The Opposite of Control: A Deweyan Perspective on
Intrinsic Motivation in “After 3” Technology Programs
Published in Computing in Human Behavior, 16, 313-338, 2000.
David Wong, Michigan State University
Becky Packard, Mount Holyoke College
Mark Girod, Michigan State University
Kevin Pugh, Michigan State University
Address all correspondence to:
David Wong, 440 Erickson Hall, College of Education, Michigan State University,
East Lansing, MI 48824-1034
Co-authors:
Becky Wai-Ling Packard, Dept. of Psychology and Education, Mount Holyoke
College, South Hadley, MA 01075
Mark Girod, Erickson Hall, College of Education, Michigan State University, East
Lansing, MI 48824-1034
Kevin Pugh, Erickson Hall, College of Education, Michigan State University, East
Lansing, MI 48824-1034
Abstract
A central feature of the design of many “After 3” technology programs is the
assumption that student learning and motivation requires that they have choice
and control of their activity. Similarly, the dominant cognitive-rational perspective
of motivation portrays effective learners as having control of themselves and their
environment. In this article, we build on Dewey’s (1934) aesthetics and
epistemology – as most fully developed in “Art as Experience” - to suggest that to
be deeply engaged in learning, to be truly moved, requires not only control, but
also the “opposite of control.” In “Art as Experience” Dewey proposed that
aesthetic experience – compelling, transformative experience – requires doing
(acting on the world), reflection (standing back from the world), and undergoing
(being acted upon by the world). Furthermore, grasping the meaning of these
experiences emerges through a qualitative sense in addition to intentional
analysis and reflection. Thus, intrinsic motivation, or what we shall call
transformative experience, finds a balance between control and its opposite. We
elaborate our conception of the “opposite of control” and discuss how this idea
helps us appreciate heretofore unilluminated qualities of intrinsic motivation in
“After 3” technology programs.
The importance of learner control in “After 3” technology programs
A common belief to which several successful “After 3” programs subscribe is that
participants should be given a large degree of personal freedom - freedom to
choose what, how, and to what degree. For example, the Computer Clubhouse
Network centered in the Media lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
describes their purpose as being to…
encourage participants to discover their interests and apply their own ideas.
Given the support and freedom to pursue their own ideas, young people get
beyond their disinterest and apathy about learning, and develop the internal
motivation to learn and grow (The Computer Clubhouse, 1999).
Similarly, the role of student control and choice is central in the rationale for the
5th Dimensions program developed at the Laboratory of Comparative Human
Cognition (LCHC) at the University of California at San Diego.
The first step in participating in the Fifth Dimension begins with children
deciding on a goal(s) for engaging in Fifth Dimension activities. Next, children
must decide where they will begin their journey in the Maze.
Activities must allow children a substantial element of personal choice and
self-direction within an overall structure designed to promote all participants’
development of level of expertise (5th Dimensions Clearinghouse, 1999).
The program that we have observed and discuss in this article Kids Learning in
Computer Klubhouses (KLICK!). KLICK! is an “After 3,” technology-rich,
community learning center designed to support adolescent and adult learning
using the latest in computer technology and resources. KLICK! currently serves
ten middle schools and their communities in both rural and urban areas
throughout the state of Michigan. These schools were targeted as those
potentially "isolated," in their lack of technology or lack of community support and
successful outreach.
KLICK! is another example of an “After 3” program designed around ideas of
student choice, interests, and personal freedom. According to Yong Zhao,
KLICK! project designer and director,
Kids define what learning should be like. Rarely are kids afforded the
legitimacy to decide how and what to learn. Largely, adults decide that
agenda. We provide access and assistance, kids bring personal interests
and ideas (Zhao, 1999).
KLICK! attempts to provide students virtually unrestricted access to technology,
resources, and support and let them decide how to use these as partners in
learning. Expertise and scaffolding comes from adult members of KLICK!, other
student participants both within their local clubhouse or at other sites around the
state, on-line help materials, as well as the staff at Michigan State University.
