Media and Globalisation
Dumisani Moyo
Globalisation, Culture and Politics
One of the major claims, notably by hyperglobalists, is that globalisation
erodes the power of the state; that it has increasingly become difficult to
exercise authority over territorial space. The coming of digital technologies and
communications that transcend geographical boundaries – expansion of the
world wide web – have been interpreted as a direct assault on state sovereignty.
The global media, especially television and the Internet, are said to possess
great potential:
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to spread democratic values and opportunities,
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to empower and encourage participation even by marginalised groups
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to subvert and challenge government power in the case of restrictive
regimes (i.e. they can circumvent state control of information flows)
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to reduce the power of the nation states through increased trans-border
information flows
The Internet, in particular, can spread information more rapidly during times of
crisis.
All this great potential of the global mass media has justified state regulation of
the media.
A good example to use in analysing the power of the global media is
Tiananmen Square demonstrations in China, 1989.
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Through CNN, the suppression of pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen
Square was broadcast into the living rooms across the world.
The Tiananmen Square events heralded a major challenge to state control over
flows of information within its territorial space (increasingly, governments are
finding it difficult to regulate or control media flows because of rapid
technological changes.
Chinese students managed to effectively use Western media to advance their
cause (in similar fashion to the way Somalis hijacked global news agencies to
tell their own story) – using banners bearing American symbols and written in
English for the benefit of the wider global television audience. The goal was to
influence global public opinion.
New information and communication technologies have been seen as
‘technologies of freedom’ (Ithiel de Sola Pool, 1983).
Such events have brought up questions such as:
Is the state still relevant as an analytical category
The state as a problematic and elusive concept in the social sciences
World society still composed politically of nation-states (e.g. United Nations)
But this Chinese case also shows limitations on the part of the global media
conglomerates, as exemplified by the Murdoch case.
It is important to note that almost invariably, where profit interests clash with
public interest values, the former always carries the day.
Murdoch’s statement in 1993 that, “Advances in technology of
telecommunications have proved an unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes
everywhere. Satellite broadcasting makes it possible for information hungry
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residents of many closed societies to by-pass state controlled television
channels,” angered Chinese authorities, who threatened to prevent Murdoch’s
News Corporation, in particular its Star Television, from entering the lucrative
Chinese market.
To placate the Chinese authorities, Murdoch removed BBC World Television
service from his Asian satellite service.
Another case where News Corporation backed down in response to Chinese
government pressure is when he is believed to have influenced the News Corp
publishing company, HarperCollins to reject an agreement to publish a
controversial book by former Hong Kong governor Chris Patten, who the
Chinese government disliked. As Governor of Hong Kong, Patten had been
highly critical of the Chinese government over its human rights record, and had
maintained the criticism in his memoirs (Audio debate from NPR).
The globalists see market reforms coupled with wider access to media
technologies as ushering in information democracy.
On the contrary, anti-globalists, critical political economists and media
imperialism theorists interpret the way corporations gain power and market
domination as undemocratic (see for example Schiller, 1996; Herman and
McChesney, 1997; Mosco, 1998).
Rise of the Internet and challenge to state power
The growth of the Internet presented a serious dilemma the Chinese
government (also Myanmar) – where on one hand developments in ecommerce are considered vital for Chinese development, yet they also pose a
threat to the traditional state control of information flows.
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The Chinese government response was to block access to certain foreign
websites, particularly news organisations such as CNN, BBC, NYT and
Washington Post – as well as human right organisations websites that are
critical of Chinese policy.
In January 2000, the Chinese government introduced new regulations that ban
ISP from running foreign news on their websites, requesting them, instead, to
use reports from official Chinese outlets.
This is not peculiar to China, as we shall later see. In Zimbabwe, ISPs are
required to register/be licensed, and the huge entry costs are prohibitive.
The communications revolution has made it possible for interest groups to
ignore constraints of geography.
As we noted from Held and McGrew, huge networks of environmental, human
rights and civil society groups that draw in local, national, and international
organisations have emerged. These groups are able to respond immediately to
international events (e.g. Seattle, Genoa, etc.), and counter state propaganda
wherever they can.
Other examples include the so-called “netwars” waged against world trade
talks, landmines, etc. These activities have led to talks about ‘global civil
society’ (See, for example Keane, Scholte, and others on global
governance/global civil society).
The state and media regulation
Governments have always intervened in all forms of economic activity, making
the claim of ‘free markets’ just an ideal (Hesmondhalgh). In the cultural
industry, they intervene in three main ways:
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through legislation: e.g. competition laws, copyright, privacy, etc.
