Naturalistic, “Pre-Theoretical” Belief in Book I of Hume's Treatise
Stefanie Rocknak
Upstate New York Early Modern Workshop
Cornell University
October 5, 2008
Long before countless twentieth-century scholars fought over the nature and
consequences of Hume’s argument concerning induction,1 Husserl complained that his
predecessor Hume, like all naturalistic, “extreme[ist] empiric[ists]” (LI 115) did not, and
could not adequately justify his method, much less his findings, with some kind of
“absolute” pre-theoretical grounding. (PRP 113-114, LI 115, 117, 406) Meanwhile,
Husserl thought that he could justify both his method and his findings with an appeal to
the phenomenological, pre-theoretical, pre-naturalistic “science” of the “epoché.” (LI 5960)
Husserl was right. Hume’s work was not, in any respect, “phenomenologically
objective.” (c.f. Rocknak (2001)) For the most part, this accusation has gone
unanswered—phenomenology, in all its various manifestations, is still alive and well.
However, in Book I of the Treatise,2 Hume did—however implicitly—appeal to a “pretheoretical” notion of belief. But this belief is by no means “pre-naturalistic.”3 Rather, it
is a function of empirical data. In particular, it is a product of the “constant and coherent”
impressions that seem to naturally obtain of experience. In this respect, Hume’s
epistemology does admit of a certain degree of regularity, but an empirical regularity.
Granted, Hume hardly ever uses the term ‘induction.’ But, as pointed out by Millican (1995), the terms
that Hume does use, i.e. ‘moral reasoning,’ ‘probable reasoning’ and ‘reasoning concerning matters of
facts,’ can be misleading. So, for our general purposes, we will stick to the term ‘induction.’
2 For the sake of brevity, I am limiting my discussion to just the Treatise.
3 I am not using the term ‘naturalistic’ in the sense that “natural” beliefs are to be distinguished from
“rational” beliefs. This usage began with the Scottish Naturalists, e.g. Shaftesbury, Hutchenson, Turnbull,
Kames, Reid and Hamilton. See also Kemp Smith (1905, 1941). Rather, by ‘naturalized,’ I simply mean
empirical (see Mounce (1999) for more detail on Scottish Naturalism).
1
1
And according to Hume, contra Husserl’s (as well as a number of twentieth-century
scholars later complaints) this is the best that we can hope for; regularity will have to
suffice, not certainty.
§1 Two Kinds of Reality
Hume tells us that “whatever is present to the memory” is especially “vivacious” in virtue
of the fact that it resembles an actual impression or impressions. As a result, these
memories are easily distinguishable from “the mere fictions of the imagination” (T
1.3.9.3; SBN 107-8).4
These memories, as well as impressions, constitute what he refers to as a
“system” of “reality”5:
Of these impressions or ideas of the memory we form a kind of system, comprehending
whatever we remember to have been present, either to our internal perception or senses;
and every particular of that system, joined to the present impressions, we are pleas’d to
call a reality. (T 1.3.9.3; SBN 107-8)
However, Hume immediately continues, this is not the only “system” of reality we work
with:
But the mind stops not here. For finding that with this system of perceptions, there is
another connected by custom, or if you will, by the relation of cause and effect, it
proceeds to the consideration of their ideas; and as it feels that ‘tis in a manner
necessarily determin’d to view these particular ideas, and that the custom or relation, by
which it is determin’d, admits not of the least change, it forms them into a new system,
4
This distinction is related to two other distinctions Hume makes between the memory and the
imagination. The first is the fact that the imagination “has the liberty to transpose and change its ideas” (T
1.1.3.4; SBN 10), while the “memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented” (T
1.1.3.3; SBN 9). Second, as already suggested above, by and large, the ideas that we remember are more
vivacious than the ideas that we imagine (T 1.3.5.3; SBN 85). In fact, if our memories were not more
vivacious than our imagined ideas, we couldn’t distinguish them from each other, regardless if the memory
retains the order in which our impressions occurred to us. This is the case because we cannot always
determine if the order in which we think our ideas exactly corresponds to the order in which their
corresponding impressions caused them. (T 1.3.5.3; SBN 85)
5 Hume’s notion of reality tends to be overlooked in the scholarship, although there are some exceptions,
e.g. Kemp Smith (1941; 383-85) Owen (1999) and Loeb (2002).
2
which it likewise dignifies with the title of realities. (T 1.3.9.3; SBN 107-8; emphasis
added).
The first system of reality emerges on a more immediate level—it is merely a function of
certain memories of impressions and any impressions that we may have. At the second
level however, the relation of cause and effect is brought to bear, which somehow, in a
regular, determined fashion, forms another, more complicated system. Accordingly,
Hume tells us: “The first of these systems is the object of the memory and senses; the
second of the judgment.” (T 1.3.9.3; SBN 107-8) The first system appears to be more
reflexive and immediate, while the second system involves reflection, particularly,
reflection based on the relation of cause and effect. As a result, the second system is
comprised of “judgment[s].”
Hume tells us that: “‘Tis the latter principle [of judgment based on cause and
effect], which peoples the world, and brings us acquainted with such existences, as by
their removal in time and place, lie beyond the reaches of the senses and memory.” (T
1.3.9.4; SBN 108) Thus, this second, reflective level somehow allows us to conceive of
and believe in the reality of places that we have never been to, people we have never met,
and events we have never experienced. In other words, things that we have never formed
actual impressions of. So it makes sense that this reality could not possibly belong to the
realm of “senses and memory.” For in the case of this kind of reality, nothing has been
sensed. And so, nothing could be remembered either. But according to Hume, it is an
accurate reality nevertheless, constructed from, it seems, second, or even n-th hand
impressions—impressions that other people have had: “By means [of this second system]
I paint the universe in my imagination, and fix my attention on any part of it that I
3
please.” In fact, he immediately continues, “I form an idea of ROME, which I neither see
nor remember; but which is connected with such impressions as I remember to have
received from the conversations and books of travelers and historians.” (T 1.3.9.4; SBN
108).
We may now thumbnail these two systems of reality as follows:
System of Reality 1: Memories of sense impressions and any impressions that we may
be experiencing at the moment.
System of Reality 2: Allows us to conceive of and believe in phenomena that we have
not actually had sense impressions of, by way of our ability to think in a causal manner.
