5. 1990S’ DEFAMATION AS ONE OF THE DOMINATION TECHNIQUES................................................. 2
The interested and deceitful tale of the Italian political ‘corruption’, as Western exception ... 2
The politics costs, in Italy, according to Teodori .................................................................... 20
The media-academic deception on the ‘heroic’ magistrates-executioners.............................. 22
The world police-judicial space as Anglophone new domination tool .................................... 33
The 1989 Anglophone transition to the attempted direct [police-judicial] world domination............ 33
Echelon: complement of the Anglophone world hegemony .............................................................. 38
‘Criminality’ as pretext for a police-judicial world web ................................................................... 45
Also German and French political leaderships as criminal questions ................................................ 54
The 1999/2000 German politics criminalisation ........................................................................... 55
And Italian-style assault .......................................................................................................... 55
The Schröder’s judiciary option to political power consolidation ........................................... 64
The attempted reduction of French politics to criminal question .................................................. 67
The ideological covers of the Anglophone espionage: the ‘transparency’ campaigners .................... 72
The myth of the casual investigations, from a magistracy fully inside the powers networks .. 79
5. 1990s’ defamation as one of the domination techniques
The interested and deceitful tale of the Italian political ‘corruption’, as
Western exception
The Italian political system and its Constitutional frame were created after WW2 in
conditions of allied occupation and under the hegemony of DC and PCI. Suddenly, in
1992, some judicial networks, of different political and powers’ colours, discovered
that only the Craxi-PSI, the Andreotti-Forlani DC, the non-pro-PCI fractions of the
PDSI, PLI and PRI were corrupted, while everyone else was absolutely pristine. In
addition the evils were corrupted (but rarely in court, having been the wide majority
never sentenced for any crime) in the measure the PCI/PDS did not decide to save, as
it did in some cases, the stricken politicians. And overall they were corrupted in the
measure they showed fidelity to national independence and resisted to renounce to
their political engagement. Intellectual networks submitted to various national
interests suddenly united enthusiastically to the chorus born from these abrupt
discovers of some Italian magistrates. So also internationally it was claimed that in
Italy there was finally, from 1992, the definite collapse of a political class needing lots
of money for party financing, and the triumph of the goodness side, which, in spite of
its gigantic bureaucratic machines and other very expensive activities, was fed by the
militants’ pure enthusiasm. As usual in State and powers propaganda, who/which
promoted because liked became liked because ‘honest’, alias ‘honest’ because liked
and promoted. It was exactly as the usual games on ‘human rights’, where States
founded on genocide, slavery, racial discrimination1 and the consociative dictatorship
of a couple of similar political parties permanently monopolising power, became
world judges and executioners.
The methodological approach was the usual tautological one. Adversaries of
foreign and internal powers were not bad because enemies but enemies because evil.
Powers were always good. Their enemies were always evil. Only for that the latter
were enemies of the former. Interest could not be an interpretative frame because
goodness, in spite of their always obsessively claimed national interests, was
absolutely disinterested. Andreotti, blessed from the Pope, and Craxi praised on
certain (not the Francophone one) Latin press were the evil the dominant international
and certain internal powers couldn’t not to perceive and their enemies, overall after
1989, and also more from 1992, the time of the Maastricht Treaty. Around these
tautologies reciprocally fed and sustaining, claims, more than documented and
positively tested theories, were built from academic networks about the 1990s’ Italian
events.
Exactly as in all case, in history, of political persecutions, the regime intellectuals
supporting the political purge assumed political magistracy as truth source, what
anyway magistracy can never be, being its function different. Actually even this
intellectual operation was too arduous because the sentences against the ‘guilty’
politicians there were not. Political magistracy defamed by press but generally
without prosecuting and sentencing. Guilty were not judicially guilty. Consequently
1
(Castoriadis 1999, p. 70/71).
2
even the judicial evidence that in the arbitrary evaluation of magistracy stricken
politicians were guilty, there were not. There were only the regime intellectuals
unfounded supposition of guiltiness. No alternative coherent interpretative and testing
frame was ever suggested, apart from the tautology that the purged political class
should be certainly guilty, since no Western or Central power had ever posed any
problem of human right and threatened and actuated bombing campaigns. Alias, who
was defamed as guilty from political magistracy and foreign powers, was claimed as
guilty from regime intellectuals. Intellectuals are always very cleaver in letting to
understand something without stating it. In fact, in the academic literature on 1990s’
Italy, evidence is always let to understand, or even invented, never showed and tested
in a reasonably coherent frame. So the GWs, the notices that the citizen was under
investigation, and the relative abusively militant Prosecutors-promoted mediadefamation were assumed as sure evidence of guiltiness of the cleansed part of the
political system. This, despite the absence, for the wide majority of the accused
politicians, of any prosecution and/or later condemnation. The actually very
ephemeral result, the realised purge, was sold as the proof that the purged were
criminals should be purged.
Naturally, since ideology must always cover interests, there was a kind of
unexpressed, but not in Italy, moral justification to the discrimination between Italian
good and evil. As summarised from a rightist journalist well connected with the
powers supporting the PDS and Lefts in office, Montanelli, to ‘steal’ for paying the
one’s and current political activity was corruption. While to ‘steal’ for the party, as,
for Montanelli, it was the case of the PCI/PDS, was claimed as moral superiority. 2 As
to tell that between two MPs equally avoiding all personal interest in politics, but one
having paid his electoral campaign collecting directly financing and the other one
having had it paid from the PCI/PDS, the former was a corrupted and the second was
morally superior. Nevertheless Montanelli, not really a very analytic mind, never
explained why a DC-Lefts politicians even if not morally superior, according to his
own frame, were equally saved from militant magistracy. More direct was the Craxiand also Andreotti- and Berlusconi-phobic La Repubblica party. For the 4 July 1999
La Repubblica Berlinguer, the denouncer of the moral question who actually did
nothing for moralising his party, the PCI, had moral tension because he avoided
alliances with Craxi, while D’Alema was without it because he dealt with Berlusconi.3
The concrete characters of different defended wallets determine always differences in
the concrete analytic approaches but inside a basically identical methodology.
Italy was a country where the PCI had been even bribed from central government,
from 1987, by an entire State-TV-group, RAI3, become its de facto monopoly but
paid from State. And macro- and micro-clientelist, category- as territorially-focused,
laws always saw Parliament unanimous. Also the benefited citizens and economic
groups never refused, on the contrary they always pretended, such kind of relations
State-citizens and of governance. In a particratic regime, and specifically in the Italian
one, where everything depends on politics the first kind of corruption is the people’s
one. Useless places of works are created, useless people is hired, useless enterprises
are build and their losses financed, to relatively young people pensions and subsides
are given. Funds are distributed in the most odd and unimaginable ways for pure
2
(Montanelli, 1995, p. 375).
Se la politica pensasse a far funzionare l'Italia, [If politics thought to make Italy working],
Repubblica, IE, 4 July 1999.
3
3
consensus reasons. In addition the entire business flows between Italy and socialist
countries included fixed percentages passed to the PCI/PDS, and also other entities, as
illegal financing. Also direct Soviet-block funds arrived to the PCI/PDS and other
entities, as Western-block ones had arrived to anti-Soviet parties and organisations.
Inside Italy from the State industry, the private one, the State bureaucracies, the illegal
financing to all parties and TUs was generalised, since the normative inadequacy,
nearly the impossibility, of legal financing. When investigations touched Lefts local
government as the Turin commune one in the 1980s, no difference from the practices
of the DC hegemonised administrations was found in the practices of clientelism,
illegal financing, bribes4. All interest block had wanted to use against concurrent
parties, party-fractions, TUs, economic and bureaucratic interests the card of the
illegal financing, bribes corruption, and also eventually of the high betrayal, had not
the problem of the crimes. Laws create crimes, and the Italian laws had created the
inevitability of the crime of political and TUs illegal financing, and other crimes, and
also of high betrayal in certain cases, for all political and TUs organisations. Only
problem was to dispose of a judicial network adequately internally and
internationally5 supported for realising political and/or other purge.
Being essential in a political purge and country-weakening operation to assure the
continuity of the stricken system, it is not astonishing that the TUs real position had
not attracted specific attention in the presentation of the 1990s Italy and its developing
political dynamics. In the Italy’s weakened continuity, TUs were more essential than
the same Lefts parties, because their power position was electoral irresponsible, and
consequently independent from their real consensus. In the soviet structure
characterised the post 1968/1969 Italy, overall the three main regime TUs participated
to thousands of State and local institutes administrations, committees and subcommittee in a capillary network of State and society co-management. According to
1998 revealed data, TUs got from the Italian Social Security (INPS), about 800 billion
liras every year. A little more than 300 were direct INPS financing to the TUs
Assistance Offices (AOs)6. The remaining sum was collected from INPS on behalf of
the TUs. In fact when the INPS customers used these AOs not only this use was INPS
financed, but TUs use it as occasion for getting delegations for detracting fees, for
their benefit, from the insured pensions. These contributions received from the TUs
should be compared with the State financing to political parties, which was of 180
billion liras per year.7 In addition the TUs got functionaries de facto paid from State
structures and from private enterprises, and all this not for favouring workers
integration, but, on the contrary, their militancy against all even shy modernising
measure, and all attempt to weaken the genetically corrupted nature of the
bureaucratic machine. The regime three main TUs, CGIL-CISL-UIL (defined from
radical-liberals as the three-dead8, actually very deadly alive), as all the TUs wide
galaxy, was carefully let untouched from all claimed as anti-‘corruption’
investigations.
4
(della Porta 1992, p. 183).
NATO in first instance. It is not possible suppose that after that from the 1960s’ the USA and NATO
had pushed in different ways terrorism as control weapon, suddenly in the post-1989 phase, when US
and NATO initiative in and against Western Europe and Mediterranean was actually strengthened, they
remained indifferent to what was happening in Italy.
6
Enti di Patronato ed Assistenza Sociale. They are generally intermediaries between citizens and INPS.
7
Geronimo, I nuovi poteri forti, [The new strong powers], Panorama, Internet Edition, 27 November
1998.
8
Trimurti.
5
4
Even if the image of an Italian politics where political parties were only
preoccupied to capture relevant flows of funds has been suggested, it would be
arduous an unfavourable-to-Italy comparison with other countries. That politics was
inexpensive abroad was not supposable, also where the political system was less
competitive and reduced to a mere couple, or triplet, of relatively similar parties, as in
the Anglophone countries. The Presidential candidate Bush junior collected, in 1999,
for his 2000 electoral campaign 70 million dollars.9 Similarly did Al Gore. The
exclusion or not, of candidates, from the Presidential pre-race, was determined from
their capacity to collect funds, alias from the private interests to have them on their
budgets. Nobody claimed for the USA par condicio among candidates, neither
prohibitions of TV political advertising. As nobody denounced as corruption to be
paid from private interests, which will inevitably condition the elected candidate. The
US politics was currently financed both from internal Mafias and from foreign ones.
That verified indifferently for Democratic and Republican political personnel. It was
obviously legal in the USA, but claimed as illegal and criminal when it was supposed
to have verified relatively to foreign States and politicians the USA considered their
enemies. Who denounced black funds and corruption, electoral frauds and corruption
neither was denounced and tried as a slanderer, nor his/her denunciations translated in
judiciary actions. For example the whole costs of the electoral campaigns for the 2000
Presidential elections and ‘general’ (always partial in the USA) elections were
estimated 3 billion dollars.10 For Sartori, the total cost of the 2000 Presidential
elections was of the order of 1 billion dollars11. Also vote is always a form of
reciprocal conditioning (in fact in Italy purged candidates were accused of the crime
of exchange vote), in one wants to use this kind of reasoning frame. Following
judicialist Italian frames all form of lobbying was corruption, apart from that
exercised from and/or for profit of judicialist components. In fact, not differently from
the case of the party financing where norms were made for being immediately
violated and everybody accepted explicitly their violation, lobbing was without any
rule in Italy. There was only an equivocal law on the exchange vote, made a bit before
the start of the judicialist waves and widely used for charging and defaming
politicians, usually without finally condemning them for it. If one looks at the USA,
for example, Clinton gave judicial pardons and guaranteed the non-prosecution of
people responsible of fiscal and other frauds and crimes only because they had
considerably financed the Democratic Party and had assured relevant quantity of
votes to his wife when she was successfully candidate as New York Senator in the
year 2000. In addition he assured relevant benefits to himself at Federal State
charge.12 Nobody prosecuted Clinton for that, or developed long and insistent
international campaigns on these practises.
Also in Japan, when systemic forces wanted to strike strong political leaders, as it
was the case of Tanaka Kakuei, a self-made-man, and more generally more attempt of
Ennio Caretto, Tutti I soldi del Presidente, All the President’s money, Corsera, IE, 17 July 1999.
Mafie straniere finanziano la politica USA, [Foreign Mafia finance the US politics], Giornale, 24
December 1999; Ennio Caretto, Usa, un voto deciso dai dollari, [USA, a vote decided by dollars],
Corsera, IE, 25 January 2000.
11
Giovanni Sartori, La grande scelta in tre domande, [The great choice in three question], Corsera,
IE, 7 November 2000.
12
Charles Krauthammer, Bill Clinton, il Presidente più "costoso" della storia, [Bill Clinton, the most
"costly" President of history], Giorno, IE, 3 January 2001.
9
10
5
politics’ autonomisation from bureaucracy, a wide claim about ‘structural’ corruption
and bribe was built and used, in the 1970s’ and later. In the Japanese case what was in
danger was the bureaucracy’s power monopoly. The legal indeterminacy was function
in that country of the bureaucratic developmental leadership. Also, thanks to the
media and magistracy control from the system’s leading forces, it was possible, each
time politics tried to interfere with real government, to oblige to the retreat political
leaders, reaffirming the submission of the political system. Already between 1983 and
1986 the experiment of the creation of a kind of external fraction of a LDP object of
media and judiciary attack for supposed corruption had been realised, creating the
New Liberal Club (NLC). More organically and decisively, in the 1990s’, the LDP
long monopoly power from the half of the 1950s’ was broken, since bureaucracy
initiative, with the creation of the New Frontier Party (NFP) at the end of 1994. It was
a party with an electoral weight of the order of 30% votes13 founded in a contest of
continued media and judicial quarrelling against the LDP ‘corruption’ and illegal
financing.14 If in a country governed since 1868 by forces outside formal politics and
also more after WW2 from a bureaucracy’s dictatorship, there was political
‘corruption’ evidently bureaucracy wanted it, as control tool. Apart from the different
nature of the two State formations and countries, one, Japan, strongly developmental,
the other one subordinate inside the international order, there were common political
patterns. The situation of indeterminacy of politics and its financing reflected the
necessity to keep it subordinate and blackmailable. In the case of Japan the
subordination was essentially internal. ‘Corruption’ was, for its ethical contents, the
brand under which to justify attacks to the political system.
Partridge writes: “Tangentopoli15 is the name commonly given to the series of
corruption scandals first emerging from the northern city of Milan, previously thought
of as the model to the corruption-ridden bureaucracies of Rome. The exposures were
set in train through the energetic and sustained work of a group of Milanese
magistrates, a prominent member of which, Antonio Di Pietro, soon become
something of a national hero.”16 The news of “447 old-guard politicians, including
five former Prime Ministers, had been investigated on various corruption-related
charges”17 by March 1994, was complemented with the most linear of the
explanations. In Italy “the intensity of the inter-party competition drove extraordinary
numbers of politicians over the boundaries of legality in the search for party funds and
this, combined with the unleashing of the judiciary’s potential independence, made
the corruption scandals exceptional among Western democracies.”18 It was a very
weak and question-avoiding logic. A ‘scandal’ is evidence of nothing and it is even
impossible to define rigorously what it is, being totally subjective to remain
scandalised. Partridge arrives even to define a comparison between Italy and supposed
“Western democracies”, funded on an entity, “corruption scandals” cannot be defined,
but even if defined and synthesised in data would be data on a stated and
incomparable feeling.
13
28% votes at the 20 October 1996 general elections, while the LDP got 38.6% votes in the singleseat constituencies and 32.8% in the proportional representation.
14
(Johnson 1995), (Rei Shiratori 1992), (Rei Shiratori 1993), (Rei Shiratori 1994), (Rei Shiratori
1995), (Rei Shiratori 1996); (Rei Shiratori 1997); (Junko Kato 1998).
15
Kickback-city
16
(Partridge 1998, p. 77/78).
17
(Partridge 1998, p. 78).
18
(Partridge 1998, p. 79).
6
Actually that there was never any judicial evidence that the persecuted politicians
were corrupted, or that they were such more than both the British and US MP, and the
MPs of the Italian saved parties. Simply political Prosecutors never cared of this
aspect. Eventually persecuted politicians were, as normal for all party and politician
of a particratic system, institutionally19 blackmailer. It does not seem that US, British,
French, German, etc leaders live in perfect insulation, and that they damage the
economic lobbies pays their political activity. There is also the further problem of
which kind of real relations established between who has economic powers and who
is elected thanks to it, and between who has a political and/or bureaucratic power
position and asks funds for being elected or re-elected. Anyway different affairs
generally immediately repressed in the USA and UK, and which led to magistracy and
Parliamentary inquiries (for example in the November-December 1999) in Germany,
and to the explosion of different affairs in France, showed how party illegal financing
was everywhere current practice.20 In the 1999 Germany they were used for the
political liquidation of Kohl inside the CDU21. But overall Partridge alluded to
bureaucratic corruption. Italian bureaucracy was not actually really and systematically
investigated. When some bureaucrats’ cases emerged it were not really deepen. To a
high bureaucrat of the Heath Ministry, Poggiolini (and wife in similar position and
corruption) whose revenues declaration was of 80 million per year some tens billion
liras were found22, in part simply hidden in the furniture (coaches) of his home.23
They came from the pharmaceutical industry. Also if over 55 billion liras initially
confiscated, 14 were returned to the Poggiolini wife, Pierr Di Maria, because judged
as totally licit24. For the illicit part, he and wives had been evidently also politically
and TUs protected for decades25. Already a couple of decades before, in 1975
Poggiolini had been investigated and accused because too ‘connected’ with
pharmaceutical industries.26 Too many interests would have been touched. Magistracy
had no real interests in these things and politics, already too weak for dealing with
them, was also further weakened from the judicialist waves. The practice of bribes is
not total. But it is so diffused, since the nature of the Italian public administration not
service- but clientelism- and life-job-oriented, that honest investigators, as the
Prosecutors of the purges were not, would have needed to transform State and public
offices directly in prisons. No concern with efficiency, the consequent absence of
controls and the certainty of the life-job, made personal corruption not contrasted in
these contests, even promoted. For the May 2000 Rudiger Dornbusch the Italian
19
In spite of the personal role and attitude.
Scandali internazionali, [International scandals], Corsera, IE, 1 December 1999.
21
Among his ‘crime’, from the point of view of the forces wanted the Italy’s and EU’s destabilisation,
there were the German unification, the EU promotion, the agreement, a couple of years before, to the
Berlusconi party adhesion to the EPP. (Maurizio Caprara, Martino: «Cade anche il modello
Germania», [Martino: «The German model falls down»], Corsera, IE, 1 December 1999).
22
Bribes of this order are not Italian monopoly. For example, inside the Israeli intelligence, the
Mossad, have been signalled private businesses of his functionaries of the same order; (Hoy 1990).
Health, Defence and Public Works are big business everywhere. There is no evidence that in other
countries the non-explosion of affairs and the public financing of politics, implied lesser global
(politics + bureaucracy) corruption.
23
From Corsera, 21 October 1993, in (Biagi 1995, p. 181). Biagi referred of 45 Billion liras found.
24
Quattordici miliardi restituiti a Lady Poggiolini. Il tribunale: «Furono guadagnati lecitamente»,
[Fourteen billion returned to Miss Poggiolini. The tribunal: «They were legally earned»], Corsera, IE,
19 November 1999.
25
From Corsera, 11 November 1993, in (Biagi 1995, p. 181-183).
26
OP, 6 December 1975, and others in (Pecorelli 1995, p. 247-250).
20
7
bureaucracy was pure waste27. In reality it was worse. The rhetoric of the necessity to
“refind transparency of democratic government”28, actually presented as pure slogan
– while efficiency and possibility to fire civil servants are basic techniques, not
slogans – was the classical conservative reply to institutional, not only personal,
corruption. Bureaucracy always refused even all control on simple clerks’ revenues
and properties, also after 1992/1993, with judicialist magistrates avoiding this kind of
questions in their daily briefings on all institutional fields. Political magistracy ought
to preserve its corruption as the corruption of the whole magistracy accepted its
hegemony but for pure conservative goals. Transparency was opposed from della
Porta to the claimed happened decision-making transfer to inter-parties and -interests
Masonic lodges would have verified in Italy since the 1970s’. The theoretical and
practical question would have eventually been why precisely in the moment of the
post-1968/1969 apotheosis of TUs, parties and people power, and parties and TUs
apparatuses acting as societal police forces, real decisions passed to transversal
centres as Masonic lodges with criminality as police forces29. The myth of
privatisation, reduced from everybody to pure cover-slogan, realised equally without
using it as occasion for results’ concern favoured the further dissolution of the State
technical corps, zeroing contracts controls and increasing costs, by external
collaborations eventually realised from the same should be checked.30 In Milan
emerged from the sub-products of the political purges investigations that there was the
entrepreneurs’ custom to pay also the retired bureaucrats. Contrarily those in services
would have refused the payment by instalments. They were surer in that way.31 Such
kind of organised and inter-generation solidarity of corrupted bureaucrats imply wide
complicity, in first instance at TUs level, but also at level of magistracy which saved
“«Dovete smantellare rapidamente tutta la vostra burocrazia: non protegge nulla, è spreco puro.
Soltanto gli interessi costituiti riescono ad autoproteggersi. Ci vuole un governo che esca dalla routine
del processo politico. Non potete più permettervi il lusso di prendere soldi in prestito dalle future
generazioni. Negli Stati Uniti abbiamo cominciato a deregolamentare venti anni fa, e adesso stiamo
godendo i risultati grazie a una crescita del cinque per cento: il nostro unico problema è che è troppo
alta, non sappiamo come rallentarla».”; [“«You must rapidly dismantle all your bureaucracy. It protects
nothing. It is pure waste. Only the constituted interests succeed in self-protecting. It is necessary a
government outside the routine of the political process. You could not permit any more the luxury to
borrow money from the future generations. In the States we began to deregulate twenty years ago, and
now we enjoy the results thanks to a 5% growth. Our only problem in that it is too high. We do not
know how to slow it».”]. (Fisco e rigidità hanno spinto l’Italia sull’orlo di una crisi economica.
L’impietosa analisi e le infauste previsioni di Rudiger Dornbush, [Taxes and rigidities pushed Italy on
the border of an economic crisis. The pitiless analysis and the unfavourable previsions of Rudiger
Dornbush], Foglio, 12 May 2000.
Naturally with the extraordinary absence of coherence, or simply of unbiased information,
characterises the US resident academicians, he was in favour of the Italy’s destabilisation and he saw in
the 1994 Berlusconi short government a fascist danger. Naturally neither knew what fascism was.
Nevertheless he caught some aspects of the Italian and European bureaucracy.
28
(della Porta 1992, p. 262).
29
These trends were exposed from (della Porta 1992, p. 250-263). Confirmed from the 1990s events,
nevertheless, in my evaluation, they had nothing of astonishing or moral repelling. The not working of
official institutions and mass organisations creates and/or valorises parallel ones. Masonry and
capillary networks of social and police control are typical of solid State formations as the British one,
what would scandalise certain anti-Masonic from the one side and libertarian from the other side Latin
intellectual traditions. Nevertheless a kind of law-of-silence seems to avoid the comparison for
example between the judicialist claims about Masonic and criminality domination in Italy and their
reality for example in the UK and USA were there are integrate harmonically inside State power.
30
MP Elio Veltri, SRDCH, n. 112, 10 December 1996. Veltri, an hard-liner judicialist, was elected in
the lists of the PDS.
31
MP Elio Veltri, SRDCH, n. 112, 10 December 1996.
27
8
for example the TUs’ galaxies. Consequence of this kind of State order was that not in
all cases the civil servants object of corruption judicial condemnation they suffered
disciplinary measures. And even in cases they were inquired for relevant corruption
crimes they were not always removed from their offices.32 The same della Porta
evidenced how poor administration generated the search for privileged channels,
bribery/corruption, increased poor administration.33 The search for privileged channel
generated also, in a context of myopic politicians and Statesmen, their submission to
inefficient and corrupted bureaucracies. Not innocuous and accomplices moral
appeals to transparency but the subordination to efficiency and citizens-oriented
services could permit to break the bureaucratic deadly circuit and to deal with the
created pitfall. Efficiency remains the suppressed concept of the della Porta
elaboration, who prefers to rely his deluded34 hopes in a supposed virtuous cycle
created from a supposed35 weakening of organised crimes since the supposed36
weakening of its political connections37, and on the equally deluded38 bureaucratic
reform perspectives opened from the 1992/1993 pogrom39.
However also efficiency is not so easy definable concept. It is generally claimed,
because sounding deceitful, that efficiency implies honesty and is incompatible with
corruption. The logical link is unprovable. Historically and factually, the stated link
is false. The British and US State formations have been work of corrupted men and
women became later the ruling class. It built itself on the violent expropriation of
previous owners and common properties. Piracy against the State enemies was State
promoted and protected. The ruling class was characterised from mobility, alias not
from the stable transformation of the bandits in honest people but from a continue
struggle of everybody against everybody. Competition with concern for achievements
was the key of the relative success of both the State formations, and more generally of
all the white-Anglophone ones, for an historical period. MPs were chosen from local
caucuses, and also when later there was the need of the people vote, the elitist nature
32
MP Elio Veltri, SRDCH, n. 112, 10 December 1996.
Donatella della Porta, in (della Porta 1997, p. 41).
34
After some years of her individuated creation of a virtuous cycle, probably only founded on the
Italian rhetoric (not its reality!) of the anti-Mafia struggle, no improvement there was in the Italian
public administrations.
35
In Italy there was no evidence apart from the self-interested judicialist claims.
36
Organised criminality seems strongly connected with the different currents and clans of the Lefts
parties having got real power during and after the 1992/1993 pogrom and with the different clans of
militant magistracy both by directs links and by justice collaborators. See later for evidence. Organised
criminality is actually connected with everybody in politics and in office. Nevertheless the Italy’s real
political power, since 1992, is, in spite of its reduced vote’s consistency, the PDS considerably more
than other parties.
37
Donatella della Porta, in (della Porta 1997, p. 42-48).
38
Because not realised.
39
(della Porta 1994, p. 461-488). Della Porta expresses the some formalism actually fed of illogical
connections and associations claiming that ‘corruption’ obstruct democracy because the politician
would be subordinated to businesses instead of “elaborating general programs” (della Porta 1994, p.
485). Again, apart from that corruption and ‘democracy’, whatever the conception of democracy,
seems without any connection. It might be even claimed that exactly the need of conquering people
vote makes, more this in necessary, corruption inevitable. But again politicians’ role is not the
elaboration of programs (art in which for example the Italian politicians and their intellectuals have
always been over-super-experts). It is assuring governance, which is skill and art considerably less
rhetorical and sounding but more essential. Transparency and democracy appear in della Porta as the
smoke concepts used for avoiding key questions of efficiency and governance. ((della Porta 1994),
(della Porta 1997)).
33
9
of the selection of the candidates did not change substantially. What means that local
gangs (in a foreign country they would have been called Mafias, there they were
called caucuses) controlled not only the local economy and State apparatuses (the
Crown representatives, or the either elected or designed from higher instances local),
but also the political representation. Even logically it is more socially profitable
efficient and surplus-producing corrupt people, than honest business-inept, and
resource wasting, honest people. That in spite that the powers’ propaganda prefers to
state the honesty of the world powers and the corruption and moral depravation of
their enemies. It is only a sounding slogan. As market, apart from that before using
the concept it would be necessary to define what is the exact meaning of the word, is
guarantee of nothing. In France it was noticed for example that the end 1970s
deregulations increased political ‘corruption’40. But again it would be necessary to
inquiry whether corruption increased, or just the claiming or the legal prosecution of
‘corruption’. Legal frames create ‘corruption’. In France for example the wish to
regulate political competition according to some supposed principle of fairness,
created the constant succession, pursuing, of norms41, which gave more the dimension
of the attempt to save previous illegalities, than the achievement of a real fairness
between political competitors. In fact ‘public opinion’ may be bought and convinced
in a plurality of means depending decisively more from real power and wealth than
from legal frames, as also in France was noticed 42. Exactly as in Italy, the possibility
of governing politically markets and their access, increased the possibility of
‘corruption’. And the concern in legal-bureaucratic-controls, making further distant
and confused the individualisation of personal responsibilities43, increased the
possibility of ‘corruption’, and the guarantee of its impunity. But also the absence of
State intervention and of control, and juridical frames not making legal what
elsewhere regulated, only apparently suppress ‘corruption’. All the advertising and
promotion industry, most developed where quantitative development is greater, is
only the legalisation of bribes and deception, at social as bureaucratic and political
level. And what seems efficiency may actually resolve in enormous social wastes and
dissolution. Moralism, at the service of the one or the other propaganda, avoids all
these questions.
Anyway when France and Germany most excited on the Italy’s ‘corruption’, in
occasion of the 1992/1993 pogrom, exactly in those years the Franco-German cooperation in party illegal financing was at its climax. The French Elf-Aquitaine
existed also before for parts the needs of the French illegal financing. It was one of its
functions, not different from the Italian IRI. But specifically in 1992 it permitted to
Mitterand to finance illegally the Kohl electoral victory. Kohl was judged as less
incompatible with the French interests, relatively to the kind of UE construction, than
his competitors.44 Apart from the moralistic point of view, not infrequently cover of
more substantive immorality, there is nothing of astonishing in this kind of
transactions. Simply they are illegal. Law creates legality and illegality, for reasons
not always clear and frequently irrational.
40
(Doublet 1997).
(Doublet 1997).
42
(Doublet 1997).
43
(Doublet 1997).
44
L’unità europea si è fatta anche pagando il prezzo dei finanziamenti illegali, [The European Union
has been made paying the price of illegal financing], Foglio, IE, 25 January 2000, p. 1.
41
10
Bureaucratic corruption and political illegal financing, as also eventual single
politicians corruption, remain phenomena certainly intertwined but conceptually
different. Partridge, done the first step of confusing corruption and illegal financing,
and resoling everything in too banal justification, found on this his avoiding of all real
questions. Why did investigations explode in Milan and not in Rome? Was it casual
that in Milan, the economic capital of Italy, there were the Craxi headquarters and that
it was also the city of an already in 1978, aspiring Pope, the Jesuit Cardinal Martini,
not surely a pro-Craxi personality. Antonio Di Pietro, a judicially-innocent corrupted
rightist, coming from a Defence Ministry job and later from the police, more than the
Partridge national hero become more banally PDS senator, in November 1997, in a
hyper-PDS constituency. Why suddenly in 1992/1993, from a rightist future PDS
Senator, and in a situation, for Partridge, of “judiciary’s potential independence”,
were “447 old-guard politicians [actually the double], including five former Prime
Ministers” ruined, and not before? Was it the technique of 50 years waiting for better
striking? Was it a sudden explosion of Milanese and Italian perversity? Was there a
sudden 1992 magistracy ‘independence’ or instead a specific form of change of their
dependence? Was the approaching Cossiga Presidency expiration psychologically and
professionally liberator for the Milan Prosecutors? Was the Maastricht Treaty a kind
of moral and/or material push? Was before 1992, after than in 1990 it was amnestied
without no militant Prosecutor promoted insurrections against Constitutional organs,
illegal party financing permitted? Did only in the 1992 Milan anti-CAF Prosecutors
get adequate bodyguard, disposability of police and Intelligence apparatuses, and
other Milan judiciary structures’, CSM’s, Cassation Court’s, etc. adequate support?
