10. Civilian – military relations in a democracy
Zdeněk Kříž
The year 2009 marked 20 years since the Velvet Revolution of the late 1980s/early 1990s
resulted in the downfall of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. The election of Václav
Havel as President in late 1989 was the symbolic beginning of fundamental changes in Czech
society. A complex process was launched to transform a totalitarian post-Soviet socialist
society into a standard liberal democracy with a market economy; this transformation is and
will long continue to be a topic of central interest for researchers. Despite the general
skepticism prevalent in Czech and Slovak society it is undeniable that both of these states
countries have become viable democracies with functioning, competitive market economies.
Proof of the transformation’s overall success lies in the membership of both successor states
of the old Czechoslovakia in the North Atlantic alliance, the European Union, and the Council
of Europe. The goal of this text is to sum up in a readable form the main principles underlying
civilian-military relations in a consolidated, stable democracy.1
10.1. Civilian-military relations in a consolidated democracy
10.1.1 Primacy of legitimate democratic political representation over the armed forces
In the 19th century democratic societies began to have to deal with the existence of a
professional officer corps. This distinct group of military professionals arose as a result of the
introduction of modern technology and the gradual process of mechanization of war which, as
This study text is based on an article by Zdeněk Kříž, The Army and Politics in the Czech Republic Twenty Years
after the Velvet Revolution. Armed Forces & Society 36(4) 2010, 627 –646.
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the Tofflers note, was a reflection of the overall mechanization of production in the Western
countries. The Tofflers refer in this context to second-wave wars.2
Several models of democracy exist in the political science literature. However,
insufficient attention is often given to the risks inherent in the very existence of a professional
officer corps, and the importance of military subordination to the political leadership. For our
considerations we may refer to the theory of Robert Dahl that democracy is not viable without
civilian control of the military; however, civilian control as such is not a guarantee of
democratic control unless the civilian political elites are subject to the democratic process.3
Dahl is undoubtedly correct: history shows that civilian control of the armed forces may not
always mean democratic control. The military was under civilian control even in National
Socialist Germany, the Soviet Union, and other states with a communist party monopoly on
power: all political regimes based on anti-democratic principles.
Dahl’s thesis says that the key aspect of civilian-military relations in a consolidated
democracy is subordination of the armed forces to democratically-legitimate political elites.
To make this possible at all the civilian and political spheres must be separated from the
armed forces in a manner based on classic theoretical principles of civilian-military relations
as found in Samuel P. Huntington’s classic work on the topic. In democratic practice these
two principles (separation between civilian, political, and military; and subordination of the
military to the political sphere) is the starting point for all security policy in a country with
elected political representation. Through security policy the army is given its orders and
expected to carry them out. However, the armed forces often have no input into the political
decision-making process other than advisory. In consolidated democracies the democratically
legitimate political elites also make the decisions over allocation of social resources on behalf
of defense and the armed forces.
More Alvin Toffler – Heidi Toffler, War and anti-War. Making Sense of Today's Global Chaos (Warner Books: New
York 1993), pp .41 – 47.
3 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (London: Yale University Press, 1989), 250-251.
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Huntington points out that a natural cleavage exists between the military forces as
experts on the exercise of state-organized violence, and the civilian sphere.4 Nevertheless, in
consolidated democracies there must be a consensus between the political sphere and the
armed forces over the basic direction of the country. Separation of political institutions from
the military is no a priori reason for conflict between civilian and military in a democracy.
Sam C. Sarkesian presented a model of equilibrium in civilian-military affairs which takes
this into account. As Sarkesian says, “the relationship between the military and society is
symbiotic. The perpetuation of the liberal democratic system is based on the partnership
between the military and society.”5 Also according to Rebecca L. Schiff there should be
efforts to reach accord between political elites, military elites, and the citizens.6
Another characteristic of a consolidated democracy is that power over the armed
forces is divided between civilian and political authority according to the principle of balance
of power and a system of checks and balances. Huntington regards such division of powers as
potentially dangerous and an invitation for soldiers to get involved in politics.7 Nevertheless
in consolidated democracies this is a frequent and natural occurrence. In consolidated
democracies the political institutions of the state create a system of institutions that serves to
direct and oversee the armed forces. A classic example are the security or defense committees
in parliament at the legislative level [in the legislative branch], and the national security
council or national defense council at the executive level.
