The Command and Leadership Competence
of
Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Caswell Tremenheere Dowding GCB GCVO CMG ADC RAF
By
Squadron Leader Simon Braun MBE MMDS MInstAM RAF
This paper was written as part of the Masters of Management in Defence Studies for the
Australian Command and Staff College in conjunction with the University of Canberra
Page 2 of 45
A difficult man, a self-opinionated man, a most determined man, and a man who
knew more than anybody about all aspects of aerial warfare.
Sir Fredrick Pile1
INTRODUCTION
Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding’s place in history is secured by what, in his own
eyes, was a failure. Dowding intended, and expected, to become Chief of the Air Staff
(CAS) and, for justifiable reasons, he never made it. Instead, he became the man who led
‘The Few’ in the Battle of Britain. The manner and timing of Dowding’s dismissal from
his post as Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOCinC) Fighter Command in the
immediate aftermath of his great victory in the Battle of Britain remains controversial,
and clearly reflects upon his command and leadership competence. As Sir Arthur
‘Bomber’ Harris reflected: ‘He is the only commander who won one of the decisive
battles of history, and got sacked for his pains.’2
2005, marks the 65th anniversary of the Battle of Britain, the first military campaign
fought entirely in the air, and without doubt one of the most crucial contests in history.
In 1940, Hitler's armies conquered and occupied Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg,
Norway, Denmark, and France. The only nation still opposing Nazi Germany was
Britain. Retreating from the continent, the British army managed to save almost all
personnel in the evacuation from Dunkirk. However, every piece of armour and heavy
equipment was left behind. Consequently, it would be a long time before the army
would be re-equipped and organised sufficiently to mount an adequate defence of the
British Isles. As Winston Churchill stated at the time:
‘What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect the Battle of Britain
is about to begin. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us.
Hitler knows he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to
him, all Europe may be free … Let us, therefore, brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear
ourselves that if the British Empire and it's Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men
will still say, this was their finest hour.’
This paper analyses a man who was singularly responsible for Fighter Command's
ability to meet the threat of the Luftwaffe, and defeat it in the vital Battle of Britain - Air
Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding.
This paper critically examines Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding’s command and
leadership competence. The first step in the examination involves insight regarding why
Dowding proves to be a most deserving subject. To facilitate the examination, the
following terms are defined, before addressing Dowding’s command competence:
leadership, effective, competent, and command. Dowding’s command competence is
critically examined in two areas - his career prior to 1940, the foundation for his
1
Battle of Britain.net, A Profile on Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding. Viewed 07 September
2004. < http://www.battleofbritain.net/section-3/appendix-17a.html>.
2
Probert, H, 2001, Bomber Harris, p 98.
Page 3 of 45
command style, and critical incidents throughout the Battle of Britain where Dowding’s
command competence was tested. The next logical step is to examine Dowding’s
leadership using four leadership models: Kouzes-Posner Trait (Great Man) Leadership
Model, Hersey and Blanchard’s Situational Leadership Theory, Fiedler’s Contingency
Leadership Model, and Bass and Avolio’s Full Range Leadership Model. Finally, this
paper concludes with an assessment of Dowding’s command and leadership
competence.
Hugh Dowding, the son of a schoolmaster, was born in Moffatt, Scotland, on 24 April
1882. He was educated at Winchester School and the Royal Military Academy in
Woolwich. He joined the Royal Artillery Garrison, and served as a subaltern 3 in
Gibraltar, Ceylon, and Hong Kong before spending six years in India with the Mountain
Artillery Troops. Returning to Britain, he learned to fly, and obtained his pilots licence
in December 1913. Following this, he joined the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and fought
in France during World War One (WW I). In 1915 he was promoted to major, and
assumed command of Number (No) 16 Squadron, before taking command of the ninth
(Headquarters) Wing during the Battle of the Somme. During the Battle of the Somme,
Dowding clashed with Hugh Trenchard,4 the RFC commander, over the need to rest
pilots exhausted by constant flying duty. As a result, Dowding saw no further
operational service during the war itself. He was promoted to brigadier-general and sent
back to Britain to run the Southern Training Brigade. After the war, Dowding joined the
newly formed RAF.
Dowding made his real mark during the 1930s. In 1933, he was promoted to air marshal,
and received a knighthood the following year. As the member of the Air Council for
Supply and Research, he believed in research and development was essential, and
campaigned hard for adequate funding. He knew the days of the bi-plane were
numbered, and pushed for a faster fighter. He encouraged the development of advanced
fighter aircraft, and it was largely due to his initiative the legendary Hurricane and
Spitfire aircraft were ordered into production in 1934. Dowding was also responsible for
early work on the Stirling and other heavy bombers, and the development of eight-gun
3
A British military term for an officer below the rank of captain, generally a second lieutenant.
4
Hugh Trenchard (1873-1956) helped to lay the foundations of the Royal Air Force (RAF) during
World War One. While commanding the RFC, Trenchard established a policy of claiming air
superiority by launching successive waves of attacks to gain air control - the approach became
standard RFC (and later RAF) policy, although Trenchard attracted much contemporary, and
subsequent, criticism for despatching obsolete aircraft on fighting missions with significant loss of
life. Trenchard also focussed the RFC efforts upon ensuring his aircrews provided adequate support
for forces on the ground. Trenchard was appointed Chief of Air Staff in January 1918, but resigned
his position three months later following a quarrel with Lord Rothermere, the Air Secretary. Later
the same year, Trenchard was given responsibility for the organisation of the Inter-allied
Independent Bomber Force, consisting of a collection of heavy RAF bombers intended to raid rail
and industrial targets in Germany. Re-appointed Chief of Air Staff, by War and Air Minister
Winston Churchill in 1919, Trenchard founded training colleges for air cadets and staff officers,
and introduced a system of short-service commissions so as to provide a reservoir of trained
personnel should the need arise. Remaining Chief of Staff until 1927, Trenchard was made the first
marshal of the RAF in that year, retiring two years later. Regarded by many as 'the father of the
RAF'.
Page 4 of 45
armament. He also showed tremendous interest in the detection of enemy aircraft, and
provided his full support to the new Radio Direction Finding (RDF) equipment.
Dowding’s interest in defence made him the natural choice to lead the new Fighter
Command when it was established in July 1936. Despite Dowding’s disappointment of
being overlooked for the CAS position in 1937, he continued to prepare his command
for war. He oversaw the introduction of new aircraft, the development of the Royal
Observer Corps, and the integration of RDF units with communications and control
organisations. The resulting system was far more advanced than anything else in the
world at the time.
In 1940, Dowding worked closely with Air Vice-Marshal (AVM) Keith Park,5 the
commander of No 11 Group, to cover the evacuation at Dunkirk. Although Dowding
only had 200 aircraft at his disposal, he managed to gain air superiority over the
Luftwaffe. However, he was unwilling to sacrifice his pilots in what he considered a
futile attempt to help Allied troops during the Western Offensive. Dowding made a
personal appeal to the War Cabinet in May 1940, and effectively ceased further aircraft
detachments to France. This showed Dowding’s significant foresight, preparing the
defences of Britain for the Battle of Britain.
During the Battle of Britain, Dowding’s defined tactical role was limited, with day-today control of the fighters resting with the Group Commanders. AVM Park commanded
No 11 Group, and AVM Leigh-Mallory6 commanded No 12 Group, with 11 Group
5
6
AVM Keith Park, a New Zealander, came to Britain to serve in the WWI as a gunner before
transferring to the Royal Flying Corps during 1917 and receiving a permanent commission in the
Royal Air Force. He was given command of his first squadron, 48 Squadron, on 10 April 1918. It
was the first to be equipped with the Bristol Fighter, and later passed through the RAF Staff
College before being appointed air attaché to Argentina. By 1938 he was Dowding's right-hand
man as senior Staff Officer in Fighter Command, and was subsequently appointed as Air Officer
Commanding No 11 Group. Like his commander, Park was relieved of his post almost immediately
after the Battle of Britain, and given command of a Flying Training Group. In 1942 he became Air
Officer Commanding Malta. This was during the anxious period when the defence of the island
rested with a few Hurricanes which fought with great determination and courage until the arrival of
additional aircraft and aid saved the garrison and the Mediterranean cleared. In January 1944, he
was appointed Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Middle East and, a year later, Allied Air
Commander-in-Chief of South-East Asia Command. He died in New Zealand in 1975. It was said
of him by Air Vice-Marshal 'Johnnie' Johnson,: a great fighter leader of the Second World War: ‘he
was the only man who could have lost the war in a day or even an afternoon.’
AVM Trafford Leigh-Mallory was born on 07 November 1892, at Mobberley, Cheshire. He joined
the Territorial battalion of the King's (Liverpool) Regiment on the outbreak of WW I and, shortly
afterwards, received a commission in the Lancashire Fusiliers. Seconded to the RFC in July 1916,
he was graded as major in the RAF following its formation in April 1918. For services in France,
he was mentioned in dispatches and awarded the Distinguished Service Order. Granted a
commission in the RAF with the rank of squadron leader, in 1921 he joined the School of Army
Co-operation, which he later command for three years. Further experience of air-land co-operation,
and, after service at the Air Ministry and overseas, he commanded No 12 Group in 1937. Five
years later, he moved across to No 11 Group and, on promotion to Air Marshal, was appointed
AOCinC Fighter Command. Leigh-Mallory was killed in November 1944 when the plane taking
himself and his wife to his next appointment as Air Commander-in-Chief, South-East Asia
Command crashed en-route.
Page 5 of 45
taking the brunt of the enemy attacks. Park's views of getting aircraft to intercept the
Luftwaffe as far forward as possible, closely matched those of Dowding’s, while LeighMallory favoured large formations of defending aircraft in 'Big Wings', and Dowding's
inability to settle the squabble between the two led to serious criticism of him. The Air
Ministry favoured Leigh-Mallory's policies, and Dowding was increasingly seen as
uncooperative and difficult. Within weeks of the end of the Battle of Britain, and with a
new CAS, Air Chief Marshal Portal, in post, Dowding was removed from his position as
AOCinC Fighter Command.
Subsequently, Dowding was persuaded by Churchill to visit the United States on behalf
of the Ministry of Aircraft Production. The trip was not successful. Dowding was
inclined to put forward his own views, which were not always in accord with those of
Britain's permanent representatives. Returning in June 1941, he was asked to prepare a
dispatch concerning the Battle of Britain. This was ready before October, the month of
his retirement as indicated to him by the Air Ministry. Churchill expressed ‘indignation’
when he learned of this, and virtually commanded Dowding to accept an appointment in
the Air Ministry. The new appointment was not to Dowding's taste and, before long, the
old arguments with the Air Ministry reappeared. At his own request, he eventually
retired in July 1942.
An unwillingness to break with Service precedents meant Dowding was not promoted to
the rank of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, even when the King recommended it, and he
spent the rest of his life largely away from the RAF and became a writer of mystic
works.7 After the war, Dowding became a legendary figure to the Battle of Britain pilots,
and one of his proudest moments was to receive a standing ovation from his so-called
‘chicks’ at the première of the film Battle of Britain in 1969. In later years, he became
President of the Battle of Britain Fighter Association. After his death in 1970, his
remains were interred in Westminster Abbey, a fitting tribute to Dowding’s remarkable
achievements.
WHY ANALYSE DOWDING?
Few people can be said to alter the course of history, but Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh
Dowding, later Lord Dowding of Bentley Priory, is undoubtedly one of them. As
AOCinC Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain, he was the architect of one of
the most significant military victories of modern times. Yet, no sooner was the battle
won, his superiors removed him as AOCinC Fighter Command.
The Battle of Britain remains not only one of the most significant battles of the World
War Two (WW II), it is, arguably, one of the most decisive battles of the twentieth
century. But, what other British battles and military actions compete with it for historical
importance? If Julius Caesar’s conquest of 44-45 AD is disregarded: the Battle of
Hastings in 1066, the Spanish Armada in 1588, and the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 are
the immortalised military actions.
7
The Commanders of the Battle of Britain, viewed 07 September 2004,
<http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/commanders.html>
Page 6 of 45
A common characteristic of all these battles is they are all invasions, or attempted
invasions, of the British Isles. The first two, Julius Caesar’s and William of Normandy’s,
were successful invasions. Conversely, the Armada and Trafalgar, like the action of
1940, were botched invasion attempts. These battles are famous in themselves as
examples of brilliant naval actions, and for the greater strategic reason of ending Spanish
and French aggression against England. It is for these reasons, the names of the
commanders and their exploits are world-famous; they are Sir Francis Drake and Lord
Horatio Nelson. However, unlike the previous momentous victorious commanders, the
name of the victor of the Battle of Britain remains virtually unknown.
Considering the Battle of Britain, a recap of the political situation is beneficial:
The Nazi war machine, under bold and brilliant leadership had, by the summer of 1940,
defeated and occupied all of Europe, from the Russian border to the Atlantic, and from the
Swedish border to the Mediterranean. The British Army, thoroughly defeated, was
evacuated at Dunkirk, and France capitulated at the end of June. Hitler’s generals had
promised him the RAF could be destroyed in two to four weeks8, and he prepared for the
invasion of England.
