SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
Return to Index
HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
ANNEX K TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
REFERENCES:
a. Basic Plan.
b. JCS Pub 0-2, 24, “Unified Action Armed Forces,” February 1995.
c. Joint Pub 6-0, 30, “Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operation,” May 1995.
d. Maps, WGS-84, series L654, KOREA, sheets 3118,3119, 3120, 3121, 3122, 3218, 3219, 3220,
3221, 3222, 3318, 3319, 3320, 3321, 3322, 3418, 3419, 3420, 3421, 3422, 3515, 3516, 3517,3518, 3519,
3520, 3521, 3615, 3616, 3617, 3715, 3716, 3717, 3815, 3816,and 3817, 3915, 3916, 3917, 4016, 4017,
edition 001-KAMC, scale 1:100,000.
e. Map, WGS-84, series L654, sheet reference d, scale 1:1,000,000.
1. General
a. Purpose.
To specify joint command, control, and communications systems.
b. Situation.
(1) General. Reference a.
(2) Enemy. Annex B.
(3) Friendly. Annex A.
(4) Assumptions. See Basic Plan.
2. Mission. When directed, CFC deploys signal forces to provide communications connectivity from the
USSOUTHCOM Headquarters to JTF Korea, and supporting commands.
3. Execution
a. Guiding Principles
(1) Plan for communications systems to support the COMJTF for all five phases of the
OPLAN to provide positive command and control over assigned forces.
K-1
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
(2) During each phase plans should provide for system redundancy, circuit diversity, and
physical protection.
(3) All Service Component Commanders and supporting organizations must identify
communications equipment and personnel shortfalls to the CFC, CJG-6.
b. Operational Concept
(1) References a, b, and c.
(2) C3 forces will install, operate, and maintain (IOM) command and control connectivity
between JTF Korea and CFC and the Service Components. The communications systems will be
installed to support a five phased plan. Communications at the intermediate staging base will be
maintained throughout all phases of the operations. The C3 forces will move forward to JTF Korea
headquarters. Maximum flexibility will be maintained by employing commercial communications means
when practicable. Service Components are responsible to provide internal communications networks.
Architecture design will focus on creating multiple access in and out of the JOA. The JTF Korea staff will
accomplish integration of South Koea forces communications links.
(3) Phase I, Prehostilities: Alert and Staging
(a) The priority of communications effort during this phase is to establish
capabilities that permit out-of-country reporting. Additionally, limited internal communications capabilities
should be established to control execution of Phase II operations with primary emphasis on commercial
capabilities.
(b) Communications elements are with the initial deployments to the staging
bases.
(4) Phase II, Establish Intermediate Staging Bases
(a) Priority of effort for this phase is establishment of initial external command,
control, and communications systems from the Intermediate Staging Base to lodgment(s) areas.
(b) In addition to the satellite communications during this phase, the following
space based systems priority is intel/recon, weather, multispectral imagery (MSI), and global positioning
systems (GPS).
(5) Phase III, Decisive Combat. The priority of effort during this phase is the
maintenance of communications systems and circuits required for CINCKorea and COMJTF Korea
command and control, intelligence reporting and dissemination, and positive airspace control to support
both ground and air hot-pursuit operations of 50 miles and 200 miles respectively.
(6) Phase IV, Lodgment and Follow-Through. The priority of communications effort is
CFC and JTF Korea command and control, intelligence, air operations, and possibly stabilization
assistance in the capital area.
(7) Phase V, Posthostilities and Redeployment.
K-2
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
Priority of effort is the maintenance C2 systems, intelligence, and systems supporting the redeployment of
forces.
C. Tasks and Responsibilities. CFC J-6 publishes separate correspondence for tasks and
responsibilities. See also Appendixes for this Annex.
D. Intelligence and Reconnaissance. See Annex B.
E. Special Measures. No special measures are planned.
4. Administration and Logistics. See Annex D.
5. Command and Signal.
a. Command Relationships. See Annex J.
b. Command, Control, and Communications Systems. See Appendixes 3, 4, and 5.