In consolidated democracies the loyalty of the military is expressed by their oath to
protect the state and not any particular political figure (such as the Führer in Nazi Germany)
or any group of individuals within the state (for example the Communist Party in
Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations. (New York: Vintage
Books): 20.
5 Sam C. Sarkesian. “Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in the West,” International Science Review 2, 3,
(1981): 291.
6 Rebeca L. Schiff “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance Armed ForcesSociety 22, 1
(1995): 24.
7 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1957).
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Czechoslovakia before 1989). Under this concept the military is a politically neutral
instrument of the state commanded within the limits of applicable law by the political elites
who have gained power by methods in accordance with democratic principles.
Soldiers naturally have a number of ways of affecting politics.8 This applies for
consolidated democracies as well, for as Sarkesian says “in reality, the military is among
other things a political institution and does have influence and access to the political process
through a variety of informal, as well as formal, channels.”9 In consolidated democracies
soldiers apply their professional knowledge through consultation for the political elites and
lobbying for the interests of military institutions. Nevertheless the armed forces are not the
institution that exercises authoritative control over the state’s security policy. A military coup,
attempts at such, or politically motivated public statements are regarded as impermissible in a
consolidated democracy, and a symptom of a dysfunctional regime.
10.1.2 Conformity with rule of law, military regulations, and military ethical codes with the
principles of democracy
Characteristic of civil-military relations in a consolidated democracy is the existence of a
clear legal framework for the military. The creation of this legal framework is entirely in the
hands of the democratically legitimate civilian political authorities. Competencies, powers,
and tasks of the individual state institutions in relation to the military in democratic regimes
are usually outlined in the constitution. The armed forces are not above the law; they, too, are
subject to the rule of law.
In a consolidated democracy there exist special organs of military justice, rules
regulating their activities during time of peace which are not unlike the rules for similar civil
organs, and these rules respect the general principles of due process. Specific military legal
More Samuel E. Finer, ”The Man on Horseback. The role of the Military in Politics” (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988).
Sam C. Sarkesian. “Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in the West,” International Science Review 2, 3,
(1981): 293.
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norms and regulations apply exclusively to members of the armed services and not to
civilians. These norms are not in conflict with the democratic legal order. Disciplinary action
against military personnel is in principle subject to review by an independent court. Last but
not least, in democratic states military regulations allow a soldier to disobey an order under
certain conditions. This especially applies when to carry out an order would mean violating
domestic or international law. In a democracy in most situations a solider is not required to
obey an order to commit a crime.
Military codes of ethics, where they exist, reflect the specific spirit, norms, and ranks
of military institutions, but in a consolidated democracy they are not considered incompatible
with democratic principles.
10.1.3 The democratically legitimate politician as commander-in-chief of the armed forces
Primacy of democratically legitimate politicians over the armed forces means that politicians
must be the ones commanding the armed forces. In a consolidated democracy the post of
commander-in-chief is usually given to a democratically legitimized, civilian political figure
(for example the president, prime minister, or a civilian political minister of defense).
Democratically-legitimized politicians at the head of the military have access to all
information that the military possesses. These politicians also decide who should fill the
highest ranks in the military (chief of staff, highest-ranking officers). Politicians leading
military institutions use their own control bodies to monitor the military. In their decision
making, civilian political authorities rely on the expert knowledge coming out of the military
structures.
In evaluating the importance of the factor of civilian control for the consolidation of
the democratic regime we quote Larry L. Watts who said that “there is great variation in the
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degree of civilian presence even among NATO member countries.”10 Although academic
debate continues about the necessity of civilian control for a successful democratic
transformation, while political control is given great importance, it is important to
acknowledge that both political and civilian oversight are required in the consolidated
Western democracies.
10.1.4 Autonomy of military professionals in their area of competence
Preventing interference by soldiers in the formation of state policy is a key element of
military-civilian relations in a consolidated democracy. Equally important is to prevent
politicians from interfering in purely military affairs, which lie beyond the range of their
competencies. Civilian-military relations in consolidated democracies are characterized by a
degree of autonomy for military professionals in turning political decisions into concrete
military measures. The problem in all democracies, constantly being argued, re-defined and
re-implemented, is what powers should pertain to politicians and what to soldiers. Allowing
politicians and political ways of decision-making access to the heart of military institutions
may result in military ineffectiveness, and result in diminished national security. Especially
destructive to the effectiveness of military structures would be the promotion of soldiers based
on their political reliability instead of professional competence.