Why did this conjunction of lucky events verified exactly from the first half 1992,
after the cold war game collapse and the US model domination restructuring? In the
Partridge tale there is only this sudden explosions of the bubble-‘corruption’, in spite
of some knowledge the author shows of Italian affairs, even if without posing too
many questions to the appearances of events. The approach is typical of an academic
tradition having too much familiarity with powers’ interests. Used knowledge is there
only function of the political ends of the respective power national interest, not of
heuristic goals.
Nevertheless, in spite of all biased representation, ‘corruption’ seems to have
specific correlation neither with Italian politics (apart from the peculiarity of the
systemic features), nor with the international powers’ enemies. For example the
Italian and the German PM of the 1930s were of absolute personal honesty in relation
to State properties and funds. But also later, in the very late 1990s, in occasion of the
resigning of the European Commission, on 15 March 1999, the two Italian
Commissioners, named from the Berlusconi government, had no role in the affairs of
favouritism and irregularities. Neither the economists Mario Monti nor the radical
politician Emma Bonino (targeted from thousands of anonymous letters of chauvinist
and xenophobe British people inviting her, defined as a "Mafia-woman" – she was
actually from Piedmont, Northwest Italy – to go home since her competent defence of
European consumers) had any role in the episodes of favouritism and corruption. The
responsible were Mrs. Edith Cresson (French), Mrs. Wulf-Mathies (German), and Mr.
Pinheiro (Portuguese). The not necessarily statistically representative sample
contradicted also eventually gender claims hypothesising that power and corruption
were masculine marks. In addition the main responsible of the omitted controls was
the Swedish Commissar Anita Gradin, and the responsible of the Anti-fraud board,
the Danish Per Knudsen. With Clans-style procedures, corrupted were protected and
11
corruption silently solved, without punishing the persons responsible of it. President
of the Commission was Jacques Santer (Luxembourg). He was responsible of having
omitted the internal controls permitting the creation of a wide situation of abuses. 45
Who had denounced, without slandering anybody, who practised favouritism, also in
businesses/contracts involving relevant flows of money, Paul van Buitenen, was
punished. In fact the EU functionary was accused of having violated the reserve duty,
was warned, threatened, and now unreliable he was moved to building maintenance
charges, in alone an isolated office in an empty floor. Who practised favouritism was
protected from the highest instances of the Commission, and in spite of the resigning
of the Commission members bureaucratic corruption continued as before, but now
more protected since the persecution of who had denounced it.46 Mrs. Cresson was
French47, and of a France troubled, in 1999, from episodes of supposed personal
corruption of Right as of Lefts high exponents of its ruling class. The collective
resigning of the Commission because she and Santer refused their individual
responsibilities was a collective act of accusation against them. Nevertheless direct
comparison with cases national corruption is not really possible. It was noticed, in
Italy, that what for Mrs. Cresson was reputed a possible abuse was not such, in the
evaluation of the Brescia GIP, for the Prosecutor Di Pietro. Mrs. Cresson was
‘accused’ of favouritism, and also more and worse than pure favouritism. Prosecutor
Di Pietro was formally accused from the Brescia Prosecutor office of having
accepted/pretended cars, money, other goods from some of his inquired, at the time of
anti-CAF and anti-Berlusconi strikes. These, for the Brescia GIP, were not crimes, if
committed from the most known Prosecutor against the CAF. Consequently they were
no-crimes. Mrs. Cresson was politically destroyed from her supposed crimes. Di
Pietro enjoyed a successful political career, for the ending part of the 1990s, in spite
of his no-crimes. But if one was guilty while the other one judicially innocent,
everything was fair.48 In the EU there was a more massive corruption the old liberal
and FI MEP Raffaele Costa denounced just elected. In addition to the 25.410
employees, which it may be were all indispensable, there were 459 Committee, with
the participation of about 10,000 experts representing 15 States. They were high
bureaucrats, ‘experts’ TUs functionaries. The inquirers of the EU Commission had
already defined these Committees as the real centres for sharing loot, and main source
of irregularities.49 Nobody of the UE top levels and no member State, and relative
media, posed the problem of dealing with them. Either they were absolutely
indispensable, or they were useful place, not only for sharing lots but also for placing
clients. According to the political-State convenience either one day they will become
45
Andrea Bonanni, «Colpevole», la Commissione si dimette, [«Guilty», the Commission resigns],
Corsera, IE, 16 March 1999; Quei controlli senza controllo: e Anita la svedese scopre la vergogna,
[Those controls without controls: and the Swedish Anita discovers shame], Corsera, IE, 16 March
1999; «Frodi e nepotismo, ecco le prove», [«Frauds and nepotism, here is the evidence»], Corsera, IE,
16 March 1999; Committee of Independent Experts, FIRST REPORT on Allegations regarding Fraud,
Mismanagement, and Nepotism in the European Commission, 15 March 1999,
http://www.europarl.eu.int/experts/pdf/reporten.pdf .
46
R. I., Denunciò i corrotti, «degradato», [He denounced corrupted, «demoted»], Corsera, IE, 7 June
1999; Stefano Montefiori, «Minacciato per le mie denunce», [«Threatened since my denunciations»],
Corsera, IE, 8 June 1999.
47
Ivo Caizzi, «Gli scandali non sono finiti», [«Scandals are not finished»], Corsera, IE, 18 March
1999.
48
La Mercedes di Edith, il dentista di Tonino, [The Edith Mercedes, the Tonino dentist], Foglio, 18
March 1999, p. 3.
49
Costa: abbiamo 459 comitati, tutti utili?, [Costa: we have 459 committees, all useful?], Stampa, IE,
15 September 1999.
12
object of an international campaign against ‘corruption’, or they will always remain
useful centre for serviceable ‘honest’ clients. In fact the case was provoked from 1998
British revelations (alias the UK wanted to strike the irresistible running of the EU
toward Euro), after that the German press had censored the news on the EU
Commission ‘corruption’50. However the UK became extraordinary tolerant with a
personage fired from Italy PM, centre of 1980s and 1990s clamorous affairs
(mismanagement of the State industry, super-sale ‘privatisation’, HSR) responsible of
the devastation of the State budget, suddenly become, in 1999, European Commission
President as Prodi. Some limited press defamation, just for submitting him each time
he showed a bit of verbal autonomy, was all that the UK did against him, after having
being their godfathers to the charge. And the deputy-President of the same European
Commission Neil Kinnock became such with the responsibility of “ridding it of
mismanagement, fraud and sleaze”51, actually preferred to do nothing in this
direction52. Probably he had no moral title and/or no attitude for doing that: when
Transport Commissar in the Santer Commission he had managed despotically the
sector with the tight collaboration of the same Andrew Kahn was later formally hired
from British Airways, a company it was supposed they should have controlled53.
The same Strasbourg European Parliament was in scandalous conditions, where
nothing of the physical structure worked properly in spite of rents (28 million Euro
per semester) more than sufficient to repay in ten year the costs for building it. The
Strasbourg Parliament was actually used only 4/5 days per month because the other
one the activity deployed in the sumptuous Brussels Parliament (equally rented). The
double Parliament was of great advantage for the removal enterprises and the
indemnities of the Parliament employees and MPs. In fact documents and people
ought constantly to move from a Parliament to the other one, from France to Belgium
and from Belgium to France.54
A difference, between the French and British behaviours in front of supposed cases
of corruption, deserves to be underlined. The second half 1999 France seemed to
submit, at least in part, to justicialism. There was a Prosecutors party, which
pretended independence, alias to offer on hire on the destabilisation and private
interests’ markets, and the same (as for Italy and Russia) Swiss-path of the
investigations. The simple rumours on possible magistracy initiatives were sufficient
because the Economy, Budget, Finance and Industry brilliant Minister Strauss-Kahn
resigned. It was a typical case of spontaneous submission to the executioner, while
proclaiming innocence and even before to have been formally suspected. In addition
in parallel with the judicialist strikes to French politics, as accompanying them, there
was the WSJ accusation to Chirac and Jospin to represent a risk for NATO, because
they, irresponsibly for the WSJ, wanted an EU autonomous defence.55 Also the
judicial strikes were bipartisan. In the UK, just a bit before the Strauss-Kahn case,
Blair had recalled into his government a Peter Mandelson had previously resigned,
recognising his material corruption denounced from the press. Anyway in the UK no
50
(Marthoz 1999, p. 230/231).
Toby Helm, Kinnock given job of ridding EU of sleaze, Telegraph, IE, 10 July 1999.
52
Jon Hibbs, Kinnock: No one sacked for sleaze, Telegraph, IE, 28 January 2000.
53
Lista Bonino attacca il vice di Kinnock, [The Bonino list attacks the Kinnock’s vice], Messaggero,
IE, 4 April 2000.
54
Ivo Caizzi, Guasti e vetri sporchi: «S'indaghi sul Palazzo degli sprechi», [Outs of order and dirty
glasses: «One inquires on the wastes Palace»], Corsera, IE, 16 September 1999.
55
Washington non ama Parigi, [Washington does not love Paris], Foglio, 17 November 1999, p. 3.
51
13
magistracy permitted to inquiry Mandelson, how it would have very likely verified if
similar episode of conflict of interest had verified in countries free land for judicialist
magistracy supported from power clans. In the UK, the intervention of magistracy in
the fights inside the ruling class was not permitted.56 The claims on the magistracy
independence, formulated form British and US media and academicians were valid
just in relation to ‘inferior’ countries.
Anglophone-people-dominated institutions as the International Olympic
Committee (IOC), inevitably centre of relevant interests, did not seem examples of
transparency and honesty. The international extension of its activities made the
corruption of difficult hiding. For being chosen from IOC as seat of Olympic games,
it was necessary to bribe. Differently it was impossible to gain the competition for
hosting them. When Ernesto Galli della Loggia, commentator of the Corriere della
Sera wrote it in the summer 1997, he was denounced from the Major of Rome the
Radical-leftist Francesco Rutelli (but for the Games of 2004 Athens was chosen;
evidently it paid more than Rome). There are things everybody know but must not be
told to faithful common people. The vice-Chairman of the IOC, Marc Holder, Swiss
lawyer, confirmed it, stating that “in the last 10 years no city hosted the games
without going inside an infernal web of corruption”57. There were lobbyists disposing
of million dollars, who bribed cash the members of the IOC. Also the sport press was
currently bribed. What may not be astonishing because interests generally brides
press. It may be bribed in the person of single journalists as distributing advertising in
discriminatory way. The responsible of the IOC Press Office was the ex-head of the
sport redaction of The Times. Evidently he, and perhaps also The Time, had
competence in these practises. There was naturally not only the central corruption of
the IOC, but also the corruption of the national branches. Politicians “from Nelson
Mandela to Valter Veltroni”58 went on pilgrimage to the IOC for consensus reasons.
The same Swiss magistracy interpreted the will of the Swiss government, which did
not want to loose the presence on its territory of international organisms, and avoided
investigations and prosecutions. After the Holder denunciation, the IOC inquiry
commission, constituted from the IOC President Antonio Samaranch, was formed
with IOC components. In the words of Galli della Loggia “Practically the steal
repression was attributed to thieves.”59 The sponsors and TV rights’ businesses made
the IOC power and its acting as a corruption central.60 It does not seem the IOC case
might be considered as an exception. The entire history of the world main power and
of its State structures had always been history of all kind of businesses and corruption,
which evidently have not obstructed the achievement of considerable results. Their
qualitative differences have been at level of State and system organisation and
finalisation, and in the concern for results, not in moral differences. In part inevitably,
academicians refer on corruption identifying it with the judiciary-claimed corruption.
As consequence countries were there is no judicial custom to inquire obsessively
politicians, as there is not this custom in the UK, USA, Germany, and more generally
56
Giuliano Ferrara, Anche in Francia pm al potere, [Also in France Prosecutions in office],
Panorama, IE, 5 November 1999.
57
“«Nessuna città, negli ultimi dieci anni, ha ottenuto i Giochi senza entrare in un'infernale ragnatela di
corruzione».”
58
“da Nelson Mandela a Valter Veltroni”
59
“In pratica la repressione del furto è affidata ai ladri.”
60
Antonio Galdo, [Interview with Ernesto Galli della Loggia] 'Giochi corrotti? Quando lo dissi io...',
[‘Corrupted games? When I told it...’], Panorama, Internet Edition, 18 December 1998.
14
were politics is strong, what in other countries appears as politicians’ corruption and
party-clientelism, there it is not evidenced as such.61 For example in Ireland and in the
UK it is common activity of MPs to interest in the release of passports and/or the
certification of the identity of their electors. In Italy for some occasional and even
unsuccessful episodes of this kind, MPs to be purged have been accused and defamed
for ‘corruption’ and Clans-connections.
For Pizzorno private corruption is the violation of the procedures defined for
solving or avoiding conflicts in the relation principal62-agent63. For him corruption at
State-institutional level is the going over or alteration of the defined line between the
power given from the control of the acts of the legal authority and the power
generated from the control of the market resources. 64 Even according to this
definition, the fact for example that Fiat and USSR had paid the PCI since Fiat-USSR
investments and businesses is not evidence that the PCI intervention for favouring that
businesses was an alteration of the relations principal-agent and State-business world.
Eventually it would have been corruption in the Pizzorno definition if the PCI had
obstructed the businesses Fiat-USSR if they had not paid it. On the contrary a
Prosecutor could have stricken the ‘bribes’, the intermediary percentages, but not an
obstructed business because the interested parties had refused to pay bribes/ransoms.
Nevertheless assuming a particratic and consociative system, as the Italian one was
and remained for the entire 1990s, the joint possibility of the politicians/parties to
perpetuate themselves, of bureaucrats to make their offices profitable as they were
their own, of the private business to profit more than possible from ‘State’, with
services as pure power tool not system’s ends, the Pizzorno definitions were not
pertinent. They were eventually pertinent for another, non-existent, world. They smelt
also of purely legal formalism because, if State goal is not services provision but
honesty (an ethical principle), the struggle for honesty guarantees neither efficient
service provision nor honesty65. While the action (if a new order succeed in breaking
the conservative resistances) for service efficiency without respect for bureaucratic,
political, TUs and businesses parasitism guarantee results also on the front of legal
certainties and rights. Particratic, as other constrained Constitutional orders, are
founded on a priori differentiate accesses to State and State services, what creates a
fundamental mechanism of political inequality, where citizens acquire value
depending on the specific access he/she has to the State and public machine.66 When
these features are generalised, as they were in Italy, they do not represent a simple
alteration of State working. They create a State order pure disordered and conflicting
collection of individual and small group bureaucratic and micro-bureaucratic powers
paid with taxpayers’ money. This represents an institutional corruption, which
certainly does not absolve the individual [moral and material] ones but, in addition,
makes them institutionally and socially devastating. Point is not the Guido Carli’s
corruption of the law, the subversion of the Italy’s Constitutional principle on the
defence to introduce new expenditures and taxes in the moment of the budget
approval, and the compulsory necessity to indicate the way to cover all new
61
(Calise 1994), (della Porta 1997).
People-electors.
63
Elected politicians, and State functionaries and representatives.
64
Alessandro Pizzorno in (della Porta 1992, p. 13/14).
65
The pure pursuing of ‘honesty’ guarantees just an ethic and imaginary State assumed as perfect since
some arbitrary decision.
66
Alessandro Pizzorno in (della Porta 1992, p. 20/21).
62
15
expenditure67. The post-Bretton Woods USA have prospered also without any kind of
budget parity, and simply printing money to distribute to the world, and in that way
paying their chronic deficit.
Key point of institutional and individual corruption was in Italy the diffusion of the
practice of privatisation of the State expenditure and deficit, what could produce
quantitative development but without any investment on the future, which would have
permitted also to absorb previous excessive expenditure. On the contrary the pure
transformation of State in centre of revenue flows for micro-groups and individuals is
destructive of future possibilities of sustained development, because it is the
progressive destruction of State as functional entity for common wealth. What
actually verified in Italy, without anybody, Constitutional and ordinary magistracy
included, contrasted that.
More pertinent was the Pizzorno sociological analysis of ‘corruption’. For him, it
is linked with social mobility and it is typical of subjects breaking both with their
previous status and the defined order. It is a way for the emergence of subjects and
social, strata for breaking with their original group and to conquer positions detained
from the existing power groups. He notices how, for example, in modern USA
corruption was typical of Irish, Italians and Jews.68 Everybody is corrupted in the
struggle for power while who has power becomes honest, as defence of his/her
conquered privileges. Legality is always defence of the existent. The existent
defending his/her position has the law he/she need. He/she is always honest, and also
well connected with power network guaranteeing that all his action is legal and
‘honest’. It is the outsider to be criminalised from the traditional networks.
Nevertheless again Pizzorno referred, in part, of another world. In the post-WW2
Italy, until the 1990s, ‘corruption’ was generalised, without distinction between
modernising political parties and social strata and conservative ones. All
parliamentary party approved, knowing they were fake, the fake budgets of all the
other parties. Political consociativism implies consociative complicity and silence-law
on ‘corruption’.69 Probably the only differentiation was that of the Radical Party,
which wanted the British-US model of party financing, as of political system and
State. The moment of the break of the corruption-unanimity might have been,
eventually, 1994. Nevertheless the regime couldn’t not refuse the 1994 solution, the
Freedoms’ Pole ephemeral victory, as it couldn’t not refuse the consolidation of a
new course, of a new and stronger political system. Everybody knew that careers
depended, in the wide State, public and party-controlled sector, from parties’ and
TUs’ servilism and not from individual skills, and this reality was also referred in
academic essays of an acute but not certainly regime disconnected intelligentsia.70
Just the Lefts lost the 1994 elections, they and their supporting press, diffused the
rumour and terror that the Berlusconi government might have purged the State and
regime controlled sector from the parties’- and TUs’-protected incompetents, for
creating professionally instead of parties’-TUs’ meritocratic selection. Naturally Lefts
and supporters were from the conservative defence of the acquired rights: who/which
was regime? who/which was from the side of regime corruption? who/which had the
support of the main word powers? But overall consociative political ‘corruption’ was
67
(Carli 1993, p. 423-430).
Alessandro Pizzorno in (della Porta 1992, p. 44/45).
69
Alessandro Pizzorno in (della Porta 1992, p. 57/58).
70
(della Porta 1994).
68
16
founded on social ‘corruption’. Apart from that it is an opportunistic assertion of a
leftist author to write “(…) it was only on one field that between government and Left
opposition there was consociation: that of the public expenditure.”71 Consociation was
inevitably, as frequently underlined from Italian politicians, generalised. All
institutional charge asked nearly for everything the agreement of the correspondent
shadow position of the PCI. Nevertheless to declare, in a country were the public debt
reached 120% of the GNP, to present as nearly an aseptic and innocuous detail that
there was consociativism on the public expenditure, give the dimension of the social
and conscience corruption. The entire political system, with the active participation of
all parties, had become not only tool of people corruption, but its popular tolerability
derived exactly from the fact that Italian people pretended, nearly unanimously, this
kind of corruption of which they benefited. The necessity of each social group and
micro-group to have the illusion to have been more favoured than the other ones was
the device of the never-ending social race, which produced the expansion of the State
debt. The internal and international forces, which supported a pure regime-limited
reaction (in concrete the Lefts but also the far-Right) to that situation, wanted, even if
in condition of stabilisation of the 120% GNP State debt, the continuation of that old
destructive scheme, which was preserved compressing investment for permitting to
expand current expenditure.72
If practises of cartellised markets and cartellised politics in ‘inferior’ countries are
covered by the concept of ‘corruption’, while they are socially considerably worst
than banal corruption, the concept of ‘corruption’ is carefully avoided for example
even for the despise of people health from State-protected private interests, when it
“(…) su un solo terreno fra governo e opposizione di sinistra ci fu consociazione: il terreno della
spesa pubblica.” (Vacca 1997, p. 214).
72
Italy had arrived at WW2 with considerable industrial development, but without war economy,
thanks to the Fascism’s liberal monetary and commercial policies, and heavy State economic
intervention Italy was second, as State intervention, only to Soviet Russia, but without for example the
strong Japanese-style central planning and with families’ capitalism. Contrarily to Japan, this Italy’s
family capitalism survived to WW2. Ineffective State bureaucracies had knew relevant growth, not for
controlling economy but as its formal surrogate. Other techniques had permitted the efficiency of the
para-State industry and of the financial sector. Liberal monetary and commercial policies and elevate
economic growth continued after the war. The backward South, and the situation of a-regulation
making accepted fiscal, and labour-contribution and -rules, evasion, guaranteed low labour and fiscal
costs. With the hydrocarbons (deceptively saved from US expropriation) industry contribution to
energetic policies, they were at the bases of the rapid 1950/1960 development. As complement and
dialectical opposition to the running development, backward models of internal consensus saw
progressively growing flows of revenue to the South, also under form of isolated and costly megaindustrial initiatives, the so-called cathedrals in the desert. While both TUs and industrialists refused
all organic contribution to economic programming, and politics was incapable, or not really interested,
to impose it. The micro-groups/corporations war of everybody against everybody continued to
dominate and deepened. At half 1960s the State debt was 20% of the GNP. The recursive victories of
each micro-group/corporation against the other ones led it to 120% at end 1980s. In some way the
export-led model was perpetuated, but with industries not competitive in the vanguard sectors and with
parallel dramatic reductions in formation and research resources and investments. The 1990s accession
to Euro, and its preparatory phase, made impossible to continue to drug the system by devaluation and
public debt, while Southeast Asian countries were competitive with Italian productions. The realised
quantitative diffusion of revenue, the territorial stabilisation of the internal migratory flows verified
overall during the 1950s and 1960s, saw the request/claim of State service in line with the economic
and social improvements. (Castronovo January-March 1995). In this kind of original State-economy
socio-political formation, it was again the request that State assured efficient services without touching
the created privileges. The judicialist waves intervened in the bifurcation point, obstructing all State
reform.
71
17
verifies in ‘superior’ countries. If the Mad Cow Disease (BSE73), or the Dioxinate
Food affairs might explode, but equally in part silenced, without using the word
‘corruption’ since the wide web of the interest, when the interest are even greater,
everything become ethereal, in spite of even greater possible damages. A curious case
was the Anglophone world current practice of food genetic modification.. It may be,
or will become, an extraordinary improvement of genetic engineering, but he point is
that the effects of the results on human beings, who are their consumers, were not
sure. Who claimed uncontrollable effects on human health was opposed with the
weak argument that the problem had to be studied. Nevertheless the effects-to-bestudied products were diffused and consumed even without the consumer had the
possibility to choose between unknown effect and relatively more normal products. A
US Presidential candidate collecting 100 million dollars for his electoral campaign
was example of virtue74; the [ridiculous] critique to him was at level of past drug use.
5 million dollars of total pluriannual party-political transit on a Craxi empty account75
were example of corruptive degeneration. The effects of the submission of State
apparatuses and politics of ‘superior’ countries to the pharmaceutical and chemical
industries, as to a lot of other ones, not different from what happens probably also in
‘inferior’ countries, are object, for the sake of the ‘national’ interest and pride, of
substantial cover-ups, which avoid the categories of ‘corruption’ and/or ‘private
interests’. Certainly the industry of the affairs-production, of the political purging,
follows neither moral nor logical criteria.
For Mellini, for the working of the system, the private bribing is better than the
bribing of the political party.76 What seems to reflect a formalistic conception of
‘democracy’. Apart from that Italian political parties pretended ransoms more than
being bribed, in a real systemic pact, if in a system parties enjoy a certain material
Constitution this is ‘the best’ for a given system. The point is eventually the
definitions of best relatively to goals not to principle religiously assumed. There is not
abstract best function of a system, as there are no abstract systems. There are not
political-institutional best models, but possible bests relatively to goals.
The Corsera judicialist journalist and commentator, Giuseppe D’Avanzo, claimed,
commenting the Craxi last text (before dying) on politics’ illegal financing, that there
was a qualitative difference between the Kohl-German case and the Craxi-Italian one.
The difference would have been that in the former case there was just illegal
financing. On the contrary in the former there would have been personal enrichment
and distortion of political-economic decisions since the illegal financing funds flows.
Actually, as usual in the judicialist field, D’Avanzo did not deny that in Italy the
illegal financing and political corruption were largely common to all parties and
Statesmen, but his example referred exclusively to Craxi.77 Apart from the custom to
create the apodictically-honest and the apodictically-dishonest politicians, judicial
73
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy.
My intention here is not critical (electoral campaigns are costly everywhere; better, for a series of
reasons, publicity of financing than hidden and/or masked one), simply comparative.
75
It was an account managed from his secretary for Craxi’s political need. It was a relative official
account, not a Swiss one, which were, for all Italian parties, not necessarily less political but certainly
unofficial.
76
Le molte facce di Tangentopoli – La corruzione ha portato allo sfascio. I luoghi comuni rischiano di
fare il resto, Giustizia Giusta, 15 January 1994, (Mellini 1994, p. 79-84).
77
Giuseppe D’Avanzo, Quei conti in sospeso, [Those accounts not yet settled], Corsera, IE, 21
January 2000.
74
18
‘evidence’ is not truth and is not historical evidence. It would be necessary to create
an historical section of the Fiscal Police, with world powers, for having comparable
evidence on the subject. In Italy even the project to create files on the State
functionaries for verifying the change of wealth since their State appointments, was
accompanied from the unanimous revolt, and a rapid silence. This was evidence not
only that State jobs led to illegal enrichments, but also that the business (which
controls totalitarian media in Italy as everywhere) and media world had a private very
interest to support, by rapid silence, the pretence of non-control advanced from State
functionaries. It is possible to claim that abroad politicians and Statesmen were
without any direct and indirect advantage from being and having been politicians and
Statesmen? In there were they were exceptions, starting from the USA and the UK
where financial powers and military-police blocks were historically in office, and
politicians benefited from them. There lots of different ways for being on the payroll
of powers: the same fact of having being selected as politicians and Statesmen, even
with the same purely legal advantages if some exception prefers not to profit of the
accessory ones. But also in the Statist Europe on what the image of ‘honest’
politicians is founded? On the media image …until it is not destroyed in 24 hours?
Whether politicians and Statesmen had used legal or illegal financing also for dining,
or for a vacation, or for a costly education of their children, for buying a villa leads
nowhere. It is only further deceiving from the point of view of the structural and
political transformation made such phenomena suddenly at the centre of the people
attention.
Nevertheless the key point of the D’Avanzo arguing was the influence of the
business (and why not also other?) financing on policy choices. D’Avanzo referred to
energetic choices verified in Italy. In these cases the negative testing of hypothesis is
the best. Be a single citizen or the most powerful of the world interests, is it believable
that one finances a political party independently from the choices it assumes and it
will assume. In this game it is also easy to observe, as judicialist custom and
deception, the thing from the side of the ‘corrupted’. There is the complementary side:
that of the ‘corrupter’. But even the simple worker paying a party because it defends a
decaying and uneconomical industry, just because it is the worker’s immediate
interest is a corruption relation, and socially devastating. It is such not differently, it
may be even more depending on circumstances, from the financing of a great
enterprise to a party or a candidate because it submits in some way to it needs. Again,
since the multiplicity of relations and interactions, things and real outcomes are more
complex than partisan polemic, generally made more for the popular masses than for
achieving some understanding. There is always the claiming of a politics and policies
coming from God, alias of a supposed best, from a supposed superior optimal
rationality, without stating who/which is really such. Is the same intellectual work’s
retribution independent from the conformity of the suggestions it produces to the
interests of who/which pays for them. Is this less ‘corruption’ than any other form of
monetary relation? A debate on ‘corruption’, limited to the pure appearance of what
moral or moralism defines as such, leads nowhere. But, at the same time, it may be
interests it lead nowhere, apart from the subliminal suggestion the arguing about it
provokes in the reader and/or listener. The corrupter, included who uses its media
power for subliminally favouring parties, politicians, Statesmen, who naturally must
reward the corrupter, are usually out any evaluation. This in spite that to finance
media, foundations, intellectuals’ conventions, scholarships and universities, be
considerably more costly for private businesses than some million, or also some tens
19
million dollars, or also some hundreds, to single political parties, politicians,
Statesmen.
For what testified the DC Administrative Secretary Severino Citaristi, while he
confessed without problems all the episodes of illegal financing, was that negotiationcorruption relations there were not in the different episodes of illegal financing.78 It is
naturally also necessary to consider that the DC, not differently from the other parties,
had not only one central administrative service. According to the testimony of Paolo
Cirino Pomicino, an exuberant Statesman who recounted without any problem the
details of the illegal financing received, the DC had about 160 different administrative
services. There were local needs as currents and sub-currents needs.79 What seems
actually absolutely similar to the relations politics-businesses there are everywhere in
the world. Differences are at different level instead of a hypothetical corruption. If the
business financing of politics is corruption, each political system of the world is
corrupted.
With absolute common sense, too difficult for interested intellectuals, the exStatesman Paolo Cirino Pomicino observed that in the USA the entrepreneurs
financing Presidential campaigns became ambassadors. In Italy, the entrepreneurs
financed politics were put in prison.80
The politics costs, in Italy, according to Teodori
For Teodori, the money for the DC, the PCI, the PSI and the other minor parties
came, centrally as well as in periphery, from bribes and black funds, Soviet and US
intelligence, public and State boards, private groups and red Coops, but it was
prohibited to speak on all that81. Overall the PCI had opposed that Constitution
obliged to any form of precise regulation of political parties82. The fact that parties
were organically dependent on illegal financing, accrued the power of oligarchies
founded also on the ability to find funds83.
The 1974 law of State financing to politics, modified in 1981, attributed the duty of
control on the parties’ budgets on the Chamber’s President. The Communist Nilde
Jotti refused to impose that the political parties denounced their real estates, shares
and their debts. So the political parties budgets continued to be false and everybody
knew they were false.84 Already during the definition of the 1974 law, all
transparency had been strongly opposed from the PCI85. For what concerned the
working conditions of the MPs and Senators, in harmony with the Italian exasperate
78
(Carra 1999, p. 38).
(Carra 1999, p. 39).
80
(Geronimo 2000, p. 11).
81
(Teodori 1999, p. 15/16).
82
(Teodori 1999, p. 16).
83
(Teodori 1999, p. 17).
84
(Teodori 1999, p. 20).
85
(Teodori 1999, p. 69).
79
20
individualism, the Italian MP were richer in money than their foreign colleagues, but
poorer in working tools.86
The constitutionalist Giuseppe Maraini coined in his 1967 work the concept of
particracy. Later, in 1991, the historian Pietro Scoppola spoke of Republic of the
Parties.87 However one should ask whether these currently accepted definitions
actually masked an excess of power of the Italian MPs relatively to the other countries
ones and the reduced militarisation of the Italian parties for instance relatively to the
British ones. Consequently the point was more the systemic efficiency of the Italian
political parties, the Italian inefficient and corrupting Statism, than their supposedly
overcoming power.
