Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
The Red Affair: FMLN-Cuban Relations
During the Salvadoran Civil War, 1981-1992
From January 1981 until January 1992, the smallest of the Central American nations was
engaged in a bloody civil war between the Salvadoran military and the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN). Backed by the country’s businessmen, landowners, and the
mainstream political parties, the military forces that presumed to embody “the state” and uphold
the “law and order” fought to preserve an increasingly contested status quo. In turn, the FMLN
was a conglomeration of the country’s different leftist elements—guerrilla movements, the
Communist Party and mass based organizations of workers, peasants, and university students.
Alleging to represent the interests of the oppressed, repressed, and impoverished pueblo
salvadoreño—Salvadoran people—the FMLN sought to overthrow the country’s authoritarian
government.
On 16 January 1992, the military and the FMLN put an end to over a decade of armed
conflict with the signing of the Acuerdos de Chapultepec. Thus began the long, arduous, and as
of yet unfinished process of reconstruction and reconciliation. By 1989, when peace negotiations
began in earnest, the FMLN’s accomplishments were extensive. Although unable to secure a
total military victory, the organization had proved not only that it could not be annihilated or
defeated by the Salvadoran government and army, which were backed politically and
diplomatically by Washington; but also that it was a force without whom peace and stability
were impossible. The successes of the Salvadoran insurgents ensured the FMLN’s position at the
bargaining table, on an equal footing with the Salvadoran government, and secured the
organization’s voice in the future of El Salvador as a legitimate political party. The level of
democracy that exists in El Salvador today—although imperfect and insufficient, especially if
social democracy is taken into account—largely attests to the FMLN’s success in countering the
1
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
authoritarian state that had historically relied on repressive mechanisms to uphold an unpopular
economic and social order.
Cuba’s role in the history of the FMLN is a topic that historians and political scientists
have largely shied away from. The scant existing sources on the topic are overridingly biased in
favor of one of the two warring factions and thus vary greatly in their evaluation of Cuba’s
contributions to the FMLN. Some—the most notable of which are documents from the US
government during the 1980s—look at the FMLN purely through the geopolitical spectrum of
the Cold War and place sole blame for its emergence and activities on Soviet, Cuban and
Communist interference. This position, which was used to justify overt and covert US support
for the Salvadoran government and military, generated a backlash. Many intellectuals,
sympathetic to the plight of the revolutionaries, or simply opposed to US intervention, focused
only on the national causes of war and denied or completely ignored Cuban involvement. Both
interpretations suffer from a politicized bias that obfuscates the liaisons between these actors.
Havana did not give birth to the Salvadoran guerrillas or push them to opt for an armed
insurgency that they would have otherwise avoided. Notwithstanding, Cuba’s relationship with
the Salvadoran opposition throughout the 1980s was extensive and consequential. National
rationales for insurgency and Cuban assistance to that insurgency were both decisive in the civil
war that unfolded throughout the 1980s: the absence of either would have severely compromised
the existence of the FMLN as an insurgent opposition force capable of challenging the status
quo.
The question of Soviet and Cuban support for revolutionary movements in Latin America
played a decisive role in the region’s geopolitical developments during the Cold War. A study on
the relationship between Cuba and the Salvadoran guerrilla movement presents an important
contribution to our understanding of Latin America’s Cold War history and holds current
2
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
political relevance in light of El Salvador’s last presidential election in March 2009, which
brought the FMLN to office for the first time in the country’s history. At a most basic level, the
FMLN and the Salvadoran Civil War cannot be fully understood if Cuba is not brought into the
equation. Additionally, the relationship between the FMLN and Havana is illustrative regarding
the effects of the Cold War on El Salvador, and it elucidates the impact of the 1959 Cuban
revolution and its aftermath on this Central American nation and on its men and women who
came to believe that social justice and change were possible only through revolution. More
broadly, the historical significance of this affair permeates beyond the borders of Cuba and El
Salvador and transcends the historical period in which it took place. Although Cuba’s
relationship with the FMLN was in many respects unique, it was also reflective of Havana’s
foreign policy in Central America throughout the Cold War. Furthermore, the episode elucidates
ties amongst the Latin American left that, while by no means unchanged, are not alien to
contemporary geopolitics in the region.
The Power of Example:
Cuba was the foreign power most extensively involved in the revolutionary struggle of
the FMLN. Its direct involvement on behalf of one of the warring parties is comparable only to
that of the United States. Evidently, these two countries acted as champions of opposing camps
and their involvement was, at times, mutually constitutive. Cuba’s unrivaled impact on the
FMLN was twofold. First, it had a profound resonance throughout the Salvadoran organization
on account of its demonstration effect: the subjective impact of its revolution and aftermath on
the Latin American left and particularly, for the purposes of this work, on the FMLN leadership.
Second, the Castro administration provided direct and extensive support to the Salvadoran
revolutionaries throughout the duration of the civil war. Cuba’s indirect influence on the
3
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
Salvadoran revolutionaries largely enabled and shaped the subsequent concrete relationship of
the 1980s.
The Cuban revolution of 1959 changed the continental axiom: it was now possible to
alter the political power structures in the area of maximum US influence against the interests of
this hegemonic power. For the first time in many years, social revolution seemed possible and
Fidel Castro’s Cuba became the obvious referent for Latin Americans aspiring to a radically
different society.1
Beyond the impact of its ideals, the Cuban revolution presented individual revolutionaries
in the region with something tangible. The men and women who overthrew Cuban dictator
Fulgencio Batista appeared to have surged from the ashes. Their personal sacrifices and success
in the face of extremely adverse conditions provided subsequent revolutionaries with corporeal
examples of the personal qualities necessary to realize their goals. In the initial stages of the
Salvadoran war, when idealism reigned and the human fallibility of individual revolutionaries
was disregarded, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara provided the FMLN leadership with the
embodiment of the ideal revolutionary man.2 While Che was immortalized as such, Fidel Castro
was the real-life example. More than any other figures, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara offered the
Salvadoran youth of the 60s and 70s, who would form the cadres of the FMLN in the 1980s,
human examples of the possibility of demanding the impossible: the world could in fact be
With the exception of Mexico’s Revolution in 1910, the option of revolution was not on the Latin American table before
1959. Communist Parties in the region throughout the 30s, 40s, and 50s, adhered to pursuing change through elections and
refused to adopt the mantle of revolutionary vanguards. In El Salvador, the Communist Party as such, did not endorse revolution
until the creation of the FMLN in 1980. In the 1970s the Party would in fact split between those who continued to oppose
revolution and those who became disillusioned with the electoral avenue and joined the guerrillas. General information on the
Latin American Communist Parties and their stance towards armed insurgency can be found in: Jorge Castañeda, “In the
Beginning,” Utopia Unarmed. The Latin American Left After the Cold War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1993). Joaquín
Villalobos and Eduardo Sancho, both former leaders of the FMLN, conveyed the specifics of the Salvadoran Communist Party
the author. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, United Kingdom, January 8, 2007. Interview with Eduardo Sancho, San
Salvador, El Salvador, January 29, 2007.
2 All of the FMLN leaders interviewed by the author agreed that Cuba embodied the possibility of change and that Fidel
Castro and Che Guevara provided the FMLN leadership with powerful and tangible examples of the ideal “revolutionary man.”
Interview with Ana Guadalupe Martínez, San Salvador, El Salvador, January 30, 2007. Interview with Salvador Sanchez Cerén
“Leonel González,” San Salvador, El Salvador, January 29, 2007. Interview with Facundo Guardado, San Salvador, El Salvador,
January 30, 2007. Interviews with Eduardo Sancho “Ferman Cienfuegos,” and Joaquín Villalobos.
1
4
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
theirs. The world, however, came at a price. The success of the Cuban revolution had taught a
consequential lesson: radical transformations were possible, but only through armed insurgency.
In addition to representing the possibility of change, and doing so through a tangible
example, the Cuban revolution resounded so loudly throughout the hemisphere because it evoked
a powerful ethos of Latin American solidarity with deep historical roots. The region’s common
history as a Spanish colony; the long-term social, economic, and political consequences of that
colonial past; and the inequitable relationship with the United States; enabled references to a
supra-national Latin American identity to carry significant weight. Had commonalities across the
region not been palpable, Cuban leaders made a point of elucidating the evident similarity of
conditions throughout Latin America at the expense of equally evident national differences.
Romantic desires of a united Latin America capable of standing up to its northern neighbor, had
deep historical roots going back to Simón Bolivar and José Martí in the nineteenth century.
While the Cuban Revolution did not create these internationalist goals, its success re-awakened
them. The Cuban revolutionaries’ ability to overthrow US-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista,
Cuba’s defiance of United States’ interests, and the survival of the Castro administration in the
face of myriad US attempts to overthrow it, fashioned Cuba into a Latin American David
confronting the US Goliath and made the Castro Administration a viable self-proclaimed
spokesperson for this revived latinamericanism.
In spite of the difficulties and hardships endured by the 26 of July Movement upon
arriving on the island and throughout their years in the Sierra Maestra, the speed and relative
ease with which the Cuban Revolution succeeded gave many in the region the impression that
revolution was not only possible but also that it was simple.3 Despite apparent commonalities
across the region, many of the conditions in pre-revolutionary Cuba were an anomaly. Although
3 Facundo Guardado and Joaquin Villalobos both claim that Cuba not only made revolution look possible but also gave the
impression that it was easy. Interview with Facundo Guardado and interview with Joaquin Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
5
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
unequally distributed, the island’s economic prosperity was unique, as was its predominantly
urban character and its geographical isolation. These exceptional qualities, which many would
overlook or refuse to acknowledge, were evidently consequential to the success of revolution in
Cuba, a success which, with the transient exception of Nicaragua, was unobtainable anywhere
else in the region.
The ideology, leadership, and concrete accomplishments of the Cuban Revolution
resulted in its unprecedented impact upon the Latin American left. In El Salvador, former FMLN
leader Facundo Guardado asserts that “the Cuba factor permeated the entire FMLN
leadership…there was not a single leader that did not find in Cuba a symbolic referent.”4
Admiration did not result in imitation. The FMLN looked to Cuba more for what it destroyed
with its revolution than for what it established in place of the status quo ante.5 Notwithstanding,
Salvadoran insurgents, like many before them, found in Cuba not only an inspiration but also a
powerful ally. Havana threw its full support behind the FMLN’s efforts. As will be demonstrated
in the following pages, Cuban support for the FMLN was profound, extensive and enormously
consequential.
The FMLN is Born…and the Affair Begins:
Ana Guadalupe Martínez made her way through Managua in an old Nicaraguan taxi. It
was October 15, 1979 and the political representative of the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo
(ERP) was headed for the Cuban embassy. She was to speak to Cuban officials and persuade
4
Interview with Facundo Guardado.