KLICK! kids can learn as much or as little as they choose of whatever they
choose. Some kids choose to only play games and they are not discouraged to
do so. Choice is critical, in fact, evaluation studies suggest that without it, a
KLICK! clubhouse struggles.
One of the most successful KLICK! clubhouses is at a small school located in
rural northwest Michigan. The two local site coordinators have let the metaphor
of 'clubhouse' guide their actions and management style. Says one of the
coordinators,
We want kids to feel like this (clubhouse) is their place. It belongs to them
and they can use it however they'd like. My job is to make sure access is
provided fairly, that nothing gets destroyed, and to provide whatever expertise
I can - if they ask.
"Freedom to learn" and "choice" have not emerged as the guiding principles in all
the clubhouses. The site coordinator at one of the struggling KLICK! clubhouse
has treated it as an extension of the regular school day. She used formal training
activities, limited access to certain software and peripherals, and employed a
timeline to guide the 'administration' of her 'curriculum.' Unfortunately, student
participation at this clubhouse has dwindled to just a few kids.
Control and theories of motivation and learning
Research on technology and motivation
The belief that student control is a critical element of motivation and learning
found in the design and practice of “After 3” programs is grounded in the
theoretical and empirical work on motivation and technology. We turn to a large
review piece on technology and learning by the Cognition and Technology Group
at Vanderbilt University (CTGV, 1996) to cite a few examples of the role of
learner choice and control.
Lepper (1989; Lepper & Cordova, 1992) has been the central figure in work on
the relationship between motivation and technology. His research supports the
idea that control – along with fantasy, curiosity, and challenge – is a critical
feature in what makes particular technologies intrinsically motivating.
Collins (1996) has contrasted the view of motivation associated with CAI to a
view of motivation associated with educational technologies based on principles
of constructivism. Whereas the former focuses on embellishment as the source
of motivation, the latter focuses on authentic activity as the source of motivation.
From a constructivist perspective, motivation is often associated with the
opportunity to find meaning and relevance in an activity, the opportunity to be
self-determining and self-regulating, and opportunity to engage in problem
solving. Hence, authentic activity is often advocated because it provides the
needed motivational conditions: i.e. “real-word” problems or situations and openended problem solving task which allows for self-regulation, self-determination,
and choice. Examples of such work include simulation programs, such as
SimCity which allows students to experience what it’s like to run a city (Bransford
& Stein, 1993); exploratory programs, such as Geometer’s Sketchpad which
allows students to explore geometric relationships by manipulating geometric
figures (Jackiw, 1991); programming software, such as Logo which allows
students to construct their own computer programs; and problem solving
programs, such as The Jasper Series which allows to students to try to solve the
reality-based problem of getting an injured eagle to safety (CTGV, 1992).
Various researchers have reported that students show high levels of interest
when engaged in these authentic tasks (CTGV, 1996).
From a social constructivist perspective, motivation is often conceived of as
stemming from participation in a learning community (Greeno, Collins & Resnick,
1996). Hence, technologies designed to foster learning communities through the
support of collaborative knowledge construction and problem solving reflect the
idea that motivation comes from participation. A well known example of such
technologies is CSILE (computer support for knowledge-building communities)
(Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1994). CSILE is a computer system that fosters
collaborative knowledge construction among students. In doing so, it also
supports intentional, self-directed learning. Theoretically, students’ motivation to
learn in such an environment stems from their opportunity to participate in the
community and be self-directed.
Each of these perspectives on motivation and technology make reference to the
issue of choice, control, self-determination, or self-direction in some form or
another. The work on CAI suggest that adding choice to computer programs can
increase interest. The constructivist perspective argues that motivation stems
from opportunities to be self-determining and self-directed, and that computer
technologies which engage students in authentic tasks provide students with
these opportunities. Finally, the social constructivist perspective argues that
motivation can arise from participation in technology supported learning
communities which support intentional, self-directed learning.