For Teodori, the Italian political parties cost, until 1992, 1,000/1,500 billion liras
per year, the years without elections, and the double, 2,000/3,000 billion liras per
year, the years with some kind of elections.88 The financial sources were substantially
the same for all parties. And the PCI-PSI-PRI Coops enjoyed of 20/25% of the public
work contracts allocated at national level89. The State funding, supplied in very
different ways, was always a very reduced part of the total costs of politics 90.
Nevertheless, in 1974 the political parties declared expenses for about 600 billion
liras, in 1984 for about 500 billion liras and in 1992 for about 400 billion liras91.
From 1995 to 1998, the political parties denounced total expenses for about 150
billion liras per years92. Is it credible that suddenly, as consequence of the judicial
assaults to the Centre of the political system, politics costs had dramatically reduced?
The only PCI was supposed to have got about 150 billion liras per years as 1.5%
on the Italian exports towards USSR. The Italian exports towards USSR had been
estimated, at contemporary values, as 400,000 billion liras between 1950 and 1987, 38
years. 1.5% over 400,000 are 6,000 billions liras.93 It is more than 150 billion liras par
year.
In 1992, the PDS denounced 1,478 party functionaries for a cost of about 13
bullion liras94: in practice less than 9 million liras per functionary per year. It was too
a reduced salary for one year: it was more credible as the functionary cost per month.
Craxi evidenced that the PSI Central Direction in Rome had 160 employees, while
the only Bologna Federation of the PCI had 250 employees. The PSI employees were
paid in Emilia-Romagna from Coops, so evidently also the PCI and PRI ones. The
PCI structures cost more than the DC one and considerably more than the PSI ones.
For Craxi, until autumn 1992, the monthly cost of the PSI was 5,6 billions liras per
month reduced to 4 billions in the winter.95
86
(Teodori 1999, p. 34).
(Teodori 1999, p. 38 and 242).
88
(Teodori 1999, p. 39).
89
(Teodori 1999, p. 112).
90
(Teodori 1999, p. 142/143).
91
(Teodori 1999, p. 157).
92
(Teodori 1999, p. 157).
93
(Vespa 1999, p. 208). Vespa has forgotten one zero, in his calculations.
94
(Teodori 1999, p. 167/168).
95
(Vespa 1999, p. 152).
87
21
For Vespa, as consequence of the 1992/1993 pogrom, the PCI/PDS passed from
about 6,000 functionaries to about 600. Before it bought buildings. Later it was
obliged to sell them.96
By the law 252/1974, the same year of the creation of the State financing of
political parties, a colossal fraud at the advantage of the political parties, trade unions,
and connected organisations was realised with State funds. Until 1995, more than
45,000 party and TUs ex-functionaries were benefited by INPS pension funds.97 It
was another form of financing political parties. Another legal fraud was realised by
the law 816/1985, overall at PCI/PDS advantage. In practice, in the moment PCI/PDS
functionaries were elected as local council members, they were falsely assumed from
Coops of other private enterprises. In this way their councillor salary was doubled,
and the INPS-pension funds were paid from State.98
In practice, in Italy, the legal financing became a pure screen for covering the
illegal one to the large masses, which however perfectly knew that politics financed
illegally. What realised was only a great hypocrisy, which finally surrendered the
central part of the political system to subversive fractions of magistracy. The
judicialist offensive and purge did not change the mechanisms of State financing.
State financing was attributed to all “parties” of al least two MPs (even only EMP,
when this was indispensable for financing some group had remained without
representation in the Italian Parliament). And, what is worst, State financing was
attributed independently from any private financing: an incentive to illegal financing
and/or not looking for private financing.
The media-academic deception on the ‘heroic’ magistrates-executioners
The objection that magistrates-heroes, alias the executioners of the 1990s Italian
coups, should not be objects of unprejudiced analysis99 reflected only the cover the
Anglophone academicians and media have given not only to the 1990s subversion but
also to its protagonists. The punctual 1999 The Telegraph campaign against the Prodi
then EU Commission President showed that Italian reality was well known, the
‘heroes’ corruption and personal interests well clear, even the direct access to original
sources and documents not a problem for Anglophone journalists and scholars, when
they national interest imposed initiative. If the Prodi not any more Lefts’ cover and
Berlusconi opponent might be discharged from the previous ‘protection’ because it
was necessary to strike the EU, the role of servile judges should still be saved from
analysis and information. That the practice of servile-to-power social sciences, and
the practice of power-functional construction of reality, was eventually generalised
does not absolve that relative to the present points.
96
(Vespa 1997, p. 281).
(Teodori 1999, p. 124-126).
98
(Teodori 1999, p. 127/128).
99
This kind of objection/obstruction is readable in the absence of the research, and on the deceptive
one later quoted. It is also directly verifiable by the Anglophone academic clans of amateurs of Italian
questions. I verified it directly. Nevertheless the analysis of the published and non-published material
on the point object of this paragraph is more than sufficient.
97
22
Methodologically, as an action claimed as against ‘corruption’ may not be a priori
assumed as such at analytic level, to assume as uncorrupted its protagonists reflects
really impossible, and impossibly falsely-naïve, assumptions. If these assumptions
were used in the key cases of the Milan (the Lefts’ and far-Right protectors and
promoters) and Palermo (the winning, and anti-CAF, Clans protectors and
promoters100) POs, that may not have been casual. There was either incompetence or
corruption, or both, of who covered the running trials. Even the information on the
personal corruption of Di Pietro, an interesting case of judicially-innocent [until the
end of the 1990s] corrupted Prosecutor, and on the Carabinieri-denounced Clans
collaboration of the Palermo Prosecutor Lo Forte and others, were carefully removed
from what became a story-building more than real analysis. The main Craxi liquidator
and the main Andreotti paralyser were publicly showed, thanks to this mediaacademic protection, as object of international powers concern and support, as they
had been de facto the most precious of their agents.
If in Milan Di Pietro and others were suddenly activated for the developed
campaign, in Palermo the inquiry against Andreotti, the hard-liner Lo Forte led,
passed through the elimination of the anti-Clans and of the moderate magistrates of
the PO and the strikes against their collaborators in the police, Intelligence, military
apparatuses. Not only current information but also what inevitably present in older
and more specialised researches was removed from the 1990s Italian politological
analyses. The omission of the historical link, for example, between Sicilian (and
American-Sicilian) Clans and US government101, key point in the analysis of the
Italian 1990s, proceeded through various passages. The role had had criminality
(British, Irish, Jew, South-Italian), in the building of the contemporary USA was
systematically omitted. Specifically the role and the US State connections with the
American-Sicilian-Neapolitan Clans already before WW2, and even more during it,
were omitted. The American-Sicilian-Neapolitan Clans were anti-fascist collaborator
of the US State on the US territory against the infiltration of German and Italian
agents through the US ports American-Sicilian-Neapolitan Clans controlled. In 19431945 the American-Sicilian-Neapolitan Clans were anti-fascist collaborator of the
US-British occupation of Italy, and its anti-fascist and anti-communist collaborator at
social and political level for a criminal model of US-British control of the South
Italy102, and through it of blackmail on the entire Country. Not that the practice was
original and new. Already the British-wanted and -promoted destruction of the
Southern Kingdom in 1860 by irregular techniques, and its incorporation in the
Piedmont Kingdom, realised, overall in Sicily, thanks to pre-defined links with the
local barons and Clans powers. That the US State and politics links with South-Italian
Clans continued well after WW2 was showed for example from the connections
relative to the Cuban question and to the same Kennedys political activity and events.
Clans are inevitably entities live thanks to official power, as its supporter and
100
The assertion may even be assumed as tautological, in first approximation, if one prefers. This is a
field where, when the causes of the phenomenon are not removed, to strike somebody or some Clans
favours inevitably other people and other Clans.
101
Also the British State, already at the time of the Garibaldi expedition, had always had tight
connection with Sicily.
102
The Office for Strategic Services (OSS), for the Sicily occupation, was linked with the Mafia of
Lucky Luciano. During the occupation Mafia-men was installed everywhere, also as mayors. (Gurwin
1983, p. 184).
23
supported. Episodes in previous chapter referred show how their and military
mobilisation on the Italian territory covered all the phase of the destabilisingstabilisation. And there is no evidence that these links were ever broken. On the
contrary there was evidence that also the new drug businesses, also in the 1980s, saw
the co-interests of the American-Sicilian-Neapolitan Clans and State apparatuses, the
US one included103. What was inevitable, being these businesses connected with those
of arms (inevitable State-connected), which interested both the USA and traffic lines
passing through the Mediterranean area. The same magistracy and political clans (of
the Lefts overall) were charged of the operation, from the South, against Andreotti
and later against Berlusconi, were guarantee of these other businesses. The absolute
stereotype of ‘heroic’ magistrates should be preserved at 100%. Overall because the
political operations in the South and from the South were yet developing during the
1990s, or anyway they continued to be opened in 1999.
In Milan Di Pietro had finished his dirty work of CAF eliminator in 1994 with his
resignation, just a bit before the Berlusconi government end. Even if no real analysis
and report on news concerning him there ever was, some limited referral to his
judicial problem, eventually subliminally presenting him as object of some revenge,
was possible after 1994, without risking to enlighten, on what he did between 1992
and 1994. The CAF had been yet liquidated, and the operation against Berlusconi
continued strong, but also with even stronger resistance, from the remained
Prosecutors of the Pool.
The Milan PSI connection of Di Pietro, and his participation to the tricked public
selection of the Milan Chief of the Communal Police, and also connected business of
money104, were know already in 1992. In 1993 the name of Di Pietro as police excommissar started to emerge, not in Milan but in Florence, in relation to an affair, the
so-called Milan car-parking. It was a Sicilian Clans logistic structure, operating since
long time and supposedly covered from State apparatuses and from the same Di Pietro
as police commissar. There were also connections between this Sicilian Clans logistic
centre and the Sicilian bomb-blast against Falcone. The affair was rapidly suppressed.
The Florence investigation was blocked. The Florence investigators had had the
guiltiness to have discovered what the Milan police and magistracy had not
discovered. The dossier passed to Milan, where naturally nobody inquired Di Pietro
possible responsibilities. That Di Pietro used the cellular-phone ‘borrowed’ from one
of his defendants, the entrepreneur Antonio D’Adamo, was already published in the
Catholic weekly Il Sabato, in the summer 1993. Also his Chief Borrelli knew it and
accepted, so he declared, the Di Pietro justification that D‘Adamo had given it to the
Di Pietro wife, a layer.105 The official and direct accusations to Di Pietro of personal
corruption were periodically known. At least from 30 September 1994, it was known
that he was investigated from the Brescia prosecution Office about episode of
personal corruption when Prosecutor106. It was public that just a telephone taping
103
(Cipriani 1998b).
Di Pietro had asked to some entrepreneurs to pay relevant play-losses of the Chief of the Communal
Police he had selected in an already PSI-decided ‘selection’. Evidently in the Di Pietro world was
current, for a magistrate, to be selector in a tricked selection, and later to ask relevant sum of money, as
gift for paying play-losses of a friend. But also for the other militant Prosecutors and heads of the
Milan PO it was normal that another Prosecutor acted in such a way.
105
(Andreoli 1998, p. 179).
106
(Burnett 1998, p. 286).
104
24
reported the Pierfrancesco Pacini Battaglia assertion that he had paid was going out
from clean hands, Di Pietro resigned as Public Work Minister107 of the Prodi
government in the autumn108 1996109. Nevertheless it was already from the second
half of December 1995 that Di Pietro was pursued by 7 different request of the
Brescia PO to try him. 5 of them were for concussion.110 On the other side the
connection between very profitable and relevant business and the partisan action, or
the partisan omitted action, of the Milan PO was so systematic, at least since the
1980s, that the assumption of its honesty and legality may no be made. If not carefully
demonstrated for all its single action and for all its members, it would be correct, from
a heuristic point of view, the opposite assumption. The Milan PO connections with
the FBI and DEA should reinforce this methodological mistrust.
These and other elements relative to the Di Pietro nonchalance and corruption were
frequently111 presented, in academic works, precisely in yearly summaries, as
(D'Alimonte 1997), collections of essays destined, in the intentions, to be consulted
from further faithful academic researchers, in the following way. “Minister Di Pietro
resign from government amid continuing accusations from the Guardia di Finanza
and the public prosecutor of Brescia.”112 The deception is in the omission of the
specification that the accusations were for corruption. The CAF and Berlusconi
government liquidator should not be associated with corruption if not as heroic
fighter. The investigation on the Di Pietro corruption, or supposed such, are “the
investigations into his affairs conducted from the GICO of the Florence Guardia di
Finanza”113. Here the language is Clans-style: “his affairs”, as he had been disturbed
in relation to some very personal and intimate question. Investigations on Di Pietro
corruption were simple investigations on his private businesses. Alias, there was in the
author the clear perception that Di Pietro and the other political magistracy were
above all current law and criteria. Certainly Di Pietro might also be innocent when the
107
18 May 1996 - 21 November 1996.
They taping were public since 14 November 1996; (D'Alimonte 1997, p. 14).
109
(Andreoli 1998, p. 183/184).
110
(Negri 1996, p. 321).
111
Other authors, whatever their legitimate comment and analysis, reported the essence of the facts
without any problem, as D. Nelken, in (Caciagli 1996, p. 196). Although without posing too many
questions about the privileged treatment reserved to Di Pietro, and the meaning that such a personage
had led a political cleansing. But the prevalent line, for the large majority of the authors was
censorship.
Di Pietro was personage politically, and also psychologically, highly mobile. Personally intimately a
far-Rightist, he would have liked to occupy the space already occupied from Berlusconi, in spite that
Berlusconi occupied the liberal-Centre. But he would have been competitive also in relation to the
Lefts electorate, in particularly that of the ex-PCI, where far-Rightist-populist paradigms and personal
styles had always been popular, also if with different designation. In particularly Di Pietro had been
‘pumped’ also within the Lefts for the entire phase of anti-CAF and anti-Berlusconi action. Before Di
Pietro became, in November 1997, independent-PDS Senator different options were theoretically
opened, or perceived as opened for him. It may be that the information on Di Pietro, when it was a bit
freer, it was let to pass, instead of suppressed, as in the case now quoted, according to some contingent
political evaluation. This hypothesis is confirmed from the weird discourses of Nelken, some pages
later (D. Nelken in (Caciagli 1996, p. 201)) on the needed “formal conclusion” of the Milan campaign.
It was an illusion present at that time (1995/1996), in PDS fractions had not clear that a party having
failed the goal of acquiring a mass influence and roots, similar to that of the old DC, could become a
bastard and shrunk form of the old DC only by the judicialist action.
112
(D'Alimonte 1997, p. 14).
113
Roberto D’Alimonte and David Nelken, in (D'Alimonte 1997, p. 27). D’Alimonte was Professor in
Florence, Italy, Nelken in Macerata (Italy) and Cardiff (Wales, UK); (D'Alimonte 1997, p. 275).
108
25
piece was written, as were judicially innocent the majority of the politicians he
persecuted and who did not enjoy any innocence presumption from media and
academic milieus. On the contrary people conditioned from such propaganda devices
was never informed about the politicians acquittals. But other academic production
avoided even any slight reference to the investigations on Di Pietro. It is the case of
(Bufacchi 1998). Other material limited to slight hints. At least, in the Chronology of
(Caciagli 1996), it is clearly written that: “Antonio Di Pietro, being investigated for
corruption and abuse of office, is interrogated for seven hours by prosecutors
Salamone and Bonfigli.”114 There is also some other limited factual information,
about judicial appointments. But that he took money and goods during 1992/1993, not
only eventually before and after, become an aseptic “having improperly served
personal interests while in office in a period that predated Tangentopoli (…)”115.
Million dollars pretended from defendants are chaste “personal interests”. The dogma
of the pure fighter might not be broken, even if absolutely unessential in a laic, nontotalitarian, approach to reality. That everything was a fiction for other purposes is
indirectly suggested from certain authors feeling the need to propose senseless and
deceptive conclusions of the 1990s pogrom. “If Tangentopoli is to be ended formally
it will require some such solution, packaged in a way that satisfies certain narrative
requirements which allow it to be ‘rhetorically managed’. The climax may arrive if
Berlusconi is convicted in a new show trial (‘I fought the law116 and the law won.’).
Alternatively, the charges against Di Pietro may be used to show that no one, not even
the most admired judge, has ‘Clean hands.’ Either result could make easier to proceed
to a formal conclusion.”117 Actually if a judicial action had not been a special court
with some informal superior power, it would not be understandable why a theatrical
conclusion should be necessary? The theatrical shows Nuremberg style are
understandable in a totalitarian logic, while they are not in a laic one. Equally it
would not be understandable what would have been the difference, if Di Pietro, as
typical in Italy and not only there, profited personally from his police and judicial
position. And it would not be understandable why the alternative should be the
judicial crucifixion-show of an entrepreneur-politician too American for being liked
from the USA and UK, and their organic intellectuals, and their ‘law’. The “formal
conclusion” is typical of coups and dirty operations, not of a normal judicial action.
Nelken knew what happened, without being allowed to tell it, if he wanted to continue
to enjoy the possibility to be recognised Italian ‘specialist’ from the Anglophone clans
of Italian amateurs and the relative academic position. The political solution was
always refused in Italy from liberal and libertarian forces, and from the same purged
components, while it was frequently suggested from beneficiaries’ Lefts. Apart from
that reality never follows rational or legal paths, and that it is not duty of analysis to
propose solution before having analysed reality in an unprejudiced way. Eventually
the only legally fair solution to the political and criminal use of magistracy offices is
the judicial one, with the application of the same law to everybody and with the
charge and prosecution of magistrates having realised discriminatory politico-judicial
actions. This is not certainly unrealistic in a context where the judicial coups clashed
against relevant opposition, which collapse all attempts of further widespread of
114
(Caciagli 1996, p. 22).
M. Caciagli and D. I. Kertzer in (Caciagli 1996, p. 37).
116
The referred law seems to be the US and British need to have in office, in their submitted countries,
only their disciplined servants. There was no news, for the entire 1990s, that Berlusconi had ‘fought’
any other law.
117
D. Nelken in (Caciagli 1996, p. 201).
115
26
judicialist actions and of stabilisation of a judicialist order. In spite of the judicialistLefts attempts, a McCarthyism ban of all oppositions to a pre-defined system never
consolidated. Only of limited form realised for a very limited period. The action was
not sufficient strong and the system had not any perspective of diffused development
and wealth, or other one, to offer as trade off for the desired passive submission of
citizens to a certain country politico-societal model.
On the other side the academic international censorship should be generalised. The
1995 golden flat affair, essential for defining who profited of the coups and who
political magistracy had saved, should equally removed from analysis. The Byzantine
practice that all entire regime nomenclature, starting from the PDS leaders D’Alema
and Veltroni, had very direct and personal interests in bureaucratic corruption and
abuses was further denounced for example from Il Giornale in August 1995118. What
Il Giornale documented was that nearly all the entire regime nomenclature, exactly
that the ‘heroic’ magistrates had saved, enjoyed very luxurious flats and houses, at
very cheap rents, from public boards. The Il Giornale offices in Rome were rapidly
object of a night robbery, which subtracted only the housing-lists relative to the
affairs. The thieves were naturally never discovered. One cannot discover and pursue
oneself. Ernesto Galli della Loggia, in the Corsera of 2 September 1995, commenting
the privileges of the oligarchy, underlined the feeling of fastidiousness shown in that
occasion from the unmasked leaders of the ‘new Italy’ of the saved old particracy and
Trade Unioncracy119. Nobody120 let the privileged flats, and the rents were not
brought to market value. At the end of the 1990s, for example, the CISL ex-leader,
DC ex-politician Vito Scalia, ex-Minister and ex-manager, continued to live in a
INAIL121 224 square meters flat, in the centre of Rome at 800,000 liras per month (the
commercial rent would have been at least 5,500,000). The dismissal of the INAIL
flats would have permitted the tenants to buy them with a discount of at least 30%. 122
Scalia was never object of political purge. The favourable (for the tenants) dismissal,
pushed from the 1999 Labour new-Minister had the function to favour overall the
regime nomenclature (PCI/PDS, DC/PPI, TUs), which enjoyed the better flats, and
their clients123.
The International silence, for the entire 1990s, on the Palermo side of the dirty
gowns and dirty politics was more meaningful. If Di Pietro had already realised his
assigned work, the Palermo PO action was running. Andreotti, yet appreciated
Senator, and Dell’Utri-Berlusconi, not eliminated but solidly in politics, were under
the massive cares of the micro-fraction of the Palermo deputy-Chief Prosecutor Lo
118
(Burnett 1998, p. 60).
(Negri 1996, p. 222/223). In Italy about 100,000 Trade Union functionary and militants participate
to State and public boards; (Galli 1994, p. 64/65).
120
Only Mastella, at that time of the CCD (a DC fraction passed with the Freedoms’ Pole) and later of
the new Lefts-Right of D’Alema, and D’Alema, just before becoming PM, let the privileged flats;
Affittopoli, [Rent-city], Stampa, IE, 1 September 1999.
121
A State Institute of insurance against industrial accidents.
122
Fabrizio Roncone, Scalia, appartamento mozzafiato in Piazza di Spagna, [Scalia, amazing flat in
Piazza di Spagna], Corsera, IE, 29 August 1999.
Actually while Inail was dismissing at discounted price, it was building at over prices (since
investigated bribes for government parties) flats for 650 billion liras; (L’Inail si fa le case: paga il
Giubileo, [Inail builds houses: Jubilee pays], Giorno, 14 September 1999, p. 1). The chain over-paid
building, discounted dismissal, is a never-ending chain.
123
E’ bufera sugli immobili degli enti. Nel mirino alti burocrati e Parlamentari, [It is storm on boards’
real estate. Targeted high bureaucrats and MPs], Stampa, IE, 30 August 1999.
119
27
Forte, who should have more solid covers than his formal Chief Caselli. The Palermo
deputy-Chief Prosecutor Lo Forte was apparently the right arm of Caselli, and
publicly supported from him, also in this circumstance now examined. Lo Forte was
accused from the Carabinieri-ROS, and from ROS militaries, who ridiculed him also
in court, of having immediately passed to Palermo Clans, in February 1991, decisive
ROS investigation, about Clans-Public Works. Naturally the Carabiniere who
ridiculed Lo Forte in a tribunal, and accused him of having been a Clans-collaborator,
was himself accused from tens of Clans-men and -bosses justice collaborators of
having been a Clans-agent, but strangely he was not arrested in spite that he asked
defiantly it. The Caltanisetta PO acquitted Lo Forte in the early 1999, but practically
writing that it did it as a pure courtesy. The same PO acquitted, not as courtesy, a
ROS Carabinieri Captain had accused Lo Forte with founded evidence. But the
Caltanisetta GIP did not accept the friendly acquittal of Lo Forte and ordered the
prosecution of the investigations against him, about a detailed and long series of very
doubtful, for Lo Forte, points. Lo Forte was the accuser, in court, of Andreotti,
charged of Sicilian Clans schizophrenic-collaboration124, because overall of old DC
relations with losing Mafia fractions. Lo Forte was also one of the protagonist of the
‘discovery’, thanks to unprovable, and also improbable, statements of Mafia-bosses
and -men become justice collaborators, of historical Clans connection and also of a
end 1998-early 1999 ‘destabilising conspiracy’ of the MP Dell’Utri, alias Berlusconi,
the real Prosecutors target. The purpose would have been the ‘destabilisation’ of
justice collaborators, and of the Palermo PO, alias ‘democracy’. Lo Forte-Caselli had
the same conditioned reflexes of States tautologically self-defining as democracy.
Also in connection with the Andreotti trial, the same Lo Forte, and the Palermo PO,
discovered vast and articulated conspiracy, for trying overcoming the presence of at
least a single objective element of evidence against Andreotti125. Actually the
conspiracies’ discoverer Lo Forte, apart from the specific episode, the supposed
passage, with other magistrates, of very precious police material to Clans’ winning
fraction, was accused de facto of having continued to obstruct the investigations on
Clans-Public Works. The obstruction in fact verified for the entire 1990s, and if the
Chief-Prosecutor came from the far Turin, Lo Forte was already in Palermo, was
Sicilian and well knew the Sicilian reality. Nevertheless if the obstructed anti-Clanspublic works businesses investigation, this was eventually coherent with the supposed
affair of the Clans collaboration exactly on the key question of the public works.
Sicilian Clans, apart from US connections, were also, since the 1980s, in good
relations with the PCI/PDS firms operating in the public works’ sector. Specifically
the Clans fraction of Provenzano, a bosses’ boss wanted from May 1963, was
pluralistic (pro DC and PCI), contrarily to a more sectarian Riina, arrested, since
Carabinieri-ROS autonomous investigations, on 15 January 1993, eventually
discharged from other Clans fraction. The magistrates Falcone and Borsellino were
killed, in part, also for their interest in the field of the relation Clans-public works,
apart from their obstruction relatively to the political trials the alliance between the
judicialist block and Clans was pressed to start. And complicity inside the Palermo
PO in relation to their killings were always publicly claimed from the CarabinieriROS. Caselli and Lo Forte never were object of bomb blasts or other Clans attacks, or
planned attacks. They produced more than one thousand justice collaborators and
claimed to led an heroic anti-Clans war, while both Falcone and Borsellino were two
124
Mafia as current leader but not as Statesman.
Processo Andreotti: ora inchiesta su ''falsi e depistaggi'', [Andreotti process: now inquiry on ''fakes
and deceptions''], ANSA, 8 April 1999, 18:16.
125
28
isolated men followed from the same contempt of the judicialist magistrates and
clans. Either Caselli and Lo Forte were more astute or they enjoyed superior, not
necessarily greater, protection.
Italian newspapers reported these news, as investigators’, POs’ and other judicial
evidence, or supposed such. Even Internet sites reported later specific (on ClansPublic Works, included PCI/PDS firms and political connections) judicial evidence,
obstructed but equally produced from some non-militant Palermo Prosecutors. For the
direction of the PO was always useful, in the permanent game of the political
pressures and blackmails, to have some limited inquiry opened also on the political
friends. The censorship of main foreign powers’ media and academic networks about
all this information from Palermo was equally total, even more total than that on Di
Pietro and Co., and on the corruption and private interests of the saved regime
nomenclature. What was meaningful. Nobody producing ‘researches’ about Italy ever
asked evidence that Senator Andreotti and MP Berlusconi were the heads of obscure
networks being these assertions reputed as self-demonstrating. They were simply
stated from the different choruses, reporting the unfounded production of propaganda
from certain POs. But on the contrary the cover-up about the militant magistracy
cover given to Clans, PCI/PDS-Clans connections126, the details of too many specific
episodes, was total. Conjectural ‘evidence’ used for political trials was preferred, as
‘heuristic’ material, to more founded elements, about what happened in the 1990s.
The argument that Lo Forte, as other militant Prosecutors, were never sentenced, until
the end of the 1990s’ could not be claimed as justification for the cover-up. Also
Churchill and Hitler were never sentenced (the latter was sentenced but in relation to
an attempted coup d’État in the early 1920, a typical political crime), but this does not
avoid their political/historical evaluation, also about supposed criminal episodes and
events. For the Italian law and Constitution, also Andreotti and Berlusconi had their
personal record immaculate until the end 1990s, and very likely until their death. No
one of them was ever accused to have passed dossiers of investigations on Clans to
the same Clans, or of collaborations for the killings of dangerous magistrates, or of
having pretended relevant sums of money from anybody. Nevertheless, this was the
analytic level of the Anglophone production from academic clans of Italy’s amateurs,
traditionally judicialist supporters and gaol party127, on Andreotti. “However,
whatever the outcome of the trial, there still remains his a political and moral
responsibility for the misdeeds of the post-war decade. The corrupt clientelist system
at the basis of the Italian politics (…) had him at his core as one of it principal
artifices.”128 Anyway Andreotti, who has a macabre sense of humour, had been nonrefused supporter, as Senator, of all the coups and Lefts’ governments of the 1990s.
He was also praised from the entire political world, also from the parties obliged to
support the judges’ party, in occasion of its 80 years, on 14 January 1999. Andreotti
suffered only, in that occasion, a little of coldness from the liberal Centre and CentreRight. Was the pro-Andreotti fervour common solidarity among Clans-bosses
Which had nothing of scandalous for a party owning a vast enterprises’ galaxy, and wanting to work
also in the sectors of the public works and also in the South.
127
A non-judicialist Milan Substitute General Prosecutor, Francesco Maisto, evidenced how the
Dipietrism was the diffused, in certain milieus, desire of inquiries without evidence and the casual
dispensation of prison-sentences. All this was claimed as resolving of criminality and corruption, while
it actually resolved nothing. Actually such enquiries terminated generally by acquittals. («Una sciagura
il dipietrismo», [«Dipietrism, a calamity»], Stampa, IE, 26 August 1999). The Allum point of view is a
very good example of focused Dipietrism.
128
Allum, in (D'Alimonte 1997, p. 230).
126
29
(according to Palermo magistrates’ theorems) and among corruption cores (according
to the Allum theorems)?
The lag between the Anglophone academic, and connected interests, deception,
and the perception and behaviours of Italian political and social actors was radical.
The traditional political opponents of Andreotti, the radical leader Marco Pannella,
stigmatised the 8 April 1999 Palermo Prosecutors’ (represented from Lo Forte and
Scarpinato) request to condemn Andreotti to 15 years prison. For Pannella, the
Palermo Prosecution Office, or part of it, which, for him, accused Andreotti of
nothing and of everything, and the judges’ party, which, for him, used Kickback-city
for regime goals, were a criminal association for subverting the democratic and
Constitutional order.129 There was no news Pannella, who was not covert from any
Parliamentary immunity at that time, was charged or arrested since his assertions.
Different politicians’ comments, from the ex-communist Sicilian leaders Macaluso130
to the LN leader, the Lombard Maroni131, were that if magistrates had ever proved
anything of what they had claimed for years, they should have asked the lifedetention. In fact for what they claimed in the 23 (twenty three!) days’ final speech
they needed for justifying the sentence request, the 15 years prison they asked were
really a miserable request. For the Prosecutor Scarpinato, Andreotti realised the Clans
sovereignty over the Italian State, which became an illegal State, lead from a politicalClans power where democracy was killed132. Scarpinato was the Prosecutor who,
since the direct testimony against him of the Carabinieri-ROS133, archived key
investigation on Clans. He did that only because the other accuser of Andreotti,
Prosecutor Lo Forte, insistently asked him for it. The discoverer of the Andreotti
conspiracy against ‘democracy’ did not charge Lo Forte with Clans complicity for the
favour he was asking him134. This was the morality of who persecuted the NATOsceptic Andreotti, as connected with a criminal association, Sicilian Clans, actually
very USA-rooted. Even comic actors showed more analytic acumen than the
‘analyses’ in academic literature. About the key, for Prosecutors, but unproved, kiss
of Andreotti to Riina, only actual ‘proof’ of the entire trial, they commented that it
was not sure the two ever had met, but certainly they had kissed. Which is the precise
definition of the philosophy of political trials. Actually the same Riina was a Clansboss sold from more power- and USA-connected Clans fractions not really
investigated in the 1990s. If the Caselli Office could never prove the historical and
key kiss, Andreotti could prove the Caselli personal compromising. It was a self and
public proof production, again censored from foreign information and academic
literature. Andreotti, using his usual macabre sense of humour, the first day of his
trial, in Palermo, approached Caselli and held out his hand. Caselli shake the hand of
the diabolic Beelzebub135. Which is certainly sure evidence of something, if on one
129
Processo Andreotti: Pannella, subito referendum sui magistrati, [Andreotti process: Pannella,
immediate referendum on magistrates], ANSA, 8 April 1999 13:56.
