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Territorial Integrity
Appendix A. Case bibliography
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c
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Territorial Integrity
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Territorial Integrity
Appendix B. Additional Tables and Figures
Table VII. Truth Table Realist Causal Pattern
~C
S
~M
~E
Count
Consistency
~Int
1
0
1
1
2
1.000
1
1
1
1
0
2
1.000
1
1
1
1
1
2
1.000
1
1
1
0
0
1
1.000
1
1
0
0
0
1
0.673
0
1
0
1
0
1
0.623
0
0
0
1
0
1
0.392
0
0
1
1
0
1
0.372
0
Table VIII. Truth Table Neoliberal Institutionalist Causal Pattern
~E
D
I
Count
Consistency
~Int
1
1
1
1
1.000
1
1
0
1
1
1.000
1
1
0
0
2
1.000
1
0
0
1
4
0.838
0
0
0
0
2
0.530
0
0
1
1
1
0.375
0
Table IX. Truth Table Causal Pattern Domestic Approaches
T
~O
~A
R
Count
Consistency
~Int
0
0
1
1
3
1.000
1
1
1
0
1
2
1.000
1
0
1
1
1
3
0.789
0
1
1
0
0
1
0.425
0
0
0
0
1
1
0.333
0
0
0
0
0
1
0.000
0
Table X. Truth Table Combined Non-Realist Causal Patterns
~E
D
I
T
~O
~A
R
Count
Consistency
~Int
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
2
1.000
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
2
1.000
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1.000
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1.000
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1.000
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1.000
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0.333
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0.200
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0.000
0
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Table XI. Expansion of Table V Analysis of necessary causes
Consistencya
Raw Coverageb
Unique Coverage
High security costs
0.120
-
-
~ High security costs
1.000*
0.781
0.098
Important security relations
0.560
-
-
~ Important security relations
0.600
-
-
Military vulnerability
0.240
-
-
~Military vulnerability
0.880
-
-
Economic vulnerability
0.480
-
-
~Economic vulnerability
0.720
-
-
Interdependence
0.280
-
-
~Interdependence
0.840
-
-
Relative Institutional Capabilities
0.720
-
-
~Relative Institutional Capabilities
0.520
-
-
Transgressor links
0.200
-
-
~Transgressor links
0.800
-
-
Occupied territory links
0.280
-
-
~Occupied territory links
0.760
-
-
Media Attention
0.320
-
-
~Media Attention
0.720
-
-
Resolve
1.000*
0.735
0.052
~ Resolve
0.120
-
-
The tilde (~) represents negation of a given factor.
∗p ≤ .05
a ∑[min(Xi,Yi)]/ ∑(Yi)
b ∑[min(Xi,Yi)]/ ∑(Xi)
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Territorial Integrity
Figure 2. Example process tracing Suez Crisis.
High cost invasion to US security
interests
Weak resolve
Britain
Severe Economic vulnerability
Britain
Anglo-French Transgression
USSR threatens
to aid Egypt;
Intelligence
report SU troop
movements in
Syria
Blockade
Suez Canal
&
Destruction
Pipeline
Run on the
British
Pound
Looming direct
military
confrontation
NATO allies with
Soviet Union
Third world
perceived the
transgression
as a Colonial
War by pivotal
US Allies
British
government
did not inform
the opposition
in parliament
Disruption
European
Oil supplies
Rapid
decline of
the British
pound
Threat of
ThermoNuclear War
Damage US
influence in
third world
Severe
domestic
opposition in
Britain
Oil shortage
France and
Britain
British need
withdrawal
IMF deposit
Decision US to
intervene
British
vulnerability
Intervention US by withholding Oil Shipments and IMF
withdrawals combined with strong political pressure aimed at
the replacement of British Prime Minister Eden
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Territorial Integrity
Appendix C. Concise elaboration on scoring per causal factor
Absence of military vulnerability
Absence of military vulnerability was measured by taking the relative sinc. score, which
is a rough measure of military power taken from Correlates of War (Singer, Bremer &
Stuckey, 1972; Singer, 1987). If the transgressor has a nuclear arsenal the case is fully out
of the set of military vulnerability irrespective of the relative sinc. score (Table III in
article).
