Business Case and Intervention Summary
Intervention Summary
Title: Roads in the East of DRC Phase 2
What support will the UK provide?
The UK will provide £19.5m over 10 years to build and maintain roads in eastern DRC in
support of the Government of DRC’s and the UN mission – MONUSCO’s – stabilisation
plan.
Why is UK support required?
DRC has extremely limited infrastructure, which hampers progress towards many of the
MDGs. Out of the core road network of 152,400 km, only 5-10% is in fair to good
condition. The rest is impassable and in need of rehabilitation. Conflict persists in
eastern DRC, and roads are a key element of the stabilisation effort.
To tackle this problem, the UK will provide support to re-open the Government of DRC’s
and MONUSCO’s priority strategic roads, ensure a sustainable maintenance system is in
place to safeguard them in the longer term, and manage the environmental and social
impacts of the roads. We will also work with other donors, MONUSCO and the
Government of DRC to leverage in other activities and interventions to ensure that the
conditions are in place for the roads to lead to increased incomes and improved security.
The road works and management of direct environmental and social impacts will be
implemented over a three-year period by UNOPS and a private sector project manager, in
coordination with the Ministry of Infrastructure, Public Works and Reconstruction and
MONUSCO. UNOPS and the project manager will sub-contract works and projects to
local private sector and non-governmental organisations. A 10-year contract will also be
let for overseeing the maintenance of the roads, managing the long-term and indirect
environmental and social impacts of the roads, and monitoring and evaluating the
programme.
What are the expected results?
Our support is ultimately intended to achieve – including by leveraging in other activity to
ensure all the necessary conditions are in place – reduced income poverty and improved
security in North and South Kivu. This impact will be delivered by catalysing economic
activity and service provision through secure, all-weather, climate resilient roads.
The outputs our support will deliver are:
 The building or upgrading of 628 km of roads
 A sustainable maintenance system which ensures the long-term maintenance of
the roads
 Equitable employment generated by road works and maintenance
 Mitigation of the negative direct and indirect impacts of the roads
 Leveraging in of government presence and other DFID and donor programming
We will determine whether these results have been achieved by linking payment to
performance. Programme design incorporates a significant monitoring and evaluation
plan which includes a baseline study, an evaluability study and a theory-based evaluation,
as well as a dedicated research element.
Strategic Case
A. Context and need for a DFID intervention
Roads in DRC
Extremely limited infrastructure in DRC makes access to markets and basic services almost
impossible, limiting progress towards many of the MDGs. DRC has only 2,800 km of largely
unconnected paved roads, in a country two-thirds the size of western Europe. This is 2% of
the total road network, compared to a sub-Saharan African average of 16%.1 Out of the
core road network of 152,400 km, only 5-10% is in fair to good condition. The rest is
impassable and in need of rehabilitation.2
The Government of DRC has identified 15,800 km of national roads as ‘extra high priority’. 3
This figure does not include provincial or rural roads. Using a conservative figure of $40,000
per km as an average cost,4 investment of $6.3 billion would be required to deliver these
roads alone.
Although coordination of donor investments in the sector is weak and there is therefore no
clear picture of total donor investments, we estimate the total to be under $3 billion. The
scale of need means that although a number of donors – including China, Japan, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Sweden, the World Bank and the EU – are active in the roads sector,
supply cannot meet demand.
DFID DRC’s Bilateral Aid Review (BAR) committed to promoting economic growth and
wealth creation and helping build peace, stability and democracy. We have committed in the
BAR and Operational Plan (OP) to improve access to markets and social services along
roads rehabilitated and maintained by DFID, and to promote regional trade.
To this end, DFID DRC agreed to provide up to £47m of new finance to the roads sector
from 2011 to 2015. Although this equates to only 1.6% of existing donor commitments,
further DFID investment would have a significant impact given the funding gap DRC
currently faces.
Roads in eastern DRC
Conflict persists in eastern DRC, and roads are a key element of the stabilisation effort. The
isolation of populations in the east exposes people to major security and human rights risks,
while the reconnecting of these populations to security services, basic services and
economic opportunities is among the highest priorities of the Government of DRC and the
UN mission (MONUSCO).
In 2008 the Government/MONUSCO Stabilisation and
Reconstruction Plan for Eastern DRC (STAREC) identified six strategic axes in North and
South Kivu that were critical to stabilisation. MONUSCO developed an International Security
and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS) based on the STAREC plan. The ISSSS has
1
Develop infrastructure to develop Africa, James Kathuri, The African Executive, August 2010:
www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=173
2 World Bank Project Appraisal Document, Multi-modal Transport Project, June 2010
3 Documented in, for example, the minutes of the first Groupe Thématique d’Infrastructures et
Transport meeting in June 2011, EDRM 3078079.
4 The World Bank/DFID ProRoutes programme supports the national priority roads programme.
Costs/km were re-evaluated two years into the project and revised upwards to $44,000/km counting
works and maintenance alone, or $68,000/km including all supporting activities such as institutional
capacity building and environmental management. EDRM 3041461
recently been reviewed to identify the priorities for 2011/12.5 The revised plan identifies two
further priority roads in addition to those in the original stabilisation plan.6
In eastern DRC, a number of donors have supported the ISSSS. Nevertheless, there are
funding gaps for the delivery of the original ISSSS, and funding has not been secured for the
two priority roads identified in the revised strategy.
Sustainable road maintenance is an essential part of investment in the sector in DRC, and
especially in the heavily forested east of the country. The environment is such that roads
can deteriorate rapidly – in as little as one year – if they are not maintained on an ongoing
basis. DFID’s experience with the Kisangani-Ubundu road, which had to be rehabilitated a
second time as there was no long-term maintenance system in place, is an example of the
specific challenges of working in the sector in the DRC context. Yet the literature suggests
that $1 of investment in maintenance in sub-Saharan Africa can save $4 of spending to
rehabilitate roads that have deteriorated.7
Justification for DFID intervention
DFID is well-placed to deliver impact in the roads sector. We already have a broad portfolio
of roads interventions. We support the national roads strategy through a World Bank/DFID
multi-donor trust fund, ProRoutes, which will build or upgrade 2,176 km of ‘extra high priority’
roads by 2016. We have also recently finished interventions to build/upgrade rural roads
and a priority road from Kisangani to Ubundu.
The first phase of ‘Roads in the East of DRC’ began in 2009 in support of the ISSSS. Of the
six axes identified in the stabilisation plan, we funded the build/upgrade of the BurhaleShabunda road as well as the maintenance of the other axes. This existing intervention in
eastern DRC makes scaling up feasible, since we have already established relationships
with relevant partners and laid the groundwork for a second phase. Moreover, Roads in the
East has had a significant impact already. The Burhale-Shabunda road reopened for the
first time in over 20 years, reconnecting Shabunda to humanitarian traffic. To sustain this
investment and upgrade access to commercial vehicles, and therefore to goods and
services, further investment is required.
A number of interventions funded in DRC in general and under the ISSSS plan in particular
have not yet set up effective and sustainable maintenance systems, meaning that the results
achieved to date are at risk. DFID is leading the field in building the capacity of government
to put a sustainable maintenance system in place to ensure that the development and
poverty reduction benefits of roads are not undermined. This is a key output of our Roads in
the East programme, through which we have gained agreement for the first time in DRC that
the national roads fund will finance the maintenance of priority provincial roads and
provincial government will implement the maintenance programme using local SMEs and
labour.
Rationale for further investment in roads in eastern DRC
In line with the context and justification set out above, DFID DRC wishes to extend its
investment in roads in the east of DRC. This includes upgrading the Burhale–Shabunda
road that we funded in Phase 1 of Roads in the East, funding the two new roads identified in
5
ISSSS/STAREC Priority Plans 2011–2012 (EDRM 3035607)
The two new roads that have been identified are Hombo-Walikale, joining South and North Kivu, and
Sake-Walikale in North Kivu.
7 Agence Française de Développement/World Bank, Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for
Transformation, siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/.../aicd_overview_english_no-embargo.pdf
6
the ISSSS plan for 2011/12, and building a bypass around a national park that would
otherwise be impacted by one of the two new roads identified in the ISSSS plan. We will
provide further financing of £19.5 million. The two new roads identified in the ISSSS plan –
from Hombo to Walikale and Sake to Walikale – are shown in Map 1.
Map 1: Nyamerira-Walikale and Sake-Walikale roads in North Kivu
This investment would allow us to:
 Deliver up to 628 km of roads built or upgraded, and an increase in the weight of
goods transported along DFID-funded roads. These results would deliver against our
BAR and OP commitments to build or upgrade 1,700 kilometres of roads and double
the weight of goods transported along DFID-funded roads.
 Deliver broader development and stabilisation outcomes, including physical access
to basic services and markets. These will include, for example, reducing the costs of
household goods: the cost of petrol in the zone of influence of the current Roads in
the East intervention has reduced from 3,000 to 2,000 CDF per litre, and the cost of
1kg of salt from 2,000 to 1,600 CDF. Our investment will also create employment
(the current intervention will create 300,000 employment days), including for women.
 Ensure the sustainability of a maintenance system for provincial roads that will
provide lessons for elsewhere.
The consequences of not intervening would include:
 Slowing progress towards DFID DRC’s BAR and OP commitments to invest further
in the roads sector. We would need to find alternative investments to build or
upgrade 628 km of roads. We currently have no other intervention in place that
could mobilise sufficiently quickly to deliver the number of kilometres that remain to
be programmed out of our OP commitment of 1,700 km and failing to capitalise on
our existing engagement in eastern DRC would jeopardise achievement of our OP
commitments.
 Insufficient donor funding to meet the priority needs set out in the stabilisation plan
for eastern DRC.
 Failure to ensure the long-term management of the environmental and social
impacts of the road DFID has funded to re-open, potentially leading to negative
results such as an increase in the production and trade of charcoal and bushmeat.
Evidence
While the literature on the size and nature of the benefits of roads is fairly limited, a number
of recent studies agree strongly on a range of poverty reduction benefits from investment in
roads. These include reduced transport and passenger tariffs, increased traffic and cargo
volume, and increased attendance at schools and health centres, particularly for women and
girls.8
DFID’s investments in roads programmes in DRC support these findings. The first phase of
DFID’s Roads in the East intervention, for example, is already showing an increase in traffic
and cargo volume and a decrease in the cost of household goods, as set out above.
There is limited focus in the literature on the degree to which the opening of roads facilitates
the provision of services by NGOs and local government. While this has been a focus of
DFID’s roads programmes in DRC, the qualitative nature of the data on the presence of
NGOs, and limitations in the capacity of partners to collect reliable data, mean that we do not
have a clear picture of the degree to which rehabilitated roads are leading to an increase in
basic services. Anecdotally, however, the recently re-opened roads from Kisangani to
Ubundu and Burhale to Shabunda have both seen an increase in NGO activity. We will
continue to collect data in this area to feed into a growing body of global evidence on roads
and the provision of services.
