From Cambridge UP edition, trans. Mary J. Gregor, 1966*
Groundwork of The metaphysics of morals
Introduction
Kant's short treatise Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is by far the best
known of his writings in moral philosophy. Its influence has been out of all
proportion to its size; so too has been the amount of commentary,
interpretation, criticism, and debate to which it has given rise. Yet we have little
historical evidence about Kant's decision to write this treatise. Like the Critique
of Practical Reason, it seems to have been almost a by-product of his plan to
write a "metaphysics of morals," the vicissitudes of which are outlined in the
editorial introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals. Early in 1784 Kant's friends
and associates began to mention in their correspondence his work on a
"Prodromus" or "Prolegomena" to his metaphysics of morals. In September of
that year Hamann reported that Kant had sent off the manuscript of his
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, and in April 1785 that he had received
four copies of the book from his publisher in Halle.
Kant's reasons for writing a treatise preliminary to his metaphysics of morals
are adequately explained within the Groundwork itself. Before the supreme
principle of morality is applied to human nature it should be exhibited in its
purity. Three years earlier, in the Critique of Pure Reason and in his lectures on
ethics roughly contemporaneous with it, Kant had recognized that the principle
for appraising actions as duties is the formal principle expressed in "the
categorical imperative." However, he had not yet seen that the thought of this
principle could provide a motive for acting or, as he put it in the Groundwork,
that our moral judgments assume autonomy as a property of the will. This was
a radically new conception, and one that would influence profoundly the
subsequent derivation of duties. If all Other systems of moral philosophy
assume that the human will can be determined only by some motive having its
origin in "human nature" - if, that is to say, they assume heteronomy as a
property of the will - it would be advisable to present this new conception in a
treatise devoted solely to "the supreme principle of morality."
Moreover, as Kant insisted repeatedly, disagreements among philosophers,
especially in such matters as the foundations of moral philosophy, are not
merely intellectual exercises for the faculty of a university. Through "popular
moral philosophers" and "teachers of virtue" they influence the public. Even as
Kant's analysis of what is implicit in the
* This reformated version is not to be distributed nor offered for sale.
prepared strictly for classroom use.
39
It has been
IMMANUEL KANT
judgments of "common human understanding" moves to the highest level of
abstraction, he interpolates reminders of the need for distinguishing the source
of moral concepts and principles. Whether the supreme principle of morality
has an empirical or a purely rational source is not an academic quibble but a
matter of practical importance. It is, in other words, the most fundamental
question of practical philosophy.
40
4:385 Groundwork of The metaphysics of morals
4:387 Preface
Ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three sciences: physics, ethics, and
logic. This division is perfectly suitable to the nature of the subject and there is
no need to improve upon it except, perhaps, to add its principle, partly so as to
insure its completeness and partly so as to be able to determine correctly the
necessary subdivisions. All rational cognition is either material and concerned
with some object, or formal and occupied only with the form of the
understanding and of reason itself and with the universal rules of thinking in
general, without distinction of objects. Formal philosophy is called logic,
whereas material philosophy, which has to do with determinate objects and the
laws to which they are subject, is in turn divided into two. For these laws are
either laws of nature or laws of freedom. The science of the first is called
physics, that of the other is ethics; the former is also called the doctrine of
nature, the latter the doctrine of morals."
Logic can have no empirical part, that is, no part in which the universal and
necessary laws of thinking would rest on grounds taken from experience; for in
that case it would not be logic, that is, a canon for the understanding or for
reason, which holds for all thinking and which must be demonstrated. On the
other hand natural as well as moral philosophy* can each have its empirical
part, since the former must determine laws of nature as an object of experience,
the latter, laws of the human being's will insofar as it is affected by nature - t h
e first as laws in accordance with 4:388 which everything happens, the second
as laws in accordance with which everything ought to happen, while still taking
into account the conditions under which it very often does not happen. All
philosophy insofar as it is based on grounds of experience can be called
empirical; but insofar as it sets forth its teachings simply from a priori
principles it can be called pure philosophy. When the latter is merely formal it is
called logic; but if it is limited to determinate objects of the understanding it is
called metaphysics.
In this way there arises the idea of a twofold metaphysics, a metaphysics '
Naturlehre. . . Sittenlehre. According to the Critique of Judgment, the doctrinal
(doktrinat), as distinguished from the critical, part of philosophy is the
metaphysics of nature and of morals (5:170). Weltweisheit, a common
eighteenth-century word for Philosophie
43
IMMANUEL KANT
of nature and a metaphysics of morals. Physics will therefore have its empirical
part but it will also have a rational part; so too will ethics, though here the
empirical part might be given the special name practical anthropology, while the
rational part might properly be called morals.'
All trades, crafts, and arts have gained by the division of labor, namely when
one person does not do everything but each limits himself to a certain task that
differs markedly from others in the way it is to be handled, so as to be able to
perform it most perfectly and with greater facility. Where work is not so
differentiated and divided, where everyone is a jack-of-all-trades, there trades
remain in the greatest barbarism. Whether pure philosophy in all its parts does
not require its own special man might in itself be a subject not unworthy of
consideration, and it might be worth asking whether the whole of this learned
trade would not be better off if a warning were given to those who, in keeping
with the taste of the public, are in the habit of vending the empirical mixed with
the rational in all sorts of proportions unknown to themselves, who call
themselves "independent thinkers,"* and others, who prepare the rational part
only, "hair-splitters":~ the warning not to carry on at the same time two jobs
which are very distinct in the way they are to be handled, for each of which a
special talent is perhaps required, and the combination of which in one person
produces only bunglers. Here, however, I ask only whether the nature of science
does not require that the empirical part always be carefully separated from the
rational part, and that a metaphysics of nature be put before physics proper
(empirical physics) and a metaphysics of morals before practical anthropology,
with metaphysics carefully cleansed of everything empirical so that we may
know how 4:389 much pure reason can accomplish in both cases and from
what sources it draws this a priori teaching of its own-^- whether the latter job
be carried on by all teachers of morals (whose name is legion) or only by some
who feel a calling to it.
Since my aim here is directed properly to moral philosophy, I limit the question
proposed only to this: is it not thought to be of the utmost necessity to work out
for once a pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of everything that may
be only empirical and that belongs to anthropology.' For, that there must be
such a philosophy is clear of itself from the common idea of duty and of moral
laws. Everyone must grant that a law, if it is to hold morally, that is, as a
ground of an obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example,
the command "thou
eigentlich Moral, perhaps, "morals strictly speaking." Moral and Sitten are translated as "morals,"
Moralität and Sittlichkeit as "morality," sittliche Weltweisheit and Moralphilosophie as "moral
philosophy," and Sittenlehre as "the doctrine of morals." Kant occasionally uses Moral in the sense
of "moral philosophy."
* Selbstdmker
~ Grübler
^ sie selbst diese ihre Belehrung a priori schöpfe
44
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
shall not lie" does not hold only for human beings, as if other rational beings
did not have to heed it, and so with all other moral laws properly so called; that,
therefore, the ground of obligation here must not be sought in the nature of the
human being or in the circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but a
priori simply in concepts of pure reason; and that any other precept, which is
based on principles of mere experience — even if it is universal in a certain
respect - insofar as it rests in the least part on empirical grounds, perhaps only
in terms of a motive,^ can indeed be called a practical rule but never a moral
law.
Thus, among practical cognitions, not only do moral laws, along with their
principles, differ essentially from all the rest,* in which there is something
empirical, but all moral philosophy is based entirely on its pure part; and when
it is applied to the human being it does not borrow the least thing from
acquaintance with him (from anthropology) but gives to him, as a rational being,
laws a priori, which no doubt still require a judgment sharpened by experience,
pardy to distinguish in what cases they are applicable and pardy to provide
them with access' to the will of the human being and efficacy for his fulfillment
of them;-' for the human being is affected by so many inclinations that, though
capable of the idea of a practical pure reason, he is not so easily able to make it
effective in concreto in the conduct of his life.
A metaphysics of morals is therefore indispensably necessary, not merely
because of a motive to speculation - for investigating the source of the practical
basic principles* that lie a priori in our reason - but also 4:390 because morals
themselves remain subject to all sorts of corruption as long as we are without
that clue' and supreme norm by which to appraise them correctiy. For, in the
case of what is to be morally good it is not enough that it conform with the
moral law but it must also be done Tor the sake of the law; without this, that
conformity is only very contingent and precarious, since a ground that is not
moral will indeed now and then produce actions in conformity with the law, but
it will also often produce actions contrary to the
' Bemegungsgriinde. Kant subsequently (4:427) distinguishes this from an "incentive" (Triebfeder),
and the force of some passages depends upon this distinction. However, he does not abide by the
distinction, and no attempt has been made to bring his terminology into accord with it. He
occasionally uses Bemegursache, in which case "motive," which seems to be the most general
word available, has been used. Here, as elsewhere, the difference between German and English
punctuation creates difficulties. It is not altogether clear from the context whether the clause "in
which there is something empirical" is restrictive or nonrestrictive.
' Or "entry," "admission," Eingang
'Nachdruck zur Ausübung
' Grundsätze. Kant does not draw a consistent distinction between Grundsatz and Prinzip and
often uses one where the other would seem more appropriate. Prinzip is always, and Grundsatz
often, translated as "principle."
' Leitfaden
45
IMMANUEL KANT
law. Now the moral law in its purity and genuineness (and in the practical this
is what matters most) is to be sought nowhere else than in a pure philosophy;
hence this (metaphysics) must come first, and without it there can be no moral
philosophy at all. That which mixes these pure principles with empirical ones
does not even deserve the name of philosophy (for what distinguishes
philosophy from common rational cognition is just that it sets forth in separate
sciences what the latter comprehends only mixed together); much less does it
deserve the name of a moral philosophy, since by this very mixture it even
infringes upon"* the purity of morals themselves and proceeds contrary to its
own end.
Let it not be thought, however, that what is here called for already exists in the
celebrated Wolff's' propaedeutic to his moral philosophy, namely in what he
called universal" practical philosophy, and that we do not therefore have to
break into an entirely new field. Just because it was to be a universal practical
philosophy it took into consideration, not a will of any special kind, such as one
that would be completely determined from a priori principles without any
empirical motives and that could be called a pure will, but rather volition
generally," with all the actions and conditions that belong to it in this generaP
sense; and by this it differs from a metaphysics of morals in the same way that
general logic, which sets forth the actions and rules of thinking in general,
differs from transcendental philosophy, which sets forth the special actions and
rules of pure thinking, that is, of thinking by which objects are cognized
completely a priori. For, the metaphysics of morals has to examine the idea and
the principles of a possible pure will and not the actions and conditions of
human volition 4:391 generally, which for the most part are drawn from
psychology. That this universal practical philosophy also discusses (though
without any warrant)* moral laws and duties is no objection to my assertion.
For the authors of that science remain true to their idea of it in this too; they do
not distinguish motives that, as such, are represented completely a priori by
reason alone and are properly moral from empirical motives, which the
understanding raises to universal concepts merely by comparing experiences;
instead they consider motives only in terms of the greater or smaller amount of
them, without paying attention to the difference of their sources (since all of
them are regarded as of the same kind); and this is how they form their concept'
of obligation, which is anything but moral,
" Abbruch tut. For Kant's explanation of this term, taken from the context of rights, see The
Metaphysics of Morals (6:429).
° allgemeinen
° überhaupt
** allgemeinen
' Or "authorization,"
Befugnis. For an explanation of this term in its moral use, see The Metaphysics of Morals (6:222).
' und machen sich dadurch ihren Begriff
46
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
although the way it is constituted is all that can be desired in a philosophy that
does not judge at all about the origin of all possible practical concepts, whether
they occur only a posteriori or a priori as well.
Intending to publish some day a metaphysics of morals,^ I issue this
groundwork in advance. Indeed there is really no other foundation for a
metaphysics of morals than the critique of a pure practical reason, just as that
of metaphysics is the critique of pure speculative reason, already published.
But in the first place the former is not of such utmost necessity as the latter,
because in moral matters human reason can easily be brought to a high degree
of correctness and accomplishment, even in the most common understanding,
whereas in its theoretical but pure use it is wholly dialectical; and in the second
place I require that the critique of a pure practical reason, if it is to be carried
through completely, be able at the same time to present the unity of practical
with speculative reason in a common principle, since there can, in the end, be
only one and the same reason, which must be distinguished merely in its
application. But I could not yet bring it to such completeness here without
bringing into it considerations of a wholly different kind and confusing the
reader. Because of this I have made use of the title Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals instead of Critique of Pure Practical Reason.
But in the third place, since a metaphysics of morals, despite its intimidating
tide, is yet capable of a great degree of popularity and suitability for the
common understanding, I find it useful to separate from it this preliminary
work of laying its foundation, so that in the 4:392 future I need not add
subtleties, which are unavoidable in it, to teachings more easily grasped.
The present groundwork is, however, nothing more than the search for and
establishment of the supreme principle of morality, which constitutes by itself a
business that in its purpose is complete and to be kept apart from every other
moral investigation. No doubt my assertions on this important and central
question, discussion of which has till now been far from satisfactory, would
receive a great deal of light from the application of the same principle to the
whole system, and of confirmation through the adequacy that it would
everywhere show; but I had to forgo this advantage, which would be after all
more gratifying to me than commonly useful since the facility with which a
principle can be used and its apparent adequacy furnish no quite certain proof
of its correctness but, instead, awaken a certain bias against rigorously
investigating and weighing it in itself and without any regard for what follows
from it.
I have adopted in this work the method that is, I believe, most suitable if one
wants to proceed analytically from common cognition to the determination of its
supreme principle, and in turn synthetically from the examination of this
principle and its sources back to the common cognition in which we find it used.
Accordingly, the division turns out as follows:
47
IMMANUEL KANT
1. First section: Transition from common rational to philosophic moral cognition.
2. Second section: Transition from popular moral philosophy to metaphysics of
morals.
3. Third section: Final step from metaphysics of morals to the critique of pure
practical reason.
48
4=393
Section I Transition from common rational to philosophic moral cognition
It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it,
that could be considered good without limitation except a good will.
Understanding, wit, judgments and the like, whatever such talents of mind^
may be called, or courage, resolution, and perseverance in one's plans, as
qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable for many
purposes,' but they can also be extremely evil and harmful if the will which is to
make use of these gifts of nature, and whose distinctive constitution" is
therefore called character, is not good. It is the same with gifls of fortune. Power,
riches, honor, even health and that complete wellbeing and satisfaction" with
one's condition called happiness, produce boldness and thereby often
arrogance"" as well unless a good will is present which corrects the influence of
these on the mind and, in so doing, also corrects the whole principle of action
and brings it into conformity with universal ends' - not to mention that an
impartial rational spectator can take no delight in seeing the uninterrupted
prosperity of a being graced with no feature of a pure and good will, so that a
good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition even of worthiness to
be happy. Some qualities are even conducive^ to this good will itself and can
' Geistes. Compare Kant's use oi Geist in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (7:225) and
of Geisteskräfle in The Metaphysics of Morals (6:445).
' in mancher Absicht, perhaps "in many respects"
"Beschaffenheit, occasionally translated as "character."
"Constitution" is also used to translate Einrichtung and sometimes Anlage, which is used rather
loosely in the Groundwork.
' Kant uses a great variety of words for what could be called "pleasure" (Lust) in the most general
sense. Although he later draws broad distinctions among pleasures in terms of their origins (e.g.,
between the pleasure of taste and that of sensation, and between both of these and moral
pleasure), these distinctions still leave a number of words problematic. Within the Groundwork
(4:396) he suggests a distinction between Zufriedenheit or "satisfaction" in general and reason's
own kind of Zufriedenheit, which in that context I have translated as "contentment." However, his
vocabulary is not consistent, and I have not attempted to make it so.
' Mut. . . Übermut ' allgemein-zweckmäßig mache beförderlich. Compare The Metaphysics of Morals
(6:407-9). Befördern is usually translated as "to further" or "to promote."
49
IMMANUEL KANT
make its work much easier; despite this, however, they have no inner 4:394
unconditional worth but always presuppose a good will, which limits the esteem
one otherwise rightly has for them and does not permit their being taken as
absolutely good. Moderation in affects and passions, self-control, and calm
reflection are not only good for aU sorts of purposes but even seem to constitute
a part of the inner worth of a person; but they lack much that would be
required to declare them good without limitation (however unconditionally they
were praised by the ancients); for, without the basic principles of a good will
they can become extremely evil, and the coolness of a scoundrel makes him not
only far more dangerous but also immediately more abominable in our eyes
than we would have taken him to be without it.
A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its
fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it
is good in itself and, regarded for itself, is to be valued incomparably higher
than all that could merely be brought about by it in favor of some inclination
and indeed, if you will, of the sum of all inclinations. Even if, by a special
disfavor of fortune or by the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this
will should wholly lack the capacity to carry out its purpose - if with its greatest
efforts it should yet achieve nothing and only the good wiU were left (not, of
course, as a mere wish but as the summoning of all means insofar as they are
in our control) - then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something
that has its full worth in itself. Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add
anything to this worth nor take anything away from it. Its usefulness would be,
as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it more conveniently in
ordinary commerce or to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet
expert enough, but not to recommend it to experts or to determine its worth.
There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute worth of a
mere will, in the estimation of which no allowance is made for any usefulness,
that, despite all the agreement even of common understanding with this idea, a
suspicion must yet arise that its covert basis is perhaps mere high-flown
fantasy and that we may have misunderstood the 4-395 purpose of nature in
assigning reason to our will as its governor. Hence we shall put this idea to the
test from this point of view.
In the natural constitution of an organized being, that is, one constituted
purposively for life,^ we assume as a principle that there will be found in it no
instrument for some end other than what is also most appropriate to that end
and best adapted to it. Now in a being that has reason and a will, if the proper
end of nature were its preservation, its welfare, in a word its happiness, then
nature would have hit upon a very bad
" zweckmäßig zum Leben eingerichteten. Zweck is translated as "end" except when it occurs as
part of zweckmäßig, Zweckmäßigkeit, and zwecklos.
