The Study of Religion: An Introduction and Provocation
by Kenneth MacKendrick
At the close of 1843, Karl Marx wrote something that has surely become
one of the significant paradoxes constitutive of the interests at stake in the
study of religion: namely, that "the criticism of religion is the premise of all
criticism" (Marx 1978: 53). The phrase remains contentious for good
reason. Is the study of religion simply a scientific endeavour, which seeks
to illuminate some obscure phenomena in an explanatory and analytic
sense, or does the study of religion actually produce a surplus or an
excess which intervenes in the very object of inquiry?
Even with these brief questions, the dice have been loaded and the stakes
have been raised. Only one object? Should we be talking about the study
of religions and not simply the study of religion? Is it the place of a scholar
of religion to be a critic of religion? Might we also ask whether religion is an
object at all? And why obscure? There is no shortage of disagreement or
debate about this. So much so that the study of religion within the
academy has yet to achieve a secure position within university curriculum
(Juschka 1997, Lease et al 1995).
One of the most difficult and controversial tasks for any religionist is the
attempt to provide a coherent definition of religion. If we at least know what
we are looking for, even vaguely, then we can begin to outline, if only
negatively, what, at least, religion is not. There are countless definitions
that permeate 'popular' and 'intellectual' thought: ranging from "a cultural
system" (Geertz) to "infantile regression" (Freud). William Arnal has
outlined several definitions, or ways of approaching religion: broadly,
substantivist definitions, which rely on 'key ingredients' and culturalist
definitions, where the contents of religion are examined according to their
function within a given system. Neither are completely satisfactory. Arnal
goes on to claim, with a high degree of justification, that "religion does not
exist" (Arnal 1999), indicating, along with Talal Asad, that the category
itself is the product of specific contingent political and economic forces
which have engendered a contentious predisposition from the outset -- a
claim well worth thinking about, and one that captures the spirit of
deconstruction, attempting at once to both criticize and preserve an
"impossible" category.
Typically, religion is a category used to describe something unique or
specific about a given cultural tradition, and we have several relatively
prepackaged categories through which to do this: Hinduism, Buddhism,
Confucianism, Taoism, Islam, Judaism, Christianity (for instance, see
Smith 1958). Without a doubt, these are the most common "world
religions" studied in any introductory class, be it in high school, college, or
university. In general, there is an underlying agreement that in a university
setting it would be irresponsible for a department, of adequate financial
means, not to include the study of these seven traditions in their program.
They have been, in effect, institutionalized. This is not to say that such
distinctions are without differentiation or conflict. Many introductions to
"world religions" entail a curious distinction between 'western' religions:
Islam, Judaism and Christianity; and 'eastern' philosophies: Hinduism,
Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism. The immediate contradiction should
not be lost on us, even if such distinctions are made less often today.
The strange mixture of religion, philosophy and culture, a mix which has
often proven itself to be inadequate in many ways, have given rise to two
distinct trends in the study of religion: phenomenology (Eliade), which has
largely fallen into disrepute, and comparativism (Paton, Sharpe), which is
certainly not short of its critics either (Martin et al 1996). These
approaches, of course, have spawned a renewed emphasis on issues of
method and theory, from Bruce Lincoln's "Theses on Method" (1996) to
Russell McCutcheon's Manufacturing Religion (1997). Furthermore, these
issues have prompted some frank and articulate self-reflective lines of
inquiry, not only interested in the study of religion, but in the study of the
study of religion. In particular, the political structure of national and
international institutional bodies (Martin, Wiebe, King, Smart, Hackett
1993), employment (McCutcheon 1998), gender (Warne 1998) and
pedagogy (Juschka 1999). In their own way, each of these scholars have
written about the institutional space in which our discipline takes place,
emphasizing often implicit issues of class, epistemology, gender, and race
that plague both the academy and the study of religion itself. There have
also been heated debates about the distinction between studying religion
and practicing religion, coming to be known as the insider/outsider debate
(McCutcheon 1999). Donald Wiebe's infamous debate with Charles Davis
is notable in this regard (Wiebe 1984, 1986; Davis 1984, 1986). There has
also been some important studies in the contribution of religionists to
public policy and the role of scholars in the public sphere, as Harold
Coward has outlined (1999).
