Introduction:
Ethnic conflicts and religious divisions are found in most countries and on all
continents (Azam, 2001). Of late, many studies have addressed the issue of ethnic
diversity and its effects on social conflicts and civil wars. Political scientists, through
increasing study on ethnic diversity, have come to realize the importance of institutions in
attenuating ethnic conflicts in ethnically divided societies (Garcia-Montalvo and ReynalQuerol, 2002). Recently, economists have become increasingly interested in these issues
and emphasize the connections of ethnic diversity to investment, quality of government
and growth (Mauro, 1995, Easterly & Levine, 1997, and Alesina, Devleeschauer,
Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg, 2003).
Many Sub-Saharan African countries find themselves engulfed in ethnic conflicts. In
addition to human cost, these violent conflicts eat away at “meager financial resources”
of African countries (Mengisteab, 2001, p. 20). In other words, ethno-linguistic
fragmentation has been shown to have adverse effects on income, growth and overall
macroeconomic policies, which is one explanation for Africa’s poor growth performance
and an indirect cause of underdevelopment.
While the literature tells us that ethnic diversity by its mere fact is not a negative
attribute, it becomes more problematic in a situation where governance is based on
weakly institutionalized politics. Ethnic diversity coupled with weak institutions is a
recipe for underdevelopment, because it breeds an ethnically divided society posing risks
for corruption, political violence, and civil wars. These adverse effects of ethnic conflict
translate into poor macro-economic growth performance—a fact that bedevils
development (rendering African development less effective).
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
2
However, studies and concrete evidence from examples of western countries have
shown that strong political institutions can reduce the adverse effects of ethnic conflict.
The U.S is one of the countries where strong institutions have overcome adverse effects
of ethnic conflicts. Quinn and Woolly (2001) hypothesized “that democracies ameliorate
social conflicts in a way that produces stability” (p. 635). Thus, ethnic diversity is not a
problem in a society where fundamental institutions are functioning. It only becomes
troubling and causative in countries where formal institutions are inadequate and weak.
It is said that ethnic and religious identities are realities in Africa and, as such, should
not be condemned as pathological to development and democratization. Africa, rather,
should adopt a principle of inclusivity and constitutionalism: reinforcing the rule of law,
participation, autonomy, equity and recognition of ethnic groups. Hence, to avoid
anarchy and genocidal politics, Abubakar (2001) recommends that Africa should foster
democratization and acknowledge various ethnic groups as stakeholders in national
building.
This project examines the links between ethnic diversity, formal political institutions,
and economic development. It focuses on how formal political institutions and ethnic
conflicts affect development. The paper is divided into four major components. Part I
examines the literature on diversity, institutions and economic development, leading to
the hypotheses. Part II presents statistical evidence on ethnic diversity, income levels, and
income growth rates for all African nations. Part III examines the correlation between
ethnic diversity and growth. Part IV presents case studies of the design of political
institutions to lessen the effects of ELF. Some preliminary explanations regarding how
“high growth, high diversity” outliers have achieved their successes is provided as well.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
3
Part I: Theories of Africa’s Underdevelopment
Given its abundance of natural resources and sweeping democratization since 1960s,
it is unfortunate that Africa has not reached its anticipated development level. East Asian
nations which were at equal footing with Africa have bypassed that continent. In
retrospect, it was a gross miscalculation on the part of scholars, policymakers and donornations that once democracy and multiparty politics took hold, the whole continent would
move towards the undeviating road of development. That never happened; instead
underdevelopment set in. It is not consoling that a few countries such as Uganda,
Mauritius, Botswana, and Tunisia continue to develop relatively well while most nations
such as Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Congo and Madagascar get poorer and poorer. Today,
32 countries in Africa are poorer than they were in 1980 while Sub-Sahara Africa is the
lowest income region in the world (Collier and Gunning, 1999).
Although almost all scholars agree that Africa is in crisis, there is disagreement about
the actual cause of this crisis (Chabal, 1991). At the 2005 G-8 Summit, for instance,
European leaders emphasized a variety of causes of Africa’s underdevelopment and also
a variety of solutions (Jeffrey, 2005). France’s Jacques Chirac called for canceling debts
to developing countries, Britain’s Tony Blair set up the African commission, which
proposed eliminating trade barriers and combating corruption, while the UN presented a
paper written by American economist Jeffrey Sachs, which optimistically envisioned that
more development aid would create a world without poverty (Visscher, 2005 July/August
26). All in all, the following are said to be responsible for underdevelopment in Africa.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
4
A. External Factors
Colonial Legacy:
European colonialism sowed seeds for ethnic conflict in post-colonial Africa. At the
onset of colonization (1885), boundaries were drawn with little or no consideration of
distributions of actual indigenous people (Blankton, Mason and Athow, 2001). With the
fall of colonial rule, some of these fragmented societies were transformed into states.
Hence, in partitioning Africa, each colony showed no regard to existing natural ethnic
boundaries. That is, by fragmenting the traditional ethnic groupings within Africa in
their quest to divide up the continent for themselves, the European powers created the
potential for ethnic conflicts. Simply put, “colonialism was not aimed at creating strong,
viable autonomous states” (Errol, 2000, p. 2).
Because of this colonial heritage, African states are smaller, on average, than countries
in other regions in terms of population. This small size is disadvantageous. First, smaller
markets are less competitive and are perceived by investors as risky. In addition, they
have a slower rate of “technology innovation and diffusion” (Collier and Gunning, 1999,
p. 9).
Each colonial style is blamed as a source of underdevelopment. European powers,
especially the British, are to blame for the policy of power decentralization. Britain
governed her colonies using a “divide-and -rule” policy— local chiefs, though
answerable to colonial government, ruled their people along ethnic lines. The resulting
ethnic divisions led to ongoing conflict and unstable governments (Blankton et al., 2001).
In turn, these ethnic conflicts create negative effects on development.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
5
External Economic Constraints
Some sources cite foreign debts, falling world prices of primary export products, and
stringent structural adjustment as contributing to Africa’s underdevelopment (Chabal,
2002). This phenomenon, according to Standard Bank Research (SBR, 2005 January),
originated in the 1970s and 1980s when volatile commodity prices, oil price shocks, and
high interest rates dominated the world market. These factors led to African economic
crises: health, environmental and transport problems amongst others. Many nations then
became slaves to servicing debts owed to the World Bank or IMF. In other words,
servicing of loans and implementation of stern structural adjustment programs has a
bearing on Africa’s development.
B. Internal Factors
Dependence on Natural Resources
It has been said that too much dependence on agriculture and natural resource export
is a curse to the African economy. It is a phenomenon known as “the curse of tropics.”
Africa’s adverse climate causes poor health and so reduces life expectancy and this puts
Africa at disadvantage (Collier and Gunning, 1999). Also the adverse climate leads to
unreliable rainfall combined with poor soil quality, which leads to unpredictable crop
failure. Adverse climate and poor soil quality lead families to care for household
consumption and ignore investment, making households become trapped in “low-income,
high-liquidity equilibria” (Collier and Gunning, 1999, p. 8).
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
6
Negative factors such as volatile commodity prices, oil price shocks, and high interest
rates lead to slow growth (SBR, 2005 January). As a presumed self-reinforcing
endogenous process, weak economic growth accounts for a lower saving rate and higher
proportion of capital flight for Africa compared to other parts of the world. The negative
market shocks (rising prices of commodities such as oil) of the 1970s, for example, not
only affected Africa but also high performing economies.
Weak Institutions and Corruption
Another cause of Africa’s underdevelopment is corruption and the neopatrimonial
nature of politics [much of politics is carried out in the informal sector and politics rests
on personalities instead of institutions] (Stasavage, 2001). This creates a clientele base for
some politicians to exploit for personal gain (Woods, 1994). In the literature, it is
assumed that less corrupt or more democratic governments are to be desired because
democracy reduces the scope of conflict and produces good governance, ensures political
stability, consolidates rule of law and installs competent institutions, thus providing a
favorable environment for investment and growth. Most recent ethnic conflicts occurred
in countries where the regime was unstable (Sadowski, 1998).