50
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose.
For all the actions that the creature has to perform for this purpose, and the
whole rule of its conduct, would be marked out for it far more accurately by
instinct, and that end would have thereby been attained much more surely
than it ever can be by reason; and if reason should have been given, over and
above, to this favored creature, it must have served it only to contemplate the
fortunate constitution of its nature, to admire this, to delight in it, and to be
grateful for it to the beneficent cause, but not to submit its faculty of desire" to
that weak and deceptive guidance and meddle with nature's purpose. In a word,
nature would have taken care that reason should not break forth into practical
use and have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think out for itself a
plan for happiness and for the means of attaining it. Nature would have taken
upon itself the choice not only of ends but also of means and, with wise
foresight, would have entrusted them both simply to instinct.
And, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason purposely occupies itself
with the enjoyment of life and with happiness, so much the further does one get
away from true satisfaction; and from this there arises in many, and indeed in
those who have experimented most with this use of reason, if only they are
candid enough to admit it, a certain degree of misology, that is, hatred of reason;
for, after calculating all the advantages they draw - I do not say from the
invention of all the arts of common luxury, but even from the sciences (which
seem to them to be, at bottom, only a luxury of the understanding) - they find
that they have in fact only brought more trouble upon themselves instead of
gaining in happiness; 4:396 and because of this they finally envy rather than
despise the more common run of people, who are closer to the guidance of mere
natural instinct and do not allow their reason much influence on their behavior.
And to this extent we must admit that the judgment of those who greatly
moderate, and even reduce below zero, eulogies extolling the advantages that
reason is supposed to procure for us with regard to the happiness and
satisfaction of life is by no means surly or ungrateful to the goodness of the
government of the world; we must admit, instead, that these judgments have as
their covert basis the idea of another and far worthier purpose of one's
existence, to which therefore, and not to happiness, reason is properly
destined,* and to which, as supreme condition, the private purpose of the
human being must for the most part defer. Since reason is not sufficiently
competent to guide the will surely with
" Begehrungsvenmgen. For Kant's definition of this term see Critique of Practical Reason (5:8 n)
and The Metaphysics of Morals (6:211). Vermögen by itself is sometimes translated as "capacity"
or "ability."
bestimmt Except when it has this sense of "vocation," Bestimmung and its cognates are translated
in terms of "determination."
51
IMMANUEL KANT
regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our needs (which it to some
extent even multiplies) - an end to which an implanted natural instinct would
have led much more certainly; and since reason is nevertheless given to us as a
practical faculty, that is, as one that is to influence the will; then, where nature
has everywhere else gone to work purposively in distributing its capacities,' the
true vocation of reason must be to produce a will that is good, not perhaps as a
means to other purposes, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely
necessary. This will need not, because of this, be the sole and complete good,
but it must still be the highest good and the condition of every other, even of all
demands for happiness. In this case it is entirely consistent with the wisdom of
nature if we perceive that the cultivation of reason, which is requisite to the
first and unconditional purpose, limits in many ways - at least in this life - the
attainment of the second, namely happiness, which is always conditional;
indeed it may reduce it below zero without nature proceeding unpurposively in
the matter, because reason, which cognizes its highest practical vocation in the
establishment of a good will, in attaining this purpose is capable only of its own
kind of satisfaction, namely from fulfilling an end which in turn only reason
determines, even if this should be combined with many infringements upon the
ends of inclination.
4:397 We have, then, to explicate'' the concept of a will that is to be esteemed in
itself and that is good apart from any further purpose, as it already dwells in
natural sound understanding and needs not so much to be taught as only to be
clarified - this concept that always takes first place in estimating the total worth
of our actions and constitutes the condition of all the rest. In order to do so, we
shall set before ourselves the concept of duty, which contains that of a good will
though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances, which, however,
far from concealing it and making it unrecognizable, rather bring it out by
contrast and make it shine forth all the more brightly.
I here pass over all actions that are already recognized as contrary to duty, even
though they may be useful for this or that purpose; for in their case the
question whether they might have been done from duty never arises, since they
even conflict with it. I also set aside actions that are really in conformity with
duty but to which human beings have no inclination immediately' and
'Anlagen
'' entwickeln. In the context of organisms generally, and more specifically with reference to man's
talents and capacities, this is translated as "to develop." However, in the context of analytic and
synthetic propositions, see the Jäsche Logik {g: 111, Anmerkung i), where it is said that in an
implicitly identical proposition (as distinguished from a tautology), a predicate that lies
unentwickelt (implicite) in the concept of the subject is made clear by means of Entwickelung
(explicatio).
' unmittelbar. Kant occasionally uses direkt as a synonym; no temporal reference is intended.
52
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
which they still perform because they are impelled-'^ to do so through another
inclination. For in this case it is easy to distinguish whether an action in
conformity with duty is done from duty or from a self-seeking purpose. It is
much more difficult to note this distinction when an action conforms with duty
and the subject has, besides, an immediate inclination to it. For example, it
certainly conforms with duty that a shopkeeper not overcharge an
inexperienced customer, and where there is a good deal of trade a prudent
merchant does not overcharge but keeps a fixed general price for everyone, so
that a child can buy from him as well as everyone else. People are thus served
honestly; but this is not nearly enough for us to believe that the merchant acted
in this way from duty and basic principles of honesty; his advantage required it;
it cannot be assumed here that he had, besides, an immediate inclination
toward his customers, so as from love, as it were, to give no one preference over
another in the matter of price. Thus the action was done neither from duty nor
from immediate inclination but merely for purposes of self-interest.
On the other hand, to preserve one's life is a duty, and besides everyone has an
immediate inclination to do so. But on this account the often anxious care that
most people take of it still has no inner worth and their maxim has no moral
content. They look after their lives in conformity with 4:398 duty but not from
duty. On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless grief have quite taken away
the taste for life; if an unfortunate man, strong of soul and more indignant
about his fate than despondent or dejected, wishes for death and yet preserves
his life without loving it, not from inclination or fear but from duty, then his
maxim has moral content. To be beneficent^ where one can is a duty, and
besides there are many souls so sympathetically attuned that, without any
other motive of vanity or self-interest they find an inner satisfaction in
spreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so
far as it is their own work. But I assert that in such a case an action of this
kind, however it may conform with duty and however amiable it may be, has
nevertheless no true moral worth but is on the same footing with other
inclinations, for example, the inclination to honor, which, if it fortunately lights
upon what is in fact in the common interest and in conformity with duty and
hence honorable, deserves praise and encouragement but not esteem; for the
maxim lacks moral content, namely that of doing such actions not from
inclination but from duty. Suppose, then, that the mind of this philanthropist
were overclouded by his own grief, which extinguished all sympathy with the
fate of others, and that while he still had the means to benefit
^getrieben. Antrieb is translated as "impulse."
* Wohltätig sein. In view of Kant's distinction between Wohltun and Wohlwollen (6:393, 450 ff.),
Wohltun and its cognates are translated in terms of "beneficence" and Wohlwollen in terms of
"benevolence."
53
IMMANUEL KANT
others in distress their troubles did not move him because he had enough to do
with his own; and suppose that now, when no longer incited to it by any
inclination, he nevertheless tears himself out of this deadly insensibility and
does the action without any inclination, simply from duty; then the action first
has its genuine moral worth. Still further: if nature had put little sympathy in
the heart of this or that man; if (in other respects an honest* man) he is by
temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others, perhaps because
he himself is provided with the special gift of patience and endurance toward
his own sufferings and presupposes the same in every other or even requires it;
if nature had not properly fashioned such a man (who would in truth not be its
worst product) for a philanthropist, would he not still find within himself a
source from which to give himself a far higher worth than what a mere goodnatured temperament might have? By all means! It is just then that the worth
of character 4:399 comes out, which is moral and incomparably the highest,
namely that he is beneficent not from inclination but from duty.
To assure one's own happiness is a duty (at least indirectly); for, want of
satisfaction with one's condition, under pressure from many anxieties and amid
unsatisfied needs, could easily become a great temptation to transgression of
duty. But in addition, without looking to duty here, all people have already, of
themselves, the strongest and deepest inclination to happiness because it is
just in this idea that all inclinations unite in one sum. However, the precept of
happiness is often so constituted that it greatly infringes upon some
inclinations, and yet one can form no determinate and sure concept of the sum
of satisfaction of all inclinations under the name of happiness. Hence it is not to
be wondered at that a single inclination, determinate both as to what it
promises and as to the time within which it can be satisfied, can often outweigh
a fluctuating idea, and that a man - for example, one suffering from gout - can
choose to enjoy what he likes and put up with what he can since, according to
his calculations, on this occasion at least he has not sacrificed the enjoyment of
the present moment to the perhaps groundless expectation of a happiness that
is supposed to he in health. But even in this case, when the general' inclination
to happiness did not determine his will; when health, at least for him, did not
enter as so necessary into this calculation, there is still left over here, as in all
other cases, a law, namely to promote his happiness not from inclination but
from duty; and it is then that his conduct first has properly moral worth.
It is undoubtedly in this way, again, that we are to understand the
* ehrlicher. I have translated this as "honest" because Kant gives the Latin honestas as a
parenthetical equivalent of such derivatives o( Ehre as Ehrbarkeit. However, the context often
makes it clear that he is not thinking of "honesty" in the narrow sense.
' allgemeine
54
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
passages from scripture in which we are commanded to love our neighbor, even
our enemy. For, love as an inclination cannot be commanded, but beneficence
from duty — even though no inclination impels us to it and, indeed, natural
and unconquerable aversion opposes it - is practical and not pathological^ love,
which lies in the will and not in the propensity of feeling,* in principles of action
and not in melting sympathy; and it alone can be commanded.
The second proposition is this: an action from duty has its moral worth not in
the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim in accordance with which it is
decided upon, and therefore does not depend upon the realization of the object
of the action but merely upon the principle of volition in 4:400 accordance with
which the action is done without regard for any object of the faculty of desire.
That the purposes we may have for our actions, and their effects as ends and
incentives of the will, can give actions no unconditional and moral worth is
clear from what has gone before. In what, then, can this worth lie, if it is not to
be in the will in relation to the hoped for effect of the action? It can lie nowhere
else than in the principle of the will without regard for the ends that can be
brought about by such an action. For, the will stands between its a priori
principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori incentive, which is material, as at
a crossroads; and since it must still be determined by something, it must be
determined by the formal principle of volition as such when an action is done
from duty, where every material principle has been withdrawn from it.
The third proposition, which is a consequence of the two preceding, I would
express as follows: duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law. For an
object as the effect of my proposed action I can indeed have inclination but
never respect, just because it is merely an effect and not an activity of a will. In
the same way I cannot have respect for inclination as such, whether it is mine
or that of another; I can at most in the first case approve it and in the second
sometimes even love it, that is, regard it as favorable to my own advantage.
Only what is connected with my will merely as ground and never as effect, what
does not serve my inclination but outweighs it or at least excludes it altogether
from calculations in making a choice'- hence the mere law for itself-can be an
object of respect and so a command. Now, an action from duty is to put aside
entirely the influence of inclination and with it every object of the will; hence
there is left for the will nothing that could determine it except
'pathologische, i.e., dependent upon sensibility Empfindung. In the Critique of Judgment (5:206)
Kant distinguishes an "objective sensation" (e.g., green) from a "subjective sensation" (e.g.,
pleasure) and suggests that misunderstanding could be avoided if "feeling" (Gefühl) were used for
the latter. I have followed his suggestion, while indicating the German word in a note.
'beider Wahl
55
IMMANUEL KANT
objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and so
4:401 the maxim* of complying with such a law even if it infringes upon all my
inclinations.
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it and
so too does not lie in any principle of action that needs to borrow its motive
from this expected effect. For, all these effects (agreeableness of one's condition,
indeed even promotion of others' happiness) could have been also brought
about by other causes, so that there would have been no need, for this, of the
will of a rational being, in which, however, the highest and unconditional good
alone can be found. Hence nothing other than the representation of the law in
itself, which can of course occur only in a rational being, insofar as it and not the
hoped-for effect is the determining ground of the will, can constitute the
preeminent good we call moral, which is already present in the person himself
who acts in accordance with this representation and need not wait upon the
effect of his action.t
4:402 But what kind of law can that be, the representation of which must
determine the will, even without regard for the effect expected from it, in order
for the will to be called good absolutely and without limitation.' Since I have
deprived the will of every impulse that could arise for it from obeying some law,
nothing is left but the conformity of actions as such with universal law," which
alone is to serve the will as its principle, that is,
*A maxim is the subjective principle of volition; the objective principle (i.e., that which would also
serve subjectively as the practical principle for all rational beings if reason had complete control
over the faculty of desire) is the practical larv.
t It could be objected that I only seek refuge, behind the word respect, in an obscure feeling,
instead of distinctly resolving the question by means of a concept of reason. But though respect is
a feeling, it is not one received by means of influence; it is, instead, a feeling self wrought by
means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different from all feelings of the first kind,
which can be reduced to inclination or fear. What I cognize immediately as a law for me I cognize
with respect, which signifies merely consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law without
the mediation of other influences on my sense. Immediate determination of the will by means of
the law and consciousness of this is called respect, so that this is regarded as the effect of the law
on the subject, and not as the cause of the law. Respect is properly the representation of a worth
that infringes upon my self-love. Hence there is something that is regarded as an object neither of
inclination nor of fear, though it has something analogous to both. The object of respect is
therefore simply the law, and indeed the law that we impose upon ourselves and yet as necessary
in itself. As a law we are subject to it without consulting self-love; as imposed upon us by
ourselves it is nevertheless a result of our will; and in the first respect it has an analogy with fear,
in the second with inclination. Any respect for a person is properly only respect for the law (of
integrity and so forth) of which he gives us an example. Because we also regard enlarging our
talents as a duty, we represent a person of talents also as, so to speak, an example of the law (to
become like him in this by practice), and this is what constitutes our respect. All so-called moral
interest consists simply in respect for the law.
t die allgemeine Gesetzmäßigkeit der Handlungen überhaupt
56
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
I ought never to cut except in such a way that I could also mill that my maxim
should become a universal law. Here mere conformity to law as such, without
having as its basis some law determined for certain actions, is what serves the
will as its principle, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be everywhere an
empty delusion and a chimerical concept. Common human reason also agrees
completely with this in its practical appraisals and always has this principle
before its eyes. Let the question be, for example: may I, when hard pressed,
make a promise with the intention not to keep it.' Here I easily distinguish two
significations the question can have: whether it is prudent or whether it is in
conformity with duty to make a false promise. The first can undoubtedly often
be the case. I see very well that it is not enough to get out of a present difficulty
by means of this subterfuge but that I must reflect carefully whether this Ue
may later give rise to much greater inconvenience for me than that from which I
now extricate myself; and since, with all my supposed cunning, the results
cannot be so easily foreseen but that once confidence in me is lost this could be
far more prejudicial to me than all the troubles" I now think to avoid, I must
reflect whether the matter might be handled more prudently by proceeding on a
general maxim and making it a habit to promise nothing except with the
intention of keeping it. But it is soon clear to me that such a maxim will still be
based only on results feared. To be truthful from duty, however, is something
entirely different from being truthful from anxiety about detrimental results,
since in the first case the concept of the action in itself already contains a law
for me while in the second I must first look about elsewhere to see what effects
on me might be combined with it. For, if I deviate from the principle of duty this
is quite certainly evil; but if I am unfaithful to my maxim of prudence this can
4:403 sometimes be very advantageous to me, although it is certainly safer to
abide by it. However, to inform myself in the shortest and yet infallible way
about the answer to this problem, whether a lying promise is in conformity with
duty, I ask myself: would I indeed be content that my maxim (to get myself out
of difficulties by a false promise) should hold as a universal law (for myself as
well as for others).' and could I indeed say to myself that every one may make a
false promise when he finds himself in a difficulty he can get out of in no other
way.' Then I soon become aware that I could indeed will the lie, but by no
means a universal law to lie; for in accordance with such a law there would
properly be no promises at all, since it would be futile to avow my will with
regard to my future actions to others who would not believe this avowal or, if
they rashly did so, would pay me back in like coin; and thus my maxim, as
soon as it were made a universal law, would have to destroy itself.
I do not, therefore, need any penetrating acuteness to see what I have
° alles Uhel. Übeln is translated as "troubles" or "ills." "Evil" is reserved for Böse.
57
IMMANUEL KANT
to do in order that my volition be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of
the world, incapable of being prepared for whatever might come to pass in it, I
ask myself only: can you also will that your maxim become a universal law? If
not, then it is to be repudiated, and that not because of a disadvantage to you
or even to others forthcoming from it but because it cannot fit as a principle
into a possible giving of universal law," for which lawgiving reason, however,
forces'* from me immediate respect. Although I do not yet see'' what this respect
is based upon (this the philosopher may investigate), I at least understand this
much: that it is an estimation of a worth that far outweighs any worth of what
is recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of my action (rom pure
respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other
motive must give way because it is the condition of a will good in itself, the
worth of which surpasses all else.
Thus, then, we have arrived, within the moral cognition of common human
reason, at its principle, which it admittedly does not think so abstractly in a
universal form'^ but which it actually has always before its 4:404 eyes and uses
as the norm for its appraisals. Here it would be easy to show how common
human reason, with this compass in hand, knows very well how to distinguish
in every case that comes up what is good and what is evil, what is in conformity
with duty or contrary to duty, if, without in the least teaching it anything new,
we only, as did Socrates, make it attentive to its own principle; and that there is,
accordingly, no need of science and philosophy to know what one has to do in
order to be honest and good, and even wise and virtuous. We might even have
assumed in advance that cognizance of what it is incumbent upon everyone to
do, and so also to know, would be the affair of every human being, even the
most common.
