THE POLITICS OF PRIVATE TIME
CHANGING LEISURE PATTERNS IN URBAN CHINA
Deborah S. Davis, Richard Kraus, Barry Naughton, Elizabeth J. Perry, eds.
Urban Spaces in Contemporary China: The Potential for Autonomy and Community
in Post-Mao China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 149-172
Shaoguang Wang
Department of Political Science
Yale University
1
PRIVATE TIME, PUBLIC TIME
(from E = MC2 sequence)
Private time, public time By my love I measure my time
By your love you measure your time
By our love we measure our time.
Content, we
assuming all
private times agree,
adjust even market clocks
to our fine degree.
Then bitter physics teach us other lies,
cosmic rays dying slow make us reckon wise.
Public time, private timeBy my hate I measure my time
By your hate you measure your time
By their hate we measure our crime.
Angry, we
accepting public time, by our sighs
only, find our lives can synchronize.
Now, observing, not serving time,
our courses relative and less than light,
all our collisions we reduce to proof -
Not what o’clock,
but who’s o’clock?
---Robert Shaw1
2
All societies of any complexity distinguish between public and private.
However, the definition of the private sphere varies from one society to
another; and even within one society it varies from time to time.
This
article attempts to examine the changing boundary between the public and the
private in contemporary China by reviewing changing leisure patterns in the
last forty years.
It is divided into five sections.
The first section is a
brief theoretical reflection about the politics of private time.
section reviews leisure patterns during Mao's era.
The next
The third section
describes main trends in the use of leisure time in Deng's China, while the
fourth analyzes the principal characteristics of leisure practices in the
l980s.
The fifth section discusses the impacts of marketization on state
control over leisure.
The Politics of Private Time
The private sphere has two dimensions: spatial and temporal.
In
discussing the significance of the private sphere, many have focused their
attention on private space.
What has been neglected is that private time, no
less than private space, is an integral part of the private sphere.
Both are
necessary to the creation and maintenance of the private sphere--a cup of
coffee yields little satisfaction if there isn’t time to drink it.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
defines "leisure" as "free
time as a result of temporary exemption from work or duties."
The
overwhelming majority of sociological definitions also equate leisure with
free time.
Vickerman may be cited here to serve for illustrations purposes:
he takes leisure time "to be roughly equivalent to free time.
That time left
over after meeting commitments of work and such essential human capital
maintenance as sleeping, eating and personal hygiene."2
Even under the most
democratic system, work is still tightly disciplined and controlled.
few questions the idea that leisure time should be a private time.
However,
A
universal principle seems to have long been accepted everywhere: "The master's
right in the master’s time, and the workman's right in his own time."3
It is
in leisure rather than work that individuals see themselves as free to act and
develop as they please.
3
Leisure has also been considered essential for human development.
Aristotle, for instance, argues: "Nature herself requires that we should be
able, not only to work well, but to use leisure well; for...the first
principle of all action is leisure."4
Probably no one has attached more
importance to leisure than Marx does.
According to Marx:
Time is the room of human development.
A man who has no free time
to dispose of, whose whole lifetime apart from the mere physical
interruption of sleep, meals and so forth, is absorbed by his
labor for the capitalist, is less than a beast of
burden.5
For obvious reasons, however, leisure has to be kept within bounds.
First of all, it seems necessary to define how much time should be allocated
to work and how much to leisure.
The historical record shows that this issue
has given rise to social conflicts since the beginning of industrialization.6
More important, free time is open to abuse.
both long and familiar.
The list of leisure abuses is
Free time is often associated with crime, violence,
and physical and psychological demoralization.
Authoritative voices have long
expressed their concern about the possible consequences of unbridled leisure.
There have always been voices urging people to use leisure "properly,"
"correctly," "fruitfully," "wisely," "constructively," and above all
"rationally."
The problem is who have the right to decide what leisure
activities are acceptable and what are not.
In traditional societies, it was
the leaders of "culture" who bore a heavy responsibility for discovering
criteria for ways of correctly employing leisure.7
In modern times, however,
the regulation of leisure activities has increasingly involved the exercise of
state power.
By cultivating or imposing a particular ideal of acceptable
leisure activity, the modern state, capitalist and communist alike, aims to
draw all social groups into "rational recreation" to curb the potential
dangers of free time.8
Thus "free time" is "free" only in the sense that time is at one’s
command that is free of duties.
Like everything else, the "free" time is more
or less regulated. "Bread and Circuses" was already recognized as an effective
means of social control in the time of the Roman Empire.
Given that leisure
is playing an increasingly important part in people’s everyday life today, it
is probably inevitable for the state to take stock of leisure activities.
4
In
order to maintain the status quo, the state needs to shape a "disciplined" and
"healthy" (physically and psychologically) population.
To do so, it has to
suppress "immoral," "irrational," and "dangerous" activities on the one hand,
and to inculcate "elevated" modes of social and moral behavior on the other.
The politics of leisure is not only contained in such control efforts on
the part of the state, but also in the active attempts of the governed to free
themselves from imposed restraints.
impotent
consumers,
leisure.
having
little
It is wrong to depict the governed as
or
no
say
in
the
term
and
content
of
In fact, the governed have the capacity to resist and contest
attempts at social control.
One
of
the
sociology
imprints
of
central
As Chris Rojek points out:
errors
leisure
values
and
individual self.
is
of
the
the
beliefs
conventional
ideal
that
regarding
wisdom
socialization
leisure
behavior
in
the
simply
on
the
Against this it is necessary to stress that the
adult self is a skilled and knowledgeable actor who can manipulate
social roles as resources for innovations and critical departures
in leisure practice.9
In
other
words,
state
hegemony
is
by
no
means
impenetrable.
The
governed can “penetrate, neutralize, and negate that hegemony”10
Leisure thus is best seen as a site of struggle of conflict, which
constantly redefine the existing relations between the state and the
society.11
Leisure relations are not relations of freedom.
they are relations of control and resistance.12
signifies.
On the contrary,
This is what leisure
This is why I choose leisure as a breach to investigate changing
state-society relations.
Many may absorb the everyday view of leisure as too
trivial to merit serious attention.
Indeed, the study of leisure for its own
sake (like any other aspect of the society) is no great weight.
But if we
look beneath the surface of leisure and try to penetrate to hidden structures
which have produced its existing leisure relations, the study of leisure may
reveal some hard facts about political reality we may otherwise ignore.
The focus of this article therefore is not on "leisure" as such.
Its
real aim is to explore what a study of leisure can tell us about the nature of
contemporary China.
questions.
To do so, we have to first answer the following
How much breathing time and space do Chinese people enjoy?
5
How
does the Chinese Communist state define "healthy" and "unhealthy" leisure?
What are the mechanisms through which the state enforces its rules of
legitimate and illegitimate pleasure?
the last forty years?
Have leisure patterns been changed over
To what extent is the discourse on leisure related to
people's daily practice of leisure?
By focusing on the changing structural
location of leisure in the overall social, economic, and political context, we
hope to reveal the vicissitudes of state power in the Chinese society.
Leisure in Mao's China
The control of leisure can generally be achieved in one of three ways or
in their combinations: regulating the length of leisure, regulating the forms
of leisure, and regulating the contents of leisure.
The Chinese Communist
regime tried all three before and during the Cultural Revolution (hereinafter
CR).
Regulating the Length of Leisure.
In Marx' view, leisure represents a haven from the "dull compulsion of
economic relations."
He believes that an important measure of wealth in a
communist society will be the quantity of leisure time, time which people
would
be
able
to
spend
on
the
"harmonious
development
of
their
personalities." 13
But according to Maoist interpretation of Marx, leisure was
merely
given
the
time
to
workers
for
their
recuperation.
Leisure
was
meaningful only if people used the time to take a rest, to reduce stress, and
to
enhance
physical
productively later.
and
mental
ability
so
that
they
could
work
more
That was why a quotation from Lenin was very popular
during Maoist era--"[t]hose who don’t know how to rest don’t know how to
work."
Here the emphasis was placed on work.
An official commentator wrote
in 1959:
Why do we have to eat, drink, dress, and rest everyday?
Why
should we sometimes go for music, opera, movie and art exhibition?
In the final analysis,
purpose
is
to
produce
what is the purpose of our lives?
more
and
products.14
6
better
material
and
The
spiritual
Thus, the primary function of leisure was to make better workers.
It
should provide rest, reduce stress, strengthen supportive relationships,
enhance physical and mental health, and generally serve the ends of
productivity.
Since leisure was supposed to be subordinate to work, it was
often sacrificed to boost production.
