Wittgenstein's Language Games
Wittgenstein, in speaking about religion and religious belief does so from the
perspective of the language-game analysis. This picture of language asserts that the
meaning of words and phrases are determined by the context, or game, in which it plays
a role. For Wittgenstein, there are infinitely many language-games corresponding to
innumerable situations in life. The language-game itself is regulated by depth grammar.
Depth grammar is what makes the language-game possible, by setting the boundaries of
what can and cannot be said. Words or activities within a language-game take on
meaning that is exclusive to that particular language-game. Hence, what is meant by 'belief
or 'truth' is different in the religious language-game t h a n t h e s c i e n c e l a n g u a g e g a m e Wittgenstein argues in his‘ Lectures and Conversations ’that the depth grammar
that regulates the religious language-game is different than the depth grammar that regulates science.
He also postulates that as long as the primary goal of a particular language-game is different from
another, they are immune to criticism from each other. Science, which is concerned with determining
how the world is ordered, has a distinctly different goal in mind than the religious languagegame which is concerned with questions of an existential nature. The religious languagegame has merit and is immune from science because it asks important questions that
science is unable to touch. It serves a human need that is unable to be fulfilled
anywhere else. What then is the nature of the religious language-game, what sort of
activity takes place in this game? As with all language-games the meaning of the words
within the religious language-game is determined by the language-game itself. The word
'belief' is important both in the religious language-game and the science language-game.
Where those who have attempted to prove or disprove God's existence rationally have
failed, is assuming that the word 'belief' is identical in both language-games. This is
clearly not the case. Belief in science is something completely different than belief in
religion. When someone says "I believe that the world is not flat" something different is
being said than "I believe in God, the Father Almighty. Creator of Heaven and Earth,"
Under the guise of the referential theory of language, which Wittgenstein asserted in
his earlier work the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the meaning of the word 'belief'
would be meaningful only if it referred to an object or fact in the world. This theory
does not allow for the same word to have different meanings depending on the context.
Wittgenstein's language-game analysis avoids this problem and offers an alternative
that truly mirrors the way in which language operates in the world. It follows from
this that words in different language-games could have different meanings. Therefore,
the word 'belief' can be demonstrated to have a different meaning in the scientific
language-game than the religious language-game. If it can be shown that these are
different versions of 'belief' and that the rational justifications for God's existence or
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Wittgenstein's Language Games
non-existence rest upon a scientific meaning of 'belief' then it can be shown that these
proofs play no role and are irrelevant to the religious language -game.
What then does 'belief' mean in the respective language-games? To say that
one believes something in science is to argue a claim on the basis of evidence
or proof. A belief that the sun is the centre of the solar system is a scientific
claim. There is corresponding empirical data that justify this claim. An individual
is able to cite reasons for this belief and postulate theories in accordance with
it. For religion, belief is not something based on evidence or proof at all. To say that "I
believe in God" is not a claim based on empirical data or reasons. It is something that
is arrived at when one goes through the process of answering the key existential
questions. 'Belief' in the religions language-game is not reasonable as 'belief' in the
scientific language-game is, nor does it pretend to be. Religions belief is not based on
rationality, but how one sees the world. Here Wittgenstein makes a key differentiation
between himself and Kierkegaard. It was Kierkegaard's claim that holding a religious belief
was irrational. Wittgenstein develops the position that a belief in the religious languagegame is not rational or irrational. Rationality does not play a role in the religious
language-game. Speaking about how science and religion differ on this point of
rationality, Wittgenstein notes that; “You could also say that where we are
reasonable, they are not reasonable - meaning they don't use reason here.”
(Lectures p. 59) If this point is granted, then at any juncture if science uses reason as
grounds for an objection to it, it must conform to the depth grammar of that particular
language-game for if it does not it cannot be spoken of meaningfully.
What results from this conclusion is that the proof for the existence and non-existence of
God plays no role in the religious language-game. St. Anselm's ontological proof plays
no role in the religious language-game. Intuitively this is not entirely surprising. When one is
asked the question; “Do you believe in God, and if so why?" and the ontological proof
is given as a reply, the inquirer remains unsatisfied. Instead, what they are likely
searching for is an explanation of how that individual sees the world. A suitable
answer may be that "The world makes more sense with God than without." This reply
does not rest upon evidence or proof, but is rather the result of an individual
searching for an answer to the existential questions about the ‘riddles of
life,’ and how one develops a religious point of view to address these
questions.
