PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES
AND PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA
Bjørn Møller, Ph.D. & MA
Senior Research Fellow, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI)1
Paper for the seminar on
Private Military Companies (PMCs) in Africa: To Ban or Regulate
Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria
8 February 2002
Abstract
Mercenaries have been around for centuries and Africa has seen more than its fair share of their
activities, most recently in the framework of private Military Companies (PMC). Despite condemnation
and attempts at banning them, however, there are as of yet no signs that they will disappear as a
phenomenon. The article argues that they should and could be regulated, rather than banned, and
provides an account of relevant regulations and actors, based primarily on a certification scheme. Not
only is this likely to moderate the activities of PMC, it may also provide the international community
with instruments for military missions that nobody else is prepared to undertake.
Contents
1
2
3
4
5
6
The Historical Background .............................................................................................................2
The Logic of Privatisation ...............................................................................................................2
Modern PMC ...................................................................................................................................3
Experiences from Africa .................................................................................................................4
The Problems with PMC .................................................................................................................6
Alternatives to the Use of PMC ......................................................................................................6
6.1
Scenarios .................................................................................................................................7
6.2
Military Alternatives ...............................................................................................................7
7 Regulations in Force .......................................................................................................................9
8 Improved Regulation? ...................................................................................................................10
8.1
Which Prohibitions and Obligations? ...................................................................................10
8.2
Which Actors? .......................................................................................................................11
8.3
Which Instruments?...............................................................................................................11
9 Conclusion and Perspectives .........................................................................................................12
10
Endnotes ....................................................................................................................................13
1
The author holds an MA in History and a Ph.D. in International Relations, both from the University of
Copenhagen. Since 1985, he has been (senior) research fellow, subsequently programme director and board member
at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI, formerly Centre for Peace and Conflict Research), where he is
also editor of the international research newsletter NOD and Conversion. He served as Secretary General of the
International Peace Research Association (IPRA) from 1997 to 2000, and has been External Lecturer at the Institute
of Political Studies, University of Copenhagen since 1992. In addition to being the author of numerous articles and
editor of six anthologies, he is the author of three books: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German
Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (1991); Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective
(1992); and Dictionary of Alternative Defense (1995).
Private military companies (PMC) and mercenaries have been recurrent phenomena in armed conflicts in
Africa and elsewhere. They have, for instance, been employed in the civil wars in Congo, Angola and
Sierra Leone, both by governments and insurgents. Their use has been controversial (to say the least) and
has usually been condemned, but this has not made the phenomenon disappear. In recent years, however,
there has been a growing interest in a possible constructive use of mercenaries and PMC, for instance for
UN peace support operations.1
In this article the argument shall cautiously be made that this possibility should not be dismissed
offhand, but that the possibilities of regulating the use of PMC is worth considering, mainly, but not
exclusively, in Africa.
1 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
We have become accustomed to viewing war as the prerogative of states, i.e. to view states as the only
entities which wage war, mainly against other states, and we expect them do so by means of their
official representatives, i.e. state armies, consisting of citizens, either in the shape of a militia (as in
Switzerland), recruited through conscription or as professional soldiers.
Even a cursory glimpse at the history of war, however, clearly shows this “trinitarian” war
(Martin Van Creveld) waged by the trinity of State, People and Army, to be merely one chapter in the
history of war—even a rather short one.2 Through most of history, wars have been waged by a
plurality of actors, among which the State in statu nascendi. The church, the nobility and the
bourgeoisie also waged war, spurred by various motives, ranging from religious to economic ones.
For this warfare the various actors employed very heterogenous types of forces, ranging from
mounted and armoured knights with their support staff, local militias comprising the lower classes of
the urban population (on behalf of the upper classes), to locally conscripted peasants—often of very
low quality and without any combat motivation whatsoever.3 As late as 1780 the French Minister of
War, Count de Saint-Germain thus wrote that,
It would undoubtedly be desirable if we could create an army of dependable and specially selected men
of the best type. But in order to make up an army we must not destroy the nation; it would be destruction
to the nation if it were deprived of its best elements. As things are, the army must inevitably consist of
the scum of the people and of all those for whom society has no use. 4
Among these troops we find mercenaries who were often the best (in the modest sense of “least bad”)
soldiers, if only because they possessed certain skills acquired through training. 5 However, as pointed
out by one of their sternest critics, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527, himself a proponent of a
people’s militia) the mercenary armies of his time caused problems:
Mercenaries are disunited, thirsty for power, undisciplined and disloyal; they are brave among their
friends and cowards before the enemy; they have no fear of God, they do not keep faith with their fellow
men; they avoid defeat just so long as they avoid battle; in peacetime they are despoiled by them, and in
wartime by the enemy (The Prince, 1999: 39-40)
... [S]urely no one can be called a good man who, in order to support himself, takes up a profession that
obliges him at all times to be rapacious, fraudulent, and cruel, as of course must be all of those—no
matter what their rank—who make a trade of war.6
The recent reinvigoration of the use of mercenaries is thus far from a new phenomenon. Perhaps the
history of war is rather returning to what used to be the normal situation. A century hence we may
have almost forgotten about the “Westphalian era”, where the State and its representatives alone were
allowed to and capable of waging war.
2 THE LOGIC OF PRIVATISATION
The use of mercenaries and PMC is arguably also in line with the predominant trend of privatisation.
First of all, other forms of (personal) security have already been extensively privatised in
2
many countries, where tasks which are “naturally” those of the police forces are actually performed
by private companies on a contractual basis—simply because the State is too weak to be able to
provide security for its citizens and because the police is too under-funded, incompetent, or corrupt.
Hence, both individual citizens and companies resort to self-help organised according to the principles
of the market economy.7
The step from such privatised (individual) security to a privatisation of national security may
merely be a small one, especially when the latter is also mainly related to intra-state conflicts as is the
case throughout the world, not least in Africa.8 The borderline is fluid, to say the least, between
ordinary violent crime, political violence, domestic guerilla warfare and such as is supported by other
countries—with the implication that the struggle against these dangers is also best understood as a
continuum. When the State has relinquished its “monopoly on the legitimate use of force” (Max
Weber),9 the door is left wide open for private companies who can provide the services which are in
demand across the entire continuum. Nothing thus speaks against the same companies serving both as
PSC (private security companies) and PMC. For the wider perspectives that this may entail, please see
the concluding section.
Secondly, it is one thing to have national armies, manned exclusively with citizens performing
their duty to defend the nation in exchange for political rights in the same nation.10 It is something else
to dispatch armed forces to missions which have little or nothing at all to do with defending the
nation, as is the case with the deployment of European forces to Africa. Just as a country like France
has for a long time used foreigners for such tasks (in the framework of the Foreign Legion)11 other
states might reach the conclusion that their military deployments (e.g. to keep the peace between
Ethiopia and Eritrea) have so little to do with national security that they might as well make their
contribution by means of non-citizens. According to the same logic it is far from obvious why such
troops should necessarily be those of the State if it is possible to outsource the tasks to private
entrepreneurs, just as is the case of cleaning, bus services and the like.
There may even be certain tasks which simply will not be performed unless they are privatised,
e.g. military missions which are so unattractive and/or dangerous that politicians will be reluctant to send
their own citizens for them, especially if they are without significance for national security.12 There is
obviously no enthusiasm in the West about sending troops to neither the DRC, Angola or Sierra Leone
(even though the UK has sent forces for the latter). The real choice may thus be between doing nothing,
or providing some economic and/or logistical support for the deployment of forces from other (African)
countries—or outsourcing to private companies.
Whether such privatisation will be possible depends, of course, on whether there are companies
that are willing to undertake these tasks. According to traditional microeconomic theory this is a
question of demand and supply, implying that a demand (e.g. from the rich countries of the West) will
automatically generate a supply (albeit perhaps with a certain time-lag), and that the price of the service
will eventually equal its real value. The customer will also be able to determine the quality of the service,
if only he is ready to pay the price.
3 MODERN PMC
There are both similarities and differences between modern mercenaries and PMC and their
predecessors. An obvious similarity is of course that modern mercenaries are also in the business for
the money—hence the often-encountered nick-name “whores of war”.13 The same could, however, be
said of all professional soldiers, as well as most other professions, including peace researchers such as
the present author.
