Bismarck - the master Planner? Views on Bismarck/h/bismarckinvestigations
According to the traditional historical view of the establishment of the German Empire
Bismarck had a very clear and precise aim and a carefully formulated stage by stage
plan by which the aim was realised.
1. To obtain friendship of Russia
2. To trick Austria into declaring war on Prussia
3. To ensure French neutrality in event of war with Austria
4. To treat Austria leniently after her defeat
5. To manipulate France into war to win support of the SGS
• Some critics argue that Bismarck did not plan to unite Germany ..."Bismarck's plan
was to preserve and extend the power of Prussia. He was a Prussian and not a
German nationalist ...It was Bismarck's task to take over the leadership of the
German unification movement and manage it in such a way that Prussia remained
intact and more powerful than before." (Shreeves)
•
Importance of kleindeutschland over grossdeutschland
• Importance of Prussian form of society & government to Bismarck - This system
under threat from industrialisation
•
Junkers had important role to play in Prussian administration
• Disagreement over master plan theory - spread by his memoirs & German
nationalist historians
"There is no exact science of politics ... the professors & their imitators in the
newspapers constantly decry the fact that I have not revealed a set of principles by
which I direct my policies ... politics is neither arithmetic nor mathematics...”
"In chess one should never base a move on the positive assumption that the other
player in turn will make a certain move. For it may be that this won't happen and then
the game is lost ... one must always have two irons in the fire." (Bismarck)
•
"In fact, Bismarck had no master plan but was, like Cavour, brilliant at making use
of whatever opportunities came his way." (Shreeves)
Bismarck the Master Planner?
Some believe this was a myth created by Bismarck in his memoirs and built on by German
nationalist historians.
To be a master-planner it follows that Bismarck's aim was to unite Germany. However,
German historian Ritter states `Bismarck had nothing to do with the nationalism of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and its blind fanaticism.' He believes Bismarck was a
Prussian and not a German nationalist.
To be a master-planner and unite Germany it follows that Bismarck engineered the wars of
the 1860s and with France in 1870. What do historians say about Bismarck's designs on
war with France?
A.J.P.Taylor states `Certainly there is not a scrap of evidence that Bismarck worked
deliberately for a war with France, still less that he timed it for the summer of
1870'.Bismarck, the Man and Statesman (1965).
•
M. Howard believes `The explanation that the conflict was planned by Bismarck as the
necessary climax to a long nurtured scheme for the unification of Germany is one which
does not today command general assent'. Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War
(1961).
•
However, Kent believes `It now seems fairly certain, on the basis of newly discovered
documents and a reinterpretation of old ones, that Bismarck planned a war from the
very beginning.' G. 0. Kent Bismarck and His Times (1978).
`The Hohenzollern candidature, far from being designed to provoke a war with France which
could complete the unification of Germany, was intended rather to make German unification
possible without a war... He had neither planned the war nor even foreseen it. But he claimed
it as his own once it became inevitable'. H. Bohme The Foundation of the German
Empire (1971)
• `...This is not to say that Bismarck planned the Hohenzollern candidature in order to trap
France into a war which would result in the accession of the south German states to the
Confederation... To impute to Bismarck the prior planning of every detail of
developments as they occurred is to make of him a kind of superman, to whom nothing
could happen that he had not intended'. W.M. Simon Germany: A Brief History
(1967)
•
Pflanze says `Bismarck's goal was not an alliance, but a crisis with France. He
deliberately set sail on a collision course wit the intent of provoking wither a war or a French
internal collapse. The partisans of his innocence ask us to believe a most improbable case:
that the shrewdest diplomatic mind of recent history permitted Germany (Prussia) to be
drawn into a war which he was eager to avoid ...In the end war came because Bismarck
believed it necessary and opportune and because the French cabinet had neither the
wisdom nor the firmness of will to avoid it'. O. Pflanze Bismarck and the Development of
Germany: Unification 1815-18'1. (1963).
•
`Some historians have recently... endeavoured to prove either that the whole affair
was an example of brinkmanship which went wrong, or even that Bismarck’s aims were
peaceful and defensive, and that no-one was more surprised than he at the result... what
we seem to have in this case is an example of Bismarck's skilful pursuit of alternative
courses. There were two possibilities; either that France would acquiesce in the
Hohenzollern election, in which case Prussia would be no worse off …or France would not,
in which case there might be a war, for which he was ready. What we must reject is that he
was innocently unaware of this second possibility'. W. Medlicott Bismarck and Modern
Germany, (1965).
Bismarck Themes
l. The Importance of the Zollverein to the Unification of Germany
Clear need to evaluate the importance of the Zollverein but don't forget to make
some reference to other factors too!
• Stiles argues that the Zollverein was a'force for unity in the 1840s and therefore a
focal point for nationalist sentiments'
•
Williamson plays down the importance of the Zollverein saying that `it is no
means clear that it could have achieved German unity unaided by other
factors."
Makes the point that many Zollverein members sided with Austria against
Prussia
• Taylor argues that the German princes came to support the Zollverein as a means
of winning back the middle classes from revolutionary activity thus making political
unity unnecessary
•
Lee acknowledges the importance of economic unity but emphasises the need to
deal with the political impasse (the Bund)
•
Bohme states that Prussia's defence against Austrian attempts to establish ‘a
great economic order' was the foundation for her `own later hegemony'
•
Perhaps need to echo Keynes in stressing the importance of the boom in the
Prussian economy - foundations for this laid in 1815 in the Vienna Settlement.
Strong economy meant strong army!