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through regulation: e.g. to promote fair competition by preventing crossownership; public interest concerns; pluralism and diversity in the
public sphere
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by providing subsidies – e.g. in the case of research that led to the
creation of the Internet (an interesting account is by Lawrence Lessig:
The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Wired World);
growing debate on Internet Governance
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ownership (structural) and content regulation have always been issues of
critical importance to the state
Some governments have enacted statist cultural policies to protect local media
production companies and fend off Hollywood dominance:
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Mexico and Brazil, whose protectionist policies have led to strong local
media industries
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Islamic governments have attempted in varying ways to halt global
media flows (e.g. Iran banned satellite dishes in 1994)
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Germany has attempted to curb internet traffic in porn and Nazi material
by targeting ISPs
Deregulation, Re-regulation and Marketisation
Following the long downturn that Hesmondhalgh describes, neoliberal ideas
emerged in the 1970s to explain the downturn as a result of public ownership
and close regulation. Neoliberalism thus called for the privatisation of public
enterprises as well as regulatory change. The term for these changes was
deregulation, and it was particularly popularised during the Reagan/Thatcher
administrations in the USA and UK.
Deregulation was a particularly exciting term in the cultural industries, where it
was taken to imply freedom from government interference.
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Deregulation implies governments are relinquishing their regulatory
powers
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Deregulation has also been taken to imply stronger markets and weaker
states
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Deregulation has also been associated with discourse about rolling back
the state
The use of this term has led to what Steven Vogel has referred to as ‘semantic
confusion’, in the sense that deregulation is used to refer both to the
introduction of more competition within a market (what he calls liberalisation)
and the reduction or elimination of government regulations (deregulation) – as
if the two were the same process.
The more appropriate term is re-regulation, which means that legislation and
regulation were not removed in the process. Rather, governments are
reformulating old rules and creating new ones. As a result we end up with freer
markets (liberalised) and more rules – in fact there are even more complex
rules (e.g. the British Ofcom which regulates the entire communications
sector).
In fact what has happened is that governments have combined liberalisation
with re-regulation.
Hesmondhalgh prefers the term marketisation – which is a critique of the
assumption that the market is an efficient and fair allocator of resources. He
argues that both deregulation and re-regulation provide misleading positive
connotations in describing the spread of neoliberal policies.
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State interest in Regulating Broadcasting and Telecommunications
Although all cultural industries are subjected to state legislation and regulation
of one form of another, two sectors have been of particular importance to the
state the world over: telecommunications and broadcasting.
Until the 1980s, both sectors have been subjected to direct state ownership and
control throughout the world (except in the USA). But even in the USA, both
sectors were under strict government regulation.
But why Broadcasting and Telecoms?
Broadcasting was considered a limited national resource right from the
beginning. The limited nature of the electromagnetic spectrum meant that it had
to be allocated in such a way that those who were privileged to own
frequencies would do so in the public interest.
Unregulated radio broadcasting, as evidenced by the radio craze in the US in
the 1920s, lead to chaos, as stations interfere with one another’s signals.
Thus even in the USA where radio grew in an unregulated environment, it
became clear that the state needed to be involved in the allocation of
frequencies. The FCC was introduced in 1927 to address these concerns.
In the UK, on the other hand, broadcasting took the public service model right
from the beginning, and this model was taken up by other European countries
and also exported to the colonies.
Right from the beginning, it became clear that broadcasting was a powerful
tool – commercially (promoting goods and services), politically (influencing
people’s voting habits) and culturally (shaping people’s identities and
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advancing the nation building project). For these reasons, governments sought
direct control of broadcasting institutions throughout the world.
Telecommunications on the other hand were seen as vital in fostering national
identity and encouraging economic development. Governments thus sought to
make telecommunications a universal service. In most countries they were run
as parastatals – through Postal, Telegraph and Telephone authorities, PTTs. In
the USA, though, a private monopoly was favoured, giving rise to AT&T.
The rationales for state involvement in both sectors was seriously challenged in
the 80s.
In the telecoms sector, the main argument advanced by proponents of
marketisation was that opening up the sector to international competition would
bring about more efficiency and better services to the consumers – thereby
driving the countries out of the Long Downturn.
In broadcasting, the technological revolution – new cable, satellite and digital
technologies – suggested to proponents of marketisation that spectrum scarcity
arguments were no longer valid. Proponents of marketisation argued that there
was no more justification for state regulation. Further, there was growing
concern that state monopoly broadcasting limited the range of viewpoints that
the viewers/audiences could be exposed. The provision of more channels was
therefore seen as the answer.
Four Waves of Marketisation
This process has been summed up in what Hesmondhalgh has described as
Four Waves of Marketisation that took place in the 1980s and 1990s.
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Important changes in cultural industry policy took place within this period
which had ramifications for the globalisation of culture and the cultural
industries themselves.
But what was the driving force for these changes? Hesmondhalgh and other
writers in the curriculum agree that these changes were consciously brought
about to support the interests of the giant multinational companies (see Held
and McGrew; Herman and McChesney).