The social and economic impacts of road access, for which the global evidence set out
above is strong, as well as the employment opportunities roads interventions offer, facilitate
community recovery. Community recovery, in turn, is a core element of any stabilisation
effort. The MONUSCO UN Support for Security and Stabilisation of Eastern DRC
background briefing and roll-out plan frame the stabilisation effort around three axes:
improved security, political inclusion and improved livelihoods or community recovery. 9
MONUSCO has stated that “there is no faster way to kick-start recovery than repairing
roads.” As a result of conflict and failure to maintain the roads that existed before the war,
many “rural areas are completely isolated and armed groups in the east have been able to
move unhindered, populations have been cut-off and commerce has all but disappeared…
Rebuilding roads and creating jobs in the process, expanding the transport grid and clearing
corridors of checkpoints will not only destroy key profit centres of the remaining armed
groups, these actions will also accelerate the economic reunification of the east, return
8
Literature review: Poverty-related impacts of roads investments, Ti-Up, August 2010 (Quest
document number 2761812)
9 MONUSCO, UN Support for Security and Stabilisation of Eastern DRC Background Briefing, (EDRM
3091507) and Roll-out Plan (EDRM 3091548)
markets to their past vibrancy and permit people to move freely.” 10 MONUSCO’s ‘roll-out
plan’ identifies lack of economic development for returning populations as a driver of
malnutrition, mortality and ethnic tensions which in turn could lead to entry into armed
groups. Further, “with 80 percent of the population dependent on agriculture, boosting
production, opening transport routes, purchasing food locally, and providing limited food aid
are the fastest, most efficient ways to increase household incomes in return areas.”11 We
will build quantifiable evidence on the links between roads investments and stabilisation
through this programme to strengthen the evidence behind this investment and to feed into
the global body of evidence in this field.
There is also a specific need for a more coherent overall diagnostic and theory of change for
the strategy for stabilisation in eastern DRC. The evidence underpinning the government’s
and MONUSCO’s ISSSS is based on a number of assumptions with a lack of quantitative
data to back it up. As set out in the theory of change in the Appraisal Case, we will build this
into a monitoring and evaluation secondment to MONUSCO’s Stabilisation Support Unit
funded from another DFID programme to ensure we can close this evidence gap.
B. Impact and Outcome that we expect to achieve
The intended impact and outcome for further work on roads in eastern DRC would be:
 Impact: Reduced income poverty and improved security in North and South Kivu
 Outcome: Economic activity and service provision catalysed by secure, all-weather,
climate resilient roads
As set out in Section A, there is strong global evidence that the building or rehabilitation of
roads contributes to a range of poverty reduction and community recovery outcomes.
Specifically in DRC, towns and villages in the east that have been closed to goods and
services for over 20 years have been reconnected, and further investment will maintain
these new-found links and ensure one constraint to positive economic and social benefits is
removed and that the provision of security is facilitated. New opportunities for trade,
employment and livelihoods, as well as access to essential services such as health care and
education, should lead to achievement of the intended outcome. Putting in place a
sustainable maintenance system will transfer responsibility for the roads to the Government
of the DRC, contributing to achievement of the intended outcome.
In recognition of the potentially negative environmental impacts that roads interventions can
have if not well managed, and on the basis of the environmental and social impact
assessment for Phase 1 of Roads in the East, one of the four outputs is to mitigate negative
social and environmental impacts. Specifically, this will include mitigating the risks of
increases in charcoal and bushmeat production and trade; increased illegal exploitation of
timber; and the environmental and conflict risks of illegitimate artisanal mining. As well as
this specific output, relevant environmental implications are incorporated into other outputs
as appropriate.
10
MONUSCO, UN Support for Security and Stabilisation of Eastern DRC Background Briefing,
(EDRM 3091507)
11 MONUSCO, UN Support for Security and Stabilisation of Eastern DRC Roll-out Plan (EDRM
3091548)
Appraisal Case
A. What are the feasible options that address the need set out in the strategic case?
This section sets out the theory of change that underpins the case for further investment in
Roads in the East, then considers a do-nothing counterfactual as well as three delivery
options.
Theory of change
The theory of change is based on the fundamental logic that a road can provide access to
markets as well as allow for the provision of security, which in turn can lead to improved
incomes and security for the population of North and South Kivu. Roads can also provide
physical access to basic services, and as such are a necessary but not sufficient condition
for improved health and education outcomes. The key assumptions in the theory of change
are the provision of security by MONUSCO and/or the Government of DRC security forces,
and the ability of the national roads fund to implement, with our support, the maintenance
system we put in place. The full theory of change is set out in Annex A.
Assumptions
Reduced income poverty and improved security in North and South Kivu
Final outcome level
4
•Access to services is supported by
other necessary conditions e.g.
availability of staff, affordable fees
•Enabling environment for
Improved physical access to good quality
services in ZoIs of roads
Increased income
Service providers and
NGOs use roads to
increase coverage
3
Reduced prices
of goods
Increased
use of
markets
Improved security and state presence in
zones of influence of the roads
Security forces
use roads to
increase
coverage
GoDRC uses
roads to
increase
coverage
commercial and agricultural
activities is improved through other
programmes
•Improvements in household
income and expenditure are not
undermined by significant shocks or
increased informal taxes on the
road
•Related programmes tackle
conditions for economic
development, such as river or other
connecting transport and safe
access for women to markets
•GoDRC prepared, and has
Increased road
use by citizens
capacity, to provide security and
services
Intermediate outcome level:
•We are acting in coordination with
Improved
transport
Increased
employment
Other DFID
and donor
programming
leveraged into
zones of
influence of
roads
All-weather, climate
resilient roads exist
and are maintained
2
I4S strategy
and its
implementation
are coherent
and effective
the rest of I4S and the international
community
•MONUSCO mandate is extended
and MONUSCO has sufficient
capacity
•MONUSCO provides security to
works and to areas that have been
opened
•GoDRC prepared, and has
capacity, to provide security and
services
•MONUSCO is prepared to develop
ISSSS with our support
•Informal taxes and cost of transport
do not undermine increased road
use
•Improved roads lead to improved
transport services
Output level:
1
Recruit SMEs
with a focus
(e.g. training,
output-based
clauses) on
assessing and
addressing
equitability and
gender issues
Recruit local
labour with a
focus (e.g.
training, outputbased clauses)
on assessing
and addressing
equitability and
gender issues
Obtain
provision of
security by
MONUSCO
and GoDRC
Functioning and
effective road
maintenance
plan and
financing
structure
Develop
environmental
and social
management
plan
Influencing work
•MONUSCO and/or GoDRC provide
security for the works to go ahead
•We have sufficient knowledge of
Research and evaluation to collect and
assess evidence and test assumptions of
I4S strategy and links between roads and
stabilisation
appropriate design standards to
ensure the sustainability of the
roads
•Local SME market exists to supply
the relevant services
The theory of change identifies some key gaps in our current evidence base. Lessons from
previous road investments show that:
 we need our implementing partners not only to construct the roads themselves but
also to ensure that the roads deliver sustainable, equitable outcomes;
 we cannot assume that roads alone lead to development outcomes such as
increased health or education outcomes or increased economic activity: other
conditions, which are beyond the scope of our roads interventions, are necessary –


such as affordable school or health fees and access to transport links beyond the
roads we fund;
we need to test our theory on the links between roads and stabilisation and build the
global and local evidence base; and
we need to test the ISSSS approach to phasing stabilisation efforts, including
ensuring that MONUSCO provides security to road building investments under the
ISSSS.
The proposed intervention therefore includes a significant monitoring, evaluation and
research element. This is set out in detail on pp. 42-43. It includes a baseline study,
evaluability study and theory-based evaluation to allow us to test and clarify the theory of
change, develop strong indicators and datasets, and iteratively improve the cost-benefit
analysis. We will also second a monitoring and evaluation specialist to MONUSCO’s
Stabilisation Support Unit to evaluate the links between roads and stabilisation and the
ISSSS theory of change.
Previous interventions in the roads sector have shown that gains can rapidly be undermined
if effective and sustainable maintenance systems are not in place; that impacts are difficult to
measure over the lifetime of a road construction intervention, or even within a two-year
period thereafter; and that the indirect environmental and social impacts of roads
interventions need to be managed over the medium to long term. The theory of change
therefore runs over a 10-year period, and the intervention will include a 10-year contract for
the oversight of maintenance, monitoring and evaluation and management of environmental
and social impacts. This will allow us to mitigate the indirect and long-term environmental
and social impacts, and to build the evidence of impact of investment in the roads sector.
As well as the theory of change leading to the intended outcomes of the programme, there is
a set of potential negative impacts that we will need to manage.
At the lowest level of the theory of change, the recruitment of SMEs and local labour could
lead to inequitable distribution of employment-generated income and resulting threats to
social cohesion if we do not understand and take into account local power structures, conflict
dynamics, and gender issues. The logic behind this linkage is that the benefits of
construction and maintenance employment could accrue only to men, the most powerful and
the most well-off, rather than the poorest and most vulnerable, including women.
The roads themselves – level 2 of the theory of change – could lead to a set of negative
outcomes at levels 3 and 4. These include:
 Increased trade in bushmeat from protected species, illegal timber and uncertified
minerals. This trade poses risks to the environment and the climate in itself, but also
provides economic benefits to armed groups and, potentially, FARDC and other
actors
 Increased prevalence of HIV/AIDS and infectious diseases
 Economic exploitation, including extraction of rent through establishing road blocks
and enforcing informal taxes by both state security institutions
 Sexual exploitation
 Risks of conflict, through increased use of the roads by armed groups, banditry along
the road if armed groups’ control of areas is successfully challenged by the state
 Risks to civilian protection due to increased presence of and activity by both armed
groups and formal security institutions
 Negative impacts upon people’s livelihoods, since the access provided by the roads
may make the land in the vicinity and its natural resources more attractive to powerful
individuals or groups and result in attempts to capture such land and/or resources
 Increased road traffic deaths and injuries

Use of the Kahuzi-Biéga National Park by artisanal miners
The logic is that these negative outcomes would lead not to increased road use by citizens
but increased road use by armed groups; not to increased use of markets and reduced
prices of goods but to increased illegal trade that fuels conflict; and not to improved security
but to increased risks to civilian protection; and not to improved incomes but to reduced
livelihoods options due to capture of land and natural resources.
It is worth noting that an indicator that the programme is proceeding as expected would be
that the anticipated positive and negative outcomes come to pass, albeit that we have
mitigated the negative outcomes as far as possible. Although we have not yet been able to
quantify and value negative outcomes, we will factor these into future iterations of the costbenefit analysis.
The potential negative outcomes are captured in more detail in the social development and
conflict and security appraisals. Strategies to mitigate, monitor and evaluate these risks are
articulated in the Management Case.
Results chain
While the theory of change recognises that roads feed in as inputs to two macro-level
theories of change (that of DFID DRC and that of the ISSSS), the results chain and logframe
(which is included in the Management Case and at Annex B) focus down onto measuring
what the intervention itself can deliver.
Level 2 of the theory of change feeds into the logframe outcome which seeks to see
economic activity and service provision catalysed by secure, all-weather, climate resilient
roads. The economic activity and service provision elements of this outcome capture the
significant focus in the programme on crowding in other DFID and donor activity.