§2 The Natural Relation of Causality v. the Philosophical Relation of Causality: An
Overview
At various places in Book I (see, for instance, 1.1.5), Hume distinguishes between the
“natural” relation of causality and the “philosophical” relation of causality. At this point
in the paper, we may understand this distinction simply as follows: the natural relation of
causality is a product of a conditioning process, or as Hume puts it, our experience of the
“constant conjunction” (T 1.3.6.3; SBN 87-8) of impressions. As a result, we do not
come to think in terms of this relation as a result of reasoning (deductive or probable; see
T 1.3.5 and §4-7 of this paper for more detail). Rather, we experience two impressions
successively and contiguously associated enough times such that we come to think that
one causes the other. Philosophical relations of causality however, are not functions of a
conditioning process, at least directly. Instead, after we have become conditioned to think
4
in terms of natural relations of causality, we may we use “reason”6 to determine if two
objects are causally related (T 1.1.5.1-2; SBN 13-14, T 1.3.6.12-16; SBN 92-3, c.f. De
Pierris (2002, n. 20),Owen (1999, 151-153) and Schliesser (2007)).
§3 Elementary Belief
With this general distinction between the natural and philosophical relation of causality in
mind, realize that Hume first defines belief in 1.3.5, where he claims that “belief or
assent, which always attends the memory and senses is nothing but the vivacity of those
perceptions they present” (T 1.3.5.7; SBN 86; boldness added). He introduces this
definition of belief to emphasize his point that the natural causal relation must be based
on impressions that we have actually experienced. As a result, these impressions and our
respective memories of them are particularly vivacious, where this vivaciousness
constitutes our belief in them. If natural causal relations were not based on such
impressions and memories of them (i.e. beliefs), they could very well be based on
imagined ideas. But, as Hume explains throughout his discussion of the natural relation
of causality in 1.3, this is not the case. Rather, by implicitly appealing to his method of
“experience” (xviii) and “observation” (xix) (i.e. by operating under the auspices of what
Garrett (1997; pp. 30-33) refers to as Hume’s “methodological empiricism”), he claims
that the natural relation of causality is based on the repetitive experience of impressions,
which are not imagined (T 1.3.4-5).
As a result, given what we saw in §1 of this paper, our conditioned ability to think
in a causal manner is grounded in reality. In particular, this ability presupposes the first
6
Granted, just what Hume means by reason is quite complex, but our purposes, we may understand
“reasoning” as the reflective “comparison” (T 1.3.2.2; SBN 73-4, T 1.3.14.31; SBN 169-70) of two
perceptions. This is opposed to a reflexive, conditioned association of perceptions.
5
system of reality, that is, our ability to have impressions, remember them, and
concomitantly, believe in them.7 This means that the “constant conjunction” of
impressions consists of the constant conjunction of beliefs. This definition of belief
squares with the first (of three) definitions of belief that Hume gives on T 1.3.13.19; SBN
153-4.8
So, although this is not Hume’s term, for the sake of clarity we may refer to the
beliefs that consist of “nothing but” the vivaciousness of either impressions or our
memories of impressions as elementary beliefs. Relatedly, we may refer to the
vivaciousness that comprises elementary beliefs as elementary vivaciousness, where this
vivaciousness immediately accompanies our impressions and our memories of them. This
means that nothing else needs to occur in order for this vivaciousness to be present;
impressions and memories of impressions are vivacious simply in virtue of being
impressions and memories of impressions.
However, most recent scholars do not acknowledge this kind of belief, claiming
instead, that Humean belief must always be a more vivacious idea, but never an
impression. And, more usually than not, these commentators suggest that belief occurs as
a result of thinking in terms of a causal process, but does not trigger it.9 See for instance,
At this point, I must diverge from Owen’s account of Hume’s two systems of reality; Owen suggests that
only Hume’s second system of reality entails beliefs, while the first does not (1999; p.166-8).
8 Note: “every kind of opinion or judgment, which amounts not to knowledge, is deriv’d entirely from the
force and vivacity of the perception, and that these qualities constitute in the mind, what we call the
BELIEF of the existence of any object. This force and this vivacity are most conspicuous in the memory;
and therefore our confidence in the veracity of that faculty is the greatest imaginable, and equals in many
respects the assurance of a demonstration.” (T 1.3.13.19; SBN 153-4)
9 And indeed, Hume does also have this kind of belief in mind in the Treatise; see T 1.3.6.15-1.3.8.3; SBN
93-99, T 1.3.13.19; SBN 153-4. However, acknowledging as much does not rule out elementary beliefs
(see §5 of this paper for more detail).
7
6
Stroud (1977; Chapter 4), Ayer (1980, 31), Wright (1983, 214), Falkenstein (1997, 33),10
Garrett (1997, 36, 209-213),11 Owen (1999, 166-170), Broakes (2002, 189), and
Broughton (2006, 45). Kemp Smith (1941) however, is a clear exception, writing: “Belief
appears in a very different, and much more puzzling guise [in 1.3.4], when … it is
considered, as it has to be, in the more fundamental form in which it shows its presence
in sense perceptio. As thus occurring, belief cannot be defined as enlivening” (112). He
continues: “[such] belief is native to sense perception; independently of any process of
inference” (112). Anscombe (1973, 3) and Livingston (1974, 15) also support this
reading, but they only acknowledge elementary beliefs in passing.
§4 Husserl’s Accusation
Husserl was deeply troubled by empiricism,, regardless if it is “extreme” (i.e. claims that
there are no a priori truths), or “moderate” like Hume’s (i.e. claims that there are some a
priori truths, like demonstrative truths). He writes in the Logical Investigations:
it goes no better with Hume’s moderate empiricism, which, despite bouts of
psychologistic confusion, still tries to keep for the pure spheres of logic and mathematics,
an a priori justification, and only surrenders the factual sciences to experience. Such an
epistemological standpoint can likewise be show up as untenable, even absurd, for a
reason similar to that brought by us against extreme empiricism. Mediate judgments of
fact—we may compress the sense of Hume’s theory into this phrase—never permit of
rational justification, only of psychological explanation. (LI, 117; emphasis added)
10
Falkenstein clearly acknowledges and discusses the role that memory and present impressions play in
Hume’s many forms of belief. However, he suggests that only the ideas “produced by” (33) and “derived
from” (34) memory and present impressions constitutes belief. Thus, he rules out impressions as
constituting a form of belief.
11 Garrett clearly emphasizes the role that memory plays in regard to belief (213), but he consistently refers
to beliefs as ideas, which are the products of belief forming mechanisms, rather than being impressions. As
such, he rules out elementary beliefs.
7
Indeed, Husserl recognized that Hume could not and did not justify his method (his
empiricism) with an appeal to reason (probable or demonstrable). Rather, all Hume could
do was give a “psychological explanation” of “mediate judgments of fact,” i.e. inductive
inferences. And so, Husserl anticipates much of the more recent discussion of this matter.