In the years of the 1950s through
1970s, Chinese planners and managers tended to believe that it was legitimate
to cut leisure time so long as it offered workers with enough physical
restoration.
It was not uncommon in those years that people were asked to
work extra hours and even extra shifts with little or no compensation.
Moreover, Party and Youth League members and political activists were often
organized to undertake "voluntary labor" on Sundays and holidays.15
Such
practices were carried to extremes during the Great Leap Forward period when
millions of Chinese were driven so hard that they worked for months without
even sufficient sleeping time.
Frederick Noisal, a The Globe and Mail
reporter in Beijing, wrote in 1959 that he had seen on many occasions "the
weary workers, the worn-out women, the peasants dead beat with physical
fatigue."
He watched "people sleeping peacefully beneath blaring loudspeakers
and even during Peking opera performances when the Chinese musical
accompaniment seemed loud enough to keep the tiredest workers awake."
What he
had witnessed led him to the conclusion that "complete leisure as the
Westerner knows it is very rare in China.
The endless cycle of life in China
today consists of working, studying, eating and sleeping."16
People might put up with the weariness for a while but it was impossible
for them to do so forever no matter how loyal they were to the regime.
The
Chinese leaders quickly realized that the great physical and mental strain on
Chinese people might become counterproductive.
Between November 1958 and May
1960, the Party issued at least two directives requiring that "the masses" be
guaranteed eight hours of sleeping time and a few more hours of "free time."17
It needs to be noted, however, that here leisure was still considered passive
relaxation and restoration of energy for work.18
More important, the state
had no intention to give up its control over time.
The two documents in fact
sanctioned that "the masses’ time" should be subject to "unitary
arrangements."19
7
Regulating the Forms of Leisure
In Chinese political culture, the public interest had always occupied "a
position of sacrosanct priority," and the communist revolution reinforced this
corporate concept of interest.20
Like everything else, the forms of leisure
in the years before and during the CR reflected this tendency.
In the name of
"collectivism," it became an unwritten rule that leisure activities should
take the form of group action.
A senior high school in Kaifeng, Henan
Province, for instance, laid down in 1954 a set of rules which was titled
"What Should We Do and When and How Should We Do Them."
The regulation
consisted sixteen sections and fifty-six items, which specified times for
getting out of bed, washing, meals, classes, recesses, exercise, and sleeping.
It even detailed the manners of eating, talking, walking and playing.
word, everything had to be done in group and in unison.21
means out of the ordinary in those days.
In one
This case was by no
It was common then that students and
workers were organized to go to movie, sport event, dance party, and the like
together regardless of their personal preferences.
dictated.
Even reading was often
Party and Youth Leagues branches from time to time issued lists of
"recommended books," and discussion sessions were often scheduled afterward so
that everyone felt compelled to read the assigned books.
Those who failed to
participate in officially organized leisure activities risked being criticized
of "cutting themselves off from the masses" and "lacking collectivist
spirit."22
Since "collectivism" was highly valued, not surprisingly, in sports it
was team games such as basketball, soccer, and volleyball that were strongly
promoted in factories, army units, and schools by the government.
Team games
were considered as an instrument of cultivating such desirable personal traits
as group loyalty, willingness to cooperate with others, self-sacrifice, and so
on.
Those
values
were
fully
consistent
with
the
official
ideology
of
"collectivism."
Thus by the l950s, the Chinese communist had controlled not only the way
in which individuals divided their time between work and leisure but also the
ways in which they conducted in leisure.
The mobilization pattern of
officially organized leisure activities was an important aspect of what many
have termed "totalitarianism."
8
Regulating the Contents of Leisure
Whereas, in the l950s, the state had absorbed a great deal of the
population’s time and started to regulate the ways in which people conducted
their leisure activities, in the l960s and l970s the regime went further
trying to monopolize people's spare time by specifying the contents of
permissible leisure activities.
In March l960, the most widely circulated magazine of that time,
Zhongguo
Qingnian (Chinese Youth) carried a letter by a young woman by the
name of Xiao Wen, in which she expressed her desire to have some free and
enjoyable leisure time.23
In the following three months, the journal received
over 14,000 letters discussing Xiao's letter, and it selectively published
about a dozen.
Most of the letters published took a strong critical view of
Xiao Wen’s desire.
They typically argued that it was not the time for Chinese
to enjoy, for communism had not yet been realized in China.
They asserted
that those who had paid too much attention to leisure could not be "real
revolutionaries."24
The conclusion derived from the discussion was that spare
time should never be used for private enjoyments.
Rather it should be used to
heighten one’s political consciousness.
In the early l960s, the Party began to develop a new thesis of leisure:
spare time could not a "political vacuum;" it was filled by either
"proletarian ideas" or "bourgeoisie ideas."
Due to this ideological
innovation, leisure became increasingly politicized.
By the end of the CR,
the politicization of leisure had undergone three stages.
In the first stage (roughly l960-l962), the politicization was
relatively mild.
People were reminded that it was politically dangerous to
enjoy pastime in a carefree mood.
Although they might have been successfully
socialized to the communist ideology, the Party thought it necessary to
continually reinforce their earlier learning at work as well as in leisure.
That was the only way to keep them from slipping into the "mire of bourgeois
ideology."
In particular, people were advised to be sensitive to "hidden
scripts" underlying movies, dramas, music, poems, novels, painting, and the
like, especially those imported from abroad and those produced before the
liberation.
They were also told that sports were not as innocent as they
tended to believe.
So-called "cups and medals mania" (jinbiao zhuyi), which
was said to be still prevalent in China then, was criticized as a
manifestation of "magnified individualism" (fangda di geren zhuyi).
9
Games
were supposed to promote only "collectivism."
leisure."
In one word, there was no "pure
Leisure was seen as a "battle-field between the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie."25
Whereas in the first stage people had been asked to make personal
judgments about what were "right" and what were "wrong" and the Party had
given only some hints, in the second stage (1963-1965) the Party began to make
judgments for them, probably because it had become disappointed by what had
been achieved without explicit direction.
In l963, two modern dramas, Never Forget and The Young Generation, were
publicized.
Each had a negative character, Ding Shaochun in the former and
Lin Yusheng in the latter.
Ding was criticized for having forgotten his
working-class origin partly because he had developed a "bourgeois habit"-hunting.
Lin was criticized because he dreamed of marrying a petty girl and
enjoying a "bourgeois style of life" together: "Every evening, we may read a
novel or poems while listening to music, or we may go to movie or concert.
Sunday, we may take a walk in the park or visit friends..."
Both dramas were
reproduced in every major city and eventually made into movies.
students were organized to watch them.
On
Workers and
National and local newspapers and
journals devoted special columns to discussing them.
By presenting the two
negative examples, the Party hoped to teach people, among other things, what
they were not supposed to do in their leisure.26
As for what people were
supposed to do in their leisure, the answer could be found in the titles of a
group of essays appearing in an issue of Zhongguo Qingnian [Chinese Youth] of
1964: "Value Your Spare Time," "Leisure Activity Should Serve One's Work,"
"You Must Behave Yourself Even In After-hours," and "Spare Time Must Be
Devoted To Studying."27
Also in the mid-sixties, official publications began to warn people that
"pursuing a hobby may sap one’s will to make progress" (wan wu sang zhi).
As
a result, fanciers of hunting, fishing, collecting stamps, keeping pet birds,
growing flowers, and all kinds of hobbies faced a hard choice: either giving
up their avocations or preparing to be criticized for "wallowing in petty
bourgeois amusements."
Moreover, many movies, plays, and books began to be
singled out as "poisonous weeds," which were soon to disappear from the public
scene altogether.
China thus had become an "unexciting society" even before the Cultural
Revolution.
10
During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), state intrusion into the
daily life of the population reached such a degree that demarcation between
"private-time" and "public time" became meaningless.
Maoist leaders were no
longer content with the elimination of "poisonous weeds."
saturate people with nothing but Maoist propaganda.
They now wanted to
The "Smashing of the Four
Olds" campaign at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution made it an
unwritten rule that no leisure activities were legitimate unless they were
officially sanctioned.
Thus, for a number of years, 800 millions of Chinese
were allowed only to watch eight "revolutionary model plays" and few dozens of
carefully selected films.
In the later years of the Cultural Revolution, more
movies were produced and more books published, but to a large extent they were
simply propaganda in crude artistic forms.
They didn’t even pretend to
provide people with relaxation, because the term "leisure" itself then was a
dirty word.