Another similarity is the fact that the executive entrepreneurs, i.e. the directors and
shareholders of modern PMC just as the mercenary captains of the past, sell their services to the
highest bidder, i.e. have no loyalty to any particular nation. In principle they could simultaneously
work for both opposing sides to an armed conflict, as was partly the case of British mercenaries in
pre-independence Angola and (allegedly) of Executive Outcomes (EO) in the same country after
independence.14
A significant difference is the structure of modern PMC. Just as other major companies they are
3
multi- or at least transnational, i.e. they have branches in several countries—which has the advantage of
making them harder for a single government to control and of facilitating the transfer of resources across
borders.. Moreover, their activities are quite diversified even though most are military in the broadest
sense of the term. Among the major modern PMC the following stand out:15



Executive Outcomes (EO) was founded in 1989, initially as part of a larger corporation, SRC
(Strategic Resources Corporation, which was later dismantled). It remained in existence until the
end of 1998 when it was closed down after the passing of a more stringent law in South Africa (vide
infra). It exhibited the typical structure of a corporation. The South Africa-based assets included
both firms owned a hundred percent and shares in other companies across a wide spectrum of
branches, including video production (Gemini Video Productions), tourism (Livingstone Tourists
and The Explorer) and air transport (Ibis Air). In the UK, EO was intimately connected to another
PMC, Sandline International, as well as (both directly and via Sandline) to companies in the oil and
diamond businesses. Among the customers of EO were both governments (especially Angola and
Sierra Leone) and multinational oil companies (Gulf Chevron and Sonangol), whereas EO claims to
have refused contracts with rebel movements in Algeria and Sudan. The main activities were in
Angola and Sierra Leone, but EO was also been approached by (but, according to their own account
refused to sign contracts with) people such as Zaïrean president Mobuto during the final battles
against the rebels of Kabila.16
Sandline International was previously know under the name “Plaza 107 Ltd.”, but received its
current name in 1996. It is owned by a holding company, Adson Holdings, and is quite closely
linked (e.g. through common shares and board members) to, e.g., Heritage Oil & Gas and
Diamondworks. It is owned by a group of former military officers header by Michael Grunberg.
Even though the company operates out of offices in London it is registered in the Bahamas.
Sandline places (at least officially) great emphasis on having merely legitimate governments and
international organisations among its customers. Its main activities to date have been in Papua
New Guinea, but it has also been involved in Sierra Leone, where it outsourced the job to
“Gurkha Security Guards”.17
Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) is headquartered in the United States and closely
linked to the US administration. It was founded in 1987 by retired military officers and its staff
includes, most prominently, former chief of staff of the US Army, Gen. Carl E. Vuono. MPRI has
more than 350 employees and has stand-by arrangements with more than 2,000 former officers.
Its main activities have been in the former Yugoslavia where it has, among other thinks, been
involved in the training of the Croat and Bosnian (i.e. Croat-Muslim) armies. Under the auspices
of ACRI (African Crisis Response Initiative), MPRI is also involved in the training of African
armies.18
Just as the structure described above is partly a consequence of “globalisation”, so is the composition
of modern mercenary armies. Globalisation means, among other things, that there is less of a need for
standing armies than before. The troops can be assembled from across the globe on very short notice
and their equipment can be leased from a multitude of providers. For instance, EO maintained a
database containing more than 2,000 mercenaries on which they could draw, and they relied on leased
transport aircraft.
Modern mercenaries primarily come from the regular forces, but also from defeated guerilla
movements. Paradoxically, the signing of peace agreements therefore often produces new prospective
mercenaries, as they are often followed by a partial demobilization and shrinking of the armed forces
which leave many former soldiers without jobs—in countries which typically have a desperate
employment situation.19
4 EXPERIENCES FROM AFRICA
Even though mercenaries are far from an exclusively African phenomenon, the black continent has
seen more of them than most others. Even here, it is not a new phenomenon.
4
Most of the African troops recruited by the European states in their “scramble for Africa” by
the end of the 19th Century were really mercenaries.20 The colonial powers (both as such and as
representatives of the League of Nations in their “mandate territories”), likewise, made occasional use
of mercenaries to fight against African liberation movements, 21 just as the CIA allegedly did in their
struggle against the liberation movements in Mozambique and (even more so) Angola in the sixties
and seventies.22
African government have also made use of mercenaries, both from Africa and elsewhere.
During the Congo crisis in the early sixties, the Katanga secessionists thus used mercenaries, as did
president Mobuto on several subsequent occasions, including the final struggle against the rebel
movements of Laurent Kabila and others.23 The secessionist Nigerian province Biafra did the same in
1967 (allegedly on French initiative),24 and the apartheid regime of South Africa used them both for
the suppression of the local black population, for the struggle against the SWAPO guerilla of Namibia
and for its intervention in Angola in support of UNITA.25
Throughout the nineties Africa saw several deployments of mercenaries, now primarily with
PMC as entrepreneurs.26


Angola has ever since independence in 1975 been ravaged by a civil war between two former
liberation movements, i.e. the MPLA (now as the government) and UNITA, now as a rebel
movement (which many regard is little more than gangsters)27 and with the direct involvement of
external actors such as Cuba, Zaïre and South Africa and the indirect involvement of both the
United States and the Soviet Union.28 The endeavour for peace on the part of UN and other
international organisations has largely been futile.29 Combined with the presence of riches such as
oil and diamonds,30 this has attracted PMC.31 Executive Outcomes first became involved in 1992
through a contract with the multinational oil companies Gulf Chevron and Sonangol, who
solicited the services of EO to protect their assets—even though other versions of the story have it
that EO was hired to re-conquer the installations which had already fallen into the hands of
UNITA. The EO further trained Angolan government troops and pilots and, since around 1994,
took a direct part in the struggle against UNITA. The size of the deployment is unclear, as the EO
has denied that its presence ever exceeded 500 employees. Nevertheless, it is sometimes assessed
as having made a significant contribution to forcing UNITA to the negotiation table which
produced the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994. The deployment was brought to an end with the
government’s termination of the contract with EO in January 1996, allegedly responding to US
pressure.
In Sierra Leone the Strasser government in March 1995 hired EO to fight the rebel movement
RUF (Revolutionary United Front) which is almost universally regarded as common thugs with a
reputation for a particularly nasty form of warfare, featuring amputation of civilians, etc.32 The
initial assignment of the EO troops was the re-conquer titanium and bauxit mines which had
fallen into the hands of the RUF, and the revenues from which amounted to more than half the
export earnings of Sierra Leone. EO was initially merely supposed to provide training and
technical support for the government forces, but after the RUF's seizure of important diamond
mines its troops also became directly involved in combat. According to the EO, the total
contingent of EO troops never exceeded 250 personnel. The results are generally assessed as a
modest success, as the situation after ten months was sufficiently peaceful to allow for the holding
of presidential elections in March 1996. The activities of the EO are also generally seen in a
positive light, as EO personnel collaborated satisfactorily with both the government and
international emergency relief organizations. A contributory cause to the acceptance among the
local population may have been that most of the deployed troops were black. The peace did not
last, and in 1996 attempts were uncovered to deploy other (in this case white) mercenaries,
apparently on the payroll of the RUF, to seize control of a diamond mine being guarded by EO,
presumably against payment in the form of diamond concessions which were subsequently sold to
BE.33 After the termination of the contract with EO in January 1997, a military coup took place
(May 1997) which deposed the government elected in 1996. Since then there has been civil war,
where UN troops (UNAMSIL) have been taken hostage by the RUF. Sandline has, likewise, been
5
involved in Sierra Leone, albeit only indirectly, as they outsourced the assignment (training of
government troops) to another company, the Gurka Security Guards.34
Mercenaries have, likewise, played a role in the civil war in Liberia, just as they have used this
country as a base for incursions (on behalf of RUF) into Sierra Leone.35
The big picture emerging from these various “snapshots” is one of a rather extensive, and
apparently fairly constant, but always ad hoc and never permanent, presence of mercenaries and PMC
in Africa—especially in situations where intra-state conflicts have become bloody, and with a clear
concentration on countries (or parts of countries) with substantial resources such as oil, gold or
diamonds.36
5 THE PROBLEMS WITH PMC
On the “macro level” the main problem with PMC is probably that they operate according to the
principles of the market economy—just as other private companies. Hence, they will only go into
action when solvent customers hire them to do so and presupposing that agreement can be reached on
the appropriate price either in cash or occasionally (as mentioned above) in the form of concessions.
