EXAM No. 9761403
Within religious epistemology, there is the view “it is entirely right, rational, reasonable, and proper to believe in God without any evidence or argument at all.”
1
The idea that evidence is not a necessary condition for justification hinges on a parity argument which makes the case that in the same way that perceptual experiences are justified, religious experiences—through the divine sense—are also justified and should thus enjoy the same epistemic status as ordinary perceptual experiences. Advocates of this view have been called reformed epistemologists with perhaps their most well known advocate being Alvin Plantinga. The focus of my attention will almost entirely be on Plantinga’s work, while other reformed epistemologists, such as William Alston, will be briefly mentioned in §3 and §4.
In §1 I will present the skeptical problem, or as Plantinga calls it the evidentialist objection, which states that belief in God cannot be justified given the available evidence. If evidentialism states that person S is justified in believing proposition p at time t if and only if S
’s evidence for p at t supports believing p , then the evidentialist will claim that while S might have evidence for p it is not sufficient to support the belief that p . I will further discuss the role that classical foundationalism plays in the evidentialist objector’s arsenal and how this commitment leads to the idea that belief in God should be based on evidence.
In §2 I will discuss Plantinga’s argument that classical foundationalism is the driving force behind evidentialism and that any rejection of the latter must first deal with the former. In spite of Plantinga’s claims about classical foundationalism, however, I will defend the idea that the real culprit behind the evidentialist objector is internalism, which is demonstrated further by
Plantinga’s acceptance of a form of externalism, namely faculty reliabilism. In §3 I will review
Plantinga’s central thesis that religious experiences are to be granted the same grace that is allowed in perceptual experiences, namely that both are to be considered properly basic.
In §4 I begin with an objection to Plantinga’s case for parity and argue that most of the arguments presented against parity fall short of any real significance. In spite of this, however, I will argue that the inability to distinguish a veridical experience from a false experience (because of some malfunctioning cognitive faulty) does pose a problem for complete parity amongst the experiences. Chapter 5 will present the Great Pumpkin Objection and the more devastating Son
1 Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God” in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, ed. Alvin
Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1983), 17.
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EXAM No. 9761403 of the Great Pumpkin Objection. I will argue that the former holds little weight while the latter, if understood correctly, is potentially devastating to Plantinga’s thesis.
In §6 I will briefly consider whether the idea of belief in God being properly basic is something absurd and whether there is any case for the argument that belief in God must be inferred to be justified. I side with Plantinga that there is nothing irrational about God being basic, but that perhaps a more moderate take on evidentialism is necessary given the allowed possibility of defeaters. More importantly, I ask whether it is true that belief in God can maintain its basicality claim in the face of a defeater-defeater. I argue that while not uncontroversial, in the end, it seems that belief in God might still retain its basicality in spite of the defeater-defeater.
Lastly, §7 will review the overall arguments presented and consider whether any of the arguments presented pose a serious challenge to reformed epistemology.
§1 Religious Skepticism De Jure and Foundationalism
The religious skeptic is typically identified as one who has serious doubts or questions concerning the central tenets of a particular religion. While the religious skeptic may have many objections to religious belief, these can be placed, as Plantinga argues, under two different types of objections, namely the de facto and de jure objections.
2
The de facto objection, historically anyway, is the form many religious objections take (at least in terms of the initial skeptical questions). As Duncan Pritchard puts it, religious skepticism often has an “ontological rather than an epistemological form.”
3
That is, religious skeptics often question the reality or truth of the religious conviction before directly considering epistemological questions. This de facto objection has many forms, with perhaps the problem of evil being the most well-known. For example, God
4
cannot possibly exist given the amount of unnecessary or gratuitous evil; thus, religions that purport the existence of God while at the same time acknowledging the existence of evil are logically false.
5
The epistemological question—or as Plantinga calls it, the de jure objection—is not one that deals with the truth of religious claims; rather, it deals with the justification of religious
2 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: OUP, 2000), viii-x.
3 Duncan Pritchard, “Reforming Reformed Epistemology,” in Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge, ed. Sabine
Roeser, Ron Rood, and Rene van Woudenberg, 177-209. (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2005), 178.
4 When using the term God, I will be referring to the monotheistic God, namely the one found in
Christianity. Further, I will assume the orthodox notion of God throughout (i.e. his goodness, omnipotence, omniscience, etc…).
5 For similar arguments see J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: OUP, 1983), 150-172.
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EXAM No. 9761403 beliefs, such as belief in God. Is belief in God irrational, unjustifiable, or epistemically irresponsible? Or, as the Freudian psychiatrist Jacques Lacan claimed, is belief in God merely based on wishful thinking?
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Perhaps those who believe in God, as Locke puts it, are religious
“enthusiasts” whose belief is not based on reason, but on (blind) faith?
7
While all these de jure objections have distinct arguments and merit attention, they are all based on a common assumption. The assumption, as Plantinga argues, is that belief in God requires evidence in order to have adequate epistemic support. But where does this evidentialist objection come from? The objection arises, argues Plantinga, due to the influence of classical foundationalism.
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So what motivates the religious skeptic is the assumption that belief in God requires the appropriate evidence in order to be justified and that such evidence is necessarily insufficient.
But what does this evidential objection have to do with classical foundationalism? The connection concerns the limits that classical foundationalism might place on what counts as a justified belief. Classical foundationalism states that certain beliefs are properly basic in that they are not inferred or justified through any other propositions. While opinions are varied as to what might count as a properly basic belief, the standard or classical view is that only propositions that are a) known through the senses, b) incorrigible, or c) self-evident should count as properly basic. Plantinga notes that in order for a belief to be properly basic within classical foundationalism, these conditions must be met.
9
And so any belief that is not within the foundational framework (i.e. not known through the senses, incorrigible, or self evident), must be inferred through rational or evidential means in order to be acceptable. Every belief, if not basic, must be inferred from the foundational beliefs that are considered basic. The
6 Grace Jantzen, Becoming Divine: Towards a Feminist Philosophy of Religion (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1998), 49.
7 This is not to say of course that Locke was against religion. He believed that belief in God, however, possessed the necessary evidence for justification. See Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Locke’s Philosophy of Religion” in
The Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 172-198.
8 To be clear, the de facto objection could also be a result of the evidentialist objection. For example, one could claim that God does not exist given the lack of evidence.
9 Plantinga, Reason, 62.
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EXAM No. 9761403 connection may not always be immediate, but it must ultimately point to an evidential path that finds its way back to the foundations. Put more directly,
A person S is justified in accepting a belief p if and only if either (1) p is properly basic for S, that is self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses for S, or (2) S believes p on the evidential basis of propositions that are properly basic and that evidentially support p deductively, inductively, or abductively.
10
J.L. Mackie, arguing from an atheist perspective, takes this claim as palpable:
If it is agreed that the central assertions of theism are literally meaningful, it must also be admitted that they are not directly verifiable. It follows then that any rational consideration of whether they are true or not will involve arguments… it [whether God exists] must be examined by either deductive or inductive reasoning or, if that yields no decision, by arguments to the best explanation; for in such a context nothing else can have any coherent bearing on the issue.
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Mackie is not alone is his demands. Locke, a theist, placed similar demands on religious belief, boldly claiming that those who do assent to (religious) belief without evidence “transgress against their own light” and disregard the very purpose of those faculties which are designed to evaluate the evidence necessary for belief.
12 So for the theist and atheist alike, belief in God is non-basic and should therefore be inferred evidentially; meaning, of course, that belief in God fails to meet the classical foundationalist criteria for basicality.
It should be clear, then, the problem that is mounting for the theist. In order for belief in
God to be rationally justified, tangible evidence must be presented. But is there such evidence available? If not, why would the theist agree to such standards? In the case of Locke (and perhaps other theistic evidentialists), the evidence pointed him towards belief in God and he believed the evidence to be more than sufficient for belief. Locke was clearly no evidentialist objector, as in the case of Mackie, Hume, and others. Yet today, few who believe in God would claim that natural theology and other forms of religious apologetics make any compelling case for God; at least not with the high probability that Locke seems to have required. In fact, as odd as this might seem, some of the most important arguments attacking and critiquing theism have come from those who believe in God.
13
10 Plantinga, Warranted, 93-4.
11 Mackie, Miracles, 4,6.
12 John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, IV, xvii, 24, pp. 414.
13 See Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca, Cornell University Press), 1990.
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EXAM No. 9761403
So the theist has, arguably, only herself to blame for this dilemma. She has agreed to a strict standard of justification that she herself cannot live up to—that standard being classical foundationalism. Not only does classical foundationalism drive the skeptical argument, according to Plantinga, it places the theist in the unlikely position of constantly having to reevaluate the evidence to ensure that her belief is justified. As Plantinga puts it, classical foundationalism ensures that the theist will constantly be checking the latest publications to see
“whether, say, Anthony Flew has finally come up with a good objection to my favorite argument.” 14
It is these standards, coupled of course with the desire to answer the de jure objection, that motivate Plantinga to offer some relevant alternative to evidentialism. Of course, his solution to the evidentialist objector must first involve some detailed rejection of classical foundational on which evidentialism rests. Thus, by defeating classical foundationalism
Plantinga attempts to remove any notion that evidentialism is a necessary component for theism.
And given that evidentialism is the motivation behind the de jure objection, a rejection of classical foundationalism should present a reasonable rebuttal to the skeptical challenge.