" allgemeine Gesetzgebung. This phrase, which recurs frequently throughout Kant's works in
practical philosophy, presents a number of difficulties, First, it is not always clear whether, within
the compound word Gesetzgebung, "universal" is intended to modify "law" or "giving." If the
context suggests the latter, I have used "universal lawgiving" and indicated the phrase in a
footnote. Second, Kant distinguishes between positive law, which is willkürlich ("chosen" by the
Gesetzgeber) and zufällig ("contingent"), and natural law, which can be known a priori. See The
Metaphysics of Morals (6:224 and 227). Since "legislation" and "legislator" suggest "making" laws
or enacting positive laws, I have reserved these words for the context of "public right," which is
distinguished from "private right" by the existence of legislative, executive, and judicial authorities.
'' abzwingt. In The Metaphysics of Morals, where the concept of Zwang comes to the foreground in
the context of moral constraint, Kant sometimes gives Nötigung as a parenthetical equivalent of
Zwang. There Nötigung is translated as "necessitation," Zwang as "constraint," and (äußere)
Zwang as "external constraint" or "coercion." In more general contexts, however, nötigen and
zwingen are sometimes translated as "forced" or "constrained" or "compelled." ' Or "have insight
into," einsehe. On the whole Kant seems to use einsehen informally. But see below 4:446, note q. '
so in einer allgemeinen Form abgesondert. Absondern is sometimes translated as "to separate" or
"to set aside."
58
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
Yet we cannot consider without admiration how great an advantage the
practical faculty of appraising' has over the theoretical in common human
understanding. In the latter, if common reason ventures to depart from laws of
experience
and perceptions
of the
senses
it falls into
sheer
incomprehensibilities' and self-contradictions, at least into a chaos of
uncertainty, obscurity, and instability. But in practical matters, it is just when
common understanding excludes all sensible incentives from practical laws that
its faculty of appraising first begins to show itself to advantage. It then becomes
even subtle, whether in quibbling tricks with its own conscience or with other
claims regarding what is to be called right, or in sincerely wanting to determine
the worth of actions for its own instruction; and, what is most admirable, in the
latter case it can even have as good a hope of hitting the mark as any
philosopher can promise himself; indeed, it is almost more sure in this matter,
because a philosopher, though he cannot have any other principle than that of
common understanding, can easily confuse his judgment by a mass of
considerations foreign and irrelevant to the matter and deflect it from the
straight course. Would it not therefore be more advisable in moral matters to
leave the judgment of common reason as it is and, at most, call in philosophy
only to present the system of morals all the more completely and apprehensibly"
and to present its rules in a form more convenient for use (still more for
disputation), but not to lead common human understanding, even in practical
matters,^ away from its fortunate simplicity and to put it, by means of
philosophy, on a new path of investigation and instruction? There is something
splendid about innocence; but what is bad about it, in turn, is that it cannot
protect itself very well and is easily seduced. 4:405 Because of this, even
wisdom - which otherwise consists more in conduct than in knowledge - still
needs science, not in order to learn from it but in order to provide access and
durability for its precepts. The human being feels within himself a powerful
counterweight to all the commands of duty, which reason represents to him as
so deserving of the highest respect - the counterweight of his needs and
inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name
happiness. Now reason issues its precepts unremittingly,"' without thereby
promising anything to the inclinations, and so, as it were, with disregard and
contempt for those claims, which are so impetuous and besides so apparently
equitable (and refuse to be neutralized by any command). But from this there
arises a natural dialectic, that is, a propensity to rationalize against those strict
laws
' Beurteilungsvermögen ' Unbegreiflichkeiten "faßlicher ' in praktischer Absicht
'gebietet die Vernunft . . . unnachlaßlich . . . ihre Vorschriften
59
IMMANUEL KANT
of duty and to cast doubt upon their validity, or at least upon their purity and
strictness, and, where possible, to make them better suited to our wishes and
inclinations, that is, to corrupt them at their basis and to destroy all their
dignity - something that even common practical reason cannot, in the end, call
good.
In this way common human reason is impelled, not by some need of speculation
(which never touches it as long as it is content to be mere sound reason), but
on practical grounds themselves, to go out of its sphere and to take a step into
the field of praaical philosophy, in order to obtain there information and distinct
instruction regarding the source of its principle and the correct determination of
this principle in comparison with maxims based on need and inclination, so
that it may escape from its predicament about claims from both sides and not
run the risk of being deprived of all genuine moral principles through the
ambiguity* into which it easily falls. So there develops unnoticed in common
practical reason as well, when it cultivates itself, a dialectic that constrains it to
seek help in philosophy, just as happens in its theoretical use; and the first will,
accordingly, find no more rest than the other except in a complete critique of
our reason.
' Zweideutigkeit
60
4:406 Section II Transition from popular moral philosophy to metaphysics of
morals
If we have so far drawn our concept of duty^ from the common use of our
practical reason, it is by no means to be inferred from this that we have treated
it as a concept of experience. On the contrary, if we attend to experience of
people's conduct we meet frequent and, as we ourselves admit, just complaints
that no certain example can be cited of the disposition to act from pure duty;
that, though much may be done in conformity with what duty commands, still it
is always doubtful whether it is really done from duty and therefore has moral
worth. Hence there have at all times been philosophers who have absolutely
denied the reality'' of this disposition in human actions and ascribed everything
to more or less refined self-love. They did not, on account of this, call into doubt
the correctness of the concept of morality but rather spoke with deep regret of
the frailty and impurity of human nature, which is indeed noble enough to take
as its precept an idea so worthy of respect but at the same time is too weak to
follow it, and uses reason, which should serve it for giving law, only to look after
the interests of the inclinations, whether singly or, at most, in their greatest
compatibility with one another.
In fact, it is absolutely impossible by means of experience to make out 4:407
with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action otherwise
in conformity with duty rested simply on moral grounds and on the
representation of one's duty. It is indeed sometimes the case that with the
keenest self-examination we find nothing besides the moral ground of duty that
could have been powerful enough to move us to this or that good action and to
so great a sacrifice; but from this it cannot be inferred with certainty that no
covert impulse of self-love, under the mere pretense of that idea, was not
actually the real determining cause of the will; for we like to flatter ourselves by
falsely attributing to ourselves a nobler motive, whereas in fact we can never,
even by the most strenuous self-examination, get entirely behind our covert
incentives, since, when moral worth is at
' unsem hisherigan Begriff der Pflicht ' Wirklichkeit and its cognates are
translated indifferently in terms of "reality" or "actuality."
61
IMMANUEL KANT
issue, what counts is not actions," which one sees, but those inner principles of
actions that one does not see.
Moreover, one cannot better serve the wishes of those who ridicule all morality
as the mere phantom of a human imagination overstepping itself* through selfconceit than by granting them that concepts of duty must be drawn solely from
experience (as, from indolence, people like to persuade themselves is the case
with all other concepts as well); for then one prepares a sure triumph for them.
From love of humankind I am willing to admit that even most of our actions are
in conformity with duty; but if we look more closely at the intentions and
aspirations in them we everywhere come upon the dear self, which is always
turning up; and it is on this that their purpose is based, not on the strict
command of duty, which would often require self-denial. One need not be an
enemy of virtue but only a cool observer, who does not take the livehest wish for
the good straightaway as its reality, to become doubtful at certain moments
(especially with increasing years, when experience has made one's judgment
partiy more shrewd and partly more acute in observation) whether any true
virtue is to be found in the world. And then nothing can protect' us against
falling away completely from our ideas of duty and can preserve in our soul a
well-grounded respect for its law than the clear conviction that, even if 4:408
there never have been actions arising from such pure sources, what is at issue
here is not whether this or that happened; that, instead, reason by itself and
independently of all appearances commands what ought to happen; that,
accordingly, actions of which the world has perhaps so far given no example,
and whose very practicabiUty'' might be very much doubted by one who bases
everything on experience, are still inflexibly commanded by reason; and that,
for example, pure sincerity in friendship can be no less required of everyone
even if up to now there may never have been a sincere friend, because this duty
- as duty in general - lies, prior to all experience, in the idea of a reason
determining the will by means of a priori grounds.
If we add further that, unless we want to deny to the concept of morality any
truth and any relation to some possible object, we cannot dispute that its law is
so extensive in its import that it must hold not only for human beings but for
all rational beings as such, not merely under contingent conditions and with
exceptions but with absolute necessity, then it is clear that no experience could
give occasion to infer even the possibility of such apodictic laws. For, by what
right could we bring into unlimited respect, as a universal precept for every
rational nature, what is perhaps
" es nicht auf die Handlungen ankommt * sich selbst übersteigenden ^ beivahren
'' Tunlichkeit
62
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
valid only under the contingent conditions of humanity? And how should laws
of the determination of owr will be taken as laws of the determination of the will
of rational beings as such, and for ours only as rational beings, if they were
merely empirical and did not have their origin completely a priori in pure but
practical reason?
Nor could one give worse advice to morality than by wanting to derive it from
examples. For, every example of it represented to me must itself first be
appraised in accordance with principles of morality, as to whether it is also
worthy to serve as an original example, that is, as a model; it can by no means
authoritatively provide the concept of moraUty. Even the Holy One of the Gospel
must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before he is cognized
as such; even he says of himself: why do you call me (whom you see) good?
none is good (the archetype of the good) but God only (whom you do not see)/
But whence have we the concept of God as the highest good? Solely from the
idea of moral perfec- 4:409 tion that reason frames a priori and connects
inseparably with the concept of a free will. Imitation has no place at all in
matters of morality, and examples serve only for encouragement, that is, they
put beyond doubt the practicability of what the law commands and make
intuitive^ what the practical rule expresses more generally, but they can never
justify setting aside their true original, which Hes in reason, and guiding oneself
by examples.
If there is, then, no genuine supreme basic principle of morality that does not
have to rest only on pure reason independentiy of all experience, I believe it
unnecessary even to ask whether it is a good thing to set forth in their
generality^ (in abstracto) these concepts as they, along with the principles
belonging to them, are fixed a priori, if this cognition is to be distinguished from
the common and called philosophic. But in our day it may well be necessary to
ask this. For if votes were collected as to which is to be preferred - pure rational
cognition separated from anything empirical, hence metaphysics of morals, or
popular practical philosophy - one can guess at once on which side the
preponderance would fall.
This descending to popular concepts is certainly very commendable, provided
the ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place and has been
carried through to complete satisfaction. That would mean that the doctrine of
morals is first grounded on metaphysics and afterwards, when it has been
firmly established, is provided with access by means of popularity. But it is
quite absurd to want to comply with popularity in the first investigation, on
which all correctness of basic principles depends. Not only can this procedure
never lay claim to the very rare merit of a true philosophic popular' Matthew 19:17 ^machen . . . anschaulich ^ im Allgemeinen
63
IMMANUEL KANT
ity, since there is no art in being commonly understandable if one thereby
renounces any well-grounded insight; it also produces a disgusting hodgepodge
of patchwork observations and half-rationalized principles, in which shallow
pates revel because it is something useful for everyday chitchat, but the
insightful, feeling confused and dissatisfied without being able to help
themselves, avert their eyes - although philosophers, who see quite well 4:410
through the deception, get little hearing when they call [moralists] away for a
time from this alleged popularity, so that they may be rightly popular only after
having acquired determinate insight.
One need only look at attempts at morality in that popular taste. One will find
now the special determination* of human nature (but occasionally the idea of a
rational nature as such along with it), now perfection, now happiness, here
moral feeling, there fear of God, a bit of this and also a bit of that in a
marvellous mixture, without its occurring to them to ask whether the principles
of morality are to be sought at all in acquaintance vnth human nature (which
we can get only from experience) and, if this is not the case - if these principles
are to be found altogether a priori, free from anything empirical, solely in pure
rational concepts and nowhere else even to the slightest extent - instead to
adopt the plan' of quite separating this investigation as pure practical
philosophy or (if one may use a name so decried) as metaphysics of morals,* of
bringing it all by itself to its full completeness, and of putting off the public,
which demands popularity, pending the outcome of this undertaking.
But such a completely isolated metaphysics of morals, mixed with no
anthropology, theology, physics, or hyperphysics and still less with occult
qualities (which could be called hypophysical), is not only an indispensable
substratum of all theoretical and surely determined cognition of duties; it is
also a desideratum of utmost importance to the actual fulfillment of their
precepts. For, the pure thought of duty and in general of the moral law, mixed
with no foreign addition of empirical inducements, has by way of reason alone
(which with this first becomes aware that it can of itself also be practical) an
influence on the human heart so much more 4:411 powerful than all other
incentives,^ which may be summoned from the
*One can, if one wants to, distinguish pure pliilosophy of morals (metaphysics)
from applied (namely to human nature), (just as pure mathematics is
distinguished from applied, and pure logic from applied). By using this name
one is also reminded at once that moral principles are not based on what is
peculiar to human nature but must be fixed' a priori by themselves, while from
such principles it must be possible to derive practical rules for every rational
nature, and accordingly for human nature as well. tl have a letter from the late
excellent Sulzer4 in which he asks me what the cause might be that the
teachings of virtue, however much they contain that is convincing to reason,
accom* Bestimmung ' den Anschlag zu fassen ' besteheud sein müssen
64
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
empirical field, that reason, in the consciousness of its dignity, despises the
latter and can gradually become their master; on the other hand a mixed
doctrine of morals, put together from incentives of feeling and inclination and
also of rational concepts, must make the mind waver between motives that
cannot be brought under any principle, that can lead only contingently to what
is good and can very often also lead to what is evil.
From what has been said it is clear that all moral concepts have their seat and
origin completely a priori in reason, and indeed in the most common reason
just as in reason that is speculative in the highest degree; that they cannot be
abstracted from any empirical and therefore merely contingent cognitions; that
just in this purity of their origin lies their dignity, so that they can serve us as
supreme practical principles; that in adding anything empirical to them one
subtracts just that much from their genuine influence and from the unlimited
worth of actions; that it is not only a requirement of the greatest necessity for
theoretical purposes, when it is a matter merely of speculation, but also of the
greatest practical importance to draw its concepts and laws from pure reason,
to set them forth pure and unmixed, and indeed to determine the extent of this
entire practical or pure rational cognition, that is, to determine the entire
faculty of pure practical reason; and in so doing, it is of the greatest practical
importance not to make its principles dependent upon the special nature 4:412
of human reason - as speculative philosophy permits and even at times finds
necessary - but instead, just because moral laws are to hold for every rational
being as such, to derive them from the universal concept of a rational being as
such, and in this way to set forth completely the whole of morals, which needs
anthropology for its application to human beings, at first independentiy of this
as pure philosophy, that is, as metaphysics (as can well be done in this kind of
quite separated cognitions);' [for we are] well aware that, unless we are in
possession of this, it would be - 1 will not say futile to determine precisely for
speculative appraisal the moral element of duty in all that conforms with duty,
but - impossible to base
plish so litde. By trying to prepare a complete answer I delayed too long.
However, my answer is simply that the teachers themselves have not brought
their concepts to purity, but, since they want to do too well by hunting
everywhere for motives to moral goodness, in trying to make their medicine
really strong they spoil it. For the most ordinary observation shows that if we
represent, on the one hand, an action of integrity* done with steadfast soul,
apart from every view to advantage of any kind in this world or another and
even under the greatest temptations of need or allurement, it leaves far behind
and eclipses any similar act that was affected in the least by an extraneous
incentive; it elevates the soul and awakens a wish to be able to act in like
manner oneself Even children of moderate age feel this impression, and one
should never represent duties to them in any other way. *
Rechtschaffenheit The structure of this sentence, from the semicolon to
"impossible to base morals," has been slightly modified.
65
IMMANUEL KANT
morals on their genuine principles even for common and practical use,
especially that of moral instruction, and thereby to bring about pure moral
dispositions and engraft them onto people's minds for the highest good in the
world."
However, in order to advance by natural steps in this study — not merely from
common moral appraisal (which is here very worthy of respect) to philosophic,
as has already been done, but - from a popular philosophy, which goes no
further than it can by groping with the help of examples, to metaphysics (which
no longer lets itself be held back by anything empirical and, since it must
measure out the whole sum of rational cognition of this kind, goes if need be all
the way to ideas, where examples themselves fail us), we must follow and
present distinctly the practical faculty of reason, from its general rules of
determination to the point where the concept of duty arises from it.
Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has
the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in
accordance with principles, or has a will. Since reason is required for the
derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason.
If reason infallibly determines the will, the actions of such a being that are
cognized as objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary, that is, the
will is a capacity to choose only that which reason independently of inclination
cognizes as practically necessary, that is, as good. However, if reason solely by
itself does not adequately determine the will; if the will is exposed" also to
subjective conditions (certain incentives) that are not always in accord with the
objective ones; in a word, 4:413 if the will is not in itself completely in
conformity with reason (as is actually the case with human beings), then
actions that are cognized as objectively necessary are subjectively contingent,
and the determination of such a will in conformity with objective laws is
necessitation: that is to say, the relation of objective laws to a will that is not
thoroughly good is represented as the determination of the will of a rational
being through grounds of reason, indeed, but grounds to which this will is not
by its nature necessarily obedient.
The representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is necessitating for a
will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called
an imperative.
All imperatives are expressed by an ought and indicate by this the relation of an
objective law of reason to a will that by its subjective constitution is not
necessarily determined by it (a necessitation). They say that to do or to omit
something would be good, but they say it to a will that does not always do
something just because it is represented to it that it
" zum höchsten Weltbesten " unterworfen
66
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
would be good to do tiiat thing. Practical good, however, is that which
determines the will by means of representations of reason, hence not by
subjective causes but objectively, that is, from grounds that are valid for every
rational being as such. It is distinguished from the agreeable, as that which
influences the will only by means of feeling" from merely subjective causes,
which hold only for the senses of this or that one, and not as a principle of
reason, which holds for everyone.*
A perfectly good will would, therefore, equally stand under objective 4:414 laws
(of the good), but it could not on this account be represented as necessitated to
actions in conformity with law since of itself, by its subjective constitution, it
can be determined only through the representation of the good. Hence no
imperatives hold for the divine will and in general for a holy will: the "ought" is
out of place here, because volition^ is of itself necessarily in accord with the law.