The customers can either be the governments of the countries in question, rebel movements, other
companies or even foreign governments (viz. the US governments outsourcing of tasks in the former
Yugoslavia to the MPRI). The corollary of this is, of course, that PMC will never undertake tasks
which nobody is prepared to pay for having undertaken.
There can be different reasons why customers may be willing to pay. In the case of private
companies, the motive will undoubtedly be economic gain which may also be the case of states—
especially as far as resource-rich “target countries” are concerned such as Sierra Leone, Angola or
the DRC. In the case of resource-poor countries such as Rwanda, Somalia or Mozambique there are
hardly any strictly economic reasons why external actors should be willing to pay for a contract with a
PMC. Even in such cases, however, there may be other reasons to do so, including humanitarian
motives. The entire “global community” was truly embarrassed by the Rwandan genocide in 1994, so
it is at least conceivable that they might want to contribute to preventing a repetition (either in
Rwanda or elsewhere, e.g. in neighbouring Burundi)—and the more so, the less this would not require
them to place their own troops “in harm’s way”.
On the “micro level” there are also problems connected with the use of PMC. Most of these
seem to be related to the legal “grey zone” in which PMC operate. As long as their very use violates
international conventions it is obviously difficult to regulate such use. Hence the mercenaries operate
in a “legal no-man’s land” with neither rights nor obligations. This may go some way towards
explaining the occurrence of rapes, atrocities and the like—even though such things have also been
known to happen in connection with the deployment of regular, state-controlled, forces.
It must also be acknowledged that the job as a mercenary, to an even larger extent than that of
a regular professional soldier, undoubtedly appeals to particular mentalities, which are not ideally
suited to all kinds of deployments. A job which promises rather high remuneration and excitement in
return for rather high risks, low job security and considerably problems for any family life will
probably appeal to that “scum of the people” referred to the French minister of war above, and to
persons such as those against whom Macciavelli warned.
6 ALTERNATIVES TO THE USE OF PMC
As the use of PMC is thus far from unproblematic, common decency demands a thorough review of
the available alternatives to their use. This in turn requires realistic assumptions concerning those
conflict scenarios which might lead to the deployment of either PMC or other armed forces, both in
Africa and elsewhere. These fall into two main categories, i.e. international and intra-state armed
conflicts.
6
6.1 Scenarios
Most international conflicts are relatively easy to handle, as they are initiated by one party’s breach of
the peace, e.g. in the form of an attack on another state—which clarifies the legal and international
law aspects of the case. Such conflicts are usually terminated with a cease-fire and a clearly
demarcated separation of the warring parties.
Along this line of demarcation UN (or other) armed forces are deployed (usually with a clear
mandate from the UN Security Council) with the mission of ensuring the lasting separation of the
formerly warring parties (who are already separated). The main “rule of the game” for such
“interpositioning forces” is impartiality, the main task is observation, and the use of force is the
exception and only resorted to in self-defence. The risks to the troops are limited and the
requirements in terms of weapons and equipment are usually quite rather modest. This was, for
instance, a fairly accurate description of the deployment of UNMEE after the truce between Ethiopia
and Eritrea,37 which is a “traditional” peacekeeping mission in most respects.
Much more complex is the setting in the aftermath of an intra-state conflict, be it a “regular”
civil war or the collapse of a state—representing the majority of armed conflicts in recent years. Often
there are not two but a plurality of conflicting parties, and the end of hostilities is frequently marked
by a cease-fire agreement which is merely signed by some of the parties who are often unable to
implement it satisfactorily. Hence, the truce is usually fragile, there is seldom any clear line of
demarcation between the parties to patroll and a significant risk of ending up under fire must be
reckoned with. The impartiality rule is hard to apply in such settings where the very identity of the
parties may be unclear, and where there is a constant risk of “mission creep”, i.e. of a mission
developing so unpredictably that the initial mandate may be rendered clearly inadequate. For such
deployments a more “muscular” equipment is indispensable and there is a significant risk of casualties
from the ranks of the peacekeepers.38
To the latter category belong missions such as the above in Sierra Leone (since September
1999 named UNAMSIL as the successor to UNOMSIL, in place from July 1998 to September 1999)
and Angola (UNAVEM I-III, from December 1988 to June 1997, followed by MONUA from July
1997 to February 1999)39 as well as previous missions, e.g. in Somalia (UNOSOM I-II from April
1992 to March 1995),40 Rwanda (UNAMIR from October 1993 to March 1996)41 and Liberia
(UNOMIL, from September 1993 to September 1997).42 The same will undoubtedly be the case of the
pending (not yet fully implemented) mission to the DRC (MONUC).43 Other peacekeeping missions
(e.g. in Mozambique) have, however, been less militarily demanding as well as more politically
successful.44
6.2 Military Alternatives
The available alternatives may be subdivided into three categories—leaving aside the utterly
unattractive “category zero” of doing nothing at all, even in the case of genocide, chaos, starvation
and misery, or of confining assistance to humanitarian aid. The tasks can either be shouldered by
armed forces from the global “North”, i.e. the industrialised world, or from the global “South”, i.e. the
Third World, or by local forces.
Regular forces from the North would undoubtedly be the ideal solution for all of the above
tasks, simply because they are generally well trained and have access to an immense support structure
in their respective homelands. Certain of them (especially US forces) may neither have much
experience with complex peace missions nor the will to learn from others—but other countries (not
least small and medium powers such as the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Canada) have
decades of experience with this kind of missions. Moreover, simple fairness demands that
contributions are proportional to economic and military “weight”, hence that NATO and its allies with
their around seventy percent of global military spending (see Table 1) should assume most of the
responsibility. Unfortunately, however, nothing seems to indicate that the rich countries are willing to
do so, and especially not in Africa. Not only have they allocated a large part of their forces to the
Balkans, but their general interest in Africa has declined considerably.45
7
Fig. 1: Military
Expenditures
(2000)46
USA
Rest of NATO
Israel
Japan
South Korea
Australia
New Zealand
Total "North"
World
Sub-Saharan Africa
Constant (1998)
Share
US$b
(%)
280.6 37.12%
190.4 25.19%
8.9 1.18%
37.8 5.00%
10.0 1.32%
6.7 0.88%
0.6 0.08%
535.1 70.78%
756.0 100.00%
9.8
USA
Rest of NATO
Other Allies
Sub-Saharan Africa
Rest
1.30%
Regular troops from Third World countries is the obvious alternative. Hence the attractions of
regionalisation which will allow North to “pass the buck” to the South.47 Even though regional forces
have some advantages in terms of familiarity with local conditions, this approach is not without
problems, e.g. because they will often be suspected (sometimes rightly) of pursuing hidden agendas in
their regional neighbourhood.
Even beyond the confines of their respective regions certain third world countries are
surprisingly active in terms of UN missions and have contributed very large troop contingents to
various UN peacekeeping missions. Examples include Bangladesh (5,782 troops), Fiji (788), Ghana
(2,140) Guinea (780), Jordan (1,864), Kenya (1,703), Nepal (968), Nigeria (3,321), Pakistan (5,102),
Senegal (478), Thailand (736), Uruguay (785) and Zambia (838). In comparison, Denmark was
registered by the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) for four troops and the
United States for one solitary soldier (sic!).48 Even though neither the cosmopolitan spirit of the listed
third world countries nor the quality of their troops are automatically dubious, there is a lingering
suspicion that at least some of these troop contributions may also be economically motivated. If so,
their use by the world community would seem to be morally quite comparable to a use of PMC.
Local troops would, of course, be the most obvious alternative if it were not for the fact that
they have usually been among the warring parties in the aforementioned intra-state conflicts. Hence
they are often part of the problem rather than a possible means to its solution. Moreover, they are
often of mediocre-to-poor quality and their equipment quite inadequate for the task, unless they are
armed, equipped and trained, either by other countries or (as mentioned above) by PMC.
All of the above problems have made a number of authors advocate the use of PMC for
international peacekeeping (or even peacemaking or enforcement) missions. 49 Either present practices
could continue where PMC are occasionally hired for specific tasks on an ad hoc basis, or a more
formalised practice might be developed.
