing about long-term conflict resolution.
Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel (1996) studied UN intervention in crises and recurring conflict
and found that this was the case. Their research showed that UN intervention in one crisis had
no effect on the “occurrence, timing, or severity of future conflict” between the same disputants
(p. 697). UN involvement might limit the dangerous aspects of a crisis, but the conflict is
repeated soon after (p. 698). They also found that their results were the same when controlling
for intervention type, signaling that more active approaches might not yield better results.
The most encouraging study also dealt with UN involvement in crises, conducted by
Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher (1984). They found that while the United Nations
only contributed to crisis abatement in 18 percent of all crises, the organization was far more
successful in dealing with the most serious crises. Their research showed that in crises involving
full-scale war, UN involvement led to abatement 45 percent of the time (p. 65). Their research
also showed that crises in which the UN is involved are far more likely to end with an agreement
than those in which the organization is not involved (p. 65).
Hypotheses
The evidence that contentious, underlying issues are at the heart of enduring rivalries is
overwhelming; thus the key to ending an enduring rivalry is to resolve those issues, a situation
that the United Nations has the ability to bring about. If unresolved issues were the only factors
at work within an enduring rivalry, conflict management would be difficult, but not impossible.
10
However, research by Goertz and Diehl (1995) into the impact of political shocks (abrupt
changes in the political arena at the system and state levels) has shown that 87 percent of
enduring rivalries begin and over 90 percent of enduring rivalries end as a result of these shocks.
This is strong evidence that there are systemic pressures in the formation, persistence, and
termination of enduring rivalries. If we accept that both of these views are at work within
enduring rivalries, to end a rivalry the United Nations, in most cases, would have to isolate the
systemic structure responsible for prolonging the dispute and change the structure in such a way
that it is conducive to settlement. After accomplishing this, the UN must then find a way to
resolve the underlying issues at work within the rivalry and do so in such a way that both parties
find an agreement acceptable and are content in ending the conflict. This is a huge task for any
organization to undertake, and in light of research conducted to test the performance of the
United Nations in managing crises (Diehl et al. 1996), there is little reason to believe that the
organization will fare much better in handling pre-crisis militarized disputes within enduring
rivalries. For the most part, my hypotheses fall in line with the results of the Diehl study on
crises. I do not expect to find a substantial difference in outcome when the UN becomes
involved earlier in the conflict process even in the context of such important cases as enduring
rivalries. With that said, the specific hypotheses to be tested by my research are as follows:
1) Involvement by the United Nations in an MID does not noticeably affect the chances
that the MID in question will result in a clear outcome or settlement of the dispute
(no short-term success).
2) Involvement by the United Nations in an MID does not noticeably affect the chances
for recurring conflict within enduring rivalries (no long-term success).
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3) Involvement by the United Nations in an MID does not noticeably affect the levels of
hostility in future disputes between the rivals (no long-term success).
If the data of my research supports these hypotheses, great doubt will be cast upon the ability of
the United Nations to bring about long-term conflict resolution in the international system as
currently constructed. This would not, however, be conclusive evidence that the UN is the
problem; nor would it be evidence that the UN is not helpful in other ways (perhaps the UN
serves as a better deterrent to conflict than it does a manager of conflict). Liberal theory expects
IGOs to have a great impact in the area of conflict management, unless the system is conducive
to defiance on the part of the states. It may be that future UN success in the management of
conflict requires a fundamental change to the international system, which may include drastic
reorganization of the UN itself.
Research Methods
The purpose of this research is to test the effectiveness of UN involvement in the militarized
disputes of enduring rivalries between 1975 and 1995. These date constraints were chosen for
the project because I wanted to test the most recent data to learn how the UN has handled these
conflicts at the end of the 20th century. While a look at the UN track record from its inception is
a worthy task, I am most interested in what the UN has done lately, without having the latest data
skewed by earlier disputes. I chose the 20 year period from 1975 to 1995 because of the benefits
at both ends of that time period. 1975 marks a time at the end of the Vietnam War, and after the
Arab-Israeli wars of the late 60s and early 70s so the data should not be skewed by those events.
While the Cold War lasted for another decade and a half, 1975 marks the beginning of relatively
peaceful time in the world, especially among major powers. Wars were still being fought, but
they were limited to local wars. 1975 also marks the point at which the current world order was
12
emerging. The Soviet Union was still a factor, but the United States was gaining the upper hand
in the Cold War. Also, countries such as China, Japan, and India were playing a larger role in
international politics and the importance of Old Europe began to fade. The study concludes at
1995 due to the amount and quality of data that exists after that time period. While data exists
for the time period after 1995, it is not as readily available and has not been scrutinized as fully
as has the pre-1995 data.
Because 1975 is the beginning year for the study, the only enduring rivalries that will be
studied are those that were active in 1975. Disputes within rivalries that had ended before or
began after 1975 will not be used in this study. Only the rivalries that the UN knew to be
problematic as of 1975 will be studied, meaning that the UN’s record of achievement should be
at its best in these cases. Also, only disputes that began between January 1, 1975, and December
31, 1995 will be included in this study. Disputes that began before January 1, 1975, and lasted
into 1975 or later will not be included in the study. However, if a dispute begins before
December 31, 1995, and is not concluded within the time period to be studied, its data will be
included for the entire duration of the dispute. For example, dispute number 4007 between India
and Pakistan over Kashmir began in 1993, and did not end until 1999. The entire duration of the
dispute will be included in the study and will not be cut off at the end of 1995. These restraints
leave 100 disputes between 16 enduring rivalries over the 20 year period to be studied (see table
4).
***Table 4 here***
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Added Variables
The dispute numbers mentioned at the end of the previous paragraph are taken from the
Correlates of War Dyadic MID Data Set. The first version was created by Zeev Maoz and was
last updated in 2001 to include MID from 1816 to 1992. Versions 2.1 and 3.02 were updates to
the data set that extended the data to 2001. These data sets will provide much of the information
necessary for this study.
One vital piece of information that these sets leave out is a variable of United Nations
involvement. This knowledge is necessary to be able to measure the effects, if any, of UN
involvement in the militarized disputes described in the data set. One first must know in which
cases were the United Nations involved, and in which were they not. The bulk of my research
was spent updating the MID sets to include a UN involvement code (UNINVOL) for the 100
disputes that are relevant to my study. The UNINVOL variable has a simple coding scheme: 0 if
the United Nations is not involved in the dispute, 1 if the UN is involved, and X-0 for
unknown/missing data. United Nations involvement is defined for my coding purposes as an
action taken by the United Nations in order to end the hostilities or resolve the issues responsible
for hostilities within the MID. “Involvement” in this study includes the following actions: factfinding, offering of good offices, condemnation (includes an implied or explicit demand to
desist), call for action by adversaries (includes call for cease-fire, withdrawal, negotiation,
member action to facilitate termination), mediation (includes proposing a solution, offering
advice, and conciliation of differences), arbitration (formal binding settlement by an arbitral
body), sanctions, and the deployment observer groups and emergency military forces. Any
resolution by either the Security Council or General Assembly attempting to end the dispute
between governments is considered involvement. Any action of the sort described above is
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coded as a 1. Failed resolutions, discussion without resolution, humanitarian efforts, and acts
vetoed by the Security Council are considered non-actions and are coded as 0.