For instance, some claim that Hume must have thought that inductive inferences are, in
fact, worthless (e.g. Stove (1973)). Meanwhile, others have alleged that Hume only
meant to show that we cannot use demonstrative reason to justify inductive inferences,
but we can, apparently, justify them with probable reason. 12 But there is another group:
those who claim (including Strawson (1952)) that no “justification” is needed. In fact,
asking for it amounts to a misplaced demand for epistemic explanation. All that Hume
has recourse to is psychological explanation (e.g. (Garrett (1997) and Owen (1999)).
But by Husserl’s lights, psychological explanation does not let Hume off the
hook. In fact, it is precisely the problem; justification is needed. In particular, according
to Husserl, because Hume’s method is not grounded by any certain principles, it does not
admit of “rational [i.e. a priori] justification.” As a result, any conclusions that Hume’s
psychological method yields are not only uncertain, they are, Husserl thought, downright
irrational.13 Worse still, a psychological explanation is circular, and so, is patently
absurd:
One need then but ask how this applies to the rational justification of the psychological
judgments (about custom, association of ideas, etc.) on which the theory itself rests, and
the factual arguments that it itself employs. One then at once sees the self-evident conflict
See Millican (1995) and Garrett (1997) for an overview of these scholars’ arguments, which include
Beauchamp and Rosenberg (1981), Arnold (1983), Broughton (1983) and Baier (1991)
13 In some respects, this anticipates Stove’s (1973) analysis of Hume. However, Stove argues that Hume
was a closet “deductivist,” where Hume meant to show that any method that does not rely on a priori
principles is worthless (see Millican (1995) for a comprehensive discussion (and dismissal) of Stove’s
position). Husserl however, thought that Hume had no such noble intentions. Rather, Husserl thought that
the Scotsman was just horribly mistaken, mired in a rather absurd methodological circle (see above).
12
8
between the sense of the proposition that the theory seeks to prove, and the sense of the
deductions that it employs to prove it. The psychological premises of the theory are
themselves mediate judgments of fact, and therefore lack all rational justification in the
sense of the thesis to be established. In other words, the correctness of the theory
presupposes the irrationality of its premises, the correctness of the premises the
irrationality of the theory (or thesis). (LI, 117; emphasis added)
Here’s the first part of the problem, which comprises the first part of the circle:
Empiricists must think that their method is correct. But in what respect are the premises
of the method (i.e. empirical observations) “correct?” How are they justified? Subjective
insight? Superstition? Religious epiphanies? Demonstrative reason?14 Probable reason?
The empiricist can’t claim that any of these sources of information justify her premises
because doing so would respectively presuppose the preeminent correctness of subjective
insight, superstition, religion and reason (demonstrative and probable), not empiricism.
But this means that, by definition, the empiricist’s premises are not only not subjective
insights, not superstitious, and not religious, they are not rational; they are irrational
“mediate judgments of fact.”
More precisely, according to Hume, neither demonstrative nor probable reason
can justify what is generally referred to in the literature as the principle of uniformity, 15
upon which all probable reasoning (and so, all “mediate judgments of fact”) rest. Briefly,
this is the case because A.) the principle of uniformity may be imagined otherwise,
without generating a contradiction, and so is not demonstrative (T 1.3.6.5; SBN 89), and
14
It should be noted that there has been a great deal of debate over the exact nature of Hume’s notion of a
demonstrative inference: Is it a deductively valid inference (see, for instance, Stove (1973), Millican (1995)
Mackie (1979) and Beachamp and Rosenberg (1981)? Or, following Descartes and Locke, does
demonstration consist of an informal evaluation of the relations of ideas (see Owen (1999)? However, the
project put forth in this paper does not require its solution. Rather, for our purposes, we need only think of a
demonstrative claim as being one that cannot be imagined otherwise without generating a contradiction (T
79-80, 89, 87, 95, 111, 161-2 and A 650).
15 Hume defines this principle in the Treatise as follows: “instances of which we have had no experience,
must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues always
uniformly the same” (T 1.3.6.4; SBN 89)
9
B.) The principle of uniformity could not be justified by probable reasoning because it is
needed to justify probable reasoning (T 1.3.6.6-7; SBN 89-90; for a more detailed, and, I
think, accurate explication of A.) and B.) see Garrett (1997) 81-83). Thus, because all
causal inferences are not justified by reason, it seems that they are irrational. And so, as
Husserl puts it, “the correctness of the theory presupposes the irrationality of its
premises.”
Now we may examine the second half of the circle incurred by a psychological
explanation of inductive claims—as Husserl sees it. It seems obvious that certain
observational claims are correct, e.g. “If I jump out in front of a moving bus, I’ll get
hurt.” But this claim is only correct if we assume that repetitive empirical observation
(testing and retesting, i.e. custom) justifies it. But repetitive empirical observation
(custom), is, by definition not (according to Husserl and Hume) reasoning, and so, it is
irrational. Thus: “The correctness of the premises presupposes the irrationality of the
theory.” And so we have, Husserl thought, a vicious, absurd, methodological circle.
Psychological explanation just won’t cut it, and thus, Husserl would have had grave
concerns over (at least) Garrett’s recent claim that “Hume’s famous argument
[concerning induction] itself requires no apology, it is the first and still … one of the
most persuasive arguments for a true and fundamental thesis in cognitive psychology”
(1997, 95).
However, Husserl claims in at least the Logical Investigations (1900-1901),
“Philosophy as Rigorous Science” (1911) and The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology (1934-37), that the obvious shortcomings of Hume’s
method paved the way for phenomenology. Hume’s work, like no empiricist before him,
10
clearly demonstrated the absurdity of the scientific method (c.f. Rocknak (2001)):
“Plainly, therefore, the demand for a fundamental justification of all mediate knowledge
can only have a sense if we can both see and know certain ultimate principles on which
all proof in the last instance rests” (LI 116) Meanwhile, Husserl’s phenomenology—i.e.,
the special science of a “pure consciousness”—was grounded in the method of the
“epoché” (see at least I1, lines 59-60), where this method is allegedly presupposed by
empirical inquiry, and so, breaks the circularity of naturalistic methodology. As a result,
Husserl
tells
us,
primarily
because
of
its
manifest
absurdity,
“Hume’s
Treatise…represent[s] a great historical event” (C, 89)
§4.3 A Closer Look at the Circle
But is Hume really trapped in this absurd methodological circle? If one or both of the
following can be shown, then he is not. 1) “The correctness of [Hume’s] theory [does
not] presuppose…the irrationality of its premises.” 2) “The correctness of the premises
[does not] presuppose the irrationality of the theory.” Showing as much will illustrate that
the psychological method is not necessarily circular, and so, is not necessarily absurd.