130
As PCI leader he was strongly opposed from the KGB; M. Antonietta Calabrò, Nomi e fatti, tutte le
«verità» di Mitrokhin, [Names and facts, all the Mitrokhin’s «truths»], Corsera, IE, 12 October 1999.
131
See different ANSA dispatches on 8 April 1999.
Felice Cavallaro, «Condannate Andreotti a 15 anni», [«Condemn Andreotti to 15 years»], Corsera, IE,
9 April 1999.
133
He revealed to the ROS Captain De Donno his crime.
134
See the early February 1999 Corsera, but also, meaningfully censored and/or confused in the
relating of the news, other Italian newspapers (specifically the De Benedetti’s and Agnellis’ ones),
referenced below, in a more specific part.
135
It was a used synonym for Andreotti.
30
non-proved kiss was founded the mega-prosecution against Andreotti. Actually there
was also a Perugia branch of the mega-prosecution-persecution of Andreotti. There, at
end April 1999, in perfect synchrony with the Palermo trial, an equally a little before
the 1999 Presidential elections, the life-prison for Andreotti was requested for
homicide. The whole persecution against Andreotti, a key moment of the 1990s
coups, will be object of specific and more precise analysis below. Anyway the Pope,
on 2 May 1999, a few days later the second request of sentence against Andreotti, that
for homicide, suddenly called, met and blessed Andreotti in front of 300,000 people
and TV-world-broadcast136. It was not interpreted, for the Italian media, as the
blessing of a sinner. It is also for avoiding this kind of inconvenient that it is in the
nature of stronger and more totalitarian State formations that there political purges be
more radical and resolving, and there only State Churches (UK-style) and fragmented
and State non-interfering cults (US-style) are tolerated. Anyway this is different
discourse only indirectly pertinent (and more problematic than it might appear), with
the case of a country in conditions of limited sovereignty, consequently inevitably
with weak State and non-totalitarian politico-social control devices. Even from the
point of view of the people perception, different signals showed unequivocally as, at
the end of the 1990s, the ‘heroic’ and ‘reputed’ political magistrates, objects of world
supports, were totally disreputed in Italy137.
Literary images are always more suggestive than careful factual and theoretical
analysis. More they are logically disconnected, but sounding, more they are
subliminally convincing. It is easy to write: “Malgré ces contributions publiques
généreuses, malgré les contributions privées officielles, une corruption systématiques
aux fins de lever des ressources supplémentaires s’est développé en Italie. Dans un
climat délétère de décadence politique et constitutionnelle, la magistrature italienne a
engagé le feu contre la corruption, mettant en lumière des pratiques délictueuses
d’une ampleur insoupçonné.”138 [“Despite these public generous contributions,
despite the private officials contributions, a systematic corruption developed in Italy.
In a deleterious climate of political and Constitutional decadence, Italian magistracy
opened fire against corruption, enlightening unsupposedly diffused criminal
practices.”]. In deception the rhetoric argument of the kind ‘we didn’t know’, ‘we
didn’t suspect’, ‘it is unbelievable’, are always touching, overall if pronounced with
the right tune of voice, or if written inside the adequate frame. Deception must always
be inside a wider deceptive climate and/or arguing. What is the rule to define a State
contribution is ‘generous’? Mény (the quoted author) referred, as example, to 83
billion liras received from the Italian parties in 1984. He does not specify, but these
83 billion liras were, in that year, 34% of the political parties expenditure139.
Generous or not, they were largely insufficient. The word “generous” he used was
functional to emphasise the ‘crime’. However the Mény detective story was possible
only because he avoided rational questioning and factual analysis. The fact that firms
were/are obliged, in Italy (but also in France, as emerged from sporadic enquiries),
from political parties, to pay the entire political system as a whole, more than the
single party, was not corruption. The single may eventually profit (a lot of funds
136
Gian Antonio Stella, Quel piccolissimo gesto, [That very small gesture], Corsera, IE, 3 May 1999;
Alessandra Arachi, E il Papa benedice Andreotti, [And the Pope blesses Andreotti], Corsera, IE, 3
May 1999.
137
Indro Montanelli, Resurrezione di belzebù, [Beelzebub resurrection], Corsera, IE, 25 August 1999.
138
(Mény 1993, p. 179).
139
(Teodori 1999, p. 270).
31
disappeared during the journey from firms to politics!), but the politician, and overall
politics (and TUs), was not corrupted. The question was radically different, as the
rhetorical arguing on “decadence” was radically different. Mined and destroyed a
building it is perhaps easy, for the same author of the achievement, to sit down on the
ruins and to exclaim: “Oh, what a destruction!”. And why if there was so diffused
corruption of politics, and legitimately not only of politics in this kind of frame,
“magistracy” (generally absolutely blind on what everybody knew, apart from
politically rooted initiatives) did not profit of that? And why some Prosecutors
suddenly activated? Did they suddenly find who paid more (in one form and/or in
another one)? The continuation of his work will present elements (or further elements,
in certain cases) on these questions, while the students of the university manual of the
Paris Professor Mény will be introduced to the comparative politics mysteries by his
apparently sounding tales: political and institutional fights as pure heroes versus dirty
criminals140.
140
The manual is however valuable when it limits to present political and institutional information.
32
The world police-judicial space as Anglophone new domination tool
The 1989 Anglophone transition to the attempted direct [police-judicial] world
domination141
During the 1990s, goal and practical action of the international powers was the
dissolution of all point of national resistance to the Anglophone direct domination,
what was indispensable since the 1989 collapse (and this was the real failure of the
post-WW2 US-British empire) of the cold war game. The Italian representatives of
the Anglophone and Jew finance and powers pressed, in Italy, at first against all
opposition to their Lefts puppets, later even on the same Lefts towards their further
dissolution in direction of ‘technicians’ (overall financial-economic groups
consultants and flankers) governments, ‘supranational’ entities domination, of mediabuilt personalities direct expression of financial and economic powers. In parallel,
pressure developed on Vatican because it abandoned the too autonomous Wojtyłacourse. For instance, emblematically, in the 10 January 2000 Repubblica, by a double
shot of two [powers’] representative commentators, the PDS/DS dissolution was
actually requested for creating a broader and fuzzy movement more easily
controllable142, while the newspaper associated to the German Bishops request that
Wojtyła resigned143.
Even a practically prostituted ex-PCI was reputed as an obstacle, after that the
powers had submitted it had blocked it ideological modernisation, while the resistance
centre the Wojtyła Vatican represented, relatively to an Anglophone-dominated world
space, was perceived as intolerable and opposite to the mythologies and practices of
the world aspiring owners. This action of world direct take-over, already well visible
in the 1980s, in parallel with the socialist camp decline, developed relatively to Italy,
as, without substantial difference, relatively, to the other Western and Eastern Europe
countries, as to the entire world.
For achieving this wished direct domination there was the essential use of
international organisations for achieving the goal of legal and police world, and
world-areas spaces, outside national control, but subordinated to USA’s Police Corps
as the FBI and the DEA. From the Italian side, the most hardliner judicialist
components were in first line, relatively to the participation to this kind of
international institutions, the relative conferences and conventions, and the pressure
on national institutions for the subscription, and also the substantial submission, to the
relative international agreements. For example Professor Pino Arlacchi (PCI/PDS
judicialist fraction politician, Interior Ministry consultant, UN high functionary), the
Paolo Foschini, Un piano dell’Onu contro la corruzione, [A UN plan against corruption], Corsera,
IE, 20 November 1999; Paolo Biondani, «Serve una Mani pulite mondiale», [«A world Clean Hands is
necessary»], Corsera, IE, 20 November 1999; Giuseppe D’Avanzo, Inspiegabili distrazioni,
[Inexplicable distractions], Corsera, IE, 21 November 1999; Carlo Bonini, Ma l’Italia non ha firmato
le due convenzioni anti-crimine, [But Italy has not signed the two anti-crimes conventions], Corsera,
IE, 21 November 1999.
142
Gad Lerner, Andare oltre i DS, [To go beyond the DS], Repubblica, IE, 10 January 2000.
143
Furio Colombo, La vecchiaia e la missione, [Old age and mission], Repubblica, IE, 10 January
2000.
141
33
Milan Prosecutors D’Ambrosio (near the PCI/PDS centrist fractions), Gherardo
Colombo (a para-PCI/PDS Lombard Catholic Left), and Greco (of Leftist alignment),
the Palermo Mayor Leoluca Orlando (a hardliner judicialist, connected with the FBI
top levels, of the Catholic Left), judicialist press and journalists, participated to the
lobbing pressure for conditioning Italian institutions, for promoting the submission to
this kind of international bodies, and for denunciating the subscription of international
agreements retards’.
Because the 1989 dissolution of the Western block was not a sudden and casual
event, all these trials of transition from the military forms of domination to the policejudicial ones were well running and visible already during the 1980s. For Professor
Ilari, the weakening, and later the formal collapse, of the cold war game, saw the
passage from the CIA ‘anti-Communist’ International to the super-Prosecutors FBI
International, created with the pretext of the internationalisation of the different forms
of organised criminality.144
The operation of powers devolution to ‘supranational’ bodies was built around the
‘philosophical’ frame that ‘corruptive’ practices were costs for States and other public
authorities, and alteration of a supposed perfect concurrency among enterprises.
Actually things are not so easy, and reality is considerably more complex and fuzzy
than academic and governments sounding stereotypes. The techniques of alteration of
the abstraction of perfect concurrency are a wide plurality, and nobody ever
demonstrated that ‘corruption’ were the main. The same concept of ‘corruption’ was
practically indefinable, since the plurality of situations it could include, starting from
the enterprises financing to a US President, or other politician, electoral campaigns.
Its purely legal definition clashes against both legal indeterminacy and the variety
national-local legislation and actual practices.
The abstraction perfect concurrency represented is in practice not possible, so its
supposed economic best not so precisely definable as claimed. Perfect concurrency
can realise only when each single person is an enterprise, and in all instant of the
economic trial there is the concrete possibility (included the omniscience and the
choice/calculation costs) to operate the best choice, changing the organisation and
selection of the employed factors. Which are assumptions of full rationality, of
impossible realisation. There are also technological obstacles to that perfection of
conditions. The assumptions of full rationality, of perfect disposability of factors, and
of presence of a best are ideological complement that there is a world best represented
from the Anglophone area and its decisions, which are in fact always presented as the
only possible perfection.
The wide dishomogeneity of State administrations functionality made all discourse
on ‘corruption’ (assumed as all purpose moralist category) too evidently focused on
the submission of judiciary and police apparatuses to the Anglophone area interests,
forgetting that inefficient State are by themselves ‘corruption’ (the waste of taxpayers
money), also when the Anglophone area find useful their existence and so certifies the
honesty of such orders. In addition, the economic difference between bribes to foreign
governments for getting contracts and the financing of US or British Statesmen and
politicians for defending the ‘national interest’ are not qualitatively different. The
144
Virgilio Ilari, Meglio Nato che niente, [Better NATO than nothing], Limes, n. 4, 1999.
34
same concept of national interest, so insistently proposed form the Anglophone area,
is against free and perfect concurrency. Finally, there was no interest, from all this
movement against ‘corruption’, and in favour of ‘perfect’ ‘concurrency’, on the most
widespread form of corruption: the systematic use of magistracy and police
apparatuses, and also of military force, as of other administrative tools, for altering
concurrency. By them, force relations, not the claimed principles, dominated.
Relatively to the intense activity for a world space with supposedly perfect
transparency, there were problems also of legal and Constitutional order. Two
European organisations, OSCE and the Council of Europe, in their December 1997
Convention and November 1998 Treaty, introduced, in the moment they had been
ratified, odd legal principles in the State frames. They unified the crimes of corruption
and concussion, suppressing that of concussion, and making the crime of corruption
pursuable also when verified from a State to another one. This would have permitted,
simply stating a corruption case, to develop stronger international defamation
campaigns (which in last analysis depend only on media control and force relations)
against enemy Statesmen directly for corruption, without, for example, to be obliged
to inquiry a company just for recycling, as it instead happened during the so-called
Russiagate built from Switzerland, in 1999, against the Russia’s top levels but also
with damages for the accomplice US ones. In practice, if an Anglophone company
had provided funds to a foreign leader and the foreign leader had recycled the funds
using companies in the London City or Wall Street, it would have been sufficient to
omit to unmask the ‘corruption’ while accusing the ‘corrupted’ of being corrupted
because he/she had recycled the funds of unknown provenience but avoiding to strike
the companies had recycled the funds. What permitted to get evidence, striking only
who/which was useful to strike. While when the ‘corruption’ had come from enemy
companies who had the best Intelligence and interception apparatuses could accuse
also them, so obstructing their businesses. It was in substance a good way of control
and use of evidence from who had an overwhelming hegemony in this sector, with
international legal rules favouring this selective utilisation of evidence. An also more
delicate norm, openly violating the principle of the personal responsibility, was that
included in the Council of Europe Treaty. For it, in case of corruption, the penal
responsible was who was at the top levels of a corporation, if the whole corporation
had been advantaged from the corruption. That kind of norm, already abusively used
from the Milan PO, the he/she-couldn’t-not-to-know norm, would have permitted to
strike, in the most legal of the ways, companies and entrepreneurs magistracy clans
wanted to destroy, and to save and/or favour other ones. In fact evidence against the
enterprise top levels, and also the choice to prosecute or does not, was, according to
this principle, entirely conjectural, as the Italy’s experience had shown. In a limit
case, it would have been possible to corrupt the functionary of a company because
he/she corrupted foreign [relatively to the corrupter] functionaries, and to use the
proved corruption of the foreign functionaries for striking the top levels of a company.
At the end of the 1990s Italy, as other important European countries, had not yet
ratified such international agreements. But also if later signed, administrative
obstructions could always eventually, according to the precise juridical frame of a
country, to produce applications, or don’t, extremely differentiated, so violating
elementary principle of legal homogeneity and certainty
Only a stricken and weakened politics could accept, or suffer, the international
legal-police-military space the Anglophone area tried to impose to the entire world for
35
directly dominating the different local realities. In fact only the purpose progressed
only in a very limited way, and with a lot of practical obstacle, included the natural
resilience also stricken and weakened system can assure. Intellectual promotion, by a
long series of sounding sophisms, was complement of the practical intense activity.
The practice of international bodies always showed how they had no a-national
neutrality.
Consequently no ‘global’ politics and politics could be really global without the
perfect, also ethnic, homogeneity of the governed reality. What does not seem
realistic. States, ruling classes, media, more they claim as objective and opposing all
badness, more they are protagonist of xenophobic campaign against all difference.
The same concept of anti- is of substantial identical value to what one declares
opposition. The anti-badness obeys to the same conditioned reflexes and logic of what
one declares opposition. In all logic friend-enemy, its contents are the same logic
friend-enemy, alias a way of relating with reality, never the claimed contents, whose
goodness or badness is never scientifically demonstrable but only apodictically
declarable.
When ‘politics’ is assaulted and annihilated in name of superior principle, the
reality is the destruction of specific political-policies centres, with simply the shifting
of policies real decision to other centres. If elective politics is annihilated, this is not
the politics destruction but simply the transferring of policies decisions to other
political centres. On the other side, also when politics is apparently strong, policies
decisions are not necessarily, and not mainly, in the forma-democratic bodies. It is not
anxiety of this work to assume same natural of functional superiority of elective
political bodies on other political entities. It would be abstractly indemonstrable. It is
possible to discuss the result of policies. Although to individuate who/which really
decided them, and a supposed superiority of formally democratic policies on different
ones, it would be impossible.
Also the supposition of a strong Anglophone formal politics opposed to a
Continental European variously assaulted and weakened one would be an arbitrary
assumption. Financial-economic powers and military-industrial complexes seems to
have taken-over since a long time formal and substantial policies of the Anglophone
countries. Also when PM, and directly elected Presidents together with Congresses,
seems to have dictatorial powers, decisions are rarely arbitrary and the devices for
submitting formal politics are currently used. Consequently, it is more realistic to
assume the also political world extension anxiety of regimes, and their developmental
centres, which are already intrinsically very strong and competitive, instead of
hypothetical plots of world domination planned from occasional political leaderships.
The systemic nature of the Anglophone superiority pressure makes it intensive,
instead of too planned moves, which are more natural historical trends.
Specifically, it seems deceiving the tendency there might be to interpret the 1990s
events in Italy, and in some way also in other continental European countries, as a
kind of grandiose experiment of a sophisticate and extremely complex weakening
strategy. It would be the thesis of the 1990s Italy as laboratory. The image would be
sounding and suggestive, but unrealistic. The used techniques were not so new and
original. No centralised planning seems ever realistically hypothesisable when events
result as too complex. Too many variables systems are not really governable: what is
36
valid also for supposed plots. Complex dynamics are necessarily casual, at least in
their concrete manifestation. If a series of non-coordinated external pressures gives
results of wide weakening of a system, it is because the system was already weak, and
already inside the system there were relevant forces both indifferent to the weakening
external pressures and desiring to profit privately from it.
Also the game of the identification of the main cause (the fraud of the privatisation,
the ‘sacrifices’ for Europe, the plot against the middle classes, geopoliticalgeoeconomic factors, the foreign take-over of the ‘strategic’ sectors, etc.) of complex
pressures a system is object, is not less deceitful. As a complex weakening, in part
contingently realised, is product of the confluence and combination of different
pressures, it expresses by a complex, and in part also causal, phenomenology.
Actions/intentions produces not only results but also counteractions, and no
achievement is irreversible. And overall when there are multiple pressures from a
geopolitical area towards the entire world, the same events and results they determine
in a specific country may induce to believe ex-post that a certain country had been
specifically targeted. It may not be supposed that the Anglophone geopolitical
pressure had specifically decided to target the 1990s Italy more that other countries. In
Washington and New York there are desks for all the countries of the world.
If the PM Andreotti, the Justice Minister Martelli and the President of the Republic
Cossiga, in front of the clear situation of illegality and institutional subversion had
created in Milan and from Milan the weeks after 17 February 1992, with illegal
diffusion of secrete judicial materials inside a wide range clear attempt against
institutions in evident complicity with the publishing group Repubblica-l’Espresso,
had simply acted in coherence with their institutional responsibilities, the starters of
the subversion would have been nearly immediately arrested and dismissed. On the
contrary each one tried to profit personally from the events and to let the Italian
electors, their parties, the institutions they contributed in some way to express, were
expropriated. This was the reply, and the non-reply, to the pressures came from
different sources and interests.
37
Echelon: complement of the Anglophone world hegemony145
Comint [Communication Intelligence], the covert interception of foreign
communications for economic, scientific and diplomatic and political Intelligence was
always practiced from the main world powers For instance, the foreign
communication to and from the USA and UK, and passing through them, had been
intercepted from more than 80 years by the connection to the relative PTT companies.
This kind of interception from the Comint organisations was conventionally called
ILC [Internationally Leased Carrier].
This system, to which it was later given the conventional name of Echelon, was
widely discussed after the 1997146 STOA [of the European Parliament] report. Its
roots were in the restructuring of the Anglophone planetary control/espionage tools
after WW2. The Sigint [Signals Intelligence] alliance among the USA (the ‘first
party’) and the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zeeland (the ‘second parties’), in
practice the Echelon formal birth, took place in 1947, by a secret agreement for the
collaboration in the conduction of Comint global activities. The formal excuse was
the detection and exchanging of anti-Soviet and anti-nuclear information. In practice
all communication and all information were detected and variously exchanged and
used, also according to the force relations inside the pool of the Anglophone
countries. For instance, the US Sigint System (USSS) included the NSA, the military
support units called CSS, part of the CIA and other organisations.
For what concerns the formal-legal aspects, the Echelon system violated the US
official norms on freedom and privacy, deploying all kind of illegal surveillance also
against US politicians and Statesmen. Corruption and frauds were not unusual inside
the Echelon structures. In certain cases there were also damages against who worked
inside the Echelon structures. For example, the Echelon Research Centre of
145
(Campbell 1999/2000); (Wright, 6 January 1998);
Ex capo Cia spiega che gli Usa spiano l’Europa per alte ragioni morali, [CIA ex-head explains that
the USA spy Europe for moral high reasons], Foglio, 23 March 2000, p. 1; f.p., Echelon, inchiesta
europea. sospetti su Microsoft e Ibm, [Echelon, European inquiry. Suspects on Microsoft and IBM],
Repubblica, IE, 24 February 2000; Ivo Caizzi, Alla Ue il caso del «grande orecchio» che dagli Usa
controlla le comunicazioni in Europa, [By the EU the case of the «grand ear», which from the USA
controls communications in Europe], Corsera, IE, 24 February 2000; Satelliti e computer, così ci
controllano, [Satellites and computers, so they control us], Messaggero, IE, 19 March 2000; Anna
Guaita, «Echelon spiava gli europei corrotti», [«Echelon spied the corrupted Europeans»],
Messaggero, IE, 19 March 2000; Mario Coffaro, «Minacciata la libertà della Ue». Inchieste a Roma e
a Bruxelles, [«Threaten the EU freedom». Inquiries in Rome and Brussels], Messaggero, IE, 30 March
2000; Umberto Rapetto, Tutto cominciò in Nuova Zelanda nel ’47, [Everything started in New Zeeland
in 1947], Messaggero, IE, 30 March 2000; Massimo Martinelli, Ecco la rete di Echelon: tutta l’Italia è
spiata, [Here is the Echelon web: the entire Italy is spied], Messaggero, IE, 30 March 2000; Guido
Gentili, La spia che scuote l’Europa, [The spy shaking Europe], Corsera, IE, 31 March 2000;
Bruxelles. Imbarazzi per le spie, [Brussels. Embarrassments since the spies], Foglio, 31 March 2000;
Francesco Manacorda, Tutte le imprese delle 007 globale, [All the enterprises of the global secret
agent], Stampa, IE, 31 March 2000; R. James Woolsey, Pourquoi l’Amérique espionne ses allies, Le
Monde Diplomatique, IE, April 2000; Come mai, d’un tratto, sulla rete Echelon si fanno tutti
prudenti, [Why, suddenly, on the Echelon web, did everydy become prudent], Foglio, 1 April 2000; La
Giornata, [The Day], Foglio, 4 April 2000; «Achille Lauro, Echelon spiava Craxi», [«Achille Lauro,
Echelon spied Craxi»], Messaggero, IE, 4 April 2000; Quella «manina straniera», [That «foreign
small hand»], Panorama, 11 May 2000; Enrico Molinari, Echelon, l’Europa indaga, [Echelon, Europe
investigates], Stampa, 6 July 2000.
146
The formal date is 6 January 1998.
38
Sunnyvale, California, was built in a high radioactivity area, so that who worked there
was usually affected from cancer. It was as it was planned to liquidate rapidly who
worked there.
The first geo-stationary Intelsat satellite, for commercial communications, was
orbited in 1967. The first US Comint satellite was launched in August 1968. At the
end of the 1990s, more than 120 Echelon antennas (satellite based collection systems)
were used, in this simultaneous information collection from some tens satellites
covering the entire globe. It was evaluated that at the end of the 1980s, about 40 of
these antennas were focused on Western commercial communication satellites (ILC),
30 on controlling space based signals intelligence satellites, and 50 on Soviet
communication satellites. With the end of the USSR, it was supposed the focusing of
part of the 50 antennas to different destination. Despite details on the 1990s US Sigint
activities were not revealed, it was estimated that they expanded.
The main ground stations processing this information were in USA, Australia,
England and Germany, while interception stations were obviously everywhere in the
world. Also Italy was disseminated of US Echelon centres for the electronic
surveillance and the sending of the communication to the NSA and other centres in
the USA. Sometimes they were officially for the protected communications of the US
Embassy in Rome, other times as NATO structures, other times in co-operation with
Italian military and military espionage structures.
The Echelon system was supposed to intercept 95% of the world communications
(Internet communications included), which were finally analysed from the NSA
computers. Already in 1979 Echelon could electronically tail a subject and to enter in
all his/her phone call everywhere in the world. Already in 1984 it could photograph a
stamp on the pavement of a street. Cable communication not passing through the
Anglophone countries, or other subjected territories, were intercepted by US
submarines, which posed interception devices in proximity of the international cables
and assured the exportation the collected and registered information. The enormous
mass of collected information presupposed automatic techniques of analysis of the
intercepted data, and the later checking of this semi-final output. The creation, from
NSA and CIA, of the SCS, permitted not only to intercept whatever electronic
message but also to overcome all cryptographic protection.
The 1947 agreement among the Anglophone countries was officially known, from
an Anglophone source, only on 16 March 1999, when the Director of the Australian
Sigint organisation, the DSD, confirmed that it co-operated with other Sigint
organisations under the USA-UK relationship. The 24 February 2000 assertion of the
NSA to the US Congress that the Echelon system did not do any planetary total
electronic surveillance was rapidly showed as one of the usual deceptions. All
personality, from Princes Diana to Jane Fonda, to everybody else was even slightly
perceived as a threat from the Anglophone militarism, or a political dissenter, resulted
to have been carefully spied using this kind of tools.
When, in the late 1990s, the EU Commission and Presidency referred to the
European Parliament, they behaved as they knew nothing on the systematic
Anglophone spying of the European countries’ citizens, companies, and institutions.
There was even the amnesia on the word, became current in media, Echelon. The
39
European Commissar to Information Society Erkki Liikanen prudently told that there
was not evidence that the disposable technologies were not used. The usually faithful
Prodi reassured that a letter of the US State Department declared that the USA were
not involved in industrial spying and that it did not accept duties from private firms.
In reality, it was as to say that the also industrial espionage was not practised
occasionally but systematically and as a State current duty, as later publicly confirmed
from the CIA ex-director Woolsey. The UK replied that the British intelligence
worked inside the norms defined from the British Parliament, which defined the use
of the interceptions: national security, preservation of the economic welfare and
prevention and identification of serious crimes. Alias, also the UK intercepted
everything possible and without any legal constraint, as perfectly normal for a country
having and wanting to continue to have a world role.
Only President Prodi, faithful to the subordination to his Godfathers had pushed
him in office in Italy (and later also in Brussels, even if rapidly unsatisfied of their
pupil), acted as he did not know all that, and claimed scepticism on the Anglophone
electronic espionage had been already related in detail to the EU Parliament from the
Scottish journalist Duncan Campbell formally in April 1999 and again in February
2000. A previous report to the EU Parliament had raised the question already in
January 1998. In 1998 there had already been an EP debate on Echelon. And it was
already clear that Echelon was used against individual liberties and rights, as against
fair competition and States security. Attitude similar to that of Prodi there was from
the side of his Dutch Commissar to Internal Market Frits Bolkestein. Campbell had
previously diffused detailed and evidenced analyses and reports on the subject. Its
oral exposition of February 2000 to the European Parliament followed his Report to
the Director General for Research of the European Parliament (Scientific and
Technical Options Assessment programme office) on the development of surveillance
technology and risk of abuse of economic information, firstly dated April 1999. In the
meantime the Prodi EU Commission assumed an absenteeist attitude on the matter,
the EMP Di Pietro self-candidate as President of an Echelon Inquiry Commission the
European Parliament had no real intention to create it. Did he want to use also there
his techniques of selective investigation and his personal-profit-oriented attitudes?
Prodi already when he was Italy’s PM, had declared, in 1998, when the Echelon
affair officially exploded, that he knew nothing and that he did not believe in the
existence of such a world surveillance web. He was evidently not even informed of
what the EU Parliament and institutions were discussing or, for him, inventing. Prodi
neither knew that during the entire period of the 1990s’ subversion, the British Crown
intensively used, in Italy, overall the Canadian Intelligence, with the advantage that if
even some Italian authority had posed problems, Canada was under the British Crown
but it was not a country of the EU, either the USA, but only an apparently marginal
State. In Prodi, as common among the personnel coming from the DC, there was the
custom to close his eyes on all episodes of covert war coming from the ‘allies’, and
not only from them. In relation to the EU there was in some way the same operational
methodology: there was a case of permanent espionage against the EU and its
countries, but also the participation to the espionage, in leading position (also if it
could try to hide behind the USA) of one country of the same EU, the UK, whose
opposition to the EU was well known. Anyway a report to the European Parliament
referring also on Echelon, for the first time, was dated 6 January 1998. In it, Echelon
was unequivocally described as primarily non-military. Although already on 8 August
40
1975, the NSA Director Lieutenant General Lew Allen had declared to the Pike
Committee of the US House of Representatives that the NSA systematically
intercepted voice and cable international communications.
Since its nature, Echelon served different needs, for what concerned its specific
Intelligence work. The collected materials were destined, according to their nature, to
different Agencies.
Political espionage was one of the Echelon functions. For instance, also the Italian
government and diplomacy was object of interception. For example, in the 1980s the
NSA spied the French diplomatic communications from Chicksands, England, while
the British GCHQ spied the Italian diplomatic communications from its Cheltenham
headquarters. Already at the time of the Achille Lauro-Sigonella affair (1985),
Echelon spied ‘friend’ governments and top-level Statesmen (PMs and Ministers),
from the Egyptian to the Italian ones, using its same bases on the Italian territory.
As different episodes of world trade and investments espionage at US benefits
showed, the economic espionage was an Echelon primary function. On 5 May 1977, a
meeting among NSA, CIA and the Department of Commerce had authorised the
creation of a secret new unit, the Office of Intelligence Liaison. After that, in 1993, the
BBC referred of it, it became Office of Executive Support. Its function was the dealing
with Comint and Sigint, received from the NSA, for supporting the US commercial
and economic interests. In 1993, President Clinton extended this US Intelligence
activity by the creation of the NEC, which paralleled the NSC. Its function was to
help US companies to win contracts abroad. The British GCHQ was institutionally
qualified to the foreign communication interception in the interest also of the
economic well-being of the UK. Its K-division was charged of commercial
interception and its processing. Commercial and economic targets of this Intelligence
work might be specified from the Overseas Economic Intelligence Committee, the
Economic Staff of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and the Treasury of the Bank of
England. Similar activities were deployed from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.
Reciprocal spying, also for business competition, there was among the different
countries composing Echelon, as normal in all case of co-operation among countries
each one very nationalistic. According to French sources, the Echelon system was
used for subtracting to the continental European countries a great number of contracts
in the aerospace, electronic, and telecommunication sectors were under negotiation
everywhere in the world.