Therefore imperatives are only formulae expressing the relation of objective laws
of voUtion in general to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that
rational being, for example, of the human will.
Now, all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former
represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to achieving
something else that one wills (or that it is at least possible for one to will). The
categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as objectively
necessary of itself, without reference to another end. Since every practical law
represents a possible action as good and thus as necessary for a subject
practically determinable by reason, all imperatives are formulae for the
determination of action that is necessary in accordance with the principle of a
will which is good in some way. Now, if the action would be good merely as a
means to something else the imperative is hypothetical; if the action is
represented as in itself good, hence as necessary in a will in itself conforming to
reason, as its principle, then it is categorical.
*The dependence of the faculty of desire upon feelings is called inclination, and
this accordingly always indicates a need. The dependence of a contingendy
determinable will on principles of reason, however, is called an interest. This,
accordingly, is present only in the case of a dependent will, which is not of itself
always in conformity with reason; in the case of the divine will we cannot think
of any interest. But even the human will can take an interest in something
without therefore acting from interest. The first signifies practical interest in the
action, the second, pathological interest in the object of the action. The former
indicates only dependence of the will upon principles of reason in themselves;
the second, dependence upon principles of reason for the sake of incUnation,
namely where reason supplies only the practical rule as to how to remedy the
need of inclination. In the first case the action interests me; in the second, the
object of the action (insofar as it is agreeable to me). We have seen in the first
Section that in the case of an action from duty we must look not to interest in
the object but merely to that in the action itself and its principle in reason (the
law).
" Empfindung ' das Sollen . . . das Wollen
67
IMMANUEL KANT
The imperative thus says which action possible by me would be good, and
represents a practical rule in relation to a will that does not straightaway do an
action just because it is good, partiy because the subject does not always know
that it is good, partiy because, even if he knows this, his maxims could still be
opposed to the objective principles of a practical reason.
Hence the hypothetical imperative says only that the action is good for 4:415
some possible or aäual purpose. In the first case it is a problematically
practical principle, in the second an assertorically practical principle. The
categorical imperative, which declares the action to be of itself objectively
necessary without reference to some purpose, that is, even apart from any other
end, holds as an apodictically practical principle. One can think of what is
possible only through the powers of some rational being as also a possible
purpose of some will; accordingly, principles of action, insofar as this is
represented as necessary for attaining some possible purpose to be brought
about by it, are in fact innumerable. All sciences have some practical part,
consisting of problems [which suppose] that some end is possible for us and of
imperatives as to how it can be attained. These can therefore be called, in
general, imperatives of skill. Whether the end is rational and good is not at all
the question here, but only what one must do in order to attain it. The precepts
for a physician to make his man healthy in a well-grounded way, and for a
poisoner to be sure of killing his, are of equal worth insofar as each serves
perfectiy to bring about his purpose. Since in early youth it is not known what
ends might occur to us in the course of life, parents seek above all to have their
children learn a great many things and to provide for skill in the use of means to
all sorts oi discretionary ends,' about none of which can they determine whether
it might in the future actually become their pupil's purpose, though it is always
possible that he might at some time have it; and this concern is so great that
they commonly neglect to form and correct their children's judgment about the
worth of the things that they might make their ends.
There is, however, one end that can be presupposed as actual in the case of all
rational beings (insofar as imperatives apply to them, namely as dependent
beings), and therefore one purpose that they not merely could have but that we
can safely presuppose they all actually do have by a natural necessity, and that
purpose is happiness. The hypothetical imperative that represents the practical
necessity of an action as a means to the promotion of happiness is assertoric.
It may be set forth not merely as necessary to some uncertain, merely possible
purpose but to a purpose that can be presupposed surely and a priori in the
case of every human 4:416 being, because it belongs to his essence. Now, skill
in the choice of means
' beliebigen Zwecken
68
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
to one's own greatest well-being can be called prudence* in the narrowest sense.
Hence the imperative that refers to the choice of means to one's own happiness,
that is, the precept of prudence, is still always hypothetical; the action is not
commanded absolutely but only as a means to another purpose.
Finally there is one imperative that, without being based upon and having as its
condition' any other purpose to be attained by certain conduct, commands this
conduct immediately. This imperative is categorical. It has to do not with the
matter of the action and what is to result from it, but with the form and the
principle from which the action itself follows; and the essentially good in the
action' consists in the disposition, let the result be what it may. This imperative
may be called the imperative of morality.
Vohtion in accordance with these three kinds of principles is also clearly
distinguished by dissimilarity' in the necessitation of the will. In order to make
this dissimilarity evident, I think they would be most suitably named in their
order by being said to be either rules of skill, or counsels of prudence, or
commands {laws) of morality. For, only law brings with it the concept of an
unconditional and objective and hence universally valid necessity, and
commands are laws that must be obeyed, that is, must be followed even against
inclination. Giving counsel does involve necessity, which, however, can hold
only under a subjective and contingent condition, whether this or that man
counts this or that in his happiness; the categorical imperative, on the contrary,
is limited by no condition and, as absolutely although practically necessary, can
be called quite strictiy a command. The first imperative could also be called
technical (belonging to art), the second pragmatict (belonging to welfare), the
third moral (belong- 4:417 ing to free conduct as such, that is, to morals).
Now the question arises: how are all these imperatives possible.' This question
does not inquire how the performance of the action that the
*The word "prudence" is taken in two senses: in the one it may bear the name of
"knowledge of the world,"s in the other that of "private prudence." The first is a
human being's skill in influencing others so as to use them for his own
purposes. The second is the insight to unite all these purposes to his own
enduring advantage. The latter is properly that to which the worth even of the
former is reduced, and if someone is prudent in the first sense but not in the
second, we might better say of him that he is clever and cunning but, on the
whole, nevertheless imprudent. tit seems to me that the proper meaning of the
word pragmatic can be most accurately determined in this way. For sanaions
are called "pragmatic" that do not flow strictly from the right of states as
necessary laws but from provision for the general welfare. A history is composed
pragmatically when it makes us prudent, that is, instructs the world how it can
look after its advantage better than, or at least as well as, the world of earlier
times.
' als Bedingung zum Grunde zu legen
' das Wesentlich-Gute derselben ' Ungleichheit
69
IMMANUEL KANT
imperative commands can be thought, but only how the necessitation of the will,
which the imperative expresses in the problem, can be thought. How an
imperative of skill is possible requires no special discussion. Whoever wills the
end also wills (insofar as reason has decisive influence on his actions) the
indispensably necessary means to it that are within his power. This proposition
is, as regards the volition, analytic; for in the volition of an object as my effect,
my causality as acting cause, that is, the use of means, is already thought, and
the imperative extracts the concept of actions necessary to this end merely from
the concept of a volition of this end (synthetic propositions no doubt belong to
determining the means themselves to a purpose intended, but they do not have
to do with the ground for actualizing" the act of will but for actualizing the
object). That in order to divide a line into two equal parts on a sure principle I
must make two intersecting arcs from its ends, mathematics admittedly teaches
only by synthetic propositions; but when I know that only by such an action
can the proposed effect take place, then it is an analytic proposition that if I
fully" will the effect I also will the action requisite to it; for, it is one and the
same thing to represent something as an effect possible by me in a certain way
and to represent myself as acting in this way with respect to it.
If only it were as easy to give a determinate concept of happiness, imperatives of
prudence would agree entirely with those of skill and would be just as"" analytic.
For it could be said, here just as there: who wills the end also wills (necessarily
in conformity with reason) the sole means to it 4:418 that are within his control.
But it is a misfortune that the concept of happiness is such an indeterminate
concept that, although every human being wishes to attain this, he can still
never say determinately and consistentiy with himself what he really wishes
and wills. The cause of this is that all the elements that belong to the concept of
happiness are without exception empirical, that is, they must be borrowed from
experience, and that nevertheless for the idea of happiness there is required an
absolute whole, a maximum of well-being in my present condition and in every
future condition. Now, it is impossible for the most insightful and at the same
time most powerful but still finite being to frame for himself a determinate
concept of what he really wills here. If he wills riches, how much anxiety, envy
and intrigue might he not bring upon himself in this way! If he wills a great deal
of cognition and insight, that might become only an eye all the more acute to
show him, as all the more dreadful, ills that are now concealed from him and
that cannot be avoided, or to burden
" wirklich zu machen
" vollständig
" eben sowohl
70
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
his desires/ which already give him enough to do, with still more needs. If he
wills a long life, who will guarantee him that it would not be a long misery? If he
at least wills health, how often has not bodily discomfort kept someone from
excesses into which unlimited health would have let him fall, and so forth. In
short, he is not capable of any principle by which to determine with complete
certainty what would make him truly happy, because for this omniscience
would be required. One cannot therefore act on determinate principles for the
sake of being happy, but only on empirical counsels, for example, of a
regimen,^ frugality, courtesy, reserve and so forth, which experience teaches
are most conducive to well-being on the average. From this it follows that
imperatives of prudence cannot, to speak precisely, command at all, that is,
present actions objectively as practically necessary; that they are to be taken as
counsels {consilia) rather than as commands (praecepta) of reason; that the
problem of determining surely and universally which action would promote the
happiness of a rational being is completely insoluble, so that there can be no
imperative with respect to it that would, in the strict sense, command him to do
what would make him happy; for happiness is not an ideal of reason but of
imagination, resting merely upon empirical grounds, which it is futile to expect
should determine an action by which the totality of a series of 4:419 results in
fact infinite would be attained. This imperative of prudence would, nevertheless,
be an analytic practical proposition if it is supposed that the means to
happiness can be assigned with certainty; for it is distinguished from the
imperative of skill only in this: that in the case of the latter the end is merely
possible, whereas in the former it is given; but since both merely command the
means to what it is presupposed one wills as an end, the imperative that
commands volition of the means for him who wills the end is in both cases
analytic. Hence there is also no difficulty with respect to the possibility of such
an imperative.
On the other hand, the question of how the imperative of morality is possible is
undoubtedly the only one needing a solution, since it is in no way hypothetical
and the objectively represented necessity can therefore not be based on any
presupposition, as in the case of hypothetical imperatives. Only we must never
leave out of account, here, that it cannot be made out by means of any example,
and so empirically, whether there is any such imperative at all, but it is rather
to be feared that all imperatives which seem to be categorical may yet in some
hidden way be hypothetical. For example, when it is said "you ought not to
promise anything deceitfully," and one assumes that the necessity of this
omission is not giving
' Begierden. According to The Metaphysics of Morals (6:212), Begierde must
always be preceded by a feeling of pleasure.
'Diät
71
IMMANUEL KANT
counsel for avoiding some other ill - in which case what is said would be "you
ought not to make a lying promise lest if it comes to light you destroy your
credit" - but that an action of this kind must be regarded as in itself evil and
that the imperative of prohibition is therefore categorical: one still cannot show
with certainty in any example that the will is here determined merely through
the law, without another incentive, although it seems to be so; for it is always
possible that covert fear of disgrace, perhaps also obscure apprehension of
other dangers, may have had an influence on the will. Who can prove by
experience the nonexistence of a cause when all that experience teaches is that
we do not perceive it? In such a case, however, the so-called moral imperative,
which as such appears to be categorical and unconditional, would in fact be
only a pragmatic precept that makes us attentive to our advantage and merely
teaches us to take this into consideration.
We shall thus have to investigate entirely a priori the possibility of a 4:420
categorical imperative, since we do not here have the advantage of its reality
being given in experience, so that the possibility would be necessary not to
establish it but merely to explain it.^ In the meantime, however, we can see this
much: that the categorical imperative alone has the tenor of" a practical law; all
the others can indeed be called principles of the will but not laws, since what it
is necessary to do merely for achieving a discretionary purpose can be regarded
as in itself contingent and we can always be released from the precept if we give
up the purpose; on the contrary, the unconditional command leaves the will no
discretion* with respect to the opposite, so that it alone brings with it that
necessity which we require of a law.
Second, in the case of this categorical imperative or law of morality the ground
of the difficulty (of insight into its possibility) is also very great. It is an a priori
synthetic practical proposition;* and since it is so difficult to see the possibility
of this kind of proposition in theoretical cognition, it can be readily gathered
that the difficulty will be no less in practical cognition.
In this task we want first to inquire whether the mere concept of a categorical
imperative may not also provide its formula containing the
*I connect the deed with the will, without a presupposed condition from any
inclination, a priori and hence necessarily (though only objectively, i.e., under
the idea of a reason having complete control over all subjective motives)."^ This
is, therefore, a practical proposition that does not derive the volition of an
action analytically from another volition already presupposed (for we have no
such perfect will), but connects it immediately with the concept of the will of a
rational being as something that is not contained in it.
^ und also die Möglichkeit nicht zur Festsetzung, sondern bloss zur Erklärung
nötig wäre
' als . . . laute
* dem Willen kein Beliehen . . . frei läßt
^ Bejpegursachen
72
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
^* proposition which alone can be a categorical imperative. For, how such an
absolute command is possible, even if we know its tenor, will still require
special and difficult toil, which, however, we postpone to the last section. When
I think of a hypothetical imperative in general I do not know beforehand what it
will contain; I do not know this until I am given the condition. But when I think
of a categorical imperative I know at once what it contains. For, since the
imperative contains, beyond the law, only the necessity that the maxim* be in
conformity with this law, while the law 4:421 contains no condition to which it
would be Umited, nothing is left with which the maxim of action is to conform
but the universality of a law as such; and this conformity alone is what the
imperative properly represents as necessary.
There is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative and it is this: act only in
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it
become a universal law.
Now, if all imperatives of duty can be derived from this single imperative as
from their principle, then, even though we leave it undecided whether what is
called duty is not as such an empty concept, we shall at least be able to show
what we think by it and what the concept wants to say.
Since the universality of law in accordance with which effects take place
constitutes what is properly called nature in the most general sense (as regards
its form) - that is, the existence of things insofar as it is determined in
accordance with universal laws - the universal imperative of duty can also go as
follows: aä as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a
universal law of nature.
We shall now enumerate a few duties in accordance with the usual division of
them into duties to ourselves and to other human beings and into perfect and
imperfect duties.^
i) Someone feels sick of life because of a series of troubles that has grown to the
point of despair, but is still so far in possession of his reason 4:422 that he can
ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to
*A maxim is the subjective principle of acting, and must be distinguished from
the objective principle, namely the practical law. The former contains the
practical rule determined by reason conformably with the conditions of the
subject (often his ignorance or also his inclinations), and is therefore the
principle in accordance with which the subject cuts; but the law is the objective
principle valid for every rational being, and the principle in accordance with
which he ought to aa, i.e., an imperative. tit must be noted here that I reserve
the division of duties entirely for a future Metaphysics of Morals, so that the
division here stands only as one adopted at my discretion (for the sake of
arranging my examples). For the rest, I understand here by a perfect duty one
that admits no exception in favor of inclination, and then I have not merely
external but also internal perfea duties; although this is contrary to the use of
the work adopted in the schools, I do not intend to justify it here, since for my
purpose it makes no difference whether or not it is granted me.
73
IMMANUEL KANT
himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action
could indeed become a universal law of nature. His maxim, however, is: from
self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life when its longer duration
threatens more troubles than it promises agreeableness. The only further
question is whether this principle of self-love could become a universal law of
nature. It is then seen at once that a nature whose law it would be to destroy
life itself by means of the same feeling whose destination'' is to impel toward the
furtherance of life would contradict itself and would therefore not subsist' as
nature; thus that maxim could not possibly be a law of nature and, accordingly,
altogether opposes the supreme principle of all duty.
2) Another finds himself urged by need to borrow money. He well knows that he
will not be able to repay it but sees also that nothing will be lent him unless he
promises firmly to repay it within a determinate time. He would like to make
such a promise, but he still has enough conscience to ask himself: is it not
forbidden and contrary to duty to help oneself out of need in such a way?
Supposing that he still decided to do so, his maxim of action would go as
follows: when I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money and
promise to repay it, even though I know that this will never happen. Now this
principle of self-love or personal advantage is perhaps quite consistent with my
whole future welfare, but the question now is whether it is right. I therefore
turn the demand of self-love into a universal law and put the question as
follows: how would it be if my maxim became a universal law.' I then see at
once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature and be consistent
with itself, but must necessarily contradict itself For, the universality of a law
that everyone, when he believes himself to be in need, could promise whatever
he pleases with the intention of not keeping it would make the promise and the
end one might have in it itself impossible, since no one would beheve what was
promised him but would laugh at all such expressions as vain pretenses.
3) A third finds in himself a talent that by means of some cultivation 4:423
could make him a human being useful for all sorts of purposes. However, he
finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to give himself up to
pleasure than to trouble himself with enlarging and improving his fortunate
natural predispositions.^ But he still asks himself whether his maxim of
neglecting his natural gifts, besides being consistent with his propensity to
amusement, is also consistent with what one calls duty. He now sees that a
nature could indeed always subsist with such a universal law, although (as
with the South Sea Islanders) the human being should
''Bestimmung
^ bestehen
^ Naturanlagen
74
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
let his talents rust and be concerned with devoting his life merely to idleness,
amusement, procreation - in a word, to enjoyment; only he cannot possibly will
that this become a universal law or be put in us as such by means of natural
instinct. For, as a rational being he necessarily wills that all the capacities in
him be developed, since they serve him and are given to him for all sorts of
possible purposes.