President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, for instance, blames underdevelopment on
tribalism, religious sectarianism and greed (Kigozi, 2004). In Uganda, for instance, as
Kigozi (2004) noted, greed, tribalism and nepotism dictate who will get employment
[what he calls “strangulation of meritocracy”] (p. 1). It is alleged that some corrupt
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
7
ministers observe regional ties and tilt employment towards those who are closer to their
ethnic groups. Hence, employment is based not on merit but on favoritism.
The public sector, which is the main employer everywhere in Africa, exhibits high
expenditure, and poor governance: it (public sector) is virtually less accountable to the
broader public. Collier and Gunning (1999) argued that, as a result, Africa experienced a
paradox of poor public services despite relatively high public expenditure. In turn, poor
public service delivery causes inefficiency in health, education, and extension of services.
Employment occurs on a whom –you- know rather than on a what -you -know basis. If
politicians favor their kin when it comes to employment and appropriating public
expenditure, they interfere with growth indirectly. This kind of practice is a ground for
underdevelopment in Uganda and everywhere on the continent. In his analysis, Mauro
(1995) did find that corruption lowers private investment, thus further reducing economic
growth.
Speaking recently at Harvard’s graduation commencement, the Ethiopian prime
minister, Melees Zenawi, summarized the fate of African economies as characterized by
rent-seeking behavior. Discriminatory employment practices, corruption, and nepotism
adversely affect economic growth performance and development indirectly, interfering
with efficiency of production (Easterly, 2001).
Greed for personal aggrandizement and riches overrides provision of public goods.
Those in power embezzle funds which affects economic performance. This situation was
vividly captured by Kigozi (2004) when he said, “we are in a quagmire which is very
difficult to overcome” (p. 1). This statement is important because the failure of
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
8
politicians, doctors, teachers and all kinds of administrators to discharge their duties with
maximum efficiency is to blame for Africa’s miseries and eventual underdevelopment.
Likewise, corruption in the government encourages regional bias, creating greater
disparity between rural and urban settings in Africa. Most politicians and ruling parties
are more responsive to urban demands than to rural demands. A development bias is
caused by this behavior. Most people in Africa live in rural areas, which are less
developed. Rural folks make up a large percent of the total population. Rural folks
therefore lack major investment expenditure which is essential for growth and
development.
Ethnic Conflict as Source of Underdevelopment
While the effects of colonialism, external policy constraints, reliance on natural
resources and corruption all matter, researchers are increasingly focusing on ethnic
fragmentation as a source of underdevelopment. In other words, accusing fingers have
been pointed to religious and ethnic diversities as the root causes of social tensions,
political unrest and an apparent lack of development on the continent. It is believed that
a highly fragmented society exhibits a high incidence of civil wars and genocide. Ethnic
diversity and conflicts make it harder to have an interconnected economy (Collier and
Gunning, 1999). Likewise, Dion Douglas (1997) wrote, “Ethnic competition breeds
ethnic conflicts” (p. 638). As each ethnic group tries to better itself, it is bound to
compete and engage in a conflicting endeavor with other groups. As Easterly (2001)
pointed out, ethnic groups maximize their own self-interest or ethnic capital.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
9
According to research conducted by Easterly (2001), lower trust between diverse
ethnic groups makes it difficult to form social networks essential for growth promotion.
These groups have difficulty agreeing on types of public goods, leading to less spending
on growth-promoting public goods (Easterly, 2001 and Alesina et al., 2003). On the
other hand, Easterly (2001) argues that ethnic homogeneity raises “social capital” (p.
687). In other words, in a situation where the level of trust among ethnic groups is high,
more cooperation on development agendas and policy implementation is probable.
Evidence from Sudan to Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that ethnic fractionalization at
times correlates with civil war. Moreover, through effects on macroeconomic policies,
ethnic conflicts indirectly and directly affect development. Costs of conflict management,
lack of cooperation, interaction breakdown, wars and genocide negatively affect
development. Violence, as Lake and Rothchild (1996) write, is parasitic because
resources which might have been invested in economic growth are instead diverted to
destructive ends. Public infrastructure and government expenditure tend to favor some
ethnic groups to the detriment of others (Garcia-Montalvo and Reynol- Querol, 2002).
This can lead to poor policy choice and transform economic policy into a rent-seeking
mechanism— corruption.
Also, the behavior of an African state towards her citizens exacerbates the corruption
and ethnic division through alienation. For example, after having won independence,
most African nations were not concerned with the luxury of democracy but with
development and national integration, a fact that led to justification for one-party rule,
autocracy, and military dictatorship on the continent (Abubaker, 2001). With devotion to
national integration, African states became exploitative, authoritarian, and threatening to
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
10
everyone except those in power. Thus, instead of protecting everyone, the state protects a
few elites, which leads various people to seek solace and comfort in their ethnic groups or
to turn away to seek fulfillment in their ethnic groups (Abubaker, 2001). The benefit of
affiliating with one’s ethnic group in this scenario outweighs the cost. As Ayalon, Rafael
and Sharot (1986) showed, people seek to obtain maximum net advantage respecting to
“rational-choice theory” (p. 551). In Africa, group polarization and ethnic fragmentation
are blamed for breeding rent-seeking behavior and overspending, undermining public
goods provision, and creating positive incentives for growth-retarding policies such as
financial repression and overvalued exchange rates that create rents for the groups in
power at the expense of society at large (Easterly & Levine, 1997).
Strikingly, Africa experienced unusual cases of ethnic conflicts from the 1960s
through the 1990s. Some of these conflicts grew into wars and loss of lives. The literature
shows that such conflicts are detrimental to both economy and civil society. Lorentzen,
McMillan, & Wacziarg (2005) show in the working paper, “Death and Development”,
that mortality is inversely related to investment, human capital, fertility and ultimately
economic growth (p. 1). This research paper links deaths, resulting from war and natural
causes, to economic growth, and hints that the mortality-growth relationship could be the
source of poverty trap in Africa, what Easterly calls “Africa’s Growth Tragedy”
(Lorentzen et al. 2005, p. 10).
Although Africa’s high ethnic diversity is blamed as the primary cause for a high
incidence of civil wars, some scholars believe that religious and ethnic conflicts are
symptoms of the real variable of lack of development. Azam (2001) attributed the
presence of ethnic conflicts as a failure of the state to perform its fundamental functions.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
11
He blamed ethnic division on institutional endowment, being cognizant of the fact that it
is a failure of governments to deliver public expenditure that escalates civil wars.
In the same vein, notable authors such as Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis
(2000) argued that ethno-fragmentations in Africa are not the root cause of the civil wars
and social unrest that impede development. Rather high levels of poverty, failed
institutions, and, to some extent, dependence on natural resources are the real causes of
underdevelopment (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000). In the same manner, they argue that
ethnic diversity by itself is not the cause of civil wars. In fact, it is said to have an
offsetting effect. A very diverse society might even reduce violent conflict because “rebel
cohesion” may be harder to create (Sambanis and Elbadawi, 2000, p. 247). They argue
political and economic failures cause wars (Sambanis and Elbadawi, 2000). They claim
that ethnic diversity is only problematic in such cases where one ethnic group accounts
for 40-60% of the total population and dominates others. When the largest ethnic group
surpasses 44% of total population, the incidence of coups is high (Dion, 1997).
Thus, if the institutions work and protect minorities, then ethnic diversity may have no
effect. As Easterly and Levine (1997) indicated, formal institutions that protect minorities
and establish clear legal rules for business may be more valuable in ethnically divided
societies than in homogenous ones. The presence of poor institutions in Africa
encourages ethno-linguistic fractionalization and accounts for poor economic growth
performance. Good institutions are likely to offset ethnically-based social conflicts that
lower growth. This is the ground upon which U.S assistance for Africa’s democratization
has been concerned with civil society, political parties, constitutional reform and
executive branch reform (Harbeson, 1993-1999).
