Dr. Kirby
PHIL 211
Final Paper
Comments on “From Necessity to Fate: A Fallacy?”
Sarah Broadie
In the paper, Broadie examines a question about determinism and futilism.
Given determinism, is there any reason for us (humans) to do anything about anything.
It is argued that determinism entails a sort of futilism, and a certain position that has
been taken with regards to determinism, namely the position that it is futile to do
anything in the face of the arguments presented by determinism, may in fact have merit
where they have been dismissed in the past.
First, Broadie attempts to show that the Lazy Argument cannot provide a problem
for determinism (understood as universal determinism). This is the classic way that
most determinists respond to reactions of the sort that it would be futile to do anything if
determinism is true. The Lazy Argument can be understood as follows:
1) If the world is such that it is inevitable that E will, then E will occur no matter what
else happens and vice versa.
2) But, (according to Stoic determinism) either the world is disposed in one of those two
ways or it is disposed in the other.
3) Either way, the outcome will be whatever it will be no matter what else happens.
The point of the Lazy Argument is to come to the conclusion that some things are
fated in the world and any attempts to try and change such fated conclusions are futile
acts, meaning that there is no way that these fated conclusion can come to be or not
be.
However, Stoic (universal) determinism attempts to refute the conclusion of the
Lazy Argument by looking to the very definition of universal determinism. It states that
things are causally necessitated and that any actions taken or not taken are not futile,
but determined. It is not the case that such actions have no bearing on the conclusion,
but instead they have the effect of necessarily causing any event in the future. Broadie
gives us the example of illness. The Lazy argument would give us the conclusion that it
does not matter if one goes to the doctor for medicine or decides to drink beer all day,
because the conclusion (either that one will get better or not) has already been fated to
happen. Determinism makes the claim that, if the Lazy Argument relies upon
determinism as a premise, it cannot come to this conclusion, for it misrepresents
determinism. Determinism would respond by saying that whether or not you decide to
go to the doctor or drink beer all day has already been causally determined, which will,
in turn, causally necessitate either you getting better, or staying ill. This is the standard
response to modern futilistic responses to determinism.
However, Broadie also recognizes that great thinkers (Aristotle among them)
have seemingly taken a futilistic view very similar to the Lazy Argument. It is because
of this that the paper then turns to attempting to understand how the determinist
response to a Lazy Argument may not be so decisive.
Broadie then turns to fatalism, determinism and futilism, showing which entails
which. First, futilism is understood in three distinct ways. The first of which is that
regardless of what actions are taken, the result will be the same (which is fatalism). The
second is that no matter which action is taken, the end value achieved will be the same.
The third is that we are in no epistemic position to prefer one event to its not happening.
Broadie claims that determinism does not entail the first sort of futilism, as shown by the
objection to the Lazy Argument. Neither does determinism entail the second sort of
futilism. However, Broadie does want to argue that determinism entails the third sort of
futilism, that there are no epistemic reasons to prefer an event to its not happening.
This sort of determinism, according to Broadie, will then approximate to fatalism.
Furthermore, Broadie will show that Aristotelian determinism also entails fatalism.
Because both of these determinisms will entail fatalism, they will also justify the
conclusion of the Lazy Argument, namely that there is no point in doing anything, for
nothing can be done to change what will happen.
Broadie begins with taking a look at fate. Fate is understood in terms of the first
sort of futilism, namely that any sort of antecedent action taken will end up at the same
consequent. Broadie gives the example of the individual who cannot seem to ever
make it to their class reunion. Every year there is something different that comes up,
illness, an ignorance in change of date, transportation problems, etc. Each year, the
individual cannot make it to the reunion, no matter what steps are taken by the
individual to ensure that the individual does make it to the reunion. From this example,
Broadie targets the difference between fatalism and determinism. Where determinism
is a universal principle, fatalism is not. Fatalism is only concerned with a particular
event, in this case, the man not getting to the reunion. It does not make any claims
about antecedents being necessary, only that the conclusion (a failure to arrive at the
reunion) is necessary. Determinism can be differentiated because it makes the claim
that both the antecedent and consequent are necessary things, caused by previous
antecedents and their consequents. Fatalism may admit of a sort of free will, though it
is a restricted one. Fatalism may permit an individual to act freely and of their own
accord, not hindered by the strictness of determinism. However, it also makes the claim
that any free actions with respect the conclusion fatalism is concerned with will have no
effect, such actions are futile.
Broadie then moves to show that universal determinism does in fact entail
futilism. Broadie gives the example of the dog and braking to avoid hitting the dog. The
determinist is bound to the fact that certain antecedents caused the event of breaking to
avoid hitting the dog. Broadie wants to use this example to show how determinism
entails the third sort of futilism, that we are not epistemically justified to prefer one
option to another. Broadie states that when individuals make choices, they do so on the
assumption that it is the best choice to make. The analysis that it is in fact the better
option is done on a sort of induction of what would happen, given certain evidence, if
the individual had not done the action they did. However, Broadie wants to refute the
possibility of this occurring, and advance the the third sort of futilism. The example of
looking back a year from the present to some action is used. Certainly, one had almost
no idea of what events would have occurred due to the antecedent of that particular
action. Because we cannot be sure of what will occur in the future as a result of a
particular action, one is unjustified in making any sort of analysis as to what action
would the better one to take. This is due to the fact that the hypothetical situation
against which doing or not doing a particular action is also held to the same conclusion,
namely that one cannot be certain about what consequents will follow from that
particular antecedent. Determinists are held to a very strict connection between past
events and their consequents. In order for them to make any sort of judgement about
what consequents would follow from which antecedents, they would need to go through
a sort of inductive reasoning. However, it has been shown that this inductive reasoning
is not a usable method to arrive at any conclusions about what might or might not have
occurred given a different antecedent. Thus, we are not epistemically justified in
preferring one event to another.
