Cuban Missile Crisis 1
Mariam Shadid
Timeline – Cuban Missile Crisis
Date
Event
January 1st
1959
Batista flees Cuba
February
16th 1959
Fidel Castro (Marxist Leninist) assumes power and becomes Premier of
October
28th 1959
NATO signatories, Turkey and US jointly agree to deploy 15 Jupiter
February
1960
Russians sign a trade agreement with Cuba to exchange Cuban sugar
May 7th
1960
Cuba and USSR establish diplomatic relations
July 8th
1960
Eisenhower administration responds by cutting back Cuba’s sugar
Cuba
missiles to Turkey as a defence against Soviet invasion
or Soviet oil, machinery and technicians
exports by 80%. This was followed by a US trade embargo on Cuba’s
imports
December
19th 1960
Cuba openly aligns its foreign and domestic policies with that of Russia
August
1960
US begin to mobilise opposition towards Cuba
January 3rd
1961
Cuban and US diplomatic relations are severed
Early 1961
CIA begin training a group of 1400 Cuban rebels to overthrow Castro
April 12th
1961
US president Kennedy states that the US will not intervene militarily in
April 17th
1961
Cuban rebels invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. It was a failure.
overthrowing Castro
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October
21st 1961
Kennedy publicises the absence of a conceived “missile gap”. Where
the US possessed several hundred ICBMs, the Soviets only had 25. This
highlighted Russia’s nuclear ineptitude
May 21st
1962
Khrushchev suggests that the USSR should deploy missiles to Cuba
June 10th
1962
Russian leaders all vote in favour to deploy missiles to Cuba. Castro
agrees with the deployment and claims that it would act as a deterrent
from a possible US invasion
July 1962
Khrushchev’s rapid deployment of missiles leads to the installation of
36 MRBMs (Medium Range Ballistic Missiles) and 24 IRMs (Immediate
Range Missiles)
August 16th
1962
CIA director, John McCone suggests to Kennedy that the Soviets are
October
14th 1962
A U2 spy plane reconnaissance mission took photographs of missile
installing MRBMs in Cuba.
sites in Western Cuba. By this stage, 42 000 Soviet troops are stationed
in Cuba and 80 cruise missiles are in place
October
15th 1962
National Photographic Intelligence Centre confirms the existence of
October
16th 1962
McGeorge Bundy informs Kennedy of the presence of MRBMs in Cuba.
(Day 1)
the National Security Council. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence
surface-to-air missiles
Kennedy immediately establishes EX-COMM: Executive Committee of
outlines the diplomatic and military courses of action to take.
October
17th 1962
The majority of EX-COMM strongly advocate for a military air strike on
(Day 2)
(Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles) capable of hitting all of
Cuba, rather than a blockade. Further U2 flights that night reveal IRBM
continental US except for Washington and Oregon
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October
18th 1962
Kennedy and Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrie Gromyko meet. Kennedy
advises Gromyko that missiles in Cuba will not be tolerated by the US
(Day 3)
October
19th 1962
Kennedy is torn between imposing a naval blockade on Cuba or to
have a military air strike
(Day 4)
October
20th 1962
Kennedy is leaning towards a blockade. It would enable American
(Day 5)
equipment from reaching the island until the missiles were removed. A
naval vessels to encircle Cuba and prevent any ship carrying military
blockade would also enable the US to start with minimal action and
increase pressure if needed, and possibly avoid armed conflict.
October
21st 1962
Kennedy decides on a naval blockade, however is advised to use the
(Day 6)
international law is considered as an act of war, and by using the word
word “quarantine” instead of “blockade”. A blockade, under
“quarantine”, it made the Soviets appear to be the aggressors
October
22nd 1962
Kennedy addresses the missile deployment in a 17 minute speech
(Day 7)
states that in order to “halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine
which is televised nationally. He reveals the presence of missiles and
on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being
initiated”. He received an overwhelmingly positive reaction towards
his speech. Khrushchev replied to Kennedy in a letter that day,
claiming that the missiles are for defensive purposes
October
23rd 1962
The Organization of American States (OAS) approves the quarantine on
Cuba
(Day 8)
October
24th 1962
Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, proposes a “cooling
(Day 9)
UN meeting, Soviet ambassador, Valerian Zorian denied the presence
off period” and the Kennedy administration reject this proposal. In a
of missiles in Cuba, whilst US ambassador Adlai Stevenson presented
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photographs of missile sites, humiliating the Soviets and winning over
the UN. Kennedy decides to enact the quarantine the following day.
Meanwhile, Soviet ships continue to approach the quarantine line,
805km away from the Cuban coast and the US military alert is raised to
DEFCON 2; the highest level ever in US history. Kennedy ordered the
navy to give "the highest priority to tracking the submarines and to put
into effect the greatest possible safety measures to protect our own