The only thing standing between a German invasion was RAF Fighter Command.
However, the inconceivable calamity did not take place due to Fighter Command; and
only Fighter Command, for the Battle of Britain was an exclusively aerial engagement.
Somehow, the Battle of Britain became associated with the name of Winston Churchill,
perhaps because of his leadership and oratory – this is a common misconception, and
Dowding was never suitably recognised for his significant role.9 Moreover, Dowding’s
treatment immediately following the Battle of Britain was abhorrent.
Much of the history of the Battle of Britain we learn about is inaccurate. Was the Battle
worth fighting at all? The best evidence that we have on this came from Field Marshal
Von Rondstedt.10 After the end of the war he was interrogated and one of the most
important questions asked of him was when he felt that the tide was beginning to turn and
when the uninterrupted catalogue of German victories became more and more doubtful.
Was it Stalingrad or Leningrad or El Alamein? ‘Oh no,’ replied the Field Marshal, ‘ it was
the Battle of Britain.’ This answer certainly surprised the interrogators and they
questioned him further. ‘Well you see, that was the fist time I realized that we were not
invincible.’ 11
However, it is clear there was one man without whom the Battle of Britain could not
have been won – Sir Hugh Dowding.
8
9
Bentley, G. 1990, They Flew for Britain, Defence Force Journal, No. 85, Nov/Dec 1990, p 39.
Dixon, J., 2004, The Battle of Britain: Victory & Defeat / Jack Dixon, viewed 07 September 2004,
<http://www.woodfieldpublishing.com/index.html?target=p_115.html&lang=en-gb>
10
German Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt was known as “a high priest of strategy” and was one
of Hitler’s ablest leaders during WWII. He held commands on both the Eastern and Western
fronts, played a major role in defeating France in 1940, and led much of the opposition to the
Allied offence in the West in 1944-45.
11
Foxley-Norris, Sir Christopher, undated, Myth and Legend of the Battle of Britain, viewed 11
August 2005, <http://www.uk-us.org/foxley.htm>.
Page 7 of 45
DEFINITIONS
Leadership has been a topic of interest to historians and philosophers since ancient
times, but scientific studies only commenced around the turn of the twentieth century.
There is a vast array of leadership literature available, but much of it converges when
defining leadership. Definitions involve the leader, the followers and the ability to
influence others to achieve results. However, this paper focuses on a single definition to
delineate the essential elements of the leadership process: ‘Leadership is a process
whereby an individual influences two or more individuals to achieve a common goal.’12
The Macquarie Concise Dictionary Second Edition defines effective as ‘producing the
intended or expected result’, and competent is defined as ‘properly qualified, capable’.
Van Crevald, an authority concerning Military leadership, suggests a commander must,
firstly, be able to arrange and coordinate those functions an army needs to exist. Secondly,
commanders must enable the army to carry out its proper mission - to inflict the maximum
amount of death and destruction on the enemy within the shortest possible time and at
minimum loss to itself.13
Conversely, command is a uniquely military concept. Commanders usually exercise
command when they head military organisations, or produce military outcomes. British
Army Doctrine defines command as:
‘the authority vested in an individual for the direction, coordination, and control of
military forces. The need for command arises from, and varies with, the size and
complexity of the force. The larger and more sophisticated a force becomes, the greater
the difficulties in preserving its cohesion and fighting power. Thus, the importance of
the function ‘Command’ is related to the level of responsibility of an individual
commander.’14
Competence in command requires the commander to master management and leadership
simultaneously and, thus, provide the most effective fighting force to achieve military
objectives with minimum losses. A competent commander will use the formal power of
command as an effective platform to project personal power and affect subordinates.
DOWDING’S COMMAND COMPETENCE
Prior to 1940. Dowding entered Woolwich at seventeen and a half with aspirations to
become a Royal Engineer. However, he failed, due to a lack of diligence, to attain the
required standard to uphold his chance of a commission in the Royal Engineers.
Consequently, he had perforce to view life from the standpoint of an officer in the Royal
Artillery. Dowding vowed never to fail again. As yet, his ambition was limited, but he
12
Northouse, P. 2004, Leadership Theory and Practice, Third Edition, Sage Publications Inc London,
p 3.
13
Van Crevald. M.L. 1985, Command in War, Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts
and London, p 6.
14
British Army Doctrine Publication Volume 2 Command (DG&D/18/34/51 April 1995) para 0103.
Page 8 of 45
had the natural desire of an able man to increase his knowledge, and advance in his
profession.15
In 1907, Dowding had his first encounter with another officer who would play a
significant part in his future. During an exercise, Dowding’s troop was to provide
support for a rifle battalion retreat, the enemy being played by two companies of the 2nd
Gurkhas. Dowding’s advance guard reported there were Gurkhas ahead of them on both
sides of the road. As a result of a spectacular night march, the Gurkhas were in an ideal
position to cut off the retreat of the British battalion. Dowding silently deployed his
small force along the ridge, before informing the Gurkhas of their annihilation. The
subaltern commanding the Gurkhas was Cyril Newall. He and Dowding disagreed on
this occasion over the claimed victory. This episode created the milieu for their future
differing views.
Dowding spent six years in India as a subaltern, and he relished the strenuous, solitary,
and often dangerous life on manoeuvres in the Himalayan foothills. He left India
determined to rise in his profession, and was destined for astonishingly swift
promotion.16 The War with Germany created the opportunity, and as Dowding later
himself reflected:
‘I served for thirteen years as a subaltern and then, in less than four years, I became a
brigadier-general. Thereafter, with the exception of a few months, I remained a General or
Air Officer for 26 years. It was a strange, lopsided record.’17
If not an infallible passport to promotion, the letters p.s.c. (passed staff college) after his
name in the Army List would enhance his career. Dowding’s path to Camberley was
anything but easy, but he eventually secured a place at Staff College. On the whole he
enjoyed his two years at Staff College. He was, however, irked by the contrast between
the respect paid in theory to freedom of thought and the tendency to repress all but
conventional ideas. Non-conformists who challenged the accepted notions were labelled
‘bad boys’ by the staff astounded at student’s temerity. Dowding became distrustful of
accepted notions, and it was not long before he became one of the ‘bad boys’. It was at
Staff College where Dowding earned the nickname ‘Stuffy’. Although he observed the
rules, his fellow students found he had a strong inclination to stand apart from the usual
boisterous antics. Subsequently, he became known as ‘Stuffy’. Dowding accepted the
nickname in the spirit it was given, and it amused him as he considered it to be original.
Later, ‘Stuffy’ was used with increasing affection, and the nickname would remain with
him for the remainder of his service career.
Dowding found the instructors at the Staff College to be hardworking and conscientious
men, well-read, intelligent, and generally open-minded. In only two respects did they fall
short of his expectations. One of these was their subservience to doctrine, the other was
their reluctance to face the dawning problem of air power. During one exercise, Dowding
had six aircraft at his disposal, and he decided to use all of them. His actions met with
ridicule from his instructor. Dowding was no expert in air matters, but he could not
15
Collier, B. 1957, Leader of the Few, Jarrod, London, p 60.
16
Collier, B. op cit, p 64.
17
Wright, R. 1969, Dowding and The Battle of Britain, MacDonald, London, p 38.
Page 9 of 45
understand the instructor’s illogical attitude. He concluded the Army may as well have
some staff officers who knew something about aviation, and he was going to be one of
them.18
He decided the only way to achieve this objective was to learn to fly.
In 1913, the RFC was in its infancy, and would only train candidates who already held a
civilian licence. Dowding learned to fly at the Royal Aero Club at Brooklands. Flying
lessons took place in the early morning, and Dowding was able to juggle his time to
undertake both his flying lessons and his Staff College curriculum. He obtained his
pilot's certificate (No. 711) early in the morning on the same day as he passed out from
Camberley, 20 December 1913. He obtained his licence after a total time in the air,
passenger, dual, and solo, of one hour and 40 minutes.
Some men learn to fly because the conquest of the air appeals to their sense of the
romantic; others because they mean to make flying their profession or source of
livelihood. Dowding belonged to none of these classes, his interest in flying was prompted
by his desire to gain knowledge likely to be useful to him as a soldier. As a graduate from
Staff College, he was readily acceptable as a candidate for the RFC. His plan was to
obtain his wings at the Central Flying School (CFS), and then return to regimental duty.19
It was at CFS, in 1914, where Dowding first met Trenchard, who was the Assistant
Commandant, and whose subsequent career would impinge upon Dowding’s. On more
than one occasion, Trenchard’s determination played a part of an immovable object to
the irresistible force of Dowding’s tenacity. Despite their different military careers to
date, both men were similar in many respects. Both were remarkable for integrity, highmindedness, contempt for meanness and pretence, a rare capacity for self-sacrifice in the
interests of others or for an abstract cause, and a fundamental kindness concealed by an
outward severity born from their determination nothing should deflect them from their
path of duty.20 Once posted from CFS, Dowding was serving under Trenchard, and was
desperate to join the fighting in France. Twice weekly he tackled Trenchard over the
issue, and eventually succeeded; Trenchard dispatched him to France as an observer – at
the time this was considered a snub within RFC circles. However, Dowding was content,
and, after a few weeks in France, one of his squadron’s aircraft descended behind enemy
lines and the crew were taken prisoner. Dowding became a front-line pilot, and was
thrown into the thick of battle over the Western Front.
Dowding was promoted to major in the summer of 1915 and was posted to command No
16 Squadron at La Gorgue. The Squadron was part of the First Wing under Trenchard,
who was soon to become the RFC commander in France. Dowding viewed this new job
as less satisfying than his old one, where he specialised in early experiments in wireless
telegraphy. Temperamentally, Dowding was well fitted to exercise authority, yet
command of a squadron was not the employment where one would expect him to be
happiest. To most of his subordinates he was seen as a tall, softly spoken man with a
18
Collier, B. op cit pp 82-83.
19
Collier, B. op cit p 84.
20
Collier, B. op cit, p 86.
Page 10 of 45
quiet manner. He had an air of abstracted concern with things outside their ken, was
curiously withdrawn, and had a disconcerting habit of mingling praise with blame. To
them, he personified aloofness.
While Dowding was commanding No 16 Squadron, it brought down only one German
aircraft, whose destruction was attested by its descent behind British lines. The pilot and
observer landed safely, only to be shot, in a flagrant disregard of the established custom,
while emerging from their aircraft. In an uncommon chivalrous act, Dowding collected
their belongings and had them dropped behind German lines with a message stating the
men were buried with full military honours. Many years later, Dowding was informed the
incident made him a legend in the German Air Force. Amongst German units on the
Western Front, it was widely held a commanding officer who thought prisoners from his
unit were not being properly treated had only to drop a message for Major Dowding to
secure prompt attention to their grievance.21
Although this is likely to be an exaggeration, it is a sound assessment of Dowding’s
character.
Dowding had his first major disagreement with Trenchard in July 1915. Dowding’s
Squadron received new propellers to fit to their aircraft, however, the propellers were
designed for the smaller-engined aircraft, and would not fit. Dowding, received no
satisfaction from Wing Headquarters, and asked Trenchard to look into the matter. The
complaint caught Trenchard at a bad moment, and Dowding’s air of superior wisdom
displeased him. While Trenchard admired Dowding’s technical efficiency, he was also
aware of the situation concerning 16 Squadron’s aircrew; the flight commanders
resented Dowding’s ‘pernickety primness’, and several of the pilots and observers were
almost in open revolt. Trenchard was not predisposed to treat the complaint reasonably,
and ordered Dowding to fit the propellers; Dowding compromised, and fitted one
propeller with extreme difficulty. His doubts as to the final airworthiness of the machine
led him to personally test fly it. Telephoning Trenchard to report on the successful, but
dangerous, test flight, Dowding was informed by Trenchard he (Dowding) was quite
right:
they were sent the wrong propellers, and the representative in Paris let them down.
Dowding seized upon the incident as an indication of the technical stupidity of Trenchard
who, by contrast, dismissed it as a manifestation of Dowding’s self-righteous
stubbornness.22
The second incident occurred towards the end of the Somme offensive. Dowding was
appointed to the Ninth (Headquarters) Wing, and was at odds with Trenchard over
tactics. Within a month of the start of the offensive, losses were extremely severe and
Dowding felt justified seeking respite for his aircrew. Trenchard agreed, but the incident
left him uneasy about Dowding’s apparent lack of self-confidence and concerns over his
obsession with casualties. Subsequently, Trenchard referred to Dowding as a ‘Dismal
Jimmy who could hardly be relied upon to restore squadrons’ morale’23 because of his
21
Collier, B. op cit, p 111.
22
Boyle, A. 1962, Trenchard Man of Vision, Collins, London, p 146.
23
ibid, p 184.