JIM R. RILEY
General, USA
Commander in Chief
Appendixes:
1 - Information Systems Security (INFOSEC)
2 - Defensive Information Warfare (IW-D)
3 - Communications Planning
4 - Satellite Communications Planning (Omitted)
5 - Defense Courier Service
6 - Communications Reporting
OFFICIAL:
/s/
LEWIS R. BALLARD
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, J-6
K-3
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX K TO CFC (KOREA) 9518X-XX
INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY (INFOSEC)
1. Purpose.
To establish policies, procedures, keying material and requirements necessary to support
CFC secure communications in support of OPLAN 9518X-XX.
2. General
a. The overall CFC INFOSEC objective is to provide CFC components and supporting
commands the methods and capabilities necessary to implement transmission security, cryptological
security, and physical security measures required for the protection of classified information during the
execution of this OPLAN.
b. CFC communications security objectives will be achieved through specific actions designed to:
(1) Protect CFC communications from hostile interception and exploitation.
(2) Ensure the proper use of technically sound, approved code and cipher systems for all
sensitive communications.
(3) Ensure the use of approved physical safeguards to protect classified equipment,
material, and documents from access or observation by unauthorized persons.
3.
Execution
a. Concept of INFOSEC Support Operations. JTF Korea’s Service Components and supporting
commands will achieve INFOSEC objectives by:
(1) Maximizing use of secure communications systems.
(2) Using only authorized machine-produced codes and authentication systems
distributed through proper COMSEC logistic channels.
(3) Using bulk-encrypted transmission paths, thereby reducing vulnerability to
interception.
(4) Establishing procedures to reduce electromagnetic emissions.
(5) Maintaining communications transmission security procedures and circuit discipline in
accordance with appropriate directives.
(6) Practicing sound electronic protection (EP).
b. Tasks
K-1-1
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
(1) CFC.
phases of this OPLAN.
Develop INFOSEC procedures for use within the AOR for use during all
(2) COMJTF Korea and SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS:
(a) Develop plans for maximum employment of INFOSEC procedures and
practices in support of this plan.
(b) Coordinate with supporting commands for cryptographic/INFOSEC material
requirements and distribution.
c. Coordinating Instructions
(1) Coordinate INFOSEC plans with other components and supporting commands.
(2) Establish, as needed, COMSEC accounts for subordinate elements.
(3) Coordinate with South Korea forces for points of contact and locations for possible
deployment of liaison teams.
4. Administration and Logistics
a. Cryptographic material will be obtained through normal logistics distribution channels.
b. Effective editions of the COMSEC materials to be used in support of this plan will be as
specified by the controlling authority and subsequent FRAGOs.
c. Only codes and authentication systems distributed through COMSEC channels are authorized
for use within the command.
d. Control and reporting of COMSEC material compromises/losses will be according to
appropriate directives. Information copies will be provided to CFC, CJG-6 and JTF Korea J-6.
e. Report incidents of suspected meaconing, intrusions, jamming, and interference (MIJI)
immediately according to Appendix 6 (Reports).
5. COMMAND AND CONTROL. See Annex J.
K-1-2
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX K TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
DEFENSIVE INFORMATION WARFARE (IW-D)
REFERENCES:
a. JP 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security,” 27 January 1997.
b. JP 3-58, “Joint Doctrine for Military Deception,” 31 May 1996.
c. JP 3-13, (Draft) “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations,” 28 February 1998.
d.JP 3-13.1, “Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Operations,” 7 February
1996.
e.JP 3-51, “Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations,” 30 June 1991.
1. Situation
a. General. Defensive information warfare (IW-D) is comprised of counter command and control
(C2) and C2 protection. C2 protection is comprised of a variety of approaches, both defensive and
offensive, with the common goal of ensuring the effectiveness of friendly command and control systems.