aircraft carriers and other vessels."
October
25th 1962
EX-COMM discusses a proposal to remove missiles in Turkey, in
exchange for the withdrawal of Cuban missiles
(Day 10)
October
26th 1962
EX-COMM receive a letter from Khrushchev, stating that the Soviets
(Day 11)
again. On Khrushchev’s part, this letter was seen as a willingness to
will withdraw their missiles if the US pledge never to invade Cuba
resolving the dispute. However, a CIA report reveals that missile sites
are continually being developed and that the Soviets attempted to
camouflage them
October
27th 1962
A U2 spy plane flies off track and drifts into Soviet air space on what
(Day 12)
manage to shoot it down. Meanwhile, Khrushchev sends Kennedy
was reported to be a “routine air sampling mission”. The Soviets
another letter, demanding that the US withdraw their missiles in
Turkey. The White House was “in hysteria”. Domestic pressures led
Kennedy to respond only to Khrushchev’s first letter, and that way, he
avoided publicly withdrawing Jupiter missiles in Turkey
October
28th 1962
Khrushchev announces over the radio that the missiles will finally be
(Day 13)
Khrushchev’s office to write a letter, signifying the retreat of the
removed from Cuba. That night, the Presidium gathered in
Kremlin and the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis
October
Kennedy orders that the quarantine remains and also orders the
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29th 1962
continuation of low level reconnaissance flights
November
21st 1962
Kennedy lifts the quarantine on Cuba, after being reassured by the
Late
November
1962
US withdrawal of Jupiter nuclear missiles in Turkey
Soviets that all missiles will be dismantled
Explain
The deployment of missiles to Cuba was influenced by several factors. Khrushchev’s need to
redress the strategic imbalance of power which was initially tipped in favour of the US and
his emotional investment in the Cuban revolution motivated him to deploy missiles to Cuba.
This, coupled with the US’ reaction to the deployment of missiles culminated into the Cuban
Missile Crisis of 1962.
Khrushchev’s need to redress the strategic imbalance which was in the United States’ favour
was a contributing factor to his deployment of missiles in Cuba. As Gaddis explains, the
Cuban Missile Crisis arose because Khrushchev understood more clearly than Kennedy that
the West was winning the Cold War1. The installation of US Jupiter missiles in a bordering
country of the Soviet Union2 was a politically3 and militarily threatening prospect for
Khrushchev. With the missiles in close proximity, the Soviet Union was vulnerable to US
nuclear attack which effectively disrupted the balance of power and as a result, the strategic
balance tipped in favour of the US. This posed serious problems for Khrushchev who relied
heavily on the notion of “Potemkinism”4 to conceal the presence of a missile gap. While
Khrushchev led the US to believe that the Soviet Union were turning “missiles like sausages”,
in reality, the Soviet Union only possessed 25 ICBMs, as opposed to several hundreds that
the US had produced. However, Khrushchev’s primary objective in redressing the strategic
imbalance was to enhance the Soviets’ ability to launch nuclear attacks on the US. By
1
Gaddis, John Lewis. Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford University Press (1998) pg. 247
In October 1959, the US deployed missiles to Turkey – a bordering country of the Soviet Union, as
well as a NATO signatory
3
Thompson, Robert Smith. The Missiles of October, Simon and Schuster (1992) pg. 168
4
A phrase Gaddis uses to describe something that seems impressive but in fact lacks substance
2
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deploying medium and intermediate range missiles for “defensive purposes” to Cuba only 90
miles off the coast of Florida, Khrushchev had effectively changed the military situation. This
is supported by Gaddis who states “IRBM + Cuba = ICBM”. Post revisionist historians James
Daniel and John Hubbell further this idea by arguing that “by moving intermediate-range
missiles to Cuba… Russia was rapidly narrowing the gap... The presence of Russian missiles in
Cuba had drastically altered the balance of world power.” Thus, by placing missiles in
America’s “backyard”, Khrushchev had changed the military situation and as a result,
corrected the strategic imbalance of power.
The USSR’s deployment of missiles was also influenced by Cuba’s need for protection from
an imminent US invasion as well as Khrushchev’s emotional attachment to the Cuban
Revolution. The attempted invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 saw the emergence of the
subsequent plan “Operation Mongoose”5. Castro looked to the Soviet Union for protection
from an imminent US invasion and Khrushchev responded by deploying missiles.
Khrushchev’s emotional investment in Cuba is illustrated through his decision to deploy
IRBMs to Cuba in response to Castro’s appeals and American aggression. It is important to
note that Cuba represented a thriving communist revolution that had occurred in a
developing country and Khrushchev needed to ensure that it was successful in order to
maintain his credibility, as he was at the forefront of communism. Moreover, the