With the exception of some of the most ideological members of the Communist Party, the FMLN leadership did not wish
to adopt the post-revolutionary Cuban model in El Salvador as leaders tended to look down upon political restrictions on the
island. Notwithstanding, there was a deep reverence towards the Cuban Revolution because it had overthrown a military
dictatorship, had achieved greater socioeconomic equality, and had freed the nation from subordination to the interests of the
United States. The author’s understanding of these viewpoints within the FMLN leadership is the result of interviews held with
four of the organizations leaders. Ana Guadalupe Martínez of the ERP, Facundo Guardado of the FPL, Eduardo Sancho of the
RN, and ERP leader Joaquín Villalobos. Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martínez, Facundo Guardado, and Eduardo Sancho.
Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
5
6
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
them to incorporate the ERP into the discussions taking place in Havana. For months, the Cuban
administration had been mediating talks between the groups that it considered to be the strongest
revolutionary forces in El Salvador: the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS), the National
Resistance (RN), and the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL). It was not difficult for the ERP to
speculate that these meetings were intended to cement Salvadoran revolutionary unity under
Cuban auspice. A year earlier, the Cuban government had established such an arrangement with
Nicaraguan rebel forces. The subsequent triumph of the Sandinista Front for National Liberation
(FSLN) had a deep impact on the Cuban administration and on the Salvadoran guerrillas. The
ERP leadership knew full well that if its group were excluded from a unified opposition force
backed by Cuba, it would be on the sidelines of the revolutionary effort. Consequently, Ana
Guadalupe found herself knocking on Havana’s door in Managua.
Her task was complicated. With the murder of communist poet Roque Dalton in 1975, the
ERP and Cuba had severed ties and entered into a relationship characterized by hostility and
mistrust.6 Ana Guadalupe was not deterred by the Cuban Embassy’s reluctance to see her. Some
ERP members who had fought with the Sandinistas had remained in Nicaragua. Through these
contacts, Ana Guadalupe secured a meeting with the Sandinista Army Chief of Staff, Joaquín
Cuadra, who persuaded two Cuban agents in Managua to meet with the ERP representative.7
The Cuban deputies were persuaded by the young guerrillera but, being part of a regime
in which practically all decisions had to be made directly by Fidel Castro, Ana Guadalupe was
told to speak directly to the Directorate in Cuba. The next day, Ana Guadalupe flew to the
6 Roque Dalton was a legendary communist Salvadoran poet who joined the ERP in 1973. Before joining the ERP, Roque
Dalton spent a number of years in Cuba and developed close relationships with prominent members of the Cuban administration.
In May of 1975, he was accused of treason by leaders of the ERP and was tried by an ad hoc military commission named
“Comisión M.” Four ERP leaders comprised the commission: 3 voted in favor of assassinating Dalton and one dissented. Dalton
was executed on May 10, 1975. His death was condemned by Havana who consequently broke relations with the ERP. The
causes surrounding the death of the internationally recognized poet are obscure, even to those who were participants in the trial.
The accusations against him seem forged as he was accused of being both a Cuban spy and a CIA agent. Eduardo Sancho
“Fermán Cienfuegos,” who was the dissenting vote in “Comisión M,” provides the most comprehensive account found by the
author of the events surrounding his death. Cienfuegos, Fermán. Eduardo Sancho. Crónica Entre los Espejos. (2nd ed. San
Salvador, El Salvador: Editoriales Universidad Francisco Gavidia, 2003), p. 100-114.
7 Interview with Ana Guadalupe Martínez.
7
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
Caribbean bastion of revolution. Her first meeting on the island was with the head of the
America Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party (Departamento
América) and the Cuban most actively involved in Havana’s revolutionary efforts elsewhere in
the continent: Manuel Piñeiro (better known as Barbaroja—“red beard”). Thus began the ERP’s
integration into the organization that would become the FMLN. This inclusion would indeed
prove decisive due to the ERP’s military strength and the close personal relationship that
developed between its leader Joaquín Villalobos and Fidel Castro.
Ana Guadalupe’s crusade to reestablish relations with Havana elucidates the first decisive
chapter of Cuba’s affair with the Salvadoran revolutionary movement: the Cuban
administration’s involvement in the union of the guerrilla factions as a collective opposition
force. The alliance of the four primary guerrilla organizations and the Communist Party into the
FMLN, proclaimed on October 10, 1980, was a momentous accomplishment. Throughout the
1970s, disagreement over insurgent strategies, and rivalry to achieve hegemony of the revolution
by winning the support of the workers and peasants, had kept the groups at odds and unwilling to
compromise with each other. 8 Furthermore, the very emergence of the guerrilla groups in the
early 1970s implied a rejection of the Communist Party as a viable means for change. The Party
itself was split between those in favor of armed insurgency and those still wishing to work
8
The ERP, the RN, and the FPL maintained the most divergent positions on strategic thought. The ERP was most
influenced by revolutionary efforts in Latin America. It prioritized massive, nation-wide military action believing this would
incite the masses to join in the insurrection that would overthrow the government. The ERP placed little value on the political
organization of the masses and used it mainly as a means to obtain recruits. The RN, which broke off from the ERP in May 1975
over tactical differences, favored popular mobilization believing that the best way to overthrow the government was through
mass action. It organized labor and trade associations, mass protests, and acts of civil disobedience. It viewed military action as a
means to protect and enhance popular political mobilizations but not as an independent method. Finally, the FPL’s strategy
derived directly from the tactics of the Vietcong as it foresaw a prolonged and drawn-out guerrilla war that would eventually
bring the direct military involvement of the United States. The FPL’s priority was thus to keep its forces spread out and to
establish an infrastructure of resistance in the remote areas of the country. With relation the Communist Party (PCS), the very
emergence of these three guerrilla organizations implied a rejection of the PCS and its willingness to work through the electoral
avenue. The above-mentioned break-up of guerrilla strategy is well established. The FMLN leadership openly recognized it
during the war as is illustrated by Fermán Cienfuegos’ speech on the history and growth of the FMLN given on 24 December
1986. Cienfuegos, Fermán. Veredas en la Audacia: Historia del FMLN.( El Salvador: Ediciones Roque Dalton, 1987-1989). The
same position was reestablished by Eduardo Sancho in an interview with the author, op. cit and in his work Crónica Entre los
Espejos. Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte and David E. Spencer also confirm these contrasting strategies. Jose Angel Moroni
Bracamonte, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas, p. 13-15.
8
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
through the electoral avenue. Besides the Salvadoran organizations themselves, no party to the
negotiations for union was as decisive as Cuba.
The alliance of these disparate elements raises three key questions: Why did these groups
decide to set aside their differences and coordinate their efforts? Why did they do so in Cuba?
And why did their unification occur at this particular point in history?
The revolutionary leaders’ agreement to come to terms with each other after years of
enmity was driven by three decisive motivators. The first entailed the repression in El Salvador
that followed the triumph of the Sandinistas and the debilitating effect that this had on the
Salvadoran guerrillas. Fearing that El Salvador would follow Nicaragua’s footsteps, the army
and security forces intensified their efforts to destroy the insurgency and violence became more
indiscriminate. In this climate, unity seemed to offer the Salvadoran opposition the only means
by which to avoid individual annihilation. The second decisive instigator was the exemplary role
of the Nicaraguan Revolution. The FSLN’s origins as a group of disparate organizations closely
paralleled the state of the Salvadoran guerrillas before they united. After years of insurgency as
individual factions, the Sandinistas overthrew the Somoza dictatorship only after coming
together in 1978 and staging a coordinated offensive. Thus, recent events in Nicaragua carried
favor for Salvadoran revolutionary cohesion.
These two factors do not account however for why the ERP sought inclusion into the
FMLN through Cuba, or why the terms of revolutionary unity were predominantly convened at
meetings in Havana, throughout the end of 1979 and 1980.9 These facets of the FMLN’s creation
This reality was first documented by the United States’ Department of State in its “White Paper,” which the Reagan
administration henceforth used to justify its support for the Salvadoran armed forces. In this document it is reported that from
May 5 to June 8, 1980, Salvadoran guerrillas attended meetings in Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Nicaragua and then
went to Cuba and met with Castro and with the Cuban Directorate of Special Operations (DOE) “to discuss guerrilla military
plans.” In late May 1980 the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP) was “admitted into the guerrilla coalition after negotiations in
Havana. The coalition then assumes the name of the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) and meets with Fidel Castro on
three occasions.” United States Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Subject: “Communist Interference in El Salvador,”
(Washington, DC: February 23, 1981). In interviews carried out by the author with three Commanders of the FMLN: Ana
Guadalupe Martinez (second in command of the ERP), Eduardo Sancho (leader of the RN and member of the “Comandancia
General”), and Joaquín Villalobos (supreme leader of the ERP and member of the “Comandancia General”), these meetings in
9
9
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
can only be understood when Cuba’s role as promoter and enabler of unification is factored in to
the Salvadoran revolutionary equation.
The fact that the ERP sought inclusion through Cuba reflects that, at this point, relations
between the individual Salvadoran organizations were still dominated by wariness. In this
atmosphere, the island provided a safe heaven for the unfolding of negotiations and its mediation
induced groups to set aside differences that they otherwise would not have. In effect, the
disparate groups envisaged Cuba as a Hobbesian Leviathan that they trusted would ensure parity
between them in the united organization by drawing on the strength of its reputation.
Commensurate leadership was indispensable for the Salvadoran groups to agree to come together
and it was institutionalized through the creation of the “Comandancia General:” the FMLN’s
commanding body where each group was equally represented. Notwithstanding this de jure
parity, throughout the duration of the civil war certain FMLN members came to have privileged
relationships with Cuban officials—most notably with Fidel Castro—and this influenced the
assistance and attention conferred by the Havana.10
Beyond its provision of a space for discussion and its role as guarantor that no group was
marginalized, the Cuban administration provided the most alluring incentive for unity: extensive
Cuban support contingent on this unity. Throughout the meetings in Havana, the Cuban
administration made its position clear: it would provide large-scale aid through armaments,
financial backing, and military training if, and only if, the groups agreed to unite and coordinate
Havana to establish unity between the guerrillas were confirmed. All three, as well as FPL Commander Facundo Guardado, agree
that Cuba played a pivotal role in bringing about the creation of the FMLN as such. The interviewees also disclosed that meetings
between the FPL, CP and RN began in mid-1979, in Cuba. These three groups were the first to unite forming the “revolutionary
tripartite.” After Ana Guadalupe Martínez’s successful lobbying efforts, the ERP was included and the PRTC was the last to join.
Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martínez, Joaquín Villalobos, Facundo Guardado, and Eduardo Sancho.