And thus, scholars like Strawson, Garrett and Owen do not commit Hume to an untenable
position. However, we will also see that contra to Strawson, Garrett and Owen, Hume’s
method is justified.
§4.3.1 The Theory: Is it Irrational?
As we just saw, according to Husserl, for Hume’s theory (the empirical method) to be
“correct,” inductive claims would have to be correct. However, because inductive claims
11
cannot be justified by reason (probable or demonstrative), they are, seemingly by
definition, “irrational.” It is in this respect, Husserl alleges, that Hume’s theory
presupposes the “irrationality” of the premises. This leads to two questions: 1) Can we
really say that the inductive inference is an irrational inference? 2) Regardless, does
Hume actually think that the (“irrational”) correctness of inductive inferences justifies the
empirical method? Makes it “correct”?
We tackle 1) in the next section, so for now, let’s focus on 2), where the answer
is, quite simply: No. We need only look at the Introduction to Hume’s Treatise to see that
this is the case. Here, Hume explicitly tells us that “metaphysical reasoning” (T Intro. 3;
SBN xiv) only leads to conflict and confusion; it gets us nowhere:
Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence
in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are everywhere to be met with in the
systems of the most eminent philosophers and seem to have drawn disgrace upon
philosophy itself.” (T Intro. 1; SBN xiii).
“Pure” a priori, “rational” reasoning, i.e. what Hume seems to mean by “metaphysical”
reasoning (for he surely does not mean a posteriori reasoning; see below) effectively
amounts to a reductio (metaphysical reasoning lacks “coherence”). Along these lines,
Hume writes: “There is nothing which is not the subject of [metaphysical] debate, and
which men of learning are not of contrary opinions” (T Intro. 2; SBN xiv). Therefore, we
should reject the metaphysical method, i.e. the method where we traditionally appeal to
pure a priori reasoning.
What method then, should we use? Hume tells us in the Introduction that “all the
sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that however wide any of
them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another.” (T Intro.
12
4; SBN xv; emphasis added). In fact, he continues: “Even Mathematics, Natural
Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of
MAN; since they lie under the cognixance of men, and judged by their powers and
faculties” (T Intro. 4; SBN xv). All of our sciences fall under our purview, the human
purview. Thus, in anticipation of Kant’s famous “Copernican Revolution,” Hume claims
that we must study that purview. The object of our method then, must be “human
understanding,” where we “explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the
operations we perform in our reasonings.” (T Intro. 4; SBN xv)
Having established the object of his inquiry (human understanding), Hume
announces his method: “And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the
other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid
on experience and observation.” (T Intro. 7; SBN xvi; emphasis added). Hume’s method
must be comprised of experience and observation because we can’t use metaphysical
reasoning, i.e. “pure,” a priori reasoning to divine the “essence” of human understanding;
this method only leads to conflict and embarrassment. The only alternative is the method
of observation: “it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being equally unknown to
us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its
powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments” (T Intro. 8; SBN
xvii; emphasis added). “And,” he immediately continues, “the observation of those
particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations.” (T Intro.
8; SBN xvii; emphasis added).
Thus, we may conclude that Hume’s aversion to the confusion and conflict bred
by metaphysics is the motivation behind Hume’s method; it makes his method, his
13
theory, “correct” by default.16 Thus, Husserl was simply wrong to say that “The
correctness of [Hume’s] theory presupposes the irrationality of its premises.” Rather, the
“correctness” of Hume’s theory presupposes the irrationality of metaphysical inquiry.
But to be fair, this is not quite the problem that Husserl has with Hume’s method.
Hume explicitly tells us that his method will never be “correct” in the respect that the
principles it employs are universal, nor are they a priori. Rather, Hume writes in the
Introduction to the Treatise:
tho’ we must endeavor to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up
our experiments to the upmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest
causes, ‘tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that
pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature ought at first to be
reject as presumptious and chimerical (T xvii)
All of Hume’s “principles,” to use Hume’s own term, are not “demonstrative,” and so,
they can be imagined otherwise without generating a contradiction. Although a number
of scholars have recognized this (e.g. Owen, 1999; 63-65), a number have not. Rather,
upon finding a counterexample to a Humean principle, they tend to mistakenly do one of
two things: Attack Hume (see, for instance, Stroud (1977) and Bennett (1971) in regard
to the distinction between feeling and thinking). Or, scramble to find a way to make it
universal (see for instance, Ayer (1980; 32-33) in regard to the copy principle and the
missing shade of blue).
Regardless, we must ask: Does the fact that a Humean principle is a posteriori
make it irrational? As we have seen, some (e.g. Husserl and Stove) claim that because a
posteriori principles cannot be justified by reason, demonstrative or probable, then they
are, therefore irrational, worthless, absurd. But this is not the case, as we see below.
16
And so, ironically, Hume uses a tacit form of logical reasoning (a reductio) to conclude that we should
not use logical reasoning (as typically employ by metaphysicians) as our method.
14
§ 4.3.2 The Premises: Are they Irrational?
We have been led back to question 1.) raised above, i.e. can we really say that the
inductive inference is an “irrational” inference? Concomitantly, can we really say that all
Humean principles are irrational, and thus, his entire method is irrational?
As explained earlier, inductive inferences (“mediate judgments of fact”) are not,
according to Hume, justified by demonstrative and probable reasoning. Thus, on the face
of it, it does seem that they are not reasonable. To many, even those who do not think that
causal inferences are worthless and absurd, this means that they are not only irrational
(e.g. Millican, (1995) 204-212)17, but, because they are not justified by reason
(demonstrative or probable), they are not justifiable at all, i.e. do not admit of what
Garrett (1997) refers to as “epistemic evaluation” (228). Or, as Owen (1999) puts it: “as
in the probable reasoning case the issue [at hand in ‘Of Skepticism with Regard to
Reason’] is the explanation of the presences of belief, and not the justification of beliefs
whose presence is unproblematic” (177; emphasis added). For what else, besides reason,
would count as justification—would allow us to evaluate some inductive claims as being
better than others, if not allow us to determine what is an inductive claim versus what is
not?