Some authors point out that many of the transitioning post-communist countries have
failed to protect the army from politically-motivated measures by the political elites.11 Larry
L. Watts writes that some Central and Eastern European countries have seen frequent
inappropriate intervention by political elites in military matters, destroying soldiers’ trust in
Larry L. Watts “Reforming Civil-military Relations in Post-Communist states: Civil Control vs. Democratic
Control” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 30, 1 (2002) 54.
11 Douglas L. Bland. “Protecting the Military from Civilian Control: A Neglected Aspect of Civil-Military Relations”.
In Democratic and Civil Control Over Armed Force: Case Studies and Perspectives p. 205. (Rome: NATO Defense
College International Symposium 1994) and Larry L. Watts “Reforming Civil-military Relations in Post-Communist
states: Civil Control vs. Democratic Control” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 30, 1 (2002) 51– 65.
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politicians.12 House-cleaning of army structures of varying degrees of intensity was conducted
in all of the transitioning countries after the fall of communism. Purges designed to rid the
army of politically non-loyal elements is seen in this geographic region as a natural
phenomenon accompanying the systemic change in regime, and was more or less expected by
both soldiers and civilians. It may be difficult to understand this phenomenon outside of its
historical context. Nonetheless empirical experience with systemic change, which has been
very frequent in Central and Eastern Europe compared to the Anglo-Saxon countries, shows
that in all countries changes in political regime have been accompanied by efforts of varying
intensity to get the army under the control of the new regime.
If some Western authors have criticized these purges (for example Larry L. Watts), it
must be considered what kind of sense it would have made for the new democratic regimes in
Central and Eastern Europe to build their armies on military cadres loyal to MarxismLeninism and the Soviet Union, professionally grounded in the military doctrine of the
Warsaw Pact, and intellectually incapable of adapting to the new realities after the end of the
Cold War.
10.1.5 Civil character of the armed forces and participation by soldiers as citizens in the
democratic political process
In the consolidated democracies members of the armed forces are citizens of the state, which
means they have rights as well as duties. In my opinion this aspect is overlooked in the classic
theory on civilian-military relations based on the principle of conflict between civilian and
military structures, and developed from the thesis of Samuel P. Huntington. On the other hand
the concept of equilibrium in civilian-military relations developed by Sam C. Sarkesian
Larry L. Watts “Reforming Civil-military Relations in Post-Communist states: Civil Control vs. Democratic
Control” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 30, 1 (2002) 51– 65.
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allows us to take sufficient account of the civic identity of the armed forces.13 It is civic
identity that is the unifying element between soldiers and civilians in a consolidated
democracy. If the civic identity of the military is disrupted, the conditions are created for
conflict in the civil-military relations of the democratic state.
From the standpoint of military-civilian relations, the formation of social groups of
professional soldiers in the 19th century, consisting of soldiers who are at the same time
citizens, forced the democratic regimes to face the problem of finding optimal avenues for
articulation, aggregation, and representation of their interests.
The result of this process is that soldiers in democracies are not completely banned
from politics. In most places they can vote, take part in political assemblies in civilian dress
and outside of working hours, they can take a political stance, and in some cases (for example
Germany) they can be elected as independent candidates on the ballots of political parties.
Military professionals quite commonly advance their interests through various types of
professional associations, which according to law are banned from engaging in some
traditional political activities (strikes, organizing demonstrations or assemblies, political
agitation in army institutions, etc.), which does not prevent them however from acting within
the political decision-making system to promote their own interests.
Soldiers participate in the democratic political process within the framework of their
civil and not their military status. Participation by soldiers as citizens in the democratic
political process is an important socializing phenomenon that involves the military in the
everyday life of democratic society, and prevents the formation of a military caste removed
from society and opposed to democratic principles.
Sam C. Sarkesian. “Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in the West,” International Science Review 2,
3, (1981): 283-297.