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
12
Evidence on Growth-retarding Effects of Ethnic Fragmentation
Ethnic fractionalization increases the likelihood of war while good institutions
mitigate it. This is why ethnic differences lead to civil wars in Sudan, Rwanda, and
Kosovo but not in Canada, Belgium, or Switzerland because the latter have strong
political institutions. From 1960 to 1990, there were 16 nations across the globe with
genocidal cases, and the majority of these cases took place in ethnically divided societies
(Easterly, 2001).
That being said, studies have shown that ethnically diverse cities and counties in the
U.S spend less on education, show little support for higher education and exhibit lower
graduation rates (Easterly, 2001). This is because “when individuals have different
preferences, they want to pull fewer resources together for public projects such as public
goods – education, and roads. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999 found that sewers
supplied by U.S cities are inversely related to ethnic fragmentation. Where ethnic groups
are polarized and politicians have ethnic constituencies, spending that goes to public
goods is low. Alesina et al. (1999) concluded that more ethnically diverse jurisdictions in
the U.S have higher spending and higher deficits per capita but lower spending on public
goods such as education and roads. Ethnic fragmentation not only affects investment but
may also increase corruption and political instability. Directly, it may slow down
diffusion of ideas and technological innovation within the country (Mauro, 1995). This
finding is consistent with political economy theory which characterizes heterogeneous
and polarized societies as valuing public goods less, and patronage more, while being
careless about fiscal discipline.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
13
Ethnic conflict creates ethnic mobilization (organization of ethnic groups along ethnic
lines for political ends) which threatens the stability of many countries (Nagel and Olzak,
1982). As Nagel and Olzak (1982) noted, this ethnic mobilization becomes widespread
when there are many competitive advantages attached to ethnic identity. An example is
seen amongst agricultural communities in West Africa. In essence, they asserted that
dialectical aspects ( the Marxian concept of reality in which material things are in the
constant process of change brought about by the tension between conflicting or
interacting forces, elements, or ideas ) of ethnic mobilization affect development (1982).
In Kenya for instance, more ethnically diverse districts spend less on education—
meaning ethnically diverse societies are a predictor of poor quality of government service
and project a likelihood of political instability and higher government consumption
(Easterly, 2001).
Part II: Measures of Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa
Measuring ethnic diversity continent-wide is a hard task. Various measures such as
the Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation index (ELF) are frequently used. ELF measures a
likelihood that two people chosen at random will be from different ethnic groups. It is
n
calculated using a simple Herfidahl concentration index whose formula is ( 1   s 2 ),
i
i 1
where Si is the percentage share of population in each ethnic group, n is the number of
ethnic groups and i indexes the ethnic groups. The closer the result is to 1, the more
fragmented is that country. Algeria, For instance, has one major ethnic group (Arab-
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
14
Berber) containing 99% of the population and one minority group accounting for 1%. Its
ELF can be calculated as follows: 1 – (0.992 + 0. 012) = 0.0099. This means that Algeria
is not very fragmented.
The ELF’s popularity stems from its simplicity to use and general acceptance.
However, as Posner pointed out, two major problems are associated with ELF. First,
since ethnic groups are recognized as social functions, they can change, expand or
contract. It is logical to argue that if a change in ethnic group (shrinkage, expansion)
occurs, then the index is not likely to reflect that country’s ethnic landscape (Posner,
2004 ). Fundamentally, there is no objective dividing line between one ethnic group and
another (Alesina et al., 2003). Secondly, Posner (2004) said that ELF suffers from what
he calls the “grouping problem” (p. 850). Nigeria, for instance, is said to have 250 ethnic
groups. Yet the data from which ELF is constructed for Nigeria comes from a few ethnic
groups that are lumped together. Even the groups that are lumped as one might have a
history of rivalry themselves (Posner 2004).
However, despite the shortcomings of ELF, it will still be used in this paper due to its
simplicity and wide acceptance1. For simplicity, I have used ELF values generated by
William Easterly. The years of the data range from 1983 to 2001(Easterly, 2001). The
correlation of the ELF with growth in GDP per capita between 1993 and 2003 is
examined below.
1
Despites his criticism of measure by ELF, Posner (2004) did in fact establish a
correlation which states that ethnic diversity affects growth through macro-economic
policies.
2
GDP stands for Gross Domestic Product. The GDP data comes from Countrywatch.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
15
Part III: Data Analysis
Table 1 shows data on Africa. All 53 countries, except Sao Tome Principe, whose ELF
value was missing from Easterly’s data, are included. In table 1, I present GDP2 per
capita in 1993 and 2003, along with the growth rates of GDP per capita for the decade.
Likewise, figures for Latin America and Asia and the Pacific (see tables 2 and 3) are
presented for comparison. As is evident from the table 1, Africa has a higher average
ELF (0.6305) compared to Latin America (0.4019) and Asia and the Pacific (0.3345).
Also, evident in tables 1, 2, and 3, are average growth rates for Africa, Latin America
and Asia and the Pacific: 0 .77%, 0.93% and 1.21% respectively. It is obvious that out of
the three regions, Africa’s growth rate is the slowest.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the raw relationship between ELF and growth in Africa, Latin
America and Asia and the Pacific. It can be deduced from the graphs that African
countries tend to cluster in the high ELF region. This fact is visible from the right hand
side of the graph. On the other hand, Latin American countries have more dispersed ELF
values. Asia and the Pacific are the least fragmented regions.
Table 4 presents the results of a simple regression of per capita growth on ELF for
African countries. The result is essentially the formula for the trend line plotted in figure
3. The relationship between ELF and growth is negative, though statistically weak.
Table 5 uses this regression to calculate “predicted’ growth rates for each country
based on that country’s ELF value. The difference between actual growth and predicted
growth then gives us a residual measure, indicating which countries are “overachievers or
underachievers” relative to their ELF values. The overachievers include Botswana,
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
16
Mauritius, Equatorial Guinea, and Uganda. Some of them will be examined in qualitative
case studies to determine why they were able to avoid potential pitfalls of high ethnic
diversity.
That being said, this analysis is limited in a number of ways. First, as noted in the
preceding paragraphs, calculation of ELF may be affected by a ‘grouping problem’. That
is, the definition of ethnic group is subjective and less clear cut than we would like.
In addition, the starting level of income seems to play a role in the results. Very low
income countries may appear to be successful in terms of growth simply because there
are many basic improvements that can be adapted to generate increase and because any
increases appear larger in percentages given the smaller base. Equatorial Guinea is a good
example.
Likewise, limitation of the study to particular years may affect the result. In other
words, growth rates could be different for instance from 1994 to 2004. A look at world
events would tell that 1994 was full of political upheavals such as the genocide in
Rwanda, and civil wars in Somalia, Sudan, and Sierra Leone.
In the end, this quantitative analysis is just a first step. It has helped in identifying the
negative relationship between ELF and growth. It has also aided the process of
identifying countries that are ‘high- and low-achievers’, given their relative ELF values.
The next step will be to choose cases from this group. These qualitative case studies will
be used to examine how political institutions overcome fragmentation. Although the
literature has at length addressed the positive effect of institutions, we can not say for
sure whether countries with large residuals are also countries with the best institutions.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
17
Part IV: Institutional Approaches to Dealing with Ethnic Diversity
According to Robert H. Bates (2000), study after study of modern Africa highlights
three major shocking catchwords: poverty, instability and ethnic diversity. While ethnic
conflicts are as old as mankind is, recent years have seen increased conflict across the
globe especially in Africa. There were, from 1989 to 1998, 108 armed conflicts in the
world, including conflicts in Kosovo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sudan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka,
Somalia, Angola, and Congo just to name a few (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 1999).
These examples confirm that armed conflicts are not confined to one nation or region.
Notably, it is a stark reality that these wars are of ethnic origin.
While there are many competing variables that are linked to Africa’s poverty
trap/growth tragedy, ethnic conflict is shown to play a major role in poor growth. Study
after study suggests that controlling ethnic conflicts could be one way of boosting
growth.
That being said, it is a general consensus that ethnic diversity is a reality of Africa in
the past, present and future. So, ethnic diversity and political instability resulting from
ethnic conflict is to be lived through and coped with (O’Connell, 1967). By the same
token, it is more consoling to assert that ethnic diversity in itself is not a bad thing; its
consequences are.