Page 11 of 45
manner and modus operandi. Dismal is perhaps not a good portrayal, but Dowding
certainly was serious and austere to the point of appearing pessimistic. To contemplate
and prepare for the worst is a function of command, but to show it, as Dowding did, was
a mistake. As a result, in 1916, Dowding was sent back to Britain to run the Southern
Training Brigade. Trenchard appointed Dowding’s old adversary, Cyril Newall, as the
new commander of No 16 Squadron. Dowding was promoted to brigadier-general, but
saw no further operational service during the war itself. After the war, Dowding joined
the newly formed RAF.
In 1930, Dowding was invited to join the Air Council as the Air Member for Supply and
Research. In this position, Dowding had greater responsibility than any other individual
for fostering technical progress within the RAF. Not all of Dowding’s decisions as Air
Member for Supply and Research turned out well. Within a few weeks of his
appointment, trusting the experts, he cleared the airship R101 for her maiden flight to
India. The disaster befalling R101 at Beauvais made him wary of trusting experts
without strong proof of their correctness. Perhaps his worst mistake was in connection
with aircraft petrol tanks.
Trying to develop tanks to be crash-proof, he overlooked the much greater need to
produce self-sealing tanks damaged by bullet penetration. However, he also made some
decisions of supreme importance to help win his Battle a few years later. Perceiving the
need for faster fighters, he took the lead insisting on metal monoplanes instead of wooden
biplanes, and wholeheartedly supported the development of the Hurricane and Spitfire. He
also backed the development of early warning radar from the initial experiments, to
operational readiness.24
His considerable technical background was invaluable to his support for the
development of radar command and control, and modern all metal fighter aircraft made
him well qualified, perhaps the most qualified in the RAF, to become AOCinC Fighter
Command.
As he strived to create Fighter Command, his relationship with the Air Ministry was
difficult, and became further soured in 1937 when, his old rival, Sir Cyril Newall, 11
years Dowding’s junior, was appointed as CAS. Dowding was convinced the Air
Ministry promised him the post of CAS, and he naturally felt surprised when the
decision was made in favour of someone else, but he controlled any great expression of
disappointment.25 However, his reserved and difficult character made him less suited
than Newall for the senior post. Dowding’s disappointment, and poor working
relationship with the new CAS, was exacerbated by the confusion created over the
frequent deferment of his own retirement. Between 1937 and his final retirement,
Dowding’s service was extended for short terms no less than four times, and the requests
conveyed in cold, discourteous terms.26 This situation continued unabated throughout
the whole of the subsequent critical period of the Battle of Britain. While this was
intolerable to Dowding, the account reflects the immense pressures of the time as much
24
Hough, R. & Richards D. 1991, The Battle of Britain, WW Norton, London, pp 28-29.
25
Wright, R. op cit, pp 60-63.
26
Balfour, H. 1973, Wings Over Westminster, Hutchinson, London, p 132.
Page 12 of 45
as it does to any insensitivity or malice within the Air Ministry. The relationship
between Dowding and the Air Staff before the outbreak of war, with its own ensuing
pressures, was both uneasy and resentful.
It is right and completely understandable for the performance of a Commander-in-Chief
(CinC) to be under the spotlight in preparing for war and conducting operations. The
more at stake, the closer the interest. Many commanders would prefer to be given their
task and then be allowed to pursue it to its logical conclusion, without what is seen as
political meddling.27 The end of the ‘Phoney War’ and the rapidly degrading situation in
France in May-June 1940 created immense problems for Fighter Command, and brought
these perspectives to a head. The alarming attrition rate of the fighter force supporting
the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), drawn from squadrons necessary for the air
defence of Britain, led Dowding to directly request he be allowed to brief the War
Cabinet -- effectively cutting across the chain of command. On 15 May 1940, Dowding
logically and starkly presented to the Cabinet the facts and consequences to home
defence should further squadrons be dispatched to France, and concluded this was
unacceptable. The Cabinet was swayed by his arguments, and agreed not to send any
further squadrons. However, Churchill, Prime Minister of only five days, reversed the
decision the same day, and dispatched four additional squadrons. Although six
squadrons less than requested by France, the BEF evacuation and subsequent fall of
France led to premature losses of Fighter Command assets, causing Dowding great
angst. Dowding’s eloquent plea and his subsequent famous letter,28 reiterating the
perilous state of the fighter defences, led to Churchill declaring, on 19 May, ‘henceforth,
no more fighter squadrons should leave the country, irrespective of events in France.’29
While Dowding’s appearance at the Cabinet meeting was a defining strategic moment, it
allegedly created a personal aversion by Churchill towards him. However, this does not
accord with the facts. Churchill subsequently intervened on Dowding’s behalf in the
long-running dispute concerning his retirement date. This was evident from the tone of
Churchill’s note to the Secretary of State for Air: ‘Personally, I think he is one of the
best men you have … in fact, he has my full confidence.’30 This clearly indicates what
Churchill thought of him. Dowding’s strategic views may well have had a decisive
impact on War Cabinet decision-making. It can be argued he filled a conspicuous gap at
the strategic level of war, as well as his duty at the operational level. Conversely, many
of Dowding’s superiors were found wanting in this area; for example, Newall, who
approved his appearance at the War Cabinet and the Air Ministry. Dowding also
cultivated very close personal relationships with critical decision-makers and resourceproviders, like Lord Beaverbrook, aircraft production and War Cabinet, and General
Pile, CinC Anti-Aircraft Command. The catalyst for his close relationship with
Beaverbrook was undoubtedly their mutual dislike of the Air Ministry. Beaverbrook
called them ‘the bloody Air Marshals,’ and with whom Dowding already fought running
battles. In addition, Dowding had a sound political patron in Churchill, who harboured
27
Journal of Strategic Studies, 1981, pp 199-200.
28
Reproduced in Totality at Enclosure One.
29
Collier, B. op cit, pp 192-94.
30
PRO AIR 19/572, Churchill to Sinclair, dated 10 July 1940.
Page 13 of 45
doubts over the running of the Air Ministry. Churchill approved of Dowding’s
organisation of Home Defence, and as the spotlight turned on Fighter Command after
Dunkirk, Churchill warmed to both its young pilots and, pari passu, their CinC.31
Dowding’s apparent focus on the strategic level of war and his ability to influence
strategic and production decisions, underlines his command competence. Thus, it is
contended Dowding’s opponent’s underhand manoeuvring led to his ultimate
replacement, and they persuaded Churchill, against his judgement, to accept Dowding’s
removal as necessary.
Despite Dowding’s eventual removal from post, his tenure as AOCinC Fighter
Command was extended numerous times at a time when others found wanting in
command competence were ruthlessly culled by Churchill, eg Wavell and Auchinlek. It
could be argued no one else was capable of assuming the position at Fighter Command
during a critical time in British history. However, to gain a balanced view, it is necessary
to appreciate what the Air Staff thought of Dowding. In their minds, by July 1940, there
were three valid reasons why he should be replaced.
Firstly, his age; Dowding was 58 years old, and the senior RAF officer holding an active
Command, while several staff 10 years his junior were ready for advancement.
Additionally, Dowding’s command style was considered inflexible and ‘old school’ by
many of his juniors, and was not perceived as dynamic enough to lead Fighter Command
through the Battle of Britain.
Secondly, Dowding’s tenure at Fighter Command commenced with its formation in July
1936. The Service custom was for an officer to hold a post for two or three years before
going on to gain further experience, so Dowding’s tenure of four years was
exceptionally long. This manifested itself in a significant lack of direction by Dowding
over the tactics employed by Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain.
Thirdly, and the main reason why the Air Council wanted Dowding ousted, was
concerned more with his personality than his age. Notably, since 1937, when he failed to
become CAS, Dowding developed an increasing disrespect for the chain of command and,
in particular, the Air Staff. He claimed they failed to share his enthusiasm for the
importance of fighter defence, and regarded them as indecisive regarding policy-making
and incompetent in its execution. While his outlook was clear, it was extremely narrow, at
times becoming blinkered, whereas the Air Staff’s was necessarily panoramic, and had a
tendency to blur when options overlapped.32
Prosecution of the Battle of Britain. Dowding’s organisation and subsequent running
of Fighter Command provided an almost classic example of how a CinC should work.
Over a protracted period of time, he evolved a method of formulating his plans in a
strategic sense and for giving orders. He had a complete grasp of the necessity to keep
his eye on the long-term view, planning ahead for what he believed would be the most
likely course of future action.33 However, if there was a potential flaw in Dowding’s
31
Ray, J, 1994, The Battle of Britain: New Perspectives, Arms and Armour, London, p 31.
32
Ray, J. op cit, p 183.
33
Wright, R. op cit, p 146 .
Page 14 of 45
intellect, it was he became too involved at the tactical level. However, despite being a
natural a sceptic, Dowding possessed very good technical knowledge, and he did his
own investigating when he considered the operational or technical advice suspect, a
lesson he learned from his time in the Air Ministry. To his credit he was aware his own
understanding of what was happening could well be inferior to the most junior of frontline pilots.34 At this point in the paper, it is fair to assess Dowding’s preoccupation with
tactics undoubtedly caused him first to miss, and then mishandle, the biggest operational
problem occurring during the Battle of Britain --the disagreement between his two
senior commanders -- AVM Trafford Leigh-Mallory, commanding No 12 Group in the
north and east, and AVM Keith Park, commanding No 11 Group in the most vulnerable
and active area south of the Thames. Park was appointed to command No 11 Group by
Dowding ahead of the extremely ambitious Leigh-Mallory. These two very different
characters had individual views regarding air fighting strategy and tactics. Park used
disruptive tactics, and scrambled squadrons as fast as he could, allowing them to
intercept as far forward as they could. This was as directed by Dowding, but carried the
risk of squadrons being outnumbered. Leigh-Mallory preferred to build up his
intercepting force into a ‘Big Wing’ of four or five squadrons, taking valuable time to
assemble in the air, and then try for a knockout blow on a raid.35
In addition to tactical differences, Park and Leigh-Mallory disliked each other to the point
of strong personal antipathy, and took no trouble to hide the fact from their staffs.36
Whatever the relative merits over subsequent tactics, Leigh-Mallory’s thwarted ambition
was at the heart of the problem.
The ‘Big Wing’ tactic was created by Squadron Leader Douglas Bader, the highly
aggressive Commanding Officer of the Duxford-based No 242 Squadron of 12 Group.37
34
Bishop, P. 2003, Fighter Boys – Saving Britain 1940, Harper Collins Publishers, London,
p187.
35
Carver, op cit, p 221.
36
Balfour, H. op cit, p 133.
37
242 Squadron were badly mauled in France, and its morale was low. When ‘Tin Legs’ Bader first
arrived at the 242 squadron's headquarters at Coltishall airfield in June 1940, most of the
squadron's pilots were sceptical of their new squadron leader. They thought he would lead them
from his desk on account of having both legs amputated as a result of a flying accident in 1931.
Bader quickly dispelled the idea by taking one of 242's Hurricane fighters and performing
acrobatics over Coltishall for 30 minutes, deeply impressing 242's pilots. He quickly transformed
242 into a tight, tough squadron through his courage, leadership, and uncompromising attitude
toward his pilots, ground crews, and the RAF high command, with whom he had a major brush.
After taking command, Bader discovered the unit had insufficient spare parts and tools to keep its
18 Hurricane fighters operational. Unsuccessful in resolving the problem through official channels,
Bader signaled 12 Group Headquarters: ‘242 Squadron operational as regards pilots but nonoperational as regards equipment.’ He refused to announce his squadron as operational until its lack
of tools and spares was rectified. Within 24 hours, 242 Squadron had all the tools and spares it
needed, and Bader signaled 12 Group: ‘242 Squadron now fully operational.’ Bader became
commander of the Duxford Wing, and was credited with destroying 152 German aircraft with the
loss of 30 pilots. When the Battle of Britain ended, Bader was awarded the Distinguished Flying
Cross (DFC) and Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for gallantry and leadership of the highest
order.
Page 15 of 45
Although Bader was an extremely courageous fighter pilot and leader, he is not
acknowledged as a strategist. However, he believed interception by a mass of fighters
was the best method of destroying large numbers of enemy aircraft. Unfortunately,
Bader’s determined drive to prove this theory led him to ignore fighter controller’s
directions, in contravention of the system created by Dowding, and led to 11 Group’s
airfields not receiving the necessary fighter cover from 12 Group. Leigh-Mallory
unreservedly backed the ‘Big Wing’ theory. However, Dowding was not in favour of
this, believing the formation of five squadrons’ aircraft would take too long to disperse,
and large formations of fighters would get in each other’s way.
Following the Battle of Britain historical data was used to recreate one of the big air
battles of September 1940 in Fighter Command. Umpires were appointed to watch the
way the battle went. Leigh-Mallory, now in charge of No 11 Group, reacted to the
German threat with big-wing formations that he and Bader argued were best. The exercise
was a fiasco, and the umpires decreed the vital Fighter Command airfields of Biggin Hill
and Kenley were bombed before the ‘Big Wings’ were airborne.38 This recreation proved
Dowding correct in his tactics.