Yet a fourth, for whom things are going well while he sees that others (whom he
could very well help) have to contend with great hardships, thinks: what is it to
me? let each be as happy as heaven wills or as he can make himself; I shall
take nothing from him nor even envy him; only I do not care to contribute
anything to his welfare or to his assistance in need! Now, if such a way of
thinking were to become a universal law the human race could admittedly very
weil subsist, no doubt even better than when everyone prates about sympathy
and benevolence and even exerts himself to practice them occasionally, but on
the other hand also cheats where he can, sells the right of human beings or
otherwise infringes upon it. But although it is possible that a universal law of
nature could very well subsist in accordance with such a maxim, it is still
impossible to will that such a principle hold everywhere as a law of nature. For,
a will that decided this would conflict with itself, since many cases could occur
in which one would need the love and sympathy* of others and in which, by
such a law of nature arisen from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope
of the assistance he wishes for himself.
These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least of what we take to be
such, whose derivation'' from the one principle cited above is clear. We 4:424
must be able to will that a maxim of our action become a universal law: this is
the canon of moral appraisal of action in general. Some actions are so
constituted that their maxim cannot even be thought without contradiction as a
universal law of nature, far less could one mil that it should become such. In
the case of others that inner impossibility is indeed not to be found, but it is
still impossible to mill that their maxim be raised to the universality of a law of
nature because such a will would contradict itself It is easy to see that the first
is opposed to strict or narrower (unremitting)' duty, the second only to wide
(meritorious) duty; and so all duties, as far as the kind of obligation (not the
object of their action) is concerned, have by these examples been set out
completely in their dependence upon the one principle.
If we now attend to ourselves in any transgression of a duty, we find that we do
not really will that our maxim should become a universal law, since that is
impossible for us, but that the opposite of our maxim should
^ Teilnehmung reading ^itefan^ instead oiAbteilung,
"classification"
' unnachlaßlich
75
IMMANUEL KANT
instead remain a universal law, only we take the liberty of making an exception
to it for ourselves (or just for this once) to the advantage of our inclination.
Consequently, if we weighed all cases from one and the same point of view,
namely that of reason, we would find a contradiction in our own will, namely
that a certain principle be objectively necessary as a universal law and yet
subjectively not hold universally but allow exceptions. Since, however, we at
one time regard our action from the point of view of a will wholly conformed
with reason but then regard the very same action from the point of view of a will
affected by inclination, there is really no contradiction here but instead a
resistance^ of inclination to the precept of reason (antagonismus), through
which the universality of the principle {universalitas) is changed into mere
generality (generalitas) and the practical rational principle is to meet the maxim
half way. Now, even though this cannot be justified in our own impartially
rendered judgment, it still shows that we really acknowledge the validity of the
categorical imperative and permit ourselves (with all respect for it) only a few
exceptions that, as it seems to us, are inconsiderable and wrung from us.
4:425 We have therefore shown at least this much: that if duty is a concept that
is to contain significance and real lawgiving for our actions it can be expressed
only in categorical imperatives and by no means in hypothetical ones; we have
also - and this is already a great deal - set forth distinctiy and as determined for
every use the content of the categorical imperative, which must contain the
principle of all duty (if there is such a thing at all). But we have not yet
advanced so far as to prove a priori that there really is such an imperative, that
there is a practical law, which commands absolutely of itself and without any
incentives, and that the observance of this law is duty.
For the purpose of achieving this it is of the utmost importance to take warning
that we must not let ourselves think of wanting to derive the reality of this
principle from the special property of human nature. For, duty is to be practical
unconditional necessity of action and it must therefore hold for all rational
beings (to which alone an imperative can apply at all) and only because of this
be also a law for all human wills. On the other hand, what is derived from the
special natural constitution of humanity - what is derived from certain feelings
and propensities and even, if possible, from a special tendency that would be
peculiar to human reason and would not have to hold necessarily for the will of
every rational being - that can indeed yield a maxim for us but not a law; it can
yield a subjective principle on which we might act if we have the propensity and
inclination,* but not an objective principle on which we would be directed to act
even though every propensity, inclination, and natural tendency of ours were
•' Widerstand
* nach welchem wir handeln zu dürfen Hang und Neigung haben
76
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
against it - so much so that the sublimity and inner dignity of the command in
a duty is all the more manifest the fewer are the subjective causes in favor of it
and the more there are against it, without thereby weakening in the least the
necessitation by the law or taking anything away from its validity.
Here, then, we see philosophy put in fact in a precarious position, which is to
be firm even though there is nothing in heaven or on earth from which it
depends or on which it is based. Here philosophy is to manifest its purity as
sustainer of its own laws, not as herald of laws that an implanted sense or who
knows what tutelary nature whispers to it, all of which - though they may
always be better than nothing at all - can still never yield basic principles that
reason dictates and that must have their 4:426 source entirely and completely a
priori and, at the same time, must have their commanding authority from this:
that they expect nothing from the inclination of human beings but everything
from the supremacy of the law and the respect owed it or, failing this, condemn
the human being to contempt for himself and inner abhorrence.
Hence everything empirical, as an addition' to the principle of morality, is not
only quite inept for this; it is also highly prejudicial to the purity of morals,
where the proper worth of an absolutely good will - a worth raised above all
price - consists just in the principle of action being free from all influences of
contingent grounds, which only experience can furnish. One cannot give too
many or too frequent warnings against this laxity, or even mean cast of mind,
which seeks its principle among empirical motives and laws; for, human reason
in its weariness gladly rests on this pillow and in a dream of sweet illusions
(which allow it to embrace a cloud instead of Juno) it substitutes for morality a
bastard patched up from Umbs of quite diverse ancestry, which looks like
whatever one wants to see in it but not like virtue for him who has once seen
virtue in her true form.*
The question is therefore this: is it a necessary law for all rational beings always
to appraise their actions in accordance with such maxims as they themselves
could will to serve as universal laws? If there is such a law, then it must already
be connected (completely a priori) with the concept of the will of a rational being
as such. But in order to discover this connection we must, however reluctantly,
step forth, namely into metaphysics, although into a domain" of it that is
distinct from speculative philosophy, namely 4:427
*To behold virtue in her proper form is nothing other than to present morality
stripped of any admixture of the sensible and of any spurious adornments of
reward or self-love. By means of the least effort of his reason everyone can
easily become aware of how much virtue then eclipses everything else that
appears charming to the inclinations, provided his reason is not altogether
spoiled for abstraction.
Zutat, literally "an ornament"
" Gebiet
77
IMMANUEL KANT
into metaphysics of morals. In a practical philosophy, where we have to do not
with assuming" grounds for what happens but rather laws for what ought to
happen even if it never does, that is, objective practical laws, we do not need to
undertake an investigation into the grounds on account of which something
pleases or displeases; how the satisfaction of mere sensation differs from taste,
and whether the latter differs from a general satisfaction of reason; upon what
the feeling of pleasure of displeasure rests, and how from it desires and
inclinations arise, and from them, with the cooperation of reason, maxims; for,
all that belongs to an empirical doctrine of the soul," which would constitute
the second part of the doctrine of nature when this is regarded as philosophy of
nature insofar as it is based on empirical laws. Here, however, it is a question of
objective practical laws and hence of the relation of a will to itself insofar as it
determines itself only by reason; for then everything that has reference to the
empirical falls away of itself, since if reason entirely by itself determines
conduct (and the possibility of this is just what we want now to investigate), it
must necessarily do so a priori.
The will is thought as a capacity to determine itself to acting in conformity with
the representation of certain laws. And such a capacity can be found only in
rational beings. Now, what serves the will as the objective ground of its selfdetermination is an end, and this, if it is given by reason alone, must hold
equally for all rational beings. What, on the other hand, contains merely the
ground of the possibiUty of an action the effect of which is an end is called a
means. The subjective ground of desire is an incentive; the objective ground of
volition is a motive; hence the distinction between subjective ends, which rest
on incentives, and objective ends, which depend on motives, which hold for
every rational being. Practical 4:428 principles are, formal if they abstract from
all subjective ends, whereas they are material if they have put these, and
consequently certain incentives, at their basis. The ends that a rational being
proposes at his discretion as effects of his actions (material ends) are all only
relative; for only their mere relation to a specially constituted^ faculty of desire
on the part of the subject gives them their worth, which can therefore furnish
no universal principles, no principles valid and necessary for all rational beings
and also for every volition, that is, no practical laws. Hence all these relative
ends are only the ground of hypothetical imperatives.
But suppose there were something the existence of which in itself has an
absolute worth, something which as an end in itself could be a ground of
determinate laws; then in it, and in it alone, would lie the ground of a possible
categorical imperative, that is, of a practical law.
" anzunehmen
° Seelenlehre
^ geartetes
78
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
Now I say that the human being and in general every rational being exists as an
end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its
discretion; instead he must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or
also to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end. All
objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth; for, if there were not
inclinations and the needs based on them, their object would be without worth.
But the inclinations themselves, as sources of needs, are so far from having an
absolute worth, so as to make one wish to have them,* that it must instead be
the universal wish of every rational being to be altogether free from them. Thus
the worth of any object to be acquired by our action is always conditional.
Beings the existence of which rests not on our will but on nature, if they are
beings without reason, still have only a relative worth, as means, and are
therefore called things/ whereas rational beings are called persons because
their nature already marks them out as and end in itself, that is, as something
that may not be used merely as a means, and hence so far limits all choice (and
is an object of respect). These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends, the
existence of which as an effect of our action has a worth for us, but rather
objective ends, that is, beings' the existence of which is in itself an end, and
indeed one such that no other end, to which they would serve merely as means,
can be put in its place, since vdthout it nothing of absolute worth would be
found anywhere; but if all worth were conditional and therefore contingent,
then no supreme practical principle for reason could be found anywhere.
If, then, there is to be a supreme practical principle and, with respect to the
human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one such that, from the
representation of what is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in
itself, it constitutes an objective principle of the will and thus can serve as a
universal practical law.' The ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as
an end in itself. The human being necessarily represents his 4:429 own
existence in this way; so far it is thus a subjective principle of human actions.
But every other rational being also represents his existence in this way
consequent on" just the same rational ground that also holds for me;* thus it is
at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme
*Here I put forward this proposition as a postulate. The grounds for it will be
found in the last Section. ' urn sie seihst zu wünschen ' Sachen ' Dinge. Although
both Sache and Ding would usually be translated as "thing," Sache has the
technical sense of something usable that does not have free choice, i.e., ^Sache
ist ein Din^ to which nothing can be imputed {The Metaphysics of Morals 6:223).
ausmacht, mithin zum allgemeinen praktischen Gesetz dienen kann. It is not
clear, grammatically, whether the subject of "can serve" is "end in itself" or
"objective principle."
" zufolge
79
IMMANUEL KANT
practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. The practical
imperative will therefore be the following: So act that you use humanity, whether
in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an
end, never merely as a means. We shall see whether this can be carried out.
To keep to the preceding examples: First, as regards the concept of necessary
duty to oneself, someone who has suicide'' in mind will ask himself whether his
action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he
destroys himself in order to escape from a trying condition he makes use of a
person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life.
A human being, however, is not a thing and hence not something that can be
used merely as a means, but must in all his actions always be regarded as an
end in itself I cannot, therefore, dispose of a human being in my own person by
maiming, damaging or killing him. (I must here pass over a closer
determination of this principle that would prevent any misinterpretation, e.g.,
as to having limbs amputated in order to preserve myself, or putting my life in
danger in order to preserve my life, and so forth; that belongs to morals proper.)
Second, as regards necessary duty to others or duty owed"' them, he who has it
in mind to make a false promise to others sees at once that he wants to make
use of another human being merely as a means, without the other at the same
time containing in himself the end. For, he whom I want to use for my 4:430
purposes by such a promise cannot possibly agree to my way of behaving
toward him, and so himself contain the end of this action. This conflict with the
principle of other human beings is seen more distinctly if examples of assaults
on the freedom and property of others are brought forward. For then it is
obvious that he who transgresses the rights of human beings intends to make
use of the person of others merely as means, without taking into consideration
that, as rational beings, they are always to be valued at the same time as ends,
that is, only as beings who must also be able to contain in themselves the end
of the very same action.*
Third, with respect to contingent (meritorious) duty to oneself, it is not enough
that the action does not conflict with humanity in our person as an
*Let it not be thought that the trite quod tibi non vis fieri etc.* can serve as norm
of principle here. For it is, though with various limitations, only derived from
the latter. It can be no universal law because it contains the ground neither of
duties to oneself nor of duties of love to others (for many a man would gladly
agree that others should not benefit him if only he might be excused from
showing them beneficence), and finally it does not contain the ground of duties
owed to others; for a criminal would argue on this ground against the judge
punishing him, and so forth. " Selbstmorde, perhaps "murdering himself In The
Metaphysics of Morals, Selbstmord {homoddium dolosum), is carefully
distinguished from Selbstentleibung (suiädium) (6:421-4). "" schuldige ' what you
do not want others to do to you, etc. [i.e., don't do the same to them].
80
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
end in itself; it must also harmonize with it. Now there are in humanity
predispositions^ to greater perfection, which belong to the end of nature with
respect to humanity in our subject; to neglect these might admittedly be
consistent with the preservation of humanity as an end in itself but not with the
furtherance of this end.
Fourth, concerning meritorious duty to others, the natural end that all human
beings have is their own happiness. Now, humanity might indeed subsist if no
one contributed to the happiness of others but yet did not intentionally
withdraw anything from it; but there is still only a negative and not a positive
agreement with humanity as an end in itself unless everyone also tries, as far as
he can, to further the ends of others. For, the ends of a subject who is an end in
itself must as far as possible be also my ends, if that representation is to have
its full effect in me.
This principle of humanity, and in general of every rational nature, as an end in
itself {which is the supreme limiting condition of the freedom of action 4:431 of
every human being) is not borrowed from experience; first because of its
universality, since it applies to all rational beings as such and no experience is
sufficient to determine anything about them; second because in it humanity is
represented not as an end of human beings (subjectively), that is, not as an
object that we of ourselves actually make our end, but as an objective end that,
whatever ends we may have, ought as law to constitute the supreme limiting
condition of all subjective ends, so that the principle must arise from pure
reason. That is to say, the ground of all practical lawgiving lies (in accordance
with the first principle) objectively in the rule and the form of universality which
makes it fit to be a law (possibly^ a law of nature); subjectively, however, it lies
in the end; but the subject of all ends is every rational being as an end in itself
(in accordance with the second principle); from this there follows now the third
practical principle of the will, as supreme condition of its harmony with
universal practical reason, the idea of the mill of every rational being as a will
giving universal law.
In accordance with this principle all maxims are repudiated that are
inconsistent with the will's own giving of universal law. Hence the will is not
merely subject to the law but subject to it in such a way that it must be viewed
as also giving the law to itself and just because of this as first subject to the law
(of which it can regard itself as the author).*
Imperatives as they were represented above - namely in terms of the conformity
of actions with universal law similar to a natural order or of the universal
supremacy as ends' of rational beings in themselves - did exclude
•' Anlagen
' allenfalls
' Or "as itself lawgiying,"
ak selbstgesetzgebend Urheber
' Zweckvorzuges
81
IMMANUEL KANT
from their commanding authority any admixture of interest as incentive, just by
their having been represented as categorical; but they were only assumed'' to be
categorical because we had to make such an assumption if we wanted to
explain the concept of duty. But that there are practical propositions which
command categorically could not itself be proved/ any more than it could be
proved either here or anywhere else in this section; one thing, however, could
still have been done: namely, to indicate in the imperative itself the
renunciation of all interest, in volition from duty, by means of some
determination the imperative contains, as the specific 4:432 mark
distinguishing^ categorical from hypothetical imperatives; and this is done in
the present third formula of the principle, namely the idea of the will of every
rational being as a will giving universal law.
For when we think a will of this kind, then although a will that stands under
law may be bound to this law by means of some interest, a will that is itself the
supreme lawgiver cannot possibly, as such, depend upon some interest; for, a
will that is dependent in this way would itself need yet another law that would
limit the interest of its self-love to the condition of a validity for universal law.
Thus the principle of every human will as a will giving universal law through all
its maxims* provided it is otherwise correct, would be very well suited to be the
categorical imperative by this: that just because of the idea of giving universal
law it is based on no interest and therefore, among all possible imperatives, can
alone be unconditional; or still better, by converting the proposition, if there is a
categorical imperative (i.e., a law for every will of a rational being) it can only
command that everything be done from the maxim of one's will as a will that
could at the same time have as its object itself as giving universal law; for only
then is the practical principle, and the imperative that the will obeys,
unconditional, since it can have no interest as its basis.
If we look back upon all previous efforts that have ever been made to discover
the principle of morality, we need not wonder now why all of them had to fail. It
was seen that the human being is bound to laws by his duty, but it never
occurred to them that he is subject only to laws given by himself but still
universal and that he is bound only to act in conformity with his own will,
which, however, in accordance with nature's end^ is a will giving universal law.
For, if one thought of him only as subject to a law 4-433 (whatever it may be),
this law had to carry with it some interest by way of
*I may be excused from citing examples to illustrate this principle, since those
that have already illustrated the categorical imperative and its formula can all
serve for the same end here. "
* angenommen
' bewiesen werden
^ Untencheidungszeichen
' dem Naturztpecke nach
82
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
attraction or constraint, since it did not as a law arise from his will; in order to
conform with the law, his will had instead to be constrained by something else
to act in a certain way.* By this quite necessary consequence, however, all the
labor to find a supreme ground of duty was irretrievably lost. For, one never
arrived at duty but instead at the necessity of an action from a certain interest.
This might be one's own or another's interest. But then the imperative had to
turn out always conditional and could not be fit for a moral command. I will
therefore call this basic principle the principle of the autonomy of the will in
contrast with every other, which I accordingly count as heteronomy.
The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as giving
universal law through all the maxims of his will, so as to appraise himself and
his actions from this point of view, leads to a very fruitful concept dependent
upon it,' namely that of a kingdom' of ends.
By a kingdom I understand a systematic union of various rational beings
through common laws. Now since laws determine ends in terms of their
universal validity, if we abstract from the personal differences of rational beings
as well as from all the content of their private ends we shall be able to think of a
whole of all ends in systematic connection (a whole both of rational beings as
ends in themselves and of the ends of his own that each may set himself), that
is, a kingdom of ends, which is possible in accordance with the above principles.