For the CIA ex-Director (1993-1995147) R. James Woolsey, since its March 2000
declarations, Echelon would have spied European attempts to use bribes in
geopolitically relevant international businesses, and used the discoveries against the
European trade. The Woolsey assumption was that the Anglophone enterprises
operated honestly and fairly while the European ones needed to be checked because
corrupted, or, better, that ‘corruption’ was always a good excuse for contrasting all
rival of the Anglophone area. The Woolsey original thesis was that the USA compete
just thanks to the market superiority of their enterprises, while Europe (and evidently
the entire world for him, because Echelon was not specifically Europe focalised)
147
Practically until the end of 1994. He sent his resignation letter to Clinton on 26 December 1994. He
served still the few weeks necessary for the transition.
41
thanks to bribes, and with the European governments accomplices of these practises.
For Woolsey there was a parallel between the European technological backwardness
and its need to pay bribes. For Woolsey it was since the need to unmask the European
bribes, and to provoke occasional scandals (synonym of pro USA destabilisation?),
that the USA and the Anglophone world (actually following an old British tradition
and excellence in also trade-focused espionage) spent billions dollars per year in also
trade- and technology-focused worldwide espionage. For Woolsey it would have been
sufficient that the European enterprises became competitive, because the US need to
spy them would have ceased. It remained the methodological problem, unexplained
from Woolsey, how to check the need not to spy without continuing spying.
Intellectually a bit more honestly Zbigniew Brzezinski rhetorically underlined,
relatively to the Echelon affair, whether the USA should have refused to use for their
interest the information they had collected. For Woolsey the expenditure in also tradefocused espionage was moral, while the supposed European-style products promotion
(what the border between bribes and other promotional techniques, advertising
included?) immoral. For Woolsey the Anglophone world was the world of the perfect
market, with pure firms, pure enterprises, a pure State, and no militarist tradepromotion, no intertwining between businesses and government.
Emanuele Macaluso signalled as also the Woolsey considerations evidenced that
there might have been a US push behind the 1990s destabilisation and political
cleansing apparently realised by magistracy clans. Already Craxi, under judicialist
fire, had suggested that there was a foreign hand behind the discovery of ‘corruption’.
By the material collected from the Echelon system, the USA-UK, and also other
countries with equivalent intelligence projects or in co-ordination with Echelon, had
the possibility intervene in a plurality of ways for promoting and/or supporting a
destabilisation formally led from indigenous judicialist clans, both in the 1990s and
already in the 1970s and 1980s operation different only in the relatively more reduced
scale. In Italy two inquiries of the Rome and Milan POs were opened on Echelon but
de facto blocked. In reality Milan had no competence, not being the formal capital of
the State. What made symptomatic its intervention. In reality no one of the two POs
resulted to have developed any real investigation of this clamorous and long lasting
case of foreign espionage, as no initiative there was at political-institutional level.
Anyway certain Anglophone theoretical poorness, and custom to mystify actions
by rationally worthless claims, does not change that while the Anglophone world
invested in innovation, militarism (espionage included) and State modernisation,
various European countries preferred to waste enormous State funds just for
preserving their backwardness and submission. While in reality militarism, when
really such, and stubbornly practised, always showed as decisive occasion for
systemic progression and development of a country.
A global interception work, apart from the complexity and the other difficulties the
choice represented, presented more problems than the simple formal world cover.
There were the key problems of the full possibility of the interceptions and their
economical character, and differences according to the destination of the collected
material. The former order of problems was in practice that of the various forms of
signals and communications protection, mainly cryptography. The US and the entire
Anglophone area used both covert interception and the official pressure for getting in
all world area, EU included, the access keys to all form of communication secrecy
42
protection. For instance, the US government always pressed on the EU because it
avoided sure cryptographic systems for the European communications and data
protection. The second order of problems was the difference between information and
information usable in Court. Echelon-style projects had no legal constraint. The FBIDEA needs were that law enforcement agencies were generally required, for
communication interception, to justify their requests to a judicial or administrative
authority. If the Echelon-style activities permitted in practice to do everything one
wanted, the FBI intervention needed to move among rules and the manipulation of
rules. These different necessities, for these two different destinations, now were
pursued autonomously, now the followed paths mixed.
In the early 1990 the US government obliged AT&T to withdraw its secure
telephone systems for replacing it with one with a chip manufactured from the NSA,
consequently permeable to its, and connected Agencies, interception. The NSA
planned solution presented evidently problems, and the NSA chip could not be
provided, so there was the concern to get the access keys to the existing phones. The
US government planned scheme was that the access keys for interception would have
been concentrated in formally non-governmental agencies for eventual utilisation
from the US government, what was in practice the same thing that giving full access
to the NSA, and US government connected agencies.
Between 1993 and 1998, the US government, concerned with cryptography,
pressed on the EU and OCDE countries because they adopted their form of key
recovery system, officially for law enforcement use. Actually the final destination of
the access keys was the NSA, which is an espionage agency, not a law enforcement
one. The US goal was just the easy access to all communication of the EU and OCDE
countries, for pure espionage purposes.
In parallel, also the FBI began to operate, in 1993, by its ILETS now opened to EU
countries. Law enforcement officials from different EU and OCDE countries met,
under FBI supervision, for discussing of their needs for intercepting communication.
While the US government presented these initiatives and polices as deriving from the
needs of law enforcement agencies, the EU perceived immediately the US deception.
For the head of the EU Senior Officers’ Group on Information Security, Davis
Herson, since his September 1996 declaration, the US authorities used the excuse of
their key recovery projects for law enforcement, just as a protective kind for other
governmental activities, which consisted in foreign intelligence. Law enforcement
was, for Herson, just a smoke screen for espionage activities evidently led, in this case
from the FBI.
The ILETS extension, from its creator FBI, to the world key countries, for leading
initiatives for building comprehensive interception systems, was inside the usual
claims on world expansion of corruption, terrorism, criminality, etc. typically made
from the US and British governments for justifying their worldwide presence. By the
usual excuse of criminality and annexed stuff, the FBI promoted its worldwide
penetration as espionage agency, which is conceptually, practically and operationally
different from that of the CIA or military agencies. The FBI spying for ‘struggling
against criminality’ was a tool from criminalizing foreign countries, or part of them,
in a subtler, and also more penetrative and insidious, way than the criminalizing of
governments operated from State Department and/or military agencies. Information
43
was in both cases (CIA and similar, and FBI and similar) used for commercial wars
and/or political conditioning and take-over. CIA and military Intelligence services
obeyed overall to the concept of military security, and only in their more specialised
branches to wider concept of economic and systemic defence. What made them
tendencially more politically subordinated.
The FBI world extension, already well present and visible in the 1980 but in reality
coincident with the same FBI creation (the CIA came later for breaking, in part, the
previous FBI omnipotence), obeying to the contrast of ‘criminality’ was in part
autonomous from the US contingent political leadership. It is possible to find the
same FBI in first line in US key internal affair against the same elected leaders, what
shows the large autonomy it, officially simple branch of the Department of Justice,
always enjoyed and preserved.
For what concerned the 1990, in the contexts of the ILETS group, a FBI parallel
structure, from 1993 representatives of EU countries and EU institutions met with FBI
agents, in practice clandestinely from their Parliaments and electors. Of the 4 known
ILETS meetings opened to European police officers, those of 1993, 1994, 1995 and
1997, one could find Italian representatives only in the 1995 and 1997 ones. In
practice the Italy of the coup d’État against the 1992 and 1994 elections results was
excluded (for what officially known), while fully realised the subversion of the voters
will, the Italy of the Dini and Prodi governments was formally present. The ILETS
entire 1990s activity involving European elements developed not only outside all
Parliaments’ control and awareness, but also, as consequence, without all consultation
and discussion with industrial and other organisations and interests the ILETS
activities inevitably affected. What was understandable since the ILETS Intelligence
purposes, included the conditioning of manufacturers and operators of new
communications systems for permitting the FBI, and connected national entities,
interception. It was one of the replies to the attempts to protect communications from
interception, and to the consequent progressive increasing of costs and difficulties in
the interception-espionage work.
In substance the ILETS opened to EU police officers were just US interventions on
and against EU countries. ILETS, as the other structures, relevant concern was the
reduction of the interception costs and its easiness, controlling the creation, on world
scale, of access doors already in the moment of the fabrication of the communication
hardware and software. This concern was relative also to cryptography, the encryption
of electronic messages. For example, US software sold outside the USA was deprived
of defences from interception and easy reading from US agencies.
These US and Anglophone anxieties in favour of their world interception work
easiness certainly met in Italy with the aspirations of the judicialist clans, which
practised on large scale this kind of activity inside the country, actually more for
political-economic destabilisation that against criminality. In reality exacting their
claims on the stubborn criminal nature of all opposition to the leftist minorities were
their propaganda base for concentrating on destabilisation goals. On 27 April 1999,
the then Palermo Prosecutor Caselli even lamented against telephonic deregulation,
44
because it made more difficult to intercept and tap citizens.148 The judicialist praxis of
purely bureaucratic police work was in fact complicated, in a context of
communication market liberalisation, from the difficulty to identify the cellular
phones of the targeted subjects without operating on the ground an with adequate
devices. What was not really possible since the extension, also in time, of the
interception and taping work, with the consequent relevant absorption of personnel.
Finally, all international clamours on the Echelon system remained without any
real outcome. If subordinated countries had no way to oppose to the espionage against
them, apart from the concrete refusal of the logics of submission, what did not verify,
internationally more active States had similar espionage systems, also if on more
reduced scale. In fact different other countries increasingly collected Comint from
satellites: Russian, Germany (by its BND), and France (by its DGSE). For instance,
Germany and France were supposed to collaborate in the operation of a Comsat
collection site in Kourou (Guyana) focused on American and South American satellite
communications. In addition the DGSE had interception-collection stations in Domme
(France), French Guyana, New Caledonia and UAE. Also Switzerland was interested
in the Comsat interception. What explained why for example France, always so
xenophobically attentive to its national independence (also if more formal than
supported from real excellence) did not push to the dramatisation of the case of
prolonged Anglophone espionage against the ‘allied’ governments and countries, and
avoided to intervene in the polemics had developed during the years 1999/2000 on the
matter. France was actually linked to the Echelon system, spied from it but also its
user. It was the traditional combination of subordination and relative autonomy of
France in relation to the Anglophone area. The handling capability of the French
system was estimated about 2 million messages per months, while the Echelon one
was of billions per month. Nevertheless ‘Frenchlon’ could equally realise some
spying Anglophone countries and EU commercial secrets.
However, despite the silence recreated on these activities, the political-economic
focusing of relevant part of the Echelon system, as of similar ones, made them
objectively matching with the needs of the different political-economic operations and
destabilisations characterised the 1990s, starting with the Italy’s one. On the other
side, it was public that information called from those projects was used for purposes
of political-economic advantage and domination, now in reserved ways, now (as
Woolsey confirmed) for creating ‘scandals’.
‘Criminality’ as pretext for a police-judicial world web149
148
Caselli contro la deregulation telefonica, [Caselli against the telephonic deregulation], Giornale.it,
IE, 28 April 1999.
149
(Ilari 1994c, Sigonella, p. 187-190); (UN.ESC.CCPCJ, 20 March 1996), (UN.ESC.CCPCJ, 11 April
1996), (UN.ESC.CCPCJ, 19 February 1998), (UNICRI, 18 November 1999), (UN.ODCCP, February
1999a), (UN.ODCCP, February 1999b), (UN.ODCCP, 13 December 1999);
Andrea Nicastro, I satelliti per battere la droga, [Satellites for defeating drug], Corsera, IE, 9
September 1999; Carlo Pelanda, I computer non hanno efficaci misure protettive, colpa di un mercato
monopolizzato, [Computers are without effective protection, since a monoplistic market], Foglio, 12
August 2000.
45
The smoke screens of different UN and other organisations and connected NGOs
were one set of the tools used for trying to impose the police and judicial world takeover of the USA and of the Anglophone area, behind the mask of a metaphysical
international will. Drug control, crime prevention, organised criminality and criminal
justice were smoke screens were concretely used. Precise policies with unequivocal
meaning were proposed. The operational tools were used were for instance the United
Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UN.ODCCP), organisms
depending from the UN Economic and Social Council, as the Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice (UN.CCPCJ), the UN Interregional Crime & Justice
Research Institute (UNICRI). By these entities, their local branches, their initiatives
directed to police and judiciary operators, different penetration policies were pursued.
There was the request to national governments to promote the judiciary function
independence from the same governments, while international networks, alias other
national governments and apparatuses, mainly the US and UK ones pretended to
impose also to the judiciary and police functions of the different countries what to do.
All claimed principle, apparently sounding and natural as the ‘judges’ freedom of
expression and association, and the freedom for undue disciplinary procedures, might
become, if carefully used, tool in the hands of judicialist Prosecutors, and also Judges,
for the defamation and abuse of formally-democratic institution, and tool for the
constitution of judicialist Prosecutors, and a magistracy submitted to them, in counterpower or even de facto in third Chamber of a formally-Constitutionally bi-Cameral
Parliament. A magistrate can be really fair if he/she is alone without any associative
and environmental constraint. A magistrate maintains his also formal fairness if
he/she expresses just by clear, simple and well argued sentences, without sentencesencyclopaedia as without media protagonism. Only controls and political-institutional
direction coming from the outside the magistracy corporations may be guarantee of
efficient working of the judiciary machine, not certainly its corporative organisation
and its irresponsibility. The dissolution of all State and public power over the
judiciary function is only function of its desegregation and new aggregation under the
control of other interests and powers have de facto made themselves stronger than
State institutions and citizens formally-democratic will.
There was the individuation of areas of intervention, as anti-corruption, narcotics
trafficking, and organised crime: the three areas chosen from the UN.ODCCP. The
mystification consisted in the false suggestion that crime was something objectively
determinable, while it was in reality a legal construct and a political choice; in the
USA, for example, the organised criminality was artificially created by
Prohibitionism and submitted to the US State. The consequences deriving from the
acceptation of these choices and policies were the acceptation of the hegemony of the
US Department of Justice, and their FBI and DEA, which by their information
monopoly and their world wide organisation could eventually impose their choices as
obvious and natural, also deceiving and corrupting foreign operators of police and
judiciary apparatuses. Narcotics production and trafficking were essential economic
activities for different areas and they replied to the demand came in first instance from
the same US market. Disorganised crime was, in many areas, most troubling that the
organised one, which anyway had its strongholds in the USA and in connection with
US apparatuses, not elsewhere.
46
Already inside the USA the action on narcotics trafficking was a socio-political
device. It was a way for imprisoning ethnic minorities. For instance, the rapport
between people sentenced for crack and cocaine was 100:1. One struck only the
‘crimes’ one wanted to strike. The imprisonment of minorities was not only a terrorist
technique also but the way for creating a prison-economy with prisoners becoming
low cost workers for industries.150 Also in this, USSR had been, when it existed, the
weak copy of the most efficient and pitiless original.
In Vienna, under the cover of the UN.ODCCP struggle against the drug trafficking,
US apparatuses financed Talebans (in anti-Iran function) and the doubling of the
narcotics production. This while the chemical production was making those natural
productions destined to the extinction. The USA-UN actually financed the drug
production and a US foreign policy, while, using that interventionist policies
(contradicting the claims on free market) and their parallel failures, they pursued the
increasing of the satellites for the control of the world territory. It is easy to claim that
satellites are indispensable for checking the Afghan drug cultivations, and to use them
for other purposes. The Italian hardliner judicialist Pïno Arlacchi (professor, PDS
Senator, Italian Interior Ministry consultant151, protagonist of the PCI high-level
penetration inside the Interior Ministry already in the 1980s, in collaboration with
FBI-DEA behind the official screen of the narcotics trafficking) became, in mid-1997,
UN.ODCCP responsible in Vienna. On 4 December 1996, Arlacchi should become
President of the Anti-Mafia Commission. But even its majority had fear of an obtuse
hardliner. The ex-Craxian Socialist Del Turco was preferred. As a kind of personal
reward, or perhaps also for firing him from Parliament, Arlacchi was later sent to
Vienna, officially to fight against world narcotics trafficking, actually to collaborate,
with US Intelligence agreement, to finance the Afghan Talebans.152 Only in July
1999, Clinton assumed sanctions against Afghanistan.153 But, from Vienna, UN
founds continued being sent to them. It was a perfect example, for what concerned
both the USA and Italy, of the judicialist approach to reality: apparently ethical great
clamours and radically different sign real politics in function of precise interests. By a
29 November 2000 Corsera article, the UN deputy-General Secretary Arlacchi
launched a violent shut-up to the Health Service Minister Umberto Veronesi guilty to
have declared that drug prohibitionism had provoked just damages, and he wrote that
he wanted a clarification of the PM Amato on the Italian position after the Veronesi
declarations. In the same article he emblematically manifested his obsession for the
Sicilian Clans, but without reference to the Calabria (the region where he was born154)
ones, as to the US and other one favoured from the FBI-DEA and UN policies.155
Noam Chomsky, America, il business delle carceri, [USA, the prisons’ business], Stampa, 15 April
2000.
151
(Craxi 1998).
152
Pentiti di mafia. Evitare antichi errori, [Mafia justice collaborators. Avoid old errors], Corsera, IE,
6 July 1999.
153
Clinton vara sanzioni contro i talebani afghani, [Clinton pass sanctions against Afghan Talebans],
Corsera, IE, 7 July 1999.
154
He was born in Gioia Tauro (Reggio Calabria) an area controlled from organised criminality and
living on frauds on State funds.
155
Pino Arlacchi, Quanta ideologia, signor ministro E ora il governo dica da che parte sta, [How much
ideology, Mister Minister. And now the government declare which its alignment is], Corsera, IE, 29
November 2000.
150
47
In substance, there was the conceptual and operational construct of the so-called
‘trans-national crime’, as tool both of social domination-penetration of other countries
and of domination of the other countries’ police corps and judiciary, by bilateral and
multilateral co-operation. If one examines the UN documents with lists of the
different national ‘organised criminalities’, one will find that they follow racist lines.
One will never find any reference, for example, to ethnic-Anglophone or ethic-Jew
Clans but just to the supposed other ones: Colombian Mexican, Nigerian, South
African, Chinese, Japanese, Thai, Cambodian, Russian, Turkish, Albanian, “Italian
mafia-type”, etc. as there were ethnic group to the targeted (the evil) and other ones
organised-criminality-immune (the goodness). There was the parallel construct of the
concept and of the action on ‘corruption’, where the same ethnic discrimination was
hidden behind supposed objectivities. For example, a European and Japanese bribe
was such, while an Anglophone one (whatever its form, from the banal direct bribe, to
the indirect one, to the military threat, to the blackmail from Echelon electronic
surveillance) was free market. It was never explained why bribes could have been
sufficient for selling non-competitive products, and why a bribe could not be a tool of
free concurrency, or why politicians were ‘corrupt’ only in countries contrasting the
Anglophone area, which was naturally perfect.
The theoretical and organisational construct on the matter was just function of
trade and domination interests of the strongest areas, however not so strong and selfconfident if ‘bribes’ were sufficient for supposedly changing the trade flows, and if
US and UK-protected cartels, with militarist support, dominated (an example of free
market?) the oil world market, and other raw materials markets, without admitting any
concurrency. The USA used even the excuse of the so-called millennium bug (which
was US responsibility since the defective technology diffused from the USA) for
claiming their superiority, so their supposed natural leadership, in the field and its
governance. In that occasion the US, perhaps for hiding their responsibilities,
elaborated even lists of backward countries, which were for them incapable to face the
problem. Italy was defined as inevitably backward in the millennium bug fight.
However, with US immediate surprise, the Italy’s problems for the event were not
superior to the US ones. The entire IT sector was, not differently for the other ones,
pretext for Anglophone world domination. The hackers actions, and amplification or
even promotion, and the perspective of possible cyber-terrorism, induced the FBI and
CIA joint creation, the NIPC, to insist, in the first half 2000, with the usual request of
world full powers. The French Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chévènement (an
Anglophone-style hyper-nationalist), who also in other occasion showed well aware
of what there was behind both the political use of magistracy and the claiming of
apparently reasonable and sounding requests of judicialist legal innovation, denied the
opportunity of all world space, of a global cyberspace in this case, the USA-UK
pretended were create under their leadership. In May 2000, also the Council of
Europe excluded the possibility of world space for the NIPC, or similar entity, action,
what was not contrasting with the knowledge and information co-operation. And
suddenly the Anglophone media claiming passed from hackers to other ‘forecasts’ on
other forms of ‘terrorism’. Since these strange correlations, it could not be excluded
that the increasing of hackers attacks was pushed-promoted, or let freely to develop,
as a way for pressing on governments for delegating to the USA-UK the IT
communications security, and consequently also possibility of total control and
48
espionage.156 Again, problems the same USA-UK had amplified, and even created,
when necessary for deception purposes, were used for pretending the recognition of
their leadership and so the world submission to them. Again there was the
manipulation of ‘criminality’ played against the world.
The millennium bug case is a very good case also from propagandistic point of
view. The US technological collapse, what was in reality a US IT bug, was replaced
from the image of a bug casually linked to a date. The reference to the ‘millennium’
was an additional false, even if irrelevant, because the passage from the 1999 to 2000
was only the passage from the penultimate year of the millennium to the ultimate
year: it was not the passage to a new millennium since the first computational year
was the year one, and it wasn’t the year zero. If the invention of the millennium was
apparently inexpensive, it was calculated the US IT bug cost to the world 180 billion
Euros/dollars according to certain sources or 1,500 according to other ones. And it
was just a ‘bug’, of which in reality the penal and civil responsibility should have
been of who/which had provided microprocessors and system architectures, and
imposed to the world the standards with the bug.157
On the 26 April 2000 Corsera Arlacchi declared, quoting the, for him,
enlightening Garzón example (the Spanish leftist magistrate struck Pinochet, but
didn’t Kissinger, what made immediately evident inside which interests frames he
was positioned) that it was necessary magistrates enjoyed of the universality of
jurisdiction, outside any national constraint. Arlacchi claimed that this was
indispensable both for slaves and narcotics trafficking.158 They were both typical
traffics enjoyed forms of powers protections since economic and consensus macrointerest linked to them. In addition, the narcotics illegal trafficking was specifically
created by protectionist legislations, not really differently from the different forms of
human flesh trafficking. In both cases formal bans mixed with toleration and
protection created the economic spaces for prosperous illegal markets. Anyway it was
unimaginable that the USA let for example Mexican magistrates to operate freely on
the US territory and against US citizens, or that the UK let the French police and
Justice to operate on the British territory and/or against British citizens. The same
Arlacchi operated in direction of third world countries, and without any global result
from the point of view of its official duties. The Arlacchi-style claims were just
function of powers interventions in other countries businesses.
The US State Secretary Madeleine Albright explicitly, in January 2000, at the
Davos Conference on trade, used ‘corruption’ as a threat for geopolitical purposes
tool. Three elements were acting in background, immediately connected with these
claims: the failure of the US policies in relation to Russia, underlined from the
European media, the difficulties the USA were realising relatively to the designation
of a new head for the IMF, the failure of the Seattle Conference on Trade. Albright
launched a generalised accusation of ‘corruption’ tolerance against the European
Stefano Cingolani, L’Europa dice no allo 007 anti-hacker, [Europe says no to the anti-hackers 007],
Corsera, 16 May 2000.
157
Baco innocuo: è costato 360 mila miliardi, [Innocuous bug: It had cost 360,000 billions], Corsera,
2 January 2000; Millennium bug, una beffa costata 3 milioni di miliardi, [Millennium bug, a joke of 3
millions’ billions’ cost], Giornale, 2 January 2000.
158
Alessandro Trocino, Arlacchi: poteri internazionali ai magistrati contro il traffico di donne,
[Arlacchi: international powers to magistrates against women trafficking], Corsera, 26 April 2000.
156
49
States, the UK included (a threat to some Blair secret intentions of full integration
with the EU, adhering to Euro?). As pretext she used one of the usual ‘anticorruption’ international agreements, in this case one of February 1999, the national
States were reluctant to ratify. The verbal strikes went from a US Administration
heavily involved in case of national and international ‘corruption’. Then the US
government was disappointed with France because obstacle to the US world
domination, with Italy since its trades with Iraq, with Iran and Libya ‘interfering’ with
US trades and domination, with Japan because obstacle to the USA’s Chinese
policies, with the UK because too slow in the salvage of Pinochet, consequently a
potential menace in direction of a world tribunal on war and against-humanity crimes,
what the USA could not tolerate since the refusal of the US Armed Forces’ war
criminals to submit to foreign and/or international laws. What better, in such
conjunctures, than the threat of world legal spaces under US control for permitting to
the US police-judiciary apparatuses to strike silently and freely whatever resisted to
their domination in name of ‘honesty’?159 In the same Davos Conference, Albright
showed disappointment because the USA had been defined as a hyperpower.
Sometimes dominators prefer discretion. At the same time she declared that without
the USA international domination, the world would have been in serious danger. 160 It
was a way for insulting the other people as inept to realise whatever without the US
guide, instead of pursuing openly domination policies without excuses and masks,
what would have been a more profitable approach to world questions.
The emphasis on the necessity of judicial campaigns may be explained with the
absence, in the 1990s of a US univocal foreign policy. There was on the contrary the
coexistence of different ones, and in addition also geographically extremely
fragmented. Single bureaucratic, police, military apparatuses developed their own
foreign policy. In this context surer intervention was the direct action of the world
arena. The foreign demolition by judicial, alias apparently objective structures as
judges and media, was suitable for that purpose. It was sufficient from a kind of
research totally financed from systemic purposes, as the Anglophone one, not to
finance research also on this aspect (the war usage of judiciary and media) for
removing that point from attention and discussion. If the FBI used, in the world arena,
the repressive-annihilation techniques in which it was traditionally specialise, other
agencies used other techniques for their goals. For example a CIA having evidently
different orientation, promoted, at end 1990s, using the CIA-connected US TUs,
which financed the mass protests, the failure of the so-called Millennium Round, the
world trade conference in Seattle. What was an opposition to the FBI world space
tightly, as unrealistically, submitted to all US economic needs. 161 What did not
hampered the RC leader Bertinotti to define the ‘Seattle boys’ as ‘Communism reinventors’162, and the defender of bureaucratic parasitism to continue to defend, from
a xenophobic and opportunistic perspective, the right of anti-modernising ruling class
to discharge the costs of their ineptitudes on workers and consumers.
Che cosa c’era dietro la tirata della Albright sulla corruzione europea, [What there is behind the
Albright claims on European corruption], Foglio, 1 February 2000, p. 1.
160
Christopher Lockwood, World warned that US could be pushed towards isolation, Telegraph, IE,
31 January 2000.
161
Per Fejtö l’opacità della politica non sta nei soldi ma nell’asse giudici-media, [For Fejtö, politics’
opacity is not in money but in the axis judges-media], Foglio, 29 February 2000.
162
Bertinotti e la moralità politica perduta nelle tenebre del mercato, [Bertinotti and the political
morality lost in the market darkness], Foglio, 3 March 2000, p. 2.
159
50
The ‘humanitarian’ excuses, widely used for justifying interventions, when there
were other interests to impose, were in practice the claiming of the supernatural right
same States self-attributed for pursuing their material interests against all international
rule and against all respect of other countries and peoples sovereignty and rights.
What was another way for trying to define a world free space for the USA-UK selfsupposed omnipotence, at least when adversaries were not too big and strong for
them. For instance the Kosovo occupation, the 1999 aggression against Yugoslavia,
was justified building false evidence on never attempted genocide, but only normal
anti-guerrilla operations from the Yugoslav government, anti-guerrilla operation
actually considerably softer than the British practices on the field, for example in
Africa. Holly Burkhalter, Advocacy Director of Physicians for Human Rights,
Washington, claimed the right to falsely denounce genocide by the original
motivation that evidence is not necessary for preventing genocide […when conform
to the Washington interests, naturally].163 It is sufficient a rough look to the
international reality for noticing that nobody ever cared of genocides or ‘genocides’,
from the North America to those realised inside the Turkish borders, or wherever else:
it is a field without ethnic and/or political differences. On the contrary, whoever had
interests was always very attentive in claiming, and also inventing, human rights
violations. For Burkhalter, evidence is not necessary. Interest is more than sufficient.
The field of the ‘humanitarian’ intervention was actually more tool of military
domination instead of police-judicial one. However also in the field of the military
interventions there was the tendency to adopt police-judiciary language, symbolism,
arguments: work of international police, international tribunals, defence of values, etc.
After having presented the police-judicial functions (which are, also historically,
eminently political) as relying on some natural-divine inspiration, there was the
attempt to use this invented objectivity as smoke screen also for the directly military
necessities of the international relations.
Continuously, month after month, year after year, judicialist initiatives were
organised from always the same set of organisations and the same personages who
used them as way for contacting operators of State apparatuses, and defining
collaborations with them. Also the arguing was recurrent and always deceitful. All
these initiatives were good occasions for recruiting to the ‘UN’ and ‘EU’ programmes
Prosecutors and Police functionaries and officers, eventually politicians if not already
inside the network. A political co-operator of this judicialist international was for
example, as one of its parallel branches, the Sicilian Catholic-leftist politician Leoluca
Orlando. Orlando had been internally and internationally active against Andreotti, as
against Falcone, since the 1980s, real leader of the Palermo PO judicialist fraction,
and, under Caselli formal rule, the real leader of the same PO work. Orlando was
active promoter of, and participant to, judicialist ‘cultural’ initiatives. For example, in
the early September 1999, there was the Friburg Conference organised, alias
financed, from the Palermo Commune (Italy), the Max Planck Institut of Friburg
(Germany), and the University Pablo d’Olavide of Seville (Spain). The Conference
was opened from Orlando and was inside the EU Project of Contrast to the Organised
163
A. Ni., Satelliti e mappe in tv ma la disinformazione rimase protagonista, [Satellites and TV maps
but deception remained protagonist], Corsera, IE, 7 January 2000; Stefano Cingolani, Derrida: «In
Kosovo violenze, non crimini contro l’umanità», [Derrida: «In Kosovo violence, not crimes against
humanity»], Corsera, IE, 7 January 2000.
51
Criminality, developed in the context of the EU Falcone Programme.164 This kind of
initiatives, took place various times each year, were in reality occasions of judicialist
propaganda and co-ordination on how to use the ‘criminality’ excuse for other
purposes. The Italian judicialist Prosecutors, who refused all political orientation from
the Italian government, claiming they were independent (but not in the moment of the
taking of their salaries and other benefits), were politically and operationally oriented
by this kind of initiatives, for them also further occasion for giving directives to the
Italian governments and Parliaments on what they should do. In the specific case of
the specific initiative with Orlando promotion or co-promotion (which was neither
occasional nor an exception) it merits to be remembered that Orlando had been
Falcone deadly enemy because Falcone refused the party prostitution of the judiciary
function, preferring to reason and act in terms of systemic interests. Falcone as name
of a Programme with Orlando and judicialist clans’ participation was a good warning
on what could happen (to explode over 500 kilos explosive) to who refused the
submission to the judicialist clans.
The Italian State subordination to the Anglophone police-judicial domination
progressed, not without resistances and counter-tendencies, in parallel with the PCI
organised infiltration inside the Interior Ministry. On 14 November 1885,
immediately after the October 1985 Sigonella crisis between Italy and the USA, the
Interior Minister Scalfaro signed, with the Attorney General Meese, an Agreement of
cooperation with CIA, FBI and DEA against ‘terrorism’. Similar Agreement was
signed on 24 June 1986. An April 1986 Agreement, yet Scalfaro Interior Minister,
formalised the already developing co-operation between Italian State Police and FBI
for the struggle, or supposed such, against narcotics trafficking.