suppression of the Cuban Revolution would have meant the defeat for the whole socialist
camp6, which directly influenced Khrushchev’s decision to protect Cuba from US imperialist
aggression7, and consequently deploy missiles. Post revisionist historian Gaddis supports this
notion, by claiming that the deployment of missiles to Cuba was “…both an old Bolshevik’s
romantic response to Castro and to the Cuban revolution and an old soldier’s stratagem to
defend an endangered outpost and ally.”8 Hence, the deployment of missiles was partially in
response to American provocations and Cuba’s need for protection, as well as Khrushchev’s
emotional attachment to the Cuban revolution.
It can be argued that what essentially transformed the Cuban Missile Crisis into one of the
most perilous of the Cold War crises was the response of the US to the deployment of
5
Also known as the Cuban Project, “Operation Mongoose” was a secret plan directed by the CIA
which aimed at stimulating a rebellion in Cuba and removing the communists from power
6
Gaddis (1998) pg. 263
7
Thompson (1992) pg. 168
8
Gaddis (1998) pg. 263
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missiles to Cuba. While Khrushchev’s first intention was to protect Cuba from American
invasion, the US perceived the Soviet sphere of influence to be rapidly expanding into a
neighbouring American nation. The discovery of missiles in the U.S’ figurative backyard was
an alarming prospect for the White House and with the volatile congressional elections only
three weeks away9 Kennedy needed to ensure he acted decisively as “such news would
undermine the Democrat’s legitimacy in preserving the country’s security.”10 However, in
response to the deployment of missiles to Cuba, EX-COMM advocated heavily for military
retaliation, which effectively transformed the situation into a crisis.
Thus, the Cuban Missile Crisis arose as a result of Khrushchev’s gamble as he deployed
missiles to the U.S’ figurative “backyard”. Khrushchev was motivated by a need to redress
the strategic imbalance which was in the United State’s favour and Castro’s acceptance of
the missiles influenced the US to respond militarily. All these factors culminated into the
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; when the world teetered on the edge of nuclear precipice11.
AsSess
The Cuban Missile Crisis had an immense and significant impact on US-Soviet relations and
essentially laid the foundations for the beginning of détente. The two superpowers
acknowledged the importance of effective communication and flexible response during the
crisis and this saw the establishment of a direct hotline between Moscow and Washington,
which exemplified their willingness to manage and resolve future conflict. Moreover, the
recognition of MAD prevented a full-scale conflict from occurring between the superpowers,
thus reducing tensions. Paradoxically, MAD provoked an escalation of the arms race which
resulted in the propagation of a number of bilateral treaties to manage nuclear
disarmament and hence, saw an easing of tensions between the superpowers.
The Cuban Missile Crisis led to improved diplomatic relations between the US and the Soviet
Union. The two superpowers recognised the importance of effective communication and
9
LaFeber (2002) pg. 234
Professor Anouar Boukhars speaking at Old Dominion University, April 2001
http://www.ciaonet.org/access/boa03/index.html
11
Dobbs (2008) pg. 345
10
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flexible response12 which was indicative of their willingness to manage and resolve future
conflict. Historian Walter LaFeber stated that immediately after the crisis, Khrushchev began
to try to prevent another such confrontation13 from occurring. However, in order to achieve
this, an effective means of communication was needed to eliminate misunderstanding
between the political protagonists, and this resulted in the establishment of a direct hotline
between Moscow and Washington in 1963. The hotline was symbolic of improved US-Soviet
relations and resulted in greater cooperation between Moscow and Washington. The
aftermath of the Missile Crisis further saw the mutual recognition of each superpower’s
sphere of influence, which impacted significantly on their later associations with one
another, as evident in the lack of U.S intervention during the Czechoslovakia crisis of 1968.
This notion is supported by historian Michael Dobbs who stated that “the United States and
the Soviet Union would never again become involved in a direct military confrontation of the
scale and intensity of the Cuban Missile Crisis.”14 Moreover, the significance of flexible
response and compromise was also an important milestone in alleviating tensions between
the US and the Soviet Union. Khrushchev’s letters to Kennedy, negotiating the dismantling of
Jupiter missiles in Turkey, signalled a willingness to resolve the conflict. Similarly, Kennedy
negotiated the conditions under which missiles would be removed from Turkey15 without
“plunging the world into a catastrophic war”16 revealing the significance of compromise
during the crisis. Hence, through the recognition of the importance of effective
communication and negotiation, relations between the two superpowers improved
significantly.