In researching for the UNINVOL variable, a variety of sources were consulted. These
include Lexis Nexis Online news search, Facts on File, Factiva, Keesing’s Record of World
Events (paper and online), un.org, and the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street
Journal archives. If an article was found mentioning UN involvement in the dispute as described
above the dispute was coded as a 1. If there was no mention of UN involvement, mention of
failed involvement attempts, or involvement by another conflict management group (such as the
Arab League, Organization of American states, etc.) without the UN playing a role, the UN was
not considered to be involved with the dispute and the dispute was coded as a 0. The X-0 coding
was reserved for disputes for which no information could be gathered on the dispute itself (other
than what was included within the data set), or for which there was little information about the
dispute and no mention whatsoever of the conflict management aspect of that dispute. At the
end of this meticulous data gathering, 39 disputes were coded as having UN involvement, 51
were coded as having no UN involvement, and only 10 were coded as missing/unknown data.
Once the data on the UN involvement for each dispute was complete, I created four more
variables out of the information contained in the Dyadic MID data set that would be useful in
testing my hypotheses. I labeled these variables DBD, CLEARSET, CLEAROUT, and
HOSTCHNG. DBD will be useful with the first hypothesis, CLEARSET and CLEAROUT for
the second, and HOSTCHNG for the third.
The DBD variable stands for the duration (in days) between disputes within a given
rivalry. This was found by arranging the disputes according to rivalry and then chronologically.
The DBD number is the amount of time between the last day of a dispute and the first day of the
15
next dispute within the rivalry. For example, dispute number 2222, a dispute between the United
States and Soviet Union started on April 9, 1977 and ended the very next day. The next dispute
between the two countries is 2223, which started November, 19, 1978. 601 days elapsed
between April 10, 1977 and November 19, 1978. Therefore the DBD number for dispute 2222 is
601. The same process was applied to all rivalries with at least two disputes, to find the DBD
number for each dispute. Rivalries in which only one dispute occurred within the 1975-1995
period were not used because there was no dispute to follow. For the same reason, the last
dispute in a rivalry was not given a DBD number.
There were two instances of disputes running concurrently within a rivalry (ZambiaZimbabwe – disputes 1430 and 3131; Israel-Syria – disputes 3444 and 3107). In this situation I
used the dispute that ended last of the two concurrent disputes. In the Israel-Syria rivalry dispute
3444 received the DBD number because it ended July 25, 1981. Dispute 3107 did not receive a
DBD number because it ended earlier than 3444 (January 8, 1981). Neither of the ZambiaZimbabwe disputes received the DBD number because there were only two disputes in the
rivalry for the designated time period, meaning that there was not another dispute that followed
the concurrent disputes.
The DBD variable will be useful in establishing the long-term effectiveness or
ineffectiveness of the UN in dealing with enduring rivalries. One would expect that, if the
United Nations had a positive influence in resolving the issues underlying a dispute, the time
interval between a UN involved dispute and the next within a rivalry would be greater than if the
United Nations did not become involved. This would be evidence that the UN had some sort of
impact in delaying the next dispute if it could not be shown that the body was responsible for
resolving the dispute. However, if the DBD is lower or about the same for UN involved disputes
16
as it is for non-involved disputes, there would be evidence that the UN has little, or even a
detrimental effect to delaying/ending the outbreak of further disputes within enduring rivalries.
The CLEARSET variable measures whether or not a dispute ended with a clear
settlement. This was taken from information contained in the SETTLMNT variable within the
original MID set. Each dispute in the MID set, was given a settlement number of 1 if a
settlement was negotiated to end the dispute, 2 if there was a settlement imposed by one country
on the other, or by an actor outside of the dispute, 3 if there was no settlement, 4 if the settlement
was unclear, and -9 if the data was missing. The CLEARSET variable uses these numbers to
determine whether or not there was a clear settlement. A dispute was coded as a 1 if in the
SETTLMNT column it was coded as a 1 or 2. Negotiated and imposed settlements are clear
settlements. If the dispute was coded as 3, 4, or -9 in the SETTLMNT column, the dispute was
coded as a 0 in the CLEARSET column because there was no clear settlement to the dispute.
For example, dispute 2179, between Greece and Turkey received a 3 under SETTLMNT,
meaning that there was no settlement in this case. This means that dispute 2179 received a 0
under CLEARSET. On the other hand, dispute 3384, between Egypt and Israel resulted in a
negotiated settlement (1 under SETTLMNT). Because this dispute was clearly settled, it was
coded as a 1 under CLEARSET.
While there is no new information in the CLEARSET variable that cannot be found in the
SETTLMNT variable, it presents the information in another way that will be useful for
determining whether or not the UN has an impact in settling disputes. If there are a greater
percentage of cases settled when the UN is involved than when they are not, it would be a first
step in establishing the type of influence that the UN has when involved in militarized disputes.
17
Almost as important as the settlement of a dispute is the outcome of the dispute. A clear
outcome can be just as effective at resolving underlying issues as a settlement. A
victory/concession from one side may be enough to end a recurring dispute, while an unclear
outcome will probably result in future disputes over the same issue. The CLEAROUT variable
shows whether or not the dispute has ended with a clear outcome. Like the CLEARSET
variable, CLEAROUT was created wholly out of data contained in the original MID data set
(this time from the OUTCOME variable in the MID set). For each dispute in the original set, an
outcome number was assigned: 1 means a victory for side A, 2 means a victory for side B, 3 a
yield by side A, 4 a yield by side B, 5 a stalemate in the dispute, 6 a compromise, 7 means that
one side released its claims, 8 represents an unclear outcome, 9 signifies that the disputants
joined an ongoing war, and a -9 shows that the data is missing. The CLEAROUT variable uses
these numbers to determine whether or not there was a clear outcome to the dispute. A clear
outcome is defined in this paper as one side winning the dispute, one side giving in to the other,
or a compromise. An unclear outcome is a dispute which escalates, results in a stalemate, or
simply fades away. For the CLEAROUT variable a dispute is coded as a 1 if it is a clear
outcome (this includes numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 from the OUTCOME variable). A dispute is
coded as 0, or unclear, if it was coded as a 5, 8, 9, or -9 in the OUTCOME column.
The CLEAROUT data will show whether or not there is a correlation between UN
involvement and the outcome of the dispute. The UN can be said to positively affect the
outcome of a dispute if there is a greater likelihood of a clear outcome when they become
involved. If, however there is no greater likelihood, or less of a chance that UN involvement
leads to clear outcomes, this data will be evidence that the UN may not have a beneficial effect
in this area of disputes.
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The final variable that I created for this project is the HOSTCHNG variable. This
variable is somewhat like the DBD variable mentioned earlier in that it measures the change
from one dispute to the next within an enduring rivalry. Instead of measuring time,
HOSTCHNG measures the change in hostility level from one dispute to the next. The data used
to create HOSTCHNG is taken from the HIHOST variable of the MID data set. The HIHOST
variable measures the highest level of hostility in the dispute. There are five levels of hostility
that a dispute may reach: the first level is no militarized action; the second a threat of force,
including threats of blockade, occupation, war declaration, and to use nuclear weapons; the third
level is a display of force including shows of troops and ships, alerts (including nuclear alerts),
mobilization of forces, fortification of border, and border violations; the fourth level of hostility
is the use of force, including blockades, occupation of territory, seizure of territory or troops,
clash of forces, raids, declaration of war, and the use of weapons of mass destruction; the final
hostility level is war, which includes beginning or joining an interstate war. Disputes are coded
from 1-5 according to their hostility level (HIHOST) with 5 being the highest level.
