LOCAL PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEES IN KENYA.
A case study by Andries Odendaal.1
Kenya is a fascinating case-study of a bottom-up process to establish a peace architecture.
The process is not yet complete, but even so a number of dilemmas and lessons learned
have already emerged.
The process started in 1993 with an initiative by a group of women of the Wajir district
of Kenya, bordering Somalia and Ethiopia [see 43]. At the time a highly destructive
cycle of violent conflict raged in the district between different clans of Kenyan Somalis,
leading to 1 213 deaths over a period of 4 years. The causes of the violence included:
 Very weak government presence in the district, resulting in the failure of state
institutions to regulate conflict, provide security and promote development.
 An environment characterized by aridity, with frequent droughts and insufficient
natural resources to sustain the population.
 The pastoralist culture of inhabitants that condoned livestock raiding.
 The influx of refugees from Somalia and Ethiopia.
 The ready availability of small arms.
The initiative in Wajir consisted of civil society actors working together to sensitize the
population to the need for peace. They engaged the elders of the different clans and set
up a mediation process between the clans. After several meetings, the elders agreed to
sign a code of conduct called the ‘Al Fatah Declaration’. In this process the civil society
actors had worked with and involved representatives of formal authority, particularly the
District Commissioner and the Member of Parliament, but on a voluntary basis. Within a
year of the commencement of the initiative, however, it became clear that some form of
formalization was necessary - for two reasons: (i) to provide coordination to all the
peace-making and peacebuilding activities in the district; and (ii) to ensure sustainability
in the participation of figures with formal authority [43: 19]. The manner of
formalization was a problem, given strained relationships between civil society activists
and government officials (a not too unfamiliar situation in Africa). If a formal peace
structure was to be located in government it would alienate some civil society actors. If it
were to be located in civil society, e.g. through the formation of an NGO, it would strain
cooperation with government officials. Eventually it was decided to integrate the peace
initiatives into the one structure in district administration in Kenya that brought
government, NGOs and citizen groups together, namely the District Development
Committee. In May 1995 the Wajir Peace and Development Committee was formed,
with the District Commissioner as chairperson. Members included the heads of all
government departments, representatives of the various peace groups, religious leaders,
NGO representatives, chiefs and security officers.
The case study forms part of a bigger study commissioned by BCPR titled: “Local peacebuilding and
National Peace Architectures: Lessons Learned from Local Peace Forums. A Working Paper.”
1
The success of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee in bringing peace to the
district and in maintaining that peace, soon led to the spread of the model to other
districts in the northern part of the country. International donors, NGOs and the National
Council of Churches in Kenya became involved in facilitating and supporting the
establishment of local peace committees. However, the process was uncoordinated and
haphazard, leading in some cases to the establishment of several peace committees in one
district. Moreover, the same model was not always followed. Adan and Pkalya [33]
identified 3 main models, varying between peace committees where the District
Commissioner chaired the committee to committees chaired by an elected civil society
member.
National government soon took notice of local peace committees. In 2001 it established
the National Steering Committee (NSC) on Peace Building and Conflict Management
with the objective to formulate a national policy on conflict management and to provide
coordination to various peacebuilding initiatives, including the local peace committees.
In the same year it used the facilitation of local peace committees in five districts to
negotiate the ‘Modogashe Declaration’ with the various pastoralist clans. The Declaration
essentially laid down ground rules for dealing with ongoing conflict associated with cattle
rustling. The Declaration was revisited in May 2005, amended and re-named the
‘Garissa Declaration’. This Declaration, though in some respects at odds with the
Kenyan constitution and jurisprudence [see 15], enjoys the formal recognition of
Government.
The process of formulating a national policy on conflict management proved to be
politically complicated, though. In spite of the fact that the NSC has tabled a draft policy
document as far back as 2006, it has not yet been passed by parliament. The draft policy
made provision for the establishment of a permanent National Peace Commission [44].