The primary objective of C2 protection is the preservation of friendly C2 forces despite the enemy’s efforts
to deny information to , disrupt, deceive, or destroy these capabilities. The operational objective of
counter C2 operations is to achieve C2 superiority by monitoring, destroying, impeding, and/or deceiving
enemy C2.
b. Enemy. See Annex B
(1) General Enemy Capabilities to Conduct IO. Because of its defective economic power
and access to international arms market, North Korea has the capability to conduct offensive information
operations. Their capabilities consist of very rudimentary direction finding, tactical radio intercept,
HUMINT, terrorism, jamming, subversion, and sabotage.
(2) IO Target Biases and Predisposition. The North Korea forces will have effective
control of much of South Korea territory and will tend to focus military efforts on the US Government’s
radar sites, the Government, and South Korea’s extensive telephone, television, and radio networks.
c. Friendly
(1) General Vulnerabilities. The friendly forces vulnerability includes limited protection for
US radar sites.
(2) General Capabilities. US forces have sophisticated IW equipment, techniques, and
procedures capable EW, EP, and EA. The use of these facets of electronic warfare operations combined
K-2-1
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
with vigorous use of operations security (OPSEC), psychological operations (PYSOP), and physical
destruction of Cartel telecommunications facilities enhance friendly capacity for victory.
2. Mission. When directed, CFC conducts defensive information warfare to protect information and
defend information systems of the US and assist the Government of South Korea.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operations. See Appendix 3 (IW) to Annex 3 (Operations).
(1) General.
Since it is not practical to defend all aspects of the infrastructure and
every information process, each phase of this OPLAN requires assessment of vulnerabilities. The
priorities will be developed based upon the assessed threat developed during each and integrated into the
priorities established in the overall information operations CONOP of this plan.
(2) Phase I, Prehostilities: Alert and Staging As the Forces Prepare for Operation in Latin
America.
(a) Identify information, information systems, information-based processes, and
infrastructure critical for execution of OPLAN.
(b) Identify and analyze threats to systems critical for execution of OPLAN.
(c) Determine vulnerabilities of critical information, information systems,
information-based process, and infrastructure by the following IW categories: propaganda, military
deception, EW, physical destruction, media (PAO), OPSEC, and computer network attack (CNA).
(d) Analyze, assess level of risk.
(e) Implement appropriate defensive measures.
(f) Determine and monitor indications and warning (I&W).
(g) Establish IO Threatcons.
(h) Develop supporting IW-D plans using counter-propaganda, EP, ES,
information assurance, physical protection, OPSEC, and special information operations
(3) Phases II – V: Deployment, Employment, and Redeployment Activities.
(a) Continue Phase I operations as appropriate.
(b) Execute related threatcon tasks.
(c) Continually assess the changing information environment and recommend
changes to hostile IO.
(d) Continually perform IW damage assessments.
K-2-2
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
b.
Tasks
(a) CFC. IO Cell provides support to the COMJTF Korea external IW-D effort.
(b) COMJTF Korea
1 Establish IO cell to provide continuous planning guidance, coordination,
integration, and recurring assessment of the defensive information situation.
2 Develop IW-D plans for the JTF Korea, Service Components, and
supporting commands and agencies.
c. Coordinating Instructions
(1) Integration. The JTF Korea IO Cell is responsible for the integration of supporting
commands and agencies IW-D requirements. CFC integrates those measures external to JTF Korea’s
Joint Operations Area.
(2) Coordination
(a) CFC approves JTF Korea initial IW-D plan and subsequent changes.
(b) CFC coordinates JTF Korea requirements external its AOR.
(c) DIRLAUTH for JTF Korea with supporting commands and agencies
(d) Defensive IO is employed IAW established principles of warfare and rule of
engagement.
(3) Security.
Normal security measures and handling procedures are applicable for
(4) Reports.
Appendix 6, Annex K applies.
planning IW-D.
4. Administration and Logistics
a. Personnel.
N/A
b. Supply.