Countries of the North could make use of PMC for peace operations in the South (including
Africa) as an alternative to sending their own troops or effectively using regular troops from the South
as “cannon fodder”. The latter option often implies the use of conscripted troops from other countries
which is hardly more ethically justifiable than to use mercenaries, as the latter are, after all, volunteers
and compensated (economically and otherwise) for risks and inconveniencies. The countries of the
North might thus meet their obligations as UN members without sacrificing anything but money
which would be used to “dial an army”. One could also imagine the UN itself making use of PMC,
either ad hoc or on a more permanent basis. This might be one means to provide the organisation with
the permanent (or at least “on call” military capacity that it was originally envisaged to have at its
disposal.50
In many scenarios a rapid deployment of even small forces could make a big difference. For
instance, it has been estimated that a force of a mere 5,000 troops (others have mentioned 2,500)
could have prevented the 1994 Rwandan genocide with an estimated death toll of around 800,000,
mainly civilians.51 In retrospect one might have wished that Western governments had contracted a
8
PMC for the task of fighting the genocidaires of the FAR (Forces Armées Rwandaises), the
Interahamwe and other genocidal militias. Considering the limited numbers and primitive equipment
of most of these forces, a PMC could probably easily have recruited the requisite forces to defeat
them, and the price of such a limited deployment would surely have been worth paying.
What stands in the way of such options is primarily the stigma which remains attached to
mercenaries. This raises the question whether it might be possible to regulate the use of mercenaries
and PMC to such an extent that they could be accepted as legitimate military instruments. In
conclusion, I shall propose a number of measures to this effect, but first an account of the set of norms
and regulations already in force seems required.
7 REGULATIONS IN FORCE
It is debatable whether the use of PMC should be regulated as such regulation obviously implies a
legalisation of PMC as such as well as perhaps an ethical legitimation of activities and companies
which do not deserve it. On the other hand, the experience to date does not give grounds to believe
than a mere condemnation and proscription makes the phenomenon disappear. From the point of view
of consequentialist ethics (as opposed to a deontological one which holds that actions have a positive
or negative value, regardless of their effects)52 it therefore seems appropriate to explore the options of
regulation.
International conventions and customary law already provide a certain legal basis for the
treatment of mercenaries, largely tantamount to a condemnation without visible effects:





The UN General Assembly in 1969 passed a resolution (no. 2548) condemning the use of
mercenaries, especially directed against the use by colonial powers against liberation movements.
The UN Security Council in 1977 passed a resolution condemning the use of mercenaries to
overthrow the government of any member state.
The UN General Assembly in 1989 adopted the “International Convention on the Recruitment, Use,
Financing and Training of Mercenaries” (GA Res. 44/34, 1989), which was only ratified by a few
member states and thus has not entered into force.
In 1976 the Geneva Convention of 1949 was renegotiated, which resulted in the signing of two
additional protocols. Additional Protocol I (art. 47) made clear that mercenaries were not allow the
status as combatants or prisoners of war (POW) and further defined who should count as
mercenaries—a definition which must be reckoned as authoritative:
A mercenary is any person who: (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed
conflict; (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities
essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict,
material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and
functions in the armed forces of that Party; (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict; and (f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member
of its armed forces.”53
In 1977 the OAU (as a follow-up to resolutions from 1967 and 1971 and a brief convention from
1972) adopted a “Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa” which entered into
force in 1985. It obliged the signatories to abstain from the use of mercenaries as well as to prohibit
their citizens to enrol as such and to make offences “punishable by severest penalties under its laws,
including capital punishment” (art. 7).54
In addition to such international “legislation”, individual states can of course legislate, either as a means
to implement the above regulations or for other reasons. As mentioned above, South Africa in 1998
passed legislation (the “Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act”) which forbade its citizens to let
themselves be recruited as, or participate in the recruitment of others as mercenaries, with penalties up to
ten years imprisonment or fines of up to one million Rand.55 While the aforementioned Executive
Outcomes initially chose to register in accordance with the law, after a couple of months it decided to
close its offices in Pretoria.56 As an illustration of the problems with national legislation, however, it
9
seems as if its activities have not been terminated, but rather transferred to its previous collaborator,
Sandline Inc. in London.
8 IMPROVED REGULATION?
As mentioned above the regulation in force has been far from effective in terms of preventing the use of
mercenaries or PMC—even though it is, of course, impossible to ascertain with any certainty how
widespread the use would have been in the absence of the above regulation.
This raises the question whether regulation could be improved, which can be subdivided into
three sets of questions: What kind regulation is desirable, i.e. which obligations and proscriptions should
it encompass? Who should adopt and implement this regulation? and Which instruments could be used?
8.1 Which Prohibitions and Obligations?
This question can be further disaggregated. First comes the question which customers should be
acceptable, which is more complex that one might expect:





An obvious and seductively simple, criterion would be “only internationally recognized
governments”, but this may be too permissive. Regimes such as that of Milosevic in the former
Yugoslavia and of Mobuto in Zaïre thus enjoyed formal international recognition (which is not the
same as respect or sympathy), which is also the case of, e.g., Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Colonel
Gadaffi’s Libya.
Alternatively, the list of customers could be limited to a subgroup of recognized states, e.g. defined
by their observance of international conventions, including those on human rights. This would,
however, raise a number of questions such as whether merely severe and systematic violations
should exclude countries, or whether to include also minor violations—and about who should
determine whether one or the other is the case.
It is also possible to argue that such liberation movements should be included as acceptable
customers as are fighting against governments which are in violation of the above criteria. This
might have applied to, e.g., the ANC in its struggle against the apartheid regime (even though the
ANC never expressed any interest in the use of mercenaries) or to the rebels of Laurent Kabila
seeking the overthrow of the Mobuto regime in Zaïre.
One could also envision private companies as legitimate customers (as has already happened, e.g.
in Angola) if only they could prove that they need protection for legal economic activities or
assets.
Finally, the UN and its affiliates should, of course, belong to the list of legitimate customers, as
might regional and sub-regional organisations such as the African Union or the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) —or NATO for that matter.
The most practical approach might be to establish a “positive list“ of acceptable customers. The
decision to include an entity on the list, or strike it, might be taken by, for instance, the UN Security
Council or whichever body it would entrust with the task (e.g. UN Secretariat, the DPKO, the World
Bank, or the World Trade Organisation). However, it would be important to ensure open negotiations
based on publicly available documentation, so that NGOs could also have a say on the matter.
Second comes the question which activities should be acknowledged as acceptable. Here as
well there are a number of options.


The most restrictive criterion would be “merely training of (and possibly other support for) local
forces”, but this would rule out options which had better be kept open. For instance, the use of
PMC would thus have been precluded in Rwanda where the local armed forces (FAR and
Interahamwe) were the main problem.
To grant PMC full freedom to perform all direct combat tasks (with an implicit ”licence to kill”)
would, on the other hand, be too permissive, at least as long as mercenaries are neither subjects to
10
humanitarian law (e.g. the Geneva Conventions), nor subject to the rulings of the (yet to be
established) ICC (International Criminal Court), to be in charge of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes.57
Until PMC are granted a status as warring parties similar to that of states some special legislation will
thus be called for. However, this might deliberately emulate the legislation pertaining to states, i.e.
strive to make the same rules applicable to the employees of PMC as to regular troops: The right to
(something very similar to) the status as a POW in exchange for the same obligations and risks of
prosecution in case of violation of the rules.
Considering that the aforementioned ICC (as opposed to the International Court of Justice
which only has jurisdiction over states) will have jurisdiction over individuals, albeit only such as are
in the service of states, it would merely require minor amendments of the existing sets of rules. One
might even contemplate making the rules pertaining to PMC personnel somewhat more rigid than
those for regional national armed forces, e.g. in terms of compulsory courses in the Geneva
conventions or annual HIV/AIDS tests.
Third comes the question which companies should be acceptable providers of the services.
The simplest solution to this problem would probably be a certification scheme, implying that a PMC
would require a certification for it to be allowed to cater for the “international community”, consisting
of the UN and the signotories to the arrangement (vide infra). A conditio sine qua non of certification
could be an abidance by all the other regulations.
8.2 Which Actors?
A wide range of actors could play a role in the regulation of PMC.