Whilst the Cuban Missile Crisis led to an easing of tensions between the US and the USSR, it
also contributed to the recognition of MAD which provoked an escalation of the arms race.
After the Missile Crisis, Khrushchev and Kennedy’s policy of brinksmanship shifted to the
recognition of Mutually Assured Destruction17 which promoted the escalation of the arms
race to ensure that both sides had MAD in the event of a nuclear attack. The doctrine of
MAD was seen to prevent a direct nuclear conflict between the US and the Soviet Union and
12
Dobbs, Michael. One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear
War, Hutchinson (2008) pg. 347
13
LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-2002, McGraw Hill (2002) pg. 238
14
Dobbs (2008) pg. 349
15
Kennedy negotiated that the removal of missiles from Turkey would have no public concessions, as
Khrushchev had initially hoped
16
Dobbs (2008) pg. 348
17
MAD - neither side will dare to launch an attack because the other side will retaliate, resulting in
the destruction of both parties. MAD was seen to prevent any direct full-scale conflicts between the
United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War
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hence, improved US-Soviet relations. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the crisis, the Soviets
were motivated by a need to seal the “missile gap” and vowed to end their nuclear
inferiority by building more weapons, thus escalating the arms race18 and as a result, Soviet
spending on the proliferation of nuclear arms increased exponentially. Historian Walter
LaFeber estimated that up to 25% of the economy was directed towards military
expenditure19 after the missile crisis, exemplifying the Soviet need to redress their nuclear
inferiority. Historian Dobbs supported this notion and stated that paradoxically to the easing
of tensions, an escalation of the arms race arose so as to “erase the memory of Cuban
humiliation”20. Thus, the recognition of MAD saw improved US-Soviet relations as it
prevented a full-scale conflict between the two superpowers from occurring.
The escalation of the arms race further saw the propagation of a number of bilateral treaties
between the two superpowers to manage nuclear disarmament which saw an easing of
tensions between the US and the Soviet Union. Historian Gaddis stated that although the
arms race intensified, it was conducted within the boundaries of precise and specific rules21.
With the escalation of the arms race came the need by both sides to regulate the amount of
radioactive fallout as a result of nuclear weapons testing. This subsequently resulted in the
ratification of several bilateral treaties between the superpowers which included the Anti
Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. These bilateral
agreements arose as both Kennedy and Khrushchev acknowledged the need for a “safer
world”. Thus, the emergence of bilateral treaties between the two superpowers was
symbolic of the political protagonists’ desire to reduce tensions through negotiations to limit
nuclear arms22 and hence, saw improved US-Soviet relations.
Therefore, the Cuban Missile Crisis had an immense impact on US-Soviet relations and saw
an easing of tensions. The aftermath of the crisis underscored the importance of effective
communication as well as flexible response between the superpowers. Although the
recognition of MAD provoked an escalation in the arms race, it prevented a direct conflict
from occurring and resulted in the proliferation of treaties to manage nuclear arms.
18
Thomas G. Paterson "Cuban Missile Crisis" The Oxford Companion to United States History. Oxford
University Press 2001. University of Western Sydney. 15 June 2010
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t119.e0377>
19
LaFeber (2002) pg. 332
20
Dobbs (2008) pg. 349
21
Gaddis, John Lewis. Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford University Press (1998) pg. 280
22
George Bunn "The Limited Test Ban Treaty" The Oxford Companion to American Military History.
John Whiteclay Chambers II, ed., Oxford University Press 1999. University of Western Sydney. 17 June
2010 <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t126.e0501>
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Quotes

“The United States and the Soviet Union would never again become involved in a
direct military confrontation of the scale and intensity of the Cuban Missile Crisis.” –
Michael Dobbs

“[Escalation of the arms race was to] erase the memory of Cuban humiliation” –
Michael Dobbs

“The Cuban missile crisis arose because Khrushchev understood more clearly than
Kennedy that the West was winning the Cold War.” – John Lewis Gaddis

“IRBM + Cuba = ICBM” – John Lewis Gaddis

“By moving intermediate-range missiles to Cuba… Russia was rapidly narrowing the
gap... The presence of Russian missiles in Cuba had drastically altered the balance of
world power” - James Daniel and John Hubbell

“The suppression of the Cuban Revolution would have meant the defeat for the whole
socialist camp” – John Lewis Gaddis

“The world teetered on the edge of nuclear precipice” – Michael Dobbs

“He [Khrushchev] was so emotionally connected to the Castro revolution that he
risked his own revolution, his country and possibly the world on its behalf” – John
Lewis Gaddis