10 Initially, the FPL and the PCS were closest with the Cuba administration and were thus the first to begin negotiations in
Havana. In particular, FPL leader Cayetano Carpio and Fidel Castro had a close relationship but Carpio’s dogmatism, and his
ambition to be the supreme leader of the revolution, soured relations between the two. Subsequently, the Cuban leader’s favors
shifted to ERP leader Joaquín Villalobos whose military audacity and intelligence carried great favor with the Cuban leader. The
ERP’s privileged relationship with Cuba resulted in the ERP’s preferential treatment regarding armaments shipments or the
allocation of funds. Castro’s personal allegiances and their effects were conferred to the author by Joaquín Villalobos, Ana
Guadalupe Martínez, Facundo Guardado, and Eduardo Sancho and by ERP commander Claudio Armijo. Interviews with Joaquín
Villalobos, Ana Guadalupe Martínez, Facundo Guardado, and Eduardo Sancho. interview with Claudio Armijo, San Salvador, El
Salvador, February 1, 2007.
10
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
their efforts.11 Above all else, the prospect of receiving weapons—at a time in which their
scarcity was proving detrimental—led the Salvadorans to agree to launch a coordinated
offensive.12 Rumor had it that in one of these meeting Manuel Piñeiro symbolically placed a
machine gun on the table and told the Salvadorans: “It’s yours if you come together.” When in
early 2007 I asked Joaquín Villalobos about the veracity of this rumor during an interview in
Oxford he replied with a smirk: “We weren’t idiots; it was blatantly clear that Cuba wanted us to
unite and that if we did we would count with the island’s full backing. There was no need for
such insinuations; Cuba’s stance was explicit.”13 In addition to practical considerations, Cuba’s
interest in the efforts of Salvadoran revolutionaries, and Castro’s personal offer to endorse and
assist them, had a subjective allure on the FMLN leadership.
The alliance of the Salvadoran left was therefore not the result of a mutually agreed upon
strategy between the different groups, but rather the product of the convergence of two interests:
to overthrow the oligarchy and to do so with Castro’s support. The ERP’s initial integration via
Cuban officials is revealing. First, it discloses that the Cuban administration played a role in
determining who would form the FMLN. In fact, RN leader Eduardo Sancho recalls that in the
initial stages of unification, it was the Cubans that largely pushed for the inclusion of the
Communist Party into the revolutionary alliance.14 More importantly, it elucidates an important
facet of the coalition that formed in these meetings in Havana: Cuban assistance was not
independent of Cuban influence on the course of the Salvadoran revolutionary movement.
It would be myopic to deny Salvadoran agency in the creation of the FMLN, as the
process was not an arbitrary Cuban. A better conceptualization is that by offering arms and
support, Cuba made the guerrillas an offer that they could not, or did not, refuse. Crucial to this
11
Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
Eduardo Sancho and Joaquín Villalobos, who were present at these negotiations, concur that Havana’s offer to provide
weapons was the biggest selling point of Cuba’s offer in exchange for unity. Villalobos recalls that in the meetings the Cubans
effectively said: “unite and we give you arms.” Interviews with Joaquín Villalobos and Eduardo Sancho.
13 Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
14 Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
12
11
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
acceptance was that Cuba never sought ideological uniformity between the groups. Some of
Barbarroja’s first words upon meeting Ana Guadalupe Martínez were: “We are not here to
impose relations between the groups, but we can discuss the importance of your union and
collective coordination, independently of your ideological differences.”15 The Cuban leadership
was not dogmatic, but practical. While it sought a strategically united front, it understood that the
different ideological positions of the Salvadoran groups were impossible to reconcile.16 The
Salvadorans’ willingness to ignore ideological opacity in their revolution can best be attributed
to fear of individual annihilation. This concern, coupled with the prospect of victory with the
promised weapons and support, underlined Salvadoran motivation for cohesion. Ideological
differences, and for that matter hegemonic control of the revolution, were meaningless if the
movement failed and in 1979 it looked as though it might unless radical changes were adopted.
These factors led to an implicit acceptance by the Salvadorans that ideology and control would
be resolved once victory was secured. In turn, Cuba probably presumed that when the time came
to settle these differences, it would have the political capital to influence the power struggle.
In retrospect, it is legitimate to question whether the Salvadorans had reservations about
uniting under Cuban auspice. In the historical context in which the negotiations for union took
place, however, there was little room for such considerations and Cuban assistance was accepted
with alacrity.
Throughout the duration of the Civil War, Cuba consistently provided a forum for
conflict resolution and helped mediate between disagreeing parties and individuals. Perhaps
more importantly, Cuba never wavered from its initial position on revolutionary unity. Although
no evidence suggests explicit threats by Cuban officials to withdraw aid if the FMLN or its
organizations split; cognizance on the part of the FMLN leadership about Cuba’s position on
15
Interview with Ana Guadalupe Martinez.
While the intellectual basis of some groups rested above all on liberation theology, that of Communist Party had a deeper
Marxist basis.
16
12
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
unity undoubtedly provided a strong incentive to settle differences. Leaders were willing to
negotiate and compromise for the sake of the revolution and for the sake of continued Cuban aid.
At key moments, the Havana’s intervention was vital in settling conflicts and rivalries between
factions or individual leaders. The most evident illustration of this was their mediation between
factions of the FPL after the mysterious suicide of its leader Cayetano Carpio “Marcial.”17
Cuba’s ability to maintain the organizations united throughout the war was indispensable. The
respect and admiration the Cuba commanded gave it the leverage to do so. Facundo Guardado
retrospectively judges that this was possibly the most important function that Cuba played in El
Salvador’s revolutionary effort.18
Whereas the factors that led the Salvadorans to unite are for the most part lucid, Cuba’s
motives are more obscure on account of the unavailability of Cuban sources to the general
public, or at least to this author. Evidently, Cuba desired another victorious revolution in Central
America and its own experience, as well as successful revolutions elsewhere, had demonstrated
that cohesion and broad based support were essential.19 The different organizations that formed
the FMLN each had distinct and powerful support bases and the Cubans understood that their
union would drastically augment their strength. Furthermore, the success of the Sandinistas after
they united under Cuban auspices in late 1978 carried great favor for reusing such a tactic.20
While Cuba sought other successful revolutions in the region—both for altruistic and
practical geopolitical considerations—the specifics of the revolutionary efforts and, above all, of
17 Cuba’s decisive role in keeping the FPL united after the death of its leader, Cayetano Carpio, was revealed to the author
by Facundo Guardado of the FPL and Eduardo Sancho of the RN leader. Interviews with Facundo Guardado and Eduardo
Sancho.
18 Interview with Facundo Guardado.
19 “Whatever he may have said, Castro understood full well both the true lessons of the Revolution itself and those of years
gone by. Without the support of broad sectors of the middle classes, part of the private sector, and the international community,
revolution in Latin America was impossible. At the same time, if the revolutionary leadership did not control the alliance thus
forged, the revolution rapidly became compromised, and the means used to achieve it soon overshadowed the end originally
sought.” Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed, p. 62.
20 Cuba’s role in the unification of the Nicaraguan guerrillas was documented by the Central Intelligence Agency as follows:
“Castro assumed a similar role in Havana’s dealings with the Sandinistas in late 1978 and was instrumental in unifying the three
Sandinista factions. In return for the Sandinistas unity agreement, the Cubans sharply increased their assistance in money, arms,
and ammunition. The same may also occur in the case of El Salvador,” Central Intelligence Agency. National Foreign
Assessment Center. Memorandum: “Cuba: Looking to El Salvador,” Digital National Security Archives, February 14, 1980.
13
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
their relationship to Havana mattered. Cuba wanted opposition movements, but opposition
movements that were loyal to Havana. By offering and providing decisive support, the Cuban
administration bolstered these loyalties and ensured that they transcended the purely emotive
allegiances that permeated the entirety of the Latin American left. Beyond loyalties, Castro
sought to exert influence over these movements and to be consistently informed of
developments. The close relationship that formed between the Castro administration and FMLN
leaders, and Cuba’s widespread involvement in the FMLN’s activities, forged the type of
opposition movement in El Salvador that Cuba considered most valuable.
An additional and more polemic Cuban motivation was the political situation in the
United States—unquestionably Cuba’s greatest adversary and a key influence on Havana’s
foreign policy. When the Cuban administration lobbied for Salvadoran revolutionary cohesion, it
was increasingly apparent that the Carter administration was on its way out. Although President
Carter’s foreign policy was not entirely in line with his dove-like rhetoric, his successor was
bound to be more prone to intervention in the region. Guided by his exceptional political
cunningness, Castro felt the need to act while the situation in the north was still predictable. A
strengthened revolutionary effort in El Salvador could have one of two results, both of which
were more favorable for Cuba than what he foresaw in the face of inaction. Optimally, the
Salvadorans would overthrow the government and the new US administration would be
presented with a fait accompli that it would have to acknowledge. If the general offensive failed,
Carter’s successor would face a Salvadoran leftist opposition movement that was organized,
funded, trained, and armed. Consequently, the Cubans foresaw that the incoming US
administration would prioritize preventing another revolution in Central America and would thus
give Fidel Castro and Cuba some breathing space.21
21 Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte and David E. Spencer argue that Cuba foresaw that the general offensive would succeed
and that the new administration in the United States would have no choice but to accept it. Bracamonte, Strategy and Tactics of
14
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
With the most important oppositional organizations in El Salvador united, and extensive
Cuban assistance secured, the FMLN came into existence as the vanguard of the opposition
fronts in the country. The FMLN’s creation resulted from a confluence of circumstances and
interests. While the revolutionaries’ decision to pursue such a union was ultimately why it
occurred, their willingness to do so, at that point in time, was indissolubly tied to Cuban
incentives. The establishment of the FMLN was simultaneous and directly related to the
inception of an extensive relationship with Cuba. The two parties immediately began
preparations for the general offensive of January 1981. Until the last day of the war in El
Salvador, Castro kept his end of the bargain, providing the FMLN with extensive assistance in
practically all spheres of its activity.
Forming Revolutionaries
Relations between the FMLN and the Havana were directed by two Cuban agencies: the
Departamento América and the Departamento de Operaciones Especiales (DOE). The former
managed all the key strategic and political decisions of the Cuban-FMLN alliance, while its
leader, Manuel Piñeiro, was the Cuban official with whom FMLN leaders had the broadest
relations. The first order of business for revolutionary leaders upon reaching Havana was to meet
with Piñeiro. RN leader Eduardo Sancho recalls that these meetings—referred to by the
revolutionaries as “the bilaterals with Piñeiro”—were practically obligatory.