The waves:
1. Policy changes in the USA from the 1980s onwards
2. Changes in other industrialised countries, influenced by changes in the
USA (Western Europe, Canada, Australia, etc). These are discussed in
more detail by Peter Humphreys (1996); Collins and Murroni (1996);
David Levy (1999) among others.
3. Changes in transitional and mixed societies (see, for example Curran
and park, 2000)
4. Convergence, and new laws that seek to reflect these changes
All this regulatory activity point to the salient point that despite claims to the
contrary, the state remains the centre of political activity
The Second Wave
In the case of the second wave that relates to Western Europe, the emergence
of the EU has brought more interesting but complex dimension to the subject of
communications policymaking, where the introduction of a higher political
level (the supranational level) above that of the state has raised questions about
communicative sovereignty as well as identity (Schlesinger, 2001; Morley and
Robins, 1995; Collins, 2002).
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But even in Western Europe, the state still matters as it retains some regulatory
power, and remains the pre-eminent locus and focus of collective identity
(Schlesinger, 2001).
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distinct national languages
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insurmountable historical differences
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institutional differences
All these point to the fact that public spaces are still largely conceived within
the boundaries of the nation-state. (Read passage from Schesinger, p98 on
‘Europeanness.’
However, we cannot ignore the challenge that ‘Europeanisation’ poses to
national cultural policymaking. The important question that Schlesinger raises
in his article is: “What, if anything, can the state do to ensure that it sovereignly
pursues nationally determined media and cultural policies in a Europeanising
political and economic context?” (see Compendium). Is it still necessary to do
so? (Tore will purse these issues next week)
The Third Wave of Marketisation and the African Experience
Hesmondhalgh’s so-called third wave of marketisation coincides with what has
come to be known as the democratisation decade in Southern Africa. The
pressures for communications reform in this part of the world is therefore a
confluence of national demands for political opening and global demands for
both political liberalisation and free market reform.
In Africa, too, we have seen the emergence of ‘supranational’ regulatory
frameworks in the communications sector. Most of these frameworks promote
neoliberal market reform and advocate the liberalisation of both the telecoms
and broadcasting sectors. What is interesting to note is that some of these
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blueprints were Western sponsored – designed by Western consultants, hence
carry global influences. The interests are obvious: it’s easier for transnational
companies to trade with regional blocks instead of singe countries …
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SADC Protocol on Transport and Communications
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TRASA Telecoms Regulators Association of Southern Africa
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COMESA – towards harmonisation of ICT policy
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African Charter on Broadcasting (MISA, USAID, OSISA)
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Declaration on Human and People’s Rights
To what extent do nation-states adhere to these supranational policymaking
bodies?
However, different African countries have pursued different approaches to
‘liberalisation’ at the national level.
To a large extent, this is a legacy of the NWICO debate of the 1970s and
1980s, which advocated development of national communications policy
through the state. This perspective remains quite strong in most African
countries, notably Zimbabwe.
NWICO debate did not only centre on imbalances in global news flows. It also
included the unequal and unidirectional flow of images from North to South or
centre-periphery; including the role of advertising in promoting consumerism
Interestingly, centre-periphery argument has another layer apart from First
World vs. Third World. It also applied to Europe vs. the USA – making it even
more complex (see from example Collins, 2002).
McBride report was published in 1980
1994 is the year when the USA and UK pulled out of Unesco in protest
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What is important about the NWICO debate is that it lays the basis for thinking
about an international public sphere – as an international communication order
implied a transnational communicative space (Schlesinger (2001)
URTNA (Union of Radio and Television Networks of Africa) can be
interpreted as part of the early concerns leading to the NWICO debate.
URTNA was the media unit of the OAU. Anti-colonialism and antiimperialism; exchanging programmes on culture and development. It was
sponsored by UNESCO and UNICEF, and received contributions from
subscribing national governments.
South African example of Negotiated Liberalisation
Contrary to beliefs that global capitalism shapes state policies according to its
requirements, Robert Horwitz (2000 and 2001) has illustrated through the
South African Communications sector reform how the state remains central in
both political action and social solidarity.
Horwitz’s argument both in his 2000 book and his 2001 article is that, “though
globalisation creates pressures, opportunities, and constraints, communications
reforms are shaped largely by domestic actors through domestic political
institutions.”
Brief Historical background of SA
- First colonised by the Dutch, then the British
- Under Apartheid grip for since the late 1940s
- The media served white interests, and used as a tool of repression
- Broadcasting in particular was used as a tool for divide and rule (Bantustan
radio)
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The SABC, in word, was a public service broadcaster (set up by none other
than John Reith himself), but in practice it was an arm of the apartheid regime:
promoting the National Party’s apartheid ideology in programming, editorial
content, and hiring of staff.