N/A
c. Reports.
See Annex D.
5. Command and Control.
See basic order and Annex J, Command Relationships.
K-2-3
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING
REFERENCES:
a. CJCS MOP 3 “Requesting JCSE Support.”
b. CJCS MOP 178: “Military Satellite Communications Systems.”
c. ACP 190: “Guide to Frequency Planning.”
d. CJCS MOP 43: “Military Telecommunications Agreements and Arrangements Between
the US and Regional Defense Organizations or Friendly Nations.”
e. CJCSM 6231 Series
1. Purpose.
To provide communications planning guidance to CFC forces.
2. Execution
a. General
(1) Communications capabilities within JOA South Korea are very limited and
require extensive satellite links for USPACCOM, JTF Korea, its Service Components, ISB, and supporting
commands. CFC and JTF Korea will jointly build an architecture for the use of a single channel UHF.
(2) CFC will support communications requirements of JTF Korea with in theater
assets or through the Joint Communications Support Element using MOP 3 procedures.
(3) Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has coordinated the approval of
frequency, bandwidths, and circuits necessary to support the installation and operation of SHF satellite
terminals throughout the JOA.
(4) The Governments of South Korea and Japan have approved the use of US
owned communications equipment necessary to support the ISB and follow-on operations.
b. Means of Communications
(1) Global Command and Control System (GCCS). The major US theater-level system
applicable to CFC. The GCCS has workstations located at USPACCOM headquartered in Hawaill , with
Naval staffs embarked in the JOA. The USPACCOM GCCS provides Automatic Digital Network
(AUTODIN) message transfer capability.
K-3-1
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
(2) Television/Radio. The Government of South Korea has available for use upon
execution of this OPLAN television and AM radio systems as well as a sophisticated telephone network
throughout the country.
(3) Satellite Systems. Planning for SATCOM systems should include all Government
controlled and most commercial systems. South Korea has earth stations that are available to include two
Pacific Ocean INTELSAT earth stations and 11 domestic stations. See reference b above.
(4) Commercial telephone systems within South Korea are very limited and require
organizations operating within the country to establish their own.
c. Frequency Management
(1) CFC performs the following functions:
(a) Assigns and controls frequencies within CFC.
(b) Coordinates all frequency requiring full protection from harmful interference
with foreign Governments, components, and supporting commands.
(c) Prepares and processes interference reports.
(d) Maintains and administers frequency records and files for support of
peacetime and contingency operations.
(2) Coordinating Instruction
(a) Requesters must identify which nets or individual frequencies that, when
assigned, will be considered “TABOO.” “TABOO” frequencies are those supporting safety-of-life missions
that cannot be jammed by friendly forces.
(b) Frequency requests supporting multiple pieces of equipment such as HF
nets, VHF/FM nets must be accompanied by a net description of some manner.
(c) JTF Korea will consolidate frequency requirements prior to submission to
CFC.
3. Administration and Logistics
a. Communications Reporting. See Appendix 6.
b. Communications Supply and Repair. Equipment supply and repair is a Service Component
responsibility.
4. Communications Security
a. All communications systems will be fully encrypted with NSA approved equipment and key
materials.
K-3-2
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
b. Maintenance of equipment will be through service channels.
c. Changing of call signs and keying material will be in accordance with the controlling authority
specifications.
K-3-3
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1 June 19XX
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX K TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING
(Omitted)
K-4-1
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1June 19XX
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX K TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE
REFERENCES:
a. DOD Directive 5200.33, “Defense Courier Service,” 30 September 1987.
b. DOD Regulation 5200.33R, “Defense Courier Service Regulation,” January 1989.
c. “Defense Courier Service Users Manual,” 1 February 1990.
1. Purpose. This Appendix provides guidance for Defense Courier Service (DCS) operations in support
of CFC operations.