Disputes were given their HOSTCHNG number according to whether the hostility of the
next dispute within the rivalry increased, decreased, or stayed the same. If the hostility level
remained the same from the dispute in question to the next, the dispute in question was labeled 0.
If the hostility level decreased from the dispute to the next, it was labeled 1. Finally, if the
hostility level of the next dispute increased from the dispute in question, the dispute was labeled
2. For example, dispute 2222 between the United States and Soviet Union had a hostility level
of 4. The next dispute between the two countries, 2223, had a hostility level of 3. Thus dispute
2222 received a HOSTCHNG code of 1 because the hostility level decreased from dispute 2222
to 2223. Like the DBD variable, this variable cannot be measured for the final dispute in each
19
rivalry. The same problem that applied to concurrent disputes in the DBD measure (ZambiaZimbabwe 1430 and 3131; Israel-Syria 3444 and 3107 mentioned above) also applies to
HOSTCHNG, so the Zimbabwe disputes are thrown out, and dispute 3444 will receive the code
in Israel-Syria rivalry because it ended later than 3107.
The HOSTCHNG variable will be helpful in assessing whether or not United Nations
involvement in a dispute leads to a reduction of hostility levels in future disputes. If the UN has
a positive affect on the resolution of conflict, we should not only expect there to be longer
periods of time from the UN involved dispute to the next (as is tested by DBD), but we should
also expect the reduction of hostilities in disputes following those in which the United Nations
became involved. If this expectation is proven by the HOSTCHNG numbers, then it will serve
as evidence of the effect that the UN has on disputes within rivalries. However, if the opposite
proves to be true then we are left with evidence pointing to the ineffectiveness of the UN in this
area of conflict management.
Analysis
Because this project is a preliminary study of United Nations involvement, the goal is to find
whether or not differences exist between those disputes in which the UN becomes involved and
those in which they do not. In order to establish these differences (or lack thereof), simple
testing of means will be used for each variable in question.
For each variable to be tested, the cases will be separated into three groups. The first
group contains disputes in which the UN became involved, the second contains the cases in
which the UN did not become involved, and the final group contains the cases with missing data.
The mean will be calculated for the relevant variables for each group. So for each variable three
different means will be calculated – the mean for the UN cases, the mean for the non-UN cases,
20
and the mean for the unknown cases. The calculation of means in this study will show if there
are any differences between the types of cases involved.
In order to ensure that these differences are significant, and not due to chance, I will
employ a significance test in Microsoft Excel (the program used to compile and sort the MID
data set and my additions to it). The significance test used is the TTEST function found in
Microsoft Excel. The TTEST function reports the probability that the difference between the
means involved is due to chance. In accordance with the majority of work done in the social
sciences, if the probability is less than 5% (.05), then I will consider the difference between the
means significant. I will only test the significance of the difference between means for the UN
involved cases and the non-UN involved cases. The difference between the missing data cases
and UN involved/uninvolved will not be tested.
The TTEST function in Excel requires four pieces of information: array1, array2, the
number of tails, and the type of test. The information to be used for array1 is to be the data
found for the variable in question of all of the cases in which the UN did not become involved.
The data for the cases in which the UN did become involved will be used in array2. For each
calculation of significance, a two-tailed distribution will be used. This will test both sides of the
distribution curve instead of only testing one. There are three different types of tests that can be
done with the TTEST function; the first is a paired t-test, the second a two-sample equal variance
test, and the third a two-sample unequal variance test. Because there are two samples being
tested here (the UN involved cases vs. the non-UN involved cases), only the second or third t-test
should be used. The second test should be used if the distribution curves for each type of case
have equal variance, while the third test is used if the distribution curves have unequal variance.
Because the variances of the two underlying populations (the entire population of cases in which
21
the UN has become involved, and the entire population of cases in which the UN has not become
involved) are unknown to me, I will assume for this research that they are unequal. Therefore, I
will be using the third type of t-test.
The reason that I have chosen to use the two-tailed, third type of t-test is because it offers
the highest probability of the difference of means being left to chance. A one-tailed test would
probably be preferable to test some of the variables, and would lead to a much lower probability
that chance is a factor than the two-tailed tests (one tailed tests result in half of the probability of
two-tailed tests because they only test one side of the distribution curve). Also, the third type of
t-test usually results in higher probability numbers (as compared to type-two) because the
variances of the populations from which the samples are drawn are unequal. Therefore the
probability numbers that result from the t-tests used in this study will be as high as possible (as if
the tests were run under the most stringent statistical conditions possible). This will ensure that
any differences in means that are statistically significant at the .05 level are significant at that
level under the most stringent statistical conditions. For this reason, if any measures are found to
be significant using this test, we can be confident that they actually are.
Results
In addition to the variables that I created for this project, I will test two additional variables
originally contained within the MID data set. These variables are the Duration variable and
HIHOST. The HIHOST variable was discussed earlier in conjunction with the HOSTCHNG
variable. The Duration variable simply measures the duration of each dispute (in days). I should
like to discuss my findings for these two variables before presenting the results for my
hypotheses. This information shows that the disputes in which the United Nations become
involved are, in fact, different from those in which the UN does not become involved.
22
For the 100 disputes studied in this project, the average duration of dispute was 264 days.
The United Nations became involved in 39 of these disputes. For the 39 disputes in which the
UN became involved, the average duration of dispute was 496 days. There were 51 disputes in
which the UN did not become involved. The duration of these disputes averaged 115 days. The
10 disputes with missing data also averaged 115 days in duration. Disputes in which the United
Nations become involved last more than a year longer (381 days), on average, than those
disputes with no UN involvement. The probability that this result is by chance is less than one
half of one percent (.0046), making these results statistically significant. Disputes with UN
involvement last longer, on average, than those that have no UN involvement.
***Table 5 here***
Militarized disputes in which the UN is involved tend to have higher hostility levels as
well. The average hostility level of the 100 rivalry disputes was 3.65 (out of 5). This falls
between a show of force/alert/border violation and the use of force on the hostility scale. For the
UN disputes, the average hostility level was 3.8. The hostility level was only 3.53 for the
disputes in which the UN did not become involved. While this difference seems small, it is
nearly statistically significant, with a probability of .054 that the results were due to chance.
While this number is slightly higher than the target of .05, one must remember that the
significance test performed yields the highest probability possible that the difference was
because of chance. If we were to assume that the population variance was equal for each sample,
requiring the use of the type 2 t-test, and then only test one side of the distribution curve (one
tail), the probability would be cut in half, bringing it down to .027.
23
***Table 6 here***
There is clearly a difference between the two types of militarized disputes within
enduring rivalries. Disputes in which the UN becomes involved tend to last longer and are more
hostile. This does not necessarily mean that they are that way because of United Nations
involvement. There are two possible explanations for this data. The United Nations could, with
their involvement, prolong disputes and cause tensions to rise between disputants. This
explanation if it could be verified would show that the United Nations may have a detrimental
effect on the disputes in which they become involved, which would be a clear failure on the part
of the UN. Another, perhaps more feasible, explanation is that the United Nations only becomes
involved in the longest, most hostile disputes. This explanation is the intuitive explanation of the
preceding data, and is probably the correct one. It is only natural that the United Nations would
be most concerned about the most dangerous disputes (the longest, most hostile) and would
actively try to resolve those problems before turning to shorter, less hostile disputes.