The Adjutant of 242 Squadron was Flight Lieutenant Peter MacDonald, who was also a
Member of Parliament (MP). MacDonald was in an ideal position to hear Bader’s
complaints concerning the squadron’s involvement, or lack of it, in the battle. During the
controversy, MacDonald tackled the Under-Secretary of State for Air, Harold Balfour,
concerning the situation. Balfour refused to discuss the matter with MacDonald, who
then asked Balfour to arrange a meeting with Churchill. Balfour refused, but as an MP,
MacDonald had a right to an interview with the Prime Minister. A meeting between
MacDonald and Churchill certainly took place, but no date is recorded. Subsequent to
the meeting, inquiries from Churchill were forthcoming concerning the controversy,
followed by visits to Duxford by senior government officials, including Churchill, to
review the situation. MacDonald’s intervention was largely heralded as part of an
alleged conspiracy led by Leigh-Mallory to discredit Dowding.39 The conspiracy theory
is supported by the reported discussion between Park and Leigh-Mallory after a meeting
with Dowding in March 1940; Leigh-Mallory said he would: ‘move heaven and earth to
get Dowding sacked.’40
However, the ‘Big Wing’ lobby appealed to the Deputy CAS, Sholto Douglas, who
chaired a, now infamous, meeting in the Air Ministry on 17 October 1940 to discuss
fighter tactics. This meeting was identified as an ambush by the ‘Big Wing’ lobby against
Dowding. Certainly, the presence of Bader, an unlikely and extremely junior attendee, lent
weight to their argument, as did the failure to include Park’s prepared statement in the
minutes.41
38
Deighton, L. 1978, Fighter - The True Story of The Battle of Britain, Triad /Panther Books
Ltd, St Albans, p 309.
39
Ray, J. 1994, The Battle of Britain – Dowding and the First Victory, Cassell & Co, London,
pp 159-60.
40
Terraine, J.1985, The Right of the Line, Hodder and Soughton, London, p 196.
41
Orange V, 1984, Sir Keith Park, Methuen Ltd, London, pp 128-30.
Page 16 of 45
There is little doubt Douglas’ sympathies lay with the ‘Big Wing’ theorists, and little
substance arose from the meeting, but it should have focused Dowding’s attention as a
commander to the critical disagreement between his two group commanders, and for
him to resolve it.
The use of contrary tactics by the AOCs of 11 and 12 Groups in the middle of a battle
was inappropriate. Moreover, their commander, Dowding, did not even notice and, when
he did, was unwilling to make a command decision. Dowding should have intervened,
and it is evident he was gravely at fault, even incompetent, for not doing so. Indeed, it
was his responsibility as AOCinC to do so. While he could see the tactical arguments
were not mutually exclusive, he failed to appreciate the extent to which the poor cooperation between the two groups, generated by the tactical differences, was
jeopardising the whole conduct of the battle. Thus, Dowding lacked competence as a
commander relating to this significant issue.
An alternative view indicates Dowding chose not to interfere; if this is the case, why
not? Firstly, the desired results were being achieved. Secondly, the locations of the
respective groups had an effect on tactics. Thirdly, what is the harm of having two very
capable, but egotistical subordinate commanders ‘having a go’ at each other so long as
they fought against the common enemy successfully – as both did. Fourthly, replacing
either key subordinate group commander in the middle of the Battle of Britain could
have disastrous consequences on morale and combat effectiveness. Consequently, an
alternative analysis of Dowding choosing not to intervene required confidence in the
validity of his own strategic appreciation of the air defence of the British Isles, faith in
his subordinates, and extreme moral courage given the consequences at stake.
As early as August 1940, the Luftwaffe began to mount concentrated night bombing
attacks. Dowding, at this critical stage of the battle, strongly resisted diverting any of his
scarce single-engined fighters to meet this new threat, against which they were largely
ineffective; he was looking to the development of airborne radar. His obstinate resolve
preserving the fighter force in a condition to prosecute the main effort was maintained
for too long in the face of the enemy’s changing tactics and the political need to be seen
to react to it. This need was demonstrated by the appointment of a high level committee
chaired by ex-CAS, Sir John Salmond, who did not admire Dowding. Salmond’s
committee’s conclusions were swiftly formulated and endorsed by the end of September,
and presented Dowding as ‘the obstacle to new thinking and progress at Fighter
Command.’42 Despite coming under considerable political pressure because of the night
Blitz, Dowding was perhaps astute enough to realise it could be endured, despite the
pain, while the central aim was achieved. Thus, he correctly identified, the key to victory
was inflicting unacceptable attrition of the Luftwaffe in the battle for air superiority
during daylight. Dowding claimed the diversion of assets away from the main effort was
self-defeating, and night engagements were not a decisive factor. However, he did divert
some valuable resources to help develop a modest night fighter capability. Overall,
Dowding continued to be steadfast in his reluctance to change tactics, showing a degree
of inflexibility required of a senior commander. Arguably, Dowding’s command
competence could be characterised by identifying he was following the first Principle of
42
Journal of Strategic Studies, op cit, p 183.
Page 17 of 45
War by careful selection and maintenance of the strategic aim. Thus, in this aspect of his
tenure as AOCinC Fighter Command, Dowding is assessed as competent in command.
As the eminent military historian Sir Basil Liddell-Hart wrote after the battle:
‘The Germans’ bid to gain command of the air was frustrated by the superb efforts of 50
odd squadrons of Fighter Command under the mastery direction of Air Chief Marshal Sir
Hugh Dowding.’43
The considerable angst over night defences, coupled with the political fallout of this and
the ‘Big Wing’ saga, provided the ‘evidence’ needed for Dowding’s critics to persuade
Churchill he should be removed. The pressure group to dismiss Dowding was led by
Salmond, whose influence behind the scenes was considerable, with the strong backing
of Lord Trenchard who: ‘entertained qualms about Dowding’s leadership, and
considered he had lost his grip.’44 As ‘the Father of the Royal Air Force’, Trenchard
retained significant influence. Considering such a powerful lobby was needed to achieve
the aim is significant, and lends credence to Dowding’s backing by Churchill. It is
surmised Churchill was under considerable political and military pressure, and
reluctantly gave way, resulting in Dowding’s removal from post on 13 November 1940.
Command Competence Summary.
As a young officer, Dowding seemed set for an honourable but conventional soldier's
life. Aviation opened new possibilities for his devoted spirit and inquiring mind. His
stern sense of duty, added to his well-founded competence in practical flying matters,
made Dowding a formidable advocate for views strongly held. Later, Dowding felt
aggrieved by what he considered to be years of shabby treatment suffered at the hands of
the Air Ministry. This discontent was compounded by the lack of camaraderie displayed
with Newall, who was promoted over Dowding in 1937. Clearly, Dowding possessed
strong moral character and integrity and, while not adverse to patronage, he did court it.
Dowding's practical bent, his insistence for experimentation and trials to take place, and
his imaginative grasp of aircrew requirements often led him into conflict with colleagues
constrained by orthodox opinions. Assessing Dowding’s command effectiveness and
competence, it is noted he had neither the time nor inclination to be diplomatic regarding
his dealings with his superiors, and being right was not necessarily an endearing quality.
Reviewing Dowding’s command competence, it is assessed he undoubtedly produced
the intended results throughout his career and was thus, competent in command.
LEADERSHIP MODELS
Before examining what makes an effective leader, identification of what leadership
means is essential. Leadership has been a topic of interest to historians and philosophers
since ancient times, but scientific studies only commenced around the turn of the
twentieth century. There are probably as many definitions of leadership as there are
leaders. There is a vast array of leadership literature available, but much of it converges
when defining leadership. Definitions involve the leader, the followers, and the ability to
43
44
Wright, R, op cit, p207.
ibid, p 181.
Page 18 of 45
influence others to achieve results. Leadership is perhaps one of the most observed, and
least understood phenomena on earth. Defining leadership is a complex and elusive
problem, largely because the nature of leadership is, itself, complex. Leadership studies
are an emerging discipline, and the concept of leadership will continue to evolve. This
paper focuses on a single definition to delineate the essential elements of the leadership
process: ‘Leadership is a process whereby an individual influences two or more
individuals to achieve a common goal.’
Leadership involves influence; it is concerned with how the leader affects followers.
Influence is the sine qua non of leadership. Without influence, leadership does not exist.
Leadership occurs in groups, and groups are the context where leadership takes place.
Leadership involves influencing a group of individuals who have a common purpose.
Leadership includes attention to goals, and this means leadership involves directing a
group of individuals toward accomplishing a task or end goal. Leaders direct their
energies toward individuals who are trying to jointly achieve something.45
Many of the images associated with leadership have their roots in conflict. It is the
domain of generals who outwit their opponents, politicians who convince and channel
groups into action, and people who take control of a crisis. 46 Therefore, defining
leadership as a process means it is neither a trait nor characteristic residing in the leader,
but is a transactional event occurring between the leader and followers. Process implies
the leader affects, and is affected, by followers. It emphasises leadership not as a linear,
one-way event, but rather an interactive event.
The qualities required of a commander to be a competent leader remained virtually
unchanged in the 2 000 years since Sun Tzu. The term leader is traced back to circa
1300 AD, but the term leadership did not emerge until circa 1800 AD.47 The first
leadership book, written in 1807 by Hegel, focuses primarily on leadership concerning
political processes. Thomas Carlyle posed the Great Man Theory in 1847. His argument
espoused the theory leaders are born, and only those exalted with heroic qualities could
emerge as leaders. In 1910, the first research regarding leadership was conducted giving
rise to the trait theories of leadership. The Trait Theory proposes natural born leaders
possess certain physical traits and personality characteristics differentiating them from
non-leaders. Several leadership theories emerged since then. These include the
Behavioural Approach, the Contingency Approach, and the Transformational
Leadership Theory. The Behavioural Approach, developed in the mid-1950s, suggests
the behaviour of the leader is more important than personality traits. The Contingency
Approach, developed in the late 1960s, examines the relationship between leadership
styles and specific situations. Transformational Leadership, identified in 1973 by
Downton, focuses on a leader’s interaction with subordinates.
45
Northouse, P.G. op cit, p 3.
46
Doyle, M.E & Smith, M.K. nd, Classical Leadership, viewed 13 September 2004,
<http://www.infed.org/leadership/traditional_leadership.htm>.
47
Mercer University, Centre for Student Involvement and Leadership, viewed 08 September 2004.
<http://www.mercer.edu/csil/Resource%20Files/Overview%20of%20Leadership%20Theories.PDF>.
Page 19 of 45
This paper has established Dowding as a competent commander. Therefore, it is
appropriate to progress the analysis in terms of his leadership effectiveness and
competence. The examination is based on four theoretical leadership models: KouzesPosner Trait (Great Man) Leadership Model, Hersey and Blanchard’s Situational
Leadership Theory, Fiedler’s Contingency Leadership Model, and Bass and Avolio’s
Full Range Leadership Model. No one leadership model is infallible in analysing
leadership. Consequently, the models chosen reflect the predominant theories of the 20th
century. Each model provides a process, through which to view and assess Dowding’s
leadership. By undertaking the analysis in sequence, enables each model to build upon
the previous summations, and will provide an authoritative leadership assessment of
Dowding.
Kouzes-Posner Trait Leadership Model
In the early part of the Twentieth century, leadership traits were studied to determine
what makes certain people great leaders. The theories developed are called ‘Great Man’
theories because they focus on identifying the innate qualities and characteristics great
social, political, and military leaders possess.48 Fundamental to this theory is the idea
some people are born with traits to make them great leaders. The Great Man approach
sought to identify the traits leaders possess distinguishing them from people who are not
leaders.49 A century of study attempted to identify definitive leadership traits. The traits
identified in each study differ, but the list of traits provided indicate the ones would-be
leaders hoped to possess, or wished to cultivate, if they wish to be perceived by others as
leaders.50
In 1948, Stogdill examined in excess of 100 studies based on the trait approach. He
uncovered several traits are consistent with effective leadership, including the basic
willingness to be in a position of control and dominance over others, and being attuned
to the needs of others. While this review revealed several traits appear in effective
leaders, the importance of a particular trait was often relative to another factor – the
situation.51 Dowding’s leadership is examined vice the situation in the next model in this
paper. Figure 1 provides a summary of the traits and characteristics researchers
identified using the trait approach. It illustrates clearly the breadth of traits related to
leadership. Figure 1 also shows how difficult it is to select certain traits as definitive
leadership traits; some traits appear in several of the studies, whereas others appear in
only one or two studies.52 Despite the lack of precise data, there is a general convergence
of research concerning which traits are leadership traits.
48
Northouse, P.G. op cit, p 15.
49
Daft, R.L. 1999, Leadership Theory and Practice, The Dryden Press, Dryden, p 65.
50
Northouse, P.G. op cit, p 19.
51
Daft, R.L. 1998, op cit, pp 66-67.
52
Northouse, P.G. op cit , p 18.
