Epistemology definitions taken from : http://plato.stanford.edu
Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of
knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and
sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits?
As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to
understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or
external to one's own mind? Understood more broadly, epistemology is about issues having to do with
the creation and dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry.
Rationalism vs. Empiricism
The dispute between rationalism and empiricism concerns the extent to which we are dependent upon
sense experience in our effort to gain knowledge. Rationalists claim that there are significant ways in
which our concepts and knowledge are gained independently of sense experience. Empiricists claim that
sense experience is the ultimate source of all our concepts and knowledge.
Rationalists generally develop their view in two ways. First, they argue that there are cases where the
content of our concepts or knowledge outstrips the information that sense experience can provide.
Second, they constuct accounts of how reason in some form or other provides that additional
information about the world. Empiricists present complementary lines of thought. First, they develop
accounts of how experience provides the information that rationalists cite, insofar as we have it in the
first place. (Empiricists will at times opt for skepticism as an alternative to rationalism: if experience
cannot provide the concepts or knowledge the rationalists cite, then we don't have them.) Second,
empiricists attack the rationalists' accounts of how reason is a source of concepts or knowledge.
Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification
Foundationalism is a view about the structure of justification or knowledge. The foundationalist's thesis
in short is that all knowledge and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of noninferential
knowledge or justified belief.
knowledge {Gk. gnwsiV [gnôsis]; Lat. cognitio; Ger. Wissen}
Justified true belief. Since Plato, nearly all Western philosophers have accepted this deceptively simple
statement of the three necessary (and jointly sufficient) conditions for knowledge. That is, I know a
proposition if and only if:
a.
b.
c.
I sincerely affirm the proposition,
the proposition is true, and
my affirmation is genuinely based upon its truth.
The correct analysis of each element of the definition, however, is open to question. Philosophers have
held different views about the nature of belief and have proposed many different theories of truth.
Much of Western epistemology has focussed on the third element: precisely what constitutes adequate
justification for knowledge? Rationalists and empiricists disagree about the sources which might provide
relevant evidence, fallibilists raise practical doubts about our certainty in achieving the second
condition, skeptics suppose that the third condition is never met, and contemporary philosophers since
Gettier have questioned whether even the satisfaction of all these elements is genuinely sufficient for
knowledge.
Knowledge by Acquaintance vs. Description
The terminology is most clearly associated with Bertrand Russell, but the distinction between
knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description is arguably a critical component of many
classical versions of foundationalism. Indeed, to describe something as known by acquaintance may just
be another way of asserting that the object of acquaintance is given.
Foundationalism
According to foundationalism, our justified beliefs are structured like a building: they are divided into a
foundation and a superstructure, the latter resting upon the former. Beliefs belonging to the foundation
are basic. Beliefs belonging to the superstructure are nonbasic and receive justification from the justified
beliefs in the foundation.[33]
For a foundationalist account of justification to be plausible, it must solve two problems. First, by virtue
of exactly what are basic beliefs justified? Second, how do basic beliefs justify nonbasic beliefs? Before
we address these questions, let us first consider the question of what it is that makes a justified belief
basic in the first place. Once we have done that, we can then move on to discuss by virtue of what a
basic belief might be justified, and how such a belief might justify a nonbasic belief.
propositional knowledge
For the most part, epistemic logic focuses on propositional knowledge. Here, an agent or a group of
agents bears the propositional attitude knowing towards some proposition. So, when one says: "Zoë
knows that there is a chicken in the yard", one asserts that Zoë is the agent who bears the propositional
attitude knowing towards the proposition expressed by "there is a chicken in the yard". Beyond
straightforward propositional knowledge of this kind, epistemic logic also suggests ways to systematize
the logic of questions and answers (Zoë knows why Murphy barked) and provides insight into the
relationships between multiple modes of identification (Zoë knows that this man is the chief) and also
perhaps even into questions of procedural "know-how". Epistemic logicians have found ways to
formally treat a wide variety of knowledge claims in propositional terms.