Most transgressors are relatively strong states in terms of relative military
capabilities. Only Morocco is mostly out of the set with a relative sinc. score of
approximately 2-2.5% and scores a 0.25 in both periods. Iraq is at the cut-off point with a
relative sinc. score of 7.5-9%, scoring a 0.5. Indonesian material capabilities are slightly
below 10% of US capabilities during the cold war period, but still score a 0.75 on
absence of military vulnerability because of its geographical characteristics and its very
strong capabilities with respect to regional power Australia: in comparison with
Australian capabilities Indonesia would score a 1.00. Following the end of the Cold War
Indonesian capabilities exceed 10% of US’ capabilities. In all other cases – i.e. UK,
France and Israel; China; and Israel post 1967 – the transgressors had very large relative
sinc. scores and/or a nuclear arsenal, these cases are all fully in the set. The triple alliance
of the UK, France, and Israel had combined capabilities of 32% of the Hegemon; Israel
joined the nuclear club as early as the end of the sixties; and China, besides its nuclear
arsenal, shows a steep increase from roughly 30-40% in the 1950s to roughly between 80
and 90% from 1970 onwards.1
To conclude, Morocco is more out than in (0.25) in both periods; Iraq scores 0.5,
Indonesia is more in than out at 0.75 because of its relative sinc. score and geographic
characteristics; and the triple alliance, China, and Israel are fully in the set of absence of
military vulnerability. Based on the current study it is not possible to discount absence
1
More than 80% of hegemonic power is a very large figure indeed. Still, this score is a very rough measure and these
figures can therefore be misleading as China has to bridge a real technological gap compared with the United States.
Nevertheless, it is clear that China is fully out of the set of military vulnerability.
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Territorial Integrity
military vulnerability as part of a sufficient a causal combination with absence of
economic vulnerability.
Interdependence
Interdependence refers to the importance for the transgressing state as a trading partner
for the (regional) hegemon, and is measured by the share of the transgressor in the
Hegemon’s imports and exports (see Table III). An important trading partner is less likely
to undergo intervention, because the capable power would not like to risk the profitable
trade relations.
Most of the transgressors – i.e. Iraq, Morocco, Israel, China 1950-90 and
Indonesia - constituted a relatively small part of US2 trade. Following the war with Iran
the share of Iraqi trade had greatly diminished and was with less than 0.2 percent of
negligible importance to the US. Trade with China before 1970 and Morocco was never
greater than 0.1 percent of total US trade. Israel, Indonesia, and China from 1970-90 were
of slightly bigger importance, with Israel showing a slight rise from 1967 till 2000 from
approximately 0.5 to 1 percent. The share of trade with Indonesia declined from approx.
1.5 % around 1975 to 0.6 % in the late 90s following the Asia crisis. Whereas China’s
share increased rapidly in the 1970-90 period, but remained below 2% of total US trade.
The most important trading partners of the US were China following the Cold
War and the United Kingdom and France during the Suez crisis. US-China trade grew
steeply from 1.75 % in 1990 to an average of 5% in 2000 and was therefore coded a 0.75,
whereas trade with the UK and France comprised more than 8% of total US trade, before
and during the Suez crisis and was consequently coded as being fully into the
interdependence set..
In sum, Iraq, Morocco, and China 1950-70 were coded as fully out of the set.
Israel, Indonesia, and China 1970-90 more out than in, China 1990-2000 more in than
out, and the triple alliance of UK, France and Israel fully in the set of interdependence.
2
EU trade may be relevant in the post-Cold War phase, as it could potentially have intervened with economic sanctions.
The EU trade picture is, however, quite similar to that of the US in all cases with the sole difference that the EU had a
higher share of trade with China. Still, because the US is the most important intervener, post-Cold War China was coded
a 0.75 instead of a 1.00. Further note that coding China with a 1.00 has absolutely no effect on the outcome of the
analysis.
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No Causal relationship between interdependence and absence of intervention was
observed.
Absence of media attention of the transgression
The factor, absence of media attention, refers to the visibility of the transgression on the
domestic agenda of the capable power. Incidents and the media attention paid to these
incidents induce the international community to act. Populations pressure their
governments to resolve the issue. It is assumed that when an issue or a conflict receives
little attention, governments are more likely to remain indifferent.
A large part of the conflicts received little to no attention in the media of the
capable power. Most notably, Tibet and East-Timor before the end of the Cold War and
the Western Sahara received little media attention. Tibet, however, did become an issue
of increasing salience during the post-Cold War period because of growing popularity of
Buddhism and the subsequent appearance of the Tibetan issue in Hollywood
blockbusters. Still, the attention for the Tibetan issue remained relatively small compared
to other more visible conflicts.
Very high immediate media attention was paid to incidents in the case of Iraq, the
Suez crisis, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza territories, and in EastTimor in 1999. Regarding the Iraq case, for example, analogies with Hitler flourished,
Kuwaiti refugees made emotional testimonies, and the military build up could be closely
followed from the living room. The Israeli occupation became visible during the 1967
conflict and later because of terrorist actions and the intifada of the Palestinian resistance.
Israel was displayed in U.S. media as hardworking pioneers drawing parallels to the
American forefathers. Especially following the Cold War, events like the dili massacre
ensured that East Timor received a lot of attention especially within the Australian media.
In addition to this, following the referendum in East-Timor, the Indonesian military
began to wreak havoc in the province; drawing media attention to the large numbers of
people that were murdered, displaced or forcibly deported to West-Timor.