It has been established that the UN is involved in the longer, more hostile disputes of
enduring rivalries, but what, if any, are the effects of this involvement? In answering this
question, I will return to the hypotheses outlined earlier in this paper. The hypotheses were
formed based on the previous research done in the area of United Nations conflict management.
The first hypothesis is concerned with the short-term effects of UN conflict management in
enduring rivalries and requires the CLEAROUT and CLEARSET variables to be tested. The
second and third hypotheses are associated with the long-term effects of UN conflict
management and require the DBD and HOSTCHNG variables to test. I will begin with the data
on the short-term effects of UN involvement in enduring rivalries.
24
If the United Nations is successful at affecting the outcome of a dispute, its involvement
should correspond to a higher percentage of settlements and clear outcomes than in the cases
with no UN involvement. The data, however, shows that this is not the case. Of the 100 cases
used in this study, only 92 had outcome and settlement data that could be tested with the
CLEAROUT and CLEARSET variables. In these 92 cases, a clear outcome resulted 12.0% of
the time. In the cases in which the United Nations became involved (34 of the 92), a clear
outcome resulted only 8.8% of the time. In the disputes with no UN involvement (49 of 92), a
clear outcome resulted 14.3% of the time. Even though these numbers are not statistically
significant, what is important is that United Nations involvement does not appear to lead to clear
outcomes in militarized disputes.
***Table 7 here***
The settlement numbers are not much better for the United Nations. Of the same 92
cases mentioned above, a settlement resulted 9.8% of the time. The UN has a settlement rate of
11.8% in these cases, which is not that much better than the 10.2% of cases that are settled
without UN involvement. The difference between the UN numbers versus the non-UN numbers,
unfortunately for the UN, is not statistically significant in the case of settlements either. This
means that UN involvement is no more likely to lead to a clear settlement in these disputes than
if the dispute witnesses no UN involvement.
***Table 8 here***
25
Now that the short-term effects of the United Nations have been discussed, I would like
to move on to the second and third hypotheses, and the long-term effects of the UN. These
hypotheses require the testing of the DBD and HOSTCHNG variables. There were 80 disputes
(of the 100 original disputes) that were given DBD and HOSTCHNG numbers. The average
duration between disputes within a rivalry for the 80 cases was approximately 639 days. For the
cases in which the United Nations became involved, the next dispute in that rivalry would occur,
on average, 611 days later. For the disputes that the UN did not become involved, the duration
between disputes was 745 days. This is a difference of 134 days. While the difference is not
statistically significant, this data shows that United Nations involvement is no more likely to
delay or end a recurring dispute than if the body remained uninvolved.
***Table 9 here***
United Nations involvement does not seem to have an effect on the future hostility level
of recurring disputes either. When the United Nations becomes involved in a dispute within an
enduring rivalry, the next dispute will increase in hostility 30% of the time. The next dispute in a
rivalry will only decrease in hostility 20% of the time after UN involvement. The numbers seem
to show that UN involvement is actually detrimental to the hostility levels within enduring
rivalries. When the United Nations does not become involved, there is only a 27.5% chance that
hostility will increase with the next dispute, and a 30% chance that hostility will decrease.
However, there is no statistically significant difference when the United Nations becomes
involved and when they do not.
26
***Table 10 here***
The figures presented do not provide sufficient evidence to reject the null hypotheses
presented at the outset of this paper. UN involvement does not affect the variables that were
tested in this study. Within enduring rivalries UN involvement does not lead to a greater
settlement rate than if the UN remains uninvolved. The involvement does not even reduce the
likelihood that the next dispute within the rivalry will be delayed or less hostile. What might be
the reasons for these findings? Perhaps there is no difference between the UN and non-UN
numbers because regional IGOs (Arab League, Organization of American States, Organization
of African Unity, etc.) become involved in disputes that the UN does not, and their successes
even out the numbers. This, however, cannot be ruled out until further studies have been
completed that test the success rates of non-UN conflict managers in enduring rivalries. Due to
the extremely low success rate of the UN in achieving a clear outcome or settlement (8.8% and
10.2% respectively) even if the non-UN conflict manager intervention cases were removed from
the study, and the UN cases were compared to the cases in which no conflict managers became
involved, it is extremely unlikely that there would be a statistically significant difference
between the two groups that would show the UN to be more successful than when no conflict
management is involved.
Another explanation of the lack of difference between the cases exhibiting UN
involvement and those that do not may be that the type of cases used in this study (enduring
rivalries) are simply not the type of cases that are conducive to UN success. Enduring rivalries
might be the type of cases that involve issues that have been so engrained in the politics of the
disputing parties that no amount of UN involvement will help to solve these problems. This
27
claim may have some merit if one looks to the overall numbers for clear outcomes and
settlements in militarized disputes for the time period studied. Of the 802 militarized disputes
that occurred from 1975-1992, 16.6% of them found a clear outcome, and 13.3% ended with a
settlement. Recall that the average rates of a clear outcome and settlement for enduring rivalry
disputes are 12.0% and 9.8%, respectively. While this is not a large difference, clearly enduring
rivalries are not as likely to be settled or result in a decisive outcome as other types of militarized
disputes. However, because the results of this study fall in line with that of Diehl et al (1996), it
is much more likely that it is not the type of case (whether it is a crisis studied by Diehl or a
dispute within enduring rivalry, as was used in this study) responsible for the inability of the
United Nations to bring about positive short and long-term results when managing conflict.
There is something inherent within the United Nations or the international system that is
responsible for the inability of the UN to produce significant results in direct conflict
management.
***Table 11 here***
The findings of this study seem to support aspects of both the liberal and realist theories
discussed at the beginning of this paper. Recall that liberal theories expect organizations like the
United Nations to have a meaningful impact in conflict management unless the current
construction of the international system is not conducive to cooperation. Realists, on the other
hand, believe that organizations like the United Nations are largely ceremonial organizations
(states only join to increase their status in the international arena, with no intention of
cooperating with any effort that is not in line with their own interests) that have little chance of
28
making a difference in conflict management. A liberal scholar interpreting the results of my
study can claim that there is something systematic that is keeping the UN from enjoying success
in conflict management. Once this change is made to the system UN success would dramatically
increase, even in the cases of enduring rivalries. A liberal may also point to other variables that
the UN may influence that were not included in this study. A realist, on the other hand, will
claim that the results are an endorsement of realist theory. The United Nations cannot bring
about peace when it is not in the best interest of the disputing parties to do so. Therefore the UN
will remain an impotent body in the area of conflict management despite any changes to the
international system or to the UN itself. The correct interpretation of this study probably lies
somewhere between the two viewpoints.