Page 20 of 45
Figure 1. Studies of Leadership Traits and Characteristics53
Stogdill
Stogdill
Mann
Mann
Stogdill
Stogdill
(1948)
(1948)
(1959)
(1959)
(1974)
(1974)
Intelligence
Intelligence
Intelligence
Intelligence
Alertness
Alertness
Alertness
Alertness
Insight
Insight
Insight
Insight
Persistence
Persistence
Persistence
Persistence
Self-confidence Self-confidence
Self-confidence Self-confidence
Sociability
Sociability
Sociability
Sociability
Achievement
Achievement
Persistence
Persistence
Insight
Insight
Initiative
Initiative
Self-confidence
Self-confidence
Responsibility
Responsibility
Cooperativeness
Cooperativeness
Tolerance
Tolerance
Influence
Influence
Sociability
Sociability
Lord,
Lord,
DeVader
DeVader &&
Alliger
Alliger
(1986)
(1986)
Intelligence
Intelligence
Masculinity
Masculinity
Dominance
Dominance
Kirkpatrick
Kirkpatrick
andLocke
Locke
and
(1991)
(1991)
Drive
Drive
Motivation
Motivation
Confidence
Confidence
Cognitive
Cognitive
ability
ability
Task
Task
knowledge
knowledge
Some of the central traits, and the ones used in this paper, are: intelligence, selfconfidence, determination, integrity, and sociability.
Intelligence. Intelligence, or intellectual ability, is positively related to leadership.
Having strong verbal ability, perceptual ability, and reasoning appears to make one a
better leader.54 Discussing Dowding’s leadership abilities with several surviving Battle
of Britain fighter pilots, many commented he possessed superior intellect in matters
relating to air warfare. Although these individuals were in the thick of battle, Dowding’s
intelligence as a leader affected them directly. Dowding’s intelligence was evident in the
establishing the integrated air defence system, which came into effect shortly after the
formation of Fighter Command. At the centre was the concept of control, and the
technology on which it was based; Dowding influenced the development of the systems,
particularly radar, whilst serving as part of the Air Council. The aim was to identify
incoming raids using the early-warning system of radar and the Royal Observer Corps,
and intercept the incoming aircraft with fighters directed to them by sector controllers.
The system was simply referred to as: The Dowding System. The very essence of the
system was control at all levels, and it was an important part of central control to
allocate the areas of responsibilities to the Groups. At the commencement of the Battle
of Britain, the system was far in advance of anything else in the world, and was due
largely to Dowding’s formidable intelligence and ability as an organiser. Combining
these factors, with his knowledge of the latest tactical developments, was of crucial
importance during the Battle of Britain.
Self-Confidence. Self-confidence is the ability to be certain about one’s competencies
and skills. It includes a sense of self-esteem and self-assurance, and the belief one can
make a difference. Leadership involves influencing others, and self-confidence allows
53
loc cit.
54
ibid, p 19.
Page 21 of 45
the leader to feel assured their attempts to influence are appropriate.55 The best example
of Dowding’s extreme confidence was his dealings with the War Cabinet in May 1940.
At the meeting, a total of 15 items were on the agenda, ranging from operations on the
Western Front and Norway, to the likely attitudes of Italy and Japan. Air Policy was the
second agenda item; the discussions focussed on the possible dispatch of additional
squadrons to France. Accounts of Dowding’s appearance at the War Cabinet meeting
vary considerably. A. J. P. Taylor commented on Dowding’s actions:
‘Dowding appeared in person at the war cabinet and threatened to resign. When argument
failed, Dowding laid down his pencil on the Cabinet table. This gentle gesture was a
warning of immeasurable significance. The war cabinet cringed, and Dowding’s pencil
won the Battle of Britain.’56
Undoubtedly, this is an exaggerated representation of events, however, it proves
Dowding’s extreme self-confidence about what was required for the defence of Britain.
He solemnly warned the War Cabinet of the dangers to the defence of the British Isles if
more squadrons were sent to France. Dowding was factual and to the point, the
professional airman stating expertly and concisely the case to be made. There was no
room for rhetoric.57
Determination. Determination refers to the desire to get the job done, and includes
characteristics such as initiative, persistence, dominance, and drive. Individuals with
determination are willing to assert themselves, they are proactive, and they have the
capacity to persevere in the face of obstacles.58 Dowding was a man who did not suffer
fools; he was not an overt promotion or impression seeker, but was intent on getting the
job done. He was a complex figure, largely devoid of charm, but possessed immense
strength of mind and character, and unafraid to stick to his principles. Dowding was
determined he and his subordinates should first see what was happening during the
Battle of Britain before they decided what to do about it. Clearly this was the
fundamental nature of his approach to the battle, but he also had to fight the battle on the
‘home front’ against his subordinates who wanted to take the initiative. Leigh-Mallory’s
argument with Park to get more fighters in the sky to attack the Luftwaffe in greater
strength, instead of attacking in piecemeal with outnumbered squadrons, required
determined direction to resolve. This was not forthcoming from Dowding. In essence,
Dowding’s strategic vision was right, and the tactical procedures were correct. He
understood the Luftwaffe should not be allowed to fly over Britain unmolested, and he
established the system to ensure this usually occurred.59 Dowding’s aloofness and the
contempt shown to him by Leigh-Mallory made it impossible for Dowding to take the
initiative, lacking the dominance required in his senior position. Moreover, he lacked the
determination, and time, to resolve the difference of opinion.
55
loc cit.
56
Terraine, J. op cit, p 138.
57
ibid, p 140.
58
Northouse, P. oc cit. p 20
59
Micklethwait, B. 1992, Monty and the Myth of the Unshakeable Plan: How Britain Won the War
but Lost the Peace, Historical Notes No. 22, Libertarian Alliance.
Page 22 of 45
Integrity. Integrity is the important quality of honesty and trustworthiness. Individuals
who adhere to a strong set of principles, and take responsibility for their actions are
exhibiting integrity. Leaders with integrity inspire confidence in others because they can
be trusted to complete tasks successfully. They are loyal, dependable, and not deceptive.
Integrity makes a leader believable and worthy of trust.60 Dowding possessed strong
moral character and integrity and, while not adverse to patronage, was neither a courtier
nor politician. His convictions enabled him to hold onto what he thought was right
against strong pressure and, in so doing, antagonised others. Dowding felt the Air
Ministry questioned his command over the ‘Big Wing’ issue. Dowding is a classic
example of a non co-operator either with the Air Ministry or any other authority. Having
a reputation for being difficult may not be a bad trait for an individual placed in
authority – though doubtless a wise man would rather have the trait amongst his juniors
rather than among his colleagues or superiors.61
To some, Dowding’s integrity and sense of dedication were obvious enough. Behind his
dour and gruff exterior, there was an immense but un-expressed respect for life, and the
deepest regret for its loss. He was at the front-line during WW I and experienced, firsthand, the lack of compassion of some commanders. However, Dowding’s immediate
concern was for those he commanded, and his deep and unrelenting feeling of personal
responsibility remained with him until the end of his time as AOCinC Fighter
Command. Lord Douglas later wrote of Dowding ‘…with him a concern more heartfelt
than it was in the case of any other commander in the Service.’62 A first-class illustration
of Dowding’s adherence to his principles and his integrity is reflected in his final
eloquent letter to all operational fighter stations and units, dated 24 November 1940:
‘I want you to know how continually you have been in my thoughts, and … though our
direct connection may be severed, I may yet be able to help you, in your gallant fight.
Goodbye to you, and God bless you all.’63
Sociability. Sociability refers to a leader’s inclination to seek out pleasant social
relationships. Leaders who show sociability are friendly, outgoing, courteous, tactful,
and diplomatic. They are sensitive to others’ needs, and show concern for their
wellbeing. Social leaders have good interpersonal skills, and create co-operative
relationships with their subordinates.64
Dowding was a distinct contrast to the average fighter pilot of the era -- perceived as lighthearted, cheerful, and even frivolous in manner, and given to minor extravagancies of dress and
diction. In contrast, Dowding seemed an incongruous figure, sober in speech and bearing, and
clearly adverse from all forms of extravagance. His kindliness and generosity, and his rather
impish sense of humour were not apparent to those who did not know him well. But, the very
60
loc cit .
61
Collier, B. op cit, p 25.
62
ibid p 206.
63
Battle-of-Britain.net, op cit.
64
loc cit.
Page 23 of 45
intensity with which he cherished these virtues suggested to those who did look below the
surface a disposition more admirable and engaging.65
The outward show of geniality making for easy popularity never come readily to
Dowding; the nickname Stuffy stayed with him for reasons obvious to all. Nevertheless,
first-hand recollections of encounters with Dowding from Battle of Britain pilots
showed, despite their character differences, a close bond of mutual respect and
admiration existed. However, despite the mutual respect shown, Dowding’s
unsociability traits clearly indicated his potential inability as a leader.
Trait Summary. Dowding was undoubtedly the right man for the job at hand. But, few
would claim him to be a charismatic leader. Dowding certainly inspired loyalty, and had
many trait leadership attributes necessary to be a successful leader. The Battle of Britain
was a close-run affair requiring sound decisions. He clearly demonstrated vision and a
sense of purpose, and was determined and active in pursuit of his strategic interests.
However, he failed to prevent his senior subordinates’ squabbling; given the stakes, this
was a serious indictment.66 Sociability was not a critical trait when dealing with extreme
danger, often resulting in the loss of subordinates’ lives. Dowding achieved the
admiration and respect of his subordinates via his intellect and sound decision-making
qualities, as opposed to social graces. He exhibits the leadership traits of intelligence,
self-confidence, determination, and integrity. However, he lacked ability in terms of
social skills. Despite this significant deficiency, his sound qualities elsewhere
underscored his undisputed place as a leader. Overall, in terms of assessing Dowding’s
leadership using the Trait Approach, he is competent.
A major criticism of using Trait Theory to analyse leadership emphasises the list of traits
chosen for leadership assessment is not irrefutable. Various studies have identified
alternative traits to the six documented by Stogdill. Consequently, assessing Dowding’s
leadership qualities using Trait Theory is exceedingly subjective. The examples used
show Dowding demonstrated traits enabling him to be subjectively assessed against trait
theory as a competent leader. The major faults found in Trait Theory concern the lack of
situation awareness, and consideration of followers. As a result, the impact of situations,
and the effect of followers on leadership, rather than concentrating exclusively on the
leader must be considered. One of the most widely recognised situational approaches is
Hersey and Blanchard’s Situational Leadership Model.
Hersey and Blanchard Situational Leadership Model
Situational leadership attempts to explain how leadership requirements change
depending on the situation, and leadership is not solely dependent on the behaviour of
the leader. Social theorist Herbert Spencer (1884) argued times produced the person and
not the other way around. Spencer and other ‘situationalists’ believed what an individual
actually does when acting as a leader is mainly dependent on the characteristics of the
65
Collier, B. op cit, p24.
66
Gray, P.W. 2002, Dowding as Commander, Leader and Manager, The Stationery Office, London,
p 209.
Page 24 of 45
situation rather than the leader’s traits.67 Development of the theory continued in the late
1960s with work undertaken by Hersey and Blanchard, with refinements subsequently
taking place over interceding years. Situational leadership demands the leader match
their leadership style to the competence and commitment of their supporters. It stresses
leadership has both a directive and supportive dimension to be applied differently in
different situations. To work effectively, the leader must evaluate his or her followers
and assess how competent and committed they are to achieving the task at hand. Leaders
must vary their directive or supportive actions over time to meet the changing needs of
their subordinates.68
The Situational Leadership Model shown in Figure 2 has two main elements: the
leadership style, and the development level of the subordinate. The leadership style
refers to the behaviour pattern of the leader, and includes both directive and supportive
behaviours. Directive behaviours assist goal accomplishment, and are often one-way
actions to clarify what to do, how to do it, and who is responsible for doing it.
Supportive behaviours are more consultative two-way communications showing social
and emotional support to subordinates. Followers are more involved in decision-making
through information sharing, problem solving, and providing opinions. Use of a
supportive style helps make followers feel comfortable about themselves, their coworkers, and the situation.
The Hersey-Blanchard Model divides directive and supportive behaviour into four
distinct categories. The first style (S1) is a high directive-low supportive style where the
leader focuses on goal achievement. This is the ‘directing’ style where the leader sets the
goals, and then supervises carefully to ensure achievement of the goal. The second style
(S2) is the high directive-high supportive or ‘coaching’ style where the leader focuses on
achieving the goal, and supporting subordinates. The leader is more involved with his or
her subordinates, but still decides on goal achievement. The third style (S3) is a
supporting approach where the leader takes a high supportive-low directive style. The
supporting approach, the leader uses supportive behaviour as the primary style to bring
out skills, and places less emphasis on goal completion. A leader using the S3 style gives
followers control of day-to-day decisions but remains available to assist with problem
solving. The fourth style (S4) is a delegating approach. The leader takes a low
supportive-low directive style to let the get on with the job. The leader will agree the
definition of the task, and delegate responsibility for getting the job done. The
Situational Leadership Model in Figure 2 shows how the directive and supportive
behaviours combine for each of the leadership styles.69
The second major part of the Situational Leadership Model is the readiness level of the
subordinate. The readiness level refers to the level of competence and commitment of
the subordinate for the particular task, the higher the competence and commitment, the
higher the readiness level of the subordinate. The bottom part of Figure 2 shows the
67
Heifetz, R.A. Extracts from ‘Leadership Without Easy Answers, Chapter 1’, Harvard Belknap
Press, Cambridge, 1994, p 15. Provided in ACSC reading pack, 2004.