Following the post-election mayhem in 2007 (when more than 1 500 people were killed
and 350 000 displaced as a result of inter-ethnic violence), the National Accord and
Reconciliation Act 2008 recommended the establishment of District Peace Committees in
all of Kenya’s districts, with priority given to the Rift Valley – the area where most of the
violence had occurred [45]. Under coordination of the NSC and with UNDP-Kenya
support, a programme was initiated to build capacity in this respect. Those districts with
peace committees reported much less violence than others [17], a fact that considerably
raised the importance of enhancing local capacities for peace.
There is a fair amount of consensus among researchers and observers that the peace
committees have, on the whole, been successful. They have demonstrated their ability to
manage inter-community conflict and to contain or prevent violence. Chopra [15: 16] has
observed their ability to integrate a broad range of local stakeholders who were locally
perceived as relevant for conflict resolution; their ability to apply features of the local
system; and their ability to tackle cases of inter-ethnic conflict where different values and
customs were at stake. In addition, they have facilitated a form of engagement between
marginalized communities and the government that has enhanced government’s
responsiveness to these communities. The following issues and dilemmas, however, need
to be noted:
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The peace committees in Kenya’s pastoralist areas operated in the vacuum created by
the weakness of governance institutions, in particular the justice system, to provide
security and justice to communities. The weakness of the judicial system, however,
was not only caused by a lack of resources or political will, but also by the
disjunction between two different paradigms of justice: that of the clans and that of
the state. The mediation offered by peace committees involved more than problemsolving; they also mediated, albeit unconsciously, at the level of those fundamental
values underpinning the justice system. Chopra [15] has identified the dilemma
posed by this situation: the negotiated declarations are prime examples of mini
‘social compacts’ that are evolving through a meaningful engagement between the
state and local communities. However, at certain points they fundamentally
contradicted the constitutional values of the state. The Declarations offer peace, but
compromise justice as defined by the constitution. It has placed state officials, like
District Commissioners, in unenviable positions where they had to choose which
paradigm they would follow in each situation.
Another aspect of the above dilemma concerns issues of inclusion and democracy.
The reliance on traditional customs, especially the authority of elders, excluded
meaningful participation by women and the youth. It reinforced traditional
asymmetric power structures. The inclusion of women and the youth on peace
committees – often under pressure by NGOs and donors – did not substantially
challenge the power structures and was little more than window dressing [see 15: 39].
A key dilemma concerned the primary methodology that was followed: mediation or
arbitration. Arbitration assumes that conflicting parties recognize the authority of the
arbitrating body; whereas mediation assumes that the parties share mutual confidence
in the mediator. The rationale that has been presented for formalizing the peace
committees included the perceived need to enhance their authority; thereby enhancing
their capacity to arbitrate. However, once the committees were perceived to be
vested with formal authority, they attracted power struggles and competition for
control of key positions [15, 33]. In a situation where the legitimacy of authority
was at the heart of the conflict (as in Kenya), the adoption of arbitration as a primary
intervention model might be counter-productive.
Finally, there is a dilemma regarding local ownership and external support. The
Wajir process was almost wholly locally owned. In most other cases NGOs and
donors played midwife to the establishment of peace committees. There seems to be
an inverse correlation, though, between local ownership and external support. The
more the process relies on external support, the weaker it is. Adan and Pkalya [33:
19] even went as far as accusing NGOs of encouraging ‘uncouth behaviour’ by
offering sitting fees to peace committee members. Yet, external support is necessary.
Without logistical support and, more importantly, intellectual and technical support to
mediation processes, most peace committees will not be able to function. Official
recognition is also a form of support, but the more the process is formalized, the less
local ownership and initiative will be possible. The dilemma is how to provide
necessary support to peace committees without undermining local ownership.
The peace architecture is, however, incomplete. While some of the local building blocks
are in place, national policy and coordination strategies are incomplete. Apart from the
National Peace Commission mooted in the draft policy prepared by the NSC, the peace
agreements between the ruling party and opposition that were negotiated in 2008 also
made provision for a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission and an Ethnic and
Race Relations Commission. These structures have not been implemented yet.