Level 1 of the theory of change becomes the programme outputs. The research and
evaluation element of the programme will assess what the contribution of those roads is to
the macro theories of change.
Results
chain
Finance for road
construction and
maintenance and
environmental and social
management
Human resources for
influencing – DFID DRC
and consultancy
Letting of construction and
maintenance contracts
which include a specific
focus (e.g. training,
output-based clauses) on
assessing and addressing
equitability and gender
Implementation of
environmental and social
management plan
Influencing work
Human resources for
research and evaluation
through secondment to
MONUSCO Stabilisation
Support Unit
Indicators
Research and evaluation
to collect and assess
evidence and test
assumptions of I4S
strategy and links between
roads and stabilisation
Roads built, upgraded,
rehabilitated and
maintained [with DFID
finance/with govt finance?]
Equitable employment
generated by road works
and maintenance
Negative direct and
indirect impacts of the
roads identified and
mitigated
Other DFID and donor
programming leveraged
into zones of influence of
roads
Economic
activity and
service
provision
catalysed by
secure, allweather,
climate
resilient roads
Reduced income
poverty and
improved
security in North
and South Kivu
Output indicators:
Outcome indicators:
Impact indicators:
•
•
Number of kilometres of road built/upgraded
•
•
Number of kilometres of road rehabilitated/
maintained
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Maintenance MoUs in place with provincial
governments
Number of days of work generated,
disaggregated by gender, income quintile,
demobilised soldiers etc
Volume of bushmeat from protected species
Volume of illegal timber
Volume of illegal minerals
Number of people sensitised to HIV/AIDS,
disaggregated by gender
Proportion of roads regularly patrolled by
security forces
•
•
•
•
•
•
Number of vehicles on road (by category incl.
non-motorised)
Average speed on roads (which allows for overachievement) or proportion of the four roads on
which motorised vehicles can travel at >40 kph
Number of days of road closure in last year
(aggregated/averaged)
Cost of transport per passenger km/tonne km
Perceptions of security along the roads
Proportion of population within x hours of nearest
health centre/school
•
Provincial GDP per
capita
Number of attacks
against civilians/ number
of deaths in security
incidents OR
aggregated security
score (from situation
assessment) OR
security perceptions in
North and South Kivu
Volume (t) of traceable artisanal minerals from
centres de négoces in the zones of influence of
the roads
Average price of basket of imported goods over
previous six months
Number/value of other projects/programmes in
ZoI
Feasible options
Since the strategic case for this intervention is that we should support the ISSSS by
investing in GoDRC and MONUSCO’s identified priority roads, the feasible options focus on
delivery mechanisms rather than strategic decisions for the delivery of the programme’s
outcome and impact.
The options are described and appraised in full in Section C from page 21. Option 1, a ‘do
nothing’ counterfactual, would involve ceasing our support to the roads element of the
ISSSS in March 2012 when our current intervention ends. Option 2 is to agree a further
memorandum of understanding with UNOPS, who delivered the first phase of the
intervention. Option 3 envisages funding the national roads bureau, Office des Routes,
directly to deliver or contract out the work, potentially through a management agent. Option
4 is to contract the private sector directly.
Appraisal of issues for all options
Before appraising each of the delivery options, we appraise below the economic and social
development case for the roads prioritised by the ISSSS plan, as well as security, conflict,
institutional, climate and environment issues. We also consider the opportunities for DFID
DRC associated with investing in these roads in particular, and in the Kivus in general.
Economic appraisal
The economic appraisal assessed the case for investing in each of the four proposed roads.
The roads are shown in Map 2 below. They run from Shabunda to Burhale (along the road
to Bukavu); Hombo to Walikale; Sake (the red circle to the south-east of Masisi) to Walikale;
and Kaseke (the red circle near Hombo) to Bunyakiri (the red circle near Bukavu). The FiziMinembwe road, also shown in the map below, will be funded by other donors.
Map 2: ISSSS priority roads
Existing axis
ISSSS axis
(fully open)
ISSSS axis /
2012-2013
Priorities
(partly open)
Boga
Rutshuru
Masisi
Walikale
Hombo
Shabunda
Minembwe
Fizi
The roads were selected by the Government of DRC with MONUSCO as the highest
priorities for stabilisation in the Kivus. This selection was made on the basis of levels of
security and actual and potential economic activity. However, this information was based on
qualitative assumptions rather than on quantitative data. The economic appraisal sought to
address some of the gaps in the data, using historic, present and forecast traffic volumes;
socio-economic data and population numbers; security costs; and information on the mining
sector and other data relating to economic activity. The roads were then divided into a
number of sections according to existing road quality, topography, environment and number
of bridges, and estimated costs were applied to each section.
The economic analysis valued security benefits using the proxy measure of the anticipated
reduction in MONUSCO costs to provide the same level of security. This includes, for
example, the cost of establishing and manning police stations, and the cost of transporting
troops and goods, which at present happens by helicopter rather than road. The benefit of
additional trade is also valued, based on the improved prospects for legitimate mining
providing a proxy for the economic impact of regional road network improvements.
The costs in the current cost-benefit analysis (CBA) are the direct capital and maintenance
costs of the intervention, taking into account the current state of the road, condition of the
terrain, nature of the soil, existing drainage structures and requirement for major bridges.
The estimated unit rates will bring the road from its state in early 2012 into a condition
whereby 4x2 traffic can travel at an average speed of 40 km/h with efficient maintenance.
Based on this analysis, the economic internal rates of return (EIRR) for all four roads are
estimated to be strong, ranging from 17% to 20% (with an average of 19%). The net present
value (NPV) of benefits minus costs is positive, totalling $6.35m for the four roads at a 12%
discount rate. Table 1 below shows the EIRRs and NPVs for each road and in total.
Table 1: Economic internal rates of return and net present values for the proposed roads
Route
Nyamirera-Walikale
Kaseke-Bunyakiri
Burhale-Isezya-Shabunda
Sake-Nyabiondo-Walikale
TOTAL all four routes:
EIRR
19%
20%
17%
19%
NPV US$m
1.31
1.08
1.68
1.85
Length km
128
72
239
189
19%
6.35
628
The CBA has identified a significant number of gaps between the impact and outcomes we
are seeking to achieve in the theory of change, and what we can currently measure and
therefore assign a value to.
For example, while the proxy measure of security costs
corresponds to the outcome “improved security and state presence in zones of influence of
the roads” in the theory of change, and the proxy measure of increased legitimate mining
corresponds to the “increased income” outcome, access to basic services is not valued in
the CBA. Likewise, there are a number of other outputs that have been identified or
quantified but are not yet valued in the CBA.
On the cost side, the roads are expected to lead to increased volumes of bushmeat from
protected species, illegal timber and uncertified minerals – which has both an environmental
cost and provides economic benefits to armed groups. The roads may lead to informal taxes
being imposed and facilitate the illicit capture of natural resources, and thus an economic
cost. The roads may lead to an increased presence of both armed groups and security
institutions, implying a security cost. Finally, there may be a social cost through increased
prevalence of HIV/AIDS and infectious diseases, sexual exploitation and increased road
traffic deaths and injuries. These costs could be significant, but will be carefully managed
through the programme in order to minimise them.
The currently non-quantifiable benefits are judged to significantly outweigh the costs. These
include direct employment, reduced prices for imported consumer goods and increased
opportunity for commercial activity, leading to increased incomes. The roads are expected
to reduce the time spent accessing basic services; and we are seeking to leverage in other
DFID, donor and government programmes and make the ISSSS approach more coherent.
In terms of security, not only will costs be reduced but security perceptions should improve
and the number of security incidents decline.
The Management Case sets out how these gaps in the economic appraisal will be
addressed in the monitoring and evaluation strategy and the logframe from page 42. We will
need to measure, and then assign values that correspond to, all of these costs and benefits,
and ensure that the theory of change, cost-benefit analysis and logframe are coherent.
The economic appraisal also demonstrates the importance of investing in the programme
over a number of years (in this case a 10-year period) to ensure positive returns on our
investment. Previous interventions in the roads sector have shown that gains can rapidly be
undermined if effective and sustainable maintenance systems are not in place. If we ended
the programme after the three-year construction period and assumed only one year of
benefits if the roads were not maintained, the costs of construction would considerably
outweigh the benefits, with a net present value of –$13.77m at a 12% discount rate. By
continuing our engagement over 10 years, we can ensure the roads are maintained and
therefore deliver the anticipated benefits.
The economic appraisal also identified qualitatively that the benefits associated with the
three of the proposed road interventions (Hombo-Walikale, Kaseke-Bunyakiri and SakeWalikale) are linked, since they form a network of provincial roads in North and South Kivu.
Synergies between the roads mean that the aggregate benefits associated with investing in
all three roads would be greater than the benefits associated with any one of the three roads
being improved in isolation. The Burhale-Shabunda road also has the benefit of increasing
the value of our investment in the Roads in the East Phase 1 intervention on the same axis.
The economic appraisal therefore recommended investing in all four roads.
Social development appraisal
From a social development perspective, there are no anticipated differences in impact
between the delivery options for this intervention as the funding modalities should not have
significant effect on the technical design of the programme, the programme’s ability to
deliver better social results at outcome and impact level, and its ability to meet the needs of
the most poor and vulnerable. All of the options can provide a means of delivering equitable
and sustainable outcomes and managing environmental and social risks and their
performance will be judged on their ability to do so.
The appraisal of social development impacts therefore compares investment in the roads
through any mechanism to the ‘do-nothing’ counterfactual. Under all three of the ‘dosomething’ options, we will need to ensure we learn from the lessons of DFID DRC’s
previous interventions in the roads sector. In particular, in the past our implementing
partners have focused largely on the delivery of the ‘hardware’ of roads programmes, i.e. the
roads themselves and their maintenance.
The appraisal assesses the following potential social benefits of the programme for the most
poor and vulnerable:
 In the short-term and at the individual level, improved access to services and income
through employment
 In the long-term and at the systemic and structural levels, improved service
availability and improved access to markets
It is reasonable to expect that roads will help facilitate the delivery of social outcomes in the
long-term but short-term gains beyond those linked to direct employment will be limited,
particularly for the poor and most vulnerable.
In eastern DRC, the construction and maintenance of roads is not likely to have a significant,
short-term impact on health outcomes, particularly for the most poor and vulnerable. 47% of
women in North Kivu and 37.3% of women in South Kivu reported that transportation posed
problems accessing healthcare. However, they noted that the high costs of healthcare
posed significantly greater obstacles.12 Furthermore, access to health centres and hospitals
in North and South Kivu is currently well-above other provinces. 73.3% of households in
South Kivu and 72.7% of households in North Kivu live within 30 minutes of a health centre
in comparison with the national average of 55.5%.
The improvement of roads is more likely to have a longer-term impact on health and
education outcomes by expanding service providers’ access and coverage. Some studies
have shown that improvement of living conditions, such as rural infrastructure and road
construction, can help improve retention of healthcare workers and encourage them to work
in remote and/or rural areas that are under-served by improving their motivation.13 This may
be true for countries like DRC, which is estimated to have higher medical unemployment in
urban areas and labour shortages in rural areas.14 Improved roads may also expand
immunisation campaigns in the east by improving humanitarian actors’ access to hard-toreach areas.