There was not, evidently, unanimous agreement these form of subordination to the
USA. The Foreign Affairs Minister Andreotti was in State visit in Washington
between 30 January and 4 February 1987. Leaving the USA, Andreotti informed the
press that the USA intended to convoke secretly, in Rome, a summit on hostages and
terrorism, of the 7 main countries of the world, and that the summit would have been
presided from Scalfaro. It was not an Andreotti support to the Scalfaro relations with
the USA and the Western powers for creating police-legal spaces.
The PCI (already decisively penetrated inside the State Police with the 1977
Cossiga reform, which demilitarised it) was present in the narco-traffic ‘struggle’
affairs with his men. Gianni De Gennaro, an ex-Fascist165 become leader of the proPCI informal clans-networks inside the Interior Ministry apparatuses, rapidly
progressed until the top levels of the State Police and Intelligence apparatuses,
included sectors directly and decisively involved in the 1990s judicialist operations.
He was, also in the evaluation of Professor Ilari, a PCI-man already in that period of
the 1980s ‘struggle’ against narcotics trafficking, when he had also an internationally
active role in inevitable co-operation with the FBI-DEA.166 Reputed a skilful
functionary, De Gennaro was also very skilful in the self-promotion and in that of his
164
Maria Teresa Conti, Grasso vuole esportare il metodo Caselli, [Grasso wants to export the Caselli
method], Giornale, 4 September 1999.
165
As university student he was FUAN member. FUAN was the university students organisation of the
MSI, the pro-RSI-Fascist party until its revision and dissolution in the 1990s.
166
Giorgio Ferrari, «La sinistra si dimostra senza senso dello Stato», [«The Left demonstrates its
absence of State ethic»], Avvenire, 4 April 2000.
52
friends’, in tight co-operation with the PCI judicialist fraction. What was anyway
inevitable: in no continental European-style bureaucracy there is no progression
without the self-organisation in clans-chains and the political-institutional
connections.
At the end of the 1980s, the clans of State Police functionaries linked to De
Gennaro, and their relative political and institutional references, pursued the
ambitious goal of affirming the State Police centrality (but under judicialist control:
what made the operation instrumental), overcoming the historical dualism with
Carabinieri and in some way also with the Fiscal Police. When the pro-high
criminality 1998 Napolitano circular (Prodi PM) had partially neutralised the special
corps of the State Police, Carabinieri and Fiscal Police, in favour of the DIA (in some
measure167, the political police of the judicialist clans), that was interpreted as a
decisive step in that direction. But later, changed government, the Carabinieri
offensive, supported from a PM D’Alema wanted to subordinate to his person the
judicialist front, made vane all illusion of judicialist full take-over of the police
forces.168 So, in practice, concrete moments of relevant systemic resilience, which can
be fully and concretely understood only inside the history and the micro-bureaucratic
mechanisms of a country, de facto hampered, also at level of police apparatuses, the
State take-over from the clans connected with the Anglophone pressure for the
subordination to their police-judicial space.
This dialectic between pressure toward domination and counteractions it provokes
is readable also at the level of the invented ‘excuse’, the recursive policies of now
creating, now inventing crisis situations. The same Anglophone denunciation of the
nearly imminent danger of forms of cyber-criminality and/or cyber-terrorism could
not hide that the USA-UK were working for promoting these cyber-criminality and
cyber-terrorism. The USA-UK, thanks to they domination in the IT sector had created
a situation of monopoly where, for instance, the development and diffusion of high
level cryptographic techniques had been de facto banned, for the entire 20th century,
for better permitting the cheap US-UK espionage of the world communications.
However, from the one side, the full control is always impossible and technological
development desegregates all ban and hamper, from the other side, also the monopoly
of the interception techniques was progressively less possible. For example, in 1995, a
small Italian firm created a very advanced system of electronic halos interception.
Apart from this case, the technological diffusion pushed in direction of the dissolving
of IT knowledge monopolies. Also developing countries of Asia and Southeast Asia
showed forms of excellence in the IT sector, in direct competition with the USA-UK.
In practice, the easily forecastable consequence was that interception techniques
would have developed without any US-UK real possibility to hamper them, while the
US-UK obstruction of the cryptographic research (they financed, but only for
controlling it and letting it starving) and application would have let the civil sector,
167
In Italy, this kind of secret polices, periodically created and dissolved, are formed by men and
women coming from the other police forces (to which they may be send back), what make them,
whatever the claimed intentions, spurious bureaucracies whose higher salaries are not sufficient to give
them a corps spirit.
168
Aliquò, dall’Fbi italiana alla Guardia Civil del premier, [Aliquò, from the Italian FBI to the
premier’s Guardia Civil], Foglio, 13 April 2000, p. 3.
53
but also the military one169, without defence relatively to non-US-UK-controlled
attacks. When this will verify, the USA-UK will claim the guiltiness of somebody
else, as usual. Already at the end of the 20th century they were claiming world
despotic powers for dealing with these crisis situations they have created, as all the
other ones they used in their claims. The criminal’s aspiration is to make him/her
police, so to be always guaranteed.
Clearly, overall in the 1990s, the Italian personnel chosen for operating inside the
supranational formal structures, de facto police-judicial Anglophone networks, was
not selected by the criteria of the police and/or judicial professionalism and
institutional loyalty, but since their judicialism and opposition to institutions.
Judicialism was not a 1990s sudden illness. It was previously protected and used also
from DC fractions (Andreotti one included) stricken in the 1990s. Consequently
already before the 1990 there was promotion of judicial and police personnel, in
formally supranational structures, according to judicialist criteria. Since this kind of
selection of the worst personnel, the progressive lost of powers of the Justice Minister
and of Government on Prosecutors, and the Progressive domination of militant
Prosecutors on the same police, myopic governments and Parliaments also formally
favoured already before the 1990s, the personnel was designed for representing Italy
in these international structures replied directly to their reference judicialist clans. So,
generally, the Italian government favoured and financed the connection between
Italian clans and international interests were acting against the Italian institutions and
people. It was advantageous, for the DC, to let to form para-PCI judicialist clans, or
also other personal power positions, well anxious to be launched against the CraxiPSI, while the pressure coming from the USA against the Centre and Andreotti DC
from in the second half of the 1980 was successfully contained until 1991 by pure
political-institutional manoeuvring, instead of by institutional universal guarantees
and relative selection of the institutionally best personnel. In practice Andreotti, and
also Martelli, felt personally guaranteed from a skilful but isolated Falcone, while the
State police-judicial structures were, in part even if meaningful part, taken over from
personnel in connection with the structures of the Anglophone and para-Anglophone
police-judicial world space.
Also German and French political leaderships as criminal questions
169
If research relatively to the civil cryptography is repressed, this inevitably hampers synergies would
have favoured also the military one.
54
The 1999/2000 German politics criminalisation170
And Italian-style assault
In the operation triggered in 1999 in Germany there were different ingredients
common to this kind of operations and recognizable for who had familiarity with the
1990s destabilisation Italy. There was the positioning of the right people in the right
places: the providential death, by car incident, of a Chief Prosecutors when all the
ingredients were ready but he was not sufficiently trusted for beginning and carrying
on such kind of operations, in a controlled way. Positioned the right Chief Prosecutor
in the right place, and carefully smashed the inquiry among different PO, the
operation fully started. Perhaps, or probably, the car accident and the later, apparently
consequent, death was absolutely casual, what is anyway irrelevant. Realised these
events, the case was strongly triggered, also propagandistically, from Canada,
territory of the British Crown. The media, never independent from financial network,
decisively created, also in Germany, the ‘scandal’ climate, which there is not if people
are not induced to fell scandalised, overall in the polls moment. Ernst Nolte
underlined the media role in transforming the magistracy inquiries on Kohl in an
irresistible political campaign against Kohl and the CDU.171 The assault was focused
on a CDU was showing, as people consensus, after the 27 September 1998 defeat,
170
Andrew Gimson, Greens seek inquiry on arms scandal, Telegraph, IE, 16 November 1999; Andrew
Gimson, Kohl party haunted by new allegations of illegal contributions, Telegraph, IE, 19 November
1999; Roberto Giardina, Cade il muro di Bonn. E' Tangentopoli, [The Bonn wall falls down. It is
Kickback-city], Giorno, IE, 23 November 1999; Merkel, la gelida e astuta “bambina” che ora vuole
liquidare l’ex cancelliere, [Merkel, the ice-cold and astute “child” who now wants to liquidate the exChancellor], Foglio, 29 December 1999, p. 1; Von Hannes Burger, Hat ein Zwerg Rasputin in Stoibers
Nähe die CDU verraten?, Welt, IE, 29 December 1999; Dietro lo scandalo c’è Stoiber dice la Welt,
[Die Welt tells that behind the scandal there is Stoiber], Foglio, 31 December 1999, p. 3; Per Di Pietro
una Germania fotocopia d’Italia. «Sulla corruzione eventi come da noi nel ’92», [For Di Pietro a
Germany photocopy of Italy. «On corruption events as by us in 1992»], Corsera, IE, 6 January 2000;
Taccuino tedesco, [German notebook], Foglio, 6 January 2000, p. 1; Michael J. Inacker, Schäuble:
«Abbiamo chiuso l’era Kohl», [Schäuble: «We have closed the Kohl era»], Corsera, IE, 8 January
2000; Andrea Tarquini, "Ho preso soldi come Kohl", ["I took money as Kohl did"], Repubblica, IE, 11
January 2000; Alain Abellard, Karlheinz Schreiber, le marchand d'armes par qui le scandale est
arrivé, Monde, IE, 20 January 2000; P. Val., «Sono un gatto su una cassa di topi», [«I am a cat on a
box of rats»], Corsera, IE, 21 January 2000; Giulio Andreotti, Onore a Kohl, [Honour to Kohl],
Giorno, IE, 24 January 2000; S.V., Siamo funzionari, non eroi, [We are functionaries, not heroes],
Espresso, IE, 3 February 2000; Paolo Valentino, Finanziamento illecito: nei guai anche l’Spd di
Schmidt, [Illegal financing: troubles also for the Schmidt’s SPD], Corsera, IE, 9 February 2000;
Bundestagspräsident prüft Millionenspende an die SPD, Spiegel, IE, 9 February 2000; Andreas
Borchers, Schröder: «Il carcere per i corrotti», [Schröder: «Prison for corrupted people»], Corsera,
IE, 10 February 2000; Marina Valensise, Per Colletti è fallimentare il tentativo di portare la politica
sotto l’egida della morale, la volontà di potenza è salvaguardia di civiltà, [For Colletti the attempt to
bring politics under the morale’s control is a failure, the power’s will is safeguard of civilisation], 10
February 2000, Foglio, p. 2; "Wer lügt, den werde ich überführen", Welt, IE, 21 February 2000; a.t., Le
accuse di Schreiber. "Ho pagato tutti i partiti", [The Schreiber accusations. "I have paid all parties"],
Repubblica, IE, 22 February 2000; Marina Valensise, Per Fest la globalizzazione sta soppiantando la
politica. Snobbata dalle nuove elite, tenta ormai solo i demagoghi, [For Fest globalisation is replacing
politics. Disdained from the new elites, it attracts just demagogues], Foglio, 31 March 2000, p. 2;
Fausto Bertinotti, Destre in movimento, [Rights in movement], Liberazione, 4 April 2000; Antonio
Missiroli, Come farà una Cdu più liberal a non scontentare l’anima bavarese, [How a more liberal
CDU could not disappoint the Bavarian soul], Foglio, 11 April 2000, p. 2; Georg Mascolo, "Bankrott
der Justiz", Spiegel, IE, 8 May 2000.
171
Marina Valensise, Per Nolte solo negli Stati totalitari i partiti non hanno fondi neri, [For Nolte only
in totalitarian States parties have not black funds], Foglio, 17 March 2000, p. 2.
55
stronger than the Parliamentary majority. It was an action apparently for favouring an
SPD (and eventually its fractions more disposable to subordinate to the paraAnglophone ‘globalisation’) was showing uncertain and inept in governing, and the
Leftist fractions of the CDU. From their side the CDU Lefts showed well
collaborative with the Kohl judicial liquidation, as the SPD did. Put under fire the
CDU Centre, also the SPD was put stricken from Canada, but only superficially and
in some of its fractions, so as a way for better blackmailing and submitting the SPDGreens government. The same centrist fractions of the SPD and the PM it had
expressed aligned with the judicialist strikes as their supporters and profiteers.
In such operations, systemic resilience is more decisive than the intensity of the
strikes. In fact the apparent achievement of the strikes was, in Germany, just a slight
weakening of the CDU such to reduce of some points its electoral consensus and to
make clear it was not allowed to become government party, not even in case of
growing unpopularity of the SPD-Green coalition. Practically, the German
government kept the strikes against the Centre fractions of the CDU under careful
control for avoiding the collapse of meaningful part of the political system, as in some
way, on the contrary, had verified in Italy. The German operation deployed in a frame
of Lefts had ephemerally, but really, won the general elections, before all judicialist
strike. The SPD achieved the relative majority in occasion of the 27 September 1998
general elections, with 40.9% (298 seats over 669) against 35.2% of the CDU-CSU
(28.4% + 6.7%, with 245 seats). The Greens got 6.7% votes and 47 seats. It was not
the imposition in office of a 16% party, the PDS, as it verified in Italy. The systemic
resilience, conjugated with the reality of this general elections majoritary people
consensus of the Lefts, produced, interaction with the judicialist assaults, the
consolidation of the position of the Lefts government. On the contrary the Italian
operations were, and effectively achieved results, openly against the voters wide
majority. Structural and also contents similarities of the judicialist action may not hide
quantitative and qualitative differences.
In 1999, Kohl (personally freer from internal duties as consequence of the 27
September 1998 defeat and the relative leaving of the CDU operational direction) was
leading the reorganisation of the European Centre/Centre-Right under a unifying
modernisation programme capable to gather the wide majority of the European
people. The perspective was that of the 2000 European election, the forecastable
exhaustion of the Leftist/para-US-Democrats political cycle had marked the 1990s,
and the new impulse it was possible to give to the EU after that Euro was running
along relatively sure, even if not at all solid, tracks. The Kohl strategic action was
precisely for building the political-institutional solidity was yet lacking around the
European currency. Inside this he agreed with the FI inclusion inside the EPP. The
Kohl electoral defeat in Germany had exalted the European dimension of the
operation he promoted, what terrorised Lefts had showed inapt to govern effectively.
The 1989/1990 German reunification had increased the economic and political
weight of Germany inside NATO and EU. The NATO extension and the perspectives
of EU extension, both toward east, made key point the political weight of Germany
inside this process.172 It was inevitable that the USA-UK and France played the cards
they disposed against Germany. It was again a game with complex interactions and
172
(Lepesant 1998).
56
actors also with contrasting interests, and whose outcome was not necessarily that
wished from myopic, and very bounded rationality, actors.
That the Euro and EU consolidation was terrorising the USA-UK was not a
mystery. It was sufficient to look at the generalised war triggered against it. On 24
January 2000, Andreotti underlined the coincidence between the Kohl liquidation as
international leader and the delicacy of the Russian situation, and how the Kohl
decisive role in the Euro launch perhaps was not extraneous to the campaign triggered
against him on the illegal financing. However the campaign was broader than the
person of Kohl, and also the strikes against persons are realised in such way when
persons are feared since their continuing role. The judicialist strike against the
German CDU openly started in November 1999. In that moment the SPD-Green
general election majority was characterised by growing ineptitude on all key question.
The German investigation against the CDU was led from Reinhard Nemetz, Chief
Prosecutor of the 42 Prosecutors of Augsburg, Bavaria. He conquered the position
thank to the death, at end April 1999, as consequence of a car accident (since
undefined reasons), of his predecessor, Jörg Hillinger. In connection with the
Hillinger death, judged from different sources doubtful it had been casual, relevant
documents on the case disappeared. The Prosecutor was directly handling the case
was Winfried Maier, with full support of Hillinger. ‘Obstruction’ for carefully
handling the case against various political leaders, avoiding it became too explosive,
came from their hierarchical superiors in Munich. The requests were also in direction
of the fragmentation of the case among different POs also outside Bavaria. There was
not pressure for the full suppression of the inquiry. The Nemetz rule seems to have
been more in the direction of its ‘reasonable’ dealing wanted from the Munich judicial
authorities. On the other side law is always something to manage for some goals,
depending on societal marks and force relations. So, on 27 Mai 1999, the Bavaria
General Prosecutor ordered to Maier and Nemetz that the inquiry was shared among
different PO. Maier in Augsburg would have dealt only with the position of the two
Thyssen (the tanks company) managers involved in the affair. Two other positions
(Riedl and Max Strauß) were attributed to the Monaco-1 PO, another one (Pfahls) to
the Monaco-2 PO, and Kiep to the Frankfurt PO.
Fractional struggle, or apparent fractional struggle, inside the CSU, inside the
CDU-CSU, inside the CDU, between CDU or CDU-CSU and other parties, mixed
also with other internal and international goals, as normal in such cases.
The investigation was collapsing Kohl was born since a year old inquiry of the
Augsburg (Bavaria) PO. The illegal financing was paid in 1991 to Walther Leisler
Kiep, then CDU Treasurer and Kohl tight collaborator. On 5 November 1999 the
arrest warrant against Kiep was emitted. Kiep was spectacularly arrested despite the
restrictive measure was actually useless and unjustified. Who illegally informed the
media on the contents of the Kiep deposition involving Kohl was at the high levels of
the Bavaria government, led from Edmund Stoiber. The anti-Kohl affair was made to
explode in November after the regional elections saw the participation of the two
Stoiber’s friends inside the CDU, Biedenkopf and Vogel, so they were not damaged,
and before the Schleswig-Holstein election. There was State candidate the Defence
ex-Minister Volker Rühe, whose defeat would compromise his candidacy as Federal
57
Chancellor. On 11 January 2002, Stoiber became the CDU-CSU candidate to the
position of Federal Chancellor in occasion of the autumn general elections.
Bavaria was already fully inside the 1990s destabilisation against Italy, as with
some kind of delegation on Italian affairs. Its being inside the Catholic world made it
apparatuses more easily usable since the greater connections with Italy there were
from Munich than directly from Berlin. It was precisely in Bavaria, and by the CSU,
that the Haider party was appreciated and popular.173 As in 1994, also from Bavaria
there were pressures on the LN for collapsing the Berlusconi government and the
Berlusconi politician, in 2000 Haider became suddenly active in direction of the
Italian liberal and northerner Centre, which from his side, remained suspicious of such
sudden pressing attentions. In the Kohl case Bavaria was via for operations against the
Protestant-German politics and institutions.
Pushed the case from Bavaria, Kohl, as central leader, was competence of the
Bonn judicial offices. In Bonn the inquiry against Kohl was developed from the
Chief-Department, the Prosecutor Bernd König. The inquiry could start thanks to the
authorisation, König requested and got, of the Bundestag President, the Social
Democrat Wolfgang Thierse. As consequence, different searches were realised, for
instance that of the Kohl’s business-layer Horst Weyrauch, of the other Kohl’s tight
collaborator Hans Terlinden, and of the archives of the CDU Frankfurt bank
Frank&Häuser.
The judicial case was apparently provoked from an old US-German business of the
times of the Gulf War. What means that USA sources had all the ‘evidence’ on it.
Since the specific deal the selling of 36 Fuchs Panzern (tanks Fox) to Saudi-Arabia
was, with relative ‘intermediation percentages’ to politics, also if US sources had not
got official information, it was precisely the kind of business checked from the
Echelon system. Illegal party financing was the ‘crime’ used propagandistically
against Kohl calling it with the usual claims on ‘corruption’. The British Telegraph,
the newspaper of the British Intelligence and military apparatuses, was in first line in
the claiming on the case. In its 19 November 1999 edition it had denounced the
‘corruption’ case involving Kohl. Already in its 16 November 1999 edition, it had
reported on the 1991 payment to the Kohl CDU, linked to the export of armoured
vehicles to Saudi Arabia, with the German Greens suggesting it was ‘corruption’.
Going yet back, the case had been in some way triggered from Canada where the
Bavarian arms dealer Karl Heinz Schreiber, already at the origin of the 1991 business,
had been arrested. He was accused in Germany of bribery and tax evasion for the
£350,000 1991 donation to the CDU treasurer Walther Leisler Kiep. The Schreiber
arrest had been the Anglophone participation to the celebrations of the 9 November
1989 fall of the Berlin wall, and the consequent German unification Kohl succeed
imposing to the world.
Professionally, Schreiber was a Canadian-German arm trader. He was an insider of
the Intelligence community, because he had worked, between 1983 and 1987, under
the nickname of Hunne, for the German secret services. His mission was exactly to
finance illegally political parties in connection with arm trades of German and
173
Taccuino tedesco, [German notebook], Foglio, 17 February 2000.
58
European industries. The Schreiber bail (one million Canadian dollars, 675,000
Euros), paid when he was arrested in Canada on German magistracy request, was paid
from different ‘friends’. Among them there were the Canadian Finance ex-Minister
Marc Lalonde and the New-Scotland Justice deputy-Minister Elmer Mackay. The
Schreiber career developed in tight connection with the CSU and Bavaria leader
Franz-Josef Strauss.
After his arrest, Schreiber immediately was used as witness, overall as public
‘witness, as defamer174, against Kohl and Germany. When yet on Canadian territory,
waiting his extradition to Germany, he developed a media-guerrilla offensive against
Kohl, the CDU, the entire German politics. He stated to declare, in the very early
January 2000, that the main elements of the affair were yet covered, and they would
have rapidly emerged. Schreiber declared that he was as cat among rats, and that he
had only to choose whom and when to ruin, SDP included, excluded only Greens and
PDS.
The case provoked in a months, already in the very early January 2000, a lost,
according to opinion polls, of 8% (from 46% to 38%) in the German Christian
Democrats electoral consensus, while the SPD gained 7% of the electorate, passing to
40%. So, as consequence of the media-judicial campaign, not of banal illegal
financing, opinion polls the relation CDU:SPD passed had, in the very early 2000
from 46:33% to 38:40%. The ineptitude to govern, or perceived as such from electors,
until then, of the SPD, that been overcome, in the people imaginary, from an
international and internal campaign.
Kohl suffered the coup, firstly denied, later admitted, was obliged to defend from
the abundant shit poured on him. However his reaction was proud, hard, frontal. It
was Craxi-style. It was not Andreotti-style: relying on technical defence, apparatuses
working, underground manoeuvring, the same collaboration with other judicialist
veins. On the other side the accusations against Kohl had been Craxi-style, illegal
financing presented as personal ‘corruption’.
The anti-Kohl operation saw the co-participation of the emerging new leader of the
German CDU, the ambitious Eastern-German Angela Merkel, and of the post 27
September 1998 defeat CDU President Wolfgang Schäuble, who wanted the definite
liquidation of the old Germany’s Statesman and CDU leader. The same ‘moraliser’
Wolfgang Schäuble, under pressure from Kohl, admitted an illegal financing from the
same Canadian-German arm trader Schreiber. The 11 January 2000 judicialist
newspaper La Repubblica, using its usual propagandist language, defined also this
episode as “corruption”. So one of the usual politician claiming he/she was the only
clean among disgusting ‘corrupted’ people, revealed himself equal to whom he had
accused. On 16 February 2000, Schäuble resigned as CDU President and as head of
the CDU-CSU MPs. Until them, discharged Kohl for saving himself, he had claimed
there was no evidence against him, and that he was just an innocent victim of absurd
suspicions. On 10 April 2000, Angela Merkel was elected CDU President, from the
CDU Congress. And CDU General Secretary became Ruprecht Polenz, of the same
Leftist wing of the party, but coming from Western Germany. The political operation
174
It was objectively such. His information was likely truthful. Its selective and focused providing,
with media moralist interpretation and suggestions, made it objectively defamatory.
59
of Merkel was to move the party more toward the Centre, subtracting political space
to the FDP (the Liberal Party) but also letting eventually free space, on the right, to
nationalist movements.
The confirmation that the whole affair was used, for what concerned its German
internal aspects, just from the SPD for liquidating the CDU strength, while the
operation was, in the foreign intentions, also against SPD fractions, went
unequivocally from Schreiber. On 21 February 2000, he continued to insist, from
Canada, that the SPD, Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping included, was fully inside
the illegal financing mechanisms. In this occasion also Die Welt, and what it
represented in Germany, the German ruling class, reacted against the massacre game,
alias the nearly generalised destabilisation, against German politics and consequently
against the whole Germany.
Coherent with the criminal rewriting of the history of all the non-Anglophone
countries, on 8 February 2000, also the SPD ex-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was
‘accused’ of the same illegal financing by which Kohl had been accused. Schmidt was
the protagonist of the start of the US and European reaction to the intimidation, or
supposed such, against Western Europe represented from the deployment of the
Russia SS-20 at the DDR-DBR border, in the 1980. That deployment was possible, in
Europe, since the Italian alignment with Germany, would have not verified without
the decisive missiles option of the Craxi PSI. However one might evaluate that option
and the Soviet block collapse, the missiles option was the strategic defeat of the
Soviet block unmasking its de facto incapability to react to economic defy after had
been contrasted at military level. However Schmidt was, in the late 1990s, relatively
outside the daily political game. So apart from the Anglophone joy for anti-German
propaganda, there was no specific interest in targeting him. What evidenced further
the political persecution Kohl was suffering. For the same ‘crime’ Kohl was under
fire, while Schmidt let free to cure his businesses. In case of a purely legal action,
‘crimes’ would have been the only concern. In a political persecution, persons are the
only concern of the apparently judicial action. Since, this reason the action is not
really judicial but judicialist.
Also in the German case, Jew lobbies showed to have been solidly against the
CDU, alias from the Lefts side (the 1990s European taxi-parties of the economicfinancial powers), and consequently from the side of the destabilising operation.
When the Assia CDU Administrative ex-Secretary Casimiro von Sayn-Wittgenstein
declared that the CDU funds in Liechtenstein came from Jews emigrated from
Germany, Paul Spiegel, the President of the Jew Central Council of Germany defined
that, on 18 January 2000, as an “infamous slander”. And the Israeli press denounced
the “anti-Semitic prejudices” these arguments would have fed.175 Since the apparent
craziness (but accepted as reasonable) of the reaction, one may suppose it had the
function to cover other things. As in Italy, ethnic minorities and private interests
before aligned on the Centre ought to abjure their previous alignment for fully
aligning with the new rulers. Otherwise, examining purely rationally the arguing,
there was nothing of anti-Semitic in reporting the eventual illegal financing of a party
from Jew or Arab (also Arabs are racially Semitic). Also the 19 January 2000 IHT
175
Paolo Valentino, Fondi neri, la Cdu giustizia il «padre» Kohl, [Black funds, the CDU execute its
«father» Kohl], Corsera, 19 January 2000.
60
wrote: “Bungled explanations this week attributing some of the money found overseas
to contributions by ''Jews'' have further compounded the party's plight and envenomed
the atmosphere with accusations of anti-Semitism. The party took the unusual step of
apologizing ''to our Jewish compatriots.''”176. Since this international echo attributed
to these senseless claims, and the even more nonsense represented from the CDU
excuses, the whole episode may be interpreted as clear evidence of the co-interest, of
decisive financial lobbies, in the anti-CDU and anti-German campaign. It showed also
that the Jew lobbies were very well informed on the terms of the CDU illegal
financing, and also on the fact that there was who/which would have been strongly
stricken, but also who/which ought to be saved. In this game the CDU was the
succumbing party. Otherwise Jew lobbies could not know whether Jew sources had
financed the CDU, they would have not cared to call out from the affair publicly
abjuring the CDU, and the Jew lobbies and Israeli attack would have been
unexplainable. It does not seems an insult177, but eventually only a factual truth or
falsehood, whether an interest group had supposedly178 illegally financed a party.
Key of the German affair-building from a banal illegal financing was the
provocation by media. Apart from a British and Anglophone press pleased in the
defamation of German historical enemy, apart from the diffusion of secret judiciary
materials, false information was constantly diffused. It was meaningful the 23 January
2000 episode when, for creating panic, the false news that Kohl wanted to do the
names of the CDU secret financiers was diffused. That this kind of campaign
progress, when launched, with the apparent dynamic of self-propelling machine,
although information and defamation be carefully oriented, was showed from the
inclusion of France, the Euro new space number-2 country, in this international attack
on politics illegal financing, ‘bribing’, ‘corruption’. The defamation by press involved
directly the French Socialists, specifically the French ex-President Mitterand, in the
affair.179 That by Elf French and foreign politics was financed could not astonish
anybody. And it seemed perfectly legitimate that, eventually also from French
fraction, illegal financing could be delivered to foreign fractions judged, in a specific
moment, less incompatible with French interests, or French fractions interests.
However it is interesting, from the custom-cultural point of view, to underline how
the same Statesmen (and also their supportive ordinary people and intellectuals
instructed from media on what to think), the same Mitterand and Kohl, had been well
happy to ‘discover’ in 1992/1993 the horrible ‘corruption’ of an inferior (as latitude)
country as Italy, and overall that of Craxi and its Liberal Centre allied, now
discovered (or were discovered/unmasked) as affected from the same ‘corruption’.
Politics was relatively costly not only in Italy, also in Germany and France, despite
their superiority (as latitude), not differently from elsewhere, and illegal financing,
and/or ‘corruption’ if one prefers, were quantitatively and qualitatively similar180.
176
Roger Cohen, Kohl Resigns Post After Rebuke by Party Over Scandal, IHT, IE, 19 January 2000.
In reality only a xenophobic perception considers a national and/or cultural adjective as insulting.
For instance, nobody perceives as insulting the concepts of Catholic finance and Latin finance.
178
A financing from abroad to a current account outside Germany is not necessarily illegal from the
side of the financer. It seems more probable it is not. And it seems anyway doubtful that the eventually
illegal intentions could be demonstrated.
179
See the Daily Telegraph and the Sunday Times. Paolo Valentino, «Kohl ha deciso di fare i nomi».
Ma è un falso, [«Kohl decided to reveal names». But it is a false], Corsera, IE, 24 January 2000.
180
From the rigidly legal point of view there is incomparability among different realities, being crimes
created by law. However, it may be supposed the substantial similarity of the politics financing needs.
177
61
Only the Prosecution action and independence/dependence from systemic interest was
different.
At end March 2000, it was finally public that the STASI knew also the CDU, and
Kohl, illegal financing from West Germany companies, including the details on its
mechanism and Swiss accounts, already, at least, from 1976. 181 Since relevant STASI
archives had been stolen from the USA, and since the USA spied carefully their allied
governments, ‘evidence’, certainly not only against Kohl, either against only one
political party or fraction, was on the dossiers’ market since a long time. The decision
whether to use it, and when, was not a legal choice or duty,.
For the Repubblica/l’Espresso group, the ‘Kohl’ affair was occasion for claiming
that Europe had been built on bribes. A banal illegal financing became the Kohl
system. Mitterand became an amoral chap who allied with the ‘unprejudiced’ Kohl.
