INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ORGANIZATION THEORY AND
BEHAVIOR, 8 (4), 559-576
WINTER 2005
CRITICAL THEORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND HEGEMONY:
ROLE OBLIGATION AND THE RECONCILIATION OF
SEEMINGLY INCOMPATIBLE GOALS
Arthur J. Sementelli*
ABSTRACT.
Literature on critical and institutional theories are often
perceived to be incompatible, despite a shared conceptual grounding. By clearly
defining and understanding the concepts of “hegemony” and “role obligations”
one might address this misconception of incompatibility, and allow the
development of a framework to bridge the concepts of institutions and critical
theory. This bridge allows the two streams of literature to meaningfully benefit
from each intellectual space. This bridge can ultimately be used to inform both
theory and practice in the study of organizations.
INTRODUCTION
The twenty first century has given rise to sets of circumstances
where conceptual turf battle among disciplines has created a sort of
environment where compartmentalized ideas of knowledge tend not to
provide the best insights into social phenomena, epiphenomena, and
what scholars typically understand as lived experiences. Consequently,
effective scholars and practitioners must reexamine, reevaluate, and
sometimes redefine relationships among seemingly disparate ideas. One
such relationship exists between the study of contemporary critical
theory and the study of institutions.
Sometimes, those who self identify as contemporary critical theorists
tend to prefer to examine and deconstruct institutions rather than engage
in a more pragmatic approach to critical theory such as that outlined by
-------------------------* Arthur J. Sementelli, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor, School of Public
Administration, Florida Atlantic University. His research interests are in
integrating economic concepts and critical theory within management and
organization studies.
Copyright © 2005 by PrAcademics Press
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Abel and Sementelli (2004). Arguably, there are benefits to be gained
from participating, modifying, and otherwise changing these institutions
from within, rather than from what some might argue to be a catastrophic
change. Despite the potential benefits of a planned or internal approach
to deconstruction, contemporary critical theorists often look upon such
an argument with horror or revulsion, as it appears to conflict with the
Marxist sensibilities of their training and flies in the face of their
understanding of hegemony, control, and power.
This purely negative view is arguably both erroneous and
unproductive since both classical scholars of critical theory in the
tradition of the Frankfurt School such as Adorno (1978) and
contemporary scholars of management such as Alvesson and Wilmott,
(1992) point towards means and methods by which critical theory can
usefully function within institutions. In each case, however, scholars
take great care to “hedge” the applicability of their conclusions within
the mainstream concerns of traditional and contemporary critical
theorists, which often leads at the very least to a tone of despair or
futility about the process of emancipation within institutions.
Some of the greatest areas of contention between the two bodies of
literature come from how they perceive, understand, and cope with
notions of hegemony and role obligations. Institutions and the
accompanying literature often understand hegemony, for example, as a
simple fact, relying on the basic definition where the institution is
invested with some sort of authority over a group of individuals. This
investment of authority is legitimated by contract, social structure, or
some other agreement such as through human nature (Aristotle, 1992),
natural law (Aquinas, 1981), dialectical necessity Hegel (Berthold-Bond,
1993), certain categorical principles of rationality (Timmons, 2002), and
social contracts adopted by everyone upon leaving a state of nature
(Barker, 1960; Rousseau, 1967). In such a context, the practice of
hegemony most often flows from the legitimate exercise of power. The
ability to wield such power and influence consistently within an
organization or institution emerges from socialization, learning, and
development of institutional leadership (Selznick, 1957).
Some scholars, associated with contemporary critical theory, and
particularly those influenced by the works of Gramsci, Freire, and others
have a different understanding of hegemony than the one forwarded by
many of the classic institutional scholars. Hegemony, from the
CRITICAL THEORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND HEGEMONY
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perspective of these contemporary critical theorists, often implies some
force, coercion, and even malicious intent. Furthermore, such a
conception is bound by its links at least contextually, if not historically,
to the traditions of a ruling class in Europe. Such a linkage raises serious
questions about the applicability of such assertions in the United States
and other countries that do not have a longstanding tradition of a ruling
class, though it often still holds in the context of social scenarios relating
to gender, ethnicity, and other groups typically affected by this negative
hegemony.