Healthier and more
educated communities
Citizens have
improved access to
social services
Roads increase availability
of affordable public
transport
Roads improve individuals’
access to previously hardto-reach areas
Service providers offer
better quality services
Roads improve services
providers’ access to
underserved areas
Road works and maintenance programmes can alleviate poverty in several ways, most
directly through income transfer (in cash or in-kind), and by creating useful economic
infrastructure. Indirect or secondary effects of road programmes include income multipliers
12
PNUD, Province du Sud Kivu: Profil Resume, Pauvrete et Conditions de Vie des Menages. Mars
2009.
13 World Health Organization, “Increasing access to health workers in remote and rural areas through
improved retention – Background paper.” Geneva, February 2009.
14 World Health Organization, “Increasing access to health workers in remote and rural areas through
improved retention – Background paper.” Geneva, February 2009.
generated by spending of public works wages, impacts on labour markets, and enhanced
employability of workers after the programme finishes.15
As evidenced in phase one of Roads in the East, the increase and or creation of new person
days of employment does not necessarily benefit the most poor or vulnerable groups,
particularly where heavy manual labour is involved. However, Phase Two of Roads in the
East will target the most poor and vulnerable and women by requiring implementing partners
to proactively ensure that employment-generated income from road rehabilitation and
maintenance is distributed to the most poor and vulnerable, including women. This might
include:
 job rotation through short-term contracts or reduced wages as a way from
discouraging all but the most poor from applying
 reduced wages – potentially below market rates – as a way from discouraging all but
the most poor from applying
 provision of water-points and firewood collection points closer to homes
 provision of childcare facilities at project sites, run by less physically-able individuals,
unable to perform manual labour
 classification of activities as ‘light’, ‘medium’ or ‘heavy’, with less physically able
individuals allocated ‘light’ or ‘medium’ tasks
 men and women work together in gangs to achieve joint piecework norms, so the
time worked and payment received are the same
 provision of capital investments, such as mechanical equipment, to reduce the need
for heavy manual labour and attract less physically-able groups of the working poor
who might otherwise be excluded from labour-intensive programmes
To mitigate risks related to road construction, we will ensure that international best practices
and lessons learned in road construction are adopted, particularly around the spread of
HIV/AIDS and infectious diseases, economic and sexual exploitation, threats to social
cohesion, and risks of conflict. Strategies to mitigate these risks are articulated in the
Management Case.
Institutional appraisal
Working on roads in eastern DRC has implications for our work with a wide variety of actors,
with some of whom we have not engaged in the first phase:
 Beneficiaries. We will need MONUSCO’s Stabilisation Support Unit (SSU) and our
implementing partners to work with communities to raise awareness and ensure that
the programme responds to beneficiaries’ needs and delivers equitable outcomes.
The Management Case sets out how we will seek to engage with communities in the
zones of influence of the roads.
 Civil society and humanitarian actors. Building links with NGOs will be crucial to
seek their assistance in sensitising the population to the use and maintenance of the
roads. We will also need a comprehensive picture of civil society interventions in the
zones of influence to ensure we build synergies where possible. We expect civil
society to play a significant part in the consortia of implementing partners, including
in terms of environmental and social management.
 Provincial government. SSU and implementing partners will need to work with
provincial governments to ensure the programme coordinates with and leverages
other interventions into provincial development plans. If the programme roads are
Stephen Devereux, “From Workfare to Fair Work: The Contribution of Public Works and other
Labour–Based Infrastructure Programmes to Poverty Alleviation.” Recovery and Reconstruction
Department, International Labour Office, Geneva; November 2002.
15




not high amongst the provincial priorities, it will be necessary to advocate for their
inclusion for maintenance by FONER.
Other provincial actors. Where national policy may impact on the provinces, for
example in ensuring timely payments from FONER in Kinshasa to OdR provincially,
we may need to seek the influence of key provincial actors such as the provincial
representative of FEC, religious organisations (i.e.catholic church), key CSO and
traditional chiefs (Mwamis).
FARDC, Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC), Police de Circulation, etc.
The
programme roads align with the ISSSS areas of operation, and are known to be the
areas where many of the former rebel groups used to operate. While these groups
have been integrated into the FARDC, the chain of command of groups such as
CNDP and Mayi Mayi retain a significant degree of independence in the way they
operate. Therefore, the success or failure of the programme will depend on the level
of buy-in and interest these integrated forces and FARDC have in the building of the
roads. Furthermore, it is possible that MONUSCO’s mandate will not continue
throughout the first three years of the programme during which the road construction
will take place. We will therefore need the Ministry of Infrastructure and Public Works
and Office des Routes to work closely with the Ministry of Defence to ensure that
FARDC and PNC provide security on the roads.
National government. The roads prioritised by the government and MONUSCO are
national priority roads which fall under the remit of the Ministry of Infrastructure,
Public Works and Reconstruction (MITPR). DFID will therefore engage with the
Cellule Infrastructure, which supports MITPR, in the drafting of the calls for
proposals, contracts, administrative arrangements and memoranda of understanding,
and in the selection of partners. We will also require delivery partners to work closely
with the Cellule Infrastructures, which represents the Ministry, and will include this in
all arrangements and contracts. We will also need to work closely with FONER to
ensure that payments are made to the provinces in a timely manner.
Key donor partners, to ensure coordination and to leverage in other activities.
Conflict and security appraisal
The programme roads could play an important role in improving security for communities
(though we need to test this theory through the evaluation element of the programme) but
also present a number of risks that will need to be managed proactively.
The roads will be constructed in an environment which is characterised by the presence of a
number of armed groups who currently prey on local communities with relative impunity. In
addition, the roads will pass through areas where there is an active mineral trade of which
much is informal and/or illegal and provides economic benefits to armed groups and,
potentially, FARDC and other actors.
MONUSCO anticipate that the building/upgrading of the roads would have a direct impact in
terms of improved security. For example, there are currently 1,400 peacekeepers deployed
along the Masisi-Walikale road in 16 bases.
Upgraded roads would allow these
peacekeepers to patrol and secure larger areas around their bases and to react more quickly
to security incidents and threats to civilians. Currently peacekeepers are able to make three
to four patrols daily in a perimeter of a maximum of 15 km around their bases. Eight
helicopter rotations are needed every week to re-supply the troops, at a cost of $13,000.
MONUSCO estimate that the same trip by road would cost $1,400.
However, the roads themselves could be seen by the state security institutions as presenting
opportunities to extract rent through establishing road blocks and enforcing informal taxes.
Armed groups may equally seek to extract rents in areas under their control or resort to
banditry along the road if their control of areas is successfully challenged by the state.
Experience in eastern Congo also informs us that increased presence and activity by both
armed groups and formal security institutions presents risks to civilian protection. The
access provided by the roads themselves may make the land in the vicinity and its natural
resources more attractive to powerful individuals or groups and any resulting attempts to
capture such land and/or resources could lead to negative impacts upon the livelihoods of
those that live in the area.
Finally, it will be important to ensure that any existing tensions between communities along
the road are not exacerbated by their construction and the improved access that they
provide. Instead, opportunities should be taken to improve social cohesion through ensuring
that equitable benefits from the roads’ construction reach all communities, and that
complementary peace-building activities are undertaken where appropriate.
Ensuring an effective communication strategy is in place to keep communities updated on
the roads’ construction, the opportunities they represent and the wider stabilisation
measures and programmes that they could facilitate, including greater access to social
services, will help to manage the risk of misperceptions and build local level understanding
and support.
The risk management section on pp. 40-41 sets out how we will manage these risks.
Climate and environment assessment
Road construction and use can have significant climate change and environmental impacts.
Investment in roads programmes in eastern DRC carries significant risks of contributing to
environmental degradation, illegitimate exploitation of natural resources and climate change
if not well managed. It also carries significant opportunities for improving communities’
resilience and improving governance of natural resources and environmental management.
A full checklist of risks and opportunities is at Annex C. The programme is therefore
Category A (high potential risk/opportunity).
The proposed intervention is to upgrade existing roads. The programme’s direct impacts will
be significant, but much less so than for new roads.
A full environmental and social assessment (ESIA) was undertaken during Phase 1 of Roads
in the East for the Burhale-Shabunda road and Kaseke-Bunyakiri roads. It was not carried
out prior to the start of works on the Burhale-Shabunda road, since the road was identified
as an urgent stabilisation priority. Although DFID insisted that it would need to be in place
within six months of the start of the programme, subsequent delays due to a lack of suitable
partners and contracting delays mean that the report was only completed in May 2011. A
social and environmental management plan (SEMP) is being implemented during the
extension of Phase 1.16 The SEMP will also be used in programme implementation of
Phase 2. ESIAs are now underway for the two other proposed roads, and SEMPs will be
developed.
The original ESIA judged that the scale of negative impacts on the biophysical environment
will be major to moderate unless well managed. The key risks include:
 Increased use and trade of charcoal and wood for fuel
 Increased consumption and trade of bushmeat
16
Roads in the East ESIA (EDRM 3029257, 3029273, 3029282, 3029375, 3029380)


Resumption of illicit or poorly managed artisanal mining
Weak capacity to manage the nearby national park
The ESIA also identified a number of possible benefits provided by the re-opened roads,
including:
 Participation of local and indigenous populations in management PNKB
 Creation and support of an environmental education program
 Improving access to drinking water
 Broader sustainable development of the region
An additional longer term risk is that further improvements in the quality of the roads in the
east of DRC will facilitate an increase in both artisanal and industrial logging. The risk of
increased logging and trade in charcoal and wood for fuel carries the broader risk of
increasing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and thus contributing to
climate change.
A further longer term risk is around the development of the mining sector. While increased
legitimate, traceable minerals trade would be a positive outcome of increased road access,
there is a direct risk to mineral exploitation within the national park from increased road
access. This risk is covered in the existing SEMP and we will continue to mitigate it in
Phase 2. There is also an indirect risk of the growing industry leading to land degradation
and pollution of water courses, and we will work with DFID’s ProMines programmes and
other mining interventions to ensure these risks are mitigated. We will also work with the
centres de négoces to provide data from road checkpoints on the mining trade, and to assist
with the certification process for traceable minerals.
An additional set of opportunities arise from the potential to increase communities’ economic
and physical resilience to climate change and environmental challenges. The roads are
expected to lead to direct employment and, assuming other conditions are in place, broader
economic development, which should lead to increased economic resilience. Improved land
management and physical access should lead to improved physical resilience.
The ESIA considered the impact of the roads on the scale of deforestation in DRC. The
direct impacts on deforestation were considered to be of relatively minor importance
because the intervention was reopening an existing road and the forest that had re-grown
where the road had once been was secondary growth. Since the roads to be funded under
Phase 2 cover only up to 628 km of a country that is greater in size than western Europe, its
impact on overall DRC deforestation levels is marginal.
In the second phase we will also consider the impact of climate change, climate variability
and extreme events on the condition of the roads. We are working with the DFID-funded
Africa Community Access Programme (AFCAP) to launch a programme in DRC, and will
seek to consider through this whether roads standards and future maintenance requirements
will need to be adjusted accordingly.