Because PMC is, by its very nature, an international (or at least transnational) phenomenon, the
most obvious political entity would be the proverbial “international society”, represented by the
UN and its various affiliates—not least the aforementioned ICC. An obvious division of labour
would be for the UN General Assembly to “legislate” (through the passing of resolutions), the
Security Council and the Secretary General to implement and enforce, and the ICC to adjudicate
and interpret.
Regional actors might also play a role, as the OAU has already done with the conventions
mentioned above.
States would be important transmission cords between the international and supranational
authorities and their citizens (who might be recruited as mercenaries) and the PMC who are
registered on their territory, thereby falling under their jurisdiction.
“World opinion” would also play a role, represented both by the media (who will, hopefully, be
vigilant and critical) and the plethora of NGOs operating in exactly those conflict areas where we
could expect PMC to be employed and who would thus be in a good position to report on any
breach of the rules.
Some of these entities would appear in the dual role of potential customer and controller which is
never unproblematic. It will undoubtedly prove difficult to ensure the smooth collaboration between
the various actors, but given the requisite political will it should not be dismissed as impossible.
8.3 Which Instruments?
Depending on which kind of regulation which political authority would want to implement, different
instruments would recommend themselves. They can be subdivided into legal and economic
instruments, in both cases subdivided into regulations pertaining to the companies and to their
employees, i.e. the mercenaries.
As far as the companies are concerned, the first requirement is that they should actually be
subject to legislation, i.e. prevent that them from registering in countries with a more liberal
11
legislation, whilst actually operating out of places such as London (as is the case of Sandline). This
demand could be included under the criteria for the certification mentioned above. Other relevant
criteria for certification might be the demand for a continuous state control of contracts, accounts,
personnel lists and the like, and an obligation to allow on-site inspections of company activities
abroad. Even though such inspections would, strictly speaking, fall beyond the jurisdiction of the
state in question, the right to conduct them could simply be made an indispensable precondition for
certification. A violation of the rules might lead to legal prosecution in the country of legal residence
according to its laws as well as to a loss of certification.
As PMC are driven by profit motives (as all other private enterprises) the most effective
instruments of control would probably be the economic ones. Government hold a tremendous leverage
in this respect as they would undoubtedly be the most important customers. While it may be tempting
for a PMC to sign a contract with, e.g. RUF or UNITA (or the al-Qaida network for that matter) the
prospects of losing future contracts with “respectable” states would undoubtedly have a considerable
deterrent effect. Moreover, there are many advantages associated with being able to operate legally
and from a metropolis such as London, compared with operating in a legal “grey zone” from offices in
the Bahamas or in Freetown. A visit to the websites of, for instance, Sandline or the MPRI also
clearly shows companies placing a great emphasis on legality, legitimacy and respectability. Even
though they may not yet have earned this respectability, their very ambitions in this respect provides
the controlling authorities with considerable leverage—and in they can draw on information from the
press, the NGO community and other who will undoubtedly be eager to report any faux pas.
As far as the personnel, i.e. the mercenaries, are concerned there is, first of all, the
opportunity to prevent PMC from hiring “undesirable elements”, e.g. by making it a prerequisite for
certification that they employ only personnel with an unblemished legal record. Compulsory records
(like olf-fashioned “servant’s conduct books”) would allow for a control both of the companies and
their employees. They should record all violations of the professional code (or at least all serious
breaches thereof), to which one could also reckon the Geneva conventions. A register could thus be
kept of which soldiers would be entitled to perform the trade within registered and certified PMC.
Another powerful instrument would be state control of seniority and pension rules. As it is
today, e.g. in South Africa, members of the regular forces lose their right to return if they enrol with a
PMC. In combination with the above records, states could grant their troops the right to return to the
ranks without loss of seniority and pension rights, provided that their records are satisfactory.
9 CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
It would undoubtedly be naïve to expect the measures listed above to be able to remove all the
“nastiness” presently characterizing both mercenaries and PMC. However, this is a weak argument
against such regulation.
The real choice seems to be between a complete “liberalisation of the market” (which would be
utterly unacceptable) and a continuing condemnation, which may give some moral satisfaction, but
seems to have no verifiable effect. By means of a regulation as the one sketched above, most of the
activities of the PMC could probably be made more acceptable and controllable. There would
undoubtedly still be firms which would escape control, but hardly more than is presently the case.
Undoubtedly there will also be “undesirable elements” who manage to slip through, but probably fewer
than today—who are therefore able to commit fewer crimes against humanity or war crimes than they
have done so far. The most important benefit accruing from a combined legalisation and regulation of
PMC is, however, that it might provide the world society and individual states with the means to bring to
an end civil wars like the one in Sierra Leone and/or prevent repetitions of the Rwandan genocide.
Should PMC and mercenaries gradually come to be viewed, even by the states of the West as
legitimate means to their military and security political ends, this would have significant implications for
the very relationship between States, Peoples and Armies. Since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), and
certainly since the Napoleonic wars, the West has come to view this as a harmonious relationship
between the three corners of a “trinity”, as Martin Van Creveld described it.58 Wars are waged as “a
continuation of politics by other means”, as formulated by Clausewitz, 59 and they are waged by States,
12
acting on behalf of their respective peoples, against other States. Moreover, they are fought against
armies by means of armies, which are presumed to be equally representative of the People as the State—
as entailed by the presumed link between conscription and democracy60 as well as by the paradigm of
“professionalisation” as the guideline for civil-military relations.61 (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1: Trinitarian War
State
State
Politics
Ends
P-S
S-A
S-A
P-S
P-S
B
A
Means
People
P-A
Army
War
Army
P-A
People
However, while this may remain a fairly accurate description of the situation in the strong and wellestablished states of the West, this is surely an exception, both historically and geographically. At most,
it describes the West after 1648, whereas war was a much messier (but less destructive) business before
this juncture. In the rest of the world, “trinitarian war” has always been a rare exception.62
States have rarely represented their peoples in any meaningful sense, and they have frequently
used their armies for the exact opposite of what is implied by the trinitarian paradigm, i.e. for oppression
or even genocide (as in Rwanda) rather than for national security. More often than not, armies have
merely consisted of segments of the population (thus being far from representative of the “People” as
such) and very often they have been highly politicised. In many cases states have preferred what were
effectively mercenaries (albeit not always referred to as such) to indigenous troops.63 Quite often, it has
not been the State which controlled the army, but the other way around, either directly (as in the case of
military rule) or indirectly, with the army defining the borderlines of what is permissible for civilian
leaders.
It would certainly be premature to proclaim a universal “retreat of the state” (Van Creveld),64
and it is surely conceivable that the use of mercenaries and PMC will, in due course, reveal itself as
merely a passing stage, i.e. that it will be used as an instrument in state-building, as it was in Europe at a
comparable stage of development.65 On the other hand, it is also conceivable that the whole world is
moving “beyond Westphalia” into an era where military force ceases to be the prerogative of the State,
and where PMC (duly regulated and controlled by the State) may come to play a legitimate role.
10 ENDNOTES
1
A good indicator of this interest is the existence of two e-mail discussion lists with a very hectic “traffic”.
“PMC-list” thus had more than 3,000 messages in 2001, while “AMPM-list” (which stands for “Anonymous
Mercenaries and Private Militaries”) had more than 2,500. See www.egroups.com/group/AMPMlist and
www.egroups.com/group/pmcs. See also Sperin, Christopher: “Private Security Companies: A Corporate
Solution to Securing Humanitarian Spaces”, International Peacekeeping, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 20-43.
2
Van Creveld, Martin: The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 35-42. See also
Snow, Donald M.: UnCivil Wars: International Security and the New Pattern of Internal War (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 1996); idem: Distant Thunder. Patterns of Conflict in the Developing World. 2nd Ed. (Armonk, NY:
M.E. Sharpe, 1997); Kaldor, Mary: New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era (Oxford: Polity
13
Press, 1999); Holsti, Kalevi J.: The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), pp. 19-40, 123-149.