In sum, we see absence of media attention in most cases that did not show
intervention: Tibet and the Western Sahara in all periods and East Timor during the cold
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war. We also see high media attention in cases that led to subsequent intervention: the
case of Iraq, the Suez-crisis, and post-Cold-War East-Timor. On the other hand in the
case of Israel, a high level of media attention coincides with absence of intervention. No
causal relationship between absence of media attention and absence of intervention was
observed.
Transgressor links and absence of occupied territory links
The factors occupied territory links and absence of transgressor links are based on the
domestic relations between the (regional) hegemon and either the occupied territory or
the transgressor. It was assumed that inks between the populations of the transgressor and
the (regional) hegemon and the absence of links between the populations of the occupied
territory and the (regional) hegemon affect non-intervention.
We see very few domestic ties between the US and the transgressor, however in
three cases there exist very strong ties with the transgressor. The US has strong domestic
and cultural bonds with the UK, France and Israel in all periods.3 Moreover, only in a few
cases there existed some domestic bonds with the occupied territory – i.e. Kuwait, Tibet,
and East Timor.
Mainly because of the frequent World War II analogies in media reports and the
depiction of the Kuwaiti’s as victims of a Hitler-like Saddam Hussain,4 the case of the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was determined to be more out than in the set of absence of
occupied territory links and was coded a 0.25.
With regard to the Tibetan issue there was initially little interest from the US
public. Therefore, the first two periods were coded fully in and more in than out
respectively. However, the predicament of Tibet has really come to life to the US public
since the beginning of the 90s with the appearance of the issue in several popular movies.
The renewed interest for Tibet has been stimulated by the growing popularity of
3
The ties between the US and its European allies are represented in the words of secretary of state Dulles. Explaining
why the US should be moderate in its condemnation of Britain and France he states: “We are of the same civilization, the
same beliefs and so on” (Neff, 1981: 386). It was no secret that the United States kept close domestic and cultural ties
with its Western European allies. The US Isreali cultural and domestic relations are widely documented; see for example
Gilboa (1987), Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (1998), Melani McAlister (2001), David Schoenbaum (1998), Peter L. Hahn (2001),
Yaakov Ariel (1991), Paul Boyer (1992), and William. B. Quandt (2005).
4
See for example Bennet & Paletz (1994), Hurst (2004, or McAlister (2001).
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Territorial Integrity
Buddhism in the US as one of the fasted growing religions. This has in turn spawned
various lobby activities, generating lots of media attention and has in turn led to pro-exile
positions in US congress, even to the point that US congress refers to Tibet as an
occupied country.5 Therefore, in the 1990-2000 period the conflict was coded more out
than in the set of absence of occupied territory links with a 0.25.
The final important occupied territory link was between East Timor and regional
power Australia. In the collective memory of the Australian populace, the Australians had
been greatly indebted to the East Timorese people that had valiantly supported a small
contingent of Australian troops against Japan during World War II, thereby thwarting a
Japanese invasion of the Australian continent. This collective identity may have
contributed to the high level of attention from the Australian public with regard to the
brutalities committed by the Indonesian military.6 Consequently, Indonesia was scored a
0.25 on occupied territory links in both periods. No causal relationship between
transgressor links or absence of occupied territory links and absence of intervention was
observed.
Relative Institutional Capabilities
The factor relative institutional capabilities was constructed by taking the institutional
capabilities of the transgressor and the occupied territory – i.e. access to General
Assembly, General Assembly member, access to veto power, permanent member of the
Security Council (see also Table III).
Only two cases are fully out of the set of relative institutional capabilities, scoring a 0.00:
China in the 1950-70, because continental China was not yet a member of the UN; and
Iraq because the occupied territory Kuwait was a member of the UN. In the case of
Indonesia, the occupied territory did have access to the UN through Portugal, which was
the former colonial administrator of the would-be-independent territory.
Moreover,
because Indonesia was a general assembly member, it scored a 0.25 in both periods.
Morocco was also a general assembly member, but the Western Sahara had no real access
5
6
Sautman 1999
see Taylor (1991), Gunn (1997), Cotton (2004) Tanter e.a. (2001), Chalk (2001) and also Tiffen (2001)
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to the UN and therefore scored a 0.5 in both periods. Israel is a full general Assembly
member of the United Nations, but does not have a permanent seat in the Security
Council and therefore no veto power. However, Isreal is a special case, because since the
end of the 60s, the US increasingly made use of its Veto power on behalf of Israel,
shielding it from condemnation or sanctions. Therefore Israel was determined to be more
in than out of the set with 0.75. In all other cases – i.e. the UK, France & Israel; and
China 1970-2000 – the transgressors were permanent members of the UN Security
Council with veto power, and where therefore fully in the set scoring a 1.00. No causal
relationship between relative institutional capabilities and absence of intervention was
observed.