For, all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat himself
and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as ends in
themselves. But from this there arises a systematic union of rational beings
through common objective laws, that is, a kingdom, which can be called a
kingdom of ends (admittedly only an ideal) because what these laws have as
their purpose is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and
means.
A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when he gives
universal laws in it but is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as
sovereign'' when, as lawgiving, he is not subject to the will of any other.
A rational being must always regard himself as lawgiving in a kingdom 4:434 of
ends possible through freedom of the will, whether as a member or as sovereign.
He cannot, however, hold the position of sovereign merely by the maxims of his
will but only in case he is a completely independent being, without needs and
with unlimited resources' adequate to his will.
sondern dieser gesetzmässig von etmas anderm genötigt wurde, auf gewisse
Weise zu handeln ' Or "attached to it,"
ihm anhangenden
' Reich, which could also be translated "commonwealth" •
* als Oberhaupt
' Vermögen
83
IMMANUEL KANT
Morality consists, then, in the reference of all action to the lawgiving by which
alone a kingdom of ends is possible. This lawgiving must, however, be found in
every rational being himself and be able to arise from his will, the principle of
which is, accordingly: to do no action on any other maxim than one such that it
would be consistent with it to be a universal law, and hence to act only so that
the will could regard itself as at the same time giving universal law through its
maxim. Now, if maxims are not already of their nature in agreement with this
objective principle of rational beings as givers of universal law, the necessity of
an action in accordance with this principle is called practical necessitation, that
is, duty. Duty does not apply to the sovereign in the kingdom of ends, but it
does apply to every member of it and indeed to all in equal measure.
The practical necessity of acting in accordance with this principle, that is, duty,
does not rest at all on feelings, impulses, and inclinations but merely on the
relation of rational beings to one another, in which the will of a rational being
must always be regarded as at the same time lawgiving, since otherwise it could
not be thought as an end in itself. Reason accordingly refers every maxim of the
will as giving universal law to every other will and also to every action toward
oneself, and does so not for the sake of any other practical motive or any future
advantage but from the idea oi the dignity of a rational being, who obeys no law
other than that which he himself at the same time gives.
In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity."" What has a
price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what on the other
hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a
dignity.
What is related to general human inclinations and needs has a market price;
that which, even without presupposing a need, conforms with a 4:435 certain
taste, that is, with a deUght" in the mere purposeless" play of our mental
powers, has a fancy price;'' but that which constitutes the condition under
which alone something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth,
that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is, dignity. Now, morality is the
condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in itself, since only
through this is it possible to be a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends.
Hence morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which
alone has dignity. Skill and diligence in work have a market price; wit, lively
imagination and humor have a fancy price; on the other hand, fidelity in
promises and benevolence from basic principles (not from instinct) have an
inner worth. Nature, as well as
" Würde
" Wohlgefallen
' zwecklosen
' Affeaionspreis
84
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
art, contains nothing that, lacking these, it could put in their place; for their
worth does not consist in the effects arising from them, in the advantage and
use they provide, but in dispositions,* that is, in maxims of the vdll that in this
way are ready to manifest themselves through actions, even if success does not
favor them. Such actions also need no recommendation from any subjective
disposition"^ or taste, so as to be looked upon with immediate favor and delight,
nor do they need any immediate propensity or feeling for them; they present the
will that practices them as the object of an immediate respect, and nothing but
reason is required to impose them upon the will, not to coax them from it, which
latter would in any case be a contradiction in the case of duties. This estimation
therefore lets the worth of such a cast of mind be cognized as dignity and puts
it infinitely above all price, with which it cannot be brought into comparison or
competition at all without, as it were, assaulting its holiness.'
And what is it, then, that justifies a morally good disposition, or virtue, in
making such high claims? It is nothing less than the share it affords a rational
being in the giving of universal laws, by which it makes him fit to be a member
of a possible kingdom of ends, which he was already destined to be by his own
nature as an end in itself and, for that very reason, as lawgiving in the kingdom
of ends - as free with respect to all laws of nature, obeying only those which he
himself gives and in accordance with which his maxims can belong to a giving
of universal law (to which at the same time he subjects himself). For, nothing
can have a worth other than 4:436 that which the law determines for it. But the
lawgiving itself, which determines all worth, must for that very reason have a
dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth; and the word respect
alone provides a becoming expression for the estimate of it that a rational being
must give. Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and
of every rational nature.
The above three ways of representing the principle of morality are at bottom
only so many formulae of the very same law, and any one of them of itself
unites the other two in it. There is nevertheless a difference among them, which
is indeed subjectively rather than objectively practical, intended namely to bring
an idea of reason closer to intuition (by a certain analogy) and thereby to feeling.
All maxims have, namely, i) a. form, which consists in universality; and in this
respect the formula of the moral imperative is expressed thus: that maxims
must be chosen' as if they were to hold as universal laws of nature; 2) a matter,
namely an end, and in this respect the formula says that a
' Gesinnungen
' Disposition
' Heiligkeit
' so müssen gewählt werden
85
IMMANUEL KANT
rational being, as an end by its nature and hence as an end in itself, must in
every maxim serve as the limiting condition of all merely relative and arbitrary"
ends; 3) a complete determination of all maxims by means ofthat formula,
namely that all maxims from one's own lawgiving are to harmonize with a
possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of nature.* A progression takes
place here, as through the categories of the unity of the form of the will (its
universality), the plurality of the matter (of objects, i.e., of ends), and the
allness" or totality of the system of these. But one does better always to proceed
in moral appraisal by the strict method and put at its 4:437 basis the universal
formula of the categorical imperative: act in accordance with a maxim that can at
the same time make itself a universal law. If, however, one wants also to provide
access for the moral law, it is very useful to bring one and the same action
under the three concepts mentioned above and thereby, as far as possible,
bring it closer to intuition.
We can now end where we set out from at the beginning, namely with the
concept of a will unconditionally good. That will is absolutely good which cannot
be evil, hence whose maxim, if made a universal law, can never conflict with
itself This principle is, accordingly, also its supreme law: act always on that
maxim whose universality as a law you can at the same time will; this is the
sole condition under which a will can never be in conflict with itself, and such
an imperative is categorical. Since the validity of the will as a universal law for
possible actions has an analogy with the universal connection of the existence
of things in accordance with universal laws, which is the formal aspect of
nature in general, the categorical imperative can also be expressed thus: aä in
accordance with maxims that can at the same time have as their object
themselves as universal laws of nature. In this way, then, the formula of an
absolutely good will is provided. Rational nature is distinguished from the rest
of nature by this, that it sets itself an end. This end would be the matter of
every good will. But since, in the idea of a wfll absolutely good without any
limiting condition (attainment of this or that end) abstraction must be made
altogether from every end to be effeaed (this would make every wiU only
relatively good), the end must here be thought not as an end to be effected but
as an independently existing end, and hence thought only negatively, that is, as
*Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends, morals considers a possible
kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature. In the former the kingdom of ends is a
theoretical idea for explaining what exists. In the latter, it is a practical idea for
the sake of bringing about, in conformity with this very idea, that which does
not exist but which can become real by means of our conduct.
" willkürlichen
^Allheit "
" selbstständiger
86
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
that which must never be acted against and which must therefore in every
volition be estimated never merely as a means but always at the same time as
an end. Now, this end can be nothing other than the subject of all possible ends
itself, because this subject is also the subject of a possible absolutely good will;
for, such a will cannot without contradiction be subordinated to any other
object. The principle, so act with reference to every rational being (yourself and
others) that in your maxim it holds at the same time as an end in itself, is thus
at bottom the same as the basic principle, act on a maxim that at the same time
4:438 contains in itself its own universal validity for every rational being. For, to
say that in the use of means to any end I am to limit my maxim to the condition
of its universal validity as a law for every subject is tantamount to saying that
the subject of ends, that is, the rational being itself, must be made the basis of
all maxims of actions, never merely as a means but as the supreme limiting
condition in the use of all means, that is, always at the same time as an end.
Now, from this it follows incontestably that every rational being, as an end in
itself, must be able to regard himself as also giving universal laws with respect
to any law whatsoever to which he may be subject; for, it is just this fitness of
his maxims for giving universal law that marks him out as an end in itself; it
also follows that this dignity (prerogative) he has over all merely natural beings
brings with it that he must always take his maxims from the point of view of
himself, and likewise every other rational being, as lawgiving beings (who for
this reason are also called persons). Now in this way a world of rational beings
(mundus intelligibilisY as a kingdom of ends is possible, through the giving of
their own laws^ by all persons as members. Consequently, every rational being
must act as if he were by his maxims at all times a lawgiving member of the
universal kingdom of ends. The formal principle of these maxims is, act as if
your maxims were to serve at the same time as a universal law (for all rational
beings). A kingdom of ends is thus possible only by analogy with a kingdom of
nature; the former, however, is possible only through maxims, that is, rules
imposed upon oneself, the latter only through laws of externally necessitated
efficient causes. Despite this, nature as a whole, even though it is regarded as a
machine, is still given the name "a kingdom of nature" insofar as and because it
has reference to'' rational beings as its ends. Now, such a kingdom of ends
would actually come into existence through maxims whose rule the categorical
imperative prescribes to all rational beings if they were universally followed. It is
true that, even though a rational being scrupulously follows this maxim himself,
he cannot for that reason
' intelligible world
^ durch die eigene Gesetzgebung
87
IMMANUEL KANT
count upon every other to be faithful to the same maxim nor can he count upon
the kingdom of nature and its purposive order to harmonize with him, as a
fitting member, toward a kingdom of ends possible through himself, that is,
upon its favoring his expectation of happiness; neverthe- 4:439 less that law,
act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a
merely possible kingdom of ends, remains in its full force because it commands
categorically. And just in this Ues the paradox that the mere dignity of
humanity as rational nature, without any other end or advantage to be attained
by it - hence respect for a mere idea - is yet to serve as an inflexible precept of
the will, and that it is just in this independence of maxims from all such
incentives that their sublimity consists, and the worthiness of every rational
subject to be a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends; for otherwise he
would have to be represented only as subject to the natural law of his needs.
Even if the kingdom of nature as well as the kingdom of ends were thought as
united under one sovereign, so that the latter would no longer remain a mere
idea but would obtain true reality, it would no doubt gain the increment of a
strong incentive but never any increase of its inner worth; for, even this sole
absolute lawgiver would, despite this, still have to be represented as appraising
the worth of rational beings only by their disinterested conduct, prescribed to
themselves merely from that idea. The essence of things is not changed by their
external relations; and that which, without taking account of such relations,
alone constitutes the worth of a human being is that in terms of which he must
also be appraised by whoever does it, even by the supreme being. Morality is
thus the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, that is, to a possible
giving of universal law through its maxims. An action that can coexist with the
autonomy of the will is permitted; one that does not accord with it is forbidden.
A will whose maxims necessarily harmonize with the laws of autonomy is a holy,
absolutely good will. The dependence upon the principle of autonomy of a will
that is not absolutely good (moral necessitation) is obligation. This, accordingly,
cannot be attributed to a holy being. The objective necessity of an action from
obligation is called duty.
From what has just been said it is now easy to explain how it happens that,
although in thinking the concept of duty we think of subjection to the 4:440 law,
yet at the same time we thereby represent a certain sublimity and dignity in the
person who fulfills all his duties. For there is indeed no sublimity in him insofar
as he is subjea to the moral law, but there certainly is insofar as he is at the
same time latpgivingvAxh respect to it and only for that reason subordinated to
it. We have also shown above how neither fear nor inclination but simply
respect for the law is that incentive which can give actions a moral worth. Our
own will insofar as it would act only under the condition of a possible giving of
universal law through its maxims - this will possible for us in idea - is the
proper object of respect; and the
88
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
dignity of humanity consists just in this capacity to give universal law, though
with the condition of also being itself subject to this very lawgiving.
AUTONOMY OF THE WILL AS THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY
Autonomy of the will is the property" of the will by which it is a law to itself
(independently of any property of the objects of volition). The principle of
autonomy is, therefore: to choose only in such a way that the maxims of your
choice* are also included' as universal law in the same volition. That this
practical rule is an imperative, that is, that the will of every rational being is
necessarily bound to it as a condition, cannot be proved by mere analysis'^ of
the concepts to be found in it, because it is a synthetic proposition; one would
have to go beyond cognition of objects to a critique of the subject, that is, of
pure practical reason, since this synthetic proposition, which commands
apodictically, must be capable of being cognized completely a priori. This
business, however, does not belong in the present section. But that the above
principle of autonomy is the sole principle of morals can well be shown by mere
analysis of the concepts of morality. For, by this analysis we find that its
principle must be a categorical imperative, while this commands neither more
nor less than just this autonomy.
HETERONOMY OF THE WILL 4:441 AS THE SOURCE OF ALL SPURIOUS
PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY
If the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness
of its maxims for its own giving of universal law - consequendy if, in going
beyond itself, it seeks this law in a property of any of its objects - heteronomy
always results. The will in that case does not give itself the law; instead the
object, by means of its relation to the will, gives the law to it. This relation,
whether it rests upon inclination or upon representations of reason, lets only
hypothetical imperatives become possible: I ought to do something because I
will something else. On the contrary, the moral and therefore categorical
imperative says: I ought to act in such or such a way even though I have not
willed anything else. For example, the former says: I ought not to lie if I will to
keep my reputation; but the latter says: I ought
" Beschaffenheit zu wählen also so, doss die Maximen seiner Wahl Kant has
apparentiy not yet drawn the distinction between Wille ("the will") and Willkür
("choice" or "the power of choice") so prominent in The Metaphysics of Morals. '
mit begriffen säen
'' Zergliederung
89
IMMANUEL KANT
not to lie even though it would not bring me the least discredit. The latter must
therefore abstract from all objects to this extent: that they have no influence at
all on the will, so that practical reason (the will) may not merely administer an
interest not belonging to it/ but may simply show its own commanding
authority as supreme lawgiving. Thus, for example, I ought to try to further the
happiness of others, not as if its existence were of any consequence to me
(whether because of immediate inclination or because of some indirect
agreeableness through reason), but simply because a maxim that excludes this
cannot be included as a universal law in one and the same volition.
DIVISION
OF ALL POSSIBLE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY TAKEN FROM HETERONOMY
ASSUMED AS THE BASIC CONCEPT
Here, as everywhere else, human reason in its pure use, as long as it lacks a
critique, first tries all possible wrong ways before it succeeds in finding the only
true way.
All principles that can be taken from this point of view are either 4:442
empirical or rational. The first, taken from the principle oi happiness, are built
upon physical or moral feeling; the second, taken from the principle oi
perfection, are built either upon the rational concept of perfection as a possible
effect of our will or upon the concept of an independently existing perfection
(the will of God) as the determining cause of our will.
Empirical principles are not at all fit to be the ground of moral laws. For, the
universality with which these are to hold for all rational beings without
distinction - the unconditional practical necessity which is thereby imposed
upon them - comes to nothing if their ground is taken from the special
constitution of human nature or the contingent circumstances in which it is
placed. The principle of one's own happiness, however, is the most objectionable,
not merely because it is false and experience contradicts the pretense that wellbeing always proportions itself to good conduct, nor yet merely because it
contributes nothing at all to the establishment of morality, since making
someone happy is quite different from making him good, or making him
prudent and sharp-sighted for his own advantage is quite different from making
him virtuous; it is the most objectionable because it bases morality on
incentives that undermine it and destroy all its sublimity, since they put
motives to virtue and those to vice in one class and only teach us to calculate
better, but quite obliterate
'fremdes Interesse. Fremd is also translated as "alien," "foreign," or "another's."
90
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
the specific difference between virtue and vice. On the other hand, moral feeUng
- this supposed special sense,* (however superficial the appeal to it is,
inasmuch as those who cannot think believe they can help themselves out by
feeling in what has to do merely with universal law,-'^ and however Uttle
feehngs, which by nature differ infinitely from one another in degree, can
furnish a uniform standard of good and evil, and one cannot judge validly for
others by means of one's feeling) - nevertheless remains closer to morality and
its dignity inasmuch as it shows virtue the honor of ascribing to her
immediately the delight^ and esteem we have for her and 4=443 does not, as it
were, tell her to her face that it is not her beauty but only our advantage that
attaches us to her.
Among the rational grounds of morality or those based on reason,* the
ontological concept of perfeäion (however empty, however indeterminate and
hence useless it is for finding, in the immeasurable field of possible reality, the
greatest sum appropriate to us; and however much, in trying to distinguish
specifically the reality here in question from every other, it has an unavoidable
propensity to get involved in a circle and cannot avoid covertly presupposing the
morality which it is supposed to explain) is nevertheless better than the
theological concept, which derives morality from a divine, all-perfect will; it is
better not merely because we cannot intuit the perfection of this will but can
only derive it from our concepts, among which that of moraHty is foremost, but
because if we do not do this (and to do it would be a grossly circular
explanation), the concept of his will still left to us, made up of the attributes' of
desire for glory and dominion combined with dreadful representations of power
and vengefulness, would have to be the foundation for a system of morals that
would be directly opposed to morality.
But if I had to choose between the concept of the moral sense and that of
perfection generally (both of which at least do not infringe upon morality, even
though they are not at all fit to support it as its foundation), then I should
decide-' for the latter; for, since it at least withdraws the decision of the
question from sensibility and brings it to the court of pure reason,
*I count the principle of moral feeling under that of happiness because every
empirical interest promises to contribute to our well-being by the agreeableness
that something affords, whether this happens immediately and without a view
to advantage or with regard for it. One must likewise, with Hutcheson,' count
the principle of sympathy with the happiness of others under the moral sense
assumed by him. It is not altogether clear whether the clause "in what has to do
merely with universal law" modifies "think" or "feeling."