As Susan Ford Wiltshire had aptly noted, "when the corrective ballast of
private life is lost, the public front becomes a monolith, a facade behind
which there is nothing except more of the same." 28
With the state completing
its monopolization of private time (not only the length of private time, but
also the ways of spending private time),
China literally became a totally
dictated society in the late l960’s and the early l970’s.
Of course, the extent to which the Communist Party attempted to maintain
control over leisure time is one thing.
another.
How far such control was possible is
Ironically, in 1967 and 1968 when the Cultural Revolution was at its
climax, many Chinese found that they had a plenty of free time for the first
time in years.
They were the so-called "wanderers" (Xiaoyaopai), those who
for one reason or another didn't have interest in factional struggle.
schools were closed and factories severely benumbed,
wanderers was how to while the time away.
Since
the problem for the
Junior high students found that it
was more fun to play with their friends in the neighborhood than with their
comrades of Red Guard organizations in school.
Every day, they wandered about
the streets seeking excitement from childish games such as cockfighting and
raising
carrier
pigeons.
Senior
high
and
sophisticated ways to entertain themselves.
chess.
Others read novels,
college
students
Some played cards,
Chinese and foreign,
found
more
go,
and
modern and classic.
Books
that had been subjected to burning during the Smashing the Four Olds campaign
now became the vogue.
Still other youths were engrossed girl or boy friends.
11
Indulging in the romantic life, they could partially dismiss the turbulent
situation in the surrounding world from their thoughts.
There were also
people
tower,
who
were
very
busy.
Some
returned
to
an
ivory
devoting
themselves to learning foreign languages, or studying mathematics, physics,
and the like.
Some were more practical, learning how to knit sweaters, cut
out garments, cook stylish dishes,
assemble and repair radios, play musical
instruments, and develop other skills.
Workers seemed even more pragmatic.
They wanted to improve the daily life quality of their families with a minimal
investment.
Therefore, fishing, hunting,
became many's avocations.
carpentering, and home repairing
In late 1967, it was bruited about in many Chinese
cities that regularly injecting cock blood into the veins would prolong one's
life.
this
For a short time,
secret
recipe
efficaciousness.
to
it became a hot topic in town.
Many boldly applied
themselves,
talking
and
more
enjoyed
about
its
It was indeed ironical that while hundreds and thousands
were killed and injured in factionalist battles, others were looking for
magical methods to prolong their lives.
More ironically,
many movies that
had been labeled as "poisonous weeds" were shown again under the pretext that
to criticize them the masses needed to view or review them.
But the truth was
that people were tired of watching a few boring "revolutionary" movies and
wanted broader choices.
Some mass organizations were even trying to make a
profit from showing those movies to culturally hungry audience.
Occasionally,
there were reports that an organization snatched the copies of such movies
from another.29
Leisure in Deng's China
The nature of leisure has dramatically changed since the end of the
Cultural Revolution.
This section examines how China's market-oriented reform
and open-door policy have transformed people's leisure patterns in the 1980s.
Change in the State’s Attitude Toward Leisure.
The 1980s was distinguished from the previous three decades first by a
change of official tone.
From the l950s to the l970s, what the Chinese
government had attempted to achieve was to restrain all leisure activities
except those harmonious with the state ideology.
In the 1980s, however, the
pragmatic Deng regime seems to have followed a different rule of thumb: people
12
are allowed to spend their spare time in ways they please so long as those
activities pose no threat to the existing social order.
that the state has given up its control over leisure.
It does not follow
In fact, whether or not
a certain type of behavior poses a threat to the existing social order is
still subject to the regime’s discretionary judgment.
Nevertheless, leisure
no longer has to always fit into the schematic strait-jacket of the state
ideology.
After the CR, the Party becomes willing to partially relinquish its
control over leisure because it has learned that the monopolization of private
time could result in a cheerless society, which is not in its best interests.
Moreover, since the Party has devalued "collectivism" and no longer takes
"class struggle as the key link," it makes sense for it to recognize
relaxation, entertainment, and relatively free choice as valid elements of
leisure.
Thus, the demarcation between "public" and "private" time re-emerges,
although the boundary line is far from unambiguous.
As a part of the new
"social contract," the state develops a new guideline for managing leisure
activities: "Encouraging those conducive to the maintenance of the existing
social order, allowing those harmless to the existing social order, and
suppressing those inimical to the existing social order."30
The Increase of Leisure Time
Chinese time-budget surveys generally divide everyday human behaviors
into four categories: Work (including commuting to work), physiological needs,
housework, and free time.
Time spent on physiological needs (sleeping,
eating, and personal hygiene) is obviously the least elastic.
Thus the
increase of leisure time depends on the reduction of the amounts of time spent
in work and housework.
Since l949, official length of work in China have
always been eight hours a day, forty-eight hours a week.
after 1980.31
This hasn't changed
But, as discussed in the previous section, actual hours spent
at work were much longer in the first three decades of the Peoples Republic,
if various non-standard forms of work, such as nonpaid overtime "voluntary"
work and participation in compulsory and semi-compulsory political activities
were included.
After the CR, as voluntary work and political study have
gradually lost luster, actual working time has been significantly shortened.
But, because there had been no time budget surveys before l980, it is
impossible to document exactly how significant the reduction was.
13
The housework burden has always been substantial, occupying a large
portion of the non-working time of Chinese households.
But thanks to the
proliferation of various time-saving machines (refrigerator, washing machine,
gas oven, sewing machine, and the like), the improvement of commodity-supply,
the rise of the service sector, and more important, the growing purchasing
power of the average Chinese families, the time spent on housework has also
drastically declined in the l980s.32
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
As a result of the reduction of actual working time and housework, the
total amount of free time has increased.33
Changes in Leisure Patterns
The demonopolization of leisure time occurred simultaneously with the
advent of tape record and television in China.
On average, China produced
only 3,000 sets of black-white television per annum in the l960s and 3,000
sets of color television per annum in the l970s.
And most of the televisions
then belonged to work units rather than individual households.34
By the end
of the l980s, however, over 90 percent of urban households owned at least one
television set.35
recorder.
Before l980, most of the Chinese had never seen a tape
Now tape recorder has become a household item in urban China.36
In
the last few years, VCRs, CDs, and karaokes also began to enter Chinese
families.
These modern entertainment devices have brought revolutionary changes in
the ways in which Chinese spend their leisure time.
Before l980, the dominant
free-time activities were probably reading, listening to the radio, moviegoing, socializing with friends (gossiping), and simply doing nothing.
l985, television audiences for the first time exceeded radio’s.37
In
A l987
nationwide survey showed that on average, every urban resident spent l.5 to
2.0 hours in front of the television each day, which accounted for almost a
half of the time available for leisure.38
Numerous recent surveys indicate
that since l982 television viewing has become the most popular form of leisure
activities.39
The rise of television was accompanied by a great decline in motion
picture viewing.
For a typical Chinese urban resident, movie-going declined
14
from once every two weeks in l979 to once every four weeks in l985.40
Thereafter, movie audiences began to stabilize.
In l990, 4.3 billion urban
residents went to movie theaters, which, though representing a five billion
drop from the record of l979, shows that going to the movies is still an
important form of leisure.41
Equally significant in the last few years has been the rise of VCR,
which provides an alternative to both movie and television.
It is recently
estimated that there are already 60 to 70 millions of VCR sets in China, and
that the number is growing very fast.
In large cities like Shanghai and
Beijing, at least one out of every five families owns a VCR, and in Guangzhou
the ratio has hit 40 percent. 42
In the early to mid-l980s when VCR was still
rare in Chinese cities, many private entrepreneurs and even state agencies
(such as Workers' Cultural Palace) found it profitable to open "video rooms."
Thus, video rooms sprang up like mushrooms throughout the country. 43
While
the contents of movies and television are usually subject to relatively strict
state control, the government has found it difficult, if not impossible, to
monitor what is being shown in largely profit-driven video rooms.
In fact,
for several years, the state simply didn’t have any video to supply.
Before
l984, imports from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and foreign countries had dominated
video rooms.
It was estimated in l985 that about 2,000 titles of "illegal
videos" were being circulated in the country. 44
Chinese-made
movies
and
television
series,
In comparison with tedious
foreign
videos
were
exciting, which therefore attracted a large number of audiences.
sensually
Instead of
going to movie theaters or staying home watching television, many, especially
young people, became frequent visitors to video rooms. 45
For instance, in
Shanghai, a city with 10 million population, “video rooms’ had l0 million
audience in the six months between November l987 and April, l988.46
Apart from television, movie, and video, other popular leisure
activities include listening to radio, listening to records, and playing
mahjong tiles, billiards, and video games.
