Comments on “Three Questions about Treatise I, iv, 2”
The section of the Treatise entitled “Of scepticism with regard to the senses” poses great challenges to any interpreter of the work. Hume’s attempt to explain the origin of our belief in body is convoluted, and some of his claims in this section appear to be unsupported or questionable. In his provocative paper Professor Dicker poses questions about three of these claims.
Although I disagree with his answers, I believe that they force one to reconsider some of the prevailing views of Hume’s positions.
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All of Dicker’s questions involve in some way the notion of the “continued existence” of objects (CE), their existence when they are not perceived or
“present to the senses.” This is not surprising, since accounting for the belief in CE is perhaps Hume’s central concern throughout this section of the work. Dicker’s paper is much richer than a mere discussion of CE but given the constraints of time, I shall limit my comments to this topic.
In his first question, Dicker considers Hume’s claim about the relation between CE and “distinct existence” (DE). The latter is a complex concept
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for Hume, involving objects’ “situation as well as relations.” That is, DE constitutes an existence external to, as well as independent of the perceiver.
Hume holds that the two kinds of existence, CE and DE, are “intimately connected,” that attributing one to an object implies the other. It’s easy enough to see how DE follows from CE; yet for many readers, including myself, the converse does not seem to hold. It would seem that there could be objects of perception having properties typically attributed to material objects, such as DE, yet whose existence only lasts as long as they are perceived.
Hume doesn’t explain why he thinks DE implies CE. Nor, unlike the implication from CE to DE, does he utilize this implication in reconstructing the belief in the existence of body in this section of the Treatise. Dicker, however, presents an ingenious argument in support of Hume’s claim.
Offering a plausible rendering of Hume’s analysis of the concept of a cause,
Dicker argues that if momentary objects (MO) exist only when they are being perceived, there would be a constant conjunction and thus a causal dependence of the existence of MO on the perception of MO, thereby precluding MO from having DE. In other words, assuming Hume’s concept of cause, MO’s lack of DE follows from its lack of CE, which is equivalent
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to DE implying CE. I will argue for two conclusions: first, it is doubtful that
Dicker’s approach and argument would be acceptable to Hume in support of his claim. Secondly, even if it were, it does not justify Hume’s view about the relation of CE and DE.
Since MO does not exist unperceived, and, according to Dicker, is dependent on or caused by being perceived, it might seem to have the same status as a twinge of pain or other fleeting feeling. Pains don’t exist unperceived, and one’s being in pain. i.e., the existence of pain, follows from the perception of pain. Still, I think there are differences between our concept of pain and Dicker’s MO. It seems wrong to claim that pain is caused by the perception of pain; it also seems wrong to claim that there’s a distinction between the perception or feeling of pain and the existence of pain. Yet for Dicker’s argument to succeed, the two kinds of events, existence of MO and perception of MO, must be distinct, as this is a requirement for a causal relation for Hume (see T 79, ECHU, Sec. IV, 1, 9).
However, early on in the Treatise, when discussing perceptions and their objects, Hume denies that any distinction can be drawn between the perception of X and X’s existence. In arguing that there is no separate idea of existence, he says that the idea of existence is the “very same with the
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idea of the perception or object.” (T 66, Cf. 94) I take Hume to be implying that in the case of a perceptual object such as Dicker’s MO, its existence just is the perception or impression of MO. So, for Hume in such cases we have a single entity, i.e., impression of MO, not two different kinds of objects or events. This explains why for Hume, seeking the cause of the existence or occurrence of MO would not be a matter of connecting it to a perception (as it is for Dicker) but rather asking for the cause of an impression or perception, namely, for something not being perceived (see T 7, 84, 192-3,
211).
Dicker’s use of the expression “in the circumstances at hand” in the second condition, (b), of his analysis of “perceiving MO causes MO to exist,” seems to confirm that treating the relation between the two as causal in nature is forced or strained. The expression was introduced by Dicker as a way of excluding possible alternative causes of an event or object; yet in (b) it is used in a quite different way, to characterize MO, itself (p.4). This appears to reflect the fact that in the case of MO, whose existence for Dicker follows from its being perceived, it isn’t clear what would constitute an alternative
“cause” or make the perception of MO unnecessary for MO’s existence.