2. General. The formation of JTF Korea and establishment of a JOA increases the need for DCS support
in CFC operations. The DCS will continue to provide courier support within CFC for movement of qualified
material to the JTF HQs, Component Commands, and supporting commands. Existing DCS channels will
be modified to transport material between CONUS, the CFC theater, JOA South Korea, and other
worldwide locations. The use of DCS is restricted to highly classified material according to reference a.
3. Concept of Defense Courier Service Support Operations. DCS Station Japan will remain operational.
Augmentation DCS personnel will deploy to the ISB and establish temporary DCS sub-station to support
JTF Korea.
a. Tasks
(1) CFC coordinates DCS support for JTF Korea. Plan for the establishment of a substation at the ISB and possible follow-on within South Korea.
(2) Primary account plans for receiving and receipt of material to include material
destined for subordinate organizations. Coordinate delivery and dispatch of material to subordinate
organizations.
b. Transportation Policies
(1) On execution of this OPLAN, the entry of material into CFC theater will be restricted
to that considered essential to CFC and JTF Korea. This restriction will be lifted once a DCS sub-station
is established.
(2) Commands using the DCS are responsible for providing vehicles suitable for
transporting material.
c. Courier Operations
K-5-1
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
(1) Direct DCS service in support of CFC will be restricted HQs, CFC, HQs JTF Korea,
JTF Service Component Commands, supporting commands, and collocated elements. DCS couriers will
exchange material with Top Secret Control Officers or properly cleared command messengers who will be
responsible for distribution and dispatch of material to subordinate activities. DCS Station Panama will act
as the focal point for the dispatch and receipt of DCS material until a DCS sub-station in the ISB is
established.
(2) All DCS courier activities will be coordinated through the USPACCOM Control Center,
Hawaii.
d. Coordinating Instruction
(1) DCS provides two levels of service for movement of qualified material. The DCS
priority movement system establishes precedence and subsequent order of movement for material
handled within the DCS.
(2) The responsibility for determining priority of material rests with originator of the
material.
(3) CINCKorea may designate specific categories of material requiring priority movement.
K-5-2
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY
HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1 June 19XX
APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX K TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
COMMUNICATIONS REPORTING
REFERENCE:
Basic Plan
1. General. This appendix specifies communications reporting and procedures for CFC. These
requirements and procedures are applicable to CFC, JTF Korea and its Service Components, and
supporting commands.
2. Reporting Requirements. The three basic communications reports, which will be used, are
Communications Spot Report (COMSPOT), the Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming and Interference Report
(MIJI), and the Communications Status Report (COMSTAT).
a. COMSPOT. The COMSPOT is used to report actual or forecast communications outages,
including relocation and emission control (EMCON). This message includes the communications event;
the effective time; the system, circuit, or facility affected; the location of the event; and the event of a
relocation, the old and new locations. COMSPOT reports will be sent to the USPACCOM Operations
Center, Hawaii.
b. MIJI. The MIJI report is used as primary means of sharing MIJI incidents promptly and
provides for joint exchange of tactical MIJI information, including electro-optical interference. This
message includes the MIJI victim unit name and location, electronic attack (EA) type, time period of event,
operator position and/or equipment affected, symptoms of MIJI, effectiveness of EA, electronic protection
(EP) actions, enemy responses to electronic protection, frequency and bandwidth affected, and signal
strength.
(1) MIJI reports will be sent as soon as possible and transmitted using electronic means.
(2) MIJI reports will be sent to HQs CFC operations center attention J-2, J-3, and J-6.
c. COMSTAT. COMSTAT reports will be submitted by the JTF for its subordinate commands
with supporting commands reporting directly. The COMSTAT will be submitted by secure means NLT
0100Z daily with a 2300Z status.
(1) COMSTAT updates will be submitted at 0500Z and 1200Z on an exception basis.
(2) The following systems will be reported: fixed telephone, fixed teletype, special C2
systems, intelligence systems, leased circuits, weather, and other items as deemed appropriate.
K-6-1
SECRET FOR TRAINING ONLY