One of the most publicized debates regarding in our field has focused on
the difference between the study of religion, religious thinking and theology
(Wiebe 1991). Although the dust has yet to clear, I think there is an
emerging sentiment that the distinctions between the study of religion and
theology are beginning to sediment. Both religionists and theologians have
a self-same interest in preserving relative independence from one another.
Despite the fact that close associations between theological and religionist
faculty remain, much can be said about their mutual excommunication.
However, if religion is a synthetic category, then the question of the study
of religion remains an open one, and this entails a variety of approaches
and perspectives, although we certainly have persuasive evidence that
some theories are better than others.
The study of religion has long since been hailed as interdisciplinary, with
an emphasis on the unique ways in which religionists "appropriate" the
methods and theories of other disciplines to form their own approaches
and analyses. This has lent itself to a common (mis)conception that the
study of religion is merely parasitic on other fields (sociology, psychology,
history, literary criticism and so on). Perhaps it is time to change this by
extending the range of religious studies into other disciplines. What is
certain is that religion has played, and continues to play, a vital and
dynamic role in political and social life. In Canada, "social conservativism"
at the present moment is enjoying unprecedented growth and political
influence. Despite the absence of 'religious' references in most
declarations of policy, there is little doubt about the distinctly religion-based
agenda that underlies this kind of public policy, which is also common
enough amongst the 'progressive left' and throughout the Green Party.
Additionally, the best-seller booklists also record mighty sales for books
about spirituality and religious faith, and the hit summer television
blockbuster Survivor is ripe with references to "island spirits" with
"confessional" anecdotes. Furthermore, as late capitalism continues to
ravage pockets of meaningful existence, transforming consumption itself
into the sole means of social and economic reproduction, scholars of
religion would be careless not to provide insight into the fetish character of
commodities and the ways in which mythology is often used to bolster
nationalistic sentiment. As religious traditions continue to morph into new
creations, from televangelism to new age environmentalism and druginduced mysticism, and the immense entertainment industry continues to
ripen with religious imagery, even so-called "non-religionists" have turned
their gaze to the study of religion (although very few of them ever read
what religionists have to say!). The recent anthology, Religion, edited by
Derrida and Vattimo (1999), Habermas's debate with theology (1992) and
even more recently, Slavoj Zizek's book, The Fragile Absolute, have taken
up investigations of the nature and dynamics of religion directly. It would
be naive to think that our field can remain limited to "seven" traditions, and
it would be a profound miscalculation to think that the study of religion has
nothing to say about the disciplines it is connected with.
Judging from the diverse nature of the debates outined above, the
question of "the critique of religion" remains, and there is no agreement in
sight. However, one thing is certain: studying religion is political.
Theoretical inquiry itself has often been the source of both public and 'ivory
tower' outcries, ranging from the separation of theological departments and
religious studies departments, to public dissent about the kind of analyses
that particular scholars pursue. Even if a religion can be studied
descriptively and analytically (and I, for one, have my doubts), the
institutional space of the study of religion is highly charged. What we do in
the study of religion is implicated in the political sphere. Despite our best
attempts, we are not simply dealing with abstract concepts. As Hegel once
cryptically noted, "spirit is a bone."
Certainly, technological change, global capitalism, the "new economy" are
driving forces behind the rapid changes in 'religious' life, prompting new
mythologies, diverse rituals and launching adaptive political movements. It
seems quite strange that very little research has been done on the
relationship between religion and the political economy, so much so that
the two issues are usually completely unconnected. Stephen Handelman
quotes Elliot Abrams, chair of the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom, as saying "The sad truth is that religion, as we begin
this new millennium, still starts more conflicts that it resolves" (Handelman
2000). This impression, which is a popular one no doubt, has lead to a the
"The Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders,"
billed as the largest ecumenical religious gathering in history hosted by the
United Nations, where "spiritual authorities" are given an opportunity to sit
down together to find "peace and love." One can be struck by the strange
naturalized and naturalizing associations here. Why should Christians and
Buddhists be lumped together? What do these supposed "spiritual
authorities" have in common such that they, in particular, should find
themselves burdened with the task of establishing peace? To be certain,
the "spiritual authorities" involved are constituted by the very traditions that
scholars of religion, at least in part, deem religious.