22
Although the
DOE handled military training and operational aspects, these undertakings had to be discussed
and cleared with Piñeiro beforehand. In effect, the Departamento América was “the bridge to the
the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas, p. 16. The belief that Cuba favored this policy even if the offensive wasn’t successful is the
author’s, but it derives from an interview with Joaquín Villalobos who maintains that Cuba’s main motivation for assisting the
FMLN, and revolutionary movements in the region at large, was to keep the United States’ administrations busy elsewhere in the
region and thus give Cuba much needed breathing space. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
22 Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
15
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
DOE”23 and Piñeiro was the conduit between the FMLN and the Cuban government—which
effectively meant Castro.24 Thus, much like a country’s Foreign Ministry serves as the link
between that country’s government and its foreign counterparts, the Departamento América was
the link between the Cuban government and the revolutionary leaders of El Salvador. The
existence of the Departamento América as a parallel organization to the Foreign Ministry
enabled Havana to avoid its explicit institutional involvement with revolutionary movements in
the region. An overt association could have jeopardized Cuba’s relations with other Latin
American governments and with the international community—relations that Cuba had worked
hard to repair since 1969.25 The Departamento America has been characterized as the place from
which revolution was exported.26 Although this classification downplays the indigenous causes
of revolutions, and the agency of revolutionaries in shaping their own movements, it does reflect
the pivotal role that this department played in Cuba’s relations with the FMLN. The assessment
that the Departamento America’s “links with the Latin American left were extensive, intimate,
and decisive,”27 holds true in the case of El Salvador.
The scarce analysis of Cuban support for the FMLN has largely had a military focus.28
While assistance was not confined to the military sphere, Cuba’s training of Salvadoran
combatants and its involvement in military planning was indeed widespread. Throughout the
1970s, Cuban assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas was limited. It mostly entailed what the
23
Interview with Claudio Armijo.
Joaquín Villalobos, Eduardo Sancho, and Claudio Armijo expressed that the Departamento América was the effective
mechanism for revolutionary leaders to get to Fidel Castro. Both Joaquín Villalobos and Claudio Armijo explicitly stated that
Piñeiro was the bridge to Castro. Interviews with Eduardo Sancho and Claudio Armijo. Interview with Joaquin Villalobos,
Oxford, UK.
25 Jorge I. Dominguez, in his comprehensive study of Cuban foreign policy, establishes that 1969 was the year that the
island began to prioritize rebuilding relations with Latin American governments. Jorge I Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for
Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 120-121
26 Jorge Castañeda describes the Cuban creation of the America Department as follows: “Thus was born the (in)famous
America Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, or, some might have called it, the Ministry of
Revolution. This was, thereafter, where Revolution was exported from…” Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed, p. 57.
27 Ibid.
28 Examples of sources that solely focus on Cuban military assistance to the FMLN include US government reports on the
topic, found in the Digital National Security Archives, as well as Bracamonte, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN
Guerrillas, and Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution.
24
16
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
Salvadoran revolutionaries refer to as “urban warfare” instruction, which consisted mainly of
intelligence and counter intelligence strategies as well as urban conspiracy tactics. After October
1980, however, Cuban military assistance increased exponentially. Throughout the subsequent
decade, Cuba trained Salvadoran combatants on the island, helped them set up a nation-wide
communications system, and aided with military planning.29 In the months following the
FMLN’s creation, Cuban military assistance proved decisive. Camps were established on the
island where Salvadoran revolutionaries received training and preparation for special operations.
On the road from Havana to the beach of Varadadero, lay what was known as Punto Cero—
“Point Zero.” This was the training base for Latin American revolutionaries that Cuban officials
conceptualized as their counter-weight to the United States’ “School of the Americas.”30 It must
be noted, however, that Cuban training at Punto Cero excluded the brutal methods conferred at
the School of the Americas that earned this institution the name of “School of the Assassins”
amongst Latin Americans.31 In fact, Cuba played an important humanitarian role throughout the
conflict, both by caring for the FMLN’s sick and wounded and by promoting a humane treatment
of war prisoners. These two roles played by Cuba in the Salvadoran Civil War deserve to be
acknowledged, not only for the effects that they had on the FMLN and the war, but because they
show a largely ignored side of Cuban foreign policy.32
29 Eduardo Sancho and Facundo Guardado told the author that the DOE was extensively involved in setting up a nation-wide
communication system for the guerrillas; that it taught the FMLN secret codes to communicate clandestinely; and that it kept the
organization up to date with the most modern technology available. Interviews with Eduardo Sancho and Facundo Guardado.
30 Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
31 The School of the Americas, one of the many places where the United States Army trained its Latin American
counterparts and paramilitaries, came to symbolize the grossly violent methods used by Latin American security forces in their
counter-revolutionary efforts. While descriptions of these tactics are found in myriad testimonies from survivors throughout the
region, a graphic description, with specific reference to the massacre of El Mozote in El Salvador, can be found in Greg
Grandin’s Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York, New York:
Metropolitan Books Henry Holt and Company, 2006), p. 90. No evidence was found by the author that similar methods were ever
used by the FMLN. Furthermore, “the FMLN assassinated an average of forty civilians each year between 1983 and 1990; the
number was never as large as 10 percent of the number of civilians killed at the hands of the security forces,” Cynthia
McClintock. Revolutionary Movements in Central America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru’s Shining Path. (Washington DC:
United States Institute of Peace, 1998), p. 59-60.
32 A number of health facilities on the island, most notably the “26 of July Camp,” were devoted to assisting injured FMLN
combatants. Those who received permanent injuries received education and capacitation courses in Cuba. Furthermore, FMLN
leaders agree that Cuba consistently advocated for the humane treatment of enemy combatants captured by the FMLN. Joaquín
Villalobos, Ana Guadalpe Martínez, Leonel Gonzalez, interviews with the author, op. cit. Jorge Castañeda, one of the few writers
17
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
Although the first group of FMLN military officials was formed in Cuba, the actual
number of Salvadorans trained on the island was small.33 The numbers, however, are deceptive
because Cuban-trained officials would return to El Salvador and instruct fellow combatants
based on their newly acquired skills. Thus, Cuban instruction had a ripple effect that permeated
the FMLN organization and had a much greater impact than the mere numbers would suggest.
As the war in El Salvador progressed, increasingly becoming a war of guerrillas, the Salvadoran
revolutionaries’ own experience came to be their best instructor. By 1983, the student had
outgrown the teacher and Salvadoran revolutionaries were more adept at guerrilla warfare than
Cuban officials.34 At this point, the FMLN learnt a great deal from Vietcong guerrilla combat
strategies. The Vietnamese tactics were taught to the Salvadorans on the island by Cuban and
Nicaraguan combatants.35
At the FMLN’s request, Havana would also provide training for special operations. The
most notorious of these operations was the ERP’s highly successful attack on the Ilopango air
base in 1981. In preparation for this venture, a facsimile air base was created in Cuba where a
group of ERP members received intensive training for a 45-day period. While the DOE built the
Ilopango duplicate and trained the Salvadorans, the military tactic was imported from the
Vietcong. Furthermore, such an accurate recreation of the base was made possible through
on the subject to acknowledge this role, suggests that Cuba’s humanitarian functions in El Salvador were symptomatic of its
foreign policy throughout Latin America: “Fidel’s vision of a revolution that had to be exported included some of its finest hours:
generous, idealistic, unselfish. In the brief moments of victory or success, and during the long years of defeat and retribution, the
Cubans stood by their friends, cared for their widows, orphans, and maimed who survived the hemisphere’s Thirty Years Wars.
They opened their doors to many who had nowhere else to go and gave much of the best of themselves and their experience to
bringing change in Latin America.” Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed, p. 55.
33 Eduardo Sancho conveyed to the author that the first cadre of officials was formed in Cuba. Joaquín Villalobos, Eduardo
Sancho, Ana Guadalupe Martinez, Leonel Gonzales, Claudio Armijo, and Facundo Guardado all concur that the actual number of
combatants trained on the island was small. Based on his visits to these training camps, ERP Commander Claudio Armijo
estimates that the number of trainees on the island at any given time was around 100. Interviews with Eduardo Sancho, Ana
Guadalupe Martinez, Leonel Gonzales, Claudio Armijo, and Facundo Guardado. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
34 Joaquín Villalobos, Facundo Guardado and Eduardo Sancho—members of the ERP, FPL, and RN, respectively—all agree
that Cuban military training, although crucial in the initial stages of war, quickly came to play a secondary role in the
organization’s military capacity. Facundo Guardado gave the specific date of 1983 to the author. Interviews with Facundo
Guardado and Eduardo Sancho. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
35 Interviews with Eduardo Sancho and Claudio Armijo. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
18
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
photographs of Ilopango taken from small FMLN planes.36 As this episode elucidates, Cuban
military assistance to the FMLN was largely the product of a joint collaborative effort between
these two groups.
Salvadoran revolutionary leaders worked closely with Havana to devise military
strategies.37 In fact, this was the aspect of FMLN-Cuban relations that Fidel Castro most
enjoyed. Villalobos judges that the key to his chemistry with Castro—a chemistry that was
unrivaled between 1981 and 1990—was that they shared a passion and genius for military
strategy.38 Therein lay Villalobos’ comparative advantage over other contenders for Fidel’s
favor. As Villalobos claims: “Fidel is a commander, a military man, a man of war. He likes war
strategy much more than the political and ideological aspects of revolution.”39 Every time
Villalobos traveled to Cuba, Castro would invariably make a surprise appearance to meet with
him.40 The former ERP leader recalls countless meetings with Fidel Castro in which they spent
hours alone, pouring over maps of El Salvador developing military strategies.41 Such instances
include preparation for the 1982 battle of Moscarrón and for the 1989 “until the limit”
offensive.42 While these summits attest to the Cuban leader’s proclivity for the military realm in
general, and for Villalobos in particular, they also reflect Castro’s constant pursuit of first-hand
information and proximity to the Salvadoran leaders.
A 1989 secret report by the Department of State, which documents Cuba’s extensive involvement in training guerrillas
throughout the conflict, claims: “to train FMLN guerrillas for the highly successful 1981 attack on Ilopango air base, the Cubans
built a facsimile of Ilopango airfield in Cuba.” United States Department of State. Secret Cable from Michael H. Armacost to all
ARA Diplomatic Posts. Subject: “Cuban Support for Subversión in Latin América.” Digital National Security Archives. February
13, 1989. ERP leader Joaquín Villalobos and ERP Commander Claudio Armijo confirmed the veracity of this information to the
author and added that the tactic used came from the Vietcong. Villalobos, who was the Salvadoran revolutionary most
extensively involved in planning and directing the Ilopango attack, conversed with the author about the additional details of the
ERP’s contribution to this operation. Interview with Claudio Armijo. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
37 Interview with Eduardo Sancho, Facundo Guardado, and Ana Guadalupe Martínez. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos,
Oxford, UK.