Theories of motivation and learning
These perspectives on motivation and technology – especially with regard to the
role of learner control – pick up on long-held assumptions in general theories of
motivation and learning. The individuals’ ability to separate themselves from the
object or situation has been a central feature characterizing higher level
psychological functioning (for examples specific to motivation, see Deci, 1995;
Deci & Ryan, 1985; Nicholls, 1984; Pintrich & Schunk, 1996). Desirable learner
attributes such as objective thought, rational thought, reflection, and critical
thinking all describe individuals as “standing back” from the activity or object at
hand. The ability to set self apart from the world or the activity is related to
controlling both oneself and the activity – another key characteristic of higher
level functioning (Greeno, Collins, & Resnick, 1996). For example, metacognitive
theory posited a separate layer of cognition that can, then, operate on and
control regular cognition. How else could an individual control cognition without
being somehow separated from it? Even for Vygotsky (cf. 1978) – from the
socio-historic perspective, rather than the cognitive-rational perspective that has
dominated much work in motivation - the development of language is critical
because it functions as a tool for controlling thinking and action. For instance,
Vygotsky (1986) attached considerable significance to what he labeled “scientific”
concepts. Such concepts are important to Vygotsky because he believed that
their hierarchical, systematic nature, allowed a person to stand back
(decontextualize) and reflect on the concept; that is be able to separate the
concept from the object or event it refers to (Wertsch, 1985).
The cognitive perspective is, in large part, a response to more behaviorist,
extrinsic ways of thinking about motivation. Instead of being simply reactions to
environmental stimuli, cognitive theories portray human activity as being
thoughtful, planful, and, thus, under the control of the individual. Cognitive
theorists developed constructs firmly grounded in the idea of control to account
for differences in individual’s learning, motivation, attitude. The following are
some examples of these constructs:
-
self-regulation, (Paris, S. G. & Newman, R. S., 1990; Pintrich, P. &
DeGroot, E. V., 1990);
-
learned helplessness, (Dweck, C. S., 1975);
-
mastery orientation, (Ames, C. & Archer, J., 1988);
-
perceptions of competence and control, (Weiner, B.,1986);
-
self-determination, DeCharms, R. (1976), Deci, E. L. (1980).
The opposite of control: A Deweyan perspective on learning
The importance of being able to step back from experience and to reflect, make
sense of it, and control it can not be disputed. Our concern is that attention to
this dimension of experience comes at the expense of attending to other vital
interactions between the person and the world. In this article, we build on
Dewey’s (1934) aesthetics and epistemology – as most fully developed in “Art as
Experience” - to suggest that to be deeply engaged in learning, to be truly moved
requires not only control, but also the “opposite of control. ” We will make the
point that transformative experience – our term for intrinsic motivation - can only
occur when the distance and distinction between person and world decreases,
rather than increases. Dewey writes,
The uniquely distinguishing feature of esthetic experience is exactly the fact
that no such distinction of self and object exists in it, since it is esthetic in the
degree in which organism and environment cooperate to institute an
experience in which the two are so fully integrated that each disappears
(Dewey, LW10:36).
The person can not step outside the experience – and, thus, can not control it in
the conventional sense. To do so would fundamentally change the experience.
We will argue that in a Deweyan account, learning and motivation can not be fully
understood from perspectives that position the individual separate from the
activity or world. We suggest that important qualities of motivation - its essence lie inside the experience of learning. That is, rather than just considering the
value of an experience from the outside, we suggest one must consider the value
of the experience itself.