We will also pilot a new approach to measuring the carbon footprint of the programmatic
operations of our partners. Currently, DFID DRC is thinking about how to measure the
footprint of our own operations, and how to ensure climate change is mainstreamed through
our programme. This misses the far greater operational footprint of the programmes we
finance.
We will therefore develop and pilot a methodology to assess our partners’ and our
programmes’ emissions. This will build on carbon accounting work done by the Asian
Development Bank, and more recently other multilateral development banks, on their own
operations.
This carbon accounting will include staffing issues such as travel. Since this intervention
involves construction, it will also include measuring the footprint of the materials used for the
works. We will also assess the increased emissions that will result from higher traffic volume
on the roads, and consider how to reduce emissions. The emissions might be expected to
be relatively small (particularly in global terms) but will need to be calculated on the basis of
traffic projections and offset against any resulting decrease in the use of airlifts. We will
draw on existing work to calculate and reduce the emissions of roads interventions.17
Emissions will need to be weighed up against the benefits for DRC’s development and
stabilisation.
Lessons from Phase 1 on environmental and social management have included:
 Ensuring ESIAs are undertaken, and SEMPs are in place, before interventions begin.
ESIAs for the two new roads are already underway as a contribution the UK is
making to the ISSSS even if we do not finance the construction of the roads.
 Ensuring that a credible plan is in place, and that the SEMP actions that are
undertaken are necessary and sufficient to mitigate the key direct and indirect
impacts of the intervention. We will ensure that a core part of the programme
involves a review of the existing and new ESIAs and SEMPs, as well as their
successful implementation.
 Setting up a committee of all relevant government, NGO and UN partners in South
Kivu to manage environmental and social impacts. This is an innovative approach
that should be developed and adopted in North Kivu during Phase 2.
DFID committed 15% of the cost of Phase 1 of Roads in the East construction works to
identify and manage the environmental and social impacts of the intervention. We will
continue with this proportion of spend to finance the implementation of the SEMP to ensure
the negative impacts are mitigated and the benefits maximised.
The mechanism for managing environmental and social impacts and delivering the carbon
accounting element will be to set up a 10-year arrangement to cover the lifetime of the
intervention. This contract or arrangement will oversee and build capacity for maintenance;
monitor and evaluate the intervention; and manage the environmental and social impacts.
The agency recruited for this purpose will have a mandate to monitor implementation of the
SEMPs and devise course corrections or alternative strategies if mitigation measures are not
working or prove inadequate to the scale of the impact. The 10-year arrangement is
considered in the appraisal of options at section C below, as well as in the Commercial
Case.
Synergies and impacts on strategic decisions
DFID DRC’s programme team considered whether a decision to invest in a three-year works
programme in support of the GoDRC and MONUSCO stabilisation plan in eastern DRC
would (a) provide opportunities for synergies with other parts of the programme to leverage
increased results, and (b) preclude any strategic decisions to shift the way DFID works in
DRC in the future. A full set of responses by programme or sector is at Annex D.
17
Such as an Asian Development Bank case study on India,
http://www.adb.org/documents/reports/estimating-carbon-footprints-road-projects/estimating-carbonfootprints-road-projects.pdf and methodologies for reducing carbon in transport interventions,
http://ss.adb.org/?cx=003580287232275984586%3A28nh6wpajf4&q=carbon+calculator
In summary, investment in the proposed roads provides a number of opportunities for
synergies with broader stabilisation, conflict, security, humanitarian and basic services
programmes.
Investing in the stabilisation plan would also give us the leverage to strengthen the
stabilisation approach. ISSSS seeks to be a programmatic effort, but functions by producing
project concept notes and then seeking funding by project. Investing in the proposed roads
would provide an opportunity to take a more programmatic approach if DFID DRC also
chooses to invest in other elements of the plan or to build synergies with other parts of our
programme. We will also work to improve MONUSCO’s understanding of the impact of
stabilisation efforts, and build development considerations into GoDRC and MONUSCO
planning to assist in the transition from stabilisation to development.
In terms of the high-level strategic decisions DFID DRC faces about how to shape its
programme in the future, there was a clear sense that as long as we do not take a decision
that we will only work in the provinces where we already have agreed roads programmes,
investment in these roads in North and South Kivu would not preclude any strategic
investment decisions in our portfolio. Nor would it preclude our building roads elsewhere in
DRC, under a scaling up of our support to the sector envisaged in the Country Operational
Plan.
A decision to invest in roads in the Kivus in support of stabilisation aims would not fit well
with, for example, a decision to pursue an area-based programme that targets the very
poorest, which might focus on a province such as Equateur.
However, it would not rule out a number of other potential priorities, such as supporting the
stabilisation effort and the transition from humanitarian to development; either top-down
support through government or bottom-up through labour-based employment and private
sector development; or focusing on trade and the investment climate, given the Kivus’
international boundaries to the east.
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option
Option
1: End Roads in the East after Phase 1
2: Develop a programme that builds on our
current Roads in the East intervention,
implemented by UNOPS
3: Fund Office des Routes to implement the
programme directly
4: Catalyse private investment in roads in
eastern DRC to deliver the programme
Evidence rating
Strong
Medium
Medium (though weaker than option 2)
Medium (though weaker than option 2)
Since the options focus on delivery mechanisms, the evidence for all three is medium. No
impact evaluations have been undertaken on roads interventions in DRC, and nor therefore
for any of these delivery mechanisms. Monitoring and evaluation in general has been
relatively weak in the roads sector in DRC, and has tended to focus on outputs as proxies for
development and stabilisation outcomes. Nevertheless, monitoring and evaluation studies
have been undertaken, good evidence on the impacts of roads on development outcomes
exists at the global level, and we have worked with both UNOPS and Office des Routes (the
latter indirectly) in other interventions.
What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and environment
for each feasible option?
Option
1
2
3
4
Climate
change
and
environment risks and impacts
n/a
A (high potential risk)
A (high potential risk)
A (high potential risk)
Climate
change
and
environment opportunities
n/a
B (medium potential opportunity)
B (medium potential opportunity)
B (medium potential opportunity)
C. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option?
From an economic, security and conflict, climate and environment and social development
perspective, there are limited anticipated differences in impact between the delivery options
for this intervention. Those that do exist are set out in the appraisal below. The funding
modalities should not have a significant effect on the technical design of the programme, the
programme’s ability to deliver better environmental and social results at outcome and impact
level and mitigate risks, or its ability to meet the needs of the most poor and vulnerable.
These issues will need to be built into programme implementation regardless of the delivery
option. The level of DFID oversight, and hence risk of poor or non-compliance with
requirements, does vary significantly between the delivery options. The appraisal therefore
focuses on institutional, quality control and value for money issues.
Option 1: Do nothing
Option 1, a ‘do nothing’ counterfactual, would involve ceasing our support to the roads
element of the ISSSS in March 2012 when our current intervention ends.
The first phase of support was intended to upgrade the Burhale to Shabunda road from a
pathway to a road passable by 4x4 vehicles, and to ensure a sustainable maintenance
system was put in place. Ceasing support in March would mean that only NGO and UN
vehicles could use the road. Local people would still only be able to access the length of the
road by foot or bicycle, and doing nothing therefore would offer minimal stabilisation and
development outcomes or impact.
There is little likelihood that, in the absence of further DFID support, other donors would
provide alternative funding. The scale of need in DRC means that although a large number
of donors are engaged in the roads sector, few have additional resources to invest and there
is a very low likelihood that DFID finance would displace other donor funding. The African
Development Bank is largely engaged in bitumen routes nationales, and the World Bank
focuses on the national priority roads plan. MONUSCO’s Stabilisation Support Unit, which
coordinates the ISSSS, has approached donors about the ISSSS priority roads. The
Netherlands, who previously provided finance for the Miti-Hombo and Sake-Masisi roads,
have had their aid budget for DRC cut. The EU was working on the road from Goma to
Masisi, but ran out of funds and is unlikely to have any further finance before 2015. Other
donors are considering providing finance for further ISSSS priority roads – the Baraka-FiziMinembwe road and two roads in Haut Uélé and Bas Uélé districts in Province Orientale –
but do not have funds for more than these roads.
It is feasible that MONUSCO engineering brigades could undertake some works on the
programme roads in the absence of DFID funding. MONUSCO are already working on 86
km of the Hombo-Walikale road and 176km of the Masisi-Walikale road. However,
MONUSCO brigades have the capability only to prepare road platforms and undertake road
surfacing works. The roads cannot be reopened without DFID support to stabilise the slopes
on either side of the roads and to construct drainage structures and bridges. In addition,
MONUSCO engineering brigades do not have the capacity to hand over road maintenance
to FONER, or to build FONER and OdR’s capacity to deliver an effective and sustainable
maintenance system. Nor would the engineering brigades offer local employment, or
management of social and environmental impacts. Moreover, work by the engineering
brigades would end with the MONUSCO mandate, or decrease with a gradual MONUSCO
drawdown, either of which could be as early as next year.
The counterfactual to the proposed intervention is that the roads remain unopened (or, in the
case of Burhale-Shabunda, passable only by 4x4 vehicles). The benefits measured in the
economic appraisal are incremental benefits over and above this baseline scenario. The
costs to MONUSCO of delivering stabilisation along the proposed routes would remain high,
though the cost to DFID directly would be zero. The opportunities for increased legitimate
mining trade would be limited.
While a second phase of support would allow us to build on and strengthen the investment
we made in Roads in the East Phase 1 on the Burhale-Shabunda road, and therefore a donothing option would imply a cost due to a failure to reinforce the investment we have
already made, this cost is not counted under the counterfactual. This is because reinforcing
the road is counted as a benefit under options 2, 3 and 4.
Option 2: UNOPS
This option envisages using the same partner for delivery as in Phase 1 of DFID’s
investment in roads in eastern DRC.
However, we would seek to improve upon the Phase 1 approach by agreeing performance
triggers for payments and by securing greater DFID involvement in the selection of service
providers for elements such as environmental and social management. This would deliver
better value for money in that unsatisfactory work would not be paid for. It would also
address the relative weakness of a memorandum of understanding, rather than a
performance-based contract, as the form of arrangement between DFID and the delivery
partner.
As in the first phase, this option would require programme-funded technical assistance to
ensure results beyond works on the road are delivered.
The benefits of this option include:
 Building upon the experience of the first phase. UNOPS has already developed
relationships with government, private sector and NGO partners in North and South
Kivu. This is the only option which would allow works to begin in early to mid 2012,
since the team is already in place, and contracts for existing works can be extended
where successful or tenders delivered rapidly where new contracts are required.
 An awareness before programme design of our partner’s strengths and weaknesses.
This would allow us to build in measures to consolidate their strengths and mitigate
their weaknesses. For example, we could require UNOPS to subcontract some
tasks, such as design and supervision, to others such as Office des Routes and
NGOs that have the necessary experience. We could also be more involved,
through the provision of technical assistance, in the delivery of the programme, for
example in the preparation of terms of reference and the selection of subcontractors.