3
On medieval warfare see Ayton, Andrew & J.L. Price: “Introduction: The Military Revolution from a Medieval
Perspective”, in idem & idem (ed.): The Medieval Military Revolution. State, Society and Military Change in
Medieval and Early Modern Europe (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 1-22; Prestwich, Michael: Armies and
Warfare in the Middle Ages. The English Experience (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 12-157;
Howard, Michael: War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 1-53. On the early
modern era see Thomson, Janice E.: Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns. State-Building and Extraterritorial
Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Tallett, Frank: War and
Society in Early-Modern Europe, 1494-1715 (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 69-104; Ropp, Theodore: War in
the Modern World, 2. udg. (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 19-40.
4
Quoted in Anderson, M.S.: War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime 1618-1789 (Phoenix Mill: Sutton
Publishing, 1998), pp. 163.
5
Hale, J.R.: War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620 (Phoenix Mill: Sutton Publishing, 1998), pp. 7599, 127-152; Anderson: op. cit. (note 3), pp. 45-63, 111-130.
6
Niccolò Machiavelli: The Prince (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1999), pp. 39-40; idem: The Art of War
(New York: Da Capo Press, 1965), pp. 14-16.
7
Lock, Peter: “Africa., Millitary Downsizing and the Growth in the Security Industry”, in Jakkie Cilliers &
Peggy Mason (ed.): Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies
(Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies, 1999), pp. 11-36; Cock, Jacklyn: “The Cultural and Social
Challenge of Demilitarization”, in Gavin Cawthra & Bjørn Møller (ed.): Defensive Restructuring of the Armed
Forces in Southern Africa (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), pp. 117-144; Chetty, Robert (ed.): Firearm Use and
Distribution in South Africa (Pretoria: National Crime Prevention Centre, 2000). On the relationship between the
privatisation of individual and national security see Mills, Greg & John Stremlau: “The Privatisation of Security
in Africa: An Introduction”, in idem & idem (ed.s): The Privatisation of Security in Africa (Braamfontein: South
African Institute of International Affairs, 1999), pp. 1-21.
8
On the global trend see Wallensteen, Peter & Margareta Sollenberg: “Armed Conflict, 1989-99”, Journal of
Peace Research, vol. 37, no. 5 (September 2000), pp. 635-650. On the “crisis of the African state” see e.g.,
Clapham, Christopher: Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996); Ayittey, George B.N.: Africa in Chaos (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Bayart, JeanFrançois, Stephen Ellis & Béatrice Hibou: The Criminalization of the State in Africa (Oxford: James Currey,
1999); Ayoob, Mohammed: The Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict, and the
International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Zartmann, William I. (ed.): Collapsed States. The
Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Reno, William:
Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Mazrui, Ali A.: “The Failed State and Political
Collapse in Africa”, in Olara A. Otunnu & Michael W. Doyle (eds.): Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New
Century (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 233-244.
9
Weber, Max: “Politics as Vocation” (1918), in H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (ed.): From Max Weber: Essays
in Sociology (New York: Galaxy Books, 1958), pp. 77-128, quotation from p. 78.
10
Posen, Barry R.: “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power”, International Security, vol. 18, no. 2
(Autumn 1993), pp. 80-124; Janowitz, Morris: “Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies”,
Armed Forces and Society, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1976), pp. 185-204; Grazia, Sebastian de: “Political Equality
and Military Participation”, ibid., vol. 7, no. 2 (Winter 1981), pp. 181-186; Giller, Joachim: Demokratie und
Wehrpflicht (Wien: Landesverteidigungsakademie, 1992).
11
On the historical bacground see Aldrich, Robert: Greater France. A History of French Overseas Expansion
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 133-134. On the use of the Legion in modern times see Chuter, David:
Humanity’s Soldier. France and International Security, 1919-2001 (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996), pp.
276, 301; Porch, Douglas: The French Foreign Legion : A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force
(London: Harper, 1992), passim.
12
On US “casualty-scaredness”, se Luttwak, Edward N.: “A Post-Heroic Military Policy”, Foreign Affairs, vol.
75, no. 4 (July-August 1996), pp. 33-44; Gentry, John A.: “Military Force in an Age of National Cowardice”,
The Washington Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 179-191.
13
See, for instance, Burchett, Wilfred G.: The Whores of War: Mercenaries Today (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1977); Botha, Chris: “Soldiers of Fortune or Whores of War? The Legal Position of Mercenaries with Specific
Reference to South Africa”, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, vol. 15, no. 2 (1993), pp. 75-91.
14
Fayemi, J. ’Kayode: “Africa in Search of Security: Mercenaries and Conflicts”, in Musah, Abdel-Fatau & J.
14
'Kayode Fayemi (eds.): Mercenaries. An African Security Dilemma (London: Pluto Press, 2000), pp. 13-42; Ripley,
Tim: Mercenaries. Soldiers of Fortune (Avonmouth: Paragonb, 1997), pp. 21-39.
15
Based mainly on Isenberg., David: “Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.: A Profile of Today's Private Sector Corporate
Mercenary Firms”, Center for Defense Information Monograph, November 1997, www.cdi.org/
issues/mercenaries/report.html See also Shearer, David: “Private Armies and Military Intervention”, Adelphi
Papers, no. 316 (1998), pp. 23-37.
16
Pech, Khareen: “Executive Outcomes—A Corporate Conquest”, in Cilliers & Mason (eds.): op.cit.. (note 7),
pp. 81-110; Shearer: op.cit.. (note 15), pp. 39-55 See also Peleman, Johan: “Mining for Serious Trouble: JeanRaymong Boulle and His Corporate Empire Project”, in Musah & Fayemi (ed.): op.cit.. (note 14), pp. 155-168;
Pech, Khareen: “The Hands of War: Mercenaries in the Former Zaïre”, ibid., pp. 117-154; Vines, Alex:
“Mercenaries and the Privatisation of Security in Africa in the 1990s”, in Mills & Stremlau (eds.): op.cit.. (note 7),
pp. 47-80.
17
Isenberg: op.cit.. (note 15). See also Sandline’s own website: www.sandline.com; and the memoirs of former
Sandline director, Tim Spicer: An Unorthodox Soldier. Peace and War and the Sandline Affair (Edinburg:
Mainstream Publishing, 1999), pp. 189-202.
18
Isenberg: op.cit.. (note 15); Shearer: op.cit.. (note 15), pp. 56-63. For the MPRI’s own version, see their
homepage:: www.mpri.com.
19
See Kingma, Kees (ed.): Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and Security Impacts
(Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), passim.
20
Vandervort, Bruce: Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914 (London: UCL Press, 1998), pp. 42-45 &
passim; Davis, Shelby Cullom: Reservoirs of Men: A History of the Black Troops of French West Africa.
Doktoral thesis , Université de Geneve, 1934 (Chambéry: Imprimeries Réunis, 1934), pp. 16-19.
21
On the mandate period see Callahan, Michael D.: Mandates and Empire. The League of Nations and Africa
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), especially pp. 92-98 on the British and pp. 113-117 on the French use
of African troops beyond the borders of their respective mandate areas.,
22
Moorcraft, Paul L.: African Nemesis. War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010 (London: Brassey’s,
1994), pp. 89. See also Ranelagh, John: The Agency. The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Touchstone,
1986), pp. 608-609; Woodward, Bob: Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1987), pp. 426; Schraeder, Peter J.: “Paramilitary Intervention”, in idem (ed.): Intervention into the
1990s. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World. 2nd Edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 131-151.
23
See, for instance, Hoare, Mike: Mercenary (New York: Bantam Books, 1979); idem: The Road to Kalamata: a
Congo Mercenary’s Personal Memoir (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989); Logan, David: The Bloody
Congo (Downsview, Canada: Unit Nine Publishing, 1978). On the UN mission see Durch, William J.: “The UN
Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964”, in idem (ed.): The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and
Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 315-352; Pruden, Caroline: Conditional Partners.
Eisenhower, the United Nations, and the Search for a Permanent Peace (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University
Press, 1998), pp. 286-303; Miller, Richard I.: Dag Hammerskjold and Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Oceana
Publications, 1961), pp. 266-318; Isenberg: op.cit.. (note 15); Reno: op.cit.. (note 8), pp. 147-181
24
Musah & Fayemi (ed.): op.cit.. (note 14), pp. 266. See also Forsyth, Frederick. The Biafra Story
(Harmondworth: Penguin Books, 1969); and Moorcraft: op.cit. (note 22), pp. 331 about the role of South Africa.