17
More precisely: Millican argues that inductive claims are not justified by a “faculty of intellectual
insight” (211), but the “true foundation of such extrapolation is revealed to be animal instinct” (212). This
means, Millican argues, that there is a looser sense in which inductive claims may be classified as
“reasonable:” “Hume thus has the basis for a naturalistic account of his intermediate sense of ‘reason,’
according to which beliefs and methods of inference count as reasonable if they have a place within a
consistent and systematic rule-governed framework dominated by the ‘permanent, irresistible, and
universal’ principles of the imagination, and in particular by the fundamental belief in inductive uniformity
and the rules by which to judge of causes and effects which systematize its implications. Hume can, of
course, give no independent justification for this fundamental belief itself” (207). I show above, however,
that our belief in the principle of uniformity, is in fact, justified, however implicitly.
15
Elementary beliefs. According to Hume, our ability to think in terms of inductive
inferences is a conditioned psychological reflex that is justified by the regularity of our
experience—i.e. in the regularity that naturally obtains of the elementary beliefs that
comprise what Hume refers to as the first system of reality. If Hume did not think that
elementary beliefs were more worthy, i.e. were more justified, than say, certain imagined
ideas, then why would he classify them as real? Why have a system of “reality” at all if
no beliefs are more “real” (i.e. admit of a positive epistemic evaluation) than others (c.f.
Loeb (2002))?
Moreover, the first system of reality is pre-theoretical, and so, is not, in any
respect, justified by the theory, let alone by the alleged “irrationality” of the theory.
Rather, it makes the theory and all its principles (including the principle of uniformity)
possible; it justifies the theory, but in a decisively naturalistic manner. Thus, this
regularity should not be understood as irrational, but rather, as “pre-rational.”
§5 The Inductive Reflex
To see that this is the case, we need to first delve a bit more into the architecture of the
Humean inductive inference, i.e. “mediate judgments of fact.” Hume tells us in the
Treatise that:
‘Tis therefore by EXPERIENCE only, that we can infer the existence of one object from
another. The nature of experience is this. We remember to have had frequent instances of
the existence of one species of objects; and also remember, that the individuals of another
species of objects have always attended them, and have existed in regular order of
contiguity and succession with regard to them. (T 1.3.6.2; SBN 87; emphasis added)
We become conditioned to experiencing (i.e. sensing, regardless if it is seeing, hearing,
smelling, touching or tasting (or any combination thereof)) two “species” of
16
impressions18 occurring in a successive, contiguous fashion. Concomitantly, as explained
in §3 of this paper, in virtue of these impressions being impressions, they are particularly
“vivacious.” As a result, by definition, we believe in them. Specifically, we believe in
their “existence;” they are “real,” as defined by the first system of reality explained
above. So, after becoming conditioned to believe that such impressions always occur
together in a successive, contiguous manner, when we think of the existence of one
(thanks to a present impression) we are naturally led to “infer the existence” (T 1.3.6.2;
SBN 87; emphasis added) of the idea that corresponds to the impression that the first
impression has been constantly conjoined with. And so, “without farther ceremony, we
call the one cause and the other effect.” (T 1.3.6.2; SBN 87; emphasis added). As a result,
according to Hume, to reflexively associate perceptions in a causal manner is to make an
existence-inference.
In a bit more detail, this conditioned ability to make an existence-inference works
as follows. After revisiting and dismissing the possibility of “powers” and “efficacy” in
1.3.14, Hume introduces the relation of resemblance, announcing, “there is then, nothing
new either discover’d or produc’d in any objects by their constant conjunction, and by the
uninterrupted resemblance of their relations of succession and contiguity.” (T 1.3.14.19;
SBN 164) He immediately continues: “But ‘tis from this resemblance, that the idea of
necessity, of power, and of efficacy are deriv’d” (emphasis added). Here, Hume is
reminding us that the constant conjunction of impressions does not divulge the idea of
necessity, a point that he dwells on in 1.3.6. Instead, Hume explains in 1.3.14, multiple
18
Granted, Hume uses the word ‘object’ in the passage cited above, not impression. However, given the
context of 1.3.6, where he makes this claim, we may conclude that by object, he means impression.
However, the existence of a present impression brings to mind an idea, not another impression. See above
for more detail.
17
instances of resembling conjunctions of impressions compel us, i.e. “determine” (T
1.3.14.20; SBN 164-5) us, upon experiencing an impression p, to automatically think an
idea q’.19 And it is this conditioned, seemingly-unwilling reflex to think the idea q’
whenever we have an impression of p, that constitutes our idea of necessity, or
equivalently, any idea that we might have of an object’s “power” and/or “efficacy.”
However, the imagination also has a role to play.
This determination is the only effect of resemblance; and therefore must be the same with
the power or efficacy, whose idea is deriv’d from the resemblance. The several instances
of resembling conjunctions lead us into the notion of power and necessity. These
instances are in themselves totally distinct from each other, and have not union but in the
mind, which observes them, and collects their ideas. Necessity then, is the effect of this
observation, and is nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a determination to
carry our thoughts from one to another.( T 1.3.14.20; SBN 164-5; emphases added)
Although Hume does not explicitly use the word ‘imagination’ here, we know, given his
remarks in 1.3.6, that he must have the imagination in mind when he refers to a “union in
the mind.” For in 1.3.6, he claims that necessity is a function of being “unit[ed] … in the
imagination” (T 1.3.6.12; SBN 92) and: “Had ideas no more union in the fancy [i.e. the
imagination] than objects seem to have in the understanding, we cou’d never draw any
inference from causes to effects, nor repose belief in any matter of fact.” (T 1.3.6.12;
SBN 92) In fact, he immediately continues, “The inference, therefore, depends solely on
the union of ideas.” So in short, we know that the imagination is responsible for the
“union” noted in the passage from 1.3.14 cited above.
19
Throughout this paper, a plain variable will represent an impression, while a variable with one quotation
mark will represent an idea of an impression. For instance, p refers to an impression while p’ refers to the
idea of the impression p. Moreover, it must be repeated that this process prompts us to think an idea q’, not
an impression q, simply because we do not “presently” experience the impression q. Rather, the impression
p brings the memory (and so, the idea) q’ to mind. If the reader is in doubt, simply recall the title of 1.3.6,
“Of the inference from the impression to the idea” (emphasis added)).