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Even if we grant the relevance of Hume’s analysis of a cause in answering
Dicker’s first question, it seems to me that it is still insufficient to support
Hume’s claim that DE implies CE. Simply put, given the analysis the constant conjunction of MO and perception of MO is compatible with MO
(possessing DE) causing the perception of MO, thereby providing a counterexample to Hume’s view. Suppose that within a realm of objects of varied duration whose existence is external to and independent of perceivers,
MO constitute a small subset of objects that last only for an extremely short period of time during which they always happen to be perceived. Using
Dicker’s model of a cause for Hume and reversing Dicker’s values for E1 and K1 on the one hand, and E2 and K2 on the other, we can then say that all cases of the existence of MO of the sort described (K1) are accompanied by the perception of such sorts of objects (K2); we can also say that all cases of the perception of such sorts of things (K2) in the circumstances at hand, that is, when the person is not hallucinating, his or her relevant senses are functioning in the appropriate way, etc. are accompanied by the existence of
MO (K1) or to express the last statement in a slightly different way, absent the existence of MO in the circumstances at hand, there are not any perceptions of these sorts of things. In the supposed sort of situation, therefore, particular MO (E1), having DE but not CE, would cause particular
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perceptions of MO (E2). The upshot is that even allowing that MO and perceptions of MO are constantly conjoined, it’s not obvious why Hume should have thought that DE implies CE. Dicker’s defense of Hume is at best incomplete.
II
Dicker’s second question: “Why does Hume claim that sensible objects obviously have an intermittent or discontinuous existence?” seems to be another way of asking why Hume claims that sensible objects lack CE.
Dicker’s answer is: for Hume the discontinuity of our perceptions “proves the falsity of the belief in the ‘continued’ existence of sensible objects.”
I believe this answer is incorrect, and shall try to show that it does not accord with Hume’s position in this section of the Treatise. In fact Hume attempts to refute the belief indirectly, which is understandable given his view about belief in CE.
Hume’s discussion of the belief in CE occurs in his examination of the vulgar view, the view he attributes to the ordinary person or all of us much
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of the time. He notes that because the vulgar confuse a series of resembling perceptions with the perception of an identical object, they take the series to be a single uninterrupted and unchanging object or thing. Nevertheless, the interruptions among the perceptions are too great to go unrecognized. So, there is a tension between the belief in identity and the recognition that one has different perceptions. CE is invoked to resolve this tension or conflict.
That is, a distinction is made between the existence of an object and its appearance (206), and gaps in one’s perceptions or the appearances are not taken to apply to the object, itself.
Hume is clearly critical of the belief in CE, noting that it is false, a fiction, and rests on a confusion or illusion. Nevertheless, he does say two things about it that I believe show why Dicker’s view is mistaken. The first, (a), is that the vulgar distinction between appearances and objects, and the idea of objects’ CE, are not contradictory (T 208), that is, the belief in CE could be true. He states, “…an interrupted appearance to the senses implies not necessarily an interruption in its existence” (T 207-8). This position is reiterated in the Appendix of the work, in the context of Hume’s reevaluation of his account of personal identity (T 634). The second thing
Hume says, (b), is that the idea of and belief in CE serve a purpose, namely,
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“to remedy the interruption of our perceptions.” (T 209). Although the remedy ultimately fails, this does not negate its purposive origin. Given (a), that is, allowing the distinction between appearances and existence of objects, it is hard to see how Hume could claim that the interruptions or discontinuities among our perceptions, the appearances alone, prove that sensible objects lack CE. Moreover, contrary to (b), on Dicker’s view the vulgar idea of CE would from the start be idle and pointless for Hume, since interruptions among perceptions that conclusively settle the issue for Dicker, are ever present, even for the vulgar. Thus, Dicker’s reading leaves Hume with a mysterious or gratuitous account of the vulgar idea and belief in CE.
Why do they arise if they serve no purpose whatsoever?
In my view, Hume’s recognition of a distinction for the vulgar between the appearances and existence of sensible objects, on which only the latter are supposed to have CE, explains why Hume instead must use the indirect argument (the appeal to “reflection and philosophy” at T 210 and 214) noted by Dicker in a footnote in his paper. Hume, presupposing the implication from CE to DE, uses evidence for the dependence of perceptual objects on perceivers (against their DE) to argue indirectly against the belief in CE. In
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effect, for Hume it follows from the dependency of the objects of perception on us that they are, as they appear, interrupted and different existences.
III
In the final part of his paper, Prof. Dicker attempts to answer the intriguing question of why Hume thinks that the “coherence” of our impressions unlike their constancy goes only a little way toward explaining the belief in body. It appears that Dicker’s answer involves three claims: (1) coherence (unlike causality) requires the existence of what he calls a type-II case, a case that involves discontinuity or gaps in one’s perceptions of objects (p.11), (2) inferences involving coherence (unlike causal inferences) attribute a greater degree of regularity or uniformity to the world than actually perceived
(p.13), (3) the attribution noted in (2) accounts for Hume’s claim that coherence is too weak to support belief in CE of all bodies (p.13).