§2 Plantinga’s Solution and the Externalist Motif
Plantinga begins his anti-evidentialist argument by demonstrating how classical foundationalism fails to live up to its own standards. This analysis and initial rejection is important since classical foundationalism would never place belief in God at the foundation of one’s epistemology as Plantinga would like, but would assume that belief in God could, at best, only be inferred from the foundation. Thus, if classical foundationalism fails, which he believes it does, then the notion that belief in God can only be legitimately inferred from the foundation, as opposed to being part of the foundation, is called into question.
15 In the end, however,
Plantinga does not completely reject foundationalism given that his primary objection to evidentialism is the notion that religious beliefs, specifically belief in God, can be properly basic and thus a foundational belief.
Plantinga’s solution, then, is to reject classical foundationalism in hopes of answering the evidentialist objector. He presents two arguments against classical foundationalism. First, he
14 Plantinga, Reason, 67.
15 While there is an obvious connection between foundationalism and evidentialism, some seem to think that Plantinga has “picture upside down.” For a good discussion on this see Norman Kretzmann “Evidence and
Religious Belief ” in Philosophy of Religion: A Guide and Anthology ed. Brian Davies (New York: Oxford, 2000).
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EXAM No. 9761403 claims that classical foundationalism is self-referentially incoherent. If the central claim that foundationalism makes, namely that
A person S is justified in accepting a belief p if and only if either (1) p is properly basic for S, that is self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses for S, or (2) S believes p on the evidential basis of propositions that are properly basic and that evidentially support p deductively, inductively, or abductively,
16 is to be taken as foundational (and therefore certain) it would need to be the case that (CF) be properly basic and meet at least one of the criteria named in (1). This, however, does not seem to be the case. There is no reason, according to Plantinga, why one should accept (CF) given the criteria in (1).
17
Concerning (2), then, there would have to be some inferred bases for accepting
(CF). Yet (CF) seems to fall short in that regard as well. After all, what evidential support can
(CF) present? Of course, notes Plantinga, no such support exists. In the end, then, classical foundationalism appears to be self-referentially incoherent in that it attempts to define a properly basic belief through foundational propositions that are themselves not properly basic.
18
Yet there is another problem facing those who are committed to classical foundationalism. As Thomas Reid so aptly pointed out, any commitment to such a rigid standard of knowledge means that we hold a substantial amount of unjustified beliefs given that the majority of our beliefs do not conform to classical foundationalism.
19
In agreement, Plantinga argues that committing to classical foundationalism means that most of the beliefs that we hold as basic have the unfortunate consequence of being unjustified and therefore epistemically suspect. Consider, for example, three different propositional beliefs that might not meet the standard of justification imposed by classical foundationalism. Most, as Plantinga argues, would consider these beliefs properly basic given that they are not typically inferred: 20
1) I see a tree (known perceptually),
2) I am in pain (known introspectively), and
3) I had breakfast this morning (known through memory).
16 Plantinga, Warranted, 93-4.
17 Ibid., 94-95.
18 For a more detailed commentary on this see Plantinga, Warranted, 94-97
19 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 187-192.
20 Plantinga, Reason, 58-63.
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EXAM No. 9761403
For Plantinga, then, the classical definition falls short in that it fails to recognize the possibility that many beliefs qualify as properly basic despite the rigid definition imposed by the classical foundationalist. And what Plantinga ultimately concludes is that given the possibility that experiences such as introspection and perception might be defined as properly basic, what other beliefs might one count as basic (i.e., God’s existence)?
The problems presented against classical foundationalism, namely that it is selfreferentially incoherent and implies that many of our basic beliefs are unjustified, do appear to be very detrimental to the classical foundationalist proposal. Yet given Plantinga’s true intentions, to silence the evidentialist objectors, it seems rather misplaced to assume that in defeating classical foundationalism one silences the evidentialist objectors. As Pritchard puts it, “one could state the evidentialist challenge without making any mention of classical foundationalism.” 21
In other words, one can still be an evidentialist without holding to any form of classical foundationalism. I could, for example, be a coherentist with regard to epistemic justification and reject the idea that all justified beliefs should rest on some non-inferential basic beliefs. In this manner, then, I can still commit to evidentialism regardless of one’s attempt to reject classical foundationalism. And while the two are clearly connected, evidentialism still stands even in the defeat of classical foundationalism.
So while classical foundationalism is still a motivating factor for the evidentialist objectors (especially when the demand is for some a priori or incorrigible proof), there seems to be another motivating factor behind the skeptical argument. Turning to Pritchard again, he argues that “what ultimately underlies…evidentialism…is not classical foundationalism at all but rather epistemological internalism.” 22
In other words, the skeptical challenge is ultimately motivated by internalist commitments rather than classical foundationalism. The reason for this is that in defining evidentialism one inevitably appeals to some aspect of an internalist epistemology.
23 Before showing the connection, however, a brief overview of internalism is at hand.
Epistemological internalism makes the general claim that in order for a true belief to be justified sufficiently for knowledge, the agent must have sufficient reasons in support of the belief that is being held. And not only must there be sufficient reason, the agent must have
21 Pritchard, Reforming, 181.
22 Ibid., 183.
23 Ibid.
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EXAM No. 9761403 internal reflective access to those reasons for justification. These justifiers, then, might come in different forms. For some internalists, a belief is epistemically justified “only where the person has cognitive access to evidence that supports the truth of the belief. Justifying evidence must be internally available.” 24
So on this account, the internalist uses evidence as a justifier for belief.
This is an attractive position for the religious evidentialist—who might state that belief in God should be based on evidence— given that the internalist might classify knowledge as justifiable only when the evidence is internally accessible. Moreover, it is easy to see how the evidentialist objector might also rely on epistemological internalism to make the case that evidence is needed for justification. One’s belief in God, for both the skeptic and religious evidentialist, is justified according to the evidence which is a necessary condition for knowledge.
25
The demand for reflective access made by the internalist, then, clearly makes it the key motivating factor behind the skeptical challenge and the evidentialist demands. The reason for this should be somewhat obvious given that in defining evidentialism one inevitably appeals to some aspect of internalism.
26
For example, if I am committed to evidentialism I would argue that in order for a belief to be justified the belief should have been gained only in accordance to the appropriate evidence. If I do not have the appropriate evidence for my belief, I am not justified in my belief. So if I came to believe A on the basis of B but have long forgotten B, I would, according to evidentialism, not be justified. This is nearly identical to what the internalist claims. Not only am I required to have evidence for my belief, I must have reflective access to my reasons for justification. So evidentialism, then, makes the same general claims as internalism.
This is not to say of course that classical foundationalism plays no role in the skeptical challenge, however. Both classical foundationalism and internalism seem to be guilty of this honor; but by presenting classical foundationalism as the main culprit or motivating factor one might miss the governing role that internalism plays.
27 Thus, given the importance of epistemological internalism and its role in evidentialism, perhaps it is best to understand
24 Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, “Evidentialism,” Philosophical Studies48, no. 1 (1985): 15.
25 Louis Pojman, What Can We Know? (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2001), 136-37.
26 Pritchard, Reforming, 183.
27 Pritchard, Reforming, 182-184.
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EXAM No. 9761403
Plantinga’s response to the evidentialist objector in terms of externalism; as opposed to, say, simply a denial or rejection of classical foundationalism.
28
Thus far, Plantinga’s response to the evidentialist objector has been to reject classical foundationalism and its evidential requirement. It was noted, however, that while classical foundationalism should be linked to evidentialist assumption, the real force behind the evidentialist assumption is internalism.
29
Central, then, to Plantinga’s solution for the evidentialist objector would be a defense of externalism. While not explicit in some of his earlier works (i.e., God and Other Minds, Faith and Rationality ), his support of an externalist view is present in his more recent work.
As its name suggests, externalism, as opposed to internalism, is not concerned about internal justifications of knowledge through evidence. In other words, justification is not dependent upon one having any special or privileged access to the justifiers. Instead, justification can be conferred by factors external to (and thus not reflectively accessible to) the cognizer.
This, of course, is in distinct contrast with internalism which demands reflective access to one’s reason in order for the belief to be justified. Within externalism, there are several important and distinct views, but for the purpose of this paper I will focus on reliabilism and its relation to
Plantinga’s work.
30
Reliabilism, roughly, is concerned with whether or not the belief was acquired by a reliable process and makes the general claim that so long as one’s belief forming mechanisms are operating correctly (i.e., sensory faculties, through introspection, etc.) then one is justified in the beliefs one forms and therefore has knowledge (when the target belief is true anyway).
31
So, for example, if I note by way of introspection that I am feeling sick then, according to reliabilism, I not only believe that I am sick, but I have knowledge of my sickness. After all, introspection usually provides a reliable portrayal of the way I am feeling.
28 Ibid., 184. I think it’s important to retain the idea that Plantinga is responding directly to the evidentialist, however, since his motto ““it is entirely right, rational, reasonable, and proper to believe in God without any evidence or argument at all” is essentially an anti-evidentialist claim. Nonetheless, as noted above, the thinking behind this evidentialist claim is motivated by epistemological internalism. So when Plantinga is responding to evidentialism, he is in turn responding to the internalist as well.