How African States Accommodate Ethnic Diversity
From the regression results (see table 4), we can infer that ethnic conflicts have an
impact on growth. Ethnic conflicts slow down the creation of nationalism, widen social
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
18
distrust among groups and elites seeking to maximize their power and impede
development (O’Connell, 1967). African countries have used various tactics to address
these costs of ethnic conflicts.
First, it must be stated as given that after independence in the 1960s, African leaders
approached national building in different ways. Some used divide- and- rule tactics as
they were used by colonial masters. Thus, the colonial legacy has played a role in some
countries. As a result, opposition voices or dissents were liquidated in the name of
national building (Kalinga, 1998; Fegley, 1981). Constitutional codes were abolished and
in most cases, post- independence leaders declared themselves as life-presidents. These
approaches alienated people, causing them to seek help in their ethnic groups, creating
divisions and ethnic violence (Woods, 1994; Ndegwa, 1997)). In pronounced cases, wars
were fought. Overall, politicians in power either excluded some ethnic groups or granted
them limited participation (Shultz, 1995).
For the states that do not seek to accommodate diversity but consolidate power,
politics is characterized by corruption, favoritism, ethnic politics, lack of cooperation
among various groups, immobility of resources, and lack of diffusion of ideas, ethnic
violence, and political instability. These factors have their share in African growth
impairment.
Nonetheless, for those states that grant limited participation to various groups, some
progress is made. This is what I call a “limited inclusive” approach to politics. Some of
these states are characterized by some formation of social capital, quasi-freedom,
stability, a move towards multiparty politics, and a promising development paradigm
(Abdalla, 1991). Examples in this category are Egypt and Uganda.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
19
In the same token, states exhibiting fully inclusionary policies are characterized by
multiparty politics, stability, openness to trade and a promising development paradigm.
An example in this category is Botswana.
Given the fact that ethnic diversity is a reality of Africa, various governments have
used diverse means to address it. However, not all methods worked. Some that have
worked are worthy of emulation. The inclusionary approach to politics is worthy of
embracing. This is because it tends to produce an environment conducive for consensusbuilding and development. A move towards multiparty politics, formation of social
capital, and stability are themselves desirable variables for development. The full
inclusive approach to politics constitutes power-sharing, constitutional codes,
institutional accountability, and an expansive role of media. These approaches should be
embraced if Africa is to reduce her number of ethnic conflicts, which in turn can stabilize
the continent and usher in an environment conducive for growth, investment and
development.
It is undeniably true that Africa since independence is characterized by ethnic conflict
arising from actions and aspirations of a dissatisfied and disenfranchised populace. The
effects of these conflicts are far reaching and they vary from nation to nation. Based on
their relative ethnic fragmentation, African nations seemed to have performed differently
over the course of the years especially after independence from various European powers.
In this paper, I am interested in what has been done or not done to reduce the negative
effects of ethnic conflicts in the following five countries: Libya, Cameroon, Somalia,
Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) and Uganda. Each country shall be examined in
terms of the type of policies taken to address ethnic conflict. In each case study, I shall
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
20
earnestly examine conditions at independence, post colonial policies, and past and
present power structures.
1. Libya
Libya, which is in northern Africa and borders the Mediterranean Sea between Egypt,
and Tunisia, achieved independence from Italy on December 24th, 1951. Libya is an
Islamic state for it is a 97% Sunni Muslim; Berber and Arab make up 97% of the
population of about 6 million people while others- Greeks, Maltese, Italians, Egyptians,
Pakistanis, Turks, Indians, and Tunisians -comprise 3% (CIA, 2006).
Based on the ELF growth regression (see table 5), Libya is an underachiever since it
has a growth residual of negative 2.28%. Theories of underdevelopment suggest poor
growth performance is a function of institutions and ethnic diversity. Thus, it makes
sense to examine the kind of institutions that are in operation in Libya as well as what the
state has done to abate ethnic conflicts and divisive politicking.
Like most governments on the continent, the Libyan regime attained power through
underhanded methods. In 1969, Muammar Gaddafi led a revolution, seized power and
established a dictatorship. Since then, Gaddafi’s ruling party, “The Great Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”, has been in power. Jamahiriya is a state of the
masses, governed by the populace through local councils. Given this unsanctioned
ascension to power, Gaddafi has consolidated his grip on authority, via suppression of
political dissents; his policies since the 1980s have caused international concern: human
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
21
rights violations, terrorist acts, an alliance with Russia and aggression towards
neighboring countries such as Chad and Niger (Ogunbadejo, 1983).
Given the nature of his government, Gaddafi is a chief of state, leader of the executive
branch, and commander in Chief of the armed forces. The Libyan legal system is based
on Italian civil law and Islamic law while the legislative branch (unicameral) is called the
General People's Congress, to which members are elected indirectly through a hierarchy
of people's committees. Under Gaddafi, non-free national elections are done indirectly
through a hierarchy of people's committees (CIA, 2006). Blatantly, there are no political
parties in Libya, which translates to a lack of checks and balances. There is a wanting of
political freedom in Libya and Gaddafi’s dictatorial government has compensated for this
political oppression in several ways.
First he brands capitalism as exploitative and communism as godless. This
characterization grants him a chance to throw these two ideologies out of Libya, leaving
Gaddafi with what he christened as “The Third Universal Theory” (TUT). TUT was
expounded in his Green book as an alternative system to capitalism and communismatheism (Ogunbadejo, 1983, p. 155). The TUT is a state of the masses, which in theory is
governed by the populace through local councils. The enactment of this theory led
Gaddafi to claim that he is distributing wealth evenly throughout the society. By using oil
riches to build a welfare state where every citizen is guaranteed food, housing, and
clothing, he showed the feasibility of his theory and silenced his opponents at home.
Consequently, this generous nature of the state under Gaddafi has resulted into mass
apathy; few people are opposed to his policies. But any opposition or coup attempts by
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
22
dissidents are mercilessly liquidated. For instance, in 1980, over 2000 arrests were made
while 800 executions of a political nature were carried out (Ogunbadejo, 1983).
That aside, the question is why there is no ethnic conflict despite lack of political
freedom and weak institutions in Libya. Though there is no definitive answer, suffice it to
say that the fear of Libyan government, mass apathy and Gaddafi’s overweening
personality (Gaddafi has always seen himself as a revolutionary and visionary leader)
have combated any ethnic conflict. With all state power at his disposable, Gaddafi relied
on trepidation and ruthlessness to garner allegiance and peaceful-coexistence among
major ethnic groups in Libya.
Thus, institutions in Libya are weak because power rests on Gaddafi. However, ethnic
conflict seems not to be the major cause of poor growth performance but rather the
presence of bad policies. For, example, aggression and meddling with affairs in
neighboring states (Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria), sanctions (resulting from
Gaddafi’s ambitions to build nuclear weapons), lack of individual freedom and an
environment conducive for investment, growth and development could have affected the
growth residual in Libya. Put differently, there has never been a civil war in Libya due to
homogeneity (two major ethnic groups), mass apathy and heavy-handedness of the
government. The fear of the government, corruption and bad policies affect Libya’s
economic policies and that could have led to negative residual growth for the period
spanning this study (1993-2003). For instance, UN sanctions were imposed on Libya in
1992, suspended in 1999 and finally lifted in 2003 when Libya announced its
abandonment of programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Economically and
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
23
politically, Libya was isolated and that could have contributed to the negative growth
from 1990s to early 2000s.
2. Cameroon
Cameroon, a Western African state, borders the Bight of Biafra, between Equatorial
Guinea and Nigeria. Cameroon attained independence from the French in 1960. The
former French Cameroon and part of British Cameroon merged in 1961 to form the
present country, which has generally enjoyed stability and has permitted the development
of agriculture, roads, and railways, as well as a petroleum industry.