 Privileged relations with MONUSCO, which should ensure that MONUSCO brigades
provide security for the road works to go ahead as well as longer-term security as
the next step in the ISSSS strategy once roads have been reopened. The
experience of the first phase shows that in fact UNOPS was not able to secure such

support for two years, leading to delays and lower value for money in the
programme. Vigilance by DFID is therefore required to make this happen, limiting
the added value of UNOPS in this area. Moreover, if MONUSCO’s mandate is not
renewed in 2012, UNOPS will have limited influence on the provision of security –
though in this scenario it is the responsibility of the government to provide security
for the UN family.
Reasonable procedures for and experience in procurement.
The risks and challenges of this option include:
 High administration costs of 12% during Phase 1. We would need to negotiate
these costs down to ensure competitive value for money. MONUSCO’s Stabilisation
and Recovery Funding Facility (SRFF) offers one option to drive down admin costs,
as set out below.
 A weaker mechanism to tackle underperformance than a contract-based approach.
We would need to agree a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for this type of
arrangement, which is not legally binding, as a contract could be.
 A focus on the delivery of works, with less attention to the social, economic and
environmental aspects of roads programmes, and a limited awareness of the market
for contractors for these ‘softer’ elements of the programme. Close supervision has
been required during Phase 1, which implies significant transactions costs for DFID.
Also in the first phase, the challenge of finding a suitable contractor for the
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment led to significant delays in managing
the environmental and social impacts of the programme. We could mitigate this risk
by requiring UNOPS to secure arrangements with suitable partners, which DFID
would need to approve, before agreeing an arrangement with them.
 Human resource management. UNOPS staff are given short contracts due to
UNOPS’ lack of central funding, so turnover of staff is high and some experienced
staff have moved on. Our negative experience in another roads intervention in DRC
showed that the quality of individuals and teams is paramount to UNOPS’ ability to
deliver, and we cannot guarantee that the strong team that is currently in place will
remain. We could mitigate this risk by requiring UNOPS to give staff longer
contracts, up to the full estimated duration of their work under the programme.
 Limited responses to tenders from local private sector organisations. We will need
to explore whether this is related to a lack of suitable organisations (and if so, how to
proactively tackle this), or UNOPS procedures. This challenge applies to all three
options.
This option provides the only tested solution, albeit with a number of areas for improvement.
It therefore presents a lower risk than the other options, and could be delivered in the fastest
timeframe. However, it is not clear that it represents the best value for money, and one of
UNOPS’ comparative advantages may disappear if MONUSCO’s mandate is not renewed.
We would have two options for the arrangement with UNOPS: a direct MoU between DFID
and UNOPS, or routing our funding through the Stabilisation and Recovery Funding Facility
(SRFF).
The SRFF is a multi-donor trust fund through which it is intended that all support to the
ISSSS be routed. Finance can be provided either for the board of the trust fund to allocate
to the highest ISSSS priorities, or to be earmarked for a particular intervention. We would
have the flexibility to negotiate clauses in our arrangement with the trust fund, such as
retaining an external overall monitoring function of UNOPS’ work and payments linked to
results; to include a set of results that will lead to disbursements in the project document;
and to veto the project document if we are not content.
The SRFF administration fees are 8%, including 1% for UNDP as trust fund manager and
7% for UNOPS as implementing agency. The SRFF would therefore significantly reduce the
administration fees compared to entering an arrangement with UNOPS directly, though if we
elect not to use the SRFF we would use the 7% fee UNOPS agreed with the SRFF as a tool
to negotiate their rate down.
Using the SRFF would considerably enhance donor coordination in support of the ISSSS,
and would empower GoDRC nationally and provincially to own and engage in the
implementation of the strategy. Our ambition to test the ISSSS theory of change, build
synergies with other donor interventions and elements of the ISSSS, leverage in other donor
and DFID programming, shift the ISSSS from a projectised to a programmatic approach, and
improve M&E within the ISSSS would be significantly enhanced by participating.
The risks of using the SRFF are that only one other donor is currently providing finance
through the SRFF, so we would be one of the first movers; reduced control over our
arrangement with UNOPS, though this could be mitigated by including clauses in the project
document and trust fund arrangement; and the possibility of delays in getting the revised
SRFF agreed by the new government and due to lack of political capacity or will. There is
also a risk around UNDP administering the trust fund, as we have had a poor experience of
UNDP managing a UNOPS arrangement in another DFID-funded roads intevention.
However, the SRFF would be managed from New York rather than at country level, lowering
this risk.
Option 3: OdR
This option would work through the national roads bureau, Office des Routes (OdR). OdR
would manage project funds, sub-contracting works to local small and medium enterprises.
DFID would provide technical support, most likely from an international consultancy firm and
perhaps through a project implementation unit approach, for design and supervision services
and technical studies.
The benefits of this option include:
 Building the capacity of the Government of DRC at the provincial level.
 Making use of existing heavy equipment which belongs to OdR in both North and
South Kivu but that is not being used for lack of project funding. By using this
equipment we would not have to pay for the amortisement of the equipment and this
would reduce the cost of using it. The overall impact may be as high as 10 to 15%.
 Securing the road works. Although MONUSCO is not obliged to provide security as it
is for the UN family, as part of GoDRC OdR should be able to work with the Ministry
of Defence to secure FARDC and police security for the roads. This is, however,
untested.
The risks and challenges of this option include:
 Considerable fiduciary risk.
DFID does not currently fund any part of the
Government of DRC directly. In order to consider this option, we would need to
undertake a fiduciary risk assessment (FRA) for the provincial branches of OdR.
However, there is no reason to expect that the risk of funding OdR in North and
South Kivu will be less than the risk of funding other parts of GoDRC, and it is
therefore unlikely that this would be a feasible option. We could mitigate the risk
through results-based payments, though this method is being tried in ProRoutes and
progress remains slow.
 Weak performance in other interventions. OdR has been used by the EU. This
experience suggested that OdR is a weak organisation that needs reinforcement and
training in all fields: technical, administrative, planning and finance. The EU-funded



PAREST project trained a significant number of staff, but 98% of these newly trained
staff have already left for the private sector. OdR is currently being supported
indirectly to implement part of the World Bank- and DFID-funded ProRoutes
programme, but the aims of ProRoutes are to build capacity in the sector and it is
therefore judged important to work through OdR even if implementation is slower as
a result. Investment in provincial roads in eastern DRC, however, has a stabilisation
objective and therefore requires rapid progress to build people’s confidence.
The challenge of building local private sector capacity. OdR has been unwilling to
sub-contract work to the private sector as its raison d’etre has always been to deliver
works itself. While it will be necessary to build OdR’s capacity to become a
management agency rather than a public works organisation, the need for Roads in
the East to deliver quickly means this programme may not be the best place to press
for this. Moreover, if OdR were managing project funds and implementing some of
the works, there would be a question over separation of functions. As set out above,
an FRA would need to be undertaken to analyse these risks.
A weaker mechanism to tackle underperformance than a contract-based approach.
We would need to agree an MoU for this type of arrangement, which is not legally
binding, as a contract could be.
A higher risk of non-compliance with environmental and social standards and
requirements. Related to the weaker nature of an MoU than a contract, it would be
difficult to withhold payment on the basis of non-compliance on the softer elements of
the programme.
This is a high risk option, but it could produce good value for money if sufficient safeguards
(including high quality technical support and results-based finance) could guarantee the
expected results and if OdR made available its new equipment to ensure our costs were
reduced. In order to promote the private sector all the non-mechanical work would need to
be subcontracted to the private sector. This would involve significant resource to shift OdR’s
culture from delivery to management.
Option 4: Private sector
DFID would hire an international engineering or consulting company as a project manager,
in joint venture with local partner(s), to manage the programme, including fund management,
design and supervision, and environmental and social components. The project manager
would hire local contractors to execute the works.
The benefits of working directly with the private sector would be:
 The opportunity to build local private sector capacity.
 Potentially good value for money. A competitive process should lead to lower fees
than UNOPS’ administration costs.
 The ability to manage performance directly through a results-based contract.
 Limited fiduciary risk.
 Access to expertise in, and experience in managing, not only physical works but also
management of environmental and social impacts and handover of maintenance.
The risks and challenges include:
 Anchorage of the programme. Since the works are executed on national and
provincial roads, an agreement with the national ministry of public works and the
provincial governor would have to be negotiated.
 Security for the works. Without UNOPS or OdR as a partner, the task of organising
MONUSCO or GoDRC security may be more difficult. Where security was not
available during Phase 1, this had a detrimental impact on the quality of the works

and on costs. Premiums may be increased to allow for insurance and provision of
security.
Risk of limited response to tenders from local private sector organisations. We will
need to explore whether this is related to a lack of suitable organisations (and if so,
how to proactively tackle this). This challenge applies to all three options.
This is a less risky option than funding OdR, and would build on experience in other fragile
environments such as Afghanistan. This option offers us the most control over the quality of
results as we can use results-based management contracts. It also potentially offers the
best value for money due to the use of a competitive tender process.
Proposed option
Table 2 below summarises the likely performance of options 2-4 against a set of key criteria.
Table 2: Strengths and weakness by objective and delivery channel
Experience
(including in
‘softer’
elements)
and past
performance
Value for
money
UNOPS joint venture
Medium
Satisfactory performance in
Phase 1 of the programme,
with room for improvement
on softer elements
Low
fiduciary risk
Ability to
start works
rapidly
Ability of
DFID to
tackle underperformance
Ability to
Private sector
Medium
Slow performance in other
DFID-funded programmes
and untested ability to work
with others on softer
elements
Medium
No experience in DRC, but
considerable experience
globally including in softer
elements and in fragile states
e.g. Afghanistan
High
Use of existing heavy
equipment would reduce
costs and results-based
finance should offer VfM, but
poor and slow performance
in other interventions has
driven up costs
Medium
Competitive tender will drive
down costs and results-based
finance should allow strong
VfM
UNOPS should have the
greatest ability to command
MONUSCO support, though
this relies on the assumption
that MONUSCO is prepared
to secure investments in the
ISSSS
Medium
OdR (and its parent ministry)
should have the ability to
work with the Ministry of
Defence to secure works,
though this is untested
International and local firms
have the lowest ability to
command provision of security.
Premiums may increase as a
result
Low
Medium
Significant experience
globally. Some small-scale
risk in subcontracts with
local actors
High
UNOPS is already working
in both provinces and has
built relationships with
government, MONUSCO
and contractors
Significant fiduciary risk in
asking GoDRC to manage
funds. An FRA would be
required
Medium
OdR is already present and
has equipment, but limited
ability and willingness to
subcontract private sector
could slow progress
Medium
MoU provides weaker
control mechanism than a
contract though mitigated by
approval by DFID of subcontractors
Low/medium
MoU provides weaker
control mechanism than a
contract. Mitigated by use of
results based agreement,
though this has had limited
utility in ProRoutes
High
Medium
High admin costs balanced
by reasonable procurement
processes
Ability to
secure
provision of
security by
MONUSCO
or GoDRC
Office des Routes
Low
Medium
Medium
Low
International firm will have
significant experience globally.