29 See Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford: OUP, 1993), 4-7. Plantinga makes note of the role that internalism plays in justification, duty, and evidentialism; all features that are present in classical foundationalism as well.
30 For a detailed overview see Hilary Kornblith, Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2001).
31 Ibid., 143.
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EXAM No. 9761403
Alvin Goldman notes that just as there are reliable processes that aid in obtaining knowledge, there are also unreliable processes that produce error in judgment. Unreliable processes might include “confused reasoning, wishful thinking, reliance on emotional attachment, mere hunch or guesswork, and hasty generalizations.” 32
So if one sees a red car driving by at a high rate of speed and assumes from this that all red cars are similarly fast, one could not say this person has knowledge given that his belief forming process was unreliable
(since such a belief might fall under the “hasty generalization” process that was noted by
Goldman).
Plantinga’s reformed epistemology falls in line with the aforementioned reliabilist account (although, as we will see, he is a faculty reliabilist as opposed to Goldman’s process reliabilism). Plantinga does, however, initially reject Goldman’s process reliabilism given its failure to adequately answer the generality problem. The generality problem, as it relates to reliabilism, poses a question about the relevant process types and how one might determine which process type is most reliable in acquiring knowledge. So in effect, “if we define the process too narrowly, it turns out that every true belief is the product of a reliable process. If we define it too broadly, we get too many clearly unjustified belief acquisitions.” 33
Moreover, as
Richard Feldman notes, numerous visual beliefs can be “formed in the same observation conditions and some of these beliefs may be better justified than others.” 34
An example of this, and one that is similar to Feldman’s, might be to consider when one sees off in the distance a black four legged animal, which happens to be a dog, walking towards him. Initially, one might simultaneously assume through his cognitive faculties that this image is an animal and a dog.
Yet, until it can be better verified you are more justified in believing that the image is indeed an animal as opposed to both an animal and a dog; it might after all be some other type of four legged animal off in the distance.
Thus, until it can be determined which natural belief forming mechanisms are most reliable and relevant in every situation, the generality problem is insurmountable for Plantinga and leads him to initially reject it in favor of a modified reliabilist account—namely, faculty reliabilism. For example, Plantinga argues that in order for our beliefs to be justified (or have
32 Alvin Goldman “Reliabilism: What is Justified Belief?,” in The Theory of Knowledge ed. Louis Pojman,
(Belmont: Wadsworth, 2003), 265.
33 Pojman, Know, 149.
34 Ibid.
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EXAM No. 9761403 warrant as he calls it), our cognitive faculties must function according to the design plan and in the correct environment for which they were created.
35
But what exactly does it mean for cognitive faculties to function properly according to design in the correct environment? Plantinga’s example deals with human organs and the manner in which they should function. The heart, on average, beats about 72 times per minute and has a similar weight in most humans. It is responsible, through moderate contractions, for pumping blood through our three types of blood vessels. There is a way in which the heart is supposed to work. If the heart is not pumping blood through to the blood vessels it is not functioning properly according to its original design. It’s tempting to assume that by design Plantinga has introduced some theistic dependence into his understanding of proper function and design. While Plantinga does ultimately believe this, his understanding of warrant need not entail that God be the designer; simply put, there is a way in which most things (human organs, cognitive faculties, etc…) are supposed to work. So in the same way the heart might malfunction (because it is not functioning in a way that was originally intended), our cognitive faculties are also subject to malfunction and disorder.
Not only do our faculties have a purpose and function, they are designed to operate in a certain environment that is essential to its proper function. The heart cannot function properly if it is deprived of oxygen in the same way that a person cannot breathe while standing on the moon. The same can be said for our cognitive faculties. Thus, a belief has warrant (or justification as I have been calling it) when it is acquired through the proper functioning of our cognitive faculties in the cognitive environment for which they were designed. The conditions for warrant, according to Plantinga, might be summed up as follows:
S knows p if (1) the belief that p is produced in S by cognitive faculties that are functioning properly
(working as they ought to work, suffering from no dysfunction), (2) the cognitive environment in which p is produced is appropriate for those faculties, (3) the purpose of the module of epistemic faculties producing the belief in question is to produce true beliefs (alternatively, the module of the design plan governing the production of p is aimed at the production of true beliefs), and (4) the objective probability of a belief’s being true, given that it is produced in those conditions, is high.
36
35 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: OUP, 1993), 213-214.
36 Alvin Plantinga “A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,” in Philosophy of Religion, 3d ed., ed. Louis Pojman
(Belmont: Wadsworth, 1998), 529.
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EXAM No. 9761403
With this in mind we might see how Plantinga’s account is just another modification of reliabilism—namely, faculty reliabilism. His account depends on our cognitive faculties for knowledge and rejects internal access to evidence as a necessary condition for justification.
While this short account cannot do justice to Plantinga’s complete system of warrant and proper function, it does offer some insight into Plantinga’s case for parity (chapter 3) and why
Plantinga believes that certain religious beliefs (such as “God exists”) require no evidence in order to be justified; for if our everyday beliefs (such as our perceptual sensations or introspectively based beliefs) are justified based on the reliability of our cognitive faculties, then other beliefs, such as “God exists,” can also be justified so long as they are formed through a similar process.
In summary, then, Plantinga’s solution to the evidentialist objector can be seen in his rejection of classical foundationalism and internalism. His rejection of the latter depends on his approval of externalism and how this relates to one’s justification of a particular belief. As we will see in §3, Plantinga relies heavily on an externalist view of justification to defend his case for parity and argues that belief in God is justified apart from evidential considerations.
§3 The Case for Parity
The beginnings of Plantinga’s parity argument can be seen in his early writings as far back as God and Other Minds .
37
There, Plantinga argues that belief in other minds and belief in
God are in the same epistemological dilemma; all their arguments for justification seem to fail.
Yet, as Plantinga states, “if belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God. But obviously the former is rational; so, therefore, is the latter.”
38
As Plantinga’s thinking has developed, so has his argument for parity among religious belief. The key difference in his thinking, as he notes in Warranted Christian Belief, is that he no longer takes proofs as the only way to justify belief in God.
39
This major shift in Plantinga’s thinking opens the door for a more daring parity argument, namely that in the same way that perceptual experiences are justified, religious experiences—through the divine sense—are also justified and should thus enjoy the same epistemic status as ordinary perceptual experiences.
In order for Plantinga’s parity argument to succeed, then, he needs to find similar belief patterns that are justified without any appeal to evidence. Further, it must be the sort of belief
37 Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967).
38 Ibid., 271.
39 Plantinga, Warranted, 69.
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EXAM No. 9761403 where if held hostage to the evidential demands it would have devastating epistemological results; perceptual beliefs are of that sort.
40
Consider, for example, the belief that I see a clock hanging on the wall. It would be difficult to present any non-circular or non-question begging evidence to justify my belief.
41
Yet, this is what the evidentialist demands. So if we can disregard the demands of the evidentialist in the case of perceptual beliefs, then perhaps the demands the evidentialist places on religious belief should be reconsidered as well; neither can produce the required evidence, but surely in the case of perceptual beliefs it can’t be said to be unjustified or an epistemically irresponsible belief. This, of course, raises further questions about evidential demands. Pritchard notes that this is the first parallel that Plantinga and other reformed epistemologist’s make.
42
The second parallel, notes Pritchard, deals with the similarities between perceptual and religious experiences.
A perceptual belief arises from some perceptual experience; the belief arises suddenly with the cognizer having no control over the initial belief. The perceptual belief that arises, then, from the experience is prima facie justified. Plantinga and other reformed epistemologists take their views concerning perception from Thomas Reid who argued that what we perceive is not
“only irresistible, but it is immediate; that is, it is not by train of reasoning and argumentation that we come to be convinced of the existence of what we perceive.”
43
What Reid wants to argue is that perceptual beliefs are not inferred, but immediately known by the perceiver given the nature of the experience. It is this sort of experience that Plantinga wants to compare. If the belief of some perceptual experience, say, seeing a tree, is prima facie justified, then if the belief of some religious experiences arises in the same manner, the religious belief is also prima facie justified.
One can begin to see Plantinga’s externalist epistemology at play here given that justification of the perceptual belief would only be merited if the belief were gained through some reliable cognitive faulty. And in order for the belief that “God exists” to be justified, in the same sense that “I see a tree” is justified due to the reliability of most visual experiences, there needs to be some cognitive faculty that is similar in that it can produce true beliefs concerning propositions about God. As with perceptual experiences, then, belief in God needs some faculty
40 I say this because finding beliefs of this sort will prove Plantinga’s point that evidentialism places to high of a demand on what might count as a justified belief.
41 Pritchard, Reforming, 184-85.
42 Pritchard, Reforming, 186.
43 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, II, v.
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EXAM No. 9761403 or cognitive mechanism to ground itself in. Plantinga uses a concept that is well known to most in the reformed tradition called the sensus divinitatis. Calvin, an early proponent of this cognitive faculty, claimed that one can accept and know that God exists without any argument or evidence, given the sensus divinitatis ; thus, for Calvin and others in the reformed tradition, belief in God is properly basic and is not inferred from any other proposition. Plantinga defends this view and notes that
Calvin’s claim, then, is that God has created us in such a way that we have a strong tendency or inclination toward belief in him. This tendency has been in part overlaid or suppressed by sin. Were it not for the existence of sin in the world, human beings would believe in God to the same degree and with the same natural spontaneity that we believe in the existence of other persons, an external world, or the past. This is the natural human condition; it is because of our presently unnatural sinful condition that many find belief in God difficult or absurd. The fact is, Calvin thinks, one who does not believe in God is in an epistemically substandard position—rather like a man who does not believe that his wife exists, or thinks she is likely a cleverly constructed robot and has no thoughts, feelings, or consciousness. Although this belief in God is partially suppressed, it is nonetheless universally present.