One of the great challenges that the study of religion faces, amidst debates
about the "politics of identity" and "multiculturalism," is precisely the
politicization of our inquiries. It has become commonplace, in some circles,
to assume that "cultural traditions" are the traditions of "others," with the
corollary (politically) relativistic attitude, "to each their own." As if,
somehow, religion or religiousity is essentially or naturally a matter of
individual 'faith' or 'spirituality.' Somewhere along the line, the critique of
religion, which was pivotal for the founding of our discipline, seems to have
collapsed into a distinctly liberal and, at the same time, privatized model.
Evidence of this collapse, or at least of the subordination of a more
politicized model of the study of religion, can be found in the introductory
comments by Bawa Jain, general secretary of the Millennium World Peace
Summit, who notes explicity, "it is not the intention of this Religious Summit
to engage in political issues" (Jain 2000). Apparently, religion, ethnicity and
peace are not political issues, or perhaps (insidiously) they are not
'appropriately' political... Asad's comments regarding the study of religion
appear to be highly relevant: "It may be a happy accident that this effort of
defining religion converges with the liberal demand in our time that it be
kept quite separate from politics, law and sciences - spaces in which
varieties of power and reason articulate our distinctly modern life. This
definition is at once part of a strategy (for secular liberals) of the
confinement, and (for liberal Christians) of the defence of religion" (Asad
1993: 28). If we take Asad's observations seriously, then perhaps we
should pause to consider what motives lie behind the largely private
donations that are funding the peace summit (Ted Turner, the honourary
chair, contributed over $750,000).
Today, multiculturalism has often assumed the position of the privileging of
already established boundaries and institutions, a kind of plurality in name
only. If this is the case, then the study and critique of religion, or perhaps
the critique of the study of religion, takes on a new relevance. Much of
what goes on under the name of global "religious conflict,"
"fundamentalism" or "ethnic tension" often seems to have little to do with
the traditions we learn about in World Religions classes. In the popular
media, for instance, we easily find a close association of "religion" with
"ethnicity" which, as we well know, is most often, although not always,
used as a pejorative category, aligning "ethnicity" with "nature," and
"nature" with social and political regression ("religion [ethnicity?] is a
crutch"). The study of religion, then, is frequently perceived as a
specialized form of anthropology which has little or nothing to do with
modern politics. These blatantly ideological caricatures are, without a
doubt, reinforced by trends in globalizing capitalism, as Marx well knew
when he wrote, "[Capitalism] has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of
religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in
the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into
exchange value, and in the place of the numberless indefeasible chartered
freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom - Free Trade. In
one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has
substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation" (Marx 1978: 475).
As 'western liberalism' soars to new heights, finding its ceiling in the stock
market, the tendency to characterize anything outside of this system as
inferior or deformed grinds its way into social policy. Equally disturbing is
the trend to associate 'kinks' in the economy exclusively with "religious" or
"ethnic" conflicts, shifting an emphasis from the political economy (i.e.
class struggle) to questions of 'culture.' Without a doubt, this influences
what we, as scholars of religion, think and do when we are studying
religion. Not only that, but we contribute to these ideological caricatures
whenever we strive to confine our discipline within distinct parameters.
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Kenneth G. MacKendrick is a graduate student at the Centre for the Study
of Religion, University of Toronto. He teaches Religion, Law and Morality
as a Sessional Instructor and is in the process of writing a dissertation on
Jacques Lacan and Jürgen Habermas, with an emphasis on the theoretical
foundations of critical social theory (Freud, Hegel, Kant). He is also
interested in popular