Consider that scholarship by people such as Gramsci (1971), Freire
(2003), and others was typically the product of an arguably oppressive
ruling class or social order. Alternatively, it might have emerged as a
reaction to the natural development or evolution of some power
relationship (Foucault, 1977; 1980). In such a context, it becomes clear
why some contemporary critical theorists tend to view institutions as
instruments of oppression requiring deconstruction (Dennard, 1997).
However, simply deconstructing institutions as a goal is problematic,
since it typically fails to address the questions of what to do after the
deconstruction. Furthermore, the process of deconstruction is at once a
positive and a negative endeavor. It suggests new options as it critiques
what is extant (Abel & Sementelli, 2004). One such possibility for the
aftermath of deconstruction might be some social transformation
(Sementelli & Abel, 2000, p. 460). Additionally, it might lead to
processes of micro emancipation offered by Alvesson and Willmott
(1992). Most likely, however, deconstruction will arguably lead to the
development of an alternative institution that might check or possibly
supplant the existing/offending entity.
This thesis that institutions will develop to counter or supplant
hegemonic efforts of other institutions is by no means altruistic,
idealistic, utopian, or an act of faith. Instead it most closely parallels the
well heeled quote by Madison in Federalist 51 “Ambition must be made
to counteract ambition” (Padover, 1953, p. 179) whereby the most
effective way to foil a hegemonic institution would be to have it compete
for scarce societal resources against another institution. The justification
for why these institutions can and should compete with each other comes
from their associated role obligations (Hardimon, 1994) which helps set
the stage for the decisions they make, actions they take, and language
games they play (Wittgenstein, 1953). This paper, consequently, will
attempt to uncover a place for institutions (be they oppressive or not) in
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contemporary critical theory grounded in their corresponding role
obligations and the values associated with their “brand” of hegemony,
which arguably leads to competition among institutions.
INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIETY
There are numerous definitions of what people generally and what
scholars in particular consider an institution to be. When the literature
speaks of an institution, it may refer to any number of different ideas
depending on where, when, and how the speaker was trained. If we
consider a sociological or organizational definition, we might understand
that “institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative
structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social
behavior. Institutions are transported by various carriers ─ cultures,
structures, and routines ─ and they operate at multiple levels of
jurisdiction” (Scott, 1995, p. 33).
If we take a more philosophical stance, institutions are simply “any
public system of rules” (Hardimon, 1994, p. 335). Economic definitions
of institutions refer to “rule-following behaviour” (Allegret, Courbis &
Dulbecco, 2003, p. 73) or some widely accepted method for doing
something in a society such as marriage, markets, government, etc.
Political scientists, in contrast, typically define institutions within the
context of “the state” (Abbot, 1999; Hansen, 1998), and often focus on
how voters interact with them rather than focusing more broadly on
institutional structures, systems of rules, or even methods.
From a sociological context, Hughes (1936) identifies the essential
elements of an institution as a set of mores, formal rules or both, which
can be fulfilled by people acting collectively in established capacities.
Such a definition is broad enough to include, at least loosely all the
definitions presented above. This piece similar to Hughes (1936, p.180)
will describe institutions as the “order of social phenomena in which the
feature establishment and that of collective behavior meet in a particular
way: namely, so that the very form taken by the collective behavior is
something socially established.” Using such a definition enables one to
include the ideas of political governance, rule following behaviors, and
implicit needs for structure discussed by political scientists, economists,
and sociologists. Additionally, it supports Hardimon’s (1994, p.341)
assertion that lives are lived through institutions, making them integral
CRITICAL THEORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND HEGEMONY
563
for understanding and coping with the lived experiences discussed by
contemporary critical theorists.