Converging interests on the eve of independence in 1993:
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The NP feared the prospect of having broadcasting in the hands of a
black majority government in the post-independence era
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Nelson Mandela’s ANC on the other hand feared the idea of going into
elections with the SABC in the control of the NP
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The NP therefore wanted to move with haste to privatise the SABC,
which would guarantee continued white ownership, as capital was
predominantly white
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Civil society, particularly the labour movement, was quick to notice the
NP strategy, and pushed to have broadcasting reform as part of the
peace negotiations.
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This led to the creation of an independent regulatory body, the IBA,
which was responsible for licensing of new players and regulating the
industry.
The IBA privatised some of the SABC radio stations and licenses several
community radio stations. It also licensed a new commercial TV channel, ETV.
It has come up with a much-celebrated three-tier system of broadcasting
encompassing public service, commercial and community broadcasting.
What is interesting is that all the three tiers have a public service mandate and
local content requirements in different percentages.
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South Africa attains independence in 1994 – when the rest of the world s
grappling with communications reform.
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How South Africa has moved way ahead of even most European
countries in terms of setting up a converged regulator
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The view of the mass media as a unifying force in a country with about
11 official languages (broadcasting and nation-building).
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The ANC envisaged broadcasting as an ally in the nation-building
project
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These concerns influenced the debate on whether to retain a large SABC
or to privatise some of the stations and remain with a lean SABC
(Horwitz, 2000).
SA’s three tier broadcasting system, and the requirement that all the three tiers
serve the public interest. The stipulation on local content quotas for even the
commercial broadcasters (MultiChoice, Etv)
The unique SA method of policymaking through nationwide consultation also
stands out. As Horwitx point out:
“South African communications institutions are more progressive than the
models they apparently ape. This is due largely to the distinctive internal
political processes that establish the new communications policies and to the
unusually open nature of the South African state during the transition period.
The South African reforms, contrary to current conventional wisdom of topdown, state-directed liberalisation, were built via participatory democratic
practice that engaged civil society and the state in policymaking (Horwitz,
2001)
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Zambia: A Case of Reluctant Reform and Donor-Driven Reform
States are not equally capacitated to in terms of their ability to negotiate with
global forces concerning the liberalisation of their media sectors
Weak Zambian economy has made the country heavily dependent on donor
support in almost everything, including state budget
This had a bearing on the independence in terms of policymaking
Communications reform process and debate largely foreign-driven (borrowed
discourse) – Panos Southern Africa and MISA
A relatively open space for debate
Civil society groups have teamed up to force government to reform
The Private Members’ Bills
The introduction of the IBA and South African influence (South-South).
Zambia’s Ministry of Information has licensed several community broadcasting
stations, and a few commercial channels, including MultiChoice Zambia &
Trinity Broadcasting
More than half of the licensed broadcasting stations are religions – mostly
owned by the Catholic Church.
Despite powerlessness, the state still matters: it has refused to privatise the
ZNBC as well as the state-owned daily and weekly newspapers.
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Zimbabwe: A Case of Partial Reform and Resistance
Zimbabwe is the only country in the region that still retains state monopoly
broadcasting.
Strict laws inherited from Rhodesia still in place
Court challenge to state monopoly broadcasting in 2000
Broadcasting Services Act – High entry requirements
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act – registration of
journalists and media companies
High and prohibitive entry requirements in an imploding economy
Stringent local content requirements – 75% (How local is local content – see
borrowed formats – play some Zim music)
Tight ownership regulations 12% shareholding
Restrictions on foreign ownership (must be Zimbabwean citizen ordinarily
resident in Zimbabwe – just is the case in the USA)
Unrealistic licence conditions: 2-year renewable
Political imperatives seem to guide the reform process
Tightening the grip on civil society (barring organisation that focus on
Governance issues)
The context is very important in the Zimbabwean case: land reform
Conclusion
Many and varied responses to neoliberal pressure to liberalise communications
sector
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To a large extent, national responses to the spread of neoliberalism are
influenced by preceding debates on media imperialism (championed by Kaarle
Nodenstreng, Herbert Schiller, the Matterlarts, among others) and antiglobalisation sentiments that are spreading across the world.
While it can be argued that liberalisation and privatisation of media systems
throughout the world, coupled with the development of cable and satellite
technologies, has reduced the state’s capacity to exercise communicative
sovereignty, it would be rather far-fetched to conclude that the state is no
longer relevant.
As Nicholas Garnham (1986) has argued, globalisation has challenged but not
eliminated states as power centres (containers) (in Waisbord and Morris, 2001)
States are still carrying out the critical function of lawmaking. The variety of
media policies that the state makes are an expression of sovereignty.
The state is still responsible for licensing broadcasters, and imposing
limitations on telecoms ownership & operations as we have seen.
Reports about the death of the state as wrong diagnosis.
Withering away of the state?
Post-state world? Global governance?
South Africanisation?
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