38 Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
39 Ibid.
40 Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Mexico City, June 26, 2008.
41 Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
42 Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Mexico City.
36
19
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
The FMLN came to have the most versatile and modern guerrilla army in Latin
America.43 Notwithstanding, the Havana’s contribution to the FMLN’s military capacity, the
Salvadoran guerrilla army cannot be reduced to a Cuban creation. At a most basic level, those
doing the fighting were Salvadoran revolutionaries. At no point in the war did Cubans fight with
the FMLN.44 Furthermore, the myriad trainings that Cuba provided were above all done at the
FMLN’s request and while both Cuban officials and the FMLN leadership share responsibility or
credit for devising battle plans, at the end of the day, the FMLN had to be convinced of their
utility and willing to carry them out.
In some cases, Cuba was more eager to assist than the revolutionary leaders wanted. For
the Ilopango operation, both Castro and Piñeiro wanted the troops to train in Cuba for 6 months,
and only after much negotiation did Villalobos bring it down to 45 days. 45 The ERP leader
claims that Piñeiro would often pressure for more combatants to be sent to the island and
Villalobos would decline because Cuba had a habit of combining military training with Marxist
academic instruction and a tendency to offer and bestow special favors on Salvadoran
combatants who agreed to keep Havana informed. In his words: “the fear was that you would
send Salvadoran revolutionaries to Cuba and they would return as Cuban ideologues that had lost
sight of Salvadoran realities.” 46
The Promised Weapons for Revolution
43 FMLN members interviewed by the author expressed that the FMLN was the most modern guerrilla army in the region.
While their assessment could be attributed to hubris, David E. Spencer and Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte, who are both
staunchly critical of the FMLN and whose sympathies clearly lie with the Salvadoran army, make the same judgment.
Bracamonte, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas, p. 7.
44 Jorge I. Dominguez asserts that Cuba publicly denied that Cuban advisers ever worked in El Salvador with the guerrillas.
Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, p. 136. The FMLN leaders interviewed by the author also affirmed that Cuban
troops never fought with the FMLN. Even the United States Department of State, in a 1985 secret memorandum based on the
testimony of a captured FMLN combatant, recognizes that “to the best of [the combatants] knowledge, there are no Cuban or
Nicaraguan advisors in El Salvador because of “political considerations.” United States Department of State. Secret Information
Memorandum from INR-Frank McNeil to the Secretary. Subject: “Cuba and Sandinista Aid to the Salvadoran Rebels.” Digital
National Security Archives. Washington, DC: May 23, 1985.
45 Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
46 As Villalobos put it: “the fear was that you would send Salvadoran revolutionaries to Cuba and they would return as
Cuban ideologues that had lost sight of Salvadoran realities.” Ibid.
20
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
Cuba kept its promise to supply arms to the Salvadoran revolutionaries. While it seldom
provided the weapons directly, Havana played a crucial diplomatic role in obtaining these arms
from third countries and in the logistics of having them reach El Salvador.47 In addition to Cuba,
Nicaragua was also a key contributor to the FMLN’s firepower.
The first step in the elaborate process of getting arms to the FMLN was persuading
countries to provide the Salvadorans with the arms in question. US government documents that
date back to the 1980s attributed these efforts to Salvadoran Communist leaders, most notably to
Communist Party leader Shafik Handal. In the notorious “White Paper,” used by the Reagan
administration to justify support to the Salvadoran government and army-48 the US Department
of State asserted that in the summer months of 1980, the leader of the Communist Party leader
Shafik Handal traveled to the USSR, Vietnam, the German Democratic Republic,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Ethiopia to secure the support of these countries in
arming the Salvadoran guerrillas.49 Although Handal’s travels and lobbying efforts did in fact
take place,50 prominent FMLN leaders agree that Cuba’s endorsement was the deciding factor
that secured the military support of these countries.51 Especially in the early stages of conflict,
Cuba’s diplomatic efforts with socialist countries carried significantly more weight than those of
the incipient Salvadoran revolutionary leaders. While Handal might have persuasively advocated
for the Salvadoran revolutionary cause throughout his travels, and put a face on the Salvadoran
movement for national liberation, his power of influence was no match for the Cuban leader. As
47 In 1982, ERP leader Joaquín Villalobos personally received 12 weapons from Fidel Castro. This was utterly atypical,
however. Ibid.
48 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, p. 275.
49 United States Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Subject: “Communist Interference in El Salvador.”
Washington, DC: February 23, 1981, p. 4.
50 Confirmed to the author by Joaquin Villalobos who claims that although Shafik Handal lobbied for their cause, Cuba was
the decisive factor in convincing these countries to support Revolution in El Salvador. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford,
UK.
51 Joaquín Villalobos, Ana Guadalupe Martinez and Eduardo Sancho all judge that Cuba’s diplomatic efforts on the FMLN’s
behalf were the deciding factor that secured the support of socialist countries in providing weapons to the FMLN. Interviews with
Ana Guadalupe Martinez and Eduardo Sancho. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
21
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
Villalobos conveys: “the most important communist we had was Fidel, not Handal.”52 Providing
further validation to this point, Joaquin Villalobos recounts that in one of the first meetings he
had with Fidel Castro, he consulted with the Cuban leader that FMLN members wanted him to
travel to Moscow to obtain its support in providing weapons. Castro’s response was: “Chico!
What are you going to do in Moscow? Your place is in El Salvador, with the combatants. I’ll
take care of Moscow’s support.”53 The weapons granted by third countries—such as those in
Eastern Europe, Vietnam, Ethiopia or Angola—were brought to the island on Cuban commercial
boats or on airplanes.54 From the island, the weapons were sent to Nicaragua both by sea and by
air and then, from here, they were transported clandestinely by sea into El Salvador through the
Gulf of Fonseca or by land through Honduras.55 The United States, upon realizing that the Gulf
was being utilized for such purposes, set up a radar system to detect and intercept ships coming
into El Salvador from Managua. To compensate for their technological inferiority, the
Nicaraguans began transporting the arms using hollowed out tree trunks that traveled
superficially over the water and passed undetected. This was done countless times and it proved
very effective.56
In fact, the main problem for the FMLN was not obtaining weapons but getting them in
to El Salvador; a process for which Cuba and Nicaragua were indispensable. In effect, these two
countries served as bridges to get arms to the FMLN and as warehouses for such arms.
Nicaragua’s “warehouse status” led to the scandalous event in 1993, colloquially known as “El
Buzonazo,” in which the explosion of a bomb in a residential area of Managua resulted in the
52
Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
Interview with Eduardo Sancho. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK
54 Because Havana had legitimate trade relations with all of these countries, the boats used to transport the weapons were
predominantly Cuban commercial carriers. “Although there was regulation of these carriers, it was impossible to know which
ones were carrying arms, and the arms were generally hidden within the vessels.” Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
55 A number of different sources concur on this point: Eduardo Sancho, interview with the author, op. cit.; Bracamonte,
Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas, p. 177; and United States Department of State. Secret Information
Memorandum from INR-Frank McNeil to the Secretary. Subject: “Cuba and Sandinista Aid to the Salvadoran Rebels.” Digital
National Security Archives. Washington, DC: May 23, 1985.
56 Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
53
22
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
uncovering of a very large arms cache that belonged to the FPL. The FMLN would pay dearly
for this incident in the upcoming presidential elections as it evidenced that the FMLN had not
disarmed in accordance with what was stipulated in the peace treaty. However, the ensuing
scandal did lead the FMLN to accelerate its real disarmament.57
A less known fact about Cuban involvement in this sphere of FMLN activity was the
Cuba’s provision of a haven for FMLN revolutionaries to test out their weapons. Joaquín
Villalobos recounts how, in the midst of war, he spent two days in Cuba trying out all of the
newly acquired arms the organization had received. At one point, Castro made one of his
surprise appearances and tested out weapons with the ERP leader.58 The surface-to-air missiles
obtained for the FMLN’s 1989 “Until the Limit” offensive were also tested in Cuba.59
Furthermore, throughout the war, RN technocrats and scientists developed a number of rockets.
Havana supported these efforts through its technological infrastructure and by permitting
weapons testing on the island.60 As with the information on Ilopango, the FMLN should be
credited with the technology for developing the rockets; but without Cuban support and
sanctuary, the technology would not have amounted to anything substantial.
Show Me the Money
With very specific exceptions, Cuba could not play a significant role in the FMLN’s
financial capacity, for the simple reason that it lacked a monetary surplus to bestow on any
cause, regardless of how worthy it felt the cause to be. There were very specific moments in
which Cuba directly gave money to the FMLN. Fidel Castro made a small contribution to help
57 Joaquín Villalobos, Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte and David E. Spencer state that El Buzonaso accelerated the FMLN’s
real disarmament. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK. Bracamonte, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN
Guerrillas, p. 36. Bracamonte and Spencer claim that prior to this incident the FMLN was keeping weapons because it still
planned to seize political power through the force of arms. Villalobos denies this claim stating that the FMLN kept the arms in
case the army did not respect the peace negotiations.
58 Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Mexico City.
59 Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK. Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
60 Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
23
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
finance the 1981 “final offensive,”61 he gave Joaquín Villalobos $500,000 for the battle of
Moscarrón, and also gave almost $1,000,000 for the last large-scale “until the limit” offensive in
1989.62 Joaquín Villalobos’ account of how this last contribution took place attests not only to
Cuban assistance but also to the Castro’s very limited possibility of providing financial support.
The Cuban leader asked Villalobos how much money he had for the offensive and upon learning
that funds for this purpose did not yet exist, Castro inquired how much was needed. Villalobos
estimated that around $953, 000.63 Fidel agreed to get the money and the ERP leader assumed
that he would be given a million dollars. “But no, Castro gave me the exact amount, not a cent
more than the quantity I had estimated.”64 Furthermore, Villalobos recalls that every time he was
given Cuban money Castro would remind him: “remember that people in Cuba don’t have
toothpaste,” or “remember that we suffer many economic limitations on the island.” “It was as
though with every payment, he was giving me a part of his soul,” Villalobos recalls.65
According to FMLN leaders, the money that Cuba was able to provide was given freely
to the extent that Cuba did not determine what the money ought to be used for or monitor how it
was spent.66 Notwithstanding, the Cuban administration did monitor how the Salvadorans spent
their resources through the informants they had within the FMLN ranks.67
The Cuban
61 In Utopia Unarmed, Jorge Castañeda accounts for the FMLN having received $200,000 from Cuba to help finance the
FMLN’s first large-scale offensive in 1981. According to this account: in 1976 and early 1977, Montoneros - the self-appointed
armed wing of the Argentine Peronist movement- on account of internal factionalism and conflict, agreed to hand over their
financial assets to a third party accepted and trusted by all: Cuba. Cuba thus received just under $70 million in cash and
documents. By 1981 the Argentine Army’s counter-offensive had wiped out the Montoneros and Cubans began to spread the
money around. Part of this money was used to support the Salvadoran revolution led by the FMLN. “The Salvadoran Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgents received $200,000 between December 1980 and February 1981, to partially
help finance their failed final offensive.” Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed, p. 12-14. Joaquín Villalobos confirmed that Cuba made a
financial contribution for this offensive but was uncertain as to the exact amount. Joaquín Villalobos, interview with author, op.
cit.