18
However, in 1.3.14, Hume clarifies that what is being “union[ized]” by the
imagination is not a particular instance of the impressions of p and q, but instead, all
instances of p1-n and q1-n in virtue of each pair’s resemblance to each other. For instance,
assume that on one instance, e.g. time T1, I jump in the water (e.g. impression p) and get
wet (e.g. impression q) and on another instance, e.g. time T2, I jump in the water and get
wet, and so on for times T3-Tn. In virtue of being able to naturally “intuit” (T 1.3.1.2;
SBN 70, T 1.3.14.28; SBN 168-9) the resemblance that holds between the pairs of events
that occur on T1-Tn, I, thanks to my imagination, “unify” all pairs of p1-n and q1-n with each
other such that when presented with p, I am reflexively determined to think q’ where I
imagine q’ based on its resemblance to q1-n20 As a result, and as indicated above, this
determination, which is a function of i.) Constant conjunction ii.) Our ability to intuit
resemblance between pairs of events and iii.) The imagination, constitutes the reflex to
think p whenever q (where p resembles p1-n and q resembles q1-n). Or, in Hume’s words:
“The necessary connexion betwixt causes and effects is the foundation of our inference
from one to the other. The foundation of our inference is the transition arising from the
accustom’d union. These are, therefore, the same.” (T 1.3.14.21; SBN 165).
Thus, via elementary transitive reasoning, Hume concludes that the “necessary
connexion” is nothing more than a “transition from the accustom’d union [in the
imagination].” (emphasis added; c.f. Craig (1987) 85 and Owen (1999) 63, n2) Necessity
is simply the conditioned reflex to think q’ whenever we have an impression of p; and
thus, the natural relation of causality is not a belief. It is not an impression nor a
particularly vivacious idea of an impression (c.f. Campbell 2006). The claim that the
20
That is, in our minds, we “unify” the pairs p 1 and q1, p2 and q2, p3 and q3 with each other etc. such that
they become simply, if p then q.
19
natural inductive reflex is not a belief (but produces beliefs) is opposed to at least (and
perhaps most famously), Kemp Smith, who refers to our ability to make a natural causal
inference as an “instinct” and as a “belief” (1941, 127; see also Chapter 16-17). However,
Kemp Smith is right to point out that this reflexive tendency is not an instance of
reasoning; we do not reflectively compare ideas, we merely react (1941, 375; see also
Owen (1999; 32). Hume is quite clear in this regard: “Thus all probable reasoning is
nothing but a species of sensation” (T 103; QTD Millican (1995) 201), “even after the
observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw
any inference concerning any object beyond those which we have had experience” (T
139, QTD Millican (1995), 201).
However, it must be pointed out that the idea q’ produced as a result of the causal
reflex is a belief (see T 93-99), comprising in fact, Hume’s second definition of belief (T
153-4).21 As noted earlier, this is the form of belief that most Hume scholars focus on,
where they tend to overlook elementary beliefs.
§6 The Role of the First Level of Reality
As we saw in §3, elementary beliefs may be properly called beliefs because of their
vivacity, and just because of their vivacity—this is what makes them “real” as opposed to
being “merely the offspring of the imagination” (T 1.3.9.4; SBN 108). In this respect, we
may not only think of them as justified, if only in the respect that they are more “real”
than merely imagined ideas, but they are self-justifying; they need nothing else to
21
“The next degree of these qualities [of force and vivacity] is that deriv’d from the relation of cause and
effect; and this too is very great, especially when the conjunction is found by experience to be perfectly
constant, and when the object, which is present to us, exactly resembles those, of which we have had
experience.” (T 1.3.13.19; SBN 153-4; emphasis added)
20
validate their status as beliefs.
Thus, if we think of making causal inferences as
“theoretical” (as Husserl did; see the Logical Investigations) then the realm of elementary
beliefs is, indeed, pre-theoretical. For, as we just saw, our natural, reflexive ability to
think in terms of causal relations presupposes elementary beliefs, but elementary beliefs
do not presuppose our ability to think in terms of causal relations. Moreover, this pretheoretical realm of elementary beliefs is naturalistic—it is a product of empirical
experience, not a mysterious condition of possibility for experience (i.e. the epoché). In
short, Hume’s first system of reality is pre-theoretical, but not pre-empirical.
§ 6.1 Constancy and Coherence; The Regularity that Naturally Obtains of our
Experience
But merely acknowledging the existence of a pre-theoretical realm in Hume’s work
would not be enough for Husserl. For, as noted earlier, Husserl is after “ultimate
principles” (LI 116) that justify and regulate empirical experience. But what if our
impressions, and so, our elementary beliefs, were completely random? If this were the
case, how could elementary beliefs intelligibly “inform” the naturalistic method? For
according to Husserl, the epoché enables us to understand certain a priori principles
which regulate the empirical world. How could impressions, which are potentially
random, be anything like principles? According to Hume, impressions, and the
elementary beliefs that correspond to them, are not anything like the principles that
govern his method. Rather, as we saw in §5 of this paper, they are presupposed by our
ability to make “mediate judgments of fact,” i.e. entertain empirical principles, and so,
could not be principles. However, impressions are not random either. Rather, they are, by
21
and large, constant and coherent. This means that we all seem to experience roughly the
same repetitive patterns of impressions.
Hume discusses the constancy and coherence of our impressions in the
notoriously difficult 1.4.2—in the course of explaining the nature of an “object.” This
shouldn’t be terribly surprising. After all, explaining why we come to believe in an
object’s existence is very much related to explaining how and why we think things are
real. In particular, he explicitly tells us that a certain regularity obtains of most of our
impressions, i.e. most impressions are constant and coherent:
These mountains, and houses, and trees, which lie at present under my eye, have always
appear’d to me in the same order; and when I lose sight of them by shutting my eyes or
turning my head, I soon after find them return upon me without the least alteration. My
bed and table, my books and papers, present themselves in the same uniform manner, and
change not upon account of any interruption in my seeing or perceiving them (T 1.4.2.18;
SBN 194).
Bodies often change their position and qualities, and after a little absence or interruption
may become hardly knowable. But here ‘tis observable, that even in these changes they
preserve a coherence…the opinion of the continu’d existence of body depends on the
COHERENCE and CONSTANCY of certain impressions (T 1.4.2.20; SBN 195;
emphases added).