Following known patterns, ‘experts’ were quoted for stating that the CDU had always
been an artificial party, fed by ‘corruption’ and that its role exhausted in 1989.182
They were the same claims on the Italian DC and PSI, in the moment foreign and
internal powers had decided to destroy them, without electors could ever allowed to
decide, after that in 1992 they had confirmed them, whether they wanted them
anymore. The 1999 European elections had confirmed the EPP as the first European
party, and the first one both in Germany and Italy. .
For the 5 January 2000 Senator, and ex-Prosecutor, Senator Di Pietro, a specialist
and practitioner in political-institutional destabilisation, the German operation,
apparently started as operation against Kohl, was a photocopy of the operation started
in 1992 in Italy. Since the differences with the 1992 starts were substantive, the Di
Pietro individuation of “«practically a photocopy»” 183 concerned evidently the
substance of the operation pointing to the destabilisation of a system for substantially
weakening it. It was not know whether Di Pietro had some reserved information on
agencies having, hypothetically, used the same operational patterns in both cases.
Di Pietro released an interview on the ‘Kohl’ case, appeared on the 28 March 2000
Süddeutsche Zeitung, Monaco, Bavaria, Germany. After having described the
‘criminal’ activity of Craxi, the illegal financing of the OLP, socialist parties and
liberation movements around the world, Eastern Europe dissidents, etc. by the
International Bank of Luxemburg, after having noticed the substantial identity of
financial networks, whatever the country, for party illegal (or supposedly illegal)
financing, and after having expressed his usual philosophy on political corruption
(good hotels, big autos, and good life: exactly the accusation of the Brescia PO
against Di Pietro, judicially but not factually ‘innocent’ – Di Pietro was more
interesting as psychological case, but individual psychology is outside the question of
the present research), Di Pietro arrived at the key point of the interview. It was the
181
Andrea Tarquini, Tangenti alla CDU. la Stasi sapeva tutto, [Bribes to the CDU. The Stasi knew
everything], Repubblica, IE, 29 March 2000; Scandalo Cdu. Gli 007 della Ddr sapevano da anni,
[CDU scandal. It was years that the DDR 007s knew], Stampa, IE, 29 March 2000.
182
Wlodek Goldkorn and Stefano Vastano, Mazzette d'Europa, [Europe’s bribes], Espresso, IE, 3
February 2000.
183
Per Di Pietro una Germania fotocopia d’Italia. «Sulla corruzione eventi come da noi nel ’92», [For
Di Pietro a Germany photocopy of Italy. «On corruption events as by us in 1992»], Corsera, IE, 6
January 2000.
62
connection, he perhaps reservedly knew would have been judicially created, among
Berlusconi, Kirch and Kohl. Di Pietro introduced the revelation – objectively a Di
Pietro-Süddeutsche Zeitung (with what both represented) revelation since the
relevance given also internationally to the interview – with the usual complaining on
Berlusconi. Berlusconi was for him the personification of the conflict of interests
(which Di Pietro did not feel relatively to himself, as profiteer of the destabilisation he
had started and led), since supposed ‘his’ media, with the, for DI Pietro, risk of
modern form of dictatorship (concept means nothing by itself, and anyway a ‘modern
form of dictatorship’ was the same Di Pietro aspiration – again Di Pietro was more
interesting as psychological case –, what is a denigration neither relatively to Di
Pietro nor to anybody else: dictatorship with people vote and support was and is in the
best tradition and practice, for example, of Liberal countries). It was the usual
judicialist deadly war against national and/or modernising political leaders, spiced but
the Süddeutsche Zeitung sorrow for the Andreotti acquittal cooked in the Di Pietro
judicialist philosophy both the point and on politics. Di Pietro declared that there was
not yet any knowledge of direct [implicitly: criminal, for Di Pietro] connection among
the three personages184. However, for Di Pietro, the connection among Berlusconi,
Kirch and Kohl was the key link for understanding the connections between politics
and businesses in Germany185. For Di Pietro it would have been necessary to
investigate this connection. He reserved a rhetorical ‘perhaps’ [‘vielleicht’] only for
his conviction that investigating on this connection would have permitted to better
define the thing186.187 A specialist in building the needed ‘evidence’, and also in
letting sleeping and/or well covered the one needed to be suppress, Di Pietro knew
that to choose a vein (Berlusconi-Kirch-Kohl assimilated in some world conspiracy)
permitted to avoid other ones eventually not in the interest of the judicialist campaign
one was leading, and that, investigating on a business and political connection, it was
possible to built whatever case one wanted to offer to the popular fantasy for
destroying judicially and propagandistically the chosen targets. Kirch and FininvestMediaset had been in business connection. Kohl and Berlusconi had been in political
connection, since the common belonging to the EPP. If one wanted to strike the EPP
(or also a German-Italian axis), and specifically its liberal and modernising part, to
focus, Milan PO-style, an investigation on the three personages indicated from Di
Pietro would have permitted to dissolve German and Italian key national and
modernising components, whatever the final judicial outcome of the judicialist
campaign. As in his 1992/1993 pogrom and 1994 campaign, Di Pietro was interested
essentially in political theorems, and in the moment French ‘crimes’ were emerging in
connection with the German ‘ones’. In practice Di Pietro and the Süddeutsche Zeitung
were telling that is was of no interest to inquire the specific French ‘crimes’ were
emerging, while it was indispensable does not forget who the enemies were: Kohl and
Berlusconi, the Andreotti acquittals had made even more urgent to continue to keep
under fire, for avoiding all Italian and European politics reconstruction.
“«Noch sind direkte Zusammenhänge nicht bekannt.»”
“«Aber die Verbindung Berlusconi-Kirch-Kohl it ein fundamentales Gelenk, um die
Zusammenhänge zwischen Politik and Geschäften.»”
186
“«Ein Gelenk, das näher untersucht werden muss: Die Ermittlungen werden vielleicht noch genauer
herausbringen, wie die Dinge wirklich stehen.»”
187
“Die Verbindung Berlusconi-Kirch-Kohl muss untersucht werden”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, IE, 28
March 2000.
184
185
63
For the February 2000 philosopher and liberal MP Lucio Colletti, clearly referring
also the destabilisation in Germany, the judiciary incursions testified the weakening of
politics, which permitted to be, eventually exogenously, easily conditioned. For him
the attempt to bring politics under morale was a failure. For Colletti, politics ought to
be autonomous and obeying only to the law power increase. For him politics was
power will. What was, without any hypocrisy, a normal Hobbesian vision.
The Kohl case had also class precise roots in the inaptitude of the Kohl
governments, not less than the ‘red’-green government, in front of the modernisation.
Entrepreneurs, after years of requests to a perceived as deaf Kohl government, which
reacted with indifference to enterprise needs, simply preferred to transfer part of their
activities elsewhere, for example in Ireland where the environmental conditions were
considerably better. Similarly there had been entrepreneurs who in front of a Luddist
local administration in Bavaria, which refused industrialisation, moved to Switzerland
were costs were lower and the environmental conditions better. Germany, as Italy,
was not liked from foreign direct investors, who preferred the UK, Ireland, Spain,
India. The German government, and local governments, had bureaucracies had the
power to obstruct modernisation, but they had no power to hamper that wealth and
wealth production moved elsewhere. For the March 2000 FAZ director Joachim Fest,
consequence of ‘scandals’, in Germany, was that politics attracted just adventurers. In
addition, if politics did not show concern on modernisation, entrepreneur did not
interest in politics.188 And, as the 1990s Italian experience unequivocally showed, for
strong interests it was easier and cheaper to buy and submit adventurers. The same
advantage there was not for the country as a whole.
The Schröder’s judiciary option to political power consolidation
As in the Italian case, also in the 1999/2000 Germany, internal forces, more
accepted (also from international interests) than the stricken ones, accepted to play the
judiciary option against other political fractions. In the person of the then SPD PM
Gerhard Schröder the judicialist symptoms were fully present. They were in substance
the support to a selective attack (despite the generalisation of the stricken
phenomenon) well focused on his political adversaries transformed in enemies, and
the acceptation of, and profit from, the method of the authoritarian containment of
these adversaries-enemies.
The judicial option against internal-to-the-SPD PM Schröder objective enemies
had been already used for liquidation the SPD Secretary and Schröder minister Oskar
Lafontaine. In this way the dualism between the liberal-democratic and socialdemocratic lines inside the SPD and government had been solved, against all electors
will, after the 27 September 1998 elections, in favour of the former. While the STASI
dossiers, the USA had stolen, continued to remain under US control, using STASI
dossiers rumours Lafontaine was induced, in March 1999, to abandon suddenly
government, Parliament and all political engagement. Lafontaine had been a partisan,
at the beginning of the 1980s of a proposal of German unification by its disarmament
and neutralisation. The episode may be evaluated in different ways. Lafontaine was
188
Marina Valensise, Per Fest la globalizzazione sta soppiantando la politica. Snobbata dalle nuove
elite, tenta ormai solo i demagoghi, [For Fest globalisation is replacing politics. Disdained from the
new elites, it attracts just demagogues], Foglio, 31 March 2000, p. 2.
64
liquidated since his present role, not since his past ideas and actions. The German
control of the STASI dossiers, instead of their US eventual utilisation, would have
permitted in that case, as in the case of the German illegal financing, that German
people, not foreign centres of interests, decided on their politicians. The SPD electors
knew Lafontaine when they had voted, just 5/6 months before, more since his
presence that since the Schröder one. It was evident Schröder was pushed from forces
outside all formal-democratic control. The episode had some procedural similarities
with the replacement of Prodi from D’Alema, verified in the same period. People, just
a 35%, had voted Prodi as implicit PM. Without any electors’ vote, and since USNATO interests relative to the aggression against Belgrade, on 21 October 1998
D’Alema replaced Prodi. In Germany there was already in the moment of the 27
September 1998 elections the dualism between the formal candidate PM Schröder,
and a Lafontaine destined to control tightly him or to be the hidden real PM, and this
dualism was approved from the electors. The dualism was solved outside people vote
by a simple liquidation. Lafontaine was not even politically liquidated inside the SPD.
A dirty and hidden dossier war (with the dossier controlled and eventually
manipulated from the USA) threatened and dismissed him, at Schröder benefit.
The judicialist liquidation of Lafontaine, who avoided a long fight accepting the
liquidation eventually waiting for him better times, coincides temporally with the start
of the dossiers war, but now with long defamation and assault against an irreducible
Kohl. Liquidate the main Schröder revival on his Lefts, in March 1999, in April 1999
the operation against Kohl, the political giant occupying the same political space
wanted to occupy an uncertain Schröder, started, equally with Schröder full judicialist
and anti-national attitude. The pretext for defaming the German recent history were a
few, or a few tens, billion liras of illegal financing, by which one wanted to justify the
destruction of the CDU, or at least of the Kohl CDU.
The PM Schröder judicialist arguing expressed indifferently on internal and
international affairs. Schröder reaffirmed, for example, on 9 February 2000, his full
adhesion to hardliner judicialist positions stating that State, either despite or thanks to
the CDU judicially-induced crisis, was working everyday better. And he defined as
State, in the order, media, POs, and federal government. It was the apotheosis of the
judicial way. Media were synonym of the economic interests baking them and the
judicialist strikes. POs were synonyms of some Prosecutors accepted to be oriented
from powers and political interests. Federal government were the same Schröder. This
was his conception of State, and of Germany
On 17 February 2000, a Schröder perhaps overexcited from the apparent
progressing of the German judicialist way to power consolidation declared that if, in
Italy, ‘Fascists’ had acceded government, the EU would have intervened (it was not
clear whether by bombardments, terrorism, or other ways). The reply of the Italian
Lefts-Right government was, naturally, non-existent. A pleased then-PM D’Alema
suggested that the dangerous Italian ‘Fascists’ were represented from a suddenly, for
D’Alema, ‘anti-European’ LN had just refused to fully submit to the same D’Alema
who had for years courted it. For D’Alema only who had policies aligned with
international powers was conform to a metaphysical ‘Europe’ and guarantor of what
he called Italy’s ‘accountability’, alias silent submission. A President Ciampi with
difficulties to be a real Statesman in front of Germany, overall when Germany had
evidently an adventurer as PM, replied that in Italy there were not Fascists. A real
65
Statesman would have rejected all interference and promoted the immediate coldness
with such foreign adventurers. Actually they there were Fascists, also in the LeftsRights D’Alema Parliamentary uncertain majority [or non-minority, depending on
days]. Although it was not Schröder business to decide who would have governed
Italy. Coherent with the interests represented from the pro Jew and international
finance newspaper Repubblica on which he wrote, Bocca, a revolutionary Fascist
until 1943, remembered that contemporary Italian ‘Fascism’ was less subversive than
the Berlusconi liberal Centre was. It was true if one positively correlated
‘subversivism’ with capability to defend national interests. If the Lefts or Left-centre
was well happy also for this further interference, it was charge of the Liberal Centre to
reject it. Berlusconi spoke of unacceptable interference in Italian questions, and
serious injury to the sovereignty principle. Fini underlined the ridiculous and
irresponsible character of the Schröder assertions, while Casini, more formal, asked
the President Ciampi intervention. Cossiga invited Schröder to limit to put his nose in
his fatherland business. The Schröder Germany was characterised, the months after
the Schröder xenophobic declarations and initiatives from growing violence against
foreigners, with benevolent attitude of the Schröder government evidently had no
interest to block them.
The judicial way to power or to power reinforcement could not produce, in the
continental Europe specific contexts, better formal rulers than the Schröders and
company. Schröder had actually fear that, in Germany, the National Right could cover
the space had been let free from the judicialist strikes against the CDU Centre,
making so vain the judicialist offensive. Consequently he theorised a kind of
international Clan defining that only the anti-national and anti-EU Lefts would have
been allowed to be in office. In fact as reply to the disputing on the Schröder verbal
abuses, his deputy-Minister, responsible for the relationship with media, remembered
that ‘Europe’ was, for him, made of values. Ethical State is also good excuse for
affirming personal and partisan interests.189 A normal State is founded on collective
services could not better provided otherwise. Although anyway the values Schröder
was advancing were xenophobia and cultural intolerance at service of partisan
interests, as already showed against Austria after the SPÖ was dismissed from the
Austrian government, and also internally, in Germany, pushing xenophobic terrorism
against foreigners by provocateurs in reality outside nationalist parties had no interest
to self-discredit.
Consequently after having weakened the CDU and opened political space at his
right, the Schröder government tried, to discredit the Nationalist parties using
provocation against them. It was a full range judicialism, firstly against the Left of the
SPD, later against the Kohl CDU, and finally, by underground provocation, against
National Right parties. All that had the function to exalt the centrality of the same
Schröder, Schröder could not evidently achieve politically. It was not the behaviour of
a Statist the Schröder discrimination against Kohl in occasion of the 3 October 2000
Dresden celebration for the 10th anniversary of the German unification. There were a
189
Paolo Franchi, Il politicamente scorretto, [The politically incorrect], Corsera, IE, 18 February
2000; Gianluca Luzi, Tempesta su Schröder, [Storm on Schröder], Repubblica, IE, 18 February 2000;
Giorgio Bocca, Fantasmi e nuove ossessioni, [Phantoms and new obsessions], Repubblica, IE, 18
February 2000; Il Polo insorge: accusa inaccettabile, [The Pole upsurges: unacceptable accusation],
Repubblica, IE, 18 February 2000; Ma Berlino insiste. "Haider vi contagia", [But Berlin insists.
"Haider infects you"], Repubblica, IE, 18 February 2000.
66
Schröder had been against and had voted against the German unification, and the
French President Chirac and the US State Secretary Albright. But there was not Kohl,
the real and unique protagonist of the unification.
The attempted reduction of French politics to criminal question
The French judicialism was extremely more insidious for the French institutions
than the German ‘Kohl’ affair. Not only the French State was traditionally weaker
than the German one, but also it was the same nature of the judicialist pressure there
was in France to make it more real and deep. In France, illegal financing inquiries
were fragmented, used from different political fractions, in different places at
different levels, against other political fractions. They exploited, but also reinforced,
the pressure coming from important and nationally organised fractions of magistracy
for magistracy ‘independence’ and ‘autonomy’, alias for fully becoming autonomous
corporation and independent from all formal-democratic and State control.
In such conditions it is relatively easy for Prosecutors and Examining Magistrates
acquiring popularity discrediting a weak politics, exploiting their social prestige for
conditioning the whole magistracy and imposing their constitution in corporation to
irresponsible institutions, if they really accept to act irresponsibly. Media-judiciary
circuits are the ingredients, while the subordination of clans of Prosecutors and
Examining Magistrates to the one or the other power the substance. In the French
dynamics there were successes and failures, for the militant magistracy action. If the
use of the one or the other Prosecutor and/or Examining Magistrate for inter-party and
intra-party struggle may be relatively physiologic to all contemporary State, direct
strikes to institutions are serious pathologies. Such is the judicial dismissal of a
Minister for unproved ‘crimes’, and with media-judicial campaign furiously, and
illegally since the illegal diffusion of secret judicial material, launched for mounting
cases nearly on nothing (from a legal point of view), and suddenly made quiet, even
without any apparent progress of the investigation, when the target liquidation was
achieved.
It was the case of the media-judicial dismissal, in November 1999, of the French
Economy Minister Strauss-Kahn, in temporal and factual connection with the
quarrelling between Anglophone world and continental Europe on the world trade.
Strauss-Kahn was strong French and European Statesman in front of the USA
pretence to impose their private needs also to France and Europe. Alias, his
liquidation was interest of the USA and of the indigenous political-financial interests
connected with them, of which the Prosecutors and Examining Magistrates
objectively submitted. If really the enormous frauds seemed to have been perpetrated
decades before from Strauss-Kahn vanished just be resigned from Minister, the
Prosecutors triggered the action and the defamation either might have been inept or
bought, or also both, what anyway could be measured only when the running events
had been exhausted. Also in case of guiltiness of the ‘suspect’, the media defamation
realised from the Prosecutors would remain as the judicial liquidation of a Minister
for responsibilities totally unconnected with his ministerial action.
For the Herald Tribune commentator John Vincour, the Strauss-Kahn resignation
demonstrated that in France a revolution was running and that an independent justice
67
had formed. For Vincour, the judge power had self-constituted in France, and it,
divorced from politics, represented the tutor of free market and the symbol of
modernity in France. Alias, the French anti- Strauss-Kahn magistracy represented the
revolutionary power aligned on the US side, consequently from the right side, for
their struggle for conquering the world markets. Naturally Vincour exalted also the
key role of the press, which for him was ‘judges’ vector in the Strauss-Kahn case. It is
meaningful the definition of the Prosecutors and/or Examining Magistrates as
‘judges’. In the judicialist imaginary there are special commissions liquidating the
targets need to be liquidated, with the irrelevance of the violation of their legal
guarantees, of the legal procedures and of their later legal innocence or guiltiness:
their interest is the result, not as it is achieved. Finally, Vincour, self-designed speaker
of the French people, stated that the anti- Strauss-Kahn magistracy action permitted to
conserve the French electors trust in French democracy, and the foreign partners trust
in the French market.190 Alias, the satisfaction of the US penetration in a market was
what made ‘democratic’ the relative country. Either the Herald Tribune commentator
was raving, or the November 1999 Strauss-Kahn liquidation was strongly wished
from the USA. Alias it was not a banal and casual judicial case.
As in Italy, these essays of judicialist campaigns were both at political-institutional
and economic personnel level. On Friday 28 April 2000, the Paris Examining
Magistrate Jean-Pierre Zanpto informed the Governor of the Bank of France Trichet
of the imminent emission of a GW against him for stories relative to the Crédit
Lyonnais, in 1992/1993, when Trichet were Director of the Treasury Ministry. In
September 1993 he became Governor of the Bank of France. The magistracy inquiry
on him was relative to the crime of false budged. Trichet was reputed candidate as
Governor of the ECB in 2002. He was a liberal and partisan of a strong French Franc
and, later, of a strong Euro.191 If the judicialist climate imposes, and in France there
were relevant symptoms in this direction, by these simple actions it is possible to put
under blackmail whatever institution and to manoeuvrer the access, or to ban,
whoever from State positions. One reduces easily to the conditions of the Scalfaro
Presidency, when militant magistracy, had co-participate to the selections of
governments as of all accession to State high position, if not necessarily actively
giving agreements, certainly negatively giving nulla osta192.
In France there was, at certain politico-institutional levels, the consciousness of the
inevitable developments, if judicialism had not been obstructed. In different
occasions, for example, on 21 November 1999, the French nationalist Socialist
Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement had underlined that magistrates and/or
other investigators had defamed by an accomplice press a Minister (the reference was
to Strauss-Kahn) illegally diffusing secret investigative information. In addition, for
Sotto l’occhio compiaciuto dell’amico americano nuove spinte per un’Europa giustizialista.
Perché?, [Under the pleased eye of the American friend new pushes for a judicialist Europe. Why?],
Foglio, 5 November 1999.
191
La magistratura bracca Trichet, il miglior grand commis rimasto a Parigi, [Magistracy hunts
Trichet, the best grand commis remained in Paris], Foglio, 3 May 2000.
192
No obstacle, a kind of stamp that there was no intention to oppose [judicial, in this case] obstacles to
the designation.
190
68
him, if the French Prosecutors had become independent from government, they would
have become led from lobbies, ideologies, corporatism.193
On the contrary militant magistrates, showing having a real personal interest in the
matter, were desperately pressing for a Constitutional reform would have permitted
the magistracy constitution in independent power and let Prosecutors free from all
political control and orientation. Not casually the slogan of the French magistracy was
to do as in Italy. French militant magistrates emphasised as they would have wanted
to define criminal policies and campaigns as, for them, Italy’s magistrates had done,
and, as in Italy, the wanted to be free to organise in Pools and in clans. And exactly as
in Italy and among the international protectors of Italy’s militant magistrates, the
French magistrates and their supporters used the theory that French politics had let
emptiness, French magistracy had been obliged to fill, developing its substitution role.
It was the usual and weird argument of all the planned subversion: ‘we are obliged to
substitute an absent politics’, a typical coup d’État justification. There was from
French militant magistrates the same Italian-judicialist hope of a European and world
legal space would have liquidated the residual government powers on Justice (where
yet there were: it was not the Italian case), and the same claims on their citizens direct
legitimacy for some divine reason militant magistrates supposed to enjoy, while
actually citizens voted politicians and not magistrates. It was the mechanism of
substitution of formal-democracy by media-created demagogy: untested advertising
would have replaced the one tested by people vote. The 1999 strikes both to the
majority and to the opposition seemed to point to get, by the militant magistracy
blackmail on politics, the 3/5 of the Congress (the two Chambers’ joint meeting) for
that kind of Constitutional reform.194 That magistrates clans were acting for flattering,
and intimidating at the same time, both the Left and the Right, by crossing strikes,
was showed by the strong personal action of Jospin and Chirac for the reform
magistrates wanted. Fortunately for the French institutions stability, the Jospin and
Chirac commitment was not sufficient.
1990s French leaders had certainly familiarity with the use of judicialist techniques
relatively to other countries. On 3 May 2000, the French President Chirac announced
his intention of an Austria-case-style Francophone xenophobic and slander campaign
if in Italy the Berlusconi front had won the general elections scheduled for
winter/spring 2001. The Chirac opposition to the LN derived from the traditional
French chauvinism against Britain, Corsica, Basque Countries, and Savoy. But, more
relevant, there was again the fear of a stronger Italy in the moment the judicialist
destabilisation developed with foreign support had miserably failed. In fact no open
attack to the LN was echoed when until it had remained submitted to the Leftsjudicialist needs.195 The use of judicialist technique in international relations however
does not explain the inclination of Chirac and Jospin to capitulate in front of the
Sotto l’occhio compiaciuto dell’amico americano nuove spinte per un’Europa giustizialista.
Perché?, [Under the pleased eye of the American friend new pushes for a judicialist Europe. Why?],
Foglio, 5 November 1999.
194
Stefano Cingolani, Politici-giudici, il duello che spacca Parigi, [Politicians-judges, the duel breaks
Paris], Corsera, IE, 22 November 1999; S.Ci., «In Francia è presto per Mani pulite», [«In France it is
early for Clean Hands»], Corsera, IE, 22 November 1999.
195
Giampiero Martinotti, Chirac: “Italia come l’Austria se governassero Polo e Lega”, [Chirac: “Italy
as Austria if Pole and League governed”], Repubblica, 10 May 2000; Farnesina, Foglio, 11 May
2000, p. 1; Giampiero Martinotti, Chirac, giallo a Parigi sulla scomunica al Polo, [Chirac, detective
story on the Paris excommunication of the Pole], Repubblica, 11 May 2000.
193
69
internal judicialism. There was perhaps the illusion, or the concrete possibility, to
orient it by different tools.
Anyway, in January 2000, a wise French Parliament sunk the anti-guarantist
reform of the French judiciary system, refusing the running Constitutional reform,
which would have transformed French magistracy in an independent and irresponsible
power. What had failed, in that moment, was the coup for transforming the CSM in
autonomous power governing the judges careers, an Italian-style reform. Only some
superficial guarantist bill on citizens’ rights, the judicialist block had proposed as
mask of the institutional take-over, was approved from the French Parliament. The
institutional take-over implicit in the constitution of magistracy in independent and
uncontrolled power would have been difficulty reversible, while, as the Italian
experience (but also the media-judicial defamation in France) had showed, when
magistracy is independent and uncontrolled no Parliament law on citizens legal
guarantees conserves any validity. The French Parliament refusal to submit to the
Jospin and Chirac intention to please judicialist magistracy diffused an hysterical
climate in the political centres of judicialism. The leftist Magistrates Syndicate (SM)
had denounced that French Justice were going back of 50 year in terms of judiciary
independence.196 What was the further confirmation that the point was exactly the
possibility of different clans to use the judiciary function against State and society,
with State and citizens funds and apparatuses. Just the French Parliament stopped the
Constitutional reform towards the judicialist take-over, a case of usual party illegal
financing involving Gaullists, Liberals, Socialists and Communists was triggered in
Paris. The usual technique of concurrency suppression with relative small percentages
to politics was hypothesised from magistracy, accusing politics of ‘corruption’.197 It
was a small and hungry revenge, however showed what could have taken place at
service of whatever strong private interests if the French politics had abdicated to its
supremacy on magistracy.
For the December 1999 French jurist Robert Badinter, in the main Western
European countries power had passed from politics to other powers under the form of
national and supranational assumption of power from magistracy. For him, the mediajudiciary circuit was the expropriation of the citizen power. In fact, for him, CSMs
autonomously governing magistracy were the magistracy autonomy from Justice
Ministries, alias from all democratic control.198
The process was more general, also if it had nothing of irresistible and, in last
analysis, systemic marks and trends characterised the magistracy specific utilisation,
which certainly not, also in the Western history, a new phenomenon. In Israel, a
militant and warrior State, in the moment of its crisis in front of the Palestinian
question had used both Kennedy-style killing of its leader and judicial liquidations of
doves. When the peace solutions progressed, the pro-appeasement leaders (when not
196
Così finisce, senza rimpianti e tra gli imbarazzi, la riforma giustizialista della Giustizia, [In this
way, without regrets and among embarrassments, the judicialist reform of Justice finishes], Foglio, 20
January 2000; Cécile Prieur, Réforme de la justice : le gouvernement veut sauver les meubles, Monde,
IE, 20 January 2000; Jacqueline Coignard, Réforme Guigou: diagnostic après amputation, Libération,
IE, 20 January 2000.
197
Parigi, un’inchiesta su molti miliardi divisi equamente tra i partiti, [Paris, an inquiry on many
milliards equitably shared among parties], Foglio, 28 January 2000, p. 1.
198
Stefano Cingolani, «Così i politici hanno perso il potere», [«In this way politicians lost power»],
Corsera, 23 December 1999.
70
directly eliminated as Rabin) started to be object of media-police-judicial campaigns.
For example, it was sufficient the Israeli President Ezer Weizman declared, at the end
of 1999, that he was decisively in favour of the peace with Syria, because, a week
later, the very early January 2000, the usual Swiss account suddenly was used for
opening a defamation campaign against him, and finally obliging him to resign. 199 He
suddenly became a ‘corrupt’ despite the media campaign against him was led by
undemonstrated, and also indemonstrable, claims.200 Also in Israel politically parties
cost and they were financed from various kind of private supporters, whatever the
party and whoever the politician. What is not necessarily corruption. Just Weizman
resigned, at mid-2000, the campaign suddenly arrested. The same aggressions were
used against Israeli PMs in the same phase of the appeasement with Palestinians and
with the surrounding Arab world. However, in Israeli, these campaigns were under
tight control of State apparatuses, what is different from judicialism, which is more a
form of State dissolution than a simple fractional struggle overflowing outside the
secrecy of the power palaces.
Gian Carlo Caselli, the Palermo ex-Chief Prosecutor passed to the prisons system
direction, commented the German and French judicialist strikes with the usual
disconnected logic characterised his daily interventions. He claimed, on the 18
January 2000 La Repubblica, that since there were politicians under investigation also
in Germany and France, the argument of the protagonism of certain magistrates,
relatively to the persecution of some inquired politicians, might not be used. It was the
‘logic’ of the self-absolution of the Italian judicialism (and also of the foreign ones)
only because in some way it was replicating elsewhere. For Caselli the German and
French episodes meant that there was the pressing need of judiciary control on politics
and State, need was, for Caselli, common to the entire Europe.201 It was as to State
that since there were crimes in different counties, this demonstrated crimes were good
and necessary. It is certainly possible to claim, also without justification, the necessity
of judges (why not of bakers, or professors, or unemployed?) dictatorship. However
the claiming that the verifying of some facts demonstrated the goodness and/or
necessity of their becoming chronic was senseless. In fact Caselli did not explain on
what was founded the supposed right of the formally-democratically uncontrolled
magistracy, Caselli dreamt, to control, in continental Europe, State and society.
Caselli limited to assert that since some magistrates of some European States were
striking politicians, this gave them, and to other their colleagues representing the same
interests, the divine right to transform themselves also more in formallydemocratically uncontrolled power controlling the entire continental Europe in a kind
of judicialist European dictatorship. This ‘superior’ caste showed in reality, in Italy,
absolutely inept to assure the efficient work both of the judiciary and of the prisons
systems it managed. It guaranteed only wastes, corruption and abuses of citizens
rights, it used as excuses fro pressing for further personnel and financing, without any
benefit anytime they were accorded. If these Caselli assertions had been individual
pure deliria, as they logically were, La Repubblica would not have published them. If
La Repubblica continued to publish these deliria, it was because they were functional
to the financial powers financed La Repubblica and La Repubblica politically
199
e.f., Weizman sotto accusa, [Weizman under accusation], Repubblica, IE, 5 January 1999.
Guido Olimpio, Weizman nei guai: «Non mi dimetto», [Weizman in troubles: «I do not resign»],
Corsera, IE, 21 January 2000.
201
Gian Carlo Caselli, Per una sicurezza senza emergenza, [For a security without emergency],
Repubblica, IE, 18 January 2000.
200
71
represented. They were the same economic-financial powers, and/or also stronger
foreign States, had interest in the political dissolution in Germany and France, as well
in the in-part-realised Italian one, for submitting politics and State apparatuses, as
already done for large part of militant Prosecutors202, to their private interests.