From the definitions offered above, we can glean some basic
information about institutions and their nature. First, they are social
structures made up of people, and as Cooley (1956, pp. 313-314) argued,
people are a primary cause of and can influence processes within
institutions. Second, they are composed of individuals who are shaped,
trained, and otherwise socialized by their leaders. Ultimately, as argued
by Selznick (1957, p.17) in many institutions, members become invested
with sets of values by their leadership core, which creates and modifies
roles and behaviors, while creating a space for the examination of role
obligations in this study. Third, as institutions evolve over time through
interaction with individuals and the changes in their beliefs, culture, and
mores, we begin to understand the reflexivity of the process, creating
opportunities for the sort of micro emancipation discussed by Alvesson
and Willmott (1992), and others. These changes can and will affect the
operation of institutions.
This responsiveness or sensitivity of
institutions in turn enables emacipatory processes while it enables
strategies for checking, supplanting, or at least moderating the effects of
negative hegemony in an institution.
Specifically, scholars can adapt and apply an analog of Madison’s
idea of pitting ambition against ambition (Padover, 1953, p. 179). Rather
than simply pitting political actors against other political actors, this
author argues we might pit institutions against other institutions, which
can lead to a number of the positive outcomes sought by contemporary
critical theorists, including emancipation, micro emancipation, and in
some cases social change a la Schumpeter (1975). However, before one
can meaningfully employ institutions as a source of what can be
understood as positive hegemony, concurrently with contemporary
critical theory which can act as a source of negative hegemony, we must
first understand these influences, which arguably grow from role
obligations. The manner in which people understand role obligations is
central to understanding how one can reconcile institutions and
contemporary critical theory.
NON-CONTRACTUAL ROLE OBLIGATIONS
There are two basic components of role obligations. The first,
contractual role obligations are tied most closely to Hegel’s (1952) idea
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of Sittlichkeit. It requires some sort of overt agreement or formal
documentation of acceptance of an institutional role. The second, noncontractual role obligations refer to roles that are not a function of
agreement. Specifically, they tend to refer to the types of familial,
cultural, and social relationships that people are born into or happen into
without conscious choice or some informed decision.
These role obligations in turn create specific relationships with
certain obligations, such as those typical among the cultural elites in
Europe, Central, and South America. These role obligations, typically
non-contractual in nature, represent the sort of negative hegemony, if not
the overt “oppression,” that is often a central argument of contemporary
critical theorists such as Freire (2003), Gramsci (1971), and others.
Typically, these non-contractual role obligations, as illustrated by
Durkheim (1949) are part of some collective framework or normative
system. The nature of these normative systems can be understood using
both Kant and Pufendorf. For example, Kant’s (Timmons, 2002) notion
that some obligations are categorical creates a system of non-contractual
role obligations from the perspective that the role is predetermined, or
without conscious choice. Pufendorf (1991) presents another way for
these normative systems to emerge. Specifically, his idea that these roles
are inherent in human nature points toward the sort of habituation that
happens in many non-contractual role obligations.
Furthermore,
Pufendorf’s (1991) conception functions particularly well when
explaining the maintenance of a patriarchy or monarchy.
The normative system in these non-contractual role obligations is
present from birth, and tends to socialize or indoctrinate individuals with
a set of values similar to the process discussed by Selznick (1957), but
without the conscious choice to enter into the institution and its
normative system. This makes the systems that foster these noncontractual role obligations “inherently heteronomous” (Hardimon, 1994,
p. 349), which can lead to conflict. This helps to explain how some, for
example, can often function habitually in ways that contradict the
normative systems that they themselves support and even defend, since
the internalized sensibilities of people within a system can exist in
conflict with the principles of the system itself. Such an internal conflict
can help foster a “lifeworld” that seeks change either within or without
an institution, but not necessarily. Socialization into an institution might
also carry with it the beliefs that enable one to establish the principle of
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565
reflective acceptability (Hardimon, 1994; Rawls, 1999), making the role
binding.