44
From this, Plantinga concludes that “there is a kind of faculty or cognitive mechanism, what
Calvin calls sensus divinitatis or a sense of divinity, which in a wide variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs about God.” 45
So in the same way that perceptual experiences such as ‘I see a table” require no evidence for belief, then when in the appropriate circumstances (e.g., such as one feeling a sense of guilt, dependence, beauty, etc.), these circumstances give rise to the divine sense and the belief that God exists requires no evidence for justification because of the cognitive working of the sensus divinitatis .
46
In comparison then, it was noted above that there are certain experiences which one might classify as properly basic given that they do not depend on any other propositions for their veracity. Perhaps now we might add “God exists” to this list of properly basic beliefs and have something like this:
1) I see a tree (known perceptually),
2) I am in pain (known introspectively),
3) I had breakfast this morning (known through memory), and
4) God exists (known through the divine sense).
44 Plantinga, Reason, 66.
45 Plantinga, Warranted, 172.
46 Plantinga, Reason, 78-81.
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EXAM No. 9761403
All these propositions, then, on Plantinga’s account and understanding of faculty reliabilism should be taken as properly basic if the agent’s belief has sufficient warrant (i.e. a belief that is produced by one whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly in the correct environments according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth).
47
This being the case, believing these propositions to be properly basic violates no epistemic duty and one is therefore justified in one’s belief.
Does it follow from this that belief in God is groundless? If I come to believe in God on
Plantinga’s model, can it be said that my belief is groundless? Plantinga argues that in the same way “I see a tree” is properly basic but not groundless, belief in God, if acquired according to
Plantinga’s model of faculty reliabilism, is not groundless. Put another way, understanding what
Plantinga means by “groundless” is important in realizing the distinction between evidence and grounds for belief. Perceptual experiences, such as those caused by visual experiences, are not considered to be groundless because they are relying upon the senses. Likewise, Plantinga claims that belief in God is not groundless, because it is rooted in the experience of the sensus divinitatis. Neither experience, however, means that belief in God is inferred; thus the cognitive faculties that give rise to these experiences do not count as evidence in the traditional sense (i.e., traditional proofs for God’s existence).
48
On Plantinga’s model, there is no reflective conclusion when one comes to believe in God; rather, the belief is occasioned by the circumstance (e.g., the circumstance of beholding some majestic mountains or desert sunset). The circumstance does not count as evidence for my belief in God, I simply believe given the circumstance that is involved.
49
This has further implications for defeaters against belief which Plantinga clarifies in some detail in Warranted Christian Belief .
50 He argues that not only is belief in God not groundless, but it is also open to argument. Suppose that someone offers a defeater for the proposition that
God exists; then, claims Plantinga, that particular belief would have to be abandoned. It is possible however for there to be a defeater-defeater, which would obviously entail the
47 Ibid, Warranted, 156.
48 As we will note later on, this the main difference between the reformed and evidentialist camp. For the evidentialist, some proof or axiom might lead one to believe in God. So naturally, this proof will be prior to the belief and will depend on the proof in order to be held logically. For the reformed epistemologist, belief in God depends on nothing but should lead to (not from) some demonstration that belief is not groundless.
49 I will discuss this more critically in chapter 6.
50 See chapter 11.
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EXAM No. 9761403 proposition being justifiably maintained. Again, this can be compared to some perceptual experience where one’s cognitive faculties are not functioning properly. Say you were given a pill that would induce sensations of a dog every time you saw cat. This would count as a defeater for the person who would normally believe that what he perceives is accurate. This is an important point in that we can now see that a properly basic belief, for Plantinga, is not some incorrigible or indubitable belief that one can always fall back on. It is, to some degree, one that is open to criticism and must be defended.
51
Thus far, then, it would appear that Plantinga has done several things. He has accepted a form of reliabilism in order to defend the notion that belief in God, if produced in the right environment and through the appropriate functioning faculties, requires no evidence in order to be justified. Central to Plantinga’s argument is his critique of classical foundationalism and its overly rigid qualification of a properly basic belief given that people typically hold many beliefs to be basic without meeting the defined criterion. Further, if there are certain beliefs that are basic through perceptual experiences, then if one comes to believe in God in a similar fashion, this belief in God is justified without being inferred from other propositions (and thus requires no evidence).
§4 Objections to Parity
Plantinga’s case for parity is both original and intriguing. If successful, it provides the theist with a way to justify her religious belief without working through difficult arguments that claim to prove or disprove the existence of God. Moreover, it seems to fit well with the way in which many come to belief in God, namely through some experience. Yet, Plantinga’s argument only works if there is sufficient commonality in the way that perceptual and religious beliefs are acquired. This might be more difficult to prove than is first assumed by Plantinga. Pritchard raises one main problem in particular that is worth noting.
52
It would seem that religious beliefs are not typically acquired in the same immediate or spontaneous fashion that perceptual beliefs are.
53 Religious belief often times seems to be a gradual one, as Keith DeRose claims, that has an element of a “gentle nudge” rather than some immediate or firm belief.
54
C.S. Lewis’ well
51 Plantinga, Reason, 82-87.
52 Pritchard, Reforming, 188-91.
53 Ibid., 189.
54 Keith DeRose, Are Christian Beliefs Properly Basic, unpublished manuscript.
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EXAM No. 9761403 known conversion story echoes the sentiments raised by DeRose.
55
In his experience he claims to have come to belief in God “kicking and screaming”, certainly not the immediate experience that
Plantinga wants to argue for. Further, this immediate or direct perceptual experience seems to be forced upon us in a way that is quite different from religious experiences. The former seems to be involuntary while the latter seems to require an invitation to assent. The religious believer tends to reflects or question before assenting to belief.
56
Yet, of course, this need not always be the case with regard to religious belief given that there are experiences that seem to be both of an immediate and involuntary nature. In the New
Testament the account of St. Paul’s belief seems to have been one of immediacy.
57
Further, the conversions of well known Christians such as John Bunyan
58
and Jonathan Edwards
59
support that such immediate and involuntary experiences might happen. Given these various religious experience, it seems that this first objection will do little to compromise Plantinga’s overall thesis. For even if those experiences by Edwards and Bunyan are the exception to the norm,
Plantinga is not arguing that God is properly basic to everyone who believes; rather, that belief in
God can be justified without evidence given that evidence is not a necessary condition (for reasons stated above) for belief in God. Of course this justification for belief would have to come by way of the parity argument described above.
60
There is another objection, however, that I will raise that might imply that there are good reasons not to take the religious and perceptual experiences as parallel. This objection will deal with Richard Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity and the manner in which perceptual experiences are taken to be justified on the externalist account. As noted above, Plantinga demonstrated that there are a number of experiential beliefs that should be considered properly basic. Perceptual experiences, for example, are normally taken to be justified ( prima facie at least); and this being the case, it is argued that two principles must follow: the causal theory of perception and the
Principle of Credulity . Accordingly, Richard Swinburne defines the causal theory of perception
55 I am using conversion to mean from unbelief to belief (in God).
56 DeRose, Basic, 9. Pritchard, Reforming, 189.
57 Acts 9:3-19
58 John Bunyan, Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners, (New York: Penguin, 1987). See especially pages
9-14.
59 George S. Claghorn, Works of Jonathan Edwards, V.16, (New Haven, Conn: YUP, 1998), 789-804.
60 I am inclined to believe that most people do actually believe in God in the manner described by
Plantinga and that most, at least when first believing, have not critically weighed all the available evidence. This, however, can become a problem once one encounters defeater. For more on this see §6.
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EXAM No. 9761403 in such a way that “S perceives x if and only if an experience of its seeming to S that x is present was caused by x’s being present. So S has an experience of God if and only if its seeming to him that God is present is in fact caused by God being present.” 61
This is a fairly straight forward explanation and one that accurately represents our everyday perceptual experiences. If indeed there is the experience of, say, chairness, this was caused by the fact that there is a chair that is present in the room. And as Swinburne points out in his example above, this casual theory could also be applied to both religious and perceptual experiences.
What needs to be examined, however, is whether we are justified in believing the experience to be an accurate representation of reality. The same critical examination that we apply to our experiences of the external world, which most accept as being reasonably accurate, should also be applied to religious perceptual experiences. For the non-radical skeptic who might agree with this analysis, this is where the Principle of Credulity comes in. Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity, in its most basic form, states that all of our experiences are by default justified unless one has sufficient reason to reject the experience. In other words, unless there is sufficient reason to reject the experience then one should take the experience as true.
62
Thus, if one experiences God and concludes that God exists, then unless proven otherwise one is justified in believing that God exists (if that’s what the experience confirms anyway). So, by way of example, if an atheist who does not believe in God is suddenly overcome by an immediate experience that triggers some awareness or sense of God, and thus denounces atheism for theism, he or she is justified in believing that God exists until sufficient reason is presented to reject the experience.