The last three items deserve a few
more words, for there have been "mahjong fever," "billiards fever," and "video
game fever" in Chinese cities in the recent years.
After l949, the Chinese government has always discouraged mahjong
playing, because playing mahjong was considered a form of gambling.
At the
beginning of the CR, mahjong became a target of the "Smashing of the Four
Olds" campaign.
As a result, mahjong disappeared altogether in China for more
15
than a decade.
The revival of mahjong playing started in Guangdong in the
early 1980s, and in the last four or five years, a "mahjong fever" has
engulfed the entire country.
Not only do retirees, housewives, private
businesspersons, and workers play mahjong, government officials, university
professors, college students, and even high school students also indulge in
the game.
In Guangzhou, a report suggests, almost every family has members
who plays mahjong.47
Gambling has made a strong comeback in the wake of the
mahjong fever, because only with betting is mahjong exciting.
For many,
gambling provided a new form of diversion and excitement, with the prospect of
a useful win.48
Although in most cases betting was small in scale, just a few
cents or a cigarette a game, there has been growing concern that gambling may
bring many people to ruin.49
If mahjong is popular among all age groups and all social groups,
billiards is favored mainly by young workers, and video games by teenagers.
Thousands of billiards tables and video game machines have been installed in
Chinese cities, big and small.
Many Chinese are still living in over-crowded,
poorly ventilated and dimly lit apartments.
For those youths who find their
homes restrictive, the street is a better place to spend spare time.
Thus
street corners where billiard tables and video game machines are placed are
usually where young people from working class families like to hang about.
Playing billiards or video games not only brings excitement, it also forges an
informal collective life for those young people who find the surrounding world
is becoming increasingly alienating.50
Reading has continued to be an important form of leisure.51
readers have much wider choices than a decade ago.
Now Chinese
The number of books
published has risen from less than 5,000 in 1970 to l7,000 in l979 to 88,000
in l991 (see Figure 1).52
Expansion of newspapers has been more remarkable.
Between l970 and l989 the number of newspapers grew from 42 (all were national
or provincial party organs) to 852 (see Figure 2).
A similar pattern is
observable in magazines--the total number had increased from 21 in 1970 to
6,500 in 1991 (see Figure 3).53
FIGURE 1, 2, 3
ABOUT HERE
"Popular" readings account for a large share of the expansion of books,
newspapers, and magazines.
Among the l6 magazines with circulation of a
16
million copies and more in l987, for instance, l3 were "popular" (see Table
2).54
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Do those facts suggest that the Chinese leisure has been directed more
towards distractions and diversions than toward creative recreation?
necessarily.
Not
In fact, minority pursuits have also been on the increase.
fishing as an example.
Take
In May l983, at the opening ceremony of the First
Chinese-Japanese Fishing Contest, a senior leader, Wang Zhen, praised fishing
as a "healthy sport."
Three months later, the Chinese Fishing Association
was founded in Beijing and a special magazine, Chinese Fishing, began to be
published.
By the end of l988, 24 of the 30 provinces had established fishing
associations with a total membership of over 30 millions.
While sales of many
magazines were falling, the circulation of Chinese Fishing kept growing,
topping l30,000 in l987.55
The l980s also saw increasing numbers of people who devoted their
pastime to their fads and fancies.
more people.
Amateur collecting has attracted more and
In Shanghai alone, there are about l00,000 active amateur
collectors, collecting everything from stamps to maps, from model ships to
soft drink cans, and from abacuses to tortoises.
Over 30 specialized
collectors’ associations have been established in the city, with memberships
ranging from two dozen to two thousand.56
families started to breed pets.
Also in the l980s countless
Birds, gold-fishes, tropical-fishes, and
crickets have their special devotees.
It was reported that there were 5-
600,000 fish enthusiasts and 500,000 cricket aficionados in Shanghai in
l990.57
Due to the limit of space, I cannot go on to discuss the growth of other
"fevers" of pastime pursuits, such as "qigong fever," "tourism fever," "keepfit classes fever," "go fever," "dressmaking fever," and the thousand and one
other ways in which Chinese people occupied their non-working hours.58
The
vitality or variety of leisure activities is an important indication of how
far the state's "indifference zone" has extended.
New Characteristics of Leisure in the l980s
17
Depoliticization
During the CR, as discussed in Section II, leisure activities were
highly politicized and sometimes even the concept of leisure itself was
regarded as an element of "bourgeois ideology."
The overpoliticization of
social life evoked a strong aversion to anything political among a large
segment of the population in the later years of the CR.
To regain popular
support, when reformist leaders came to power, they thus had to somehow
depoliticize social life, redefining the boundary between the private time and
the public time, and allowing greater autonomy for individuals to decide how
to spend their private time.
attempt to control leisure.
The state, of course, hasn't given up its
But the Deng regime’s understanding of "control"
is different from that of the Maoist regime’s.
For the latter, "control"
meant "dictating," or "having everything all my way," while for the former,
"control" means "curbing," or "keeping bad things in check."
That is why
depoliticized leisure is acceptable, or even desirable for the Deng regime.
A
certain degree of political apathy may be conducive to the regime’s stability.
Privatization
One of the results of depoliticizing social life has been the
privatization of leisure pursuits.
After a decade of weary "class struggle"
in the CR, people began to retreat from outside social relationships into the
domestic sphere in the late l970s.
This tendency was reinforced by the advent
and spread of television, audio, and video equipment in the l980s.
The
overwhelming majority of urban residents have become habituated to staying at
home after work.
The home thus has become the major site of leisure
experience in China, just as what have happened in many other countries.59
As
an "exit," the privatization provides an important option for many of those
who have found the public life meaningless and alienated.
In this sense, the
"exit" is functioning like a safety valve for the society.
Diversification
As political hindrances to the enjoyment of private time have been
lessened, there has been increasingly diversity of leisure activities.
Indeed, it is only natural that the freeing of private time has led to the
expansion of private space.
With relative freedom in the area of leisure,
people of course tend to unleash previously suppressed emotions, express
18
previously suppressed desires, and pursue previously suppressed interests.
Hence, many previously forbidden games (e.g., playing mahjong, reading love
stories, breeding birds, etc.) have come out of the closet; and many new ways
of leisure (e.g., watching television, playing video games, tourism, etc.)
have been embraced enthusiastically by millions of Chinese who have long
hungered for relaxation, fun, and amusement.
"Westernization"
Here "Westernization" refers to influences from the outside world,
including Hong Kong and Taiwan.
The demonopolization of private-time
concurred with the introduction of "open-door" policy.
In the l980s, the
numbers of foreign tourists (including visitors from Hong Kong and Taiwan)
increased by 500 percent.60
To accommodate foreign guests, China has built
hundreds of luxury hotels in cities all over the country.
To entertain
foreign guests, those hotels are attached by bars, discos, bowling alleys, and
in some cases even golf courses.61
Visitors come and go, but the constant
flow of foreign visitors presents vivid examples of how people in other parts
of the world spend their leisure time.
As a result, bars and dance halls have
been proliferating in Chinese cities.
Chinese
don’t
have
to
experience foreign influence.
go
to
Westernized
bars
and
dance
The foreign presence is everywhere.
halls
to
Chinese
now are listening to the music of Michael Jackson, Deng Lijun (a Taiwanese
singer), Zhang Xueyou (a Hong Kong singer); reading books written by Jin Yong
(a Hong Kong writer), Qiong Yao (a Taiwan writer), or translated from American
paperbacks; and watching movies, videos, and television programs produced in
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Hollywood. 62
As Orvill Schell points out in his Discos
and Democracy.
Gone were the days when China’s youths spend their every waking
hour going to political study meetings, reading the Little Red
Books and working as volunteer laborers in order to learn from the
workers, peasants, and soldiers. Having caught a few fleeting
reflections
television
of
and
the
outside
films,
these
world
youths
cosmopolitan forms of entertainment.63
19
through
now
books,
wanted
more
magazines,
exciting,
We
may
safely
replace
"China’s
youths"
and
"these
youths"
in
this
paragraph with "Chinese," because the "open-door" policy has led to an inflow
of new cultural patterns and aspiration not only for China’s youths but also
for all Chinese at large.
Commercialization
The changed position of leisure also manifests in the fact that commerce
has intruded the leisure domain.
Instead of regarding leisure as a
battlefield between "proletarian" and "bourgeois" ideologies, the Deng regime
now considers it as a market--"cultural market."
It is accepted that
"cultural commodities" such as films, audio and video tapes, books,
newspapers, magazines, dance halls, etc. should be subject to the same
economic rules that apply to other commodities.