25
Cawthra, Gavin: Brutal Force. The Apartheid War Machine (London: International Defence and Aid Fund for
Southern Africa, 1986), pp. 76-80; idem: Policing South Africa (London: Zed Books, 1993).
26
For an overview see Musah, Abdel-Fatau & J. ’Kayode Fayemi: “Appendix I: Mercenaries: Africa’s
Experience 1950-1990”, in idem & idem (ed.): op.cit.. (note 14), pp. 265-274.
27
A good overview is Vine, Alex: “Angola: 40 Years of War”, Track Two, vol. 9, no. 2 (Cape Town: Centre for
Conflict Resolution, June 2000), pp. 1-32..
28
On superpower rivalry in southern Africa see Berridge, Geoff R.: “The Superpowers and Southern Africa”, in
Roy Allison & Phil Williams (ed.): Superpower Conpetition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 206-226; Zacarias, Agostinho: Security and the State in
Southern Africa (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 62-92; Davis, R. Hunt Jr. & Peter J. Schraeder: “South Africa”,
in Schraeder (ed.): op.cit.. (note 22), pp. 247-267; Rodman, Peter W.: More Precious Than Peace. The Cold War
and the Struggle for the Third World (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994), pp. 163-182, 358-399; Hopf,
Ted: Peripheral Visions. Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 61-116; Scott, James M.: Deciding to Intervene. The Reagan
Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), pp. 112-151. On the role of
the USSR see Krassin, Yuri: “The USSR and the Third World: A Historical Perspective”, in Mohiaddin
15
Mesbahi (ed.): Russia and the Third World in the Post-Soviet Era (Gainesville: University Press of Florida,
1994), pp. 109-124; MacFarlane, Stephen Neil: “Russia, Africa, and the End of the Cold War”, ibid., pp. 225249.
29
Fortna, Virginia Page: “United Nations Angola Verification Mission I”, in Durch (ed.): op.cit.. (note 23), pp.
376-387; ida: “United Nations Angopla Verification Mission II”, ibid., pp. 388-405; Lodico, Yvonne C.: “Peace
that Fell Apart: The United Nations and the War in Angola”, in William J. Durch (ed.): UN Peacekeeping,
American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 103-133; Hare,
Paul: Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace. An Indsider's Account of the Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace Press, 1998); Hampson, Fen Osler: Nurturing Peace. Why Peace Settlements Succeed or
Fail (Washington, DC: Unites States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 87-128. A cmparative of the various
agreements in, inter alia, Angola and Mozambique is Ohlson, Thomas: Power Politics and Peace Politics. IntraState Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa. Report nr. 50 (Uppsala: Afd. for Freds- och konfliktforskning,
Uppsala Universitet, 1998); idem & Stephen John Stedman: The New Is Not Yet Born. Conflict Resolution in
Southern Africa (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994).
30
Cilliers, Jakkie & Christian Dietrich (ed.): Angola’s War Economy. The Role of Oil and Diamonds (Pretoria:
Institute for Security Studies, 2000), passim.
31
Isenberg: op.cit.. (note 15); Rogers, Anthony: Someone Else’s War. Mercenaries from 1960 to the Present
(London: Harper Collins, 1998), pp. 67-93; Shearer: op.cit.. (note 15), pp. 46-48, Cleary, Sean: “Angola—A
Case Study of Private Military Involvement”, in Cilliers & Mason (ed.): op. cit (note 7), pp. 141-174.; Reno:
op.cit.. (note 8), pp. 61-67; Hare: op.cit.. (note 29), pp. 67.
32
Abdullah, Ibrahim & Patrick Muana: “The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone. A Revolt of the
Lumpenproletariat”, in Christopher Clapham (ed.): African Guerillas (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), pp. 172193. On the conflict see Zark-Williams, Alfred B.: “Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 199198”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 1 (February 1999), pp. 143-162.
33
Isenberg: op.cit.. (note 15); Shearer: op.cit.. (note 15), pp. 49-53 Douglas, Ian: “Fighting for Diamonds—
Private Military Companies in Sierra Leone”, in Cilliers & Mason (ed.): op. cit. (note 7), pp. 175-200; Reno:
op.cit. (note 8), pp. 113-146..
34
Facts on UNAMSIL are available at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/body_unamsil.htm.
35
Reno: op.cit.. (note 8), pp. 79-111. On the conflict and its history see Sawyer, Amos: The Emergence of
Autocracy in Liberia. Tragedy and Challenge (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992); Huband, Mark: The Liberian Civil
War (London: Frank Cass, 1998); Alao, Abiodun, John Mackinlay & ‘Funni Olonisakin: Peacekeepers, Politicians,
and Warlords: The Liberian Peace Peace Process (Tokyo: UN University Press, 1999).
36
On the economic bacground of these wars see Jean, Francois & Jean-Christophe Rufin (ed.): Économie des
guerres civiles (Paris: Hachette, 1996), passim, especially Rufin, Jean-Christope: “Les économies des guerre
dans les conflilts internes” (pp. 19-60); de Montclos, Marc-Antoine: “Libéria: des prédateurs aux ramasseurs de
miettes” (pp. 269-298); Weissman, Fabrice: “Mozambique: la ‘guerre du ventre’” (pp. 299-340).
37
Facts on UNMEE are available at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unmee/body_unmee.htm.
38
Ratner, Steven R.: The New UN Peacekeeping. Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War (New
York: St. Martin's Press and Council of Foreign Relations, 1995); Hill, Stephen & Shahin P. Malik:
Peacekeeping and the United Nations (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996); Warner, Daniel (ed.): New Dimensions of
Peacekeeping (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995); Whitman, Jim (ed.): Peacekeeping and the UN
Agencies (London: Frank Cass, 1999); Berdal, Mats R.: “Whither UN Peacekeeping. An Analysis of the
Chganging Military Requirements of UN Peacekeeping With Proposals for Its Enhancement“, Adelphi Papers,
no. 281 (London: IISS/Brassey's, 1993); Kühne, Winrich: Blauhelme in einer Turbulenten Welt. Beiträge
internationaler Experten zur Fortentwicklung des Völkerrechts und der Vereinten Nationen (Baden-Baden:
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993). On the personnel requirements see Däniker, Gustav: “The Guardian Soldier:
On the Nature and Use of Future Armed Forces“, Research Paper, no. 36 (New York & Geneva: UNIDIR,
1995); Bellamy, Christopher: Knights in White Armour. The New Art of War and Peace (London: Hutchinson,
1996); Battistelli, Fabrizio: “Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier”, Armed Forces and Society, vol. 23, no.
3 (Spring 1997), pp. 467-484.
39
On UNAVEM see note 29. Data on all these operations are found at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/
co_mission/co_miss.htm.
40
Sahnoun, Mohamed: Somalia. The Missed Opportunities (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace,
1994); Lyons, Terrence & Ahmed I. Samatar: Somalia. State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies
for Political Reconstruction (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Hirsch, John L. & Robert B.
Oakley: Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington,
16
DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1995); Heinreich, Wolfgang: Building the Peace. Experiences of
Collaborative Peacebuilding in Somalia 1993-1996 (Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute, 1998); Baynham, Simon:
“Somalia—UN at the Crossroads”, African Defence Review.A Working Paper Series, no. 15 (Halfway House:
Institute for Defence Policy, 1994); Clark, Jeffrey: “Debacle in Somalia: Failure of Collective Response”, in Lori
Fisler Damrosch (ed.): Enforcing Restraint. Collective Intervention in International Conflicts (New York:
Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1994), pp. 205-240; Lewis, Ioan & James Mayall: “Somalia”, i James Mayall
(ed.): The New Interventionism 1991-1994. United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and
Somalia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 94-126; Durch, William J.: “Introduction to
Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and ‘State-Building’ in Somalia”, in idem (ed.): op.cit. 1996 (note 29), pp.
311-366; Donald C.F. Daniel, Brad Hayes & Chantall de Jonge Ouddraat: Coercive Inducement and the
Containment of International Crises (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), pp. 79-112;
Ahmed, Ismail I. & Reginald Herbold Green: “The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and
Somaliland; Local-level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 20, nr.
1 (februar 1999), pp. 113-128.