At first, this seems quite plausible. The conclusion avoids the criticisms that
futilism (the Lazy Argument) comes under by being a different sort of futilism. This
futilism makes no claims about certain conclusions being fated regardless of what
actions are taken, which is not in keeping with universal determinism, upon which the
Lazy Argument relies. Instead, it makes a claim that the determinist is simply unjustified
in any claims made about how things may have been different given a different
antecedent. While this certainly seem to be a sound claim, it may also be a moot claim.
Seemingly, the determinist would have no interest in making any claims about how the
world might have been different, given a different antecedent. The determinist is bound
to one path of antecedents and consequents. It is unintelligible for them to consider
how the world might have been otherwise. Each antecedent was necessarily caused by
another antecedent and consequent. Necessity means that in all possible worlds, the
world can only be that certain way. Because every event in a determinist’s view is
necessary, all possible worlds are the same, meaning that there is only one world,
namely the actual world. To think of a different world is unintelligible because that
would mean that a certain event was not necessary, but this is of course false in
determinism.
Broadie next moves to show that Aristotelian determinism entails fatalism.
Aristotelian determinism moves from later events to former events, meaning that later
events necessitate their antecedents. For example, if one wants to build a house, it is
necessary that one has the materials for that house beforehand. Also important to
Aristotle is teleology, or that things have purpose. Intelligent things are what Aristotle
looks to for teleology and Broadie uses this to state that with Aristotle’s determinism and
this idea teleology, Aristotelian determinism admits of fatalism. Aristotle looks to
celestial bodies as intelligent and purposive. They are constant and nothing changes
the path that they are on, they cannot erode, etc. Their path is continuous and
unending. They move in a circular pattern, and because this pattern is unending, there
will always be a further end to which that celestial body is moving towards, meaning that
there is some previous event that led up to that further end. This establishes that there
is always an end that the purposive thing is working towards. Then Broadie moves
back to the house example. While certain events may pose obstacles to the builder of
the house, there are multiple ways for the end to be reached by the builder of the
house. However, these events are not human controlled, as would be the case with a
tornado forcing the building to build another way, or start over, etc. They are not human
controlled because no human can make an end come about as a necessity. Also, any
notion that a human would have control over the means to ensure the necessity of an
end would mean that at some point a person would have required to make the decision
to ensure that the ends would be necessary, and there can be no choice in
determinism, for that would mean that the end was not necessary for all time, only as a
result of an unnecessary choice. Because of this, Broadie comes to the conclusion that
there is some agent such that that agent has always made it so that for every necessary
end to be reached, it will be free of any obstacle (where obstacle means that the
necessary end is not reached). Broadie then states that we are left with two
implications of combining determinist idea that some has always been predetermined
(the celestial bodies always moving towards that further end) and the Aristotelian idea
that later events are caused by previous events. These implications are that no human
has control over whether or not an event occurs, or that if human decisions and efforts
are involved, they are futile and the end would be reached anyways, which is simply
fatalism and the first sort of futilism.
A problem that Aristotelian determinism runs into is that it faces the problem of
infinite regress. Certainly, there was some beginning event which causally necessitated
all consequential events. However, this event would require an event, because,
according to Aristotelian determinism, later events necessitate some antecedent.
However, this would create more events in the past, but presumably they could be
classified as “later events” for some further antecedents. Thus, this sort of determinism
runs into the problem of infinite regress.
Furthermore, this idea that purpose is something that is not controllable by
humans, and thus any ends reached are fated to have been reached does nothing to
refute the idea that ends do in fact meet up with obstacles. Broadie talks about certain
links in a chain not materializing. However, nothing is said that there are an infinite
amount of links in that chain for such an end to be met. If something is to be necessary,
then its antecedents must be great in number. Also, equally great in number are the
number of obstacles that could potentially cause the “chain” to never “materialize”.
Because we can imagine a world in which every obstacle to an end comes to pass, it
seems that there may in fact not be necessary ends. Even if this higher power of
“purpose” moves to obstruct the obstacle, we can presumably imagine a further
obstacle to take its place. Thus, purpose would be in an evenly matched, endless
struggle with obstacles. If these obstacles are able to achieve a sort of equilibrium with
purpose, then presumably the obstacles will have managed to ensure that the
necessary end will never come to be. From this, we can infer that there are not
necessary ends, and thus determinism does not entail fatalism.
Work Cited
Broadie, Sarah. “From Necessity to Fate: A Fallacy?” The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 5, No.
1, Ancient Greek Ethics (2001), pp. 21-37. Web.