62 Interviews with Joaquín Villalobos.
63 Joaquín Villalobos estimated the amount when speaking to the author, as he did not recall the actual number. Joaquín
Villalobos, interview with the author, Cambridge, op. cit.
64 Joaquín Villalobos related the entire story to the author. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK
65 Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Mexico City.
66 Joaquín Villalobos, who personally dealt with a large amount of Cuba’s financial assistance, related this fact to the author.
Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Mexico City.
67 For example, Joaquín Villalobos affirms that his logistics coordinator, whom he trusted entirely, was constantly informing
the Cuban administration of the ERP’s spending. Ibid.
24
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
administration was on a relentless quest for information obtained through intelligence, not unlike
most governments throughout the Cold War.
The Salvadoran revolutionaries did not depend on Castro financially. They had their own
reserves—obtained through kidnappings, bank robberies, and taxation from territories under their
control. Furthermore, they received vast sums of money from Western Europe, socialist
countries such as Libya—whose leader Gaddafi gave the FMLN vast sums of money throughout
the war—and to a lesser extent from support groups in the United States.68 The FMLN’s
monetary funds were perhaps the sphere in which the organization enjoyed the most
independence from Cuban support. This financial independence from Havana was consequential
because it gave the FMLN the space to pursue strategies that Cuba did not necessarily agree
with, especially in the ambit of foreign policy.
FMLN Diplomacy:
The FMLN’s struggle to transform El Salvador was not confined to the military realm.
Spearheaded by the Political Diplomatic Commission (Comisión Político Diplomática: CPD),
the FMLN created a diplomatic nexus with myriad foreign countries that was unprecedented, in
both scope and significance, by any other opposition movement in Latin America. The Comisión
Político Diplomática enabled the international community to hear not just the point of view of
the Salvadoran powers that be, but also, that of the opposition which was quickly becoming a de
facto power alongside the State. In this non-military realm of FMLN activity, Cuba also proved
its resolve to support its Salvadoran allies. In contrast to covert Cuban-FMLN relations in the
military sphere, diplomatic relations were between the CPD and Cuba’s Foreign Ministry and
embassies. At gatherings of the Socialist International and meetings of the Non-Aligned
68
Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
25
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
Movement, Havana advocated the cause of the Salvadoran opposition and gave the FMLN a
space to present its platform.69 Cuban endorsement at these international forums—arenas where
Cuba was well respected—undoubtedly bolstered the recognition of the FMLN by the membercountries. This reality becomes especially palpable when one takes into account that the FMLN’s
diplomats were predominantly in their mid or late twenties; a factor that surprised governments
and raised initial skepticism. Ana Guadalupe Martínez, the diplomatic representative of the ERP
in the CPD, was in her late twenties when she was lobbying for international support on behalf of
the FMLN. She recalls that her age not only surprised but also scared some governments. She
judges that Cuban endorsement was key in promoting the CPD’s credibility.
70
The effectiveness
of such efforts, and the capabilities of the CPD corps, resulted in the Salvadoran guerrillas
receiving “more international aid from the Socialist world than any other Latin America
insurgent group ever received during the Cold War.”71
Although the FMLN leadership recognizes the importance of Castro’s endorsement, it is
impossible to know how much international support the FMLN would have mustered without
Cuban backing.72 What is certain is that, had it not been for Cuba, the FMLN would have been
unable to lobby at the plethora of forums that took place outside of the American continent.
When the FMLN attended conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Socialist
International, the Cuban administration and embassies took care of the logistics of the FMLN’s
diplomatic missions abroad. Cuba handled the CPD’s transportation to and from these foreign
countries and the representatives’ accommodation while on these mission.73 Most frequently, the
CPD members would travel to these conferences on Cuban planes. 74 In the gatherings of the
69
Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martínez, Eduardo Sancho, and Leonel Gonzales confirmed this to the author.
Interview with Ana Guadalupe Martinez.
71 Bracamonte, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas, p. 3.
72 Eduardo Sancho, Leonel Gonzales and Ana Guadalupe retrospectively judge that Cuba’s support was markedly
consequential to the FMLN’s diplomatic strength. Interviews with Eduardo Sancho, Leonel Gonzales and Ana Guadalupe.
73 Interview with Ana Guadalupe Martinez.
74 Ibid.
70
26
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
Non-Aligned, the FMLN had the opportunity to lobby with the entirety of Latin America and in
these efforts they “always counted with the full backing of the Cubans.”75
The FMLN’s foreign policy did not come cheap. Flights to Cuba, Mexico, Russia,
Czechoslovakia, Angola, and other countries had to be paid for. This the FMLN lacked the
financial resources to do. In addition to Cuba, the FMLN was assisted in its travels by a number
of countries that gave the organization airplane ticket vouchers. Providing this type of assistance
presented a convenient way for some governments to help the Salvadoran revolutionaries while
avoiding the potential complications that could come from directly giving them money. French
President Mitterrand, for example, unable to give the FMLN money directly because in his
words: “France is not Cuba, and in France leaders have to account for money spent,”76 resorted
to giving the Salvadoran revolutionaries $50,000 in airplane vouchers.77 The Soviet Union also
provided thousand of tickets on Aeroflot, the USSR’s national airline. 78 These vouchers would
prove to be an invaluable resource to the FMLN during the peace negotiations.
The diplomatic endeavors of the FMLN reveal a crucial facet of the nature of its
relationship with Cuba. Cuban influence, and Fidel Castro’s clout within the FMLN leadership,
did at times shape the FMLN’s politics and, by extension, the course of the war. In 1981, the
FMLN proclaimed that it was open to negotiations with the Salvadoran government through
international mediation. This platform was initially adopted not because the FMLN seriously
considered negotiation, but because it became convinced that this would strengthen international
support by giving the organization a moral high ground.79 Cuba was always in favor of the
FMLN’s adoption of this strategy and it proved to be vital in making this a reality. The leader of
the ERP recalls that he was initially exposed to the idea in his first meeting with M-19 leader
75
Ibid.
Joaquín Villalobos recounts that this is how President Mitterrand responded to Guillermo Ungo when they first met and
Ungo asked for financial backing. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
77 Ibid.
78 Interview with Eduardo Sancho.
79 Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martínez and Eduardo Sancho. Interviews with Joaquín Villalobos.
76
27
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
Jaime Bateman who discussed the positive developments in the M-19’s negotiations with the
Colombian government. After this meeting, which had been arranged by Manuel Piñeiro in his
Protocol House in Cuba, Villalobos began to support the FMLN’s stance as a willing negotiator.
The ERP and M-19 leaders met on a couple of occasions, always in the company of Piñeiro.80
Including negotiations in its political platform was a tense and contentious process for the
incipient Salvadoran organization. While the majority of the FMLN leadership favored the
strategy, FPL leader Cayetano Carpio—the de facto leader of the organization when the war
began—believed it was an utter betrayal of revolutionary principles. The Comandancia General
of the FMLN devised a seven-point proposal, known as “the green book,” that outlined the
justifications and methods for using such a strategy. Carpio refused to endorse it. Aware that
Cuba supported using negotiations as a political strategy, the drafters of the proposal turned to
the Cubans for support.81 A decisive meeting followed in Havana where the FMLN leadership
sat across the table from its Cuban and Nicaraguan counterparts to discuss the platform.
According to an account by an FMLN leader who has asked to remain anonymous, Fidel Castro
picked up the proposal and, one by one, read over the seven points asking Carpio to voice any
objections to each of the points as he finished reading them. Sensing his isolation, and the
evident endorsement of the Cuba leader for the proposal, Carpio was, in essence, coerced and
pressured into signing the document. For a man such as Carpio, who prided himself on being the
revolution’s supreme leader and insisted on being treated accordingly, this event provoked his
outmost humiliation.82 Not only had it become evident that the rest of the FMLN leadership
disagreed with him, but he had been pressured by Cuba into endorsing something he opposed.
The FMLN leader who recounted the story to the author recalls that, when Carpio left the room
80
Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Mexico City.
with Eduardo Sancho. Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Mexico City.
82 Many FMLN leaders retrospectively judge Cayetano Carpio as a dogmatic leader who believed the FMLN should be a
hierarchical organization that he would preside. Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martínez, Eduardo Sancho, Joaquín Villalobos,
and Facundo Guardado.
81Interview
28
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
abruptly after signing the document, “I thought he was going to commit suicide.” Carpio did in
fact kill himself under very mysterious circumstances—not unrelated to this meeting—just a
couple years later.
Undoubtedly, “Cuba carried a tremendous weight with negotiations being used as a
political tool” and their endorsement of this strategy was crucial to its implementation.83 The
FMLN leadership turned to Cuba in pressuring Carpio to do something the Salvadoran leaders
could not accomplish alone because they perceived that Castro’s position could make or break
certain facets of the revolution. Castro’s success in securing Carpio’s official endorsement of the
green book proved that the FMLN leaders were right about Fidel’s potential coercive power.
Castro’s clout cannot be reduced to his provision of arms and military training. This was, of
course, important, but the Cuban leader’s capacity to influence the course of events had much
more profound historical roots. As described by Joaquín Villalobos, Fidel was in many ways
looked to by the Salvadoran revolutionaries as “el papá” or the father figure of revolution.84
What Did Cuba Get?
While the core benefits obtained by the FMLN from its relationship with Cuba should be,
at this point, clear, a crucial question warrants further discussion: what was in it for Cuba? In
other words, what did Cuba have to gain that merited putting so much of itself into this
relationship?
First, it must be stressed that Cuba’s relationship with the FMLN was the product of
Cuban policy and not, as some have charged, the product of instructions by Moscow. 85 Cuban
83
Interview with Joaquín Villalobos, Oxford, UK.
Ibid.