Conclusions
I began this project hoping to shed some light on an area of United Nations conflict management
that had never been studied before – in the cases of enduring rivalries. Does the involvement of
the United Nations within the militarized disputes of enduring rivalries lead to positive results in
managing/preventing conflict? The importance of this topic in international relations is
indisputable: there exists a relatively small list of dyads responsible for nearly half of the
militarized disputes and wars that occur in the international system. If it is possible to effectively
manage the conflict of enduring rivalries, then the number of militarized disputes and wars will
be drastically reduced. This paper explores one possible approach to abating conflict between
rivals: direct involvement by the United Nations. It is extremely important to look at the track
record of the UN in dealing with these cases to see if direct involvement by the UN will
reduce/end the incidence of disputes between rivals.
29
In beginning my research, I considered some of the theoretical perspectives of both
enduring rivalries and conflict management. Four theories (diffusion, rational actor, system
structure, and power transition) were considered as possible explanations of the creation and
continued existence of enduring rivalries in the international system. In addition to the theories
of enduring rivalries, the liberal and realist perspectives of conflict management by organizations
were presented. Previous research completed in the areas of enduring rivalries and conflict
management tends to provide evidence validating the system structure theory of rivalries (Goertz
and Diehl, 1995), and the realist theory of conflict management (Diehl et al, 1996). These
theories, taken together with the previous research, led to the formulation of hypotheses
contending that United Nations has no direct, positive effect (in either the long or short-term)
when it becomes involved in the militarized disputes of enduring rivalries.
Because the majority of all the previous studies of conflict management have focused on
the crisis level of the conflict process or higher, I chose to limit this project to a study of
militarized disputes (a lower level of conflict than crises). Because of my interest in the modern
track record of the UN, and the benefits that the dates provided, the study was further limited to
the 20-year time period between 1975 and 1995. Thus the study was restricted to 100 militarized
disputes among the 16 enduring rivalries still active in 1975.
The Dyadic MID data set was used to derive statistical measures of the effectiveness of
the United Nations within enduring rivalries for the 100 disputes mentioned above. Because the
MID set did not have a variable for UN involvement, I created my own (UNINVOL). Each
dispute was researched individually until a UN involvement number could be assigned to each
dispute (1 – involved, 2 – no involvement, X-0 – missing data). Once the cases were coded for
UN involvement, the cases in which the UN became involved could easily be compared to those
30
in which they did not. Variables for duration, duration between disputes (DBD), hostility
(HIHOST), change in hostility from one dispute to the next (HOSTCHNG), outcomes
(CLEAROUT), and settlements (CLEARSET) were tested in order to discover whether or not
United Nations involvement seemed to have an effect on the disputes.
The results of my study, in line with much of the previous data on UN conflict
management (especially the Diehl et al study of 1996), point to the ineffectiveness of the United
Nations to bring about positive results in the area of direct conflict management, both in the short
and long-term. The United Nations involves itself in longer, more hostile disputes, but this
involvement does not result in a greater likelihood of bringing about clear outcomes or
settlements to the disputes within enduring rivalries. UN involvement does not delay the
outbreak of future conflict within a rivalry, nor does its involvement result in lower hostility
levels in future disputes.
When reading the results of this study, I ask that the reader keep certain limitations in
mind. This is not a comprehensive study of the UN and enduring rivalries. It is not even a
complete look at the data for all rivalry disputes since the founding of the UN. It looks at the
most recent 20-year period for which data was readily available, and it only tests a small number
of variables (although the variables tested are extremely important). This was meant to be a
preliminary study of UN involvement within enduring rivalries to see if it could be linked to any
positive effects that might be fleshed out with further research. While no positive effects were
discovered in this study, it should not preclude further inquiry into the subject. This study can
serve as a starting point for a more comprehensive analysis (including every dispute within
rivalries since the inception of the UN and the testing of more variables) of the United Nations
involvement in enduring rivalries.
31
Though this research was meant to be a starting point, conclusions may still be drawn
from the results. The results suggest that direct involvement by the United Nations does not
influence the outcome of disputes in the ways that many have come to believe that it does
(lowering hostility, reducing recurrence of disputes, leading to settlement, etc.). The results also
lend credence to the systemic theories of rivalry and realist theories of international politics.
Recall that systemic theories require a change to the system to end rivalries; this requires much
more than simple conflict management by an organization. Realists may draw the rash
conclusion that these results serve as further evidence of the failings and ultimate worthlessness
of the United Nations.
Despite the results of this study, one should not be led to the conclusion that the United
Nations is wholly ineffective in managing conflict. There are many other aspects of UN conflict
management (other than direct involvement) to be studied at all levels of the conflict process in
addition to the countless other areas outside of its conflict management activities that the UN
may have success in limiting or deterring the outbreak of conflict. It is important that future
research focus on United Nations involvement in the earliest stages of the conflict process,
including a complete look at militarized disputes, non-militarized disputes, and conflicts of
interest. The data for militarized disputes is available in the MID data set; it only lacks a United
Nations code. I fear that data for non-militarized disputes and simple conflicts of interest will be
difficult to compile, but this should not deter political scientists from studying these levels of
conflict as thoroughly as possible. The lower levels of the conflict process are extremely
important to the study of conflict management because the United Nations may make its biggest
difference in the earliest stages of a conflict. As the data seems to suggest, once a conflict
32
evolves to the militarized dispute and crisis level, the UN is less likely to play a meaningful role
in managing the conflict.
As I stated previously in this paper, the evidence that is offered in this study is not a
complete picture of United Nations conflict management nor is it even an exhaustive depiction of
UN conflict management in cases of enduring rivalry. The purpose of this paper has been to
offer evidence in support of the bigger picture of UN conflict management and introduce the
subject of UN conflict management to a new arena, that of enduring rivalries. This paper, and
the data gathering methods described within, can be useful to the study of international relations
because it serves as a model of what the next step in the study of conflict management should
look like. It is my hope that the UNINVOL code, or a variation thereof, can be expanded and
applied to the MID data set for the entire time period since the founding of the United Nations.
This would provide a comprehensive picture of the UN attempts at conflict management at the
militarized dispute level.