Doing and reflecting: An incomplete and problematic portrait of learning
In education, “learning by doing” has become a popular one-line synopsis of
Dewey’s philosophy. Although action is central to Dewey’s epistemology, one
merely has to consider any example of mindless activity to see how this
characterization can only be either an incomplete or incorrect characterization of
Dewey’s perspective on learning. Mere “doing” does not assure learning. Most
educators realize this simple point and, as a result, recognize the importance of
the activity of reflection - a second element often associated with Dewey’s
perspective on learning. One learns by both doing something and then reflecting
upon what one has done. Many cognitive perspectives on learning are at a basic
level some elaboration of these two components and portray ideal learners or
learning environments as optimizing opportunities to do and reflect. For
example, the Fostering a Community of Learners (FCL) classrooms designed by
Brown and Campione (1990, 1994) emphasize “learning by doing” and
metacognitive reflection. Likewise, many of the technology environments
mentioned above (e.g. the Jasper series, CSILE) were designed to support
student action (exploration, problem solving, participation in a learning
community, etc.) and reflection.
The central role of doing and reflection finds abundant support in the recent
history of learning theories. In behaviorism, learning was a matter of developing
adaptive patterns of action-reaction associations. Little distinction was made
between the innate, reflexive qualities of animal behavior and human learning.
This image did not set well with theorist and practitioners who saw individuals as
having more freedom, control, individuality, and self-determination. (Skinner, the
preeminent behaviorist, contended that true control or freedom was an illusion).
With the rise of cognitive perspective, behavior was not simply a matter of
establishing action-reaction patterns, but was a purposeful activity directed by
meaning and the desire to make meaning. Knowledge and meaning were
constructions of the active, conscious mind with intentional action and careful
reflection as the core processes. Thus, learning was a matter of both doing and
thinking.
The problem of control: A brief digression into epistemology
The cognitive perspectives heavy reliance on the active, intentional mind as
being the constructor of meaning came at a cost, however. The more a theory
identifies individuals as the locus of meaning-making the greater its vulnerability
to nagging philosophical and psychological problems: foremost among them is
the question of how new knowledge emerges. Plato’s “Meno paradox” sums up
the issue:
You argue that a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows or
about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to
enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not now the very subject about
which he is to enquire. (Plato, 1949).
Thus, inasmuch as intentionality, control, choice, and rational thought are central
virtues in many images of the accomplished learner, they can also become
liabilities. The Meno paradox makes the point elegantly clear: since we can
never see, understand, or act in the world beyond the limits of our own habits,
preconceptions, and prejudices, how can we ever be transformed by our
experiences?
The problem seems airtight in its logic. For Dewey – along with Peirce and Kant
among others – the only way to get beyond logically intractable problems is to
question their fundamental assumptions. Dewey’s strategy is inventive and
daring. Prawat (in press) writes,
His goal, following Pierce, is to “change the metaphysical premise” regarding
the relation of mind and matter, restoring immediate qualities “to the rightful
position as qualities of inclusive situations” (Dewey, LW1: 203).
In other words, the first part of Dewey’s two-part strategy is to propose the
existence of some forms of meaning that are inherent in situations and largely
independent of a subject. In particular, Dewey discusses how situations can be
inherently doubtful or harmonious.
It is…a mistake to suppose that a situation is doubtful only in a ‘subjective’
sense…It is the situation that has these traits. We are doubtful because the
situation is inherently doubtful (Dewey, LW12: 109-110).
Dewey is claiming, then, that some forms of meaning – in an undeveloped form –
exist independent of the individual’s interpretive viewpoint. Thus, the
construction of understanding involves more than just prior knowledge and
biased observation as its starting materials. With this assertion, Dewey offers a
way to escape the circular logic of the Meno paradox. However, a critical
problem remains: even though meaning may exist independent of the individual,
a rational, intentional model of learning precludes the possibility that this meaning
can be perceived. That is, changing the nature of the world makes little
difference in the original problem if the individuals’ capacity to make meaning
remains the same.
Thus, the second part of Dewey’s strategy is to propose how the meaning
inherent in a situation can be directly perceived without being completely filtered
through prior knowledge, i.e. habits, preconceptions, and prejudices. Dewey
accomplishes this by elevating the role of non-conscious, non-rational processes
by the individual. Dewey refers to this process as having a “qualitative sense” of
a situation.