William Alston further defends the notion that religious experiences should be taken on equal grounds as our perceptual experiences. He defends this view by stating that “any supposition that one perceives something to be the case—that there is a zebra in front of one or that God is strengthening one—is prima facie justified. That is, one is justified in supposing this unless there are strong enough reasons to the contrary. According to this position, beliefs that are formed on the basis of experience possess an initial credibility by virtue of their origin. They are innocent until proven guilty.” 63 So seeing a zebra and experiencing God might both be counted
61 Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: OUP, 1979), 247-48.
62 Swinburne, God, 254.
63 William Alston, “Why Should There Not Be Experience of God,” in Philosophy and Religion: A Guide and
Anthology, ed. Brian Davies (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 384.
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EXAM No. 9761403 as perceptual experiences and thus should be taken as veridical until proven otherwise. On these accounts, then, if the Principle of Credulity stands, Plantinga is justified in taking God as properly basic belief given that there is no difference between any perceptual experiences one might have.
However, there is a problem that presents itself when equally applying our perceptual experiences with the religious experiences. Recall Plantinga’s commitment to externalism, particularly his endorsement of reliabilism, and how every person has an innate sense of the divine. It is through this divine sense that one perceives God. Of course, this particular cognitive faculty must be functioning properly in order for the experience to happen in the first place. For example, the Principle of Credulity—in regards to religious experiences—assumes that the person who concludes that God exists given the experience of the divine sense has access to the criterion that will be necessary to reject the experience. If the Principle of Credulity can tell us that our religious beliefs are justified by the experience (until sufficient reason is provided in order to reject those experiences), the Principle should further demonstrate which criterion might be used to reject those religious experiences that are perhaps delusional. For example, in perceptual experiences I might perceive a bird; I visually perceive the bird because my eyes are functioning properly. If my eyes were in some way dysfunctional, I would, in most cases, know how to correct them. Perhaps I would need to rest my eyes, buy glasses or adjust the room so there is more light. However, with the divine sense we have no way of knowing when it is dysfunctional or when it is accurately depicting the existence of some divine being.
64
On
Plantinga’s account of reliabilism, our cognitive faculties must be functioning properly in order to produce knowledge. Yet, with our religious perceptual experiences there doesn’t seem to be any way to determine whether our faculties are in fact functioning properly. So the link that
Plantinga wishes to make seems to create problems—at least as it relates the Principle of
Credulity given that it is not entirely clear on what grounds one might reject some religious experience. This inability to determine which perceptual experiences are veridical can have dire consequences in that it invites a whole host of potentially questionable beliefs.
65
In order for
Plantinga’s hypothesis to stand, there must be some other way to evaluate religious perceptual experiences.
64 William Rowe, Philosophy of Religion (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2007), 76.
65 This criticism will further evaluated in §5.
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EXAM No. 9761403
However, the Principle of Credulity when not applied to some religious experience and when only applied to our ordinary perceptual experiences, might be a reliable guide given that there is generally some uniform, verifiable experience about our sensory perception of the external world. If there is actually a zebra in front of me, then generally speaking, this sensory experience could also be experienced by other people around the same vicinity. Those within eye sight of the zebra, for example, will most likely have the same sensory experience that I have had. This is not the case in religious perceptual experiences.
Moreover, if there is a tree in front of me and I believe, to use a phrase from Chisholm, that “I am appeared to treely,” I can verify what exactly I am experiencing is the sensation of a tree by, say, reaching out and touching it, asking those around if they experience a tree as well, and so on. However, when these supposed accounts concern perceptions or sensations of some other-worldly experience—such as God—there is vast disagreement as to whether a) one is actually experiencing God and b) if a , exactly what verifications are available to demonstrate that what you are experiencing is in fact God?
Alston notes that there are problems with applying this verification method to all experiences, however, and claims that those who assert that sensory experience is veridical while denying the same privilege to religious perceptual experiences are committed to epistemic chauvinism.
66
He gives a powerful example of introspection to demonstrate his point. If someone claims, by means of self introspection, that they are feeling upset there is no way to verify this feeling in the way that we can verify whether one is visually experiencing a dog. So, claims
Alston, just because our introspective knowledge cannot pass the tests that are imposed upon it by the verification of sensory experiences, we would not reject introspection as a source of knowledge.
67
Prima facie, this does pose a problem for those who claim that perceptual experiences should not be considered epistemically akin to religious experiences. Indeed, there are instances where one has introspective knowledge that need not be questioned or verified. This argument fits nicely with the overall point that Plantinga is trying to make; namely, that because we count these experiences (such as introspection) as cases of knowledge without verification, the same grace should be applied to religious experiences.
66 Alston, “Experience,” 385.
67 Ibid., 386.
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EXAM No. 9761403
Alston’s critique of this verification principle seems persuasive. There does seem to be an unwarranted bias on the part of those who would claim that the religious experiences must be verified in order to be justified; especially if one is to grant justification in the case of perceptual experiences similar to introspection. However, there is still the problem, as noted above, that seemingly arises with Principle of Credulity and how this relates to a properly functioning cognitive faculty. If one is unable to determine whether his divine sense mechanism is functioning in the right environment and to the right standard, then it seems to warrant any number of odd experiences that one could count as properly basic; there is no criterion to determine if the cognitive faculty is malfunctioning and thus we have no means of determining when to reject a religious experience as unjustified. While I find this objection valid, on its own it seems a bit weak to do much damage. Hence, this argument will be furthered in §5 given that it seems to lead inevitably to a much stronger and perhaps the most well known objection, the
Great Pumpkin.
§5 The Great Pumpkin Objection and Son
In a classic Charlie Brown episode, Linus van Pelt, Charlie’s best friend decides to forgo the typical Halloween tradition of “trick or treat” in order to await the arrival of the Great
Pumpkin. Linus believes the Great Pumpkin to be the Santa Claus of Halloween who will rise up from the most sincere pumpkin patch (which happens to be his) and give gifts to all the kids in the world. Linus holds this belief in spite of bitter disappointment every year.
As the objection goes, then, Linus would be justified in his belief of the Great Pumpkin given that Plantinga is justified in his belief in God. If God is “properly basic with respect to warrant,” then the Great Pumpkin is properly basic with respect to warrant. Plantinga thinks this objection is non-starter and argues that just because he is willing to grant that “some kinds of beliefs are properly basic with respect to warrant,” this need not entail that all beliefs should then be considered properly basic.
68
The point of this objection concerns the reformed epistemologist and whether or not they are obligated to take Linus’ believe as being justified. The issue is not, however, whether other communities themselves might consider their own beliefs justified and properly basic. Recall that
Plantinga is seeking epistemic justification for belief in God even from those who do not themselves believe. So the original Great Pumpkin Objection, then, should be seen as a call to
68 Plantinga, Warrant, 344.
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EXAM No. 9761403
Plantinga and other reformed epistemologists to universally accept any belief that any person wants to count as basic. I think Plantinga’s dismissal of this original objection is warranted.
Michael Martin agrees and claims that Plantinga and other reformed epistemologists are not committed to such a universal acceptance of justification.
69
DeRose echoes Martin’s sentiments, but claims that Plantinga has made this formulation of the objection unnecessarily weak.
70 A stronger version of the objection, which Plantinga credits to Martin, would look something like this:
(1) If the reformed epistemologist can legitimately claim that belief in God is rationally acceptable in the basic way, then for any other belief accepted in some community, the epistemologists of that community could legitimately claim that it was properly basic, no matter how bizarre the belief.
But
(2) The consequent of this condition is false.
So
(3) The Reformed epistemologist can’t legitimately claim that belief in God is rationally
acceptable in the basic way.
71
This objection is much stronger than the original one that is presented above, but similar enough that Plantinga labels this the “Son of the Great Pumpkin Objection.” 72
Martin claims that if
Plantinga accepts (1), then he will be forced to admit that his epistemic system is radically relativistic. The key point in Martin’s objection, I think, is the role that the individual community plays in the justification process. For example, belief in God is justified for the Christian in the community given the sensus divinitatis or, using a term from Warranted Christian Belief, the internal instigations of the Holy Spirit; keeping in mind of course there is no claim about belief in God being true—in spite of the fact the Christians in the community would believe it to be true—only that the belief is justified. So, as Martin sees it, there is no reason to assume why someone could not argue that their particular community is justified in holding to voodoo beliefs.
69 Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: TUP, 1990), 272.
70 Keith DeRose, Voodoo Epistemology, Unpublished manuscript.
71 Plantinga, Warranted, 345.
72 Ibid.
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EXAM No. 9761403
Of course, Plantinga’s point is not that belief in God is basic just because he believes it to be. His case is one of parity to other beliefs that we count as basic. Then again, Martin’s point I believe is that the voodoo community could argue as well that they have a case for parity and the voodoo epistemologists could develop a systematic defense similar to Plantinga’s.
Plantinga’s response to this is somewhat puzzling. He claims that Martin is vague in use of the terms “rational” and “legitimately.” He goes on to explain three different ways in which each term might be taken. Without getting into the details of what Plantinga thinks Martin might have meant, I will state what I think he means and develop two arguments on the basis of those interpretations (one related to Martin’s and the other related to DeRose).