68
Northouse, P.G. op cit, p 87.
69
Northouse, P.G. op cit, pp 88-89.
Page 25 of 45
readiness level of the subordinate for the specific task from low (R1) to high (R4).70 The
Situational Leadership Model promotes the principle employees move forward and
backward along the readiness continuum, depending on their competence and
commitment for the task. The leader must identify the readiness level of the subordinate,
and match his or her leadership style to it. There is a one-to-one relationship between the
readiness level of the subordinate and the leadership style of the leader (ie S1=D1). For
example, if followers are at the first level of readiness (R1), the leader needs to adopt a
high directive-low supportive leadership style (S1).71
The Situational Leadership approach gained wide acceptance because it suggests what
should be done in various contexts. Additionally, it is easy to understand, is sensible and
adapts well to varied situations. Moreover, it stresses the need for leaders to determine
his or her subordinates’ needs, and then adapt their style accordingly. Effective leaders
are those who can change their style to suit the task and subordinate.72
LEADER BEHAVIOUR
IPA
TIN
PA
RT
IC
S3
S2
AT
IN
G
Hi. Task
G
Lo. Rel
DE
LE
RELATIONSHIP BEHAVIOUR
Hi. Rel
G
IN
LL
TE
Lo. Task
Hi. Task
Lo. Task
Turn over
responsibility for
decisions and
implementation
S4
Explain decisions
and provide
opportunity for
clarification
NG
Lo. Rel
Hi. Rel
LI
SEL
Share ideas and
facilitate in
decision making
G
(HIGH)
Provide specific
instructions and
closely supervise
performance
S1
TASK BEHAVIOUR
(HIGH)
(LOW)
FOLLOWER READINESS
HIGH
MODERATE
R4
Able and
Willing
LOW
R3
R2
Able and but
Unwilling
Unable but
Willing
R1
Unable and
Unwilling
or
or
or
or
Confident
Insecure
Confident
Insequre
FOLLOWER
DIRECTED
LEADER
DIRECTED
Figure 2. Hersey and Blanchard Leadership Model
Using the model, shown in Figure 2, Dowding’s leadership during the Battle of Britain
is analysed to identify if he was competent. Consideration is given to the role he played
in the development of his subordinates.
70
Northouse, P.G. op cit, p 90-91.
71
Northouse, P.G. op cit, p 92.
72
Northouse, P.G. op cit, pp 92-93.
Page 26 of 45
During the Battle of Britain, Dowding had a clear view of the strategy required for his
command and, with this view of strategy in mind, he took it for granted Fighter
Command HQ would direct the coordinating of the Battle of Britain. The respective
group commanders were delegated authority to direct the day-to-day tactical command
of the battle. Delegating authority to his Group Commanders, Dowding had no intention
for them to be left alone to get on with their own methods of fighting. At the time,
Dowding stated:
‘standardising tactics throughout a Command as large as mine would have meant
cramping the style of the different Groups. They had different problems to face, but I had
to know how they were going to face them, and I had to issue general directives.’73
Dowding’s strategy directive was to preserve his own force while inflicting the
maximum damage on the enemy. The aim was to intercept the incoming raids with
fighters directed to them by sector controllers. These would act on information provided
by the early-warning system of radar and the Royal Observer Corps. Squadrons were
relieved in the front-line with fresh units on a rotational basis. Dowding’s bent for
keeping close tabs on his subordinates led to criticism for not delegating enough
authority to others. Thus, considering effective leaders are versatile, Dowding did not
alter his leadership style to suit the situation. The Hersey and Blanchard Model assesses
the leader as if on a ‘train track’, and they progress along the bell curve from one
situation to another as the leader, and the followers, work together. The assumption is all
leaders are equally adept at changing leadership styles for each situation. However,
Dowding seemed incapable of adapting his leadership style to suit the situation.
Consequently, as Dowding’s focus was exclusively on goals, and he closely monitored
subordinates behaviour to ensure they accomplished the task, his leadership style was
within the S1 area.
In terms of charisma: ‘Stuffy’ Dowding recognised his own weaknesses, and never tried
to ‘do a Trenchard’ by visiting squadrons to deliver pep talks. 74 He was seldom seen in
the squadrons, and did not mix easily with his subordinates. Indeed, there was an
extraordinary contrast between the AOCinC and the pilots of Fighter Command. Some
CinCs obtained their information by mixing freely among those under their command.
Dowding was too reserved by nature to do this, and although the young pilots under his
commend never realised it, he was hesitant he might be an intrusion in the lives of those
for whom he highly regarded and respected. Despite this, he knew the structure of his
command, the natures of the men serving under him, and their motives more by intuition
than by personal contact.75 His subordinates saw Dowding as insular and
unapproachable, a sentiment repeated by Battle of Britain survivors. Moreover,
Dowding knew he did not have the skill to create optimism, among his officers and
airmen, he did not feel himself.
73
Ray, J. op cit, p.147.
74
Carver, Field Marshal Sir Michael, 1976, The Warlords, Military Commanders of the Twentieth
Century, Weidenfield and Nicholson, London, p 205.
75
Wright, R. op cit, p 148.
Page 27 of 45
Dowding was, thus, aloof and unable to directly influence his subordinates as described
by the Situational Model. It is important to recognise in relation to this model, the
relationship between leaders and followers is the crucial variable in the leadership
situation. In essence, there is no leadership without someone following. 76 In considering
the Readiness Category of Dowding’s subordinates there are two major components:
ability and willingness. Ability is the knowledge, experience, and skill an individual, or
group, brings to a particular task. Willingness is the extent to which an individual, or
group, brings to a particular task. Undoubtedly, Dowding’s subordinates possessed a
high degree of ability and willingness towards the task and are assessed as D4. However,
in making this assessment, due cognisance is afforded to the skills and motivation
possessed, the nature of the task in hand, and the total commitment and dedication
afforded to the wartime task by them. This highlights another limitation with the model,
it assumes identification of the follower readiness is easy, and all leaders are adept at
identifying this. Dowding was not, and his greatest failure was his performance as a
‘team coach’. This may be attributable to the fact he was running out of energy and
stamina;77 indicating it was time to change him as the leader.
To those who worked with Dowding in his official capacity, saw a stern commander, even
zealous on behalf of the organisation under his control, quick to resent any move likely to
weaken it or make it less effective. Dowding had a reputation as a hard man. He was
stubborn, self-opinionated, contemptuous of the views of others, and merciless in
pouncing on any weakness in an opponent’s argument.78
Situational Leadership Summary. Dowding’ leadership style using the Situational
Leadership model is S1, and in considering the Readiness Category of his subordinates
there are two major components: ability and willingness. Consequently, his
subordinates’ readiness is assessed as R4. Comparing the assessments to the model, the
two do not exactly match each other, ie S1 should equal R1, and are directly attributable
to Dowding’s inability to adjust his leadership style to the situation. Essentially, as
defined by the model, Dowding was not an effective leader as he did not change his style
to suit the task in hand, or develop his subordinates, or fight to change the situation.
The Situational Leadership Model can be related to Dowding’s leadership in some cases,
but fails to address the complexities of a military organisation. Moreover, the writer
considers there is a constraint in the Situational Model analysing leaders during intense
periods of war, as their subordinates have a common goal, and they will undoubtedly
work relentlessly to achieve the goal. Consequently, the model does not allow a full and
consistent assessment of Dowding’s leadership. However, ignoring the limitation of the
situational leadership in respect of the military requirements, the Hershey and Blanchard
Situational Leadership model shows Dowding was not a competent leader. This model,
although limited in its ability to analyse military commander’s situational leadership
behaviour, indicates a different analysis from the Trait Theory. Therefore, it is
appropriate to consider Dowding’s leadership against the organisational situation to
ascertain which leadership analysis of his leadership competence is accurate.
76
Hersey, P. & Blanchard, K.H. 1993, Management of Organizational Behaviours, Prentice-Hall
International, Inc. USA, p 189.
77
Gray, P. op cit, p 205.
78
Collier, B. op cit, p 24.
Page 28 of 45
Fiedler’s Contingency Leadership Model
Contingency theory is predicated on the notion, leader traits and behaviours act in
conjunction with situational contingencies to determine outputs. As such, the
contingency approach is a model of leadership describing the relationship between
leadership styles and specific organisation situations.79 The contingency approach seeks
to delineate the characteristics of situations and followers, and examine the leadership
styles to be used effectively.80 Although several approaches to leadership can be called
contingency theories, the most widely recognised is Fiedler’s Contingency Theory.
Fiedler’s Contingency Theory seeks to match a leader’s style to the situation most
favourable for the leader to succeed. The cornerstone of the theory is whether the leader
is primarily concerned with reaching a goal (task-oriented), or if the leader is concerned
with developing close interpersonal relations (relationship-oriented). Measuring the
leader’s style, Fiedler developed a questionnaire to determine the Least Preferred CoWorker (LPC) scale. The scale instructs the leader to consider the individual with whom
he or she has the greatest difficulty working, and then to describe the individual in terms
of a series of bipolar adjectives (eg friendly-unfriendly, boring-interesting, sincereinsincere). Leaders who score high on the scale are relationship oriented; those who
score low are task oriented.81
Fiedler’s theory suggests situations can be characterised by three factors. These are: 82

Leader-member relations, referring to the group atmosphere and the degree of
trust, confidence, loyalty, and attraction followers feel for their leader.

Task Structure, referring to the degree to which the requirements of a task are
clearly defined. Completely structured tasks tend to give more control to the
leader, whereas vague and unclear tasks lessen the leader’s control and influence.

Position Power, referring to the amount of authority a leader has to reward or
punish subordinates. It includes legitimate power individuals acquire as a result
of the position they hold in the organisation.
Combining the three situational characteristics yields a list of eight leadership situations,
illustrated in Figure 3. Situation I is the most favourable to the leader because leadermember relations are good, task structure is high, and leader position power is strong.
Situation VIII is most unfavourable because leader-member relations are poor, task
structure is low, and leader position power is weak. The other octants represent
intermediate degrees of favourableness for the leader.83
79
Daft R.L.1999, op cit, p. 503.
80
Daft, R.L. 1999, op cit., p 94.
81
Northouse, op cit., pp 109-10.
82
ibid, pp 110-11.
83
Daft, R.L. 1999, op cit, p 95.
Page 29 of 45
Very
Favourable
Leader-Member Relations
Good
Task Structure
Good
Good
High
Leader Position Power
Very
Unfavourable
Intermediate
Good
Poor
Low
Poor
Poor
High
Poor
Low
Strong
Weak
Strong
Weak
Strong
Weak
Strong
Weak
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
Situations
Figure 3. Fiedler’s Classification of Situation Favourableness84
Based on his research, Fiedler asserts specific leadership styles are more effective in
certain situations. Task-oriented individuals will be effective in the very favourable
situation as everyone gets along, the task is clear and the leader has power. Similarly, if
the situation is very unfavourable to the leader, a great deal of structure and task
direction is needed. Individuals who are relationship-oriented will be effective in the
intermediate situations because interpersonal skills are important in achieving high
group performance. The results, depicted in Figure 4 again highlight leaders will not be
effective in all situations.85 Two factors are important to know regarding Fielder’s
Contingency Theory: first, is the leader relationship or task-orientated? Second, the
situation should be diagnosed to determine whether the leader-member relations, task
structure, and position power are favourable or unfavourable.86 To determine if the
leader is effective, one must establish whether the individual’s style matches the
setting.87
High
Person-orientated leaders
Perform better
Least Preferred
Co-worker Score
0
Low
Leader-Member Relations
Task Structure
Leader Position Power
Good
Good
High
Strong
Weak
Good
Good
Low
Strong
Weak
Task-orientated leaders
Perform better
Poor
Poor
High
Strong
Weak
Figure 4. Fielder – How Leader Style fits the Situation88
84
Daft, R.L. 1999, op cit, p. 96.
85
ibid, p 507.
86
Daft, R.L. 1999, op cit, p 96.
87
Northouse, op cit., p 112.
88
Daft, R.L. 1999, op cit, p 97.
Poor
Poor
Low
Strong
Weak
Page 30 of 45
By comparing the recommended leader type to the situational control variables there is
some utility in Fiedler’s contingency model to determine Dowding’s effectiveness as a
leader.
Throughout the Battle of Britain, Dowding’s leadership style was one of taskorientation. Was task-oriented leadership the most effective for the situation he found
himself? To answer this question, the nature of each of the three situation variables must
first be determined.