Despite movement toward democratic reforms in recent years, political power remains
firmly in the hands of an ethnic oligarchy headed by President Paul Biya (CIA, 2005). In
this study, Cameroon emerges as a moderate achiever (see table 5) for it has a positive
mild growth residual of 0.93%. Recognizant of the proposition that institutions and
ethnic diversity play a role in macroeconomic policies and growth performance, it is a
good idea to examine the kind of institutions that are in Cameroon. First, there are three
branches of government in operation. In Cameroon, there is only one legislative chamber,
whose members are elected by direct popular vote to serve for five-year terms. However,
the president, Paul Biya, has more room for maneuver as to the stability of the legislature.
He can, at will, either elongate or shorten the term of the legislature. This is a sign of
weak institutions (CIA, 2005).
Overall, the legal system is based on the French civil law system with common law
influence. But the president has another power when it comes to judicial nominees. The
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
24
President has the prerogative power to appoint the Supreme Court judges. There is no
legislative oversight respecting to his appointees. Thus, these judges are likely to be loyal
to the president. Only high courts justices are elected by the National Assembly. This is
another lack of judicial independence.
Unlike Libya, political parties are legal in Cameroon. Some of the political parties
and their respective leaders include the following: the Cameroonian Democratic Union
(Adamou Ndamnjoya); the Democratic Rally of the Cameroon People (Paul Biya); the
Movement for the Defense of the Republic (Dakole Daissala); the Movement for the
Liberation and Development of Cameroon (Marcel Yondo); the Movement for the Youth
of Cameroon (Dieudonne Tina); the National Union for Democracy and Progress
(Maigari Bello Bouba); the Social Democratic Front (John Frundi) and the Union of
Cameroonian Populations (Augustin Frederic Kodock) (CIA, 2005).
Besides institutions, ethnic diversity is also a factor to reckon with in Cameroon. It is
wise to assess what the state has done to combat ethnic conflicts that arise in a multiethnic and multi-religious society. Primarily, Cameroon’s population (about 16 million)
is comprised of Cameroon Highlanders (31%), Equatorial Bantu (19%), Kirdi (11%),
Fulani (10%), Northwestern Bantu (8%), Eastern Nigritic (7%), other African (13%), and
non-African (less than 1%) (CIA, 2006). Each of Cameroon’s ethnic group has less than
44% of the population. This might have accounted for lack of domination by one major
ethnic group. It is said that whenever one ethnic group exceeds 44% of the entire
population, it is likely to dominate others and cause conflict (Sambanis & Elbadawi,
2000).
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
25
Cameroon has combated ethnic conflicts with an assortment of choices. First, since
the 1990s, the government has embarked on sound economic policies, such as various
IMF and World Bank programs designed to spur business investment, increase efficiency
in agriculture, improve trade, and recapitalize the nation's banks, raising hope for every
Cameroonian. In June 2000, the government completed an IMF-sponsored, three-year
structural adjustment program. Still, the IMF is pressing for more reforms, including
increased budget transparency, privatization, and poverty reduction programs (CIA,
2006). Secondly, no ethnic group has been singled out as the “enemy of state”. This
alienates no one and reduces ethnic mobilization.
Also, politicians, few as they are, have not incited one ethnic group against another.
The instigation of one group against another is the root cause of civil wars in Somalia and
Rwanda. Democratic reforms might have also helped to boost growth. These could
account for the lack of full flown civil war in Cameroon. Thus, regardless of high ELF,
Cameroon experienced no civil conflicts. These mild reforms, lack of civil war and weak
yet gradually improving institutions might have accounted for a modest growth residual
of 0.93%.
In short, the small positive growth residual in Cameroon could be a combination of a
number of factors. Political stability since independence, and sound economic programs,
could have reduced any potential ethnic conflicts. Notwithstanding, concentration of
power in a few hands means lack of accountability and transparency necessary for
investment and more rapid growth. This could also have accounted for the moderate
economic performance observed in this study.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
26
3. Somalia
Somalia is an Eastern African country, bordering the Gulf of Aden and the Indian
Ocean. It is also located east of Ethiopia and northeast of Kenya. Somalia got
independence from Britain and Italy in 1960. Somalia has an estimated population of 9
million people.
Studying what the state has done to combat both ethnic conflicts and to strengthen
institutions speaks volumes in the case of Somalia. Let us examine the kind of institutions
Somalia has to begin with. Admittedly, there are no formal political parties in Somalia.
Worse still, there is no permanent national government, but only various fleeting
transitional, parliamentary federal governments have been operating since the breakdown
of the central government in 1991 (Rigol, 2004 October). The mandate of the
Transitional National Government (TNG), created in August 2000 in Arta, Djibouti,
expired in August 2003. President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed has formed a new
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) consisting of a 275-member parliament. This
body was established in October 2004 to replace the TNG but has not yet moved to
Mogadishu because numerous warlords and factions are still fighting for control of the
capital city as well as for other southern regions.
Additionally, there is no national legal system except Shari'a and secular courts which
are in some localities. This translates to lack of uniformity in the criminal justice system.
In other words, each region or clan resorts to local conflict resolution based on traditional
or sharia law. Currently, the judicial branch is malfunctioning due to the breakdown of
the central government in 1993.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
27
Altogether, the central government is ineffectual and conflict-ridden. Since
independence, Somalia has been embroiled in ethnic politics culminating in the war of
1991. But at independence, colonial leaders assumed that given one religion, Somalia
would hold together because of homogeneity: major ethnic clans are Somali (85%),
Bantu and other non-Somali (15%). They were wrong because clan differences became
the source of conflicts, tearing Somalia apart. Inter- and sub clan warfare tore Somalia
because clans sometimes control different regions and natural resources (Rigol, 2004
October). These tensions continued until the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre was ousted
in January 1991, and turmoil, factional fighting, and anarchy have followed in the years
since. Rigol (2004, October) blamed this on Siad Barre’s “notorious divide- and –rule
approach supplemented by the ruthless slaughters of opposition members and clans” (p.
1).
In May of 1991, northern clans declared an independent Republic of Somaliland that
now includes the administrative regions of Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag,
and Sool. Although not recognized by any government, this entity has maintained a stable
existence, aided by the overwhelming dominance of a ruling clan and economic
infrastructure left behind by British, Russian, and American military assistance programs.
The regions of Bari and Nugaal and northern Mudug comprise a neighboring selfdeclared autonomous state of Puntland, which has been self-governing since 1998.
Puntland also has made strides towards reconstructing a legitimate, representative
government, but has suffered some civil strife. Puntland also disputes its border with
Somaliland as it claims portions of eastern Sool and Sanaag (CIA, 2005).
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
28
Lack of central authority, political parties and divisions of power formed along ethnic
lines have hurt Somalia. First, a weak central government has done nothing to enfeeble
ethnic conflicts. On the contrary, each region under any warlord wanted to maximize
their ethnic capital and this heightens clan tensions and hostilities.
Hence, following the breakdown of the central government, most regions have
reverted to local forms of conflict resolution, either secular, traditional clan-based
arbitration, or Islamic (Shari'a) law with a provision for appeal of all sentences. This
precedent has led scholars, Shultz (1995) among others, to describe Somalia as a
“prototype of state disintegration and ungovernability”.
The state has done nothing to combat but rather spurs clan conflicts. Politicians in
power have maximized their gains using the state apparatus. In other words, Somalia
practices an exclusionary approach to politics because every clan, at the expense of
others, is hell-bent on furthering their interests. Politicians who come to power only favor
their clansmen. Apart from the ruling party, everyone else is excluded from participating
in politics. Hence, the lack of social capital, diffusion of ideas, black markets with high
premiums, and weak institutions could have contributed to the negative growth residual
of 5.75%. Also, the latent or lag effects of the civil war in 1993 could have impacted the
data chosen. In short, Somalia with its exclusive approach to politics aggravates the
effects of ELF, making it an underachiever.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
29
4. Democratic Republic of Congo (DR)
The Democratic Republic of Congo is located in Central Africa, northeast of Angola.
Established as a Belgian colony in 1908, the Republic of the Congo gained its
independence in 1960. All in all, DR has over 200 African ethnic groups. The four largest
tribes are Mongo, Luba, Kongo (all Bantu), and the Mangbetu-Azande (Hamitic) which
make up about 45% of the estimated population of 60 million people.