85 This was the official position of the United States during the Salvadoran civil war. Speeches by ex-Secretary of State
Alexander Haig, US Ambassador to the UN Jean Kirkpatrick, and President Ronald Reagan, presented events in Central America
as paradigmatic of worldwide Soviet expansionism that was being channeled through Cuba. Laurence Whitehead. “Explaining
Washington’s Central American Policies,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol.15, no.2. (Nov. 1983): 321-363, 321. In the
“White Paper” the US Department of State affirms: “it is clear that over the past year the insurgency in El Salvador has been
84
29
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
diplomacy is what secured the support of the Soviet camp towards the Salvadoran
revolutionaries and not the other way around. With the exception of some members of the
Salvadoran Communist Party, who did have close ties with Moscow, the FMLN leadership dealt
with Havana and not with the Soviet Union. In the words of an FMLN leader and member of its
Directorate:
The USSR never understood revolutionary movements in Central America,
they never understood Che Guevara and they never understood us. The
initiative in Cuba’s relations with the FMLN was Cuban and the Soviets….
stayed out of it and let the Cubans do their thing. 86
In an extensive study on Cuban foreign policy, Jorge I. Dominguez establishes that this
independence from Moscow actually pertained to the entirety of Central America. Dominguez
asserts: “Cuba led the USSR in fashioning policies towards Central America, inducing the
Soviets to behave in ways they otherwise might not have.” 87
Cuba’s policy towards the FMLN was therefore its own and was driven, above all, by
three factors: Cuban altruism; Castro’s attempt to compensate for its geographical and regional
geopolitical isolation; and the Cuban administration’s aim to keep revolutionary movements in
the region close.
The Cuban government accurately perceived—and empathized with—the injustices and
suffering inflicted upon the Salvadoran masses under the autocratic system that ruled the country
until the 1980s. Whatever might be said about Fidel Castro’s pragmatism, he is also a man of
conviction who genuinely believes that the socioeconomic system in post-revolutionary Cuba
offers people a more humane and dignified existence than the alternative presented by freeprogressively transformed into another case of indirect armed aggression against a small Third World country by Communist
powers acting through Cuba.” United States Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Washington D.C. “Communist
Interference in El Salvador,” February 23, 1981.
86 Interview with Eduardo Sancho. The United States’ Defense Intelligence Agency came to acknowledge the absence of
direct Soviet support for the FMLN towards the end of the war. In a secret position paper written in 1990, the Agency states:
“The Soviet Union does not appear to have provided direct military training or equipment to the FMLN since the early 1980s.
However, the Soviet Union has not indicated that it disproves of such aid by the Cubans, who depend economically and militarily
on the Soviets. United States. Defense Intelligence Agency. Secret Position Paper. Citation: “Soviet and Cuban support for the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front.” Digital National Security Archives. October 31, 1990.
87 Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, p. 4.
30
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
market economies. The bold voluntarism that constituted a key element of Cuban foreign
policy—under the principle that “it is the duty of revolutionaries to make the revolution”—
cannot be accurately understood if this factor is not taken into account.
Supporting the FMLN was also a Cuban foreign policy strategy to ensure its own
survival. In Havana’s eyes, while the United States was vexed with possible revolutionary
triumphs elsewhere in Latin America, its resources and attention focused on preventing such an
occurrence, and Cuba took a back seat to these more immediate objectives. For the United States
to prioritize other revolutionary efforts, it was essential for these movements to appear as though
they might succeed. By promoting the union of the opposition in El Salvador; arming, training,
and indirectly funding the guerrillas; and supporting their strength in the international arena,
Cuba contributed towards creating the type of movement that it believed would scare and
preoccupy Washington. Cuba’s foreign policy strategy produced the desired results. With the
triumph of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and the birth of the FMLN in El Salvador, the United
States made preventing revolution in Central America one of its priorities abroad. It trained and
funded counter-revolutionaries in Nicaragua and diverted a vast amount of resources to defeat
the FMLN. Over the course of the decade, the United States provided more than a million dollars
a day to fund a lethal counterinsurgency campaign in El Salvador.88
US Ambassador to the UN Jean Kirkpatrick argued that the Reagan Administrations’
resolve to prevent revolution in El Salvador resulted from Central America being “the most
important place in the world for the United States.”89 Others have countered that it was the
regions insignificance that made it a place where the US could recover from the calamitous loss
This statistic is provided by Greg Grandin in Empire’s Workshop, p. 71. In a secret memorandum from Salvadoran
President Cristiani to the US Department of State the following total sum is given: “The US has supported the Salvadoran
Government throughout the ten year insurgency with economic and military assistance totaling more than $3billion.” United
States Department of State. Executive Secretariat. Confidential Memorandum from Roy J. Stapleton to Brent Scowcroft.
Citation: “Proposed Call on the President by Salvadoran President Cristiani.” Digital National Security Archives. January 22,
1990.
89 Grandin, Empire’s Workshop, p. 71.
88
31
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
and humiliation it had suffered in Vietnam.90 Irrespective of the motivator, the outcome for Cuba
was the same: insurgency in El Salvador absorbed a vast amount of attention and resources from
the region’s hegemonic power.
Finally, while Castro’s administration certainly favored the emergence of other socialist
movements in the region, it wanted these movements to be close to Havana and under its clout.
Providing widespread assistance and being actively involved in every sphere of FMLN activity
enabled Cuba to obtain the coveted loyalty and influence from the Salvadoran insurgents.
The survival of the Cuban revolutionary government for almost half a century, in the face
of myriad challenges, largely attests to its bold and successful foreign policy. Some FMLN
leaders emphasize the Cuban administration’s selfless motivations when assessing why their
movement received so much support from Havana.91 Others focus instead on the pragmatic
considerations that led Cuba to endorse and assist their movement.92 In truth, altruistic and
pragmatic motivators are not mutually exclusive and both drove the Cuban-FMLN affair.
Cuba’s support for revolutionary and guerrilla movements in Latin America throughout
the Cold War merits a historical and geopolitical contextualization. Throughout this time period
of stark polarization, and when so much was considered to be at stake, not only was it unfeasible
for Cuba—the bastion of communism in the hemisphere—to remain uninvolved, but also, very
few countries actually remained neutral.93 The beacons of capitalism and communism in the
hemisphere—the United States and Cuba respectively—were both actively and extensively
90 This position is argued by Greg Grandin in Empire’s Workshop, Chapter 2: “The Most Important Place in the World:
Toward a New Imperialism.” It is also argued by William M. LeoGrande in “A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El
Salvador” International Security, Vol. 6, no.1. (Summer 1981): p. 27-52.
91 Interviews with Salvador Sánchez Cerén “Leonel González” and Ana Guadalupe Martínez.
92 Interviews with Joaquín Villalobos and Facundo Guardado.
93 Even those countries proclaiming to have a foreign policy of non-intervention where often complicit in supporting groups
that adhered with either Cuba or the United States. Perhaps the best example of this is the case of Mexico who had close relations
with both Cuba and the United States and proclaimed neutrality in the region. Notwithstanding, Mexico provided widespread
support to the FMLN through its diplomatic efforts. See Salvador Samayoa’s, El Salvador: la reforma pactada.
32
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
involved in the Salvadoran conflict: each throwing its support behind the faction closest to its
geopolitical position and interests.
The Salvadoran civil war should not be purely reduced to geopolitics, but it can also not
be fully understood without considering this dimension. The involvement of the United States
and Cuba was profoundly consequential in shaping and defining this episode of Salvadoran
history. The primary guarantors of the FMLN’s endurance and success were the FMLN
guerrillas. Notwithstanding, without Cuba’s support, the Salvadoran security forces—which
enjoyed the institutional advantages that came with the regime’s support and extensive backing
of the United States—would have militarily defeated the FMLN. In turn, had Washington not
supported the Salvadoran military and security forces, the Salvadoran opposition would have
been victorious.94 The parallel accusations made by the Cuban and US governments against each
other, that their respective involvement was crucial in the survival of the respective warring
faction each supported, were valid and provided both administrations with a justification for
participating in the war. One can only speculate and hypothesize how the war in El Salvador
would have developed if Cuba and the United States had not become active participants. With
certainty, however, it would have been remarkably different.
The End of the Affair?
The FMLN’s attempt to bring about a new order through armed insurrection was the
norm rather than the exception in Latin American during the Cold War. Although undoubtedly
the methods, objectives, and success of the region’s different revolutionary efforts varied, they
94 The FMLN leaders interviewed by the author generally concurred on this point. More revealingly, Bracamonte and
Spencer, recognize that US support was essential to the military’s ability to combat the FMLN. Bracamonte, Strategy and Tactics
of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas.
33
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
were all symptomatic not only of legitimate national grievances but also of a sentiment that
social revolution was the only viable option, and more importantly, that it could succeed. These
movements were inherent to an epoch in which the triumph of capitalism was not yet secure.
Many still believed that a more egalitarian socioeconomic system was possible, and some, were
prepared to fight and die for it. When peace negotiations between the FMLN and the Salvadoran
government began in earnest, the Cuban administration neither supported nor opposed the
process.95 While its phlegmatic attitude starkly contrasted the avidity with which it had supported
the war, the Cubans accepted and respected the FMLN’s decision to negotiate and to constitute
itself as a democratic force. While the FMLN leadership celebrated what they perceived, in
effect, to be the end of a terrible war, Cuba was perhaps mourning a lost revolution that, coupled
with the fall of the Berlin wall a few years earlier, was perceived as an omen of the end of
revolutions; the end of their Latin American left.
As exemplified by the Salvadoran case, Latin America’s Cold War was marked by a
series of “hot wars” that transformed the political and economic landscape of the region. In this
process of conflict and transformation, the region’s leftist movements were pivotal agents and it
is therefore necessary to understand how they were shaped and how they operated. While the
Latin American Cold War Left has received ample scholarly attention, the different
revolutionary and guerrilla movements have been studied largely through national paradigms and
thus contemplated as independent entities that acted predominantly within the confines of the
nation-state. Furthermore, Cold War historiography of the region has largely focused on
Washington as the central international actor shaping geopolitical developments and national
processes.
95 Ana Guadalupe Martinez, Facundo Guardado, Eduardo Sancho and Joaquín Villalobos agree that Cuba stayed out of this
final stage of the conflict. Villalobos recalls his failed attempts to get the Cubans more involved with these developments.
Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martinez, Facundo Guardado, Eduardo Sancho and Joaquín Villalobos.
34
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
This study has argued that despite its autonomous roots, the FMLN’s development,
growth, and achievements throughout the Salvadoran Civil War were indissolubly linked to its
relationship with Cuba. By placing Cuba as a nodal point in the Salvadoran Civil War, the idea
of “unilateralist” US hegemony in the region throughout the Cold War is brought into question.
Furthermore, this analytical paradigm begins to shed light on the transnational dimension of
developments throughout the 1980s. Contemporary scholars of the Latin American Cold War
need to move beyond frameworks of analysis confined by national boundaries and to look past
US influence in the region by considering the impact of other regional powers. Doing so will
broaden our understanding of how the Cold War unfolded in different parts of the region and it
may reveal how the mutually constitutive interaction between national and international
processes shaped the region’s post-Cold War order.