The sense of a thing… is an immediate and immanent meaning; it is meaning
which is itself felt or directly had (Dewey, LW1: 200).
Jackson explains this point:
What Dewey is saying is that we sense or feel the situation we are in without
thinking of it per se, without it becoming an object of reflection. (Jackson,
1998, p. 21)
For Dewey the process of meaning-making involves two kinds of awareness: (a)
a conscious, intentional, and reflective mode, and (b) a non-conscious, nonrational, and non-linguistic mode. The qualitative sense of a situation is had
directly when we are totally immersed in an experience and "is not and cannot
be stated or made explicit." Dewey describes the interplay between the two as
beginning with a qualitative sense then developing to include – not to be replaced
by - a more explicit, reflective activity.
My theory of the relation of cognitive experiences to other modes of
experience is based upon the fact that connections exist in the most
immediate non-cognitive experience, and when the experienced situation
becomes problematic (i.e. discordant), the connections are developed into
distinctive objects of knowledge (i.e. logical relations), whether of common
sense or of science (Dewey, LW14: 33).
Jackson also provides a good description of the process:
At times…the feeling that a situation arouses is bafflement. Under those
circumstances the situation lacks coherence. In the extreme case we might
say that it makes no sense whatsoever. When those conditions hold, we are
led to search for elements and relations within the situation that will reveal its
meaning, thereby causing it to make sense (Jackson, 1998, p. 21).
In Dewey’s own words::
"When we are baffled by perplexing conditions, and finally hit upon a clew,
and everything falls into place, the whole thing suddenly, as we say, 'makes
sense.' (Dewey, LW1: 200)
Thus, the qualitative sense of a situation pervades throughout the process of
coming to understand by not only marking both the beginning and the end of
inquiry and but also serving as a reference point throughout.
Undergoing: The opposite of control
Dewey’s portrait of learning balances the individual acting upon the world with
the world acting back upon the individual. Thus, transformation requires not only
doing and reflection, but undergoing.
There is…an element of undergoing, of suffering in its large sense, in every
experience. Otherwise, there would be no taking in of what preceded
(Dewey, LW10:41).
The idea of undergoing is a vital - as vital as doing – and yet, it has been an
ignored or misinterpreted part of Dewey’s philosophy. What is meant by
“undergoing” and what does undergoing have to do with “suffering in its large
sense”? “To suffer” can mean to experience pain, but that is not the meaning
that Dewey has in mind. Rather, “to suffer” is to be acted upon by the world. For
Dewey, undergoing is the inextricable complement of acting upon the world. To
suffer is to be under the influence. As mentioned earlier, this element of
meaning-making is not developed much by most cognitive perspectives as they
tend to portray learning as under the learner’s physical or cognitive control.
Learning, at its best, is described as self-regulated, intentional, goal-directed, and
so on. For Dewey, however, transformative experience requires not only gaining
control, but also relinquishing control. One must let go – as much as possible one’s long held ways of seeing, doing, understanding, and feeling. The degree
that one undergoes, the degree that one can truly experience, is the degree that
one be open to the true nature of an outside influence.
Thus, for Dewey, intelligent activity finds a productive balance between
undergoing, doing, and reflection. Dewey uses a simple example to describe this
relationship:
There are conditions to be met without which an experience cannot come to
be. The outline of the common pattern is set by the fact that every experience
is the result of interaction between a live creature and some aspect of the
world in which he lives. A man does something; he lifts, let us say, a stone. In
consequence he undergoes, suffers, something: the weight, strain, texture of
the surface of the thing lifted. The properties thus undergone determine
further doing. The stone is too heavy or too angular, not solid enough; or else
the properties undergone show it is fit for the use for which it is intended. The
process continues until a mutual adaptation of the self and the object
emerges and that particular experience comes to a close. What is true of this
simple instance is true, as to form, of every experience. (Dewey, LW10: 43-44
)
In an experience, doing and undergoing cooperate to change the individual and
how the individual acts in world. Dewey’s prosaic example of lifting a rock
notwithstanding, in profound aesthetic experiences, nothing less than the very
essence of the individual is transformed. Aesthetic experiences inspire – the root
of inspire being the Latin spirare, which means to “breathe life into.” Such
profound engagement and transformation can not occur if the individual remains
at an emotional or cognitive distance from the world – a distance prerequisite for
conventional notions of control.