Like many nations on the continent, Congo’s early years were marred by political and
social instability. Colonel Joseph Mobutu seized power, declaring himself as a president
in a November 1965 coup. He subsequently changed his name - to Mobutu Sese Seko -as
well as that of the country- to Zaire. Mobutu maintained his position for 32 years through
several subsequent sham elections as well as the use of brutal force against political
opponents. However, ethnic strife and civil war were fueled by the massive inflow of
refugees in 1994 from Rwanda and Burundi. These events eventually caused the toppling
of the Mobutu regime in May of 1997 by a rebellion led by Laurent Kabala, who
renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Reybtjens, 1999).
Although the government of Laurent Kabila was moving to democratic reforms,
external aggression had a destabilizing effect. Like his predecessor, Kabila’s regime was
itself challenged by an insurrection backed by Rwanda and Uganda in August, 1998.
Troops from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad, and Sudan intervened to support the
Kinshasa regime. A cease-fire was signed in July 1999 by the DR, Zimbabwe, Angola,
Uganda, Namibia, Rwanda, and Congolese armed rebel groups.
Tragically, Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 and his son Joseph
Kabila was named head of the state. In October 2002, the new president was successful in
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
30
negotiating the withdrawal of Rwandan forces occupying eastern Congo, and two months
later the Pretoria Accord was signed by all remaining warring parties to end the fighting
and establish a government of national unity. A transitional government was set up in
July 2003 and Joseph Kabila remains as president and is assisted by four vice presidents
representing the former government, former rebel groups, and the political opposition
since independence.
Let us examine what the state has done to reduce ethnic conflict. First, under Mobutu,
political activities were illegal, unlike now under Kabila. Under Kabila, DR has the
following parties: Democratic Social Christian Party, Forces for Renovation for Union
and Solidarity, the National Congolese Lumumbist Movement, the Popular Movement of
the Revolution, the Unified Lumumbast Party, the Union for Democracy and Social
Progress, the Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans (CIA, 2006).
As of 2003, a National Assembly and Supreme Court were running. DR has a new
constitution adopted 17 July 2003 with a legal system based on Belgian civil law and
tribal law. It also has a 500-member National Assembly and a 120-seat Senate
established in June 2003. It is hoped that the first free elections will be held in early
2006.
The institutions inherited from Mobutu were weak. The country has also suffered from
the war of 1998. Thus, Despite natural endowments with vast potential wealth (cobalt,
copper, niobium, tantalum, petroleum, industrial and gem diamonds, gold, silver, zinc,
manganese, tin, uranium, coal, hydropower, timber), the war, which began in August
1998, dramatically reduced national output and government revenue, increased external
debt, and resulted in the deaths of perhaps 3.5 million people. Foreign businesses
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
31
curtailed operations due to uncertainty about the outcome of the conflict, lack of
infrastructure, and the difficult operating environment.
Although ethnic conflict played no major role in this, weak institutions and
devastating civil war could have accounted for the DR’s negative growth residual in this
period. Under Mbotu, Congo exercised an exclusive approach to politics. However, it
became less dictatorial under Laurent Kabila and his son, Joseph. Thus, political
instability, an unfavorable environment, uninvited aggression by sister countries, and lack
of social capital could have accounted for Congo’s negative growth residual.
5. Uganda:
The Republic of Uganda is a country in East Africa bordered in the east by Kenya,
in the north by Sudan, by the Democratic Republic of Congo in the west, Rwanda in the
southwest and Tanzania in the south.. Uganda takes its name from the historical Buganda
kingdom, which encompasses a portion of the south of the country, including the capital
Kampala (CIA, 2005). Uganda achieved independence from Britain in 1962. The transfer
of power from colonial masters to African elite was a smooth one.
However, by 1966, the first Prime Minister, Milton Obote, had overthrown the
constitution and declared himself president, ushering in an era of coups and countercoups which would last until the mid-1980s. 1971, for instance, saw Idi Amin take
power, ruling the country with an iron fist. During Amin and Obote’s dictatorial regimes,
it is estimated that about 300, 000 and 10,000 lives were lost respectively. But in 1986,
there was a change in government and that change saw the rise to power of Yoweri
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
32
Museveni. Ever since, Museveni is generally viewed as being part of a new generation of
African leaders (Nystrom, 2000).
According to the regression (see table 5), Uganda seemed to have done well relative to
its ELF. As indicated in the foregoing paragraph, Uganda is an overachiever. This growth
performance took place under the reign of Museveni. It is befitting to examine factors
that might have reduced the effects of ELF: what has the government done to help lessen
adverse sides of diversity and what sort of institutions are in Uganda.
First, Uganda is a republic which had never held popular elections since independence
until 1996 under Museveni. The President, who is the head of the government and chief
of state, appoints both cabinet members and a prime minister to help him rule the
country. He is elected by popular vote to a five year term. There are checks and balances
in Uganda. High court judges are appointed by the president and approved by the
legislature. Legislators are elected by popular vote in direct elections. There are also
political parties, though they are not allowed to campaign on behalf of any candidates.
Political campaigns were permitted in July 2005 through referendum (Nystrom, 2000). It
appears that presence of some checks and balances in the constitution is a sign of
competent institutions.
Besides institutions, it is also healthy to investigate what has been done to reduce
ethnic conflicts which could have resulted from Uganda’s ethnic diversity. The
composition of the population is as follows: Baganda (17%), Ankole (8%), Basoga (8%),
Iteso (8%), Bakiga (7%), Langi (6%), Rwanda (6%), Bagisu (5%), Acholi (4%), Lugbara
(4%), Batoro (3%), Bunyoro 3(%), Alur (2%), Bagwere (2%), Bakonjo (2%), Jopodhola
(2%), Karamojong (2%), Rundi (2%), non-African (European, Asian, Arab) (1%), and
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
33
other (8%) (CIA, 2006). With the intent to thwart corruption, ethnic violence, ethnic
politics and sectarian violence, political parties were restricted in their activities from
1986 only to be reinstated in July 2005 during a referendum. No ethnic group or political
party is allowed (1986-2005) to campaign for any candidates because political party
activities are seen as confrontational and divisive (Stasavage, 2001; Makinda, 1996).
More telling, the state tries to be inclusive. None of any ethnic group is isolated or
singled out as the enemy of the state. Because of its respect toward human rights,
equitable development, single-party politics, and an independent judiciary, Uganda has
few ethnic conflicts within its borders. Most of scarce public resources go toward
constructive ends (development). Since 1986, the government - with the support of
foreign countries and international agencies - has acted to rehabilitate an economy
decimated during the regime of Idi Amin and subsequent civil war (CIA, 2005).
Thus, it is possible that Uganda is an overachiever because there were no wars which
would have led to misallocation of resources. Secondly, the period of this study (19932003) falls within the years of political stability in Uganda. What's more, corruption and
ethnic politics were discouraged, and that could be the cause of the growth residual of
2.43%. Besides, unlike Somalia, or Congo, transparency and stability are counted on in
Uganda. Thus these factors could be the grounds for observed growth performance.
In short, under Museveni’s leadership, relative stability has been brought to the
country with the exception of the North, which continues to struggle with a rebel
insurgency. Sufficient institutions and a limited inclusive approach to politics accounts
for good growth. Uganda, under Museveni, exhibits a limited inclusive approach to
politics.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
34
Policy Implications
Although research like this has limitations, there are inferences to be made from it.
First, this study has shown that ethnic fragmentation and growth are inversely correlated
though, the correlation is somewhat weak (see table figure 4).
Secondly, it is assuredly clear that the nature of institutions affects the importance of
ELF. Only two out of the five countries studied in detail, have done relatively well given
their ELF values. There are similarities among the two: there were no full scale wars in
those countries and their institutions, such as the legislature, executive branch and
judiciary are functioning. Both countries have sought ways that did not alienate ethnic
groups. But in the case of Somalia, Congo and Libya, there are imbalances of power. In
Libya, the executive branch wields too much power. While in Somalia, lack of central
government is a handicap. For the case of Congo, bad policies from the former
government, and bothersome neighbors impacted growth. In short, institutions are
stronger in Uganda and Cameroon but somewhat weaker in Somalia and Congo. While in
Libya, lack of freedom has meant slower diffusion of ideas, technology innovation and
cooperation. This might have affected investment and growth.
