The Rwandan genocide Mahmood Mamdani; When victims become killers Girard in Africa Introduction Theory as heuristic tool. Scales: state, community, domestic -> Geometry of Violence Demand: honour particularity, recognise universality. Aporia of collective violence (II): particularity/universality. In African studies: exotic and banal. No solution: beyond the impasse Not this or that; but this and that. Working the particular (Mamdani) and the universal (Girard) The particular Historical conditions for the possibility of Rwandan genocide Three: identity, revolution [founding], genocide [iteration]) 1. First major theme: Identity Introduction Colonial anthropology: difference = difference of origins. Migration hypothesis.. Responses: 1) differences = social selection (elites breed and feed selectively. 2) migration, yes; relevance? If migration is a fact, so is shared living for 500 years. Shared community: economic, cultural and political level. Economic: Difference agriculturalist (Hutu) and pastoralist (Tutsi) did not precede their settling down; enforced through political power. Cultural: language = Kinyarwanda; predates formation of Rwanda state and still exceeds it. Reproduced through patrilineal descent. Result: Hutu and Tutsi the result of state power and patriarchal ideology. a. Racialisation: History of “race”: 1700-1880 “race” distinguishes between “European Africa,” “Africa Proper” and “Asiatic Africa” (attached to Eurasia). Sahara divides European and Proper Africa. See Mamdani, p78 Hamitic hypothesis no. 1: Negro descendents of Ham, cursed to be slaves, black as sign of curse. Justification for slave-trade; Colonialism reveals Saharan trade-network and ancient civilizations. By 1800 Hamitic hypothesis troubled. Solution: civilization brought by Caucasians under black skin. Result: Egyptians, Nubians, Ethiopians = Hamitic. (Africans Proper not human enough to be Hamitic) Tutsi said to be one of many Hamitic groups -> Migration hypothesis. Why so powerful in Rwanda? Racialised identity reproduced through institutions that reproduced Tutsi superiority. Intellectuals can discard the myth; but not if it is institutionally entrenched. b. Institutionalising Germans scramble; Belgians invade (1916). Combined efforts of Catholic church and colonial state. Church: “Europeans under a black skin.” Slaughter in churches? (see Geometry, p55). Institutionalisation: education, state administration, Church Schooling: in French for Tutsi (assimilation; rule); in Kiswahili for the Hutu called “Bantu” (Bantu Education). Administratively: indirect rule. Decrease the power of the king, colonisers appoint chiefs, no community accountability; make all chiefs Tutsi Culmination: census and racial classification (1933-1934) = formalising difference. Sources for classification: 1) oral information provided by church, 2) physical measurements, 3) ten cow rule. Consequences: neither ethnic “social climbing” or “falling” possible after 1933. For the fist time ever, they had become fixed identities. Identity: creation, legitimation, institutionalisation. c. Identities: political, economic, cultural Economic identities – result from development of markets Cultural identities – result from communities where language etc is shared. When institutionalised, identities become political - not a marker of cultural formation Codification of race/ ethnicity in law = political identity, not cultural/ biological. Cultural identity codified as political identity becomes unlike culture: no grey, no mobility Identity: creation, legitimation, institutionalisation, essentialising, (no movement). d. Forms of political identities Direct rule: race-based identities: settler and native Indirect rule: fractures race consciousness of natives into multiple ethic identities. The latter governed through “customary law” enforced by “native authority.” Ethnicity as cultural identity becomes a political one when legally coded. Therefore: indirect rule executed through both race and ethnicity. Absurdity: only natives divide into ethnicities, not settlers. Race used to differentiate between colonised: those indigenous and those not. Creates affinity between settlers and native minority. Generates subject races (Tutsi, South African coloureds and Indians, Asians in East Africa) or virtual citizens. Anti-colonial violence -> master races; post-independence violence -> directed at subject races. Identity: Identity: creation, legitimation, institutionalisation, essentialising (no movement), ambivalence (Girardian: victim) Conclusion (identity) Explanation of violence: 1. The politicisation of indigeneity (victim) 2. Failure of Rwandan nationalism to transcend colonial native/alien divide 3. Failed revolution of ’59 (failed mythology). Tutorial III Reading: K. M. Vandenberg (2006) “René Girard and the Rhetoric of Consumption,” in Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture, Vol. 12-13. Questions: 1. Easy: Explain the role that mimetic desire historically played in the shift from a producer to a consumer culture. 2. Quite easy: This shift can also be usefully explained by invoking the difference between political and sociological propaganda. Explain. 3. Quite easy: Using any example you can think of, illustrate the roles played by political propaganda and sociological propaganda in the formation of the violent group. 