33
Table 1: Comparison of Operational Definitions of Enduring Rivalries*
Author
Minimum Length
(Years)
Minimum Number
of Disputes
Maximum Time
between Disputes
(Years)
Termination
Gochman and Maoz
(1984)
None
7
None
None
Wayman (1990)
11
2
10
10 years without a
dispute
Diehl (1985)
None
3
15 initially, 10 after
rivalry is
established
10 years without a
dispute
COW Goertz & Diehl
(1993)
20
6
15 initially, 10 after
rivalry is
established
15 years without a
dispute
*Table taken from Goertz and Diehl (1993), pp.162
34
Table 2: Empirical Comparison of Operational Definitions of Enduring Rivalries*
Author
Total
Rivalries
Major/Major
Major/Minor
Minor/Minor
Average
Number of
Disputes
Average
Duration
(Years)
Wars
Gochman &
Maoz
52
5
26
21
11.35
77.67
35
Wayman
276
30
115
131
3.72
10.35
104
Diehl
148
17
48
83
4.98
13.47
64
COW Goertz
& Diehl**
44
8
13
23
9.45
43
Unavailable
*Table taken from Goertz and Diehl (1993), pp. 164
** Data for Goertz and Diehl taken from Thompson (1995), pp. 199
35
Table 3: Enduring Rivalries 1815-1976, according to Diehl and Goertz*
Dyad
Number of Disputes
Rivalry Duration
Russia-Japan
17
1895-1976
United States-Mexico
16
1836-1893
Greece-Ottoman Empire
16
1829-1919
Syria-Israel
16
1948-1976
Italy-Ottoman Empire
15
1888-1926
Ecuador-Peru
14
1893-1955
India-Pakistan
14
1947-1976
China-Japan
13
1874-1937
Russia-Britain
12
1877-1923
Soviet Union-United States
12
1946-1973
Egypt-Israel
12
1948-1973
China-United States
11
1949-1974
Spain-United States
11
1850-1875
Britain-Ottoman Empire
11
1876-1922
Thailand-Kampuchea
11
1953-1976
China-India
10
1950-1976
Bolivia-Paraguay
10
1906-1938
Russia-Ottoman Empire
9
1876-1921
Britain-United States
9
1837-1861
France-Germany
9
1905-1939
Laos-North Vietnam
9
1958-1971
Austria-Italy
8
1843-1915
China-France
8
1860-1914
Germany-Belgium
8
1912-1939
Jordan-Israel
8
1948-1976
Chile-Argentina
8
1952-1976
Zambia-Zimbabwe
8
1966-1976
France-Ottoman Empire
7
1880-1920
Britain-Italy
7
1911-1940
Britain-Japan
7
1932-1954
United States-Ecuador
7
1952-1976
Peru-Chile
7
1871-1920
Bolivia-Chile
7
1857-1884
Chile-Argentina
7
1873-1900
Greece-Turkey
7
1958-1976
Somalia-Ethiopia
7
1960-1975
Britain-Germany
6
1900-1939
Britain-Brazil
6
1826-1862
United States-Haiti
6
1869-1891
Iraq-Israel
6
1948-1976
Afghanistan-Pakistan
6
1949-1976
India-Nepal
6
1950-1969
Lebanon-Israel
6
1965-1976
Zambia-South Africa
6
1968-1976
*Table taken from Thompson (1995), pp. 199
36
Table 4: Active Enduring Rivalries 1975-1995
State A
Code A
State B
Code B
United States
2
Ecuador
130
Disputes From
1975-1995
1
United States
2
USSR/Russia
365
14
Chile
155
Argentina
160
7
Greece
350
Turkey
360
10
USSR/Russia
365
China
710
8
USSR/Russia
365
Japan
740
8
Somalia
520
Ethiopia
530
8
Zambia
551
Zimbabwe
552
2
Zambia
551
South Africa
560
4
Iraq
645
Israel
666
4
Egypt
651
Israel
666
6
Syria
652
Israel
666
9
Lebanon
660
Israel
666
4
Afghanistan
700
Pakistan
770
3
China
710
India
750
3
India
750
Pakistan
770
9
Total Number
of Disputes
100
37
Table 5: Dispute Length
Average Length of Dispute (in days)
Number of Disputes
UN Involvement
496*
39
No UN Involvement
115*
51
Missing Data
115
10
Total
264
100
* Significance of the difference between means is .0046
Table 6: Hostility Levels
Average Hostility Level
Number of Disputes
UN Involvement*
3.795
39
No UN Involvement*
3.529
51
Missing Data
3.7
10
Total
3.65
100
*Significance of the difference between means is .0537
38
Table7: Clear Outcome Percentage
Clear Outcome Percentage
Number of Disputes
UN Involvement*
8.824%
34
No UN Involvement*
14.286%
49
Missing Data
11.111%
9
Total
12.0%
92
*Significance of the difference between means is .44164
Table 8: Clear Settlement Percentage
Clear Settlement Percentage
Number of Disputes
UN Involvement*
11.765%
34
No UN Involvement*
10.204%
49
Missing Data
0%
9
Total
9.783%
92
*Significance of the difference between means is .82691
Table 9: Duration between Disputes
Average Duration Between Disputes (in days)
Number of Disputes
UN Involvement*
610.8
31
No UN Involvement*
745.05
40
Missing Data
298
10
Total
638.825
81
*Significance of the difference between means is .4807
39
Table 10: Hostility Change
Percent followed by an
Percent followed by a
Percent followed by the same
Number of Disputes
increase in hostility (n)
decrease in hostility (n)
level of hostility (n)
UN Involvement
30.0% (9)1
20.0% (6)2
50.0% (15)3
30
No UN involvement
27.5% (11) 1
30.0% (12)2
42.5% (17)3
40
Missing Data
20.0% (2)
20.0% (2)
60.0% (6)
10
Total
27.5% (22)
25.0% (20)
47.5% (38)
80
1
Significance of the difference between means is .8228
Significance of the difference between means is .3417
3
Significance of the difference between means is .5410
2
Table 11: Outcome and Settlement Comparison (Enduring Rivalries vs. all MID), 1975-1995
Clear Outcome Percentage (n)
Clear Settlement Percentage (n)
Total Number of Disputes
Enduring Rivalries, 1975-1995
12.0% (11)
9.783% (9)
92
All MID, 1975-1995
16.6% (133)
13.3% (107)
802
40
Appendix A:
Data
41
Codebook and Operational Definitions1
DISNO – Correlates of War (COW) dispute number
STATE A – COW number of state A in dyad
NAME A – Abbreviated name of state A in dyad
STATE B – COW number of state B in dyad
NAME B – Abbreviated name of state B in dyad
STRTDAY – Start day of dispute
STRTMNT – Start month of dispute
STRTYR – Start year of dispute
ENDDAY – End day of dispute
ENDMNT – End month of dispute
ENDYR – End year of dispute
UNINVOL – United Nations Involvement
0 – The United Nations was not involved in the MID
1 – The United Nations was involved in the MID
X-0 – No mention of UN involvement in Keesings Online, NY Times (Lexis Nexis), Lexis
Nexis (General Search)
United Nations involvement is defined in this paper as an action taken by the United
Nations in order to end the hostilities or resolve the issues responsible for hostilities within
the MID. Involvement in this study includes the following actions: fact-finding, offering of
good offices (minimal involvement in both the content and process of resolving a dispute),
condemnation (includes an implied or explicit demand to desist, a request for member aid to
the victim of hostile activity), call for action by adversaries (includes call for cease-fire,
withdrawal, negotiation, member action to facilitate termination), mediation (includes
proposing a solution, offering advice, and conciliation of differences), arbitration (formal
binding settlement by arbitral body), sanctions, observer group, emergency military forces.
Any resolution by either the Security Council or General Assembly attempting to end the
dispute between governments is considered involvement. Any action of the sort described
above is coded as 1. Failed resolutions, discussion without resolution, humanitarian efforts,
and acts vetoed by the Security Council are considered non-actions and are coded as 0.