Thus, "cost," "profit,"
"quantity," "quality," "demand," "supply," "competition," "import," and
"export" are no less legitimate concerns for producers and consumers of
"cultural commodities" than for their counterparts of other commodities.
Although the government has emphasized that both "economic and social
efficacy" are important in "cultural production," the economic reform has in
fact driven most, if not all, of producers of "cultural commodities" to pursue
profits at the expense of "social efficacy."
The pursuit of profit maximization was part of the reason why Chinese
television stations and video studios would rather import programs from abroad
than produce their own.
It usually costs about 60,000 yuans to purchase the
broadcasting right of a 20-parts TV series from abroad.
But if a television
station decides to make a 20-parts TV series itself, the cost could go as high
as 200,000 yuans. 64
Similar cost-benefit concern applies to video producers.65
The result is that in China, television has become congested with foreign-made
programs and the video market has been dominated by imports.
In sum, due to the fact a lot of money could be made out of people's
spare time activities, entertainment and leisure have become increasingly
commercized.
Rather than ideologically motivated propagandists, most of
entertainment providers have become profit-driven businessmen.
Polarization
The commercialization of leisure implies that purchasing power in terms
of income matters, for one could not take part in commercialized leisure
20
activities without money.
Numerous studies have shown that the
differentiation between "haves" and "have nots" has been growing since the
early l980s.66
A result is the polarization of leisure patterns.
At one end,
those whose incomes are barely sufficient to maintain the minimum standard of
living haven't benefited much from the general expansion of commercialized
leisure.
Many of them have to take second jobs and thus sacrifice hours of
leisure to obtain more income.67
Most of the Chinese find that their resources cannot stretch beyond the
requirements of basic everyday existence and easily accessible pastimes.
For
them, the home is the main site of leisure and recreation, and TV viewing is
the staple leisure activity.
Only occasionally do they participate in leisure
activities that require not only time but also money.
At the other end, there is a small proportion of the urban population
who could afford expensive leisure activities.
It is them who are regular
customers of Western-styled dance halls, bars, and cafes.
The new rich
consists of upstart private businesspersons, employees of foreign companies,
cultural elites, and corrupt officials.
For those people, especially for
private businesspersons, the extravagant pattern of leisure is as much for
relaxation and recreation as for flaunting their elite status.
A private
businessman, for instance, arrogantly proclaims: "Those who ride bicycles at
best could only afford to play billiars" (because he and his friends either
ride motorcyles or take taxis).
With minimum expenditure of 50 yuan or more
per visit, night life in dance halls, bars or cafes is simply too expensive
for ordinary Chinese to enjoy.68
Therefore, there has been a growing sense of
deep inequality of access to leisure.
Formation of Voluntary Associations
In the first three decades of the People’s Republic, the Chinese
communist state didn’t tolerate the existence of any voluntary groups.
situation began to change in the post-Mao period.
This
The l980s witnessed "the
emergence of avowedly autonomous formal associations."69
By l99l there have
been over l00,000 registered voluntary, semi-voluntary, and quasi-official
societies in the nation,70 many of which are recreational groups.
The
aforementioned national and provincial fishing associations are just an
example.
But national or provincial autonomous organizations are still few
and far between.
Most of the newly established leisure groups are operating
21
only at the grassroots and at local levels.
In Capital Steel Corporation, for
instance, there were over 30 recreational clubs in l986, pursuing a broad
range of interests such as music, dance, modern drama, folk art, the fine
arts, calligraphy, photography, stamp collection, sports and etc.71
Such
community leisure groups are often sponsored by the official trade unions or
Youth League committees in a given unit or a given locality.
should be subject to the sponsors’ supervision.
a certain degree of autonomy.
In theory, they
However, those groups do have
In most cases, they are free as long as their
activities don’t run counter with the sponsors’ interests.72
To prevent voluntarily organized leisure activities from growing out of
control, the state discourages the formation of transunit and transregional
recreational organizations.73
come into existence.
Nevertheless, thousands of such groups have
As mentioned above in Shanghai amateur collectors alone
had set up over 30 voluntary associations by l990.
In Wenzhou, a medium-sized
city, for instance, there were about 400 transunit leisure organizations, such
as poem societies, art salons, sports clubs, flower-lover associations, and
the like in l987.74
For the members of leisure groups, the emphasis is less on the
individual home than on the voluntary collective life in the community.
Precisely for this reason, the state takes an ambivalent position toward such
organizations.
On the one hand, home-centered leisure activities, though not
harmful, are not as "healthy" as those conducted by voluntary leisure groups,
because the former function mainly to kill time rather than to spend spare
time in creative ways.
On the other hand, however, any autonomous
organizations, especially those which transcend administrative boundaries,
could become potentially dangerous, even if they ititially have no political
agenda.
After all, groups are not as readily amenable to governmental
control as isolated individual households.
Individual Preferences, Market, and State Control
When the state decided to demonopolize private time, it intended to
loose rather than lose its control in this regard.
However, the matter of
fact is that the government ability to manipulate pastime activities has been
significantly impaired in the last decade.
This is an unanticipated
consequence of the government's initial decision to step back and allow
22
whatever is not "harmful."
Once allowed to be expressed through "cultural
markets," individual preferences for leisure become a very powerful force, so
powerful that it is able to "chip away" the state's domination over people's
private time.
products.
The state is no longer the sole provider of recreational
Even in those areas in which the state still seems to be the sole
provider, its control has become less and less effective, largely because the
reform has transformed many of state agents from ideologically motivated
propagandists into profit-driven businesspersons.
Take movie, television, and
publication as examples.
Movie
The state may have the authority to decide what people shouldn’t see on
the screen, but people have the right to decide what they are going to see.
The state’s control over the movie cannot be said effective unless it is able
to get people to see what it wishes them to see.
task.
This has never been an easy
But when people have more choices for their leisure as they do in the
post-Mao era, it becomes a great challenge for the state.
In the early l980s, when Western and Hong Kong movies were allowed to be
imported for the first time in decades, Chinese-made movies lost the market by
a big margin.
A survey conducted in Shanghai in l982 showed that 62% of
audiences liked foreign films while only 23% liked those made domestically. 75
The result of a l983 study was just as shocking:
Judged by what Chinese call
"box office rate" (namely, on average how large percentage of the theatre
seats
being
filled
domesitcally-made
when
movies
a
did
given
film
reasonably
was
well
being
shown),
("audience
only
rate"
at
27%
of
50%
or
higher).
The same study also revealed that martial-arts adventures, spy-
thrillers
and
light
comedy
topped
awarded by the government had
the
audience’s
few audience. 76
choices,
whereas
movies
The fact that over 50% of the
movies lost money forced Chinese movie makers to take the audience’s taste
seriously.
In the following years, more researches were done, almost all of
which came to the same conclusion that people went to the movies to amuse
themselves rather than to appreciate those movies' ideological content or
artistic
quality.
representative:
One
"Given
film
the
critic's
consumption
policy
suggestion
structure
of
our
entertainment should be the first concern in movie-making."
was
bold
movie
77
and
market,
Before the
Cultural Revolution, the Party set a guideline for the Chinese movie industry:
23
at least 60% of films dealing with contemporary issues (so-called "policy
movies") and 30% revolutionary histroy, and only l0% or less "healthy" light
comedy.
After l986, however, "entertainment films" have dominated the market
(60-70%), outshining "propaganda films"
and "art films."
78
Television
Since TV viewing has become the staple leisure activity, it is important
for the state to dictate the content of television programs.
Given the fact
that there are no privately-owned television stations in China, at first
glance, this doesn’t appear to be a difficult task.
film, the real situtation is not that simple.
But as in the case of
Although so far the programs
that Chinese TV audiences may choose are very few, they have one choice over
which the state has no control--turning off the machine.
To make the
79
television programs attractive, the State thus has to yield to the audience’s
taste.
Numerous researches have shown that audience watch television mainly for
relaxation and fun.
indoctrination.
Japan,
Hong
They don’t like programs which carry a strong dose of
Their favorite is TV drama, especially those imported from
Kong,
Taiwan,
and
the
United
States.
80
As
a
response,
production of TV drama rapidly increased in the l980’s (see Figure 4). 81
the
And
imports still accounted for one third of the series shown on television by the
late l980’s.
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
Both cases of movie and television demonstrate that the state is no
longer able to competely dictates what people see on the screen.
On the
contrary, people’ tastes to a certain extent limit the autonomy of program
planners.
In
Norbert
Elias’
language,
audiences make up a "figuration." 82
here
the
state
and
film
and
TV
Since the state is the only provider of
films and TV programs, audiences have little choice except to see what the
State allows them to see.