By rational I think it might be safe to assume that Martin is referring to the term in the traditional sense and I see no reason to take it to mean anything else (i.e., the voodooites have sufficient reason to hold their belief). However, we could strengthen the argument that Martin presents and replace “rational” with “justification” and use it in the same way that Plantinga refers to belief in God as warranted (or as I am calling it, justification). By legitimate, Martin is probably using it in the same way he used rational. Or perhaps, as Plantinga suggests, he might have meant warranted, justified, or showing some capacity of being defended cogently.
Regardless if we understand Martin fully, it can be reformulated in the following manner: Can one particular community be justified (or as Plantinga wishes to say, warranted), such as the voodoo community, in holding their particular beliefs to be properly basic in the same manner that Plantinga’s belief in God is properly basic?
That is, I believe, the question that Martin wants to ultimately ask; and it seems like a difficult one to answer. If Plantinga concedes to Martin, then Martin is right in claiming that
Plantinga’s system leads to relativism; which is obviously not epistemically responsible and something Plantinga wants to avoid.
73
Plantinga seemingly concedes the point (premise (1) at least) to Martin and argues that “obviously the voodooists could be within their intellectual rights in thinking what they do think (if only by virtue of cognitive malfunction); hence they could be justified.” Plantinga goes on to argue that, yes, per Martin’s point, the voodoo epistemologists could legitimately claim that those voodooists were justified.
74 So Plantinga concedes premise
73 Obviously Plantinga agrees or he wouldn’t have tried to defend himself against the claim!
74 Plantinga, Warranted, 346
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EXAM No. 9761403
(1), but denies premise (2).
75
There is an interesting point that is to be raised from all this.
Mainly, that Plantinga still appears to be missing the main objection that Martin wants to raise.
Recall that Martin is stating that if the reformed epistemologist can legitimately claim that belief in God is rationally acceptable (or justified as I am calling it) in the basic way, then for any other belief accepted in some community, the epistemologists of that community could legitimately claim that it was properly basic, no matter how bizarre the belief. Plantinga conceded this and claims that Martin’s overall argument fails given that (2) is false. But Plantinga’s concession of
(1) seems to raise, as DeRose points out, the real objection which is that there are irrational or
“bizarre” beliefs that are Plantinga-defensible.
76
It can be formulated in the following manner:
1.
There are some possibly wildly/bizarre aberrations of irrationalism that are Plantingadefensible (i.e., are such that Plantinga’s defensive strategy against the charge of irrationality would be as successful in defense of them as it is in Plantinga’s hands in defense of Christian belief).
2.
Plantinga’s strategy could not be used to successfully defend wildly bizarre/weird aberrations against the charge of irrationality.
3.
So, Plantinga’s defensive strategy does not provide a successful defense of Christian belief.
77
So the same system of justification that Plantinga uses to claim that belief in God is properly basic and justified so (and thereby not irrational, unjustified, etc…), is the same system that could be used to justify irrational, bizarre, or weird beliefs. Put another way, the same defense that supposedly reverses the charge of irrationalism, can then be used to advocate irrationalism. I take this claim, then, to be the point that Martin and DeRose are trying to make.
This argument, if successful, is quite detrimental to reformed epistemology given that
Plantinga’s system is primarily aimed at demonstrating that it is not irrational or unjustified to believe in God (or, further, in the central tenants of Christianity). So, one would think, given the central aims of Plantinga’s project, if his epistemic system further justifies irrational belief then this system should be met with considerable criticism, if not rejection. In spite of this difficulty,
DeRose argues that this objection is not a “killer argument,” but more of nagging question.
78
While I agree that this is not a killer argument, it is surely more than just a nagging question. I
75 So long of course as we are taking Martin’s use of “rational” and “legitimately” to mean justification.
76 DeRose, Voodoo.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
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EXAM No. 9761403 would argue that it is not a killer argument given that Plantinga’s overall thesis is still intact. All that Plantinga’s seemingly needs to account for is whether belief in God is justified on the reformed epistemology model. It’s not clear whether he must concern himself directly with the consequence of system (however irresponsible this might be). Thus, a killer argument, it would seem, would have to directly undermine Plantinga’s central claim that belief in God is justified without any evidence or argument. This objection doesn’t attack Plantinga’s central claim, but merely points out the epistemic consequence of accepting reformed epistemology. Of course this is no small acknowledgment, especially given that the consequence might lead to an irrational belief being justified (hence my claim that this is more than just a nagging question).
It is up to the reformed epistemologist, then, to determine whether a system that supposedly justifies both rational and irrational belief on the same reformed model is one that should be adopted. This is difficult to access, however, given that Plantinga never directly responds to the criticism since the question that is posed by Martin is never fully understood.
This of course doesn’t diminish the force of Plantinga’s general argument, but leaves one wondering whether Plantinga or other reformed epistemologists can adequately deal with the objection.
Thus far, then, I have pointed out that there are two different Pumpkin objections. It was argued that the original objection, the Great Pumpkin Objection, had little to offer by way of criticism. The second objection, dubbed the Son of the Great Pumpkin by Plantinga, has a much stronger criticism, especially when taken the intended way. The right formulation of the second objection leaves one wondering if Plantinga’s system, at the very least, is epistemically responsible.
79
§6 Evidence and Its Sustaining Role in Justification
I chapter’s 4 and 5 I pointed out two main objections. The first main objection dealt with problems of parity in Plantinga’s system. I argued that most of the critiques of parity presented didn’t pose much of a problem to Plantinga’s reformed epistemology. However, I argued that the
Principle of Credulity and how this relates to a properly functioning cognitive faculty is a valid objection, but this objection is quite similar to the Great Pumpkin Objection. In §5, I pointed out that the original Great Pumpkin Objection is unfounded, but that it points to a much stronger
79 By this I mean a system that only justifies the right kind of beliefs; such as beliefs that are at least possibly true, rational, and cogent.
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EXAM No. 9761403 objection, namely the Son of the Great Pumpkin. This objection could prove to be devastating to
Plantinga’s epistemology. In this chapter, I will raise one last objection that deals with
Plantinga’s view of proper basicality with respect to justification. I will question the most vital assertion in reformed epistemology (that God is properly basic) and ask whether belief in God is indeed properly basic or better seen as a belief that is justified by inference. In the end I will argue that while evidentialism is still a necessary component for sustaining justification, it need not play the central role of initial justification that perhaps a more classic rendition of evidentialism might have demanded. Before arguing for this position though, it might help if I return briefly to the claims made by Plantinga concerning proper basicality.
It was mentioned above that there do seem to be instances of belief in God that are not inferred. Further, it was argued that in such cases the believer might be justified. This reasoning is dependent on what Plantinga calls the Aquinas/Calvin model which states that humans are born with an innate sense of the divine. Of course, in order for the belief to have warrant the cognitive faculties must function properly in the right environment according to the plan for which they were designed.
80
Yet, how exactly is this supposed to work? What is it precisely that makes a belief basic?
For example, if I were to look up at some majestic snow covered mountain top in Colorado and conclude that God exists would I be justified? Would this belief count as basic under Plantinga’s reformulation? This hardly seems sensible. What seems strange in the example above is the manner in which the belief is justified. I am concluding that God exists because of my majestic mountain top experience. What Plantinga wants to argue, however, is that the belief simply arises from within. There is no reflective conclusion; rather, the belief is occasioned by the circumstance. So the divine sense is triggered by my perceiving the majestic mountains. The mountains are not evidence for my belief in God, I simply believe given the circumstance that is involved.
81 In this way, then, the belief is basic.
This is different of course than saying the belief is properly basic with respect to justification. For example, a belief can be seen as basic (i.e. a belief that is held without being inferred from any other proposition) while not being properly basic in that the belief lacks the proper justification. So in order for the belief to be ‘properly basic’ on Plantinga’s model, the
80 Plantinga, Warranted, 172-179.
81 Ibid., 175.
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EXAM No. 9761403 belief must have been produced by a properly functioning cognitive faculty. Belief in God, then, is justified by the cognitive faulty known as the sensus divinitatis.
Thus, in the same way that some perceptual experience might be immediately justified, religious experience might also be immediately justified.
How is the evidentialist to respond to these claims? In spite of the fact that the parity argument is not without problems, the overall claim made by the reformed epistemologist does seem to be convincing. Does this mean the end of evidentialism (in this case, specifically the demands imposed about religious belief) and all the restricting demands that it might impose?
This question seems to overstate the problem; for even if the parity argument works, evidence, at least some to some extent, plays a role in justification. Before a defense of this proposition, however, we must be clear what demands the evidentialist makes.
It was briefly mentioned above that the evidentialist claims that person S is justified in believing proposition p at time t if and only if S’s evidence for p at t supports believing p .
It is often claimed that evidentialism is truistic or self evident in that it is irrational to believe anything on insufficient evidence.
82 Moreover, the evidentialist might further claim that all nonbasic beliefs, in order to be justified, should be based on evidence (an evidentialist in the foundationalist camp anyway). Whether the evidence presented is sufficient for belief is a matter of considerable debate. However, where all evidentialists can agree is that some sort of evidence must be presented in order for that belief to be epistemically justified. This type of reasoning, that evidence is a necessary justifier for belief, has had considerable sway in religious epistemology. Most theistic philosophers, for example, with the exception perhaps of those in the reformed tradition, have advocated (or currently advocate) some form of evidentialism as foundational to their religious epistemology.