Conversely,
the
counter
evidence
provided
against
God’s
existence is subject to the same kind of scrutiny. Objections, like the
problem of evil, that rest upon empirical evidence or reason can no longer
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Wittgenstein's Language Games
be considered within the religious language -game. However viable they
may be in terms of reasonability, it is irrelevant to the religious languagegame.
Clearly, Wittgenstein has placed science and religion into separate spheres, unable to
criticize one another. A key distinction must be made here as to what Wittgenstein
means by the religious language-game. One who has developed a religious point
of view need not partake in organised religion. Following Wittgenstein's thought,
the religious language-game is not an inclusive subset of organized religion or
Christianity. This is not what Wittgenstein is connotating when he speaks of a
religious language-game. It may very well be the case that certain individuals adopt
organised religion within the religious language-game. Christianity or other organized
religions may serve as a vehicle for answering the questions of life. However an individual
may be playing the religious language-game and not take part in any organised religion.
If an individual, outside of organised religion addresses the existential questions necessary
in developing a religious point of view, then they indeed are playing the religious
language-game. Similar1y, one need not believe in God to take part in the religious
language-game. If one, after developing a religious point of view, sees the world making
more sense without God than with God, then they are playing the religious languagegame. Again, all that is required is for one to seek answers to the "riddles of life."
Conversely, it is also possible for those within organised religion to not be playing the
religious language-game. People who attend church services or functions, or even
believe in God may be outside the religious language-game. If for example, a
person were to blindly accept God in his life without ever inquiring about God's
nature or his own existence, this person is not playing the religious language-game.
If the existential questions are not asked and the religious point of view is not
developed, then, consistent with Wittgenstein, it can be said that the person is not
playing the religious language-game. It is in this way that an interesting paradox of a
person being ‘religious’ but not playing the religious language-game emerges.
Another more important example of someone who is ‘religious’ or a theist not playing
the religious language-game are those who attempt to prove God’s existence
rationally. Anselm and Aquinas, despite their strong faith in God’s existence
introduced proofs for God's existence that have nothing at all to do with the religious
point of view. As demonstrated in this paper, these proofs are given from the
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Wittgenstein's Language Games
perspective of the scientific language-game. These proofs are not religious, and therefore
fall under the scrutiny of science. Criticism is possible within a language-game, and therefore
these proofs based upon scientific reasoning are subject to the same rules as other
scientific theories. As such, principles such as Occam’s Razor easily refute the claims
made by these proofs. Therefore, just as both science and religion dismiss superstition,
both the religions language-game and the scientific language-game reject the rational
proofs for God's existence.
Which leads into the rational reasons for disproving God's existence. The same mistake
that the theist makes by asserting God's existence on the basis of rational proofs is
also made by the atheist who bases reasoning as an objection to God's existence.
Atheism is no more scientific than theism. From a rational view point it has been
shown that belief in a Divine Being is irrational. Kierkegaard was not mistaken about
this. What he and the others are mistaken of, according to Wittgenstein, is applying
rationality to the religious language-game. Religious and non-religious belief has
nothing at all to do with rationality and those who claim atheism based upon science
are no more justified than those who base belief on rational proofs.
In conclusion, Wittgenstein’s language-game analysis, as it applies to religious belief,
allows one to solve an age old problem. The logical contradiction that exists
between an all-perfect God and the problem of evil has now been solved. Belief in
God is no longer subject to proof or evidence or empirical justification. The
religious point of view is how one answers the existential questions, or how
one sees the world. The result may be individualistic and perhaps enter into
relativity, but it does give religion immunity from the assaults of science. Like
the rest of Wittgenstein’s language-game analysis, this theory of religion is
consistent with our human needs. Clearly, today’s society relies largely upon
the theories and principles of science. Wittgenstein is not denying science, as
much as he is preserving the rightful place of religion as an important part of life.
Essential to being human is coming to terms with the existential questions and
developing a religious point of view. Science can tell us about the world, but we need
the religious point of view to tell us about our existence. As Wittgenstein illustrated in the
Tractatus, paragraph 6.52; "We feel that even when all possible scientific
questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched."
Language Games by B M Sandin - 1999
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