Consequently, many of the duties assigned by these non-contractual
roles are not questioned, which might lead to oppression and other
undesirable outcomes. At least, participants in these roles might have
doubts or skepticism while performing their duties (Hardimon, 1994, p.
344), but this is not the only option since such skepticism might also lead
to the sublimation discussed by Marcuse (1985), and even insurgency or
“Jihad” (Barber, 1995).
It can craft through this process of
primogeniture, the sort of situation railed against by a number of
Frankfurt critical theorists including Adorno (1978), Horkheimer (1999),
and Marcuse (1964), as well as the more contemporary ones including
Gramsci (1971), Freire (2003), and even Foucault (1977; 1979; 1980;
1991).
CONTRACTUAL ROLE OBLIGATIONS
Contractual role obligations, in contrast, are based on freely entered
agreements such as those grounded in “the constitutional rights of the
place” (Padover, 1953, p. 179). This role obligation also includes
traditional entrances into organizations and institutions such as
volunteering for the military in the US, accepting employment at a
Federal agency, or accepting employment at a private institution. In this
situation, the process of entering into the role is significant since the
individual is in effect accepting the package of duties that accompany
that role (Hardimon, 1994, p. 354) with a generalized and diffuse
understanding of these duties typically without force or coercion.
Contractual role obligations, though defined, can also change and
mutate over time. These obligations can be interpreted, reinterpreted,
and recast as institutions grow and evolve into other roles, duties, and
obligations through the process of drift or endogenous evolution (Abel &
Sementelli, 2004, p.95). Furthermore, since these roles are linked
explicitly to the external world through these agreements (Hegel, 1952,
pp. 122-123), the potential exists to reflect, adapt, and challenge other
institutional roles. It is at this point where these evolving role
obligations require continued informed consent or at least a mechanism
of refusal to prevent it from evolving into an instrument of oppression
through some type of coercion.
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Consequently, by itself, these role obligations offer no comfort and
no repose for contemporary critical theorists, but only the potential to
function within their framework, or at least function as a heuristic device
to understand the current set of obligations. Moreover, these concepts
could be equally as likely to change or evolve into the sort of control and
potential for oppression through the authority provided by these
institutional positions that concerned Hayek (1994), as they can in
situations with “at will” employees. However, even though we now have
the potential for hegemony and oppression, we also have means and
methods to respond to it as well. Once the nature of hegemony itself has
been examined, we can then demonstrate how to reconcile hegemonic
relationships within contemporary critical theory.
HEGEMONY AND ITS PROBLEMS
The idea of hegemony itself is relatively complex. Though
hegemony is simply defined as leadership or preponderance (Oxford
English Dictionary, 1991), it has become encumbered with value
judgments placed on how this leadership or preponderance is achieved
over time. Current conceptions often distinguish between hegemony that
exists with or without the threat of force. The implication of force is
most often associated with contemporary critical theory, while the study
of organizations and institutions tend to refer to a more legalistic
hegemony that is entered into willingly. In either case, there is typically
a dominant group as well as one that typically has less power, or is
potentially marginalized for good or for ill. This argument parallels the
discussion of the positive and negative aspects of power discussed by
Abel and Sementelli (2002).
The primary issues with hegemony emerge when we try to mix and
match these remarkably different uses, values, and intentions. As
discussed earlier, many critical theorists (both classical and
contemporary) believe that oppression and social injustice are the
inevitable consequences of institutions, arguably seeing only one element
of this concept “hegemony.” As a result many scholars of classical and
contemporary critical theory tend to argue that immanent encounters are
necessary to deconstruct meanings, identities and dualisms that emerge
from these socioeconomic elites through the dominant culture (Dennard,
1997, p. 50), while often ignoring the potential effects of positive
hegemony on institutions and society.