Skepticism
Much of epistemology has arisen either in defense of or in opposition to various forms of skepticism.
Indeed, one could classify various theories of knowledge by their responses to skepticism. For example,
rationalists could be viewed as skeptical about the possibility of empirical knowledge while not being
skeptical with regard to a priori knowledge and empiricists could be seen as skeptical about the
possibility of a priori knowledge but not so with regard to empirical knowledge. In addition, many
traditional problems, for example the problem of other minds or the problem of our knowledge of God's
existence, can be seen as restricted forms of skepticism which hold that we cannot have knowledge of
any propositions in some particular domain thought to be within our ken.
Inductive Logic
An inductive logic is a system of reasoning that extends deductive logic to less-than-certain inferences.
In a valid deductive argument the premises logically entail the conclusion, where such entailment means
that the truth of the premises provides a guarantee of the truth of the conclusion. Similarly, in a good
inductive argument the premises should provide some degree of support for the conclusion, where such
support means that the truth of the premises indicates with some degree of strength that the conclusion is
true.
Linguistics
Innateness and Language
The philosophical debate over innate ideas and their role in the acquisition of knowledge has a venerable
history. It is thus surprising that very little attention was paid until early last century to the questions of
how linguistic knowledge is acquired and what role, if any, innate ideas might play in that process.
To be sure, many theorists have recognized the crucial part played by language in our lives, and have
speculated about the (syntactic and/or semantic) properties of language that enable it to play that role.
However, few had much to say about the properties of us in virtue of which we can learn and use a
natural language. To the extent that philosophers before the 20th century dealt with language acquisition
at all, they tended to see it as a product of our general ability to reason — an ability that makes us
special, and that sets us apart from other animals, but that is not tailored for language learning in
particular.
Causality and Motion
The term ‘motion’, in Aristotelian philosophy, can stand for a wide range of changes of state, and not
simply changes of place (the latter is usually known as local motion). Aristotle's Physics is basically an
exhaustive study of motion in this very wide sense.
Motions are, in Aristotle's physics, classified into natural and violent. A paradigmatic example of
natural (local) motion is the motion of a freely falling body, whereas an example of violent (local)
motion would be the motion of a thrown body. If we throw a body, then it is relatively unproblematic to
account for the motion when it is in contact with our hand: what is difficult is to account for its
continued motion thereafter. Aristotle's theory accounts for it by saying that, when it is moving, a
temporary vacuum is caused behind it, and, in order to fill in this vacuum, air rushes around from the
front, thus leaving a void in front of the projectile which is filled by the continued motion of the
projectile. This explanation was vulnerable to a large number of objections — for example, it is clearly
easier to throw a moderately heavy object, such as a stone, than a light object, such as a bean, whereas
light objects ought to be more susceptible than others to motions of the air. And Aristotle's theory, when
confronted with the example of two stones thrown in opposite directions so as to pass near to one
another, cannot consistently say how the air is supposed to move in the neighbourhood of their close
encounter.
http://www.philosophypages.com/ as source for the following:
deconstruction
Interpretive method that denies the priority or privilege of any single reading of a text (even if guided by
the intentions of its author) and tries to show that the text is incoherent because its own key terms can be
understood only in relation to their suppressed opposites. Deconstructionists like Derrida seek to
uncover the internal conflicts that tend to undermine (or at least to "decenter") the putative significance
of any text. In ordinary language, for example, someone who says, "If I may be perfectly candid for a
moment, . . ." thereby betrays a reluctance—at least in the past and, probably, even in the present case—
to do so, and this difference points toward a systematic ambiguity in the very notions of honesty and
truth.
a priori / a posteriori
Distinction among judgments, propositions, concepts, ideas, arguments, or kinds of knowledge. In each
case, the a priori is taken to be independent of sensory experience, which the a posteriori presupposes.
An a priori argument, then, is taken to reason deductively from abstract general premises, while an a
posteriori argument relies upon specific information derived from sense perception. The necessary truth
of an a priori proposition can be determined by reason alone, but the contingent truth of an a posteriori
proposition can be discovered only by reference to some matter of fact. Thus, for example:
"3 + 4 = 7." may be known a priori.