Some small-scale risk in
subcontracts with local actors
Low
The need to procure using
international norms and
timelines and the fact no
international firms are currently
present in DRC imply long lead
in time
High
Performance-based contracts
would allow for a high degree
of control
Medium
build GoDRC
capacity
Ability to
build local
private
sector
capacity
MoU will need to include
mechanisms to build OdR,
FONER and relevant
environmental and social
ministries’/agencies’
capacity
Medium
Subcontracts will be let to
private sector, though there
is room for improvement in
proactively building the
capacity of the private sector
and MoU will need to include
mechanisms for this
Opportunity to work with
OdR for the first time as a
roads agency, managing
funds and subcontracting
the private sector
Contract will include building
OdR and FONER and relevant
environmental and social
ministries’/agencies’ capacity
Low
No track record and have
shown lack of willingness to
subcontract rather than
undertake works with own
brigades
High
Contract will include
proactively building private
sector capacity. International
firms have strong track record
in this area
The summary table shows:
 That the option of working through Office des Routes has the highest number of
weaknesses.
 That working through the private sector offers the best opportunity to exploit real
strengths, but also has a number of weaknesses to mitigate including around
provision of security and ability to start works rapidly.
 That an improved UNOPS delivery mechanism would not have any weaknesses we
do not feel could be addressed, and could start most rapidly.
The relative strengths and weaknesses of each feasible option point to a hybrid solution that
would allow us to test the ability of different partners and mechanisms to deliver in the east
of DRC, whilst at the same time minimising and mitigating risks through a portfolio approach
which allows for lesson learning and backstopping.
The proposed approach would blend options 2 and 4, while encouraging OdR to offer its
services as a plant hire operator. We would:
 Negotiate a memorandum of understanding with UNOPS, or enter into an
arrangement with the SRFF (see pp. 23-24), for the upgrading of the BurhaleShabunda road and management of the direct environmental and social impacts.
Improving on the first phase of Roads in the East, we would negotiate a
performance-based arrangement, which would set out the results that would trigger
payments. We would ensure that liability issues were clearly addressed, to ensure
that UNOPS takes liability for any underperformance in contracts they manage. We
would also ensure that, where necessary, DFID would have the right to be involved
in the drafting of terms of reference and selection of contractors. This may include
agreeing the proposed contractors during the negotiation of the arrangement. We
would ensure that the arrangement captured accountability lines to the Ministry of
Infrastructure and Public Works (MITPR) through the Cellule Infrastructures, who
would approve terms of reference and contractor selection.
 Tender the building/upgrading work and management of direct environmental and
social impacts on the other roads to bring in competition from the private sector,
NGOs and consortia. We propose to tender a results-based contract that allows for
sufficient flexibility to ensure strong delivery of results and value for money. This will
allow bidders to propose innovative models for delivery. The Commercial Case sets
out a number of considerations which will need to be captured in the tender
document. These include accountability lines to MITPR, who, as with UNOPS,
would approve terms of reference and contractor selection.
 Encourage OdR to offer its services as a plant hire operator. This may allow the
programme to take advantage of the presence of unused heavy equipment without
OdR being engaged in direct works, and would increase the possibility to build OdR
capacity through a direct link to the programme.


Let a 10-year contract for the three elements of the programme that will run for the
full duration: monitoring and evaluation, management of indirect and long-term
environmental and social impacts, and establishment and oversight of maintenance
arrangements. This organisation or consortium would provide monitoring and
evaluation and lesson learning across the elements of the programme, and would
engage in the first two years of the programme with the monitoring and evaluation
secondee to MONUSCO that we intend to fund through another DFID programme
(see page 8). The contractor would also be responsible for implementing the
environmental and social management plan where it relates to indirect impacts, and
coordinating with UNOPS and the project manager on their management of direct
risks and the handover of management after the first three years of the programme.
Finally, they would work with UNOPS and the project manager to hand over the
maintenance of the roads to the provincial government authorities, provide in-kind
support such as training and equipment over the lifetime of the programme, and
manage contingency funds to backstop the maintenance system in the event that it
fails over the 10-year programme lifespan. The Commercial Case sets out a
number of considerations which will need to be captured in the tender document.
These include accountability lines to MITPR, who, as with UNOPS, would approve
terms of reference and contractor selection.
Consider other alternative delivery mechanisms within the portfolio approach. We
will scope out the potential for working with the Cellule Infrastructures (CI) as a quasi
roads agency with a view to delivering long-term institutional impact. In this model,
CI would oversee the procurement of contracts with the local private sector, with
OdR providing the engineer role of quality assuring works and approving the release
of results-based payments. We will also consider whether the project manager
should sit within CI. In either case, a provincial CI office may need to be set up for
the first time. We will also consider whether a pooled fund approach to roads in
eastern DRC, such as using the Stabilisation and Recovery Funding Facility (SRFF)
as set out on pp. 23-24, would be feasible and sustainable and would allow burden
sharing and reduced overheads. We will discuss the SRFF with other ISSSS donors
and consider the case for routeing our finance in this way.
The proposed option would allow us to balance the unique ability of UNOPS to deliver
rapidly and build on existing relationships, with the increased competition and therefore VfM
of a private sector approach. We should be able to offset the low score of the private sector
option in terms of commanding the provision of security by using UNOPS’ comparative
advantage in this area for all programme roads given their involvement in the works on one
road.
Lesson learning and information sharing between the two approaches will allow us to use
the comparative advantages of each to improve the other. If the bids from the private sector
for the project manager are low quality, we have the option of asking UNOPS to step in on
any or all of the other roads.
The proposed option has been selected because we do not yet know what works best, and
which approaches will prove more and less cost-effective. The portfolio approach requires
us to evaluate and weigh up the different delivery options to feed into future decision-making
and to build the local and global evidence base. The programme therefore includes a
significant monitoring, evaluation and research element. This is set out in detail on pp. 4243.
D. What measures can be used to assess Value for Money for the intervention?
VfM for the programme is based on the following measures, against which we will monitor
progress during the intervention:



Economy and efficiency measures using unit costs: to open the roads to a standard
at which 4x2 vehicles can travel at 40 kph, from $10,000/km on sections with
relatively unchallenging topography and environment and no bridges, to $80,000/km
for mechanised works on difficult sections
Effectiveness measures: to be developed as part of the 10-year M&E contract
Economic internal rate of return/net present value: 19%/$6.35m at 12% discount rate,
as set out on page 12
We have compared these measures to other roads programmes in DRC. At present, the
mechanised unit costs are directly comparable to the anticipated unit costs for ProRoutes,
though actual figures are not yet available as works are still ongoing.
We have also compared unit costs with average costs in Africa, recognising that DRC’s size,
topography, security, lack of infrastructure and limited trading relationships mean that costs
of inputs are high. Default values for Africa derived from World Bank’s Road Costs
Knowledge System are $35,000/km to reopen a gravel road that needs to be fully
reconstructed.
We will factor the administrative costs of delivery partners into our appraisal of bids.
The programme would no longer represent good value for money if average unit costs
exceeded $50,000/km or if the rate of return was below the discount rate of 12%. We will
build unit cost measures into a results-based contract or arrangement as set out in the
Commercial Case.
E. Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option
The preferred option allows for competition to deliver the intervention, which should drive
down both unit and administration costs. A competitive tender process should allow us to
capitalise on the comparative advantages of various actors through the forming of consortia
– offering maximum value for money at the output level by using actors experienced at
delivering roads in eastern DRC, and at the outcome level through bringing in expertise to
ensure broader results are delivered that are inclusive and sustainable.
Commercial Case
Removed for reasons of commercial sensitivity until memoranda of understanding/contracts
have been agreed.
Financial Case
A. What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure accurate
forecasting?
Removed for reasons of commercial sensitivity until memoranda of understanding/contracts
have been agreed.
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
UNOPS is audited under its own Financial Regulations and Rules and manages
procurement, fraud and corruption through these and its Staff Regulations.
The financial risks and risks of fraud in the sub-contracts let by these organisations may be
higher, albeit that these will be significantly smaller financial arrangements. We will mitigate
this risk by paying by results, and by ensuring that our implementing partners have sufficient
safeguards in place in their sub-contracts.
To ensure we have the flexibility to tackle the risk of corruption and fraud effectively, we will
review the programme budget during the first annual review to consider the need for
independent assurance.
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported, and accounted for?
Partners will be required to provide quarterly financial statements and annually audited
reports. Partners will be required to maintain an asset register, and as with other roads
interventions in DRC we will seek for any assets at the end of the project to be handed over
either to other DFID interventions or to Office des Routes or another relevant GoDRC body.
Disposal of assets is determined in the rules and procedures of all UN organisations.
As set out in the Commercial Case, we will include review points or break clauses in the
MoU, which will include a clause covering the identification of fraud.
Management Case
A. What are the management arrangements for implementing the intervention?
The intervention will be implemented through three major DFID-managed contracts or
arrangements – with UNOPS, a project manager and the 10-year contractor. In order to
manage these relationships and implementing partners’ performance without significantly
increasing the requirements on our limited human resource capacity, DFID DRC will
continue to engage a technical consultant to support both the Government of DRC and the
implementing partners, and to assess progress. The consultant will make quarterly visits to
the project sites and partners. The consultant will report progress to the Infrastructure and
Environment Adviser in DFID DRC, who will coordinate with the social development,
economics, humanitarian, health, education, governance and security advisers in DFID DRC
as appropriate. Given the innovative nature of engaging over a 10-year period, and the
resource requirements this implies, we will consider, as part of our office-wide thinking on
evaluation, how to manage the long-term resource implications of engaging in longer
programmes. We might explore, for example, the idea of sector-wide long-term monitoring
and evaluation for a number of years after our direct interventions have ended in priority
sectors.
We will also set up a Steering Committee to govern the programme, which will meet via
monthly teleconferences. The committee will include DFID, the Cellule Infrastructures,
MONUSCO’s Stabilisation Support Unit, UNOPS, the project manager, the 10-year
contractor and the technical consultant. If we route finance for the UNOPS arrangement
through the SRFF, DFID will have a seat on the board with oversight of the ISSSS as a
whole.
The contractors and UNOPS will be expected to work closely with MITPR, CI and SSU and
this relationship will be captured in all contracts and arrangements. The project manager
and UNOPS will be required to work closely with the organisation delivering the 10-year
contract. They will need to share information relating to the handover of maintenance,
monitoring and evaluation, and the management of long-term and indirect environmental and
social management. They will also need to ensure that they build relationships with key
partners in coordination with one another, so as not to add transactions costs for
government and community partners. Contractors and UNOPS will be expected to engage
the beneficiaries of the programme at the community, territorial and provincial levels, through
community and territorial authorities, NGOs and religious organisations. They will also be
expected to work closely with a range of provincial actors. Contracts and arrangements will
set these expectations out in detail.
DFID will work closely with the Ministry of Infrastructure, Public Works and Reconstruction
(MITPR) through the Cellule Infrastructures (CI) to develop terms of reference, select
contractors and monitor and evaluate progress.
DFID will also work closely with
MONUSCO’s Stabilisation Support Unit (SSU), including on provision of security and to
coordinate with and leverage in other donor programmes, including those in support of the
ISSSS.