But it doesn’t follow that the State can control
the overall bonding in the figuration.
constantly
rethink
what
to
produce
To capture audiences, the State has to
and
what
to
import.
audiences restraint the scope of the state’s choices.
24
In
this
sense,
These interdependencies
engender structural tensions, conflicts, and struggles which determine the
direction of the long-term figurational shifts.
Publication
If the state so far is still able to retain its monopoly over motion
pictures and television, its domination in publication has been seriously
challenged.
In the last decade, thousands of printing facilities have been installed
by township or village enterprises or even private entrepreneurs.
To seek
exorbitant profits, those publishing concerns care more about "market signals"
than governmental guidelines.
More important, required to assume the sole
responsibility for their profits or losses, China’ five hundred state presses
and six thousand registered journals and magazines have also turned themselves
into profit maximizers.
As a result, the government has found itself
increasingly unable to control what are being printed.
The declining state
capacity in this regard is best illustrated by its losing battle against
"illegal publications."
Since l980, Chinese readers' favor has changed in several
distinguishable turns: detective stories in l980, traditional knight errant
fiction between l981 and l983, modern knight errant fiction between l984 and
l985, triangular love stories in l986, pornographic stories after l987.83
Accordingly, the contents of "illegal publications" have gone from martial
arts to murder, from pornography to obscenity, from feudal superstitions to
directly attacking the Chinese Communist Party and socialist system.
The
government has tried to discourage publishing houses from printing "unhealthy"
and "harmful" stuff at every turn, but all its attempts have stopped short of
achieving this goal.84
In the late l980s, in face of growing competition from
hundreds of newly founded pulp magazines, even serious literary journals
became more or less corrupted by profit consideration.
To respond to "market
signals," many of them were forced to cater to readers' tastes for
supernatural martial arts, romance, fashion, violence, crime, intrigue, and
above all, sex.85
When the state launched its first crackdown against "illegal
publications" in l987, the target was "underground publishers," namely,
unregistered township or village printing houses that didn’t have permits to
publish.86
However, "illegal publications" became flourishing again in l988.
25
And this time, it was official presses (including ones owned by academic
institutions, trade union, and even the army) that took the lead.
Thirty-five
state presses received warnings for publishing pornography in that year.87
But, "illegal publications" were subdued only for a short moment.
spring of 1989 saw a new wave of pornography.
Chinese
government
initiated
a
more
publications" after the turmoil of l989.
The
That is part of the reason the
vigorous
campaign
against
"illegal
By the end of the year, thirty-one
million volumes of books and magazines had been confiscated, one-hundred-six
pulp magazines, one-hundred-ninety newspapers, and forty-one publishing houses
closed.
88
Before long, however, "illegal publications" began to make a
comeback.
Varieties of "illegal" books and magazines reappeared at bookstalls
in 1990. 89
In the winters of l990 the state started its fourth campaign
against "illegal publications."
In spite of those annual campaigns, "illegal
publications" is still flourishing.
now in operation.
Hundreds of "underground networks" are
Many of them have become highly organized and disciplined.
A recently uncovered network, for instance, consisted of two-hundred-fiftyseven editing, publishing, and distributional units that were scattered over
eighty-five cities and counties in twenty-seven provinces. 90
In the winter of
l99l, China launched a sweeping new crackdown on "illegal publications," the
fifty in a row. 91
It curbed "illegal publications" for the moment.
unlikely that the state would win the battle.
But it is
As long as huge demands for
such "illegal publications" exist, there would always be some people who are
willing to take the risk of violating the laws in order to make big profits.
When I visited China in 1992 and 1993, "illegal publications" were on display
at almost every bookstall.
26
Conclusion
In the course of China's economic reform, the legitimacy of private time
has been rehabilitated.
Along with the changed conception of social time,
private space has been in effect enlarged.
Chinese people now enjoy a
relatively larger private sphere than at anytime since 1949.
The expansion of the private sphere is attributable as much to the
state's intentional retreat as to societal forces' "nibbling" efforts.
The
state is willing to retreat because it has learned that, left with little
breathing time and breathing space, people are likely to become dispirited and
depressed.
To arouse masses' enthusiasm for its "four modernization" program,
the state cannot afford to continue the monopolization and politicization of
people's every minute.
But it doesn't mean that the state would take a
laissez-faire attitude toward the ways in which people spend their private
time.
Although the state's "indifference zone" has been broadened, it still
hopes to shape people's leisure pattern in one way or another so as to channel
people’s excessive energies into activities that it believes are physically
healthy, morally correct, socially consolidating, and politically integrative.
However, the market-oriented reform has eroded the state's ability to
exercise
its
guidance
role.
At
the
same
time
when
depoliticized, it becomes increasingly commercialized.
leisure
is
being
Profit has replaced
ideology to become the primary concern for most of providers of recreational
products, including state agencies.
official
guidelines
to
respond
to
To maximize profit, they often ignore
"market
signals."
Individual
leisure
preferences thus can often be satisfied through "gray" or "black" cultural
markets, which in effect expands people's private space.
27
Table 1:
Leisure Time
(in hours and minutes)
Year
l980(a)
Free Time
2:2l
l982(b)
l984(c)
l986(d)
l988(e)
1991(f)
3:26
3:16
3:59
4:3l
4.48
a. Calculated from Wang Yalin and Li Jinrong, “Chengshi zhigong jiawei
laodong yanjiu [A Study of Urban Residents' Housework],” Zhongguo shehui
kexui [Social Science in China] l (l982): 60.
b. Calculated from The National Statistics Bureau, Zhongguo shehui
tongji zhiliao l985 [Chinese Social Statistics, 1985], 307.
c.
Calculated from he National Statistics Bureau, Zhongguo shehui
tongji zhiliao l987 [Chinese Social Statistics, 1987], 28l-282.
d.
Qing Nianbing, "Da chengshi zhigong shenghuo shijian fenpai he
liyong wenti di chubu yanjiu [A Preliminary Research Report on TimeBudget of Chinese Residents of Big Cities]," Shehuixue yanjiu [Research
in Sociology] l (l990): 92-l02.
e.
Calculated from Lu Hanlong, “Laizhi geti di shehui baogao [A
Sociological study of Individual Lifestyle]” Shehuixue yanjiu
[Researches in Social Science] 1 (l990): 83.
f.
National Statistics Bureau, Zhongguo shehui fazhan zhiliao l992
[Chinese Statistics on Social Development, 1992] (Beijing: Zhongguo
tongji chubanshe, 1992), 114.
28
Table 2:
Sixteen Most Widely Circulated Magazines in 1987
(in ten thousand)
1.
Gushihui (Story-telling Session)#
494.6
2.
Banyuetan (fortnightly)&
457.0
3.
Hongi (Red Flag)&
282.0
4.
Jiating (Family)*
255.2
5.
Qingnian yidai (Young Generation)$
235.3
6.
Gushi dawang (Story King)#
l73.7
7.
Duzhe wenzhai (Readers’ Digest)%
l63.6
8.
Gongchan dangyuan (Communists)&
l60.8
9.
Minzhu yu fazhi (Democracy & Rule of Law)%
l59.2
10.
Liaoning qingnian (Liaoning Youth)$
150.0
11.
Nongmin wenzhai (Peasants’ Digest)%
133.4
12.
Zhongguo Qingnian (Chinese Youth)$
125.5
13.
Zhi ying (Bosom Friends)$
116.5
14.
Shanhai jing#
109.6
15.
Zhongguo funu (Chinese Women)*
107.0
16.
Jingu qiguan (Eternal Wonder)%
100.0
# Story Magazines, * Women's Magazines, $ Youth's Magazines
% Miscellaneous, & Propaganda
Source:
Zhongguo chuban nianjian l988 [Chinese Publication Yearbook:
1988], l20-l2l.
29
Figure 1:
N umbe r of B ook s P ublishe d in C hina
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
1960
Source:
1970
1980
1990
2000
National Statistics Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1991
[Chinese Statistics Yearbook, 1991] (Beijing: Zhongguo
tongji chuban she, 1991), 755.
30
Figure 2:
Source:
National Statistics Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1991
[Chinese Statistics Yearbook, 1991] (Beijing: Zhongguo
tongji chuban she, 1991), 756.
31
Figure 3:
N umbe r of Jour nals Publishe d in China
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
1960
Source:
1970
1980
1990
2000
National Statistics Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1991
[Chinese Statistics Yearbook, 1991] (Beijing: Zhongguo
tongji
chuban
she,
32
1991),
755.
Figure 4
N umbe r of T V D r amas P r oduce d in China
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1983
1984
1985
1986
33
1987
1988
Endnotes
1.