"Chicago is located on the shore of Lake Michigan." is known only a posteriori.
Rationalists typically emphasize the importance of a priori ideas and arguments in establishing genuine
knowledge on a firm foundation. Kant argued that synthetic a priori judgments are preconditions for any
experience and thus provide a basis for mathematical and scientific knowledge. Empiricists, on the other
hand, usually hold that all a priori propositions are merely analytic, so that we must rely on a posteriori
propositions for significant information about the world. Kripke challenges even the identification of
this distinction with that between the necessary and the contingent
deduction / induction
Distinction in logic between types of reasoning, arguments, or inferences. In a deductive argument, the
truth of the premises is supposed to guarantee the truth of the conclusion; in an inductive argument, the
truth of the premises merely makes it probable that the conclusion is true.
representationalism
Theory of perception according to which we are aware of objects only through the mediation of the
ideas that represent them. Descartes and Locke were both representationalists. Although it handily
accounts for perceptual illusion and memory, such a theory often leads (as in Hume) to skepticism about
the existence of external objects.
solipsism
Belief that only I myself and my own experiences are real, while anything else—a physical object or
another person—is nothing more than an object of my consciousness. As a philosophical position,
solipsism is usually the unintended consequence of an over-emphasis on the reliability of internal mental
states, which provide no evidence for the existence of external referents.
phenomenalism
Belief that the immediate objects of sensation provide no evidence for the existence of anything beyond
themselves. Taken together with basic principles of empiricism, this entails that what we usually
describe as physical objects have no reality apart from our individual, private perceptual experiences of
them. Although an anticipation of this view may occur in the work of Berkeley, Mill and most of the
logical positivists explicitly defended some form of phenomenalism.
instrumentalism
Belief that statements or theories may be used as tools for useful prediction without reference to their
possible truth or falsity. Peirce and other pragmatists defended an instrumentalist account of modern
science.
cause / effect {Ger. Ursache / Wirkung}}
Distinction between the events involved in a causal relationship, where the occurrence of one (the cause)
is supposed to bring about or produce an occurrence of the other (the effect). Although the correct analysis
of causation is a matter of great dispute, Hume offered a significant criticism of our inclination to infer a
necessary connection from mere regularity, and Mill proposed a set of methods for recognizing the
presence of causal relationships. Contemporary philosophers often suppose that a causal relationship is
best expressed in the counterfactual statement that if the cause had not occured, then the effect would not
have occured either.
deontology
Study of moral necessity, duty, or obligation.
A deontological normative theory holds that moral worth is an intrinsic feature of human actions,
determined by formal rules of conduct. Thus, deontologists like Kant suppose that moral obligation rests
solely upon duty, without requiring any reference to the practical consequences that dutiful actions may
happen have.
empiricism
Reliance on experience as the source of ideas and knowledge. More specifically, empiricism is the
epistemological theory that genuine information about the world must be acquired by a posteriori means,
so that nothing can be thought without first being sensed. Prominent modern empiricists include Bacon,
Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Mill. In the twentieth century, empiricism principles were extended and
applied by the pragmatists and the logical positivists.
Aristotle's Greek term for the complete reality or perfection of a thing, as the soul is of the human body.
For Leibniz, then, an "entelechy" is the active force resident in every monad.
imagination {Gk. eikasia [eikásia]}
The capacity to consider sensible objects without actually perceiving them or supposing that they really
exist. Philosophers have disagreed over whether or not acts of imagination necessarily involve mental
images or ideas.
justice {Gk. dikh [díkê]; Lat. iustitia}
Equitable distribution of goods and evils, including reward and punishment. After surveying alternative
notions of the virtue of justice {Gk. [dikaiôsunê]}, Plato defined it as the harmonious function of diverse
elements of society or of the distinct souls within an individual person. Most social philosophers of the
Western tradition, however, have followed Aristotle's conceptions of retributive and distributive justice.