Duration – Duration (in days) of the dispute
DBD – Duration (in days) between this dispute and the next within the same rivalry
HOSTCHNG – Hostility level change from this dispute to the next within the same rivalry
0 – Hostility level remains the same
1 – Hostility level decreases in the next dispute
2 – Hostility level increases in the next dispute
Hihost – Highest level of hostility reached in the dispute
1 – No militarized action
2 – Threat to use force
3 – Display of force
4 – Use of force
5 – War
Hiact – Action Code [Hostility Level]
42
1 – No militarized action [1]
2 – Threat to use force [2]
3 – Threat to blockade [2]
4 – Threat to occupy territory [2]
5 – Threat to declare war [2]
6 – Threat to use nuclear weapons [2]
7 – Show of troops [3]
8 – Show of ships [3]
9 – Show of planes [3]
10 – Alert [3]
11 – Nuclear alert [3]
12 – Mobilization [3]
13 – Fortify border [3]
14 – Border violation [3]
15 – Blockade [4]
16 – Occupation of territory [4]
17 – Seizure [4]
18 – Clash [4]
19 – Raid [4]
20 – Declaration of war [4]
21 – Use of CBR weapons [4]
22 – Interstate war [5]
23 – Joins interstate war [5]
-9 – Missing [-9]
OUTCOME – Outcome of dispute
1 – Victory for side A
2 – Victory for side B
3 – Yield by side A
4 – Yield by side B
5 – Stalemate
6 – Compromise
7 – Dispute Relased
8 – Unclear
9 – Joins ongoing war
-9 – Missing
SETTLMNT – Settlement type of dispute
1 – Negotiated
2 – Imposed
3 – None
4 – Unclear
-9 – Missing
CLEAROUT – Was there a clear outcome to the dispute?
0 – Unclear outcome (codes 5,8,9,-9 in the OUTCOME column)
1 – Clear outcome (codes 1,2,3,4,6,7 in the OUTCOME column)
CLEARSET – Was there a clear settlement in the dispute?
0 – Unclear settlement (codes 3,4,-9 in the SETTLMNT column)
1 – Clear settlement (codes 1,2 in the SETTLMENT column)
1
Gochman and Maoz, 1984; Bremer and Singer, 1996; Ghosn and Bennet, 2003; Ghosen,
Palmer, and Bremer, 2004.
43
Enduring Rivalry MID and United Nations Involvement2
STR
Disp STATE NAME STATE NAME STRT T
Num
A
A
B
B
DAY MNT
358
710 CHN
750 IND
20
10
365
365 USR
740 JPN
6
9
1289
350 GRC
640 TUR
3
6
1290
350 GRC
640 TUR
8
1
1428
520 SOM
530 ETH
14
12
1430
551 ZAM
552 ZIM
10
10
2053
700 AFG
770 PAK
26
3
2054
700 AFG
770 PAK
18
9
2069
520 SOM
530 ETH
22
2
2070
520 SOM
530 ETH
14
4
2071
520 SOM
530 ETH
24
2
2072
520 SOM
530 ETH
30
6
2073
520 SOM
530 ETH
30
1
2074
520 SOM
530 ETH
20
12
2075
520 SOM
530 ETH
17
9
2081
155 CHL
160 ARG
14
7
2082
155 CHL
160 ARG
18
8
2083
155 CHL
160 ARG
7
9
2084
155 CHL
160 ARG
25
4
2085
155 CHL
160 ARG
21
9
2086
155 CHL
160 ARG
18
8
2087
155 CHL
160 ARG
19
10
2101
710 CHN
750 IND
27
2
2102
710 CHN
750 IND
1
12
2174
350 GRC
640 TUR
1
11
2175
350 GRC
640 TUR
21
3
2176
350 GRC
640 TUR
1
12
2177
350 GRC
640 TUR
17
10
2179
350 GRC
640 TUR
27
6
2222
2 USA
365 USR
9
4
2223
2 USA
365 USR
19
11
2224
2 USA
365 USR
9
8
2225
2 USA
365 USR
31
8
2226
2 USA
365 USR
13
3
2227
2 USA
365 USR
4
5
STRT END END END UN
HOST Hi Hi OUT SETTL CLEAR CLEAR
YR DAY MNT YR INVOL Duration DBD CHNG host act COME MNT
OUT
SET
1975 20 10 1975
0
1 1226
1
4 18
5
3
0
0
1976 31 11 1976
0
87 281
0
3 9
5
3
0
0
1976
1
9 1976
1
90 791
2
3 10
5
3
0
0
1975
8
1 1975
0
1 512
2
2 2
5
3
0
0
1975
4
1 1976
X-0
22 414
2
4 18
0
0
0
0
1976 31 11 1977
1
419
4 20
0
0
0
0
1979 14
4 1982
1
1116 522
1
4 19
0
0
0
0
1983 30
4 1987
1
1321 653
2
3 7
0
0
0
0
1977 14
3 1978
0
390
31
1
5 22
0
0
0
0
1978
7
2 1979
0
300 382
0
4 19
0
0
0
0
1980 13
6 1981
0
476 382
0
4 18
0
0
0
0
1982 13
8 1983
0
410 170
0
4 19
0
0
0
0
1984 26
5 1984
0
118 208
0
4 19
5
3
0
0
1984
2
1 1985
0
14 258
0
4 18
0
0
0
0
1985 22 10 1985
0
36
4 18
5
3
0
0
1977 10
2 1978
0
212 189
0
3 9
0
0
0
0
1978
9
1 1979
0
145 607
2
3 12
0
0
0
0
1980
9
2 1981
0
156
65
0
4 17
0
0
0
0
1981 29
4 1981
0
5 145
0
4 17
5
3
0
0
1981 23
2 1982
0
156 541
1
4 19
0
0
0
0
1983 18
8 1983
0
1 427
2
3 9
6
1
1
1
1984 19 10 1984
0
1
4 19
5
1
0
1
1979 27
2 1979
0
1 2103
2
3 10
5
3
0
0
1985
4
6 1987
0
551
4 18
0
0
0
0
1978
1 11 1978
1
1 871
1
4 19
5
3
0
0
1981 28
3 1982
1
373 248
2
3 9
0
0
0
0
1982 10
3 1984
0
466 221
1
4 19
0
0
0
0
1984 13
3 1985
1
148 471
2
2 2
0
0
0
0
1986 31
7 1987
0
400 530
1
4 19
0
0
0
0
1977 10
4 1977
0
2 601
1
4 17
7
3
1
0
1978
2
1 1979
0
45 220
2
3 8
0
0
0
0
1979 10
8 1979
0
2
21
1
4 17
7
1
1
1
1979 20 11 1979
X-0
81 114
0
3 7
5
3
0
0
1980 19
3 1980
0
7
48
1
3 8
5
3
0
0
1980
4
5 1980
0
1 373
2
2 2
5
3
0
0
44
Disp STATE NAME STATE NAME STRT
Num
A
A
B
B
DAY
2228
2 USA
365 USR
12
2229
2 USA