And, Hume indicates in 1.4.2, this regularity, this constancy and coherence, does not
obtain of just Hume’s experience, but of all normally functioning human beings. We all
seem to experience the same repetitive patterns of impressions; e.g. the “mountains,
houses and trees” that Hume sees out his window constantly appear to him in the “same
order,” in the “same uniform manner.” He repeats this claim a few pages later in 1.4.2:
“We have been accustom’d to observing a constancy in certain impressions, and have
found, that the perception of the sun or ocean, for instance, returns upon us after an
22
absence or annihilation with parts and in a like order.” (T 1.4.2.24; SBN 199; emphasis
added)
We all experience similar patterns (“orders”) of elementary beliefs, and thus, tend
to reflexively think in terms of similar causal relations—the constancy and coherence of
our impressions makes this so. In this very fundamental respect, we do not impose
regularity upon experience. Rather, our experience regulates us; particularly, the causal
relations that we are conditioned to think in terms of (c.f. Stroud (1977))22. And precisely
this constancy and coherence grounds, i.e. justifies all our causal inferences, and so,
concomitantly, all the a posteriori principles that Hume employs in his “science of man.”
In short, Humean empirical theory is justified by the regularity of our experience, by the
first level of “reality” and nothing more. This conclusion is opposed to at least Kemp
Smith (1941) and Mounce (1999).23
§7 Natural v Philosophical Causal Relations Revisited: Pre-Rational Regularity v.
Rational Principles
But we have yet to account for a lurking difficulty. As I mentioned earlier, the reflexive
ability to think in terms of causes and effects is not a belief, it is a reflex. Yet Hume
certainly does suggest that we believe in certain causal relations. In particular, we all
seem to believe in the principle of uniformity, which is the “mediate judgment of fact”
22
Stroud writes: “[No] objective connection between perceptions or objects [is] required in order for me to
come to think of things as causally connected with each other. As long as my experience exhibits certain
regularities I will come to have that ‘ficticious’ idea (140; emphasis added)
23 Mounce, qua Kemp Smith writes: “The naturalism which appears in the profounder aspects of Hume’s
work is the same as the Scottish naturalists … It holds that the source of our knowledge lies not in our
experience or reasoning but in our relations to the world which for the most part pass beyond our
knowledge. Thus in all our experience or reasoning we presuppose our belief in causality or in an
independent world.” (8)
23
that grounds all probable reasoning, but is not justified by probable or demonstrative
reasoning.
In particular, in virtue of believing in this “principle” (T 89)) and other causal
relations, we come to certain reflective conclusions; we “reason…from causes or effects”
(T 94; emphasis added). Thus, it certainly seems that when it comes to making causal
inferences, we do infer, i.e. we do reason, rather than just reflexively react (c.f. Millican
(1995, 207) and Garrett (1997; 92)). In fact, Hume writes: “we infer a cause immediately
from its effect; and this inference is not only a true species of reasoning, but the strongest
of all others” (T 97n; emphases added; QTD Millican (1995), 202). Moreover, “One who
concludes somebody to be near him, when he hears an articulate voice in the dark,
reasons justly and naturally; tho’ that conclusion be deriv’d from nothing but custom (T
255; emphases added; QTD Millican (1995), 202).
Does this mean that Hume is contradicting himself? For on the one hand, he
claims that causal relations are just conditioned reflexes, which do not entail reasoning,
where on the other hand, he clearly claims that we do engage in causal reasoning, where
this reasoning turns on our belief in the principle of uniformity. No. As already
mentioned, in §2 of this paper, Hume employs two senses of causality: the natural
relation of causality, and the philosophical relation of causality. The former is a
conditioned reflex, which is not believed in (although it produces belief) and the latter, is
a belief, where it may be believed in as a result of comparing the idea of the cause with
the idea of the effect.
Consider the following example: One may become conditioned to think that weed
killer causes weeds to die. And so, every time she sees weed killer poured on weeds, the
24
enlivened idea of weeds dying reflexively comes to mind; she believes that the weeds will
die. This is a causally-produced belief. However, as a result of her conditioning, she may
also believe the philosophical causal relation that “every time weed killer is poured on
weeds, weeds will die.” In this respect, a causal relation is, in effect, a “principle;” it is a
causal relation that we believe to obtain between two ideas, i.e. the idea of “weed killer”
and “weeds dying.” However, what one believes (i.e. the reflexively produced idea or the
causal principle) merely depends on how one looks at it: “There may two definitions be
given of [causation] … which are only different, by their presenting a different view of
the same object, and making us consider it either as a philosophical or as a natural
relation; either as a comparison of two ideas, or as an association betwixt them.” (T 170)
This distinction plays itself out in Hume’s rather notorious, and frequently discussed
“two definitions of cause” which we need not explicate in detail here (see Garrett (1997)
for an overview of this controversy). Rather, we need only realize that a philosophical
relation of causality may be believed in as a result of reflectively comparing the cause
and the effect; a reflection that constitutes what Hume refers to as “causal reason.”
With this in mind, consider the principle of uniformity, i.e. if something happened
in a certain way in the past, then it is likely to happen that way in the future. This
principle is merely the philosophical way of looking at how the regularity of experience
has naturally conditioned us. Thanks to the constancy and coherence of our impressions,
and concomitantly, our elementary beliefs, we, upon repeatedly experiencing p being
associated with q, tend to reflexively think that p will be associated with q in the future.
That is, upon being presented with p, we naturally think q.’ And thus, this “principle” is
not justified by reasoning (probable or demonstrative), but rather, by the regularity of our
25
elementary beliefs; it is imbued by the first system of reality. However, we may, from a
philosophical perspective, believe in it. This is precisely what Hume means when he
writes: “Experience is a principle, which instructs me in the several conjunctions of
objects from the past. Habit is another principle, which determines me to expect the same
for the future” (T 265; emphasis added)
It is precisely in this respect that elementary beliefs and the regularity that obtains
of them may be understood as pre-rational rather than as irrational; “without this quality,
by which the mind enlivens some ideas beyond others (which seemingly is so trivial and
so little founded on reason) we could never assent to any argument, nor carry our view
beyond those few objects, which are present to our senses” (T 1.4.7.3; SBN 265) The
regularity of our experience is a condition of possibility for our reflexive tendency to
expect the future to be similar to the past, and so, concomitantly, our ability to look at this
tendency from a philosophical point of view, and so believe in it at as a relationship that
holds between two ideas. In turn, we employ this principle of uniformity in our probable
reasoning.24
§8 Conclusion
Husserl was simply wrong to claim that the correctness of Hume’s theory presupposed
the irrationally of its premises and vice versa. Causal inferences (including the principle
of uniformity) are not “irrational,” because they are indeed justified (contra at least
Strawson (1952), Garrett (1997) and Owen (1999)), but not by reason. Rather, they are
24
Precisely how the regularity of experience affects our ability to demonstratively reason is not a topic that
I will tackle here. Space does not permit.
26
justified, i.e. they are “instructed,” by the regularity that naturally obtains of elementary
beliefs, i.e. the regularity inherent in Hume’s first level of reality.