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Dicker illustrates his reading of Hume by using the example of the fire in
Hume’s chamber. While he acknowledges that for Hume custom-based or causal inferences may enable one to infer later stages of the fire, provided one has always experienced the entire process of the fire burning and now has a continuous perception of this particular fire’s earlier stages, inferences involving coherence require the existence of gaps in one’s present experience of the fire. By filling in these gaps with unperceived stages of the fire, inferences from coherence increase the uniformity in the world beyond what is actually perceived.
Even if one agrees that Dicker has fairly described the nature and role of coherence for Hume, the account is still puzzling. For one thing, even garden variety causal inferences result in a believed regularity beyond what is actually perceived. This is most obvious in inferences to unobserved causes but would also occur in any case in which at a given time I perceive a
“cause” but am not in a position at a later time to perceive its usual “effect.”
I think the account is made more problematic by Dicker’s view that inferences involving coherence do not occur for Hume until one has had a
“gappy” or discontinuous experience of an object. To simplify the
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discussion, let’s suppose that the course of the fire in Hume’s chamber can be broken down into 10 stages of a specific duration. Based on Dicker’s response to an objection at the end of his paper, it would seem that he concedes that if I have always perceived the burning of the fire in its entirety, and now perceive, for example, the first five stages, I can infer the occurrence of the characteristics of the sixth and subsequent stages at specific times via custom-based inference, whether I perceive these stages or not. Thus, if I make such an inference before falling into a deep sleep, and awaken hours later, when the fire has burnt itself out and all of its traces have been removed, coherence is not involved, since the experience of the fire is continuous and not “gappy.” Given Hume’s view of causal inference and the same past experience, it would seem that a similar conclusion follows if after awakening from a long sleep I begin to observe the fire at stage 6, continuously observe all its later stages, and infer via custom stages of the fire prior to stage 6. However, even with the same past experience, if I now observe the entire course of a fire save for stage 6 (when my head is turned), and I then infer the missing stage, I am making a questionable inference via coherence that increases the perceived regularity. Yet in all three cases, what is actually perceived conforms only partially to past experience and in all three cases the inferences seek to make the present case
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conform fully. Furthermore, on Dicker’s interpretation it is unclear why
Hume would exclude causality as a source of belief in CE and body, since like coherence, custom-based inference seems in the business of inferring, at least in some situations, unperceived stages of the fire. These considerations suggest that Dicker’s view of coherence (and “gappiness”) is too narrow, and must be broadened to include cases like the first two above, in which we
“supplement” our actual perceptions in order to reconcile present and past experience.
Still, it isn’t clear to me why Dicker wants to claim that the role of coherence in the attribution of a degree of regularity beyond that perceived
“illustrates” why coherence alone is too weak to support belief in the CE of all external bodies. Even if for Hume there is something discreditable about beliefs based on coherence because he thinks they increase the perceived regularity and don’t arise from custom per se, this is something that the skeptical Hume would seem to welcome rather than to deplore. After all, his aim in this section of the work appears to be to criticize not to vindicate our belief in CE and body. Constancy, which Hume invokes to fill the explanatory breach left by coherence, is in fact discreditable for him, although for different reasons.
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I want to conclude by noting a possible reason for why Hume thinks coherence is inadequate for explaining belief in external objects and specifically needs to be supplemented by constancy, a reason I discussed in an article many years ago. It’s worth noting that Hume’s examples of coherence are disparate. The fire is a series of successive perceptions, none of which endures. The case of the noise of the door in Hume’s study, on the other hand, is a case involving an enduring, relatively unchanging object. If coherence fills in gaps in the observed fire, it is unclear exactly how this process would apply to the case of the enduring door. Yet even in the case of the fire, merely filling in the gaps appears to omit one very important component of the ordinary person’s belief concerning the fire, namely, that it is taken to be the same fire or object from beginning to end. This is certainly also present in the case of the door. Since constancy is a feature of perceptions that generates beliefs in their identity, we can see why Hume might have thought that coherence needs to be supplemented by constancy to explain our ordinary beliefs about body. This reading would also make sense of Hume’s distinction between causal inferences and inferences involving constancy/coherence, since the former don’t require that cause and effect involve an identical object. Nevertheless, I think this reading leaves us
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with another puzzling issue, namely, how on the vulgar view, belief in the identity of changing things like the fire, is possible.
Eric Steinberg
Brooklyn College of CUNY
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