4. Difficult: At the heart of the relationship between model and imitator lies a contradiction Girard describes as a “double bind” (p268-269). According to Vandenberg (p268), the person most susceptible to propaganda is the one who most often confronts this contradiction. Explain. 2. Second major theme: the revolution of 1959 Introduction 1. Indirect rule: more complex independence than direct rule; 2. Direct: violence directed against foreigners (settlers) 3. Indirect: Against foreign power and subject people. 4. Complexity also key to successful transition (collaboration between Hutu and anti-colonial Tutsi). The revolution of 1959 1. Appeal to “Hutu-solidarity” = revolutionary rallying call 2. Result: dismantle local Tutsi power 3. Effect celebrated as revolution of 1959. 4. Mamdani: = socio-economic success but political failure 5. Significance: For the first time violence used to differentiate between Hutu and Tutsi (ref. Praeg: transition from conflict -> violent conflict) 6. Question: why transition to violence? 7. Answer: increasing state vs. society conflict. State uncompromising (institutionalise difference); society more flexible - > money economy, education (see Mamdani, pp106). 8. Result: production of Hutu counter-elite. 9. Two dynamics: restoration and revolution. 10.Restoration: of pre-colonial elites/cults prior to their subjugation “as Hutu” through collaboration of colonialist and Tutsi king. (In 1962 some refused to be called “Hutu” instead of local clan name). 11.Revolution: replacement of Tutsi state elite with Hutu state elite under the name of “replacing monarchy with democracy” 12.Common ground: elimination of Tutsi 13.By 1959: two proposals for independence following direct and indirect rule logics. Tutsi king: defuse tension between white and black and centralise monarchical power. Hutu: defuse tension between Hutu and Tutsi. 14.Period 1959 – 1964: accommodationist vs. exclusionist. Tutsi flee or incorporate; Hutu: exclude Tutsi or accommodate. 15.Both accommodationist had accepted 1959 as fait accompli 16.After 1964: Tutsi exclusionists filter in to undermine Hutu. Became known as inyenzi. 17.State reprisals violent and exceptional/anomalies. As raids expanded, so reprisal massacres became the rule. Conclusion: 1. Many claim genocide rooted in revolution. 2. True in two specific senses: 1) one context specific, 2) universal and general. Context specific: genocide the culmination of repressive massacres. Universal/general: the failure of post-revolutionary discourse to mythologise the violent transition to democracy. Mamdani: “[The revolution of ‘59] turned sour in spite of real social gains, because 1959 repudiated only the consequences of colonial rule, but not the native/setter dynamic that was its institutional premise. Instead of pioneering a way beyond colonially shaped identities and destinies, 1959 locked Rwanda’s fate within the world of political identities constructed by colonialism. Instead of the promised first act in a revolutionary drama that would close the curtain on the colonial era, 1959 turned into a final act desperately trying to breathe life into racialised identities born of the colonial state. Indeed, 1959 ushered in a pursuit of justice so focussed that it turned into revenge” (Mamdani, p36). 3. Third theme: the relationship between revolution of 1959 and the genocide of 1994 General review structure: 1. Problem 2. Solutions 3. Contribution 4. Evaluation ***** 1. Problem: Historical facts 2. Solution 1. Two interpretative possibilities: particular; universal. 2. Particular: Mamdani’s When victims become killers: colonialism, nativism and the genocide in Rwanda (2001) (Post-colonial studies). 3. Gains: Ethnicity: cultural identities -> political identities Colonialism: creation, legitimation, institutionalisation, essentialising, ambivalence of subject peoples. Excess: use and institutionalisation of Hamitic hypothesis Revolution as failure; prefigures genocide. 4. Losses: no de-exceptionalising of extreme violence. 5. Solution: universalist interpretation 6. Conventional response: comparative (genocide studies). 3. Contribution 1. Alternative: Girardian analysis 2. Gains: De-exceptionalise (p27). 3. Risk: Banality of violence; aporia (p29) 4. Aim of text: Girard helps us map this aporia in both manifestations: Understanding (universal, sacrificial structure of genocide) vs. judgement (as outrage) Particular vs universal 5. Girard summary (eg. p35-36). 6. Failure of 1959 revolution (p39; 56-57). 7. Conclusion: genocide as deferred act of foundational violence (p41) 8. Condition: generalisation of victimage category (inyenzi) victim ambivalence (sociological) accusatory ambivalence (“restoration of monarchy”) and generalised to all Tutsi. mimesis (propaganda; co-opting of everyday language) 9. Excess: where scapegoating is consciously manipulated, only extreme violence can make it work (p53) 10.Risk: aporia (p46-51) 4. Evaluation Exam question: Is a combination of particularist and universalist interpretations a way beyond the impasse of the aporia that haunts any contemporary interpretation of acts of collective violence? Tutorial IV Reading: K. Scott (2009) A Girardian Critique of the Liberal Democratic Peace Theory, in Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture, Vol. 15/16, p45-62 Task: Write a review of this article following the general structure of a review as discussed in class: 1. Problem 2. Solution 3. Contribution 4. Evaluation