In virtue of establishing as much, we have, I think, exposed the general
relationship between Hume’s skepticism and his naturalism; a relationship that has been
much discussed in the literature (e.g. Passmore (1952), Flew (1986), Millican (1995),
Falkenstein (1997), Garrett (1997), Owen (1999) and De Pierris (2002)). Hume was,
indeed, a skeptic in the respect that reason does not justify causal inferences, which
meant that none of the principles of his own theory could be justified by reason—even a
qualified reason of the sort that Millican (1995) introduces. However, as we saw above,
such principles are a reflection of the regularity of our empirical experiences, and so,
despite his skepticism regarding the justificatory role that reason plays in his system, he
can continue his work with some degree of confidence. Hume, must, despite any
intermittent inclinations he has otherwise, be satisfied with (feel justified by) the natural
regularity that obtains of his experience, of his elementary beliefs, rather than by
certainty: “If I must be a fool, as all those who reason or believe any thing certainly are,
my follies shall at least be natural and agreeable … [I] will no more be led a wandering
into such dreary solitudes, and rough passages as I have hitherto met with” (T 1.4.7.10;
SBN 270). As soon as Hume realizes this, and embraces the fact that regularity is enough,
the intense grip of his skepticism subsides: “Where reason is lively and mixes itself with
some propensity [and thus, reflects the regularity of experience], it ought to be asserted
to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate upon us.” (T 1.4.7.11; SBN
270).
27
Yet how this general relationship between Hume’s skepticism and his naturalism
plays itself out in regard to the rest of his work, particularly in regard to probability,
scientific claims, demonstrative reason and the nature of objects, must be left for another
project, too large to take on here. However, by calling our attention to fundamental role
that elementary beliefs play in Hume’s work in the Treatise, I hope that I have provided
the proper basis upon which this larger project may rest.
28
References
Ayer, A.J. (1980) Hume, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Beauchamp, T. L., and A. R. (1981) Hume and the Problem of Causation, Oxford
University Press, New York.
Bennett, J. (1971) Locke, Berkeley and Hume: Central Themes, Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Butler, R. J. (1960) “Natural Belief And The Enigma Of Hume.“ Archiv Für Geschichte
Der Philosophie 40:71-100.
Campbell, T. (2006) “Human Philosophy: Hume on Natural Instincts and BeliefFormation”, in Di Nucci, E. & McHugh, C. (eds.), Content, Consciousness, and
Perception: Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge Scholars Press,
London.
Craig, E. (1987) The Mind of God and the Works of Man, Clarendon Press: Oxford.
DePierris, G. (2002) “Causation as a Philosophical Relation in Hume”, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 64: 499-545
Dicker, G. (1998) Hume's Epistemology & Metaphysics, Routledge, New York.
Gaskin, J.C.A. (1974) “God Hume And Natural Belief.” Philosophy 49: 281-294.
Falkenstein, L. "Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism in Hume's Account of Belief,"
Hume Studies 23 (1997): 29-72.
Flew, A. (1961) Hume's Philosophy of Belief, Routledge: London.
Garrett, D. (1997) Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy, Clarendon Press,
Oxford.
Hume, D. (2002) A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. D.F and M.J. Norton, Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Hume, D. (1978) A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed., ed. Selby-Bigge, Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Howson, C. (2000) Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief, Clarendon
Press, Oxford.
Husserl, E. (1970) Logical Investigations. Trans. J.N. Findlay, Humanities Press, New
York.
29
Husserl, E. (1965) Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy: Philosophy as Rigorous
Science and Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man. Trans. With notes and an
introduction by Quentin Lauer. Harper and Row, New York.
Jenkins, J.J. (1992) Understanding Hume, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.
Kemp Smith, N. (1905) “The Naturalism of Hume” (I). Mind. 14 (54): 149-173.
Kemp Smith, N. (1905) “The Naturalism of Hume” (II). Mind.14 (55): 335-347.
Loeb, L. E. (2001) “Integrating Hume's Accounts of Belief and Justification,” Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 63, 279-303.
Loeb, L. E. (2002) Stability and Justification in Hume’s Treatise, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Meeker, K. (1998) “Hume: Radical Skeptic or Naturalized Epistemologist?”, Hume
Studies 24, 31-52.
Millican, P. (1998) “Hume on Reason and Induction: Epistemology or Cognitive
Science?”, Hume Studies 24, pp. 141-159.
Millican, P. (1995) “Hume's Argument Concerning Induction: Structure and
Interpretation”, in David W. D. Owen (ed) Hume: General Philosophy (2000),
Routledge, vol. 2 pp. 165-218.
McCormick, M. (1993) “Hume On Natural Belief And Original Principles,” Hume
Studies 19:103-116.
Mounce, H.O. (1999) Hume’s Naturalism, Routledge, New York.
Norton, D.F, ed. (1993) Cambridge Companion to Hume, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Norton, D.F (1982) David Hume: Common Sense Moralist, Skeptical Meta-physician,
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Owen, D. (1999) Hume's Reason, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Pears, D. (1990) Hume’s System, Oxford University Press, New York.
Price, H. H. (1969) Belief, George Allen & Unwin, London.
Richman, K. A. (1995) “Empiricism, Natural Belief and The New Hume,” History of
Philosophy Quarterly 12 (4): 425-439.
30
Rocknak, S. (2001) “Husserl’s Phenomenologization of Hume: Reflections on Husserl’s
Method of Epoche,” Philosophy Today, SPEP Supplement, 45, 28-36.
Schliesser, E. (2007) “Two Definitions of ‘Cause,’ Newton and the Significance of the
Humean Distinction Between Natural and Philosophical Relations,” The Journal of
Scottish Philosophy, 5 #1, 83-101.
Smith, N.K. (1941) The Philosophy of David Hume; A Critical Study of its Origins and
Central Doctrines, Macmillan, New York (Rpt. 1964).
Strawson, P.F. (1952) Introduction to Logical Theory, Methuen and Company, London.
Stroud, B.(1977) Hume, Routledge, London and New York.
Stroud, B. (1991) “Hume's Scepticism: Natural Instincts and Philosophical Reflection,”
Philosophical Topics 19, pp. 271-91. Reprinted in Margaret Atherton (ed.), The
Empiricists: Critical Essays on Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, Rowman & Littlefield,
Lanham, Maryland, 1999, pp. 229-252.
Winters, B. (1979) “Hume on Reason”. Hume Studies 5, 20-35.
Wright, J.P. (1983) The Skeptical Realism of David Hume, University of Minnesota
Press, Minnesota.
31