The first area to consider is Dowding’s Leader-Member relations, and the key factor to
consider is to what degree he was accepted and supported by the group members under
his command? As previously mentioned in this paper, Dowding did not enjoy good
leader-member relations. In particular, the situation concerning one of his key
operational commanders, AVM Leigh-Mallory, was particularly difficult. Leigh-Mallory
is assessed as moderately low in the LPC analysis relating to Dowding’s leadership
situation during the Battle of Britain. Dowding’s relationship with the fighter pilots
under his command was poor. He never visited operational fighter stations to listen to
the pilots and give them much-needed support, leading to the perception he was
uncaring. After the war, Dowding observed:
‘of course I had concern and admiration for these pilots, almost to a point where I could
call them ‘my boys’, but they had problems and concerns of their own without seeing their
CinC suddenly arrive on the scene. The job of liaising with the pilots was best left to the
Group Commanders who, in most cases, knew them better.’89
In essence, Dowding was compassionate, and he cared deeply about the fighter pilots
under his command, as he was throughout his whole career, but he was totally unable to
demonstrate his compassion, thus undermining his position as their leader. Dowding was
not totally accepted as the leader due to his aloofness and the remoteness from his
subordinates. In addition, he was poorly supported by his subordinates, and the poor
relationship with senior commanders led to the underhanded campaign to have him
removed from post. Although the standing ovation afforded him in 1969 at the premier
of the film ‘ The Battle of Britain’ showed the high regard in which his pilots held him,
Dowding’s leader-team relations were poor.
The second factor to consider is task structure. At the strategic level, there was no doubt
in Dowding’s mind regarding the job in hand and the objectives. Moreover, he was
acutely aware only Fighter Command stood between the German forces and the invasion
of Britain. He clearly enunciated the requirement for the defensive requirements to his
superiors and political masters, but did not adequately communicate this to his
subordinates. Additionally, the Fighter Command squadrons knew what was required to
achieve the defeat of the Luftwaffe in the air, and to win the Battle of Britain. There
were differing tactics adopted by the various Groups under his command, but Dowding
was firm in his direction at the strategic level, leaving his subordinate Group
Commanders to manage the daily battle tactics. The task structure was high during the
Battle of Britain.
89
Battle of Britain.net, op cit, p3.
Page 31 of 45
Lastly, regarding position power, Dowding was the AOCinC, and his ability to directly
affect the subordinates was potentially significant. However, there was significant
political intervention in the overall composition of the senior military positions during
WW II. Dowding could have removed Leigh-Mallory from post as AOC 12 Group, but
without the support of the CAS and the Air Ministry, this would have been virtually
impossible. Considering Dowding’s poor relationships with his own superiors was
anything but cordial, he was unlikely to affect the senior personnel under his command.
In essence, his position power was weak.
Using the factors described above, Dowding’s leadership, analysed against Fiedler’s
Contingency Model, is summarised in Figure 5.
Very
Favourable
Leader-Member Relations
Good
Task Structure
Leader Position Power
Situations
Good
Very
Unfavourable
Intermediate
Good
High
Good
Poor
Low
Poor
Poor
High
Poor
Low
Strong
Weak
Strong
Weak
Strong
Weak
Strong
Weak
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
Figure 5 – Analysis of Dowding’s Leadership against the Contingency Model
Contingency Leadership Summary. Having analysed Dowding’s leadership using the
Contingency Leadership Model, his leader-member relations were poor, his Task
Structure was high, and his position power was weak. These factors coupled with a very
brief analysis of Leigh-Mallory as the LPC assessing him as moderately low, show
Dowding’s leadership style fits into situation VI. Consequently, Dowding’s leadership in
relation to this model is at the lowest end of the intermediate category scale. Moreover,
the theory asserts relationship-orientated leaders can be effective in intermediate
situations, but Dowding was clearly not thus orientated, and he is not competent as a
leader.
Contingency Theory can be criticised because it is a personality theory, and does not
advocate teaching leaders how to adapt his or her style to suit the situation. Instead, it
advocates leaders adapt to the situation to meet with his or her style.90 However, by
comparing recommended leadership types to situational control variables there is some
utility in assessing Dowding’s leadership using Fiedler’s Contingency Model.
Conversely, as Trait Theory concentrates exclusively with the leader, and the Situational
Leadership Theory examines the leader-follower relationship. The natural progression is
to consider a transformational leadership model to provide a more balanced analysis of
Dowding’s leadership competence.
90
Northouse, op cit., p 112.
Page 32 of 45
Bass and Avolio Full Range Leadership Model
Transformational leadership is the process of engaging the commitment of followers in
the context of shared values and vision. This sharing is particularly relevant in the
context of managing change, and involves establishing a relationship of mutual trust
between leaders and their subordinates.91 The transformational leadership approach
emerged as part of the ‘New Leadership’ paradigm. It was subject to intense research
since the 1980s. The term, transformational leadership was first coined by Downton in
1973, but it became better known when
MacGregor Burns published his book Leadership in 1978.92 Around the same time,
House published a theory of charismatic leadership. Over time, the term charismatic
became synonymous with transformational leadership.93 In his Charismatic Leadership
Theory, House suggests charismatic leaders have a specific charismatic effect on their
subordinates. In the mid-1980s, Bass expanded and refined the work of Burns and House
by giving more attention to the emotional elements and origins of charisma. He suggests
charisma is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for transformational leadership.
Bass expanded on his own work in 1990, joining with Avolio in 1994 to combine the
transactional, transformational, and non-leadership factors to provide The Full Range
Leadership Model.94 This model is the cornerstone of the post-industrial school of
leadership.95
The non-leadership factor in the model is the laissez-faire (LF) approach, and represents
the absence of leadership. Laissez-faire leaders take a hands-off approach to leadership
by abdicating responsibility, delaying decisions, providing no feedback, and making
little effort to satisfy follower needs.96
The transactional leadership element consists of three factors: contingent reward (CR),
management-by-exception passive (MBE-P), and management-by-exception active
(MBE-A). MBE refers to leadership involving corrective criticism, negative feedback,
and negative reinforcement.97 The CR style sees the leader gaining agreement
concerning expected performance standards, and then providing suitable rewards when
the standards are met. It provides the best incentive to followers, and is reasonably
effective. MBE-P involves the leader waiting until errors, shortfalls, and failures become
obvious, and then react to them. MBE-A involves actively seeking indications of poor
performance and taking corrective measures.98
91
Sadler, P. 1997, Leadership – Styles, Role Models, Qualities and Behaviours, Kogan Page Ltd,
p 98.
92
Northouse, P. G. 2004, op cit, p 170.
93
Northouse, P.G. 2004, op cit, p 171.
94
Northouse, P.G. 2004, op cit, p 173.
95
Rost, Joseph C. 1993, Leadership for the Twenty-First Century, Praeger, Westport, p 123.
96
Northouse, P.G. 2004, op cit, p 179.
97
Northouse, P.G. 2004, op cit, pp 178-79.
98
Bass, B.M. & Avoilo, B. 1994, Improving Organizational Effectiveness Through Transformational
Leadership, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, p 4.
Page 33 of 45
The four factors of transformational leadership used by the model are the Four Is:
idealised influence (II), inspirational motivation (IM), intellectual stimulation (IS), and
individualised consideration (IC). II describes leaders who are strong role models for
subordinates; they are charismatic, and make others want to follow the vision put
forward. IM leaders communicate high expectations to his or her followers, and inspire
them to commit to, and become part of, the organisation’s vision. Leaders displaying IS
encourage followers to think independently, and engage them in careful problem
solving. Leaders who display IC act as coaches and advisers by providing a supportive
climate, and listening carefully to the individual needs of followers.99
The most recent variant of the Full-Range Leadership Model is at Figure 6. This model
aims to demonstrate the spectrum of styles from which a leader can draw, depending on
the followers and the current situation. Every leader will display elements of these styles
to a varying degree, however, the better leaders are predisposed towards the upper-right,
transformational, part of the model. Conversely, poor leaders fit into the lower-left
portion of the model.
LEGEND
Non-leadership
LF Laissez-Faire
Transactional
MBE-P
Management-byException, Passive
MBE-A
Management-byException, Active
CR Contingent Reward
Transformational 4 Is I
II- Idealised Influence
IM- Inspirational Motivational
IS- Intellectual Stimulation
IC - Individual Consideration
Figure 6. Full Range Leadership Model100
A large body of research supports the transformational approach and, although still
being developed, displays several strengths. The transformational approach provides a
broader view of leadership by augmenting other leadership models. Clearly, leaders will
provide a vision. The needs of others are central to the transformational leader because
99
Northouse, P.G. 2004, op cit, pp 174-75.
100
Bass, BM. and Avoilo, B. 1997, A Full Range of Leadership Model, viewed 02 October 2004,
<www.mlq.com.au/Products/Products.html>.
Page 34 of 45
the process occurs between the followers and leaders. Demonstration of the four factors
of transformational leadership will disclose Dowding’s leadership level.
There is no evidence of Dowding practising the LF style of leadership; he would most
certainly have failed in his strategic objective if he took this approach. He undoubtedly
used the MBE-A style of leadership as he built up Fighter Command and created the
necessary forces required for the Battle of Britain. Additionally, clear evidence exists
concerning the intellectual and central role he played during the 1930s, and his influence
with the British defence industry to produce the necessary equipment for the defence of
the British Isles.
The result of his efforts was the formation of the Dowding System, essentially an
Integrated Air Defence System, combining anti-aircraft command, the Royal Observer
Corps, and Civil Defence. This was a significant leadership achievement as air defence
was generally neglected due to the dogma of ‘the bomber will always get through’. It
required something in the nature of a miracle to bend RAF thinking to the notion the
bomber must not get through, and could be prevented from doing so.101
The fortitude with which Dowding undertook this challenge shows leadership in this
vein.
CR is the most favourable of the transactional styles, and is usually emphasised by
rewarding the achievement of mutually agreed goals. Dowding had little he could offer
in the form of CR, other than to provide the necessary encouragement required to
achieve the desired end result. Consequently, there is no evidence of him using this style
of leadership. This is consistent with the previous arguments presented in this paper
concerning the clear focus of the whole of Fighter Command during the Battle of
Britain. The scope for Dowding to personally reward individuals was extremely limited
due to his remoteness from the front line, and his difficult relationship with his superiors
and the Air Ministry.
Considering all the factors associated with his leadership during the Battle of Britain,
Dowding’s leadership style was more suited to MBE-P. He was reliant upon his
‘System’ of defence established in the late 1930s to win the day, and was reluctant to
adapt his procedures, despite changing Luftwaffe tactics, to achieve the desired result.
Consequently, the battle was to be fought in accordance with his System and based on
control at all levels; central to this was the allocation of areas and responsibilities.
However, some of the units within Fighter Command had little regard for the ‘Dowding
System’; 12 Group were particularly discontent over the assigned role of guarding sector
stations north of the Thames Estuary, while major action took place elsewhere. The
resultant effect saw the formation of the previously mentioned ‘Big Wing’ theory, and
the adopting of tactics contrary to the ‘Dowding System’. The formation of the ‘Big
Wing’ theory coincided with the change of German tactics switching from day to night
bombing. Fighter Command had no immediate answer to the change of tactics.
Essentially, Dowding waited for the errors associated with his own tactics to arise as
opposed to resolving the issue decisively.
101
Terraine, J. op cit, p 21.
Page 35 of 45
The real benefits of using the Full Range Model comes from analysing Dowding against
the Four Is. Transformational leaders employ any or all of them to achieve enhanced
results. II has two attribute and behaviour aspects, but they have a common intent –
undertaking the task, and building trust and confidence. This is normally the domain of
charismatic leaders, and it was already established Dowding was not a charismatic
leader.
IM leadership encourages followers to do their best, by communicating expectations and
intent in a simple manner. In this aspect, Dowding was not successful communicating
his ideas, but the fighter pilots readily risked their lives in spite of the odds they faced.
IS requires the leader to assist followers to think through new ways, promote rationality,
carefully problem solve, and take risks. The high level of uncertainty throughout the
Battle of Britain provided the opportunity for Dowding’s intellectual qualities to shine;
however, he failed to capitalise in this area. He was stubborn and set in his ways, and as
previously identified in relation to the Salmond Committee, and he stifled the ideas of
his subordinates.
IC involves paying attention to the needs of individuals and showing compassion.
Dowding was dour in aspect, with an almost expressionless face, and this appearance,
coupled with his sparing use of speech, had a daunting effect on those who met him for
the first time. Dowding was passionate about his work, and had strong moral ethics,
making him very compassionate towards his ‘fighter boys’. However, his remoteness
and introverted modus operandi made him unapproachable. Perhaps his biggest failure
was not being seen by his subordinates and not overtly supporting them during the
heaviest fighting during the Battle of Britain. Consequently, there is little evidence of
him actively developing and nurturing his subordinates.
Full Range Leadership Summary. In terms of the Full Range Leadership Model,
Dowding showed little use for the Four Is, and was unable to nurture his subordinates.