Bibliography
Secondary Sources:
35
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
Brown, C. Timothy. When the AK-47s Fall Silent. Revolutionaries, Guerrillas, and the Dangers
of Peace. USA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000.
Bracamonte, Jose Angel Moroni, and David E. Spencer. Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran
FMLN Guerrillas: Last Battle of the Cold War, Blueprints for Future Conflicts. Westport
Connecticut, USA: Praeger Publisher, 1995.
Carranza Valdes, Julio. “New Challenges for Cuban Policy Toward Central America.”
Translated by Lucia Rayas. Latin American Perspective. Vol. 20, no.1, Cuba: Labor,
Local Politics, and Internationalist Views. (Winter, 1993): 58-63.
Castañeda, Jorge G. La Vida En Rojo: Una Biografía del Che Guevara. Mexico City: Punto de
Lectura, 2002.
Castañeda, Jorge G. Utopia Unarmed. The Latin American Left After the Cold War. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1993.
Centro de Información Internet de la Asamblea Legislativa. Partido Demócrata Cristiano,
http://www.asamblea.gob.sv/diputados/pdc.htm
Cortina, Maria, “Celebrar la Mentira: XV Aniversario de Paz en El Salvador,” Crónica, January
15, 2007, Opinión.
Dix, Robert H. “Why Revolutions Succeed & Fail.” Polity, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Spring, 1984), pp.
423-446.
Dominguez, Jorge I. To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy Cambridge
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989.
Dominguez, Jorge I. “Cuba’s Relations with Caribbean and Central American Countries”.
Cuban Studies. Estudios Cubanos 132 (1983): 79-120
FMLN. Lo Que No Se Puede Dejar de Conocer del Informe de la Comisión de la Verdad. San
Salvador: Ediciones al Frente, 1993.
36
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
Galeas, Marvin. “Cronica de una Guerrilla.” elsalvador.com, Octubre 2, 2003,
http://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/2003/10/02/editorial/edito3.html
Glauert, Earl T. and Lester D. Langley, ed., The United States and Latin America. Philipines:
Addison Wesley Publishing Company. 1971
Gleijeses, Piero. Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa 1959-1976. United
States of America: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002.
Goodwin, Jeff and Theda Skocpol "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World,"
Politics and Society, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 489-509, 1989.
Grandin, Greg. Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New
Imperialism. New York, New York: Metropolitan Books Henry Holt and Company,
2006.
Grandin, Greg. The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War. London: The
University of Chicago Press, 2004
Guevara, Che. Reader: Writings on Politics and Revolution, 2nd ed. Edited by David
Deutschmann. New York: Ocean Press, 2004.
Haggarty, Richard A., ed. “Economic Crisis and Repression.” El Salvador: A Country Study.
Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988, http://countrystudies.us/elsalvador/7.htm
Hallinan, Conn, “Caesar’s Wife: Negroponte and the “War on Terrorism,”” San Francisco
Examiner. October 20, 2001, http://users.westnet.gr/~cgian/negroponte.htm
Hartlyn, Jonathan, Lars Schoultz, and Augusto Varas, ed., The United States and Latin America
in the 1990s: Beyond the Cold War. United States of America: University of North
Carolina Press, 1992.
37
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
Hernandez, David. “Roque Dalton Un modelo para armar,” Vértice. Febrero 8, 2004,
http://www.elsalvador.com/vertice/2004/080204/especial.htm
La Febre, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions. The United States in Central America. New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, 1984.
LeoGrande, William M. “A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El Salvador” International
Security, Vol. 6, no.1. (Summer 1981): 27-52.
López, Gilberto. Reportaje en el Salvador. Centroamérica: Editorial Universitaria Centroamérica
(EDUCA), 1984.
López Segrera, Francisco. Cuba y Centroamérica. México D.F.: Claves Latinoamericanas, S.A.
de C.V., 1986.
López Segrera, Francisco. El Conflicto Cuba-Estados Unidos y la Crisis Centroamericana
(1959-1984). Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1985.
McClintock, Cynthia. Revolutionary Movements in Central America: El Salvador’s FMLN and
Peru’s Shining Path. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1998.
McPherson, Alan. Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles. The United States and Latin America Since
1945. Virginia, USA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006.
Modak, Frida, coordinator., 25 Años de relaciones América Latina- Estados Unidos. Mexico
D.F.: Sociedad Cooperativa Publicaciones Mexicanas, S.C.L, 1988.
“Resolutions on Central America and Cuba Proposed at the Tenth National Meeting of Lasa.”
Latin American Perspectives, Vol.9, no. 3, Social Classes in Latin America, Part I: Rural
Class Relations. (Summer, 1982): 111-114.
Rosenberg, Tina. Children of Cain. Violence and the Violent in Latin America. New York:
Penguin Books, 1991.
38
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
Shaull, Wendy. Tortillas, Beans, and M-16S. A Year with the Guerrillas in El Salvador. London,
UK: Pluto Press, 1990.
Skidmore, Thomas E. and Peter H. Smith. Modern Latin America. 6th Ed. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005.
Smith, Gaddis. The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine 1945-1993. USA: Harper Collins, 1994.
Tiempo de Audacia. DVD. Museo de la Palabra y la Imagen, 1982.
Vanderlaan, Mary. “The Dual Strategy Myth in Central American Policy.” Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 26, no.2. (May, 1984): 199-224
Vivanco, Jose Miguel, “Restraint, Not Force, Will Bring Change to Cuba,” Financial Times.
December 22, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/22/cuba14925.htm
Waller, J. Michael. The Third Current of Revolution. Inside the ‘North American Front’ of El
Salvador’s Guerrilla War. Maryland, USA: University Press of America, 1991.
Whitehead, Laurence. “Explaining Washington’s Central American Policies,” Journal of Latin
American Studies, Vol.15, no.2. (Nov. 1983): 321-363.
Wood, Elisabeth Jean. Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Wood, Elisabeth Jean. Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa
and El Salvador. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Primary Sources
Armijo, Claudio. Interview with author. San Salvador, El Salvador: February 1, 2007.
Central Intelligence Agency. National Foreign Assessment Center. Memorandum:“Cuba:
Looking to El Salvador”. Digital National Security Archives, February 14, 1980.
39
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
Central Intelligence Agency. National Foreign Assessment Center. Memorandum: “CubaNicaragua: Support for Central American Insurgents. Summary.” Digital National
Security Archives, June 20, 1980.
Cienfuegos, Fermán. Veredas de la Audacia: Historia del FMLN. El Salvador: Ediciones
Roque Dalton, 1987-1989.
Cienfuegos, Fermán. Eduardo Sancho. Crónica Entre los Espejos. 2nd ed. San Salvador,
El Salvador: Editoriales Universidad Francisco Gavidia, 2003.
Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario (FER-29). La Marcha Hacia La Victoria No Se Detiene.
Entrevistas a los Comandantes Leonel Gonzales, Dimas Rodrigues, Joaquín Villalobos.
El Salvador: Editorial Arcate, 1989.
Guardado, Facundo. Interview with Author. San Salvador, El Salvador: January 30, 2007.
Harnecker, Marta. Con La Mirada en Alto. Historia de las Fuerzas Populares de Liberación
Farabundo Martí a través de entrevistas con sus dirigentes. San Salvador, El Salvador:
UCA Editores, 1993.
Henríquez Consalvi, Carlos. Interview with author. San Salvador, El Salvador: January 30, 2007.
Martínez, Ana Guadalupe. Interview with author. San Salvador, El Salvador: January 30, 2007.
Martínez, Ana Guadalupe. Las Cárceles Clandestinas de El Salvador: Libertad por el secuestro
de un oligarca. 8th ed. San Salvador, El Salvador: UCA Editores, 2004.
Perales, Iosu, and Marta Harnecker. La Estrategia de la Victoria: Entrevistas a los Comandantes
del FMLN Leonel González, Jesús Rojas y Ricardo Gutiérrez. Ediciones Farabundo
Martí,1989
Pino Robles, Ricardo. El Salvador: Experiencias de la Ofensiva de Noviembre de 1989.
Entrevistas con Dirigentes del FMLN. El Salvador: Ediciones Liberación, 1990.
Rico Mira, José Eduardo. En Silencio Tenia Que Ser: Testimonio del Conflicto Armado
40
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
en El Salvador (1967-2000). San Salvador, El Salvador: Editorial Universidad Francisco
Gaviria, 2003.
Samayoa, Salvador. El Salvador: la reforma pactada. San Salvador, El Salvador: UCA, 2002.
Sánchez Cerén, Salvador “Leonel González.” Interview with author. San Salvador, El Salvador:
January 29, 2007.
Sancho, Eduardo “Fermán Cienfuegos.” Interview with author. San Salvador, El Salvador:
January 29, 2007.
Sancho, Eduardo. E-mail message to the author, March 30, 2007.
Sancho Castañeda, Jose Eduardo. “The Best Military Strategy of All is to Avoid War,” in When
the AK-47s Fall Silent: Revolutionaries, Guerrillas and the Dangers of Peace, edited and
translated by Timothy C. Brown. USA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000.
United States. Defense Intelligence Agency. Secret Position Paper. Citation: “Soviet and Cuban
support for the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front.” Digital National Security
Archives. October 31, 1990.
United States Department of State. Secret Cable from Michael H. Armacost to all ARA
Diplomatic Posts. Subject: “Cuban Support for Subversión in Latin America.” Digital
National Security Archives. February 13, 1989.
United States Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Subject: “Communist Interference
in El Salvador.” Washington, DC: February 23, 1981.
United States Department of State. Executive Secretariat. Confidential Memorandum from Roy
J. Stapleton to Brent Scowcroft. Citation: “Proposed Call on the President by Salvadoran
President Cristiani.” Digital National Security Archives. January 22, 1990.
41
Andrea Oñate-Madrazo
United States Department of State. Secret Information Memorandum from INR-Frank McNeil to
the Secretary. Subject: “Cuba and Sandinista Aid to the Salvadoran Rebels.” Digital
National Security Archives. Washington, DC: May 23, 1985.
Villalobos, Joaquín. Interview with author. Oxford, United Kingdom: January 8, 2007.
Villalobos, Joaquín. Interview with author. México City, México. June 26, 2008.
Villalobos, Joaquín. Sin Vencedores ni Vencidos: Pacificación y Reconciliación en El Salvador.
San Salvador El Salvador: Instituto para un Nuevo El Salvador INELSA, 2000.
Villalobos, Joaquín. Una Revolución Democrática para El Salvador. El Salvador: Editorial
Sistema Venceremos, 1988.
Villalobos, Joaquín. Una Revolución en la Izquierda para una Revolución Democrática. San
Salvador, El Salvador: Octubre 1992.
42