365 USR
9
2229
365 USR
740 JPN
23
2230
2 USA
365 USR
12
2231
2 USA
365 USR
24
2232
2 USA
365 USR
24
2233
2 USA
365 USR
13
2571
551 ZAM
560 SAF
19
2639
750 IND
770 PAK
7
2640
750 IND
770 PAK
8
2641
750 IND
770 PAK
20
2642
750 IND
770 PAK
25
2643
750 IND
770 PAK
17
2644
750 IND
770 PAK
14
2714
365 USR
710 CHN
4
2715
365 USR
710 CHN
11
2716
365 USR
710 CHN
27
2717
365 USR
710 CHN
5
2718
365 USR
710 CHN
12
2726
365 USR
740 JPN
1
2727
365 USR
740 JPN
20
2728
365 USR
740 JPN
12
2810
551 ZAM
560 SAF
9
2964
365 USR
740 JPN
7
2976
365 USR
740 JPN
3
2982
2 USA
365 USR
16
3005
551 ZAM
560 SAF
23
3007
365 USR
710 CHN
12
3101
645 IRQ
666 ISR
7
3105
2 USA
130 ECU
25
3107
652 SYR
666 ISR
12
3127
551 ZAM
560 SAF
6
3131
551 ZAM
552 ZIM
11
3180
645 IRQ
666 ISR
28
3381
651 EGY
666 ISR
15
STR
T
MNT
5
9
6
9
11
3
3
5
7
9
10
6
1
10
7
3
1
10
7
4
5
11
4
9
4
12
8
12
6
10
12
7
5
12
10
STRT END END END UN
HOST Hi Hi OUT SETTL CLEAR CLEAR
YR DAY MNT YR INVOL Duration DBD CHNG Host act COME MNT
OUT
SET
1981 14
5 1981
0
3 483
0
4 17
7
3
1
0
1982 24
1 1983
X-0
138 243
1
4 16
0
0
0
0
1982 24
1 1983
X-0
216 658
1
4 16
0
0
0
0
1984 19
9 1984
X-0
8 186
0
4 17
7
3
1
0
1983 20
5 1984
X-0
189 115
2
3 9
0
0
0
0
1985
7
9 1985
0
168 122
1
4 19
5
3
0
0
1986 13
3 1986
0
1
3 8
5
3
0
0
1986 19
5 1986
0
1 325
1
3 14
5
3
0
0
1981
3 11 1981
1
120 310
1
4 18
5
3
0
0
1982
8
9 1982
1
1 407
2
3 10
5
3
0
0
1983 31
1 1984
1
104 146
0
4 18
0
0
0
0
1984 30
8 1984
1
67 140
0
4 18
5
3
0
0
1985
7 10 1985
1
264 373
0
4 19
5
3
0
0
1986 15 11 1986
1
33 1184
0
4 19
5
3
0
0
1977
5
8 1977
X-0
32 218
0
4 18
5
3
0
0
1978
9
5 1978
0
60 217
1
4 19
5
3
0
0
1979 14
2 1980
X-0
384 234
0
4 18
0
0
0
0
1980 29 10 1980
0
255 2082
0
4 18
5
3
0
0
1986 12
7 1986
0
1 2880
0
4 18
5
3
0
0
1975 18
6 1975
X-0
79 445
0
3 8
5
3
0
0
1978
2 10 1979
0
501 914
0
3 8
0
0
0
0
1984 23 11 1984
0
12 3290
2
3 9
5
3
0
0
1987 25
4 1987
0
17
4 19
5
3
0
0
1977
7
9 1977
0
1 255
0
3 14
5
3
0
0
1982
3
4 1982
0
1
81
2
3 14
5
3
0
0
1982 16 12 1982
0
1
3 9
5
3
0
0
1978 26
8 1978
0
4 2823
1
4 19
5
3
0
0
1978
7
3 1979
0
88
3 8
0
0
0
0
1981
7
6 1981
0
1 204
0
3 14
1
3
1
0
1980 20
1 1981
0
88
4 17
0
0
0
0
1980
8
1 1981
1
28
3 7
0
0
0
0
1977
2 11 1977
1
119 295
0
4 18
5
3
0
0
1977 21 12 1979
1
955
4 20
0
0
0
0
1981
3
1 1982
0
7 3011
2
3 14
0
0
0
0
1975
6
3 1976
1
145 618
2
2 2
0
0
0
0
45
Disp STATE NAME STATE NAME STRT
Num
A
A
B
B
DAY
3382
651 EGY
666 ISR
14
3383
651 EGY
666 ISR
3
3384
651 EGY
666 ISR
20
3385
651 EGY
666 ISR
16
3439
652 SYR
666 ISR
26
3440
652 SYR
666 ISR
1
3441
652 SYR
666 ISR
27
3442
652 SYR
666 ISR
4
3443
652 SYR
666 ISR
13
3444
652 SYR
666 ISR
24
3444
663 LEB
666 ISR
24
3637
2 USA
365 USR
7
3909
350 GRC
640 TUR
12
3915
651 EGY
666 ISR
3
3916
700 AFG
770 PAK
11
3956
645 IRQ
666 ISR
2
3959
750 IND
770 PAK
11
3981
645 IRQ
666 ISR
4
3985
750 IND
770 PAK
1
3994
660 LEB
666 ISR
20
3995
652 SYR
666 ISR
5
3995
663 LEB
666 ISR
11
4007
770 PAK
750 IND
17
4040
640 TUR
350 GRC
8
4042
365 RUS
740 JPN
26
4052
710 CHN
365 RUS
9
4092
640 TUR
350 GRC
28
4104
710 CHN
365 RUS
-9
4182
666 ISR
652 SYR
12
4182
666 ISR
660 LEB
6
2
STR
T
MNT
11
7
1
8
11
7
6
10
6
8
8
1
1
6
2
4
2
10
5
9
6
4
9
6
11
6
12
6
7
4
STRT END END END UN
HOST Hi Hi OUT SETTL CLEAR CLEAR
YR DAY MNT YR INVOL Duration DBD CHNG Host act COME MNT
OUT
SET
1977 19 11 1977
1
6 591
0
3 10
5
3
0
0
1979
3
7 1979
0
1 1328
0
3 9
6
1
1
1
1983 21
1 1983
0
2 207
2
3 7
3
1
1
1
1983
5
7 1985
1
691 1429
0
4 17
0
0
0
0
1975 23
9 1977
1
668 281
0
4 19
0
0
0
0
1978 11
7 1978
1
11 351
0
4 18
5
3
0
0
1979 31
2 1980
1
250 177
0
4 19
0
0
0
0
1982 14
6 1984
1
620 364
0
4 19
0
0
0
0
1985
7
8 1986
1
421 2531
0
4 19
0
0
0
0
1980 25
7 1981
1
338 315
2
4 18
5
1
0
1
1980 25
7 1981
1
338 260
2
4 18
5
1
0
0
1986
7
1 1986
0
1
65
0
3 8
5
3
0
0
1989 12
1 1989
0
1 1974
2
3 10
5
3
0
0
1989
3
6 1989
0
1
4 19
5
3
0
0
1989
7
4 1989
1
56
4 19
5
3
0
0
1990 28
2 1991
1
333 218
1
4 19
0
0
0
0
1990 22 12 1990
1
315 129
0
4 18
6
1
1
1
1991
4 10 1991
1
1
3 14
5
3
0
0
1991
2
9 1991
1
124 746
2
4 18
5
3
0
0
1977 13
6 1978
1
269 803
0
4 16
8
1
1
1
1982
1
9 1982
1
88
34
1
5 22
0
0
0
0
1982
5
6 1985
1
739 2863
1
5 22
2
1
1
1
1993 17
7 1999
1
2130
5 20
1994
8
6 1995
1
1 203
0
4 16
1993
-9
9 1995
0
669
4 16
1993 12
6 1993
X-0
353
0
4 15
1995
9
7 1996
1
195
4 17
1994
-9
6 1994
0
30
4 16
1993
1
7 2001
1
2911
4 17
1993 18 12 2001
1
3531
4 17
Maoz, 1999; Bremer and Singer, 1996; Ghosen, Palmer, and Bremer, 2004
46
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