Thirdly, Somalia and Libya, both underachievers, differ in their approaches to
addressing ethnic diversity. In Libya, Gaddafi has used trepidation and ruthlessness to
ensure stability and hold the country together. For the case of Somalia, lack of an
authoritative figure like Gaddafi has meant that each war lord garnered allegiance from
his immediate group. These cases show that it is possible to fail in dealing with ethnic
fragmentation both by exerting excessive external control and by failing to hold the
center together.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
35
Fourthly, this paper hints that corruption is likely to flourish in places where there is
lack of accountability. In a corrupt government, even good intentions do not necessarily
result in public goods. For instance, foreign aid, which is intended to reduce poverty,
improve training and increase salaries for public employees, erodes quality of governance
in unstable regimes (Knack, 2001). Aid also increases political instability when various
parties compete for control of large scale food aid, as was the case in Somalia’s civil war
(Knack, 2001). In other words, under regimes with weak institutions, a high level of aid
dependence makes government accountable to donors and not the public, and when
funding stops, institutions break down. Thus, aid is not effective on the continent because
of the weak institutions and lack of accountability. Although as of January 2005, the U.N
asked the world’s wealthiest nations to forgive debts and give more aid to the poorest
nations with the intent to halve extreme poverty by the year 2015, not much will be
achieved unless corruption is eliminated (Jeffrey, 2005). The presence of corruption and
poor governance leads to misuse of funds.
Fifthly, it seems that fear under tyrannical regimes breeds fake loyalty, sycophancy
and boot-licking. These makings of dictatorial regimes do not last. For instance, Mobutu
wielded power through brutality. But when his time came, his government crumpled
within days. General Siad Barre did the same thing in Somalia. Libya is also being held
together by fear of Gaddafi. The point here is that some nations are not experiencing civil
wars or falling apart because an oppressive personality holds them at least for the time
being.
Sixthly, other factors beside ELF could have affected growth rates in this case studies.
Libya is 97% Sunni Muslim (though its ELF is higher than average.792). Religion could
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
36
have been a uniting factor and thus help to reduce ethnic conflict. In other words, there
could be many ways of categorizing a particular group of people. ELF could not capture
the changing effect of religion. Thus, “grouping problem” merits consideration.
Unreliability of African Politics
It should be noted that African politics is fluid; nothing is fixed so to speak. Countries
in Africa may be inclusive for a while under certain regimes but exclusive under other
regimes. They may be underachievers today and overachievers tomorrow. For instance,
Uganda under Iddi Amin was oppressive and divisive. However, under Museveni, it is
united and freer. The same is also true of Zaire, the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Moreover, another distinctive characteristic of African politics is its high number of
states. This means Africa is highly fragmented and, if the ELF theory holds, then it is an
indication of more political and ethnic divisions (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 1999),
which breeds an unfavorable environment for investment and growth. Out of these
numerous political and ethnic divisions, some regimes cause ethnic groups to fight one
another while some do not. Some regimes can be dictatorships today but might not be
tomorrow (see the case of Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda). This
changeability in the forms of governments has a bearing on development because it
interferes with growth and investment. Growth may improve in a country with stronger
institutions and harmonious ethnic relationships and may drastically suffer under another.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
37
Conclusion
This research finds that growth and ELF are negatively correlated though the strength
of the correlation in Africa requires further study.
It also finds that African politics is unstable. Countries in Africa may be inclusive for
a while under certain regimes but exclusive under other regimes. This fluidity might
have led some countries to either embrace or shun ethnic plurality. Many countries might
have either embraced ethnic diversity but excluded politicians that embrace ethnic votes
(Liberia, Uganda) or have shunned diversity and singled out some tribes ( Malawi,
Somalia, Congo). Also, evidence from this study shows that some countries have made
efforts to weaken or exacerbate ELF effects by choosing inclusive or exclusionary
approaches to politics.
Finally, this paper does not find a “Silver bullet” in dealing with ethnic conflicts. The
variety of approaches undertaken by Somalia, Congo, Libya, Uganda and DR affirm this
claim. Uganda abolished campaigns on behalf of candidates; it thus alienated no one but
boosted growth. Libya exploited fear and religion to fight ethnic conflicts and it suffered
poor growth. Somalia used ethnic mobilization and thus reaped disintegration and poor
growth, while DR adopted sound policies and appeased meddling neighbors, though a
decade of instability resulted in poor growth.
.
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
38
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Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
Table 1: GDP per Capita and ELF in Africa
Country
1993 GDP Per
2003 GDP
Capita (2000$)
Per Capita
(2000 $)
Annual
Growth
Rate
ELF
Uganda
796
1024
0.025
0.9302
Liberia
351
698
0.069
0.9084
Madagascar
737
610
-0.019
0.8791
Congo (RC)
1573
1433
-0.009
0.8747
Congo (DRC)
1069
612
-0.056
0.8747
Cameroon
1868
2099
0.012
0.8635
Chad
907
954
0.005
0.862
Kenya
1374
1385
0.001
0.8588
Nigeria
951
819
-0.015
0.8505
Central African Republic
1464
1544
0.005
0.8295
Cote D’ Ioire
1358
1459
0.007
0.8204
Sierra Leone
742
473
-0.045
0.8191
Somalia
1540
898
-0.054
0.8117
Guinea-Bissau
1040
741
-0.034
0.8082
Djibouti
1390
1203
-0.014
0.7962
Libya
8463
7012
-0.019
0.792
Benin
1104
1233
0.011
0.7872
Angola
823
1244
0.041
0.7867
Gambia
1001
998
0.000
0.7864
Zambia
1010
847
-0.018
0.7808
Gabon
5621
5851
0.004
0.769
South Africa
6094
6879
0.012
0.7517
Guinea
978
1055
0.008
0.7389
Burkina Faso
924
1000
0.008
0.7377
Tanzania
653
691
0.006
0.7353
Ethiopia
449
540
0.018
0.7235
Sudan
774
910
0.016
0.7147
42
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
Togo
1394
1601
0.014
0.7099
Senegal
1434
1630
0.013
0.6939
Mozambique
712
1264
0.057
0.6932
Mali
710
783
0.010
0.6906
Malawi
691
753
0.009
0.6744
Ghana
1573
1795
0.013
0.6733
Eritrea
612
706
0.014
0.6524
Niger
858
922
0.007
0.6518
Namibia
3695
3686
0.000
0.6329
Mauritania
1623
1768
0.009
0.615
Morocco
3198
3611
0.012
0.4841
Mauritius
7841
10832
0.032
0.4634
Cape Verde
1073
1540
0.036
0.4174
Botswana
2841
3637
0.025
0.4102
Zimbabwe
1915
1583
-0.019
0.3874
Equatorial Guinea
607
3435
0.173
0.3467
Algeria
4341
4472
0.003
0.3394
Rwanda
714
825
0.014
0.3238
Burundi
781
701
-0.011
0.2951
Lesotho
1976
2645
0.029
0.255
Seychelles
6534
6186
-0.005
0.2025
Egypt
2420
2723
0.012
0.1836
Swaziland
3619
3536
-0.002
0.0582
Tunisia
4273
5379
0.023
0.0394
Comoros
922
655
-0.034
0
Mean
1950
2132.
0.0077
0.6305
n
Notes: ELF = 1   si
i 1
Source: Easterly (2001).