Robert Shaw, Private Time, Public Time (London: Poet & Printer, 1969), p.
1.
2.
R. W. Vickerman, “The New Leisure Society:
Futures,
3.
An Economic Analysis”.
Vol. l0, No. 3 (l980); p. l92.
Quoted from P. Baily, Leisure and Class in Victorian England (London:
Routleges & Kegan Paul, l978), l80.
4.
Aristotle, Politics, l337a 31.
5.
Karl Marx, Selected Works (London: Lawrence & Wishart, l968), 219.
6.
For example, see E. P. Thompson, "Time-Work-Discipline and Industrial
Capitalism," Past and Present 38 (l967): 56-97; and Douglas A. Reids,
"The Decline of Saint Monday: l766-l876," Past and Present 78 (l976):
76-l0l.
7.
W. Sutherland, "A Philosophy of Leisure," Annals of the American Academy
(September l957): l36.
8.
For a discussion of the role of the capitalist state, see John Clarke
and Chas Critcher, The Devil Makes Work:
Leisure in Capitalist Britain
(London, MacMillan, l985), l22-l43.
9.
Chris Rojek,
Capitalist and Leisure Theory (London:
Tavistock
Publications, l985), pp. l80-l8l.
10.
James Scott, The Weapons of the Weak (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1989) p. 336.
11.
Stephen G. Jones, Workers At Play:
Leisure l9l8-l939 (London:
12.
13.
A Social and Economic History of
Routledge & Kegan Paul, l986), p. l65.
Rojek, Capitalism and Leisure Theory, p. l56.
Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of l844 (London,
Lawrence at Wishort, l970), 737.
14.
Liu Zijiu, "Yishou zhua shengchan, Yishou zhua shenghuo [Be Concerned
with Production as well as the Well-Being of the Masses]," Chongtian
genjin he kexue texin [Boundless Enthusiasm and Scientific Attitude]
(Hong Kong: Shannian Publications, l959).
15.
Mei Qi, "Yingdang Zunzhong bieren di zhiyou [Respect Others' Freedom],"
Zhongguo qingnian [Chinese Youth, hereinafter ZGQN] 12 (June l956): 3l.
34
16.
Charles Taylor, ed., China Hands: The Globe and Mail in Peking (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart Limited, l984), 26.
17.
Ma Qibin and Chen Wenbin, Zhongguo gongchandang zhizheng sishinian l949l989 [The Chinese Communist Party: Forty Years in Power, 1949-1989]
(Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, l989), l85.
18.
See an editorial of Chinese Youth, "Laoyi jiehe shi weiliao baozhen
chixu dayaojin [To Continue the Great Leap Forward, We Have to Strike A
Proper Balance between Work and Rest]," ZGQN 12 (June, l960): 30-3l.
19.
Ma and Chen, Zhongguo gongchandang zhizheng sishinian, l85.
20.
Lowell Dittmer, "Public and Private Interests and the Participatory
Ethic in China," in Victor C. Falkenheim, ed., Citizens and Groups in
Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies of the
University of Michigan, l987), l7-66.
21.
Zhen De, “Mantan jiti huodong ji qita”
Zhongguo qingnian 4 (February,
l956), pp. 6-7.
22.
Mei Qi, "Yingdang zunzhong bieren di zhiyou;" Guo Lin, "Weishenmo yiding
yao qiangqiu yizhi [Why do We have to Impose Rigid Uniformity]," ZGQN l2
(June, l956): 30-31; and Shang Qi, "Guanche ziyuan yuanzhe, gengjia
fengfu duocai di kaizhan kewei huodong [Implement the Principle of
Freedom and Develop a More Colorful Program for Extracurricular
Activities]," ZGQN l7 (September l956): 8-9.
23.
Zhongguo qingnian 5 (March l960), pp. 36-37.
24.
See Zhongguo qingnian 6-l0 (March-May l960).
25.
Ma Ye, "Kan dianying buneng zhishi weiliao tu qingsong [Movie-going is
not just for Fun]," ZGQN l5 (August l960): 24; Ma Xiuyun, "Woman shi
zenyang yindao qingnian guohao yegu shenghuo di [How do We Guide Young
Workers in Their Leisure Activities]," ZGQN 4 (February l96l): 24.
26.
Bai Ye, "Zouchu geren zhuyi xiaotiandi [Do Away with Individualism],"
ZGQN 24 (December l963): l0-l1.
27.
28.
ZGQN 8-9 (May, l964): 46-47.
Susan Ford Wiltshire, Public and Private in Virgil’s Aeneid (Amherst,
MA: University of Massachusetts Press, l989), p. 64.
29.
See Shaoguang Wang, Failure of Charisma: The Chinese Cultural Revolution
in Wuhan, Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1990,
pp. 490-49l.
Also see Perry Link “Hand-Copied Entertainment Fiction from the Cultural
35
Revolution”, in Perry Link, Richard Madsen, and Paul G. Pickowicz, eds.,
Unofficial China:
(Boulder:
30.
Popular Culture and Thought in the People’s Republic
Westview, l989),
pp. l7-36.
Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian l989 [Chinese Broadcasting and
Television Yearbook: 1989, hereinafter DSNJ] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo
xueyuan chubenshe, l989), 336.
31.
The National Statistics Bureau, Zhongguo shehui tongji zhiliao, l985
[Chinese Social Statistics Yearbook, 1985] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji
chubanshe l985), 307-308; Zhongguo Shehui tong zhiliao, l987, pp. 28l284; and Qing Nianbing, "Da chengshi zhigong shenghuo shijian fenpai he
liyong wenti di chubu yanjiu [A Preliminary Research Report on TimeBudget of Chinese Workers Living in Large Cities]," Shehuixue yanjiu
[Research in Sociology] l (l990): 92-l02.
32.
Qing Nianbing, pp. 95-96, pp. l00-l0l; and Zhang Jianguo, "Gaige chujing
liao zhigong shenghuo fangshi di bianhua [Reform Has Resulted in Changes
in Chinese Workers' Life Style]," Shidai [Time] l (January l987): 7-l0.
33.
Because there have never been nationwide time-budget surveys, I have to
base my estimates about leisure time on a number of regional surveys.
The comparability of the surveys is, of course, far from perfect.
Nevertheless with supporting evidence, I have reasonable confidence to
believe that the Table 1 represents the general trends in China.
For
instance, in Beijing, the daily amount of free time increased from 3.5
hours to almost 4 hours in the four years between l982 and l986.
trend in other cities may be more or less the same.
The
Of course, the
situation varies tremendously from place to place and from social group
to social group.
All statistical data available are too general for us
to gauge variations.
34.
DSNJ l989, 33l-332.
35.
DSNJ 1988, 40l; Institute of Journalism, Chinese Academy of Social
Science, Zhongguo xinwen nianjian, l988 [Chinese Journalism
Yearbook:1988, hereinafter XWNJ] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo chubanshe,
1988), l92.
36.
The Chinese Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian, l990 [Chinese
Statistics Yearbook: 1990, hereinafter TJNJ] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji
chubanshe, 1990), 294.
36
37.
XWNJ l989, 2l7.
38.
Qing Nianbing, p. l02; Li Yuanpu, and Yen Jinchang, "Tianjin shi jumin
yeyu shenghuo chouyang diaocha [Random Samples of Tianjin Residents'
Leisure Pattern]," Liaowang [Outlook] 22 (November l986): l2; and Deng
Tongtong, "Dianshi wenhua shixiang lu [Reflections on TV Culture],"
Shehui [Society] 7 (July l990): 35.
39.
Zhang Yun, Cai He, and Jiang Shanhe, "Qingnian gongren shenghuo fangshi
xianzhuang tedian yanjiu [A Research on New Characteristics of Young
Workers' Life Style]," Shehui kexue zhanxian [Social Science Front] 3
(June l982): l0l-l08; Mai Jungang, "Qiye gaige yu zhigong xianxia
shenghuo fangshi di bianhua [Enterprise Reform and Changes in Workers'
Leisure Pattern]," Shehui diaocha yu yanjiu [Social Investigation and
Research] 7 (July l985): 86-893; and Sun Zaiqing, "Dui zhigong yeyu
shenghuo di sanxiang diaocha [Three Investigations on Workers' Leisure
Activities]," Qunzhong wenhua [Mass Culture] ll (November l986): ll-l2.
40.
Chinese Motion Picture Association, Zhongguo dianying nianjian l986
[Chinese Motion Picture Yearbook: 1986, hereinafter DYNJ], (Beijing:
Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, l986), ll-5, ll-l3.