' Wohlgefallen Unter den rationalen oder Vemunflgründen '
Eigenschaflen
^ bestimmen
91
IMMANUEL KANT
even though it decides nothing there it still preserves the indeterminate idea (of
a will good in itself) unfalsified, for closer determination. For the rest, I believe I
may be excused from a lengthy refutation of all these doctrines.* That is so easy,
and is presumably so well seen even by those whose office requires them to
declare themselves for one of these theories (because their hearers would not
tolerate suspension of judgment), that it would be merely superfluous labor.
But what interests us more here is to know that all these principles set up
nothing other than heteronomy of the will as the first ground of morality, and
just because of this they must necessarily fail in their end.
4:444 Wherever an object of the will has to be laid down as the basis for
prescribing the rule that determines the will, there the rule is none other than
heteronomy; the imperative is conditional, namely: if or because one wills this
object, one ought to act in such or such a way; hence it can never command
morally, that is, categorically. Whether the object determines the will by means
of inclination, as in the principle of one's own happiness, or by means of reason
directed to objects of our possible volition in general, as in the principle of
perfection, the will never determines itself immediately, just by the
representation of an action, but only by means of an incentive that the
anticipated effect of the action has upon the will: / ought to cb something on this
account, that I mil something else, and here yet another law must be put as a
basis in me, the subject, in accordance with which I necessarily will this
something else, which law in turn needs an imperative that would limit this
maxim. For, because the impulse that the representation of an object possible
through our powers is to exert on the will of the subject in accordance with his
natural constitution belongs to the nature of the subject - whether to his
sensibility (inclination and taste) or to his understanding and reason, which by
the special constitution of their nature employ themselves with delight' upon an
object - it would, strictiy speaking, be nature that gives the law; and this, as a
law of nature, must not only be cognized and proved by experience - and is
therefore in itself contingent and hence unfit for an apodictic practical rule,
such as moral rules must be - but it is always only heteronomy of the will; the
will would not give itself the law but a foreign impulse would give the law to it
by means of the subject's nature, which is attuned to be receptive to it. An
absolutely good will, whose principle must be a categorical imperative, will
therefore, indeterminate with respect to all objects, contain merely the form of
volition as such and indeed as autonomy; that is, the fitness of the maxims of
every good will to make themselves into universal law is itself the sole law that
the will of evety rational being imposes upon
* Lehrhegriffe
' Wohlgefallen
92
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
itself, without having to put underneath it some incentive or interest as a basis.
How such a synthetic practical proposition is possible a priori and why it is
necessary is a problem whose solution does not lie within the bounds of
metaphysics of morals, and we have not here affirmed its truth, much less
pretended to have a proof of it in our power. By explicating the generally 4:445
received concept of morahty we showed only that an autonomy of the will
unavoidably depends upon it," or much rather lies at its basis. Thus whoever
holds morality to be something and not a chimerical idea without any truth
must also admit the principle of moraUty brought forward. This section then,
like the first, was merely analytic. That morality is no phantom - and this
follows if the categorical imperative, and with it the autonomy of the will, is true
and absolutely necessary as an a priori principle - requires a possible synthetic
use of pure practical reason, which use, however, we cannot venture upon
without prefacing it by a critique of this rational faculty itself, the main features
of which we have to present, sufficiently for our purpose, in the last section.
" anhänge, perhaps "is attached to it"
93
4:446 Section III Transition from metaphysics of morals to the critique of pure
practical reason
THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM IS THE KEY TO THE E X P L A N A T I O N " OF
THE AUTONOMY OF THE WILL
Will is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they are rational, and
freedom would be that property" of such causality that it can be efficient
independently of alien causes determining it, just as natural necessity is the
property of the causahty of all nonrational beings to be determined to activity
by the influence of alien causes.
The preceding definition*' of freedom is negative and therefore unfruitful for
insight into« its essence; but there flows from it & positive concept of freedom,
which is so much the richer and more fruitful. Since the concept of causality
brings with it that of laws in accordance with which, by something that we call
a cause, something else, namely an effect, must be posited, so freedom,
although it is not a property of the will in accordance with natural laws, is not
for that reason lawless but must instead be a causality in accordance with
immutable laws but of a special kind; for otherwise a free will would be an
absurdity.'^ Natural necessity was a heteronomy of efficient causes, since every
effect was possible only in accordance with the law that something else
determines the efficient 4:447 cause to causality; what, then, can freedom of
the will be other than autonomy, that is, the will's property of being a law to
itself? But the proposition, the will is in all its actions a law to itself, indicates
only the principle, to act on no other maxim than that which can also have as
object itself as a universal law. This, however, is precisely the formula of the
" Erklärung ° Eigenschafi ' Erklärung. On the translation o{ Erklärung see The
Metaphysics of Morals (6:226). ' einzusehen. As was noted above, Kant seems on
the whole to use einsehen informally. In the Jäsche Logik (g: 64-65), however,
he distinguishes seven levels oiErkenntnis in the general sense, the sixth of
which is einsehen (perspicere), i.e., to cognize through reason or a priori, and
the seventh begreifen {comprehendere), which adds to einsehen "sufficiently for
our purpose." Some passages in Section III, notably 4:459 and 460, suggest
that he has this distinction in mind.
' Unding ,
94
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
categorical imperative and is the principle of morality; hence a free will and a
will under moral laws are one and the same.
If, therefore, freedom of the will is presupposed, morality together with its
principle follows from it by mere analysis of its concept. But the principle of
morality - that an absolutely good will is that whose maxim can always contain
itself regarded as a universal law - is nevertheless always a synthetic
proposition; for, by analysis of the concept of an absolutely good will that
property of its maxim cannot be discovered. Such synthetic propositions are
possible only in this way: that the two cognitions are bound together' by their
connection with a third in which they are both to be found. The positive concept
of freedom provides this third cognition, which cannot be, as in the case of
physical causes, the nature of the sensible world (in the concept of which the
concepts of something as cause in relation to something else as effect come
together). What this third cognition is, to which freedom points us and of which
we have an idea a priori, cannot yet be shown here and now; nor can the
deduction of the concept of freedom from pure practical reason, and with it the
possibility of a categorical imperative as well, as yet be made comprehensible;
instead, some further preparation is required.
FREEDOM MUST BE PRESUPPOSED AS A PROPERTY OF THE WILL OF ALL
RATIONAL BEINGS
It is not enough that we ascribe freedom to our will on whatever ground, if we
do not have sufficient ground for attributing it also to all rational beings. For,
since morality serves as a law for us only as rational beings, it must also hold
for all rational beings; and since it must be derived solely from the property of
freedom, freedom must also be proved' as a property of all rational beings; and
it is not enough to demonstrate" it from certain supposed experiences of human
nature (though this is also absolutely 4:448 impossible and it can be
demonstrated only a priori), but it must be proved as belonging to the activity of
all beings whatever that are rational and endowed with a will. I say now: every
being that cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom is just because
of that really free in a practical respect, that is, all laws that are inseparably
bound up with freedom hold for him just as if his will had been validly
pronounced'^^ free also in itself and in theoretical philosophy.* Now I assert
that to every rational being
' untereinander verbunden werden
bewiesen
" darzutun
" gültigßr frei erklärt würde
*I follow this route - that of assuming freedom, sufficiently for our purpose, only
as laid down by rational beings merely in idea as a ground for their actions - so
that I need not be
95
IMMANUEL KANT
having a will we must necessarily lend the idea of freedom also, under which
alone he acts. For in such a being we think of a reason that is practical, that is,
has causahty with respect to its objects. Now, one cannot possibly think of a
reason that would consciously receive direction from any other quarter with
respect to its judgments, since the subject would then attribute the
determination of his judgment not to his reason but to an impulse. Reason
must regard itself as the author of its principles independently of alien
influences; consequently, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being it
must be regarded of itself as free, that is, the will of such a being cannot be a
will of his own except under the idea of freedom, and such a will must in a
practical respect' thus be attributed to every rational being.
OF THE INTEREST ATTACHING^ TO THE IDEAS OF MORALITY
We have finally traced the determinate concept of morality back to the idea of
freedom; but we could not even prove the latter as something real 4:449 in
ourselves and in human nature; we saw only that we must presuppose it if we
want to think of a being as rational and endowed with consciousness of his
causality with respect to actions, that is, with a will, and so we find that on just
the same grounds we must assign to every being endowed with reason and will
this property of determining himself to action under the idea of his freedom.
But there also flowed from the presupposition of this idea consciousness of a
law for acting: that subjective principles of actions, that is, maxims, must
always be so adopted that they can also hold as objective, that is, hold
universally as principles, and so serve for our own giving of universal laws. But
why, then, ought I to subject myself to this principle and do so imply as a
rational being, thus also subjecting to it all other beings endowed with reason.' I
am willing to admit that no interest impels me to do so, for that would not give a
categorical imperative; but I must still necessarily take an interest in it and
have insight into how this comes about; for this "ought" is strictly speaking a
"will"'' that holds for every rational being under the condition that reason in him
is practical without hindrance; but for beings
bound to prove freedom in its theoretical respect" as well. For even if the latter
is left unsettled, still the same laws hold for a being that cannot act otherwise
than under the idea of its own freedom as would bind a being that was actually
free. Thus we can escape here from the burden that weighs upon theory.
'Absicht ' in praktischer Absicht. The subject of "must be attributed" could be
either "this idea" or "such a will."
' welches den Ideen . . . anhängt
" dieses Sollen ist eigentlich ein Wollen
96
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
like us - who are also affected by sensibility, by incentives of a different kind,
and in whose case that which reason by itself would do is not always done —
that necessity of action is called only an "ought," and the subjective necessity is
distinguished from the objective.
It seems, then, that in the idea of freedom we have actually only presupposed
the moral law, namely the principle of the autonomy of the will itself, and could
not prove by itself its reality and objective necessity; and in that case we should
still have gained something considerable by at least determining the genuine
principle more accurately than had previously been done, but we should have
got no further with respect to its vaHdity and the practical necessity of
subjecting oneself to it; for, if someone asked us why the universal validity of
our maxim as a law must be the limiting condition of our actions, and on what
we base the worth we assign to this way of acting - a worth so great that there
can be no higher interest anywhere - and asked us how it happens that a
human being believes that only through this does he feel his personal worth, in
comparison with 4:450 which that of an agreeable or disagreeable condition" is
to be held as nothing, we could give him no satisfactory answer.
We do indeed find that we can take an interest in a personal characteristic* that
brings with it no interest at all in a condition, if only the former makes us fit to
participate in the latter in case reason were to effect the distribution, that is,
that mere worthiness to be happy, even without the motive of participating in
this happiness, can interest us of itself; but this judgment is in fact only the
result of the importance we have already supposed belongs to the moral law
(when by the idea of freedom we detach ourselves from all empirical interest);
but we cannot yet see, in this way, that we ought to detach ourselves from such
interest, that is, to regard ourselves as free in acting and so to hold ourselves
yet subject to certain laws in order to find merely in our own person a worth
that can compensate us for the loss of everything that provides a worth to our
condition; and we cannot yet see how this is possible, and hence on what
grounds' the moral law is binding.
It must be freely admitted that a kind of circle comes to light here from which,
as it seems, there is no way to escape. We take ourselves as free in the order of
efficient causes in order to think ourselves under moral laws in the order of
ends; and we afterwards think ourselves as subject to these laws because we
have ascribed to ourselves freedom of will: for, freedom and the will's ovm
lawgiving are both autonomy and hence reciprocal concepts, and for this very
reason one cannot be used to explain the other or to furnish a ground for it but
can at most be used only for the logical
" Zustand
' Beschaffenheit
' woher
97
IMMANUEL KANT
purpose of reducing apparendy different representations of the same object to
one single concept (as different fractions of equal value are reduced to their
lowest expression).
One resource, however, still remains to us, namely to inquire whether we do not
take a different standpoint when by means of freedom we think ourselves as
causes efficient a priori than when we represent ourselves in terms of our
actions as effects that we see before our eyes.
No subtle reflection is required to make the following remark, and one may
assume that the commonest understanding can make it, though in its 4:451
own way, by an obscure discrimination of judgment which it calls feeling: that
all representations which come to us involuntarily'' (as do those of the senses)
enable us to cognize objects only as they affect us and we remain ignorant of
what they may be in themselves so that, as regards representations of this kind,
even with the most strenuous attentiveness and distinctness that the
understanding can ever bring to them we can achieve only cognition of
appearances, never oi things in themselves. As soon as this distinction has once
been made (perhaps merely by means of the difference noticed between
representations given us from somewhere else and in which we are passive, and
those that we produce simply from ourselves and in which we show our activity),
then it follows of itself that we must admit and assume behind appearances
something else that is not appearance, namely things in themselves, although,
since we can never become acquainted with them but only with how they affect
us, we resign ourselves to being unable to come any closer to them or ever to
know what they are in themselves. This must yield a distinction, although a
crude one, between a world of sense and the world of understanding, the first of
which can be very different according to the difference of sensibility in various
observers of the world while the second, which is its basis, always remains the
same. Even as to himself, the human being cannot claim to cognize what he is
in himself through the cognizance he has by inner sensation. For, since he does
not as it were create himself and does not get his concept a priori but
empirically, it is natural that he can obtain information even about himself only
through inner sense and so only through the appearance of his nature and the
way in which his consciousness is affected - although beyond this constitution
of his own subject, made up of nothing but appearances, he must necessarily
assume something else lying at their basis, namely his ego as it may be
constituted in itself; and thus as regards mere perception and receptivity to
sensations he must count himself as belonging to the world of sense, but with
regard to what there may be of pure activity in him (what reaches
consciousness immediately and not through affection of the senses) he must
count himself as belonging to the intellectual world, of which however he has no
further cognizance.
'' ohne unsere Willkür
98
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
A reflective human being must come to a conclusion of this kind about all the
things that present themselves to him; presumably it is also to be 4:452 found
even in the most common understanding, which, as is well known, is very
much inclined to expect behind the objects of the senses something else
invisible and active of itself- but it spoils this again by quickly making this
invisible something sensible in turn, that is, wanting to make it an object of
intuition, so that it does not thereby become any the wiser.
Now, a human being really finds in himself a capacity by which he
distinguishes himself from all other things, even from himself insofar as he is
affected by objects, and that is reason. This, as pure self-activity, is raised even
above the understanding by this: that though the latter is also self-activity and
does not, like sense, contain merely representations that arise when we are
ajfected by things (and are thus passive), yet it can produce from its activity no
other concepts than those which serve merely to bring sensible representations
under rules and thereby to unite them in one consciousness, without which use
of sensibility it would think nothing at all; but reason, on the contrary, shows
in what we call "ideas" a spontaneity so pure that it thereby goes far beyond
anything that sensibility can ever afford it, and proves its highest occupation in
distinguishing the world of sense and the world of understanding from each
other and thereby marking out limits for the understanding itself.
Because of this a rational being must regard himself as intelligence (hence not
from the side of his lower powers) as belonging not to the world of sense but to
the world of understanding; hence he has two standpoints from which he can
regard himself and cognize laws for the use of his powers and consequentiy for
all his actions; first, insofar as he belongs to the world of sense, under laws of
nature (heteronomy); second, as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws
which, being independent of nature, are not empirical but grounded merely in
reason. As a rational being, and thus as a being belonging to the intelligible
world, the human being can never think of the causality of his own will
otherwise than under the idea of freedom; for, independence from the
determining causes of the world of sense (which reason must always ascribe to
itself) is freedom. With the idea of freedom the concept of autonomy is now
inseparably combined, and with the concept of autonomy the universal
principle of morality, which in idea is the ground of all actions of rational beings,
just as the law of nature is the ground of all 4:453 appearances.
The suspicion that we raised above is now removed, the suspicion that a hidden
circle was contained in our inference from freedom to autonomy and from the
latter to the moral law - namely that we perhaps took as a ground the idea of
freedom only for the sake of the moral law, so that we could afterwards infer the
latter in turn from freedom, and that we were thus unable to furnish any
ground at all for the moral law but could put it
99
IMMANUEL KANT
forward only as a petitio principii' disposed souls would gladly grant us, but
never as a demonstrable^proposition. For we now see that when we think of
ourselves as free we transfer ourselves into the world of understanding as
members of it and cognize autonomy of the will along with its consequence,
morality; but if we think of ourselves as put under obligation'* we regard
ourselves as belonging to the world of sense and yet at the same time to the
world of understanding.
HOW IS A CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE POSSIBLE.?
A rational being counts himself, as intelligence, as belonging to the world of
understanding, and only as an efficient cause belonging to this does he call his
causality a mil. On the other side he is also conscious of himself as a part of the
world of sense, in which his actions are found as mere appearances of that
causality; but their possibility from that causality of which we are not cognizant
cannot be seen; instead, those actions as belonging to the world of sense must
be regarded as determined by other appearances, namely desires and
inclinations. All my actions as only a member of the world of understanding
would therefore conform perfectiy with the principle of autonomy of the pure
will; as only a part of the world of sense they would have to be taken to conform
wholly to the natural law of desires and inclinations, hence to the heteronomy
of nature. (The former would rest on the supreme principle of morality, the
latter on that of happiness.) But because the world of understanding contains
the ground of the world of sense and so too of its laws, and is therefore
immediately lawgiving with respect to my will (which belongs wholly to the
world of understanding) and must accordingly also be thought as such, it
follows that I shall cognize myself as intelligence, though on the other side as a
being 4:454 belonging to the world of sense, as nevertheless subject to the law
of the world of understanding, that is, of reason, which contains in the idea of
freedom the law of the world of understanding, and thus cognize myself as
subject to the autonomy of the will; consequently the laws of the world of
understanding must be regarded as imperatives for me, and actions in
conformity with these as duties.