2
43
, where si = the share of the population accounted for by group i
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
44
Table 2: GDP Per Capita and ELF in Latin America
Country Name
1993
2003
Annual
Growth Rate
ELF
values
Bolivia (BL)
Suriname (NS)
Belize (BH)
Peru (PE)
Ecuador (EC)
Trinidad and Tobago (TD)
Guyana (GY)
Colombia (CO)
Cuba (CU)
Panama (PM)
Mexico (MX)
Brazil (BR)
Guatemala (GT)
Nicaragua (NU)
Dominican Republic (DR)
Bahamas (BF)
Jamaica (JM)
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (VC)
Grenada (GJ)
Argentina (AR)
Uruguay (UY)
Costa Rica (CS)
Dominica (DO)
El Salvador (ES)
Honduras (HO)
Chile (CI)
Saint Kitts & Nevis (SC)
Saint Lucia (ST)
Paraguay (PA)
Antiqua (AC)
Barbados (BB)
Haiti (HA)
Mean
2521
2787
2910
3359
4382
5849
1820
5890
1324
6460
7583
5330
3380
2306
3784
17179
3347
2126
2816
8612
7055
6127
2759
2551
2083
9130
4497
3841
3334
6508
8998
1312
4749
2783
3442
2905
4113
4108
8714
2570
5765
1645
6788
7884
5662
3456
2431
5079
18773
3186
2536
3840
7636
6691
6598
2823
2778
2135
11737
6137
3782
3125
6963
9821
1150
5221
0.0099
0.0211
-0.0002
0.0202
-0.0065
0.0399
0.0345
-0.0021
0.0217
0.0049
0.0039
0.0060
0.0022
0.0053
0.0294
0.0089
-0.0049
0.0176
0.0310
-0.0120
-0.0053
0.0074
0.0023
0.0085
0.0025
0.0251
0.0311
-0.0015
-0.0065
0.0068
0.0088
-0.0132
0.0093
0.7396
0.7332
0.7015
0.6566
0.6550
0.6475
0.6195
0.6014
0.5908
0.5528
0.5418
0.5408
0.5122
0.4844
0.4294
0.4228
0.4129
0.3066
0.2661
0.2550
0.2504
0.2368
0.2003
0.1978
0.1867
0.1861
0.1842
0.1769
0.1689
0.1643
0.1423
0.0950
0.4019
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
Table 3: GDP Per Capita and ELF in Asia and the Pacific
Annual
GDPPC
GDPPC
Growth
Country Name
1993
2003
Rates
Indonesia
Pakistan
Micronesia
Nepal
Thailand
Bhutan
Malaysia
Nauru
Fiji
Brunei
Laos
Palau
India
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Mongolia
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Vietnam
Cambodia
Tuvalu
China
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Tonga
Marshall Islands
Kiribati
Bangladesh
Vanuatu
Korea (North)
Japan
Korea (South)
Mean
2547
1776
2052
979
5566
829
8307
10553
5913
16251
978
5494
1297
1989
19374
1952
2436
3050
1267
598
780
2236
1991
2565
2141
2426
693
1143
1186
1133
20891
9781
4291
2648
1938
1737
1047
6118
1078
9883
10882
7025
15924
1267
7249
1786
2470
20556
2231
2053
3434
1847
662
986
4072
2985
2210
2399
1833
750
1419
1144
1019
21891
13349
4776
0.0039
0.0087
-0.0167
0.0068
0.0095
0.0263
0.0174
0.0031
0.0172
-0.0020
0.0259
0.0277
0.0320
0.0216
0.0059
0.0133
-0.0171
0.0119
0.0377
0.0101
0.0234
0.0599
0.0405
-0.0149
0.0114
-0.0280
0.0079
0.0216
-0.0036
-0.0106
0.0047
0.0311
0.0121
ELF Values
0.7351
0.7098
0.7005
0.6632
0.6338
0.6050
0.5880
0.5832
0.5479
0.5416
0.5139
0.4312
0.4182
0.4150
0.3857
0.3682
0.2718
0.2385
0.2383
0.2105
0.1629
0.1538
0.1376
0.1110
0.0869
0.0603
0.0511
0.0454
0.0413
0.0392
0.0119
0.0020
0.3345
45
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
Table 4: Africa’s Regression Results
Constant
Coefficient
0.0219
Standard Error
0.0127
t-statistics
1.72
ELF
-0.0226
0.0187
-1.21
Dependent variable = Growth rate of GDP per capita 1993-2003.
N = 50,
R2=0.033,
F=1.4571.
Table 5: Growth Residuals for Africa
Annual
Country
Growth Rate
Predicted
Growth
Residuals
Equatorial Guinea
Liberia
0.173
0.069
0.0141
0.0014
0.1592
0.0673
Mozambique
0.057
0.0063
0.0511
Angola
0.041
0.0041
0.0372
Uganda
0.025
0.0009
0.0243
Cape Verde
0.036
0.0125
0.0237
Mauritius
0.032
0.0114
0.0209
Lesotho
0.029
0.0161
0.0130
Ethiopia
0.018
0.0056
0.0129
Botswana
0.025
0.0126
0.0121
Sudan
0.016
0.0058
0.0104
Cameroon
0.012
0.0024
0.0093
Togo
0.014
0.0059
0.0080
South Africa
0.012
0.0049
0.0072
Eritrea
0.014
0.0072
0.0071
46
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
Table 5 (continued)
Benin
0.011
0.0041
0.0069
Senegal
0.013
0.0062
0.0066
Ghana
0.013
0.0067
0.0065
Cote D’ Ioire
0.007
0.0034
0.0038
Mali
0.010
0.0063
0.0035
Burkina Faso
0.008
0.0052
0.0027
Chad
0.005
0.0024
0.0026
Guinea
0.008
0.0052
0.0024
Central African Republic
0.005
0.0032
0.0021
Tunisia
0.023
0.0210
0.0020
Malawi
0.009
0.0067
0.0019
Morocco
0.012
0.0110
0.0012
Mauritania
0.009
0.0080
0.0005
Tanzania
0.006
0.0053
0.0004
Niger
0.007
0.0072
0.0000
Rwanda
0.014
0.0146
-0.0001
Gabon
0.004
0.0045
-0.0005
Kenya
0.001
0.0025
-0.0017
Gambia
0.000
0.0041
-0.0044
Egypt
0.012
0.0178
-0.0060
Namibia
0.000
0.0076
-0.0079
Algeria
0.003
0.0142
-0.0113
Congo (RC)
-0.009
0.0022
-0.0115
Nigeria
-0.015
0.0027
-0.0176
Djibouti
-0.014
0.0039
-0.0184
Madagascar
-0.019
0.0021
-0.0210
Zambia
-0.018
0.0043
-0.0219
Seychelles
-0.005
0.0173
-0.0228
Libya
-0.019
0.0040
-0.0228
Swaziland
-0.002
0.0206
-0.0229
47
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
48
Table 5 (continued)
Burundi
-0.011
0.0152
-0.0261
Zimbabwe
-0.019
0.0132
-0.0322
Guinea-Bissau
-0.034
0.0037
-0.0376
Sierra Leone
-0.045
0.0034
-0.0484
Comoros
-0.034
0.0219
-0.0561
Somalia
-0.054
0.0036
-0.0575
Congo (DRC)
-0.056
0.0022
-0.0579
Source: See text
Figure 1: Africa’s Growth Rates
ELF Vs. 1993-2003 Growth Rates
0.200
Growth Rates
0.150
0.100
0.050
0.000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
-0.050
-0.100
ELF Values
Source: See text
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
49
Figure 2: Latin America’s Growth Rates
ELF Vs. 1993-2003 Growth Rates
0.05
0.04
Growth Rates
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
0.0000
-0.01
0.1000
0.2000
0.3000
0.4000
0.5000
0.6000
0.7000
0.8000
-0.02
ELF Values
Source: See text
Figure 3: Asia and the Pacific’s Growth Rates
Asia and the Pacific: ELF Vs. 1993-2003 Growth Rates
0.07
0.06
0.05
Growth Rates
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
0.0000
-0.01
0.1000
0.2000
0.3000
0.4000
-0.02
-0.03
-0.04
ELF Values
Source: See text
0.5000
0.6000
0.7000
0.8000
Ethno-Linguistic Fragmentation and Political Institutions
Name of Candidate: James Alic Garang
Birth Date: 1976Birthplace: Ajokrenge, Marialbai, Sudan
Address: 1638 West Secret Garden # 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84104
50