41.
Liaowang, February l8, l99l, 41.
42.
China News Agency, Beijing, February 12, l992.
43.
DSNJ l988,
44.
DYNJ 1986, ll-6.
45.
DSNJ l989, 344.
l7-70.
46.
Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian, l989, p.344.
47.
China News Agency, Guangzhou, January l, l992.
48.
Lu Hanlong, 84.
49.
Wei Yunheng, Liu Yuxun, Xin Minghua, "Dongbei sansheng dufeng toushi
[Gambling Crazy in the Three Northeastern Provinces], Liaowang 7-8
(February l8, l99l): l9-20; Chen Lu, "Dubo qishi lu [Reflections on
Gambling]," Zhongguo Zhichun [China Spring] 2 (February l99l): 77-80;
and Zhong Shu, "Zhongguo dalu shaoshu getihu di shenghuo baitai [Private
businessmen's Life Style]," Zhongguo shibao zhoukai [China Time Weekly]
3 (January l9-25, l992): 7l.
50.
Yun Lan, "Fangguan jiehe, jiji daoxiang, tuidong wenhua shichang
jiankang pengbo fazhai [Combine "Relaxation" and "Regulation," Actively
37
Guide the Development of Cultural Markets]," Qunzhong wenhua l0 (October
l989): 9-ll.
51.
Wang Haiping, "Nanjing qingnian di dushu re [Reading Fever among Youth
in Nanjing]" Baxiaoshi yiwai [After Eight Hours] 3 (March l987): ll.
52.
New China News Agency, Beijing, December 29, l99l.
53.
Shijie ribao [World Journal], January 12, l992.
54.
The other three, Hongqi (Red Flag), Banyuetan (Fortnightly) and Gongchan
dangyuan (Communists) were subscribed mainly by work units rather than
by private citizens. See Zhongguo chuban nianjian l988 [Chinese
Publication Yearbook: 1988, hereinafter CBNJ], l20-l2l.
55.
Dai Banyun, "Fengmi zhongguo di diaoyure [Fishing Fever in China] Hubei
qingnian [Hubei Youth] 8 (August, l989): 20-23.
56.
Sheng Yu, "Shanghai minjian siren shouchang di diaocha [Private
Collections in Shanghai]," Shehui 8 (August l990): l6-l9.
57.
Zhao Zhenda, "Chongwu chao [Pet Wave]," Shehui 7 (July, l990): 20-22.
58.
For example, see Yan Jian, "Beijing di weiqi re [Go Fever in Beijing],"
Shidai [Times] l (January l988): 55.
59.
Jones, Workers at Play, 200-20l; and Rojek, Capitalism and leisure
Theory, l9-20.
60.
Zhongguo tongji nianjian l990, 658.
61.
Orville Schell, Discos and Democracy, 349-356.
62.
Ibid, 355.
63.
64.
Ibid, p. 355.
Shi Liuzi, "Dianshiju di kewang he kunhuo [The Prospects of TV Dramas],"
Zhongguo zhichun 5 (May l99l): 65.
65.
DSNJ 1989, 336.
66.
Tianjin ribao [Tianjin Daily] July 20, l988; and Zhao Renwei, "Woguo
zhuanxingqi zhong shouru fengpai di yixie teshu xianxiang [Special
phenomena in the Income Distribution of Our Country during the
Transition Period]," Jingji yanjiu [Researches in Economics] l (January
l992): 53-63.
67.
Contrary to the conventional perception, "second economy" is not a new
phenomenon.
At the beginning of the l980’s, there was already 5% of
state enterprise employees who had second jobs.
The number of state
employees who took second jobs has steadily increased in the course of
38
the economic reform.
By the late l980’s, about 20% of state employees
were working on more than one job.
as 35%.
In Zhenzhen, the ratio was as high
Lin Guoxing and Yuan Qingshou, "Shehui zhuyi shehui de zhigong
yeyu laodong[Second Jobs in Socialist Society]," Beifang Luncong
[Northern Tribune] 5 (October, l98l): 64-68; Yang Yuan, "Dier zhiye
toushi [Perspectives on Second Jobs]," Shidai [Times] ll (November
l988): l7-l9;
and Zhang Yun, "Shenzhen dier zhiye zhuangkuang kiao cha
[Second Jobs in Shenzhen]," Shehuixue yanjiu [Sociological Researches] 3
(March l989): 76-85.
68.
Yi Xudong, p. 7.
69.
Martin K. Whyte, "Urban China: A Civil Society in the Making?" in Arthur
Lewis Rosenbaum, ed., State and Society in China: The Consequences of
Reform (Boulder: Westview, 1992), 9l.
70.
She Dehu, "Youguan woguo shehui tuanti wenti di shikau [Reflections on
Voluntary Associations of Our Country]," Qiushi [Seek Truth] l7
(September, l99l): l5,
71.
The Council of Trade Unions, Capital Steel Corporation, 'Banhao zhigong
wenhua huodong zhongxin, chujin liange wenming jianshe [Strengthen
Employees' Cultural Centers, Promote the Construction of Two
Civilizations]," Qunzhong wenhua [Mass Culture] 6 (June, l986): l5.
72.
Shao Zhixiong, "Lanzhou lianyou chang zhigong yeyu xinggu huodong
kaizhan huoyao [Pastime Activities are Brisk at Lanzhou Oil Refinery],"
Qunzhong wenhua [Mass Culture] ll (November, l987): 28-29.
73.
Chen Lu, "Ba qingnian di yeyu wenhua shenhuo zhenzheng huoyao qilai
[Enliven Youth Pastime Activities]," Qunzhong wenhua [Mass Culture] 5
(May l986): 2-3.
74.
Huang Ruigeng, "Wenzhou shi gunzhong wenhua huodong kongqian huoyao
[Pastime Activities are Brisk in Wenzhou]," Qunzhong wenhua [Mass
Culture] 10 (October, l987): l6.
75.
Chinese Motion Picture Association, Zhongguo dianying nianjian, l984
(Beijing:
Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, l984), p. l9l.
76.
Zhongguo dianying nianjian l985, pp. 67l-675.
77.
Wan Tie, “Dianying wenhua shixian zuijia shehui xiaoyi di zhonggao
zhongjie”,
in Zhongguo dianying nianjian l986, p. ll-l6.
39
78.
Hong She, “Xiaofei, wenhua, dianying”,
Qunzhog wenhua l (January,
l988), pp. l8-21.
79.
A national survey shows that one fourth of audiences tend to turn off
the television if they don’t like the program.
See Liang Xiaotao,
“Zhongyong dianshitai chuanguo dianshi guanzhong chouyang diaocha fengxi
baogao”,
80.
Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian, l988 p. 407.
Zhongguo xinwen nianjian l987, pp. l38-l87; Zhongguo guangbo dianshi
nianjian, l987, pp. 469, 475;
Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian , l987,
pp. 32l-324, 339-340; Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian, l988, pp. 4004l3.
81.
Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian l986, p. 883;
nianjian l987, p. 744;
Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian1988, p. 59l;
Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian l989,
82.
Norbert Elias,
Zhongguo guangbo dianshi
The Civilizing Process:
p. 5l8.
The History of Manners (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, l978).
83.
Bian Chunguang, "Chong seqing yinhui duwu di chuban suo xiangdao di
[Reflections on the Proliferation of Pornography]," Chuban gongzue
[Publication Works] l0 (October l988): 6.
84.
Renmin ribao [People's Daily], November l5, l985; Zongguo gingnian bao
[Chinese Youth Daily], March l6, l986.
85.
Shen Daran, "Qingchu jingshen wuran, quanli zhengdun shukan yinxiang
shichang [Clean up Spiritual pollution, Consolidate the markets of
Books, Journals, Audios and Videos]," Qunzhong wenhua [Mass Culture] ,
l0 (October l989): 7.
86.
Chuban gongzou [Publication Work] 8 (August l987): 6-l3.
87.
Cai Bo and Yang Jian, "Huangfeng lueguo beijing cheng [Pornography Wind
Sweeping Beijing]," Shidai [Times] ll (November l988): 30-3l.
88.
The Editorial Broad, Zhongguo baike nianjian, l990 [China Yearbook of
Newspapers and Magazines, 1990] (Beijing: Zhongguo da baike chubanshu ,
l990), l45-l59.
89.
Yin Jindi, "Xiaochu huangdu, gongzhai qiunqiu [Clean up Pornography],"
Liaowang 46 (November l2, l990): 6-9.
90.
91.
China News Agency, Zhengjiang, December 25, l99l.
UPI, Beijing, December l9, l99l.
40