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One scholar most frequently associated with studies of hegemony in
a society is Antonio Gramsci, who believed that states could not enforce
control or class structures without a multifaceted approach, which
included some socialization and management of media. This makes
Gramsci, exceptional among contemporary critical theorists since he at
least alludes to both aspects of the concept of hegemony, though tending
to emphasize the negative aspects of it in practice. As a consequence of
emphasizing these negative elements, those inspired by Gramsci’s work,
including Kiros (1985, p. 102) focus on the “continuous effort in
stimulating the human subjects to critically question, examine and
intellectually overthrow the effects of ideas that have generated those
distorted and false religions, political ideas and philosophies.” Rather
than include both the positive and negative aspects of hegemony, this
literature stream instead takes the far more limited view, which
emphasizes negative hegemony.
Gramsci (1971) himself is not immune to this trap. In Selections
from the Prison Notebooks, he argues that hegemony can be classified as
the “social basis of the proletarian dictatorship and of the Workers State"
(p. 443). From such a stance, Gramsci’s hegemony takes on far more
malicious tones and becomes reinforced through manipulation and
development of a ‘false consciousness.’ Gramsci, similar to Marx, and
other scholars of what we might now call Neo Marxism or Neo
Socialism, also points toward the issues of domination that arise from
economic determinism and moral leadership. These socioeconomic
influences, according to Gramsci and other like-minded philosophers,
often lead to specific life choices, and can create or reinforce a culture of
domination.
In summation, the views of Gramsci and his intellectual progeny
tend to emphasize one element of the concept of hegemony, and have
over time sculpted the term to mean something wholly negative. This in
turn, creates a sort of “imaginary truth” for the term (Baudrillard, 1996)
that completely ignores the other, more positive elements of hegemony
as a concept. To bridge these two faces of hegemony we need to
examine them through the lens of role obligations. It is the two
categories of role obligations, which can aid us as scholars in our efforts
to understand hegemony, and consequently reconcile how institutions
can and must mesh within the study of contemporary critical theory.
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ROLE OBLIGATIONS, HEGEMONY, AND CRITICAL THEORY
Understanding role obligations becomes a fundamentally useful
exercise in the context of both the study of institutions and critical
theory. As discussed earlier, Hardimon (1994) discusses two different
types of role obligations, contractual and non-contractual. Contractual
role obligations are entered into freely and are not encumbered by many
of the “domination” issues expressed by Gramsci, and others in the
context of institutional membership. Non-contractual role obligations,
however, are often very consistent with many of the fears of Gramsci
(1971), Freire (2003), and others sometimes leading to domination,
alienation, and marginalization.
Consequently, one can arrive at the idea that contractual and noncontractual role obligations differ based both on their processes and
context. One (contractual role obligations) relies on the unimpeded,
unencumbered entry into an institution. Some critical theorists might
even argue that such a set of processes and context requires if not alludes
to the sort of genuine communication proffered by Habermas (1981).
The other (non-contractual role obligations) function within the sort of
oppressive or otherwise unjust contexts that emerge from the habituated
social conditions that remove the freedom of decision from the process
of entry into an institution. Once these contextual differences between
contractual and non-contractual obligations are understood, one might
then argue that contractual role obligations reflect the sort of hegemony
often understood in the mainstream literature on institutions (positive
hegemony), while non-contractual role obligations typically reflect the
sort of hegemony feared by contemporary critical theorists (negative
hegemony). These differences in intent and process can allow us to
disassociate the negative connotations from hegemony at least some of
the time, in turn reducing if not eliminating the perceived incompatibility
between the study of institutions and contemporary critical theory.
CHOICES, JUSTICE, AND GOAL DIFFERENCES
Philosophers tend to be most interested in contractual role
obligations, often within the study of justice or fairness. Rawls (1999)
discusses how people enter into institutions and then become
“encumbered” with duties. In this sense, one might argue that Rawls is
referring to a contractual role obligation, which is supported by the
statement that people entering the institution have to do it voluntarily,
CRITICAL THEORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND HEGEMONY
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and use this agreement to advance their interests. This concept of entry
as discussed earlier is remarkably different from that of Kant (Timmons,
2002), Pufendorf (1991), and even Rousseau (Barker, 1960; Rousseau,
1967) who explicitly or implicitly advocate for non-contractual role
obligations, which in turn can provide a basis for many of the concerns
voiced both by classical and contemporary critical theorists.
