47.02.24
(842w)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH
THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR1
February 24, 1947
Washington, D.C.
Top Secret
The British Ambassador, accompanied by Mr. [Herbert
M.] Sichel, First Secretary of the British Embassy, was
received at their request by the Secretary this morning at
9 o’clock. The Ambassador informed the Secretary that, upon
instructions from his Government, he had come to hand him
the two aide memoires attached hereto, one relating to
Greece and the other to Turkey.2
After reading the aide memoire relating to Greece, the
Secretary stated that he realized that the matter treated
in it was of the utmost urgency and importance, that it
would be discussed at once with the President and the
Chiefs of Staffs, and that he hoped that a reply could be
made in the near future.
After examining the aide memoire relating to Turkey,
the Secretary stated that what he had said with regard to
the first note also applied to the second; that the
question of Turkey would also be given the urgent attention
of the United States Government. He added that the problem
with regard to Turkey seemed to be somewhat different,
however, from the Greek problem. The Ambassador agreed,
adding that the Greek problem was undoubtedly the more
urgent of the two; nevertheless, it seemed wise to the
British Government that the problem of Turkey should not be
neglected.
2
The Secretary said that it was his understanding that
the Russians had made no move with regard to Turkey for
some time and asked if the Ambassador had any ideas
regarding the reasons for the Russian silence. The
Ambassador said that in his opinion no foreigner knows why
Russia takes or fails to take certain actions. Therefore,
as an honest man, he must admit that he is not in a
position to explain what is responsible for the present
Soviet attitude towards Turkey. He could make guesses, but
his guesses would be of no more value than those of any
other person.
The Ambassador emphasized the fact that neither the
Greek nor the Turkish Government had as yet been informed
of the decision of Great Britain that it could no longer
extend financial assistance to Greece and Turkey. He added
that it probably would be disastrous to give such
information to the Greeks or the Turks unless they could be
informed at the same time that the United States Government
had definite plans to aid them.3
NA/RG 59 (Central Decimal File, 868.00/2-2447)
1. This memorandum was written by Loy W. Henderson,
director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.
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2. Political and economic conditions in Greece had been
deteriorating rapidly since the year began. As a result of
increasing communist guerrilla activity--supplied from Albania,
Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria--internal economic chaos, and the
government's inability to meet the crisis, Greece appeared to be
on the verge of imminent collapse. Dean Acheson sent the
secretary a memorandum (initially drafted by Henderson) entitled
"Crisis and Imminent Possibility of Collapse in Greece" which
asserted that only a national coalition government and
substantial aid from the United States could save the country.
(See Foreign Relations, 1947, 5: 29–31.) In his memoirs, Acheson
implies that Marshall saw this memorandum before he left for New
York City on the morning of February 21 and "instructed me to
prepare the necessary steps for sending economic and military
aid." (Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the
State Department [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969], p. 217.)
Rumors of impending British troop withdrawals had
previously been reported by U.S. observers in Greece. After
Marshall had departed on February 21, the British Embassy in
Washington made an appointment for their ambassador, Lord
Inverchapel, to see the secretary on Monday, February 24.
Meanwhile, the embassy sent Loy Henderson two top secret aidemémoire stating that Great Britain would end aid to Greece and
Turkey at the end of March. (These documents are in Foreign
Relations, 1947, 5: 32–37.) Acheson immediately ordered the
department's staff to draft reports analyzing the situation and
telephoned Marshall and President Truman about the British
notes. Marshall read these reports prior to his meeting with
Lord Inverchapel. (Acheson, Creation, pp. 217–18. See also
Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks [February 21–June 5, 1947]
[New York: Viking, 1955], pp. 3–8.)
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3. Shortly after noon, Marshall met with President
Truman, as he normally did prior to a Cabinet luncheon, and
showed him the British notes. He also gave Truman a
memorandum from Acheson regarding the notes that asserted
that the British were "wholly sincere in this matter and
that the situation is as critical as they state. This puts
up the most major decision with which we have been faced
since the war." (Acheson's memorandum is in Foreign
Relations, 1947, 5: 44–45. See President Truman's brief
account in Memoirs, vol. 2, Years of Trial and Hope [Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1956], p. 100. Secretary of
the Navy James Forrestal and Secretary of War Robert
Patterson also participated in the discussion.)
//QUESTION FROM MAME: Should the last sentence be outside
the end parenthesis?//
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