83
The evidentialist assumption can be broadened considerably from the generic form that was presented above. For example, we might follow Stephen Wykstra and claim that the individual need not have access to the available evidence for the justification of belief, but that propositional evidence must be available somewhere within the community.
84
Norman
82 Kretzmann, Religion, 95.
83 Plantinga agrees and notes that most philosophers of religion and epistemologists have historically been evidentialists. See Plantinga, Reason, pp. 16-18, 39-40.
84 Stephen Wykstra, “Towards a Sensible Evidentialism,” in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, 2ed., ed. William Rowe and William Wainwright (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989). Cf. Plantinga, Warrant,
90, 102-3.
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EXAM No. 9761403
Kretzmann broadens the evidentialist claim and holds that the evidence need not be propositional. So experience, for Kretzmann, might count towards what he is calling evidence.
85
Yet, in spite of the above attempt to broaden the evidentialist position the evidentialist will still affirm that evidence is a necessary justifier for belief; and as stated above this still seems too strict a proposal (i.e. given the Plantinga’s convincing argument for parity). Perhaps an example from Plantinga can get us closer to finding a place for some aspect of the evidentialist motif. In Reason and Belief in God, Plantinga presents the reader with an unassuming young theist (Ted).
86 Ted believes in God and thinks he is justified in his belief. For
Ted, his belief in God is basic in that it is not based on evidence and is not inferred from any other belief. The question that Plantinga asks, then, is whether Ted is presently justified in holding the belief that God exists. Plantinga notes that Ted may have never heard the more sophisticated arguments for the existence of God and if confronted by the skeptic with the question of why he might believe in God, he would fail to produce any evidence. Would we consider this belief to be epistemically justified? Surely, claims Plantinga, most would consider
Ted to be justified in his belief.
87
Plantinga’s example seems convincing. Yet as Kretzmann points out, the evidentialist would never assume that the young theist is unjustified in his belief. Surely Ted is justified in believing as he does and that whatever justification he might have, “considered relative to his age and circumstances, is sufficient for his theism.”
88
What the evidentialist would say, however, is that with knowledge and age comes a responsibility to check ones system of belief in order to determine whether the beliefs held are justified. For some, this might entail the necessity of abandoning a previously held belief given the evidence presented.
Further, argues Kretzmann, Plantinga seems to be saying that Ted has no good evidence for his belief in God given that this young theist could not produce some detailed analysis of the cosmological argument for his belief in God.
89 However, Ted might point you to his belief in the bible; of course this would be circular, but it is still nonetheless evidence. Or perhaps the young
85 Plantinga, Warrant, 103.
86 Plantinga, Reason, 33-34. Following Norman Kretzmann’s lead I will call this young theist Ted.
87 Plantinga goes on to say that given this conclusion, would it not be the case that if Ted is justified in his belief that God exists, then surely someone (other than Ted) who also asserts that God exists without evidence is epistemically justified as well?
88 Ibid.
89 Kretzmann, Religion, 103.
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EXAM No. 9761403 theist would point out the fact that his mom, who is usually a reliable source of true information, told him about God and thus grounds his belief in the reliable testimony of his mom. Perhaps his appeal to the bible would be counted as insufficient, or even stronger, as bad evidence; but one is hardly justified in stating that this counts as no evidence at all.
The second argument presented by Kretzmann, namely that what Plantinga seems to be saying is that Ted has no good evidence, is misleading. After all, Plantinga clearly states that Ted has no evidence, not specifically that he has only the wrong kind of evidence. Kretzmann has tweaked Plantinga’s argument to his advantage. Regardless, where Plantinga and Kretzmann seem to be disagreeing is what each of them might count as evidence for justification. For example, say that Ted came to believe in God because he beheld the majestic mountains of
Colorado. As mentioned above, Plantinga wants to argue that Ted’s belief in God arose from within. There is no reflective conclusion; rather, the belief is occasioned by the circumstance.
Kretzmann on the other hand, would claim that the majestic mountains are evidence for belief in
God and that his belief in God is therefore an inferred belief based on evidence (and thus not properly basic). This fits well into Kretzmann’s broader understanding of evidentialism (i.e. one that might include experience). Now there is nothing particularly wrong with Kretzmann’s objection, except that this is not what Plantinga has in mind with the example. For example, someone (other than Ted) might have come to believe in God in the way described by
Kretzmann; but this is not what Plantinga’s example is claiming with regard to Ted. Plantinga’s example is arguing that Ted came to believe without any evidential consideration, not that Ted came to believe with no good evidence. So Kretzmann’s second objection is irrelevant.
Kretzmann’s first claim, namely that the evidentialist would expect Ted to justify his belief based on some future considerations, is somewhat stronger; however, it must be put another way. Let’s assume that Plantinga is right in claiming that Ted is justified in his belief
(this much has already been granted above). However, some years have passed and Ted is now in college. He takes a philosophy of religion class and is assigned The Miracle of Theism by
Mackie. He comes across Mackie’s claim that there is something inherently contradictory in holding that both God and evil simultaneously exist.
90 So the problem for Ted, then, is that he is
90 I am assuming of course that the God that Ted believes in is wholly good. See above footnote 4.
(Oxford: OUP, 1982), 152.
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EXAM No. 9761403 presented with a potential defeater for justification of his belief in God. Plantinga describes a defeater in the following manner:
D is a purely epistemic defeater of B for S at t if and only if (1) S’ s noetic structure N at t includes B and S comes to believe D at t , and (2) any person S* (a) whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly in the relevant respects, (b) who is such that the bit of the design plan governing the sustaining of B in her noetic structure is successfully aimed at truth (i.e., at the maximization of true belief and minimization of false belief) and nothing more, (c) whose noetic structure is N and includes B, and (d) who comes to believe D but nothing else independent of or stronger then D, would withhold B (or believe it less strongly).
91
The general idea, then, is that the defeater must be warranted and must be held more strongly than the initial belief. Concerning Ted, however, it is only a potential defeater given that he is wavering in his belief in God in that he is unsure whether to accept the defeater. Of course on accepting the defeater Ted would be accepting another belief, namely that God does not exist, and thus he would be obliged to give up the original belief that God exists; but Ted is not quite to this point yet, although this is a potential outcome of his belief (that it could fall prey to the defeater).
92
How, then, does Ted defeat the defeater so that his belief maintains justification?
Thus far, then, we have agreed on several points. First, Ted was prima facie justified in his belief that God exists. Second, this justified belief did not come by means of any inferred propositions but was justified in the manner that Plantinga argued for above. Third, we have assumed that defeaters are a real possibility for beliefs that are properly basic (see §3 above). We are still uncertain however as to how Ted is to defeat the potential defeater that was presented.
The only way to do this, I believe, is to present evidence or an argument that defeats the defeater.
Yet Plantinga’s central claim is that it is entirely right, rational, reasonable, and proper to believe in God without any evidence or argument at all. But Ted, who is in danger of accepting a defeater to his justification for belief in God, needs all the evidence and arguments he can pull together at this point. So in the same way that the classical evidentialist motif is too strong, perhaps Plantinga’s general claim is overstated in the face of defeaters.
But this is something that Plantinga would surely agree with given that I am not claiming that Plantinga must accept every belief in God as basic. It is clear that Plantinga only wants to argue that belief in God could be basic and not that all belief in God is basic. Surely Plantinga would agree that one could come to believe in God on the evidentialist model. The claim,
91 Plantinga, Warranted, 363.
92 For a full discussion of defeaters and potential defeaters see Plantinga, Warrant, 357-373.
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EXAM No. 9761403 however, made by Plantinga is that this is not necessary (and unreasonable given evidentialism’s strict demand). The question to be raised, however, is what role does evidence play in the justification of belief in God. It would seem, from the example above, that while it need not play the central function of initial justification that perhaps a more classic rendition of evidentialism might have demanded, evidence is still a necessary component for sustaining justification, especially in the face of potential defeaters. This is no small part, especially given the devastating critiques that are presented by Plantinga.
This realization—that evidence is still a necessary component for sustaining justification—does not of course disprove the theory that belief in God is properly basic. Even if one might have several good reasons or arguments for the existence of God in the face of defeaters, Plantinga’s overall thesis is intact since we are primarily concerned with the question of whether or not evidence is a necessary justifier for belief in God—not necessarily whether you have come to believe in God through evidence. If belief in God is properly basic, as
Plantinga argues, then those who might not possess any evidence are still justified in their belief.
There is nothing mentioned above, I should think, that Plantinga would initially disagree with. Indeed, Plantinga would argue that potential defeaters should be dealt with in the traditional sense (e.g. by arguments and evidence).
93
My argument, however, is that Plantinga fails to properly acknowledge the important place evidence holds in the justification process
(even if this justification is a by way of a sustaining role).
Thus far, then, I have pointed out a necessary role that evidence could play in justification and described how evidence is needed in the face of defeaters in order to sustain justification. And while it is quite different than the classical evidentialist motif, evidence nonetheless remains an important part of the overall justification process. In spite of this clarification, however, there is still a more interesting question with regard to defeaters; namely, whether a defeater-defeater would cause a belief to lose its basicality.