And so categorical imperatives are possible by this: that the idea of freedom
makes me a member of an intelligible world and consequently, if I were only
this, all my actions would always be in conformity with the autonomy of the will;
but since at the same time I intuit myself as a member of the world of sense,
they ought to be in conformity with it; and this categorical ought represents a
synthetic proposition a priori, since to my will affected
' Erbittung des Prinzips
^erweislichen
* als verpflichtet
100
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
by sensible desires there is added the idea of the same will but belonging to the
world of the understanding - a will pure and practical of itself, which contains
the supreme condition, in accordance with reason, of the former will; this is
roughly like the way in which concepts of the understanding, which by
themselves signify nothing but lawful form in general, are added to intuitions of
the world of sense and thereby make possible synthetic propositions a priori on
which all cognition of a nature rests.
The practical use of common human reason confirms the correctness of this
deduction. There is no one - not even the most hardened scoundrel, if only he is
otherwise accustomed to use reason - who, when one sets before him examples
of honesty of purpose, of steadfastness in following good maxims, of sympathy
and general benevolence (even combined with great sacrifices of advantage and
comfort), does not wish that he might also be so disposed. He cannot indeed
bring this about in himself, though only because of his inclinations and
impulses; yet at the same time he wishes to be free from such inclinations,
which are burdensome to himself Hence he proves, by this, that with a will free
from impulses of sensibility he transfers himself in thought into an order of
things altogether different from that of his desires in the field of sensibiUty,
since from that wish he can expect no satisfaction of his desires and hence no
condition* that would satisfy any of his actual or otherwise imaginable
inchnations (for if he expected this, the very idea which elicits that wish from
him would lose its preeminence); he can expect only a greater inner worth of his
person. This better person, however, he beUeves himself to be when he
transfers himself to the stand- 4:455 point of a member of the world of
understanding, as the idea of freedom, that is, of independence from
determining causes of the world of sense, constrains him involuntarily' to do;
and from this standpoint he is conscious of a good will that, by his own
acknowledgments, constitutes the law for his evil will as a member of the world
of sense - a law of whose authority he is cognizant even while he transgresses it.
The moral ''ought" is then his own necessary "mil" as a member of an intelligible
world, and is thought by him as "ought" only insofar as he regards himself at
the same time as a member of the world of sense.
ON THE EXTREME BOUNDARY OF ALL PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY
All human beings think of themselves as having free will.^ From this come all
judgments upon actions as being such that they ought to have been done even
though they were not done. Yet this freedom is no concept of experi' Zustand
' unwillkürlich
' denken sich dem Willen nach als frei
101
IMMANUEL KANT
ence, and moreover cannot be one, since it always remains even though
experience shows the opposite of those requirements that are represented as
necessary under the presupposition of freedom. On the other side, it is equally
necessary that everything which takes place should be determined without
exception in accordance with laws of nature; and this natural necessity is also
no concept of experience, just because it brings with it the concept of necessity
and hence of an a priori cognition. But this concept of a nature is confirmed by
experience and must itself unavoidably be presupposed if experience, that is,
coherent cognition of objects of the senses in accordance with universal laws, is
to be possible. Hence freedom is only an idea of reason, the objective reality of
which is in itself doubtful, whereas nature is a concept of the understanding
that proves, and must necessarily prove, its reality in examples from experience.
From this there arises a dialectic of reason since, with respect to the will, the
freedom ascribed to it seems to be in contradiction with natural necessity; and
at this parting of the ways reason for speculative purposes finds the road of
natural necessity much more traveled and more usable than that of freedom;
yet for practical purposes the footpath of freedom is 4:456 the only one on which
it is possible to make use of our reason in our conduct; hence it is just as
impossible for the most subtle philosophy as for the most common human
reason to argue freedom away. Philosophy must therefore assume that no true
contradiction will be found between freedom and natural necessity in the very
same human actions, for it cannot give up the concept of nature any more than
that of freedom. Nevertheless, this seeming contradiction must be removed in a
convincing way, even though we shall never be able to comprehend how
freedom is possible. For if even the thought of freedom contradicts itself or
contradicts nature, which is equally necessary, it would have to be given up
altogether in favor of natural necessity.
It would, however, be impossible to escape this contradiction if the subject who
seems to himself free thought of himself in the same sense or in the very same
relation when he calls himself free as when he takes himself to be subject to the
law of nature with regard to the same action. Hence it is an indispensable task
of speculative philosophy at least to show that its illusion* about the
contradiction rests on our thinking of the human being in a different sense and
relation when we call him free and when we hold him, as a part of nature, to be
subject to its laws, and to show that both not only can very well coexist but also
must be thought as necessarily united in the same subject; for otherwise no
ground could be given why we should burden reason with an idea which,
though it may without contradiction be united with another that is sufficiently
established, yet entangles us in a business that brings reason into difficult
straits in its theoretical use. This
* Täuschung
102
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
duty, however, is incumbent upon speculative philosophy only so that it may
clear the way for practical philosophy. Hence it is not left to the philosopher's
discretion whether he wants to remove the seeming conflict or leave it
untouched; for, in the latter case the theory about this would be bonum vacans,'
into possession of which the fatalist could justifiably enter and chase all morals
from its supposed property, as occupying it without title.
Nevertheless it cannot yet be said here that the boundary of practical
philosophy begins. For, the settlement of that controversy does not belong to it;
instead it only requires of speculative reason that it put an end to the discord in
which it entangles itself in theoretical questions, so that practi- 4:457 cal
reason may have tranquillity and security from the external attacks that could
make the land on which it wants to build a matter of dispute.
But the rightful claim™ to freedom of will made even by common human reason
is based on the consciousness and the granted presupposition of the
independence of reason from merely subjectively determining causes, all of
which together constitute what belongs only to feeling" and hence come under
the general name of sensibility. The human being, who this way regards himself
as an intelligence, thereby puts himself in a different order of things and in a
relation to determining grounds of an altogether different kind when he thinks
of himself as an intelligence endowed with a will, and consequentiy with
causality, than when he perceives himself as a phenomenon in the world of
sense (as he also really is) and subjects his causality to external determination
in accordance with laws of nature. Now he soon becomes aware that both can
take place at the same time, and indeed must do so. For, that a thing in
appearance (belonging to the world of sense) is subject to certain laws from
which as a thing or a being in itselfit is independent contains not the least
contradiction; that he must represent and think of himself in this twofold way,
however, rests as regards the first on consciousness of himself as an object
affected through the senses and as regards the second on consciousness of
himself as an intelligence, that is, as independent of sensible impressions in the
use of reason (hence as belonging to the world of understanding).
So it is that the human being claims for himself a will which lets nothing be put
to his account that belongs merely to his desires and inclinations, and on the
contrary thinks as possible by means of it - indeed as necessary - actions that
can be done only by disregarding all desires and sensible incitements. The
causahty of such actions lies in him as intelligence and in the laws of effects
and actions in accordance with principles of an intelligible world, of which he
knows nothing more than
i.e., something that belongs to no one
" Rechtsanspruch
" Empfindung
103
IMMANUEL KANT
that in it reason alone, and indeed pure reason independent of sensibility, gives
the law, and, in addition, that since it is there, as intelligence only, that he is
his proper self (as a human being he is only the appearance of himself), those
laws apply to him immediately and categorically, so that what inclinations and
impulses (hence the whole nature of the world of 4:458 sense) incite him to
cannot infringe upon the laws of his volition as intelligence; indeed, he does not
hold himself accountable for the former or ascribe them to his proper self, that
is, to his will, though he does ascribe to it the indulgence he would show them
if he allowed them to influence his maxims to the detriment of the rational laws
of his will. By thinking itself into a world of understanding practical reason does
not at all overstep its boundaries, but it would certainly do so if it wanted to
intuit or feel itself into it." That is only a negative thought with respect to the
world of sense: it gives reason no laws for determining the will and is positive
only in this single point: that freedom as a negative determination is combined
with a (positive) capacity as well, and indeed with a causality of reason that we
call a will, a capacity so to act that the principle of actions conforms with the
essential constitution of a rational cause, that is, with the condition of universal
vaUdity of a maxim as a law. But if practical reason were to fetch in addition an
objeä of the will, that is, a motive, from the world of understanding, then it
would overstep its bounds and pretend to be cognizant of something of which it
knows nothing. The concept of a world of understanding is thus only a
standpoint that reason sees itself constrained to take outside appearances in
order to think of itself as practical, as would not be possible if the influences of
sensibility were determining for the human being but is nevertheless necessary
insofar as he is not to be denied consciousness of himself as an intelligence and
consequendy as a rational cause active by means of reason, that is, operating
freely.^ This thought admittedly brings with it the idea of another order and
another lawgiving than that of the mechanism of nature, which has to do with
the sensible world; and it makes necessary the concept of an intelHgible world
(i.e., the whole of rational beings as things in themselves), but without the least
pretense to think of it further than in terms merely of its formal condition, that
is, of the universality of maxims of the will as law and so of the autonomy of the
will, which alone is compatible with its freedom; on the contrary, all laws that
are determined with reference to an object give heteronomy, which can be found
only in laws of nature and also can have to do only with the world of sense.
But reason would overstep all its bounds if it took it upon itself to 4:459 explain
how pure reason can be practical, which would be exactly the same task as to
explain how freedom is possible.
° hineinschauen, hineinempfinden
' ats vernünftige und durch Vernunft tätige, d.i. frei mirkende
104
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
For we can explain nothing but what we can reduce to laws the object of which
can be given in some possible experience. Freedom, however, is a mere idea, the
objective reality of which can in no way be presented in accordance with laws of
nature and so too cannot be presented in any possible experience; and because
no example of anything analogous* can ever be put under it, it can never be
comprehended or even only seen/ It holds only as a necessary presupposition of
reason in a being that believes itself to be conscious of a will, that is, of a
faculty distinct from a mere faculty of desire (namely, a faculty of determining
itself to action as an intelligence and hence in accordance with laws of reason
independently of natural instincts). Now, where determination by laws of nature
ceases, there all explanation ceases as well, and nothing is left but defense, that
is, to repel the objections of those who pretend to have seen deeper into the
essence of things and therefore boldly declare that freedom is impossible. We
can only point out to them that the supposed contradiction they have
discovered in it hes nowhere else than in this: in order to make the law of
nature hold with respect to human actions they must necessarily regard the
human being as an appearance; and now when they are required to think of
him, as an intelligence, as also a thing in itself they nevertheless continue to
regard him as appearance here too; in that case the separation' of his causality
(i.e., of his will) from all the natural laws of the world of sense in one and the
same subject would be a contradiction; but this would come to nothing if they
were willing to reflect and to acknowledge, as is equitable, that things in
themselves (though hidden) must lie behind appearances as their ground and
that one cannot insist that the laws of their operation' should be the same as
those under which their appearances stand.
The subjective impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will is the same as
the impossibility of discovering and making comprehensible" an 4:460 interest
which the human being can take in moral laws;* and yet he does
*An interest is that by which reason becomes practical, i.e., becomes a cause
determining the will. Hence only of a rational being does one say that he takes
an interest in something; nonrational creatures feel only sensible impulses.
Reason takes an immediate interest in an action only when the universal
validity of the maxim of the action is a sufficient determining ground of the will.
Only such an interest is pure. But if it can determine the will only by means of
another object of desire" or on the presupposition of a special feehng of the
subject, then reason takes only a mediate interest in the action, and since
reason all by itself, without experience, can discover neither objects of the will
nor a special feeling lying at its basis, this latter interest would be only
empirical and not a pure rational interest. The logical interest of reason (to
further its insights) is never immediate but presupposes purposes for its use. '
niemals nach irgend einer Analogie ' niemals begriffen, oder auch nur eingesehen
werden kann
' Absonderung
' Wirkungsgesetzen
" ausfindig und begreiflich zu machen
" des Begehrens
105
IMMANUEL KANT
really take an interest in them, the foundation of which in us we call moral
feeling, which some have falsely given out as the standard for our moral
appraisal whereas it must rather be regarded as the subjective effect that the
law exercises on the will, to which reason alone delivers the objective grounds.
In order for a sensibly affected rational being to will that for which reason alone
prescribes the "ought," it is admittedly required that his reason have the
capacity to induce a feeling of pleasure or of delight in the ^ fulfillment of duty,
and thus there is required a causality of reason to determine sensibility in
conformity with its principles. But it is quite impossible to see, that is, to make
comprehensible a priori,"' how a mere thought which itself contains nothing
sensible produces a feeling'' of pleasure or displeasure; for that is a special kind
of causality about which, as about any causality, we can determine nothing
whatever a priori but must for this consult experience alone. But since this
cannot provide us with any relation of cause to effect except between two
objects of experience - whereas here pure reason, by means of mere ideas
(which yield no object at all for experience), is to be the cause of an effect that
admittedly lies in experience - it follows that for us human beings it is quite
impossible to explain how and why the universality of a maxim as law and
hence morality interests us. This much only is certain: it is not because the law
interests us that it has validity for us (for that is heteronomy and dependence of
4:461 practical reason upon sensibility, namely upon a feeling lying at its basis,
in which case it could never be morally lawgiving); instead, the law interests
because it is valid for us as human beings, since it arose from our will as
intelligence and so from our proper self; but what belongs to mere appearance is
necessarily subordinated by reason to the constitution of the thing in itself. Thus
the question, how a categorical imperative is possible, can indeed be answered
to the extent that one can furnish the sole presupposition on which alone it is
possible, namely the idea of freedom, and that one can also see the necessity of
this presupposition, which is sufficient for the praaical use of reason, that is,
for the conviction of the validity of this imperative and so also of the moral law;
but how this presupposition itself is possible can never be seen by any human
reason. On the presupposition of the freedom of the will of an intelligence,
however, its autonomy, as the formal condition under which alone it can be
determined, is a necessary consequence. Moreover, to presuppose this freedom
of the will is (as speculative philosophy can show) not only quite possible
(without falling into contradiction with the principle of natural necessity in the
connection of appearances in the world of sense); it is also practically necessary
- that is, necessary in idea, without any further condition - for a rational being
" einzusehen, d.e. a priori hegreiflich zu machen
' Empfindung
106
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
who is conscious of his causality through reason and so of a will (which is
distinct from desires) to put it under all his voluntary^ actions as their
condition. But it is quite beyond the capacity of any human reason to explain
how pure reason, without other incentives that might be taken from elsewhere,
can be of itself practical, that is, how the mere principle of the universal validity
of all its maxims as laws (which would admittedly be the form of a pure
practical reason), without any matter (object) of the will in which one could take
some interest in advance, can of itself furnish an incentive and produce an
interest that would be called purely moral; it is impossible for us to explain, in
other words, how pure reason can be practical, and all the pains and labor of
seeking an explanation of it are lost.
It is just the same as if I tried to fathom how freedom itself as the causality of a
will is possible. For then I leave the philosophic ground of 4:462 explanation
behind and I have no other. I might indeed revel in the intelligible world, the
world of intelligences, which is still left to me; but even though I have an idea of
it, which has its good grounds, yet I have not the least cognizance of it nor can I
ever attain this by all the efforts of my natural faculty of reason. It signifies only
a "something" that is left over when I have excluded from the determining
grounds of my will everything belonging to the world of sense, merely in order to
limit the principle oi motives from the field of sensibility by circumscribing this
field and showing that it does not include everything within itself" but that
there is still more beyond it; but of this something more I have no further
cognizance. As for pure reason, which thinks this ideal: after its isolation from
all matter, that is, cognition of objects, nothing is left for me but the form of it namely the practical law of the universal validity of maxims - and to think of
reason, conformably with this, with reference to a pure world of understanding
as a possible efficient cause, that is, a cause determining the will. Here an
incentive must be quite lacking; for this idea of an intelligible world would itself
have to be the incentive or that in which reason originally takes an interest; but
to make this comprehensible is precisely the problem that we cannot solve.
Here, then, is the highest* limit of all moral inquiry; and it is already of great
importance to determine it just so that reason may not, on the one hand, to the
detriment of morals search about in the world of sense for the supreme motive
and a comprehensible but empirical interest, and that it may not, on the other
hand, impotently flap its wings without moving from the spot in the space,
which is empty for it, of transcendent concepts
-' willkürlichen
herumschwärmen
'Alles in Allem in sich fasse oberste. Given the heading of the division beginning
on 455, one would have expected äußerste, "extreme."
107
IMMANUEL KANT
called the intelligible world, and so lose itself among phantoms. Moreover, the
idea of a pure world of understanding as a whole of all intelligences, to which
we ourselves belong as rational beings (though on the other side we are also
members of the world of sense), remains always a useful and permitted idea for
the sake of a rational belief, even if all knowledge stops at its boundary - useful
and permitted for producing in us a lively interest in the moral law by means of
the noble ideal of a universal kingdom of ends in themselves (rational beings) to
which we can 4:463 belong as members only when we carefully conduct
ourselves in accordance with maxims of freedom as if they were laws of nature.
CONCLUDING REMARK
The speculative use of reason with respect to nature leads to the absolute
necessity of some supreme cause of the world: the practical use of reason with
regard to freedom leads also to an absolute necessity, but only of laws of actions
of a rational being as such. Now, it is an essential principle of every use of our
reason to push its cognition to consciousness of its necessity (for without this it
would not be cognition on the part of reason). It is, however, an equally
essential limitation of this same reason that it can see neither the necessity of
what is and what happens nor the necessity of what ought to happen unless a
condition under which it is and happens or ought to happen is put at the basis
of this. In this way, however, by constant inquiry after the condition, the
satisfaction of reason is only further and further postponed. Hence it restlessly
seeks the unconditionally necessary and sees itself constrained to assume it
without any means of making it comprehensible to itself, fortunate enough if it
can discover only the concept that is compatible with this presupposition. It is
therefore no censure of our deduction of the supreme principle of morality, but
a reproach that must be brought against human reason in general, that it
cannot make comprehensible as regards its absolute necessity an unconditional
practical law (such as the categorical imperative must be); for, that it is
unwilling to do this through a condition - namely by means of some interest
laid down as a basis - cannot be held against it, since then it would not be the
moral law, that is, the supreme law of freedom. And thus we do not indeed
comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, but
we nevertheless comprehend its incomprehensibility; and this is all that can
fairly be required of a philosophy that strives in its principles to the very
boundary of human reason.
108