Contemporary discussions often focus on Rawls's notion of "justice as fairness."
memory
The capacity to recall past experience or information in the present. The reliability of memory as a source
of knowledge and the extent of its contribution to personal identity are matters of philosophical dispute.
naturalism
Belief that all objects, events, and and values can be wholly explained in terms of factual and/or causal
claims about the world, without reference to supernatural powers or authority. Prominent naturalists
include Clifford and Dewey. Quine proposed a naturalistic epistemology, understood as empirical study of
the origins and uses of sensory information.
natural law theory
Belief that the principles of human conduct can be derived from a proper understanding of human nature
in the context of the universe as a rational whole. Although voluntarists suppose that god could will
anything at all, Aquinas held that even the divine will is conditioned by reason. Thus, the natural law
provides a non-revelatory basis for all human social conduct. Modern appeals to natural law are the
foundation for social thought in Grotius and Pufendorf.
opinion {Gk. doxa [dóxa]; Lat. sententia}
Acceptance of a proposition despite a lack of the conclusive evidence that would result in certain
knowledge of its truth.
pragmatism
An indigenous American philosophical theory that explains both meaning and truth in terms of the
application of ideas or beliefs to the performance of actions that have observable practical outcomes.
Prominent pragmatists in the tradition include Peirce, James, Mead, Addams, and Dewey. More recently,
such analytic philosophers as Quine, Putnam, and Rorty have expressed sympathy with various portions of
the pragmatic program.
relativism
Belief that human judgments are always conditioned by the specific social environment of a particular
person, time, or place. Cognitive relativists hold that there can be no universal knowledge of the world,
but only diverse interpretations of it. Moral relativists hold that there are no universal standards of moral
value, but only the cultural norms of particular societies.
sensation {Gk. aisqhsiV [aisthêsis]}
Conscious experience or feeling that apparently conveys awareness of the external world. Empiricists
commonly suppose that sensations are the basis for our a posteriori knowledge of the world.
solipsism
Belief that only I myself and my own experiences are real, while anything else—a physical object or
another person—is nothing more than an object of my consciousness. As a philosophical position,
solipsism is usually the unintended consequence of an over-emphasis on the reliability of internal mental
states, which provide no evidence for the existence of external referents.
sophists
Presocratic philosophers who offered to teach young Athenians how to use logic and rhetoric to defeat
opponents in any controversy. Socrates and Plato sharply criticized most of the sophists because they
accepted monetary rewards for encouraging unprincipled persuasive methods.
idealism
Belief that only mental entities are real, so that physical things exist only in the sense that they are
perceived. Berkeley defended his "immaterialism" on purely empiricist grounds, while Kant and Fichte
arrived at theirs by transcendental arguments. German, English, and (to a lesser degree) American
philosophy during the nineteenth century was dominated by the monistic absolute idealism of Hegel,
Bradley, and Royce.
sufficient condition
What logically or causally secures the occurrence of something else; see necessary / sufficient. Thus,
Leibniz supposed that there must always be a sufficient reason for the way things are.
truth {Gk. alhqeia [alêtheia]; Lat. veritas; Ger. Wahrheit}
The conformity of a proposition to the way things are. Precise analysis of the nature of truth is the subject
of the correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, redundancy, and semantic theories of truth.
virtue {Gk. areth [aretê]; Lat. virtus}
Excellence, skill, or art. In classical thought, virtues are admirable human characteristics or dispositions
that distinguish good people from bad. Socrates sought a singular virtue for human life, while Plato
identified four central virtues present in the ideal state or person. Aristotle held that every moral virtue is
the mean between vicious extremes.
Modern deontologists and utilitarians tend to suppose that individual virtues are morally worthwhile only
when they encourage the performance of duty or contribute to the general welfare.
wisdom {Gk. sofia [sophía]; Lat. sapientia}
Good judgment with respect to abstract truth or theoretical matters (in contrast to prudence in concrete,
practical affairs). For Plato, wisdom is the virtue appropriate to the rational soul, and for Aristotle, it is the
highest intellectual virtue.