Using the combination of voluntary participation and advancement
of self-interest, one might arrive at a conception of a contractual role
obligation grounded in the principle of fairness and moral reasoning that
is attached to the role, instead of from the role itself outside of any social,
ethical, or moral context. These concepts of voluntary participation and
fairness are key elements of contractual role obligations. Contractual
role obligations enable participants to enter into institutions freely, while
retaining their links to the social world given that our lives are lived in
practice through institutions (Hardimon, 1994).
Non-contractual role obligations, as stated earlier, are problematic
(Hardimon, 1994) since they are often nonspecific, the duties tend to be
ill defined, or are shaped over time, and often lead to conflicts with
moral beliefs. In practice, non-contractual role obligations can provide
the sort of social space for the “administrative evil” discussed by Adams
and Balfour (1998), where people can engage in acts of evil, harm, or
hegemony without being aware they are doing anything wrong. It is
under these circumstances, where the sort of hegemony discussed by
Freire (2003), Gramsci, (1971), and others can and does exist.
Historically, we find these role obligations are often habituated and
typically lead to many of the clearest examples of injustice and harm.
The study of role obligations, then, appears to offer substantial
insights as a mechanism for understanding first, how contemporary
critical theory and institutions might be in opposition to each other and
second, how they might be complimentary to each other. The context of
contractual role obligations, typically understood as being Hegelian
(1952) in nature, focuses on how people freely choose to enter into
institutions and their associated obligations. The tension between
contractual and non-contractual role obligations gives us a somewhat
balanced view of society, similar to Madison (Padover, 1953), who
simultaneously reflected on the “idea of complete human depravity”
while accepting Jefferson’s logic that people might possess “sufficient
virtue” to participate meaningfully in institutions. This in turn reveals
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other options besides the oppression and social injustice discussed by
many critical theorists. Instead, institutions, like the individuals that
exist within them, can become mechanisms that foster emancipation, or
at least micro emancipation (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992), by
challenging, impeding, or replacing other hegemonic institutions that
might otherwise not be interested or amenable to the processes of
emancipation or micro emancipation. Such a strategy remains analogous
to Madison’s notion of pitting ambition against ambition (Padover,
1953), or in contemporary terms, it places the impetus for deconstruction
and change on institutions competing against one another for scarce
resources and support.
BRIDGING LIFEWORLDS AND PRAXIS
One of the most interesting areas of theory and practice that could
benefit from this intersection of literature of contemporary critical theory
and institutions is the study of communicative spheres (or lifeworlds),
and how people, organizations, and institutions interact within them
(Habermas, 1989). Organizations and institutions exist in many different
“spheres” including public, private, mass, and others (Ku, 2000).
Additionally, these organizations and institutions often deal both with of
the conceptions of hegemony discussed earlier (Ogbor, 2001) and the
associated consequences of them including critique, oppression,
deconstruction, and reconstruction. Additionally, using role obligations
appears to help clarify and bridge contemporary critical theory and
institutional theory similar to what Dryzek (1987) advocated for the
public sphere. Unlike Dryzek (1987), who limits himself to the study of
the public sector exclusively, one might argue instead that the conception
of role obligations allows scholars to use critical theory and literature on
institutions within any and all of the spheres discussed by Ku (2000).
Linking contemporary critical theory to institutional theory using
role obligations also creates a solid foundation to use epistemic critique
(Steffy & Grimes, 1986) meaningfully. Furthermore, it can help us to
understand and explain how social rationality, where rational procedures
tend to emanate from psychological processes and are eventually
embraced and adopted within a society (Tillman, 2004 p. 156), might
function in each of these spheres either consistently or inconsistently
with the goals, objectives, and beliefs of contemporary critical theorists.