He showed no use for CR or LF leadership. Dowding used MBE-A during the formation
of Fighter Command to achieve the ‘Dowding System’ associated with the defence of
the British Isles. However, the most fitting leadership style associated with this model is
the MBE-P, and shows Dowding fits in the passive/ineffective portion of the model. He
is, thus, not a competent leader.
In summary, throughout his career, Dowding demonstrated some leadership traits.
However, to provide a detailed assessment of his competence as a leader, Dowding’s
leadership was examined against four leadership models. Although the models did not
individually enable a detailed analysis of his behaviour and qualities, the cumulative
effect of the model analysis enables a succinct assessment to be made of Dowding’s
leadership competence. With the exception of the Trait Theory, the leadership analysis
shows Dowding was not a competent leader as the AOCinC Fighter Command.
Consequently, the final question to consider concerns whether Dowding’s command
competence was predicted by his leadership competence? Clearly, a commander’s
leadership influences his, or her, ability to be a competent commander. However, the
analysis undertaken on Dowding shows him to something of a paradox; he was clearly a
competent commander, but not a competent leader.
Page 36 of 45
CONCLUSION
This paper critically examines Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding’s command and
leadership competence. The first step in the examination involves insight regarding why
Dowding proves to be a most deserving subject. To facilitate the examination, the
following terms are defined, before addressing Dowding’s command competence:
leadership, effective, competent, and command. Dowding’s command competence is
critically examined in two areas - his career prior to 1940, the foundation for his
command style, and critical incidents throughout the Battle of Britain where Dowding’s
command competence was tested. The next logical step is to examine Dowding’s
leadership using four leadership models: Kouzes-Posner Trait (Great Man) Leadership
Model, Hersey and Blanchard’s Situational Leadership Theory, Fiedler’s Contingency
Leadership Model, and Bass and Avolio’s Full Range Leadership Model. Finally, this
paper concludes with an assessment of Dowding’s command and leadership
competence.
As a young officer Dowding seemed set for an honourable but conventional soldier's
life. Aviation opened new possibilities for his devoted spirit and inquiring mind. His
stern sense of duty, added to his well-founded competence in practical flying matters,
made him a formidable with strongly held views. He was not a compromiser, nor
politician, often arousing hostility, sometimes unwittingly. Dowding felt aggrieved by
what he considered to be years of shabby treatment suffered at the hands of the Air
Ministry. Also, the lack of friendship displayed between Dowding and Newall, who had
replaced Dowding in France in WWI and was promoted over him in 1937, stemming
from the rivalry established in India when they were both subalterns, added to his
discontent. Dowding built up a fractious relationship, borne from bitter experience, with
his superiors and there was a general view he could be prickly and difficult, lacking the
golden virtue of tact. His uncooperative nature was often displayed to those with whom
he disagreed. This is underpinned by the sentiment expressed by Pile: ‘A difficult man, a
self-opinionated man, a most determined man, and a man who knew more than anybody
about all aspects of aerial warfare.’
Additionally, Dowding possessed strong moral character and integrity and, while not
adverse to patronage, he did court it. His convictions enabled him to hold onto what he
thought was right against strong pressure. He was a complex figure, largely devoid of
charm, but possessed immense strength of mind and character, and unafraid to adhere to
his principles. Known as ‘Stuffy’, he was aloof and tactless, but his formidable gifts as
an organiser, combined with his knowledge of the latest tactical developments, were of
crucial importance during the Battle of Britain. Dowding is a classic example of a non
co-operator, either with the Air Ministry or any other authority.
Dowding's practical bent, his insistence on experimentation and trials, and his
imaginative grasp of aircrew requirements often led him into conflict with colleagues
constrained by orthodox opinions. Although Dowding was willing to listen to his
scientific advisers, it was clear he formed his own opinions. Dowding must be praised
for his mastery of air weaponry, the deployment of his forces, his rotation of the most
heavily engaged squadrons, and his constant regard for reserves of aircraft and
personnel. All these aspects indicate competence of the highest order. In addition to
Page 37 of 45
commanding the struggle by day for air superiority over south-east England, Dowding
spent most nights monitoring the development of airborne radar and other techniques to
meet the threat of the night bomber. His complete personal commitment partly explains
his failure to control the clash of tactics and personalities between Park and LeighMallory over the use of squadrons in Big Wing formations.
The ‘Big Wing’ theorists were generally misguided regarding their theory as a panacea
for victory. Unlike the ‘Big Wing’ theory, the 11 Group tactics withstood the scrutiny of
hindsight, Dowding’s handling of the situation between Leigh-Mallory and Park was
instrumental in his downfall as he failed to act competently as the senior commander. In
addition, he failed to heed the significance of the necessity for night defences, and afford
it the priority his masters felt it deserved.
Undoubtedly, Dowding was properly qualified, perhaps the most qualified officer in the
RAF, to become AOCinC Fighter Command. He is acknowledged as the architect of the
co-ordinated air defences instrumental in the Battle of Britain victory. Thus, Dowding
was proved correct concerning his handling of the battle and winning a decisive victory.
Assessing his command effectiveness and competence, it is noted he had neither the
time nor inclination to be diplomatic regarding his dealings with his superiors, and being
right was not necessarily an endearing quality.
Thus, it is concluded Dowding was effective in the period leading up to 1940, and was
instrumental preparing the defences necessary for the Battle of Britain. However, he was
not competent as a senior commander dealing with the complex issues associated with
commanding a large and sophisticated force. Consequently, he was properly qualified
and capable, but was unable to create cohesion and fighting power. Analysing all the
facts relating to Dowding’s military career, his command competence is assessed as a
success as he achieved the intended result.
The following quote from Sir Winston Churchill is a good summary of Dowding’s
command competence:
‘We must regard the generalship here shown as an example of genius in the art of war.’
Four leadership models are used to determine Dowding’s effectiveness as a leader.
Despite his humility and reserved nature, he was undoubtedly the right man for the job.
He certainly inspired loyalty, and a degree of disloyalty too, and had many trait
leadership attributes necessary to be a successful leader. Although Trait Theory lends
itself to subjectivity decide the traits determining a leadership outcome and how these
traits are applied to the leader, assessing Dowding’s leadership using the Trait
Approach. He is competent.
The Hersey and Blanchard Model assesses the leader as if on a ‘train track’, and they
progress along the bell curve from one situation to another as they and the followers
work together. The assumption is all leaders are equally adept at changing leadership
styles for each situation. However, Dowding seemed incapable of adapting his
leadership style to suit the situation, and consequently, as Dowding’s focus was
exclusively on goals and he used supportive behaviour to ensure his subordinates
Page 38 of 45
accomplished the task, his leadership style was within the S1 area. In terms of charisma,
‘Stuffy’ Dowding recognised his own weaknesses and never tried to visit squadrons to
deliver pep talks. Dowding was, thus, aloof and unable to directly influence his
subordinates, as described by the Situational Model. Considering the Readiness
Category of Dowding’s subordinates there are two major components: ability and
willingness. Consequently, his subordinates’ readiness is assessed as R4. Comparing the
assessments to the model, the two do not exactly match each other, ie S1 should equal
R1, and is directly attributable to Dowding’s inability to adjust his leadership style to the
situation. Essentially, as defined by the model, Dowding was not an effective leader as
he did not change his style to suit the task in hand or develop his subordinates, or fight to
change the situation.
Throughout the Battle of Britain, Dowding’s leadership style was predominantly taskorientated. Assessing Dowding against the Fielder Contingency Model, he did not enjoy
good leader-member relations. Dowding’s relationship with the fighter pilots under his
command was perceived as pitiable. Consequently, Dowding’s leader-team relations
were poor. Dowding was acutely aware only Fighter Command stood between the
German forces and the invasion of Britain. He clearly enunciated the requirement for the
defensive requirements to his superiors and political masters, but did not adequately
communicate this to his subordinates. There were differing tactics adopted by the
various groups under his command, but Dowding’s strategic direction was firm, leaving
his Group Commanders to manage the daily tactics. The Task Structure was high during
the Battle of Britain. Lastly, regarding position power, as the AOCinC, Dowding’s
ability to directly affect the subordinates was potentially significant. However, in reality,
senior military positions during WW II were affected by political intervention,
constraining Dowding’s ability to act decisively to replace subordinates. This fact,
coupled with Dowding’s poor relationships with his own superiors, made him unlikely
to affect personnel under his command. In essence, his Position Power was weak.
Bass and Avolio’s Full Range Model, demonstrates which factors of leadership
Dowding displayed to disclose his leadership level. He was truly dedicated to the
defence of the British Isles through the best possible use of the command he created, and
brought in action in war. The fortitude with which Dowding undertook this challenge
showed leadership in the MBE-A vein. Considering all the factors associated with his
leadership during the Battle of Britain, Dowding’s leadership style was more suited to
MBE-P. He was reliant upon his ‘System’, and the battle was fought in accordance with
it. Transformational leaders employ all of the Four Is to achieve superior results.
Dowding was not successful communicating his ideas, but his fighter pilots readily
risked their lives in spite of the odds facing them. The high level of uncertainty
throughout the Battle of Britain provided the opportunity for Dowding’s intellectual
qualities to shine, but he failed to capitalise in this area. Consequently, there is little
evidence of him actively developing and nurturing his subordinates. Overall, Dowding’s
leadership fits into the passive/ineffective portion of the Bass and Avolio’s Full Range
Model, and it is assessed he is not a competent leader.
Regardless of the theoretical treatment of this subject, it is largely through the
observations of others recited personally to me at Battle of Britain receptions the most
incisive insights regarding Dowding’s leadership is revealed, and despite the obvious
Page 39 of 45
admiration held for Dowding, he is not considered a competent leader. These
observations, coupled with the evidence provided by assessing Dowding’s leadership
using models, supports he was not an effective leader during the Battle of Britain.
Thus, as this paper takes its final step along the determination path, the conclusions
reached regarding Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding’s command and leadership
competence can be summarised. In terms of his command of Fighter Command,
Dowding was competent. Analysing his leadership using four recognised leadership
models reveals, with the exception of the Trait Model, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh
Dowding was not a competent leader.
Page 40 of 45
Enclosure:
1.
Letter from Air Chief Marshal Dowding to Air Ministry dated 16 May 1940
Authorities Consulted:
Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris GCB DSO OBE RAF
Air Commodore James Coward RAF (Retired)
Group Captain Dennis Stubbs RAAF (Retired)
Wing Commander Roald Dahl RAF (Retired)
Flight Lieutenant Jan Malinski, VM, Polish Air Force (Retired)
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ENCLOSURE ONE
HEADQUARTERS FIGHTER COMMAND
ROYAL AIR FORCE,
BENTLEY PRIORY,
STANMORE,
MIDDLESEX.
16 May, 1940
Sir,
1.
I have the honour to refer to the very serious calls which have recently been made upon the
Home Defence Fighter Units in an attempt to stem the German invasion on the Continent.
2.
I hope and believe that our Armies may yet be victorious in France and Belgium, but we
have to face the possibility that they may be defeated.
3.
In this case I presume that there is no-one who will deny that England should fight on, even
though the remainder of the Continent of Europe is dominated by the Germans.
4.
For this purpose it is necessary to retain some minimum fighter strength in this country and
I must request that the Air Council will inform me what they consider this minimum strength to
be, in order that I may make my dispositions accordingly.
5.
I would remind the Air Council that the last estimate which they made as to the force
necessary to defend this country was 52 Squadrons, and my strength has now been reduced to the
equivalent of 36 Squadrons.
6.
Once a decision has been reached as to the limit on which the Air Council and the Cabinet
are prepared to stake the existence of the country, it should be made clear to the Allied
Commanders on the Continent that not a single aeroplane from Fighter Command beyond the
limit will be sent across the Channel, no matter how desperate the situation may become.
7.
It will, of course, be remembered that the estimate of 52 Squadrons was based on the
assumption that the attack would come from the eastwards except in so far as the defences
might be outflanked in flight. We have now to face the possibility that attacks may come from
Spain or even from the North coast of France. The result is that our line is very much extended at
the same time as our resources are reduced.
8.
I must point out that within the last few days the equivalent of 10 Squadrons have been
sent to France, that the Hurricane Squadrons remaining in this country are seriously depleted, and
that the more Squadrons which are sent to France the higher will be the wastage and the more
insistent the demands for reinforcements.
9.
I must therefore request that as a matter of paramount urgency the Air Ministry will
consider and decide what level of strength is to be left to the Fighter Command for the defences
of this country, and will assure me that when this level has been reached, not one fighter will be
sent across the Channel however urgent and insistent the appeals for help may be.
2
10. I believe that, if an adequate fighter force is kept in this country, if the fleet remains in
being, and if Home Forces are suitably organised to resist invasion, we should be able to carry on
the war single handed for some time, if not indefinitely. But, if the Home Defence Force is
drained away in desperate attempts to remedy the situation in France, defeat in France will
involve the final, complete and irremediable defeat of this country.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Air Chief Marshal,
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Fighter Command, Royal Air Force