41
Vacarro, J. Matthew: “The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda”, in Durch (ed.):
op.cit.. 1996 (note 29) , pp. 367-407; Jones, Bruce D.: “Military Intervention in Rwanda’s ‘Two Wars’:
Partisanship and Indifference”, i Barbara F. Walter & Jack Snyder (eds).: Civil Wars, Insecurity, and
Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 116-145. See als the report (15 December 1999)
of the independent investigation commission headed by Igvar Karlsson: Report of the Independent Inquiry into
the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda at www.un.org/News/ossg/
rwanda_report.htm.
42
On Liberia, see www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unomil.htm. On the role of ECOWAS (via
ECOMOG) see Howe, Herbert: “Lessons of Liberia. ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping”, International
Security, vol. 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 145-17; Wippman, David: “Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and
the Liberian Civil War”, in Damrosch (ed.): op.cit.. (note 40), pp. 157-204; Sesay, Max Ahmadu: “Collective
Security or Collective Disaster? Regional Peace-keeping in West Africa”, Security Dialogue, vol. 26, no. 2 (June
1995), pp. 205-222; Kwesi-Aning, Emmanuel: Security in the West-African Subregion. An Analysis of
ECOWAS's Policies in Liberia (København: Institut for Statskundskab, Kbh. Universitet, 1999).
43
See www.un.org/Depts/dpko/monuc/monucF.htm By 31 August 2001, only 2,398 of the authorized 5,537
military observers and troops had been deployed. On the conflict see Shearer, David: “Africa's Great War”,
Survival, vol. 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 89-106; Seybolt, Taylor B.: “The War in the Democratic Republic of
Congo”, SIPRI Yearbook 2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 59-76.
44
Hume, Cameron: Ending Mozambique's War. The Role of Mediation and Good Offices (Washington, DC:
United States Institute for Peace Press, 1994); Synge, Richard: Mozambique. UN Peacekeeping in Action, 199294 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997); Msabaha, Ibrahim: “Negotiating an End to
Mozambique's Murderous Rebellion”, in I. William Zartman (ed.): Elusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil
Wars (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 204-230; Schiedman, Witney W.: “Conflict
Resolution in Mozambique”, in David R. Smock (ed.): Making War and Waging Peace. Foreign Intervention in
Africa (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1993), pp. 219-238; Reed, Pamela L.: “The Politics of
Reconciliation: The United Nations Operation in Mozambique”, in Durch (ed.): op.cit.. 1996 (note 29) , pp. 275310; Turner, J. Michael, Sue Nelson & Kimberley Mahlling-Clark: “Mozambique's Vote for Democratic
Governance”, in Krishna Kumar (ed.): Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International Assistance
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 153-175.
45
See, e.g., Thomas, Scott: “Africa and the End of the Cold War: an Overview of Impacts”, in Sola Akinrinade &
Amadu Sesay (eds.): Africa in the Post-Cold War International System (London: Pinter, 1998), pp. 5-27;
Wright, Stephen: “Africa and Global Society: Marginality, Conditionality and Conjuncture”, ibid., pp. 133-146.
46
“North” is here defined as NATO plus other countries with security treaties with NATO members, i.e. Japan,
South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Israel. The figures are taken from tables 4A.1 and 4A.3 in Sköns,
Elisabeth & al.: “Tables of Military Expenditure”, SIPRI Yearbook 2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001),
pp. 267-295.
47
See Adenji, Oluyemi: “Regionalism in Africa”, Security Dialogue, vol. 24, no. 2 (1993), pp. 211-220; Ayafor,
Chungong & Jean-Pelé Fomete: “Towards a Subregional Agenda for Peace in Central Africa”, Disarmament,
vol. 19, no. 1 (1996), pp. 73-94; Keller, Edmond J.: “Rethinking African Regional Security”, in David A. Lake &
Patrick M. Morgan (ed.): Regional Orders. Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1997), pp. 296-317; Salim, Salim Ahmed: “The OAU Role in Conflict Management”, in
Otunnu & Doyle (eds.): op. cit. (note 8), pp. 233-244; Sur, Serge: “Vers la marginalisation de l'ONU dans le
17
domaine du maintien de la paix?”, Arés, vol. 17, no. 1 (October 1998), pp. 11-24; May, Roy & Simon Massay:
“The OAU Interventions in Chad: Mission Impossible or Mission Evaded?”, International Peacekeeping, vol. 5,
no. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 46-65; Kiplagat, B.A.: “The African Role in Conflict Management and Resolution”, in
David R. Smock & Chester A. Crocker (ed.): African Conflict Resolution. The U.S. Role in Peacemaking
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1995), pp. 27-38; Cohen, Herman J: “African
Capabilities for Managing Conflicts”, ibid., pp. 77-94.
48
The numbers are for December 2001 and taken from the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations at
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/dec01.htm.
49
See O’Brien, Kevin: “Military-Advisory Groups and African Security: Privatized Peacekeeping?,”
International Peacekeeping, vol. 5, no. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 78-105; idem: “PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries:
The Debate on Private Military Companies,” RUSI Journal, vol. 145, no. 1 (February 2000), pp. 59-64.
50
See Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (“Brahimi Report“) (UN Documents A/55/305, S/2000/809),
at www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/.
51
The figure 5,000 stems from Feil, Scott R. (Colonel, US Army): Preventing Genocide. How the Early Use of
Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflict, 1998). OAU’s report on Rwanda, which aggrees with this assessment, is available at www.oau-oua.org/
Document/ipep/report/Rwanda-e/EN-III-T.htm. The UN’s report (note 41) mentions the figure 2.,500.
52
On the distinction see Boyle, Joseph: “Natural Law and International Ethics”, in Terry Nardin & David R.
Mapel (ed.): Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 112-135
(especially pp. 116-121); Smith, Michael Joseph: “Liberalism and International Reform”, ibid. pp. 201-224
(especially pp. 207-209); Mapel, David R. & Terry Nardin: “Convergence and Divergence in International
Ethics”, ibid. pp. 297-322.
53
De Lupis, Ingrid Detter: The Law of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 118; Green,
L.C.: The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 111-114;
McCoubrey, H. & N.D. White: International Law and Armed Conflict (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992), pp. 269270; Rubin, Elizabeth: “Mercenaries”, in Roy Gutman & David Rieff (eds.): Crimes of War. What the Public
Should Know (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), pp. 248-250.
54
Abraham, Graham: “The Contemporary Legal Environment”, in Mills & Stemlau (eds.): op.cit.. (note 7), pp.
81-106; Kufuour, Kofi Oteng: “The OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism and Civil Conflicts”,
in Musah & Fayemi (ed.). op.cit.. (note 14), pp. 198-209; Olonisakin, ‘Fummi: “Arresting the Tide of
Mercenaries: Prospects for Regional Control”, ibid., pp. 233-256. The central conventions are reprinted ibid.,
pp. 275-288. An assessment of their effects is available in “The Report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the
Use of Mercenaries” (1998), ibid., pp. 289-320.
55
The law is available at www.parliament.gov.za/acts/1998/act-15.pdf.
56
Cilliers, Jakkie & Richard Cornwell: “Africa—From the Privatisation of Security to the Privatisation of War”,
in Cilliers & Mason (ed.): op.cit.. (note 7), pp. 227-245, especially pp. 236-240.
57
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at www.un.org/law/icc/statute/ romefra.htm.
58
Creveld: op. cit. (note 2).
59
Clausewitz, Carl Von: Vom Kriege, Ungekürzter Text nach der Erstauflage (1832-1834) (Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein
Verlag, 1980), p. 34 (Book I, chapter 1.24).
60
Giller, Joachim: Demokratie und Wehrpflicht (Vienna: Landesverteidigungsakademie, 1992); Posen, Barry R.:
“Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power”, International Security, 18:2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80-124.
61
Janowitz, Morris: The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960);
Huntington, Samuel P.: The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957).
62
For an elaboration see Møller, Bjørn: “Post-Trinitarian War and the Regulation of Violence?”, forthcoming in
Dietrich Jung & Stefano Guzzini (eds.): Copenhagen Peace Research (working title).
63
For documentation see Møller, Bjørn: “Raising Armies in a Rough Neighbourhood: Soldiers, Guerillas and
Mercenaries in Southern Africa”, Working Papers, no. 30 (Copenhagen: COPRI, 2001).
64
Van Creveld, Martin: The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 415421 & passim.
65
Giddens, Anthony: The Nation-State and Violence (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995). Tilly, Charles: Coercion,
Capital and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
18