Consider the young theist Ted again. Ted came to believe in God based on Plantinga’s model and, it was argued, justifiably so. However, like most who believe in God, Ted has encountered a potential defeater for his belief in God; and given this potential defeater it was mentioned that evidence and argument are essential to defeat the defeater. Ted, then, has reflected on the evidence and considered the alternative defeater (that God does not exist given
93 Plantinga, Reason, 82-84.
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EXAM No. 9761403 the problem of evil) to be invalid. Ted’s noetic structure now includes the belief that God exists
(which was justified on Plantinga’s descriptive model) and a defeater-defeater (which was gained according to an internalist and evidentialist model). Considering this, would it not be the case that Ted’s belief in God is no longer basic? If so, would it not also be the case that most who believe in God justifiably do so on the internalist/evidential model (given that most people encounter potential defeaters) thereby making belief in God non-basic for most believers?
94
If the above proposal stands—that belief in God is non-basic once a defeater is defeated—then Plantinga really hasn’t answered the evidentialist objector (i.e., the religious skeptic). Belief in God would still need to be based on evidence in order to be sufficiently justified. For if most have come to believe in God on Plantinga’s model and are later challenged by defeaters, then once they have a defeater-defeater the belief is non-basic meaning that most theists will have a non-basic belief in God. And if most do actually have a belief in God that is non-basic then Plantinga’s case for basic belief in God seem inconsequential. I don’t take this claim to be uncontroversial; especially given the fact that “most” is rather vague and speculative.
Nonetheless, if Plantinga claims that a) most arguments for God’s existence are unconvincing or insufficient, b) it doesn’t matter that (a) because evidence is not a necessary justifier for belief in
God, then it would seem to follow that c) it is vital that those who do hold belief in God to be basic need the belief to remain so (given (a)).
95
Of course the evidentialist objector is initially silenced at the first point of belief (assuming belief came about on Plantinga’s model); yet, once a potential defeater is presented the evidentialist objector once again becomes an important factor. At this point however, we are only assuming that belief in God is non-basic in the face of a defeater-defeater.
In order to see if the above proposal is true then, consider the following propositions:
(1) Ted believes in God and his belief is properly basic.
(2) Ted has encountered a defeater for his belief in God based on Mackie’s arguments.
(3) Ted now has a non-basic belief about the non-existence of God.
94 I am assuming of course that most will encounter a defeater to their belief in God at some point.
95 Plantinga himself definitely believes (a). In God and Other Minds his central point is that there is no convincing argument for God’s existence. He goes to great lengths to undermine several of the classical arguments in natural theology.
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EXAM No. 9761403
(4)
Ted encounters Plantinga’s arguments on the problem of evil and concludes through reflective analysis that Mackie’s assertions are unfounded.
(5) Ted believes in God.
(6) Ted’s belief in God is no longer basic given that it is, at least partially, based on (4).
96
I take (1) – (5) to be uncontroversial. I am assuming that Ted came to believe on Plantinga’s model and was justified in doing so. Further, Ted is inferring his non-belief from an argument or evidence so his non-belief in God is non-basic. (1) – (3) follows. (4) was argued for above and
(5) seems to be the next reasonable step. Obviously the controversial claim then is going to be
(6).
There does seem, however, to be something initially right about (6) especially given the truth of (3) and (4). It seems, prima facie at least, that (6) is true given that (5) comes from the belief that (4) is a successful argument. We have to be careful here though since (4) could be an inferred belief about the nature of (2) and not directly related to (5). Put another way, it could simply be that (2) is an obstacle to (5) and (4) plays the role of removing the obstacle. In which case (5) would not be inferred from (4), but (5) would simply be occasioned by fact that (2) has been found to be a failed defeater for (1). Which in turn means that (6) is false.
97
Perhaps this can be better understood if we recall Plantinga’s definition for basicality:
S’s belief at time t is basic only if B at t is such that it is not accepted by S on the evidential basis of any other beliefs in S’s noetic structure at t.
98
The key to this definition, I believe, is that the belief in question is basic so long as the believer does not accept arguments or evidence for his belief (in this case Ted’s belief in God). In the case of Ted, then, it could be that (2) is an obstacle to his basic belief in God and (4) simply plays the role of removing that obstacle; further, Ted is dependent on (4) for his belief to satisfy the necessary epistemic norms, but he need not infer (5) from (4). For Ted, belief in God could still be basic and our above example could be reformulated in the following manner:
96 For a similar examples and a more detailed look into defeaters see Christian Miller, “Defeaters and the
Basicality of Theistic Belief,” in Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge, ed. Sabine Roeser, Ron Rood, and Rene van
Woudenberg, 147-175. (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2005).
97 See Miller, “Basic,” 163-169.
98 Plantinga, Warranted, 175-176.
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EXAM No. 9761403
(1) Ted believes in God and his belief is properly basic.
(2) Ted has encountered a defeater for his belief in God based on Mackie’s arguments.
(3) Ted now has a non-basic belief about the non-existence of God.
(4)
Ted encounters Plantinga’s arguments on the problem of evil and concludes through reflective analysis that Mackie’s assertions are unfounded.
(5)
The obstacle that was preventing Ted’s properly basic belief in God from being held has been removed.
(6) Ted believes in God and his belief is properly basic (i.e., it is not believed on any evidential basis or argument).
For reasons stated above, (6) seems reasonable.
99
Of course it is not without controversy and a more detailed analysis might do more justice to such objections. In the end, however, it seems reasonable that Ted’s belief in God is still basic in spite of having to present a defeater-defeater through evidence and argument.
This discussion bodes well for the above proposal that a more moderate evidentialist position might be necessary to ones overall religious epistemology. Clearly evidence plays a vital role in the face of defeaters and helps to sustain justification in face of potential defeaters. So while it is still the case that belief in God could be properly basic, one would do well to note the incompleteness in one’s system of religious epistemology if the proper place for evidence is overlooked.
Concluding Thoughts
In general, I have argued that Plantinga makes a compelling case for the idea that belief in God is properly basic. He has done this, I believe, in answering the skeptical challenge by questioning the foundation or motivating factors that drive the skeptical argument against religious belief. Once Plantinga has shown the motivating factors to be unfounded, he began to defend his case for parity. I concluded that Plantinga’s case for parity is a compelling one given the many similarities between our religious and perceptual experiences. Of course this concession is not without critique. I presented two general critiques against parity. First, it was noted that Plantinga’s account presumes to bypass the verification of the particular religious experience. However, following Alston, I argued that there are problems with applying this
99 Plantinga, Function, 185. I borrowed the term “obstacle” from Miller, “Basic,” 163-169.
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EXAM No. 9761403 verification method to all experiences given that there are those who assert that sensory experience is veridical without applying the verification criteria. In short, both experiences should be granted the same epistemic grace in this situation.
A second objection to parity that I raised is that there seems to be no way of determining if our cognitive faculty is malfunctioning and thus we have no means of determining when to reject a religious perceptual experience as inaccurate. This idea, as noted above, seems to invite any number of odd experiences that one could count as properly basic. In other words, there is no criterion to determine if the cognitive faculty is malfunctioning. This objection, I noted, is somewhat similar to the Great Pumpkin Objection. I argued that the Great Pumpkin Objection holds little weight in that Plantinga is not committed to holding that any belief is properly basic.
However, related to the Great Pumpkin is the Son of the Great Pumpkin Objection which I argue could have potentially devastating consequences for a more responsible religious epistemology.
Understood properly, the argument states that the same system of justification that Plantinga uses to claim that belief in God is properly basic (and thereby not irrational, unjustified, etc), is the same system that could be used to justify irrational, bizarre, or weird beliefs. Put another way, the same defense that supposedly reverses the charge of irrationalism, can then be used to advocate irrationalism.
In spite of this potentially devastating argument, I concluded that it need not be taken as a killer argument. My reason for this is that however epistemically irresponsible it is to have a system that justifies irrational belief, it is unclear whether it undermines Plantinga’s central claim—namely that it is it is entirely right, rational, reasonable, and proper to believe in God without any evidence or argument at all. I argued that in order for the objection to be wholly devastating it needs to somehow undermine that central claim; which I think the above objections fails to do.
Lastly, I considered what role evidence might play in religious belief. I argued that evidence is necessary as a sustaining justifier, but need not play the initial role of justification that classical evidentialism might have demanded. This sustaining role is best seen in the face of defeaters where the only way to respond to a defeater is by presenting evidence and argument. I noted that this is something that Plantinga would agree with but that he fails to give evidence the proper credit it deserves.
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EXAM No. 9761403
More interestingly, however, I raised a question concerning whether belief in God maintains its basicality in the face of a defeater-defeater. This, I believe, is one the most important questions facing Plantinga and the reformed epistemologist. What makes it so important is that most who believe in God will face a potential defeater. So if the believers are to maintain or regain their belief in God they will have to present a defeater-defeater. If the belief does not return to basicality then most who believe in God, I argued, do so on evidential grounds; which, of course, might potentially validate the evidentialist objector’s skeptical challenge. Yet, in spite of this possibility, I argued that while the debate is far from over, it does seem possible that one can return to holding belief in God as basic after defeating a defeater so long as the defeater is seen as an obstacle to belief in God as properly basic.
In conclusion, then, I believe that Plantinga has presented a compelling case for belief in
God as properly basic. In spite of the fact that his model is not without problems, he presents a detailed and convincing account of warranted Christian belief. Thus any future account of religious epistemology will have to first deal with the forceful arguments presented by the reformed epistemologist.
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EXAM No. 9761403
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