Additionally, within the context of “community” writ large, the argument
CRITICAL THEORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND HEGEMONY
571
forwarded helps to describe and explain how institutions in each sphere
can interact, and how communitarianism often plays a role, particularly
when there are issues of stratification and power ((Brint, 2001).
Within contemporary society, we as scholars have come to
understand that people inevitably exist within structures, within
organizations, and within institutions. These institutions interact across
multiple spheres, have multiple agendas, and exist in multiple geographic
areas. Consequently, understanding the positive and negative influences
of such institutions on the members of this contemporary society is
essential for any cogent treatment of the subject. Separately, scholars
such as Freire (2003) attempted to understand the politics of oppression,
or the negative elements of hegemony. Simultaneously, other scholars
including Selznick (1957) and Scott (1995) at least implicitly if not
explicitly examined the positive elements of hegemony within
organizations and institutions. This, in turn, raises the question of which
to use. As argued throughout this piece, it would be fruitful to the study
of both institutions and critical theory to spend some time reflecting upon
the concepts of hegemony, role obligations, and how they influence
organizations, institutions, and society in the broadest sense.
By including this understanding of role obligations and the two sides
of hegemony, one might begin to understand and possibly resolve some
of the paradoxes regarding institutions acting on behalf of individuals, as
a foil to dominating institutions, and as a space for the sort of immanent
critique desired by many critical theorists without endorsing violence
(Jay, 1973).
Furthermore, when institutions become spaces for
immanent critique, tools of emancipation, and foils against oppression,
they in effect can begin to act against many of the “totalizing influences”
(Marcuse, 1964; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1947) leading us to a
meaningful critical praxis and possibly as a consequence a less
oppressive society.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
By linking the ideas of contemporary critical theory to the
institutional literature through role obligations, we find a mechanism to
understand, cope, and potentially address the “crisis of confidence” that
critical theorists often have as a goal, without the negative baggage that
often accompanies the understanding of such a crisis. Instead of relying
on the very destructive, arguably “Marxist” alternatives for coping with
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this crisis, by reflecting on the two sides of hegemony in practice, we
might instead, supplant a dominant culture (Dennard, 1997), with another
from within a societal sphere. This process of institutional competition,
pitting the interests of a potentially oppressive institutions against the
interests of other institutions, possibly with different values, goals, and
objectives can in turn achieve many of the goals set forth both by
Frankfurt and contemporary critical theorists without the negative
consequences associated with a total social upheaval.
Some critics of such an approach might argue this is nothing more
than an affront to the sensibilities of Frankfurt Critical theorists.
Arguably, given that what we currently understand as “critical theory”
has, in fact continued to evolve and change over time, it must then
incorporate new scholars, perspectives, and ideas into its body of
knowledge. Additionally, if the study of critical theory is to be a
productive endeavor within the study of organizations and institutions, it
must reconcile itself within these seemingly disparate goals such as
institutional survival and longevity. Critical theory generally, and
contemporary critical theory in particular can provide us with a number
of useful insights into organizational dysfunction, many process issues,
and issues of representation and power, making it a powerful tool to
manage both survival and change.
By reexamining and re-grounding the concept of hegemony, we as
scholars can now have a productive discussion of the positive and
negative consequences of it in public, private, and other social spheres.
The concept of role obligations also has proved itself a fruitful
mechanism to help frame the interpretations often found in the literature
of contemporary critical theory. Understanding this notion of hegemony
within the context of these role obligations then enables us to understand
some if not most of the issues forwarded by contemporary critical
theorists regarding institutions and their function. Finally, bridging the
institutional literature to the literature on critical theory through the
concept of hegemony opens a space for debate about the study of both
organizations and institutions, while simultaneously offering access to
some powerful tools and methods, such as immanent critique, that might
not otherwise be pursued by scholars.
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