DFID will work across the DFID DRC office and with other donors, and with SSU who in turn
will engage with donors to the ISSSS, to build synergies and leverage in other programmes
to the zones of influence of the roads. This will include:
 Asking SSU to work with local and provincial authorities to review local and provincial
development plans, identify synergies and communicate and consult with
communities on how the roads will help deliver their plans.



Working with the DFID-funded Tuungane programme to consult with chefs de
secteurs, in particular around the equitable distribution of benefits and women’s
employment.
Considering whether we can capture any economies of scale from synergies with
Pooled Fund logistics cluster projects in the same area.
Coordinating with the UN’s new access strategy18. Our support to the upgrading of
roads will affect the access strategy, which currently cites specific access problems
in the Shabunda area19. It notes that increased access and an increased
MONUSCO presence would significantly improve humanitarian access to vulnerable
communities in this region.
The performance of the programme will be monitored and assessed through the 10-year
contract, with ongoing technical support and in-year progress monitoring provided by a
consultant to DFID. Contractors and UNOPS will be required to submit quarterly financial
and narrative reports, as well as annual reports and annually audited statements. These will
feed into the annual reviews and DFID’s project completion report. As set out in Section D
below, we will undertake a theory-based evaluation and consider the potential for a research
element.
B. What are the risks and how these will be managed?
DFID will maintain an overall risk register of strategic risks to programme delivery. The
contractors and UNOPS will be expected to manage sub-sets of these risks and to report on
these quarterly.
Risk
Lack of
security
prevents road
construction
and
maintenance
MONUSCO
mandate is
not renewed
and nature of
drawdown
puts the
process of
stabilisation in
doubt
Intervention
has adverse
climate and
environment
and social
impacts that
invalidate or
outweigh the
benefits
18
19
Likeli- Impact
hood
H
H
M
H
M
H
Mitigating actions
Negotiate provision of security with MONUSCO before
programme implementation begins. Explore possibility of
negotiating MoUs on the provision of security with the
permanent elements of the MONUSCO brigades. Require
contractors and UNOPS to develop a plan for this and make
provision for safe storage of equipment and draw down of works
teams.
At the strategic level, political/diplomatic influencing to negotiate
a phased drawdown with an effective handover to GoDRC
forces, and donor support for security. At the programme level,
negotiations with FARDC and PNC, including through Ministry
of Infrastructure and Public Works, Office des Routes and
MONUSCO, to secure provision of security for the roads.
Environmental and social impact assessments have been or are
being undertaken for all roads, and we will finance social and
environmental management plans with 15% of the works
budget. Through the 10-year contract we will work closely with
the Ministry of Environment and other key governmental and
non-governmental organisations as well as communities. We
will require the contractor to review the ESIAs and SEMPs and
establish, implement and adapt to ground realities a credible
management plan. We will ensure that international best
practices and lessons learned in road construction are adopted,
including around the spread of HIV/AIDS and infectious
diseases, economic and sexual exploitation, threats to social
cohesion, and risks of conflict. We will require the 10-year
contractor to develop a risk analysis of expected road crash
Currently in draft. Draft Strategie D’Access, OCHA
Ibid. p.14
Residual
risk
High/
medium
Medium
Medium/
low
Extreme
climatic
events/climate
change
undermine
sustainability
of roads
M
H
Intervention
worsens
conflict or
promotes
rent-seeking
M
H
Lack of
private sector
capacity
M
M
Cost
overruns,
including
through
exchange rate
fluctuations
M
L
State and
NGO service
providers do
not respond to
improved
access and
security
L
M
death and injury scenarios.
An effective ongoing maintenance system should cope with all
but the most extreme of climatic impacts. The programme will
build the capacity of government to take on the financing and
management of a sustainable maintenance system. The
decision to run the programme over a 10-year period allows us
to provide continued capacity building and in-kind support, as
well as to backstop finance if the government system faces
unforeseen difficulties. The budget has been set to allow for
this. We will ensure that technical standards draw on best
practice for wet environments to increase the climate resilience
of the roads.
We will require implementing partners to monitor and mitigate
rent seeking and natural resource exploitation; to develop an
effective communications strategy to inform and consult with
local communities; and to ensure that equitable benefits reach
the different communities along the roads. We will work with
MONUSCO to ensure that complementary ISSSS security plans
are delivered to manage any risks to communities. Through
DFID DRC’s monitoring and evaluation secondment to
MONUSCO’s Stabilisation Support Unit, we will ensure that
progress towards security objectives is effectively monitored
and that this includes community perspectives; the need for
civil-military relations initiatives to promote civilian protection is
assessed and initiatives are put in place as necessary;
MONUSCO fulfils their obligations to undertake patrolling and
provide security guarantees; and that local level conflict
analyses are undertaken and inform the development of local
level peace-building activities. We will request SSU to monitor
the impact of rent seeking upon economic activities and
community security, whether government fulfils their
commitments to increase the presence of the state, and
community perceptions of security.
We will require the project manager and UNOPS to develop a
proactive local private sector development strategy to identify
and address market failures – including an assessment of the
market, training of SMEs, pre-qualification, management and
supervision.
We will require UNOPS and the project manager to build a price
escalation clause into the construction contracts to cover
increases in costs, and to identify key input costs and monitor
these throughout their projects. While DFID will face an
exchange rate fluctuation risk, we judge that this is a
manageable risk compared to the alternative of asking the
contractor to assume the risk, in which case an additional
premium will be added to the cost of the contract. If we choose
to use the SRFF for the UNOPS arrangement, we will have
increased control over spending forecasts and exchange rate
fluctuations for this element of the programme, since we would
contribute to a trust fund.
The programme includes a significant influencing element to
leverage in service provision and other programmes. We will
work across DFID DRC to ensure that synergies are built with
other elements of the programme focused on governance and
basic services.
Medium/
low
Medium/
low
Medium/
low
Low
Low
As set out in the financial case, to ensure we have the flexibility to tackle the risk of
corruption and fraud effectively, we will review the programme budget during the first annual
review to consider the need for independent assurance.
C. What conditions apply (for financial aid only)?
n/a
D. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
Monitoring
The programme has a strong focus on monitoring implementation according to plans,
particularly because we learnt from Phase 1 and from other interventions in the roads sector
that while delivery of the ‘hardware’ of previous interventions has been satisfactory,
considerable improvements need to be made in terms of speed of implementation, provision
of security and the delivery of the social and environmental elements. Monitoring will
therefore include measuring activities as well as outcomes.
There are opportunities for innovative partnerships to help us with M&E. CARITAS were
also open to the idea of assisting us with collecting data on prices in villages as part of our
M&E work, and we will explore further the possibility of using NGO partners in this way
through the UNOPS and private sector arrangements.
Evaluation
As set out in the theory of change section on pp. 7-9 and in Annex A, we have identified a
number of gaps in the evidence and in the theory underpinning the impact of roads and
stabilisation efforts in DRC. The programme therefore includes a baseline study, evaluability
study and theory-based evaluation, which we will ask the 10-year contractor to design and
undertake.
The evaluability study will test and clarify the theory of change, draft evaluation questions in
consultation with beneficiaries and other stakeholders, and consider the most appropriate
theory-based evaluation approaches to undertake a robust assessment.
The theory-based evaluation will provide a systematic and cumulative study that allows us to
test the theory of change, which will be crucial given how susceptible we believe the
intervention is to internal and external changes. It will also allow us to test the logic behind
the pathway we have identified to the intervention’s impact, and to refine the logic model on
the basis of tried and tested assumptions and dependencies.
We will explore the potentially strong crossover between evaluation and research, looking at
what the outcomes are, and what the contribution of roads has been. We are keen to know
more about the long term effects of roads on outcomes we judge to be stabilisation
outcomes, and to assess:
 what outcomes have been achieved;
 how the programme has delivered outcomes and outputs;
 what has contributed to achievement and what has constrained achievement of
objectives;
 what conditions allowed outcomes to be achieved;
 which approaches have proved more and less cost-effective;
 what outcomes, positive and negative, intended and unintended, can be observed;
 how these are linked to, or potentially caused by, programme activity and
processes;
 the complex interdependence of activities and outcomes, particularly in terms of
sequencing and relative importance to outcomes;
 how responses to and efforts to mitigate negative outcomes were managed;


what trade-offs between positive and negative outcomes for local populations occur
from road building; and
the contextual factors that have affected programme delivery, performance and
outcomes, especially the risk elements and how actions taken have interacted
with the context.
To investigate such questions, we will include a dedicated research element in the
monitoring arrangements and in the theory-based evaluation strategy. We will decide in the
first three months whether, for example, a systematic review of current literature on roads
and stabilisation may add greater rigour in the evaluation design phase, and in planning and
setting up monitoring systems, starting with baselines. This research element will be built
progressively with partners and local communities where feasible to encourage ownership
and engagement in any primary research activity and to facilitate wider accountability for the
outcomes and processes by which they are achieved.
We will consider whether an impact evaluation would be appropriate for the wider ISSSS
strategy (through the monitoring and evaluation secondment to MONUSCO’s Stabilisation
Support Unit, funded from elsewhere in the DFID DRC programme). We will consider within
that whether evaluating the impact of roads on stabilisation outcomes performs a good
analysis of the whole stabilisation approach. This will be explored and determined with key
partners and stakeholders.
E. Logframe
The theory of change (pp. 7-9) and cost-benefit analysis (pp. 11-13) have generated a
significant number of new indicators for which data currently do not exist, or exist but are not
easily accessible. The logframe is therefore still in draft, with a significant number of
baselines and targets to be confirmed. We will launch a baseline study, either between
business case approval and the start of the UNOPS arrangement in April 2011 (in line with
the tendering process for the private sector contracts), or as part of the 10-year contract if
we judge that the baseline study, the evaluability study and the broader monitoring and
evaluation function should be undertaken in tandem and by the same organisation.
The range of new data to be included in the baseline study include:
 Perceptions data – on security, access to services, state presence
 Effectiveness measures for measuring the VfM of the programme
 Incidence of road blocks and informal taxes
 Road traffic deaths and injuries
 Vehicle numbers, including non-motorised traffic, on all four roads
 Number of attacks against civilians/number of deaths in security
incidents/aggregated security score
 Average speed on roads or proportion of the four roads on which motorised
vehicles can travel at >40 kph
 Number of days of road closure in last year
 Cost of transport per passenger km/tonne km
 Volume (t) of traceable artisanal minerals from centres de négoces in the zones of
influence of the roads
 Average price of basket of imported goods
 Axle loads, use of rain barriers and how long after rain the barriers stay closed
 Number of days of work generated, disaggregated by gender, income quintile,
demobilised soldiers
 Volume of bushmeat from protected species
 Volume of illegal timber
 Volume of illegal minerals


Proportion of roads regularly patrolled by security forces
Number/value of other projects/programmes in ZoI
We will include strengthening the ISSSS security data in the terms of reference for the DFIDfunded secondee to MONUSCO’s Stabilisation Support Unit. This will include requesting an
aggregate security score for North and South Kivu. We will also need to assess whether the
impact of the road on economic activities, particularly those related to natural resource
exploitation, is having a positive impact upon local communities or posing additional risks.