Major points in Prof. Petra von Morstein’s workshop on *Philosophical Counselling*, Venezia, 3 & 4
March, 2006, in the Master Programm of Philosophical Counselling.
I.
Two fundamental assumptions, which can be neither proved nor disconfirmed
1) We human beings are in reality and not separable from it. We cannot propositionally know reality in itself
and as a whole.
2) Persons are both subjects and objects. The subject aspect of persons is not discernible and not separable
from objective aspects. Thus the identity of a person cannot be established fully by objective identity criteria.
The subject aspect cannot be discursively analysed. As objects individual persons are discrete particulars;
as subject they are inseparable from each other and, therefore, one. An individual person is both clearly
distinct from every other person, and one with every other person.
These two assumptions lead to an I-Thou approach in philosophy, in human interaction, and specifically in
Philosophical Counselling.
II.
The ‘ Ground’ of Philosophical Counselling and Philosophical Methods..
1) Methods and systems of establishing, identities, categories and relations by means of our cognitive
abilities, in science as in everyday life (appear to) become invalid through extreme, especially catastrophic
experiences in nature, politics, society as well as in personal life. Such experiences may throw us to the
‘ground’ where we have no points of reference or guide-lines. On a large scale, the Copernican Revolution,
Darwinian Evolution Theory, Freuds theory of the Unconscious shattered our previous methods of
understanding and ways or finding our ways in our world and lives. In catastrophic situations we may find
ourselves immediately face to face with ourselves, ‘’bottomed out’ so to speak, ‘zugrunde gegangen’.
Objective understanding of ourselves or anything else has turned impossible or has no validity. Thus, in such
situations we encounter ourselves only as subjects, without identity. We have to start enquiry without
presuppositions. This is clearly and instructively demonstrated in Descartes *Meditations*. As some clients
come to Philosophical Counsellors in states of great disorientation in their lives, Descartes turns out to be
one of the most excellent teachers for us Philosophical Practitioners.
2) The roles of philosophical methods in Philosophical Counselling then must be experimental. Nietzsche
spoke of Philosophy as experimental and recommended to explore every philosophical method, including
nihilism, in order for us to find out how any method, were it to pervade some of our experiences, would
enable us to live our lives more fulfillingly. Wittgenstein compared philosophical methods to ‘therapies’.
Accordingly a Philosophical Counsellor cannot work as, say, an Aristotelian, Kantian, Hegelian, .... Rather
the productive connection between a person’s experiences and a philosophical method arises from the
experience and the dialogue which arises from a client’s narration and the counsellor’s responses. For
instance, a person who is self-critical of her morality may respond to Aristotle’s views on the acquisition of
virtue. Or a client troubled by the gap between thought and action may benefit by Kant’s notion of persons as
‘ends-in-themselves.
Philosophical methods and ideas are not ‘applied’ in Philosophical Counselling but integrated into the
dialogue, almost as if this, that, or the other philosopher (historical or contemporary) were present in the
dialogue between counsellor and client. This does not mean at all that a philosopher’s name or terminology
need be mentioned.
III.
Philosophical Dialogue in Counselling
What does a Philosophical Counsellor have to bring to dialogues with clients? Broad and deep philosophical
scholarship and a good vivid understanding of diverse philosophical methods and ideas are essential, but
not sufficient. A counsellor’s motivation must include a passionate purposefree (non-egotistical) interest in
exploring human experiences: the personal experiences which any individual client brings. This must go
with the commitment to regard any client’s personal experiences always also as basic human experiences ,
as we are inseparably connected by virtue of being not just objects but also subject. Thus the counsellor
must suspend/transcend his or her concepts, explanations, and values and move within the client’s
experiences as attentively and freely as possible. Then both will recognize and accept the cognitive
inexhaustibility of human experiences and persons, and conduct the endeavour to understand as an
unending process in which our rational faculties must be exercised to the fullest and again and again
transcended. This may enable the client to change counterproductive perspectives on their experiences and
begin to develop with their experiences with more constructive understanding, with an improved ability to act
and with creativity.
An important difference between a counselling dialogue and a dialogue about problematic experiences
among trusting friends consists in the ‘space’ of the dialogue. In counselling it is as if the client invites the
counsellor into her or his life, and the counsellor lets herself in to this life space and leaves her own,
temporarily behind. Both need to be generous and trusting. Thus the counsellor’s personal emotional and
moral interests are bracketed; this is necessary for full and free attention to the client.
Art, and specifically literature, are indispensable ‘teachers’ for Philosophical counsellors. For it is, for
instance, in response to literary characters in dramas and novels, that we are typically free of our own egocentric purposes and enter the characters’ situation, regardless what historical time and culture may be,
freely. And if we are deeply affected we leave the literary characters’ lifeworld and are changed. We
internalize their experiences without having them and understand them as not just personal, but also
basically human experiences. This is what Aristotle calls ‘Katharsis’.
The Counsellor must bring a kathartic attitude to her or his work.
We conducted three demonstration sessions of Philosophical Counselling and subjected them to critical
discussion.
We
did
not
have
--counsellors’ motivation;
time
and
opportunity
--social and ethical aspects of their professionalism;
to
work
on
the
topics
such
as
--attitudes toward, and roles of, language in counselling sessions
Especially the last topic has been given hardly any attention in works I have read by Philosophical
Practitioners and talks I have heard at relevant conferences. I would be very glad of an opportunity to
continue my work, especially with regard to the topic of language, with the group of the Master Programm. I
am most thankful for the recent opportunity of working with them.
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(C) Petra von Morstein , 2006