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10.2 Acceptance of democracy by military elites
As we said above, the presence of tension between military professionals and politicians is the
key to Huntington’s whole theory of civilian-military relations. But as the real-life practice of
consolidated democracy has shown, tension between the civilian and military spheres need
not always produce conflict. And if conflict is generated, it need not affect the fundamentals
of the democratic regime. Soldiers in a democracy accept the regime and do not challenge it.
Conflict between soldiers and the civilian elements, if there is one, does not affect the actual
principles of democracy. If the armed forces do not accept democracy as the form of
government, then we are not talking about a fully consolidated democratic regime.
If we speak of accepting the principles of democracy by the military in a consolidated
democracy, this does not mean that individuals will not surface in the military who do not
accept democracy. In a democratic society not all of the citizens will accept democracy, as
shown by the existence of anti-system parties under practically every democratic regime.
10.2.1 A security community of experts independent of the military
In consolidated democracies there will be a security community independent of military
structures, which serves as an instrument for analytical support for the political elites in
forming and evaluating military security policy. The existence of a security community in a
democracy, unlike under regimes founded on a monopoly of power by the communist party,
is made possible by a broad degree of transparency in military and security affairs.
If we consider civilian-military relations in a consolidated democracy, we must take
into account that in making political decisions political elites are to a great degree reliant on
the knowledge of experts from the military sphere. This monopoly can be used by the military
to influence the elected political elites in making political decisions. It can be assumed that in
civilian-military relations, the importance of knowledge of military affairs for adequate
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control of the military will continue to increase for what for what the Tofflers refer to as thirdwave militaries. If for the economies of third wave societies the main means of knowledge
production are data, information, pictures, symbols, culture, philosophy, and values,
according to the Tofflers these factors are key for the armies of the third wave as well14, and
the power of the experts who understand these factors and know how to work with them will
increase in the future.
10.2.2 Public oversight of the activities of civilian and military structures in the field of
defense
All affairs having to do with defense are subject to public oversight, regardless of whether
they fall under the civilian-political authorities or the military. In military affairs there is a
certain degree of transparency. Instruments of public oversight include the mass media,
independent institutional oversight, and the citizens. The final word in setting the boundaries
between public and non-public information in military affairs is held by the elected political
representation.
In some consolidated democracies there are independent institutions set up within the
military structures that are tasked with monitoring the activities of the army. One example is
the Federal Assembly’s plenipotentiary for the Bundeswehr (Wehrbeauftragte).
Last but not least a public oversight role over military affairs can be played by citizens
themselves. This is true especially for a conscripted military. In a conscripted military a large
proportion of citizens gain personal experience with reality in the military forces, which on
one hand can lead to the penetration of the military mentality and ways of dealing with
problems into civilian society; on the other hand it forces the military to deal with the
opinions of civilian society. It is important that a broad swath of civil society have personal
14
More Alvin Toffler – Heidi Toffler, War and anti-War Making Sense of Today's Global Chaos, pp.73 - 93
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experience with the workings of the armed forces and can be less subject to manipulation by
marketing specialists paid by the military that might aim to conceal the real situation in the
armed forces.
10.7 Conclusion
Research on civil-military relations has a long tradition in Western sociology and political
science, shaped by the works of Samuel P. Huntington15, Moris Janowitz16, Samuel E. Finer17,
and many others. Unfortunately no one has come up with an applicable, logically sound,
comprehensive, empirically-tested and concise theory of civil-military relations. Authors that
try come up against many obstacles. The largest, in the words of Douglas L. Bland, is that
“understanding civil-military relations has been hindered  at least from a theoretical and
international perspective  by ethnocentric analysis, narrow definitions of the problem,
dogmatic demands for unconditional civilian control, and an inability to adequately explain,
theoretically and otherwise, what is meant by the term civilian control and how exactly
civilians might exercise it.”18 Even so, the above-described principles can be considered the
minimum requirement for democratic civil-military relations.
For research on civil-military relations it is important to realize that the existing
theoretical framework of civil-military relations is still being developed and revised on the
basis of the experience gained during the transformation process in the former communist
countries.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations. (New York:
Vintage Books, 1957)
16 Moris Janowitz, “The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait” (New York: The Free Press, 1960)
17 Samuel E. Finer, ”The Man on Horseback. The role of the Military in Politics” (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988)
18 Douglas L. Bland, “Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations” Armed ForcesSociety 27, 4 (2001): 527.
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