•
Echoing Lee Bismarck should receive much credit for overcoming the political
barrier to unity in destroying the Bund & replacing it with the NGF
2. The Nature of the new German Empire
• Bismarck seemed to have rejected liberalism following his experiences in 1848 -9
but worked with the National Liberals in the Prussian Land tag in the 1860s
• Bismarck created a bi-cameral system of government - the Bundesrat & the
Reichstag
• Reichstag elected by universal adult male suffrage!
• German socialist Liebknecht described Reichstag as `a fig leaf covering the
nakedness of absolutism'
• Bismarck as Chancellor was only responsible to the Kaiser
• Could ignore resolutions from the Reichstag - hired & fired ministers
• Emperor retained huge amount of power - appointed Chancellor, could
dissolve Reichstag, commanded the Army, controlled foreign policy,
possessed right to interpret constitution
Conservative nature of Empire revealed by structure of the Empire - federal system
• State governments granted large degree of autonomy especially the South German
States
• Empire functioned as federation of 25 states - each had its own representative
assembly - local royal families retained
Low level of nationalism?
•
Lack of national symbols eg anthem & flag
•
New Empire contained non German minorities + some German minorities excluded
•
Prussian power expanded so some nationalist needs met?
3. Bismarck & the Wars
Wilmot points out the need to consider 3 important questions : a) Did Bismarck possess an
overall blueprint for unification? b) Did he owe his success to a coincidental gathering of
favourable international and domestic circumstances? c) Was he merely an opportunist,
cleverly exploiting the mistakes of his adversaries & taking calculated risks which happened
to be successful?
Bismarck claimed that the Polish Revolt was an opportunity to secure Russian neutrality
in the forthcoming clash with Austria - this is supported by Cowie & Wolfson ...
"Bismarck had long contended that Prussia needed Russian friendship if she were to
succeed in fashioning Germany as she wished."
According to Wilmot Bismarck had more practical reasons for dealing with the Poles their Catholic faith and their radical tradition + "The Alvenslben Convention was in all
probability an attempt to gain security against possible disturbances in Prussia's Polish
territories"
War with Denmark - German nationalists excited over issue of the 2 Duchies- many
supported claim by Prince of Augustenburg but Bismarck less than keen. According to
Wilmot he wanted both duchies for Prussia. Cowie & Wolfson argue that Bismarck was
anxious to revenge a similar slight in 1848 + Kiel Canal ran through this territory. Also
emphasise Bismarck's desire to see Prussian interests served.
Bismarck claimed that this issue was the pretext he required to provoke Austria into war but
Wilmot only partly agrees. "Bismarck's only clear policy was his determination to prevent
any attempt by Austria to reassert their leadership of the German states... it seemed that
Bismarck was not following a set plan but was pursuing a `wait and see' policy"
Bismarck referred to the Convention of Gastein as having `papered over the cracks'
According to Taylor Bismarck preferred to win the states through diplomacy... "Bismarck
was a diplomatic genius, inexperienced in war and disliking its risks. He may well have
hoped to manoeuvre Austria out of the duchies, perhaps even out of the headship of
Germany, by diplomatic strokes ... His diplomacy in this period seems rather calculated to
frighten Austria rather than to prepare for war."
War with Austria
Bismarck met Napoleon III at Biarritz in October 1865 - neutrality apparently secured
with deal over Venetia - according to Wilmot Bismarck saw this as first necessary step
to success against Austria
Both Wilmot & Taylor emphasise the favourable international situation at this time
Wilmot stresses the high level of risk in the war with Austria and that Bismarck was
anxious for a quick resolution of the conflict
According to Cowie & Wolfson Bismarck was prepared to make deal with Austria but
Francis Joseph was not prepared to surrender presidency of the Bund so war had to be
considered (though only as a last resort).
Wilmot concludes by saying that `It seems unlikely [in 1866] that he was looking ahead
to a war with France to complete the unification of Germany.'
War with France - considerable debate over this!
Source quoted in Wilmot from Bismarck in 1867 ...'I shall never consent to a war that is
avoidable, much less seek it. But this was with France will surely come. It will be forced
upon us by the French Emperor. I can see that clearly.'
Bismarck wrote to the Prussian ambassador in July 1870 saying that Prussia would not go
to war over the Spanish Succession but "Should the French attack us, however, we shall of
course resist."
Taylor argues that Bismarck did not plan the war saying that the object of the Hohenzollern
Candidature was `to act as a check on France, not to provoke her into war... Bismarck's
overriding concern was with southern Germany and a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne
was designed to raise Prussian prestige south of the Maine.'
Taylor... "Certainly there is not a scrap of evidence that Bismarck worked deliberately
for a war with France, still less that he timed it for the summer of 1870."
"The explanation that the conflict was planned by Bismarck as the necessary climax
to a long matured scheme for the unification of Germany is one which does not
today command general assent." (Howard)
"The Hohenzollern candidature, far from being designed to provoke a war with France
which could complete the unification of Germany, was intended to make German unification
possible without war... He had neither planned the war nor even foreseen it. But he claimed
it as his own once it became inevitable." (Bohme)
Pflanze argues that Bismarck did have a major responsibility in starting the war...'He
deliberately set sail on a collision course with France with the intent of either provoking war
or a French internal collapse.'
Mann sees that Bismarck was willing to fight France but that it was unnecessary to the
unification process...' For the attainment of the Prussian goal, the establishment of a
`little Germany’, no war against France should have been necessary.'
According to Cowie & Wolfson there is no evidence to support the usual assumption that
Bismarck deliberately intervened in the Spanish Marriage question in order to provoke
France into war.