The ideological covers of the Anglophone espionage: the ‘transparency’
campaigners203
The literature on the subject is wide, and mentioned, referred and discussed in
different points of this work. Nevertheless Un paese anormale. Come la classe politica
ha perso l’occasione di Mani Pulite, [An abnormal country. How the political class
lost the Clean Hands opportunity], this end-1990s work of Donatella della Porta and
Alberto Vannucci, two Italian academic campaigners on ‘corruption’ and ‘anticorruption’, obscurity and ‘transparency’, markets to make perfect by ProsecutorsGods dictatorships, and so on, and since that enjoying international diffusion in
English language, is a very good collection of sophisms on the subject, where real
analysis there is not and the offered solutions are worthless.
The very good collection of interesting points, as of stereotypes and stereotyped
solutions, the 1999 work of della Porta and Vannucci represents, is emblematic
already in the title. It informs the reader that in Italy there was an entity called, or selfcalled, Clean Hands, alias the absolute goodness, that what it did was an opportunity,
and that the political class lost that suddenly appeared opportunity. Alias, Di Pietro
and his political purge unit were the opportunity and an undefined political class lost
this opportunity. The theory of the lost opportunities is congenitally a mystification.
One could state that the post-WW2 USA lost the opportunity of McCarthyism, the
1950s Russia that of the glorious Stalinian purges, China that of the Cultural
Revolution, Italy that of Fascism, Germany that of Nazism, the 1938/1939 France that
of allying with Germany and together unifying Europe until Urals, and so on.
Opportunities there are in everything. However, since all human event has some deep
cause, despite the randomness of details and of concrete courses, the theory of the lost
opportunities becomes a deceitful way for stigmatising reality instead of explaining,
and/or changing, it. In the della Porta-Vannucci game there is the absolute goodness
of subversive Prosecutors versus the absolute badness of now aggressed now
apparently friendly but not totally Prosecutors-subordinated politicians. It is their
vision of how, and from whom, Italy would be governed.
All this, this oddness (an offer coming from somewhere to a political class which
refuses it, and judiciary bureaucrats should govern instead of formally-democratically
elected Statesmen/women), made Italy an abnormal country, for the two authors.
What supposes some normality assumed as reference. Actually no power supported
202
It is legitimate to suppose single cases of personal fanaticism or other pathology. However militant
Prosecutors were well connected in political and interest clans, and, everywhere somebody tried to
inquiry, their material corruption emerged as norm, not as exception. A plurality of techniques, also
formally legal, was used for bribing Prosecutors, or simply for benefiting Prosecutor ‘casually’
persecuted the ‘right people’. However the phenomenon was not limited to judicialist Prosecutors and
magistrates, and it was not specifically continental European.
203
(della Porta 1999).
72
this kind of theories and practices relatively to Italy was governed from Prosecutors,
and neither fed ‘independent’ Prosecutors for making them ruling instead of formallydemocratically elected rulers. So the concept of normality was further deception. Italy
was abnormal because object of Prosecutors apparently-led authoritarian course, and
wasn’t such, as della Porta-Vannucci suggested, since the reaction and refusal of the
apparently Prosecutors’ full dictatorship there was also inside the centreLeft-Lefts.
An abnormal country, the main title, was also a subtle polemic against the PDS
leader and Italian PM (1998-2000) D’Alema (mistrusted from the judicialist clans,
contrarily to the good pupils Prodi and Veltroni) who continuously used, also as
narrative device, the expression ‘a normal country’ followed from what for him would
have done a normal country. The deep anxiety D’Alema created in the judicialist front
was his post-1995 approach to militant magistracy. For him, in a normal country
(after dissolved manu militari the CAF and contributed to the Berlusconi removal
from office and the making clear that, Scalfaro President, Berlusconi would have
never become PM), militant magistracy as revolutionary-subversive force had
exhausted its function and it was indispensable it totally submitted to the D’AlemaPDS needs and will, instead of limiting to co-operate with it in position of supremacy.
All the judicialist claims on the legality control function of militant magistracy were
one of the explicit forms of request of the Prosecutors dictatorship. In no well-ordered
and well-run country magistracy is legality controller. Legality control is function of
government and government-submitted Prosecutors. Magistracy function is just
judging suspect lawbreakers, not of controlling citizens, politicians and
Statesmen/women. A legality controller magistracy becomes embodiment of the
judiciary function, of the executive power, and in part also of the legislative function:
it was what clamorously verified in the 1990s Italy, but its roots were already in 1980s
and 1970s running processes and in political-institutional responsibilities.
Consequently, to claim that, at the end of the 1990s, Italy had lost an historical
opportunity and continued to be abnormal was the assumption that normality was the
hard-liner judicialism, of which the two academicians were intellectual supporters,
even against all D’Alema-PDS relative flexibility and/or political realism. One cannot
really say that D’Alema defended the priority of politics and of State against the
judicialist abuse, but he certainly affirmed the tight submission of the judicialist abuse
to his politics and his ruling. In fact della Porta-Vannucci repeat the usual rhetoric on
magistracy as autonomous power [but paid, overpaid and extra-paid by citizens
money] with some divine right for acting as censor of politics. della Porta-Vannucci
even declared the indispensability of laws creating the crime of illegal financing, and
the relative power of penal magistracy of pursuing it, as pretext for permitting the
Prosecutors repression of these ‘crimes’ (but not any more crimes when Law
depenalise them, as della Porta-Vannucci lamented had verified in the late 1990s
Italy), and, consequently, their control on Italian politics. In practice, della PortaVannucci tried to argue the indispensability of laws permitting some [surely fromsomewhere well supported] judicialist Prosecutors to keep the Italian politics in
condition of permanent blackmail. On the contrary, the 1996-2001 Parliament, despite
it was controlled from the Leftist minority, was de facto more in harmony with Italian
citizens become resilient to the militant magistracy pretences and disgusted from the
climate of persecution created from every day more [self-]discredited, and also very
costly for the Stat budget, militant Prosecutors.
73
I have already argued, in a previous paragraph, as the claims on ‘honesty’ and
‘transparency’ were functional to the deception implicit in the refusal to reason in
terms of efficiency. Efficiency implies the concern for results. On the contrary
honesty and transparency are only worthless categories from the point of view of
results. If results imply a pragmatic vision of reality, and specifically, here, citizensatisfaction orientation, honesty and transparency, as other apparently ethical claims,
are functional to some genre of Ethic State and/or, more probably, to some kind of
deception founded on apparently sounding and undiscussible categories. Ethic State is
the vision that State is not a functional entity, but it pursues one or more absolute
values. It is the foundation, or just the mask, of all authoritarianism and of certain
totalitarian anxieties. It was for example the para-religious vision of some of the main
Jacobean leaders, vision finally finished submerged from the people laughs. However
it is a kind of approach widely diffused and with different results, in all cultural
frame, for instance from militant Statism to militant liberalism, also if it is an attitude
antagonist to all liberal, and overall libertarian, vision and practice. Ethical State is
anyway opposite to functional State, a laic vision, where State limits to provide the
services it can better provide at the best condition.
Behind ‘transparency’ and ‘honesty’, instead of citizen-satisfaction, it is easy to
justify all crusade, included the negation of transparency in name of the fight for
transparency, and all dishonesty in the name of the fight for honesty. Behind all
moralism there is a rooted immorality. If a bureaucratic procedure has one hundred of
useless passages, they may be absolutely transparent but they aren’t, since that, less
inefficient and wasteful. Millions of useless bureaucrats may be, theoretically,
absolutely honest, but they aren’t, since that, less fraudulent, as a whole, for citizens.
Anyway, apart from their fraudulent nature and consequences, the judicialist
campaigns of the 1990s Italy had no ‘transparency’ (and overall no defence possibility
for many abused citizens), and no ‘honesty’ from the side of their active protagonists
(inside the POs all transaction, of all kind, took place outside any control). However
these points, both the methodological and the practical ones, remained outside the
della Porta and Vannucci arguing.
They prefer mythology: some magistrates-Gods, acting as uncontrolled censors of
politics. What practically had meant uncontrolled magistrates-adventurers on hire on
the subversion and private interests’ market. They invent the magistracy
independence (in reality the full independence of some magistrates from formallydemocratic control and submission) as Italian virtue instead of Italian abnormity. And
they spice the invention with a sounding historical false: the Italian magistracy
independence as antidote to its having being, for della Porta-Vannucci, Fascisms
longa manu. Actually the Mussolini governments, which were liberal government
with liberal Statesmen, were so respectful of the Italian liberal magistracy that Special
Courts were created for political repression. It was 1970s-1990s judicialist magistracy
achievement to have submitted magistracy to political repression needs.
Mythology as careful deception is evident from the first pages of their 1999 work.
It starts, in its first page, with the sounding assertion that in October 1989 the Berlin
wall fell down and in April 1992 the supposed law of silence on the supposed Italian
‘corruption’ fell down. However if, with the Craxi (and other parties had won the
1992 elections) liquidation, the ‘corruption’ and the relative law of silence finally fell
down, the thesis of the della Porta-Vannucci book would be, if logically examined,
74
totally crazy both as a whole and in their single elements. Their book was in fact built
on a special variant of the schizo-theory of the double State (one unknown and
corrupt, and that of the PCI, MSI and DC Left absolutely pure) combined with the
exaltation of the 1992/1993 pogrom and further judicialist-authoritarian course, they
declare was strategically useless (the lost opportunity). The problem was ‘solved’, but
not really, from della Porta-Vannucci, by purely literary images. They state that the
Italian case was unique as ‘corruption’, clearly confounding a phenomenon with the
claims around it. It would be as to claim that, for example, in the countries where
infantile abuse does no arrive until media and tribunals, it does not exist. According to
this method, it does not exist in Greece and Turkey, while the UK and the USA would
be countries of progressing degeneration, from this point of view. It is clearly not so.
In addition, when one claims great principles (‘pro-honesty fight’, ‘anti-Clans war’),
or supposed such, but finally the North magistracy action limited to liquidate elections
results and to co-operate with the privatisations fraud, and the South magistracy
action limited to favour Southerner Clans restructuring and reinforcement, the real
results are under the nose of everybody, while claimed principles are just irrelevant
noise. della Porta-Vannucci avoid carefully the ground of the Milan PO function of
selection of the political-economic personnel in function of the colossal fraud against
the State budged and the systemic efficiency Italian privatisation represented, and the
key role the Milan PO played in this fraud.
If this basic methodological testing is sufficient for defining a work as pure
propaganda and deception for other purposed, other della Porta-Vannucci claims, as
the statement that ‘corruption’ is one of the components of a more general democratic
question, are just apparently sounding rhetoric. It was the subliminal suggestion that
the 1990s para-PDS regime privatisation fraud, and other State mismanagement and
weakening, was democratic and honest, while the DC-PSI running action for
privatising at fair, or fairer, prices and preserving the national interest was antidemocratic and dishonest. What is certainly correct if one assumes an anti-national,
and subordinated to private interests, point of view.
In fact when finally one looks for objective, or relative objective, evidence on all
this claimed ‘corruption’, it reduces to indexes on ‘corruption perception’, alias to
fantasies, while an eventual arguing on privatisations cases and other economic
policies would have been the only possible arguing on reality. Perception, which
depends on the questions posed for detecting it (a highly subjective fields), depends
decisively on cultural frames, which made practically impossible all inter-State, and
frequently (as in a multi-national State, as Italy is) also intra-State, comparison. The
same della Porta-Vannucci, when following the academic tradition of showing
knowledge of some literature in the field, and trying some generalisation, show
actually that the literature they know is not at all enlightening, and generalisations on
correlations including ‘corruption’ are impossible. And solutions to these bottlenecks
do not come from idealisations of ‘market’, which is already a pre-built concrete
frame not necessarily a magic solution. It is a solution to different clans, clientelist
and parasitic logics, but it is not, by itself, a magic solution. It depends.
On the contrary, della Porta-Vannucci followed certain typical Anglophone-style
use of the slogan ‘market’: they claimed ‘market’ for justifying their judicialist
perspectives (their gaol party propensity), while they claimed international
homogenisation (with the excuse of ‘transparency’) relatively to the areas and sectors
75
competitive with the Anglophone ones. The tools for disaggregating bureaucratic
conservatism and laziness, and socio-economic and cultural backwardness, are
necessarily more complex than ‘markets’, which need to be built and guaranteed in
their efficient working. However the judicialist clans della Porta-Vannucci supported
were the negation of market. The 1990s judicialist action further repressed market
instead of freeing and making it more efficient. The judicialist erasing of elections
results was the opposite of market. The judicialist ban of political parties was the
opposite of market. The judicialist systematic targeting of some parties, to which
corresponded the systematic protection of other ones, was the opposite of market. All
this was a dirigist action, not a pro-free market one. The judicialist selectionimposition of weak political-economic personnel, and submitted to the usual internal
and international interests (as, for example, Prodi and Ciampi, key protagonists of the
privatisations fraud), was the opposite of market, which needs counterparts fairly
negotiating and does not let buyers freely defining prices.
The second chapter of the della Porta-Vannucci work opens with a quotation
contradicting the two authors claimed 1992 sudden collapse of the law of silence.
They quote the 27 February 1998 La Repubblica, which reports the then PDS
Secretary D’Alema declaring that everybody, journalist and magistrates included,
knew everything, without the need to wait the Milan ‘heroes’. A law of silence
presupposes the hiding of reality why in our case it was well known to the same
magistrates and journalists who suddenly ‘discovered’ it. What supposed a complicity
in reality not broken but only used and oriented as in similar (not as scale) operations
of the 1970s/1980s. Clamorously self-contradicted in their mythological construction,
indifferent della Porta-Vannucci insist in it. Pervaded from the fire of exaltation, they
invent more than 500 MPs (more than 50% of the Italian Parliament, with is
composed of 630 deputies, and 315 Senators plus some life-Senators) of the 11th
Legislature under investigation, and ‘all the vital centres’ of the Public
Administrations, with thousands of local administrators and bureaucrats, Armed
Forces, Fiscal police, ‘all the main State boards and companies’, magistracy sectors. It
is the ideological operation of representing as a mass operation, what was a surgical
intervention. Actually the 1992/1993 pogrom was an Intelligence-style terrorist
action, not such a generalised war. Media pumped the operation, but numbers were
not so massive and there was no indiscriminate repression. Everything was carefully
focused. However if one wants to invent a war against ‘corruption’, as it seems the
della Porta-Vannucci anxiety, one must, in first instance, invent the war. What della
Porta-Vannucci coherently do. Nevertheless in the Italian reality, State private use and
profiteering from small and big bureaucrats, and their clans, continued undisturbed
from the judicialist ‘heroes’ action, which was surgically focused on the CAF core.
della Porta-Vannucci correctly mention how the mechanism of bribes/ransoms, with
bureaucrats as beneficiaries, was the price imposed from corrupted bureaucrats to
citizens. However they avoid underlining that this practice was made possible from a
State organisation where offices actually were private feuds of bureaucrats and their
clans, with relative party and TUs protection and profiteering. They evidenced the
party and clientelist domination, with the relative worst civil (and military) servants
selection, but not the key point of the traditional (well before the Republic, also if less
degenerated) feudalisation until the lowest levels of the bureaucratic machine. And
this was not necessarily connected to the politics financing, conceptually and
practically different. In German and France, politics illegal financing had and has the
same characteristics of Italy, despite the better working (what does not mean
76
necessarily honesty) of bureaucracies. However it might be plausibly argued that in
such an order, with bureaucracy as private-personal counter-power, business living
politics and State as extraneous, as counter-party not as collaborator, politics could
self-finance only (and more than abroad) in coactive way (what does not mean
‘corruptive way’ but exactly the opposite204). What is not a justification for no one of
these three parties (politics, bureaucracies, businesses), but just the evidencing of a
specific kind of systemic order.
Instead of confronting, also if only at theoretical level, with the concreteness of
problems of an inefficient and feudalised bureaucratic machine, della Porta-Vannucci
exercise in the academicians popular sport: the quotation of the supposed illness
cures, carefully taken from the current literature. They are, in this case, for della
Porta-Vannucci: controls, crossed controls, introduction of forms of concurrency, new
controlling bureaucracies without drastic reduction of the already existent ones,
delegation to special pools of Prosecutors purposely made more powerful (the switch
from the administrative to judiciary level is a recursion rich implications usually
unnoticed), new bureaucracies for studying the simplification of the existing
procedures and laws. It was the reproposition of the usual list of already permanently
attempted solutions without achieving any result. On the ground of their non-working,
structures cannot be transformed in working ones. Useless structures may only been
dissolved and with the dispersion of their personnel.205 A public administration having
had the function of the distribution of salaries-subsidies cannot be directly
transformed in efficient service- and client-oriented structures. Similarly, a condition
of legislative proliferation and confusion may not be reversed by other over-detailed
and over-formal legislation, which was just function of deresponsibilisation.
Controlled corruption but intertwined with efficiency, as in the Anglophone
tradition, is considerably better, from the point of view of the systemic efficiency,
than the bureaucratic and costs’ proliferation which tutors only inefficiency and
uncontrolled wastes. From the judicialist point of view (and it is the approach implicit
in della Porta-Vannucci), legions of now corrupted now simply privileged and abusive
204
When politics impose, but also businesses accept happily the imposition, all the micro- and macrosociology of the entire matter are different. For instance, a French President having received financing
from the nuclear industry and favouring it, since that, just elected, acts under corruption conditions
(supposed there were not different reasons for what could appear a direct exchange relation). In Italy
politics even destroyed big companies had financed it, and it did not it for reasons connected with the
financing. Be the systemic working better in an Italian-style or in a US-style politics financing is
question totally unconnected with ‘corruption’. The US Presidents may be generally corrupted
relatively to the Italian one who were not, and the US system might had been considerably more
efficient. The kind of micro-mechanisms determining systemic efficiency has no correlation with
‘corruption’. As natural consequence of this non-correlation, it may also be plausibly argued that equal
‘corruption’ and ‘honesty’ (supposed they were quantitatively measurable) translate in radically
different systemic efficiency. della Porta-Vannucci-style campaigners, in reality campaigns for other
purposes, be they conscious or unconscious on that (what is here irrelevant).
205
The only relevant example I know of progressive transformation of an existing feudal-style
bureaucratic machine in a modern one is that of the early 20 th century Korea under Japanese
occupation. However there was the Japanese military-police control, the Japanese management, also
relevant Japanese personnel involved in the transformation, and more than four decades of Japanese
occupation. Japan was a State having recently dealt, and continuing to deal, with in-same-way similar
kind of transformation and having sent to Korea some of his top level specialists in State building.
When the Anglo-American armies occupied Italy in 1943-1945, they brought with them the top level
specialist of the US organised criminality and attributed them the supplying Italian markets control.
Italy was not Korea, the USA were not at all Japan.
77
uncontrolled Prosecutors and cops, intertwined with State bureaucracies inefficiency,
are considerably better than reasoning in terms of efficiency, and operating for
efficiency. It is the supposed ‘ethic’ versus the results-orientation, fantasies versus
pragmatism. What is absolutely natural since judicialism (for certain aspects an
extremist form of bureaucratism and its tutoring) prospers on the problemaggravation, while it is condemned by the problem-solving. Each guarantee given to
non-working (relatively to the service efficient provision) employees and structures is
a guarantee against the creation of efficient State administrations. As current
academic concern in underdevelopmental countries and cultures, della PortaVannucci formulate advices acceptable to the TUs (corporative structures) and their
political references (which are the same interests aligned with judicialist magistracy:
Lefts and Far Right, but also Centre fractions), alias to feudal visions of the working
place (magistracy working places included), corrupted and lazy employees
(magistrates included). What makes in reality all advice useless: it is easier to claim
abstract needs of judicialist permanent crusades than to pose problems of efficiency,
alias the respect for the citizens’ rights to efficient services. With academicians’
convinced support and collaboration, in Italy all new Parliament ‘reformed’, at least
once, the public administration, plus the continuous flows of micro-‘reforms’ inside,
or also corrective of, the main ones. The results could be observed from everybody
had relation with the Italian bureaucracy. The usual vision that it was necessary to
preserve statically the existing consensus without disturbing all personal interest
always prevailed. While the vision that consensus could be dynamically pursued by
the success of modernisation was always judged too risky for the political order and
its backing interests. And so the DC-PCI (in reality DC-PCI-MSI, overall for what
concerned the public administration) conservatism always prevailed.
The only initiative of real control of civil servants was assumed, in July 1994, from
Giulio Tremonti, the Finance Minister of the Berlusconi government. It formed a
corps of one hundred inspectors for contrasting corruption and bureaucratism of the
130,000 employees of the Fiscal Administration. Rapidly fired the intolerable heresy
of the Berlusconi government (using against it the slogan that State was not a
company, consequently the best was that Statesmen were only party functionaries and
bureaucrats, or eventually somebody of the Agnelli family206), the decree instituting
this corps was never discussed from the Lefts-LN dominated Parliaments. Probably
more according to the rule that bureaucracies may be created but not dissolved, than
since intimate conviction, the decree was simply renewed from the following
governments each time it expired, but the corps was never used for its original tasks.
For della Porta-Vannucci the failure of the 1990s judicialist operations, for them
against ‘corruption’, derived from metaphysical obstructions. They list a mysterious
exhaustion of ‘confessions’ (people rapid delusion that ‘heroes’ did not use them
against real corruption?), the fact that the Cassation Court contradicted some
evidently too illegal207 sentences, a judiciary machine which, despite the judiciary
independence and self-management, was evidently badly self-managed from
206
Just fired Berlusconi, Scalfaro, while launching anathemas on conflicts of interest, offered the
Foreign Office to Gianni Agnelli who, feeling a bit degraded as simply Minister, suggested and got, at
his place, his sister Susanna, already Foreign Office deputy-Minister from 9 August 1983 to 12 April
1991.
207
For slight and medium illegalities, sometimes also relevant illegalities, the 1990s CSC acted in
conditions of intimidation.
78
magistrates because too slow, some legal guarantees which were, for della PortaVannucci, the real responsible of additional slowness (della Porta-Vannucci implicitly
suggested that the US-style trial, Parliament tried to impose for the entire 1990s to a
rebel magistracy, was the maximum of slowness: in unappealable sentences directly
emitted from Prosecutors CK/GPU/NKVD-style were de facto suggested, from
judicialists, as the best), a guarantist FI, a nasty politics which permitted to criticise
the ‘heroic’ magistrates so delegitimising them, the reduced sanctions. Alias, for della
Porta-Vannucci, if it would have been imposed the adequate ‘confession’ flow, if
militant Prosecutors could have formed special commission condemning rapidly,
without the burden to produce evidence (supposed – it was very contested – they
produced, at least sometimes, reliable evidence), and without appeal, if FI had
understood that it had not the judicialist authorisation to exist and had consequently
disappeared, if politics had been directly exercised from militant Prosecutors and their
employees/puppets, if militant magistracy had had the possibility to condemn to long
detentions (naturally only for their political and interest enemies), the supposedly
ethic war could have continued in permanence, and a real Ethic State, a militant
Prosecutor Kingdom, could have been imposed. In fact, for example, della PortaVannucci candidly let to understand that all provisional sentence, without waiting the
full Justice course and despite all innocence Constitutional assumption, is sufficient to
define a citizen as legally a criminal, and that if the Cassation Court declares null a
sentence, this favours criminals instead of eventually tutoring a legally innocent
(relatively to the specific trial and/or crime) citizen. della Porta-Vannucci quoted, as
evil example, the Carnevale case, a skilful and guarantist Cassation Court Section
President who exercised, with other magistrates, the normal legality control by total or
partial validation and making null of sentences. Persecuted, not only by the judicialist
and judicialist-academic propaganda, has was later declared innocent in Court, a bit
later della Porta-Vannucci were continuing to give also their contribution to his
defamation. Perhaps, also in this case, reality was more complex, and less
personalisable, than the points of view of the gaol parties, or eventually of the
absolute-innocentist ones, apart from the personal integrity of the citizen and judge
Carnevale the same ferociousness of the judicialist aggression, and its incapability to
produce even a shadow of piece of evidence, unequivocally demonstrated.
The myth of the casual investigations, from a magistracy fully inside the
powers networks
The myth of the spontaneous events is used from ‘specialists’ when explications
are embarrassing for assumed interests. Casualness exists. Although there are
circumstances it is really absent. As authors wanting to avoid the evidencing of the
consociative nature of the Italian political system invented unexpected ‘”government”
creation of the Italian regions,208 non-casually the same networks offer a basic thesis
about the 1990s purge start. That suddenly a 17 February 1992 casual arrest permitted
to see what before what hidden. Unfounded, and carefully bounded, sociological
explications justify the possibility of the inquiry. Formal juridical arguments build the
cage of the irrefutable truth.
208
(Putnam 1993, p. xiii).
79
Actually, in spite of the Constitutional compulsory character of the penal action
there is nothing of spontaneous and automatic in the decision to prosecute a crime.
Anyway a single crime, or also a collection, or a connection, of single crimes, is
different from a judicial campaign. It is sufficient that the Head of the Prosecution
Office decides that the crime does not exist, is not evident, cannot the really be
proved, etc., and the crime does not exist. It is sufficient the Head of the Prosecution
Office decides that the crime is absolutely evident, eventually proved logically, and
that the crime cannot not to exist, and non-crime becomes a crimes.
The techniques for obstructing an investigation and/or a simple prosecutor, or even
an entire PO are different and they have been always used 209. It is possible to pose the
competence conflict in relation to an investigation from a Prosecution Office. In this
way investigation were traditionally moved to Rome were the political power could
better control them. It is possible to arrest Prosecutors or other magistrates, as to
obstruct them directly in different ways. All Prosecutor can, theoretically, order the
arrest of another magistrate. It is also possible to let an exposed magistrate without
bodyguard, or effective bodyguard, and to provoke his/her threatening, injuring or
killing.
It is possible to intervene directly on the single magistrate. It is possible to
overcharge him/her of other investigations, eventually criticising and inquiring
him/her if not rapid and efficient to do everything. It is also possible from police and
intelligence services to produce false evidence, to suppress the existing one, to refuse
to supply the right one.210 Everything depends of the power network, and on real force
relations. The tales on the sudden appearing of heroes and on the sudden explosion of
crimes before hidden are, it may be, well sounding. But they are heuristically
sterilising miserable lies.
In the 1980 there were magistrates, one was Carlo Palermo, started to investigate
on arms and drug traffics. Supposedly they involved Turkey, Bulgaria Austria,
Yugoslavia, Italy, American Mafia, USA, in connection with intelligence services, as
the US CIA, DEA and NSA, Germany, Swiss, Latin America, Arab countries, etc,
industries, finance, political parties, governments, in different connected networks.
The Carlo Palermo investigation on these supposedly illegal world traffics involved
heads of States, Reagan included, and even the Buenos Aires tube. The inquiry led to
the charge of more than one hundred people, and finished with the generalised
acquittal. On 2 April 1985 Carlo Palermo was victim of an attempt to his life by
bomb-blast, in Sicily. When in 1985 the PM Craxi acted against the magistrate, Craxi
was supported from his Interior Minister Scalfaro. Also the Confindustria had
protested for the inquiry, because the Palermo investigations obstructed businesses.
These magistrates were stopped and in certain cases induced to abandon magistracy.
They were lauded and sometimes also rewarded from the Lefts, but avoiding
defending really them when they were under fire and obliged to leave. 211 In addition
this kind of inquiries were not really continued during the 1990s judicialist course.
209
(Colombo 1996).
(Colombo 1996).
211
(Mellini 1996, p. 55/56); Luigi Cipriani, Armi e droga nell'inchiesta del giudice Palermo, [Weapons
and drug in the investigation of judge Palermo], Democrazia proletaria, May 1985, in Luigi
Cipriani, Scritti di controinformazione, http://members.planet.it/freewww/cipriani/indice.html
[November 1998], May 1998.
210
80
They were avoided not because senseless for a functional magistracy, but because it
was imperative to avoid concrete damages for foreign protagonists ought to remain
untouched. Judicialist demagogy was internationally liked but only if against
politicians and institutions to be purged.
When apparently more modestly, but in reality more effectively, police forces and
single magistrates tried to pursue current episodes of bureaucratic corruption, TUs
denounced those investigations as abusive and against workers (the corrupted
functionaries). Those had verified also in Milan212, a bit before corruption became a
good business for all bureaucrats wanted to continue safe in his/her usual business,
when he/she had adequate TUs connections, protection and support. In that occasion,
a banal and ordinary case of relevant bribes by the Town Planning Office of the Milan
Commune, also the Milan Chief-Prosecutor had publicly commented, after the TUs
protest, that the Carabinieri were investigating (and for doing better that had asked the
complete list of the Milan Commune civil servants, as a way for individuating more
rapidly who worked by the Town Planning Office) had exceeded in their duties. It
was prohibited, before the 1992/1993 pogrom, to declare publicly and to investigate
what everybody knew, that in the Milan Commune, as in all other public office, there
were corrupted functionaries.213 It was necessary some superior push because
accomplices Prosecutors transformed in militant Jacobeans.
The technique of building clamorous trials to ‘criminality’, actually only for
favouring its fractions, and connected political and power interests, was used already
in the 1980s. See for example the 856 (of which 500 of people not already in prison)
arrest warrants executed the night of 17 June 1983 in Naples, essentially against a
loosing fraction of Camorra, with the relative advertising-arrest of a journalist and
showman later revealed innocent. The episode is detailed in the chapter on the judges’
party philosophy. This was the essence of the Milan and Palermo POs-led operations,
and of the entire 1990s judicialist waves, included the most clamorous episodes of
what was claimed as struggle to the organised criminality, actually neither really
contrasted nor weakened. On the contrary the magistracy action, lead from its
politico-judicialist clans, favoured actively the strengthening of organised, as of
micro-, criminality and the dramatic weakening of the State structure deputed to
contrast it. In that, magistracy had the full collaboration of the 1990s’ Lefts and paraLefts governments.
Technically it was not very difficult, for judicialist magistracy, already in the
1980s’, to select how to strike and how to save political fractions. Apart from that
even in difficult juridical situations, Di Pietro, the Milan Pool, and the other judicialist
clans had no legal problem to save a personage and to ruin another one, also if their
names eventually emerged associated and with the same juridical responsibilities. In
the Prodi case, they even attributed Prodi responsibilities to his successors Nobili they
he wanted to fire for re-promoting Prodi in 1993. Nevertheless, in the [non-rigid]
sharing of the Italian power, specialisation created and evolved. Initially, the Fanfani
current had the RAI, the dorotei the Agriculture power centres, other DC-Left
currents the Labour Ministry. The Mattei ENI (apart from that Mattei paid all parties
and currents, but was influenced from no one) had as its direct political expression the
212
213
(Torrealta 1995, p. 70).
(Torrealta 1995, p. 70).
81
DC current the Base. When, in the 1980s ENI became a Socialist feud, the Base got as
its power and illegal financing source the IRI, to which De Mita assigned Prodi.
Andreotti was the only DC leader who, having been directly called to central
government from De Gasperi, and having always reserved little interest in DC
matters, was without interests and illegal financing in the State industry. 214 The power
geography was naturally more complex and detailed, in part intertwining, and slowly
evolving. However everything was public and not difficulty identifiable for the needs
a targeted strikes, were they against single fractions or against meaningful part of the
political system as in the 1990s.
214
(Riva 1999, p. 441).
82