While undergoing and surrender may seem passive, particularly when contrasted
to doing, one can be certain that no part of Dewey’s view of intelligent activity is
passive (Dewey, 1934, 1938). Similarly, surrender or the opposite of control are
not the same as losing control.
The esthetic or undergoing phase of experience is receptive. It involves
surrender. But adequate yielding of the self is possibly only through a
controlled activity that may well be intense. In much of our intercourse with
our surroundings we withdraw; sometimes from fear, if only of expending
unduly our store of energy; sometimes from preoccupation with other
matters,
as in the case of recognition. Perception is an act of the going-out
of energy in order to receive, not a withholding of energy. To steep ourselves
in a subject-matter we have first to plunge into it. When we are only passive
to a scene, it overwhelms us and, for lack of answering activity, we do not
perceive that which bears us down. We must summon energy and pitch it at a
responsive key in order to take in. (Dewey, LW10: 53).
Thus, Dewey uses intriguing phrases such as “to go out in order to receive,” “to
plunge in in order to steep,” or "to take in" to emphasize the distinctly active
essence of undergoing or the opposite of control. The opposite of control is not
to be lifeless, to be devoid of mind, body, or spirit. In fact, in transformative
experience, relinquishing control increases, rather than decreases, the sense of
being alive.
Undergoing, anticipation, consummation
Csikszentmihalyi calls it flow; Dewey calls it “an experience.” These are
descriptions of optimal engagement – the kinds of engagement that we strive to
create for our students. How are control and its opposite part of Dewey’s notion
of an experience? Jackson, referring to Dewey’s “Art as Experience” explains
what deep engagement in art can illuminate:
The arts, above all, teach us something about what it means to undergo
an experience. Successful encounters with art objects and performances
offer a set of standards by which to judge ordinary experiences. Such artcentered experiences are distinguished by their unity and wholeness.
They are consummatory. They are accompanied by feelings of fulfillment
and satisfaction. They are self-sufficient and meaningful. They do not
point beyond themselves. Lesser forms of experiencing, by way of
contrast, contain but fragments, mere shards, of what Dewey would call
an experience (Jackson, 1998, p. 124).
Therefore, ordinary experience is something that merely happens: an occurrence
occupying space and time. By contrast, an experience is an event. As an event,
an experience moves forward in time. It flows over time and, more importantly,
this flow has a unity to it: “every successive part flows freely, without seam and
without unfilled blanks, into what ensues” (Dewey, LW10: 36). In addition, this
flow builds upon itself toward a completion such that the experience “is so
rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation” (Dewey,
LW10: 35). By contrast, in ordinary experience, things happen one thing after
another: it is a succession of occurrences, rather than an unfolding event.
Experiences are dramatic events complete with a plot, tension, characters, and
setting. As a drama, there is coherence and development in the plot as it moves
toward consummation. The end of the story is a consummation, rather than a
cessation, because it brings coherence to the variety of elements that constitute
the event.
…we have an experience when the material experienced runs its course to
fulfillment. Then and then only is it integrated within and demarcated in the
general stream of experience from other experiences. A piece of work is
finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its solution; a game
is played through; a situation, whether that of eating a meal, playing a game
of chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or taking part in a
political campaign, is so
rounded out that its close is a consummation and
not a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own
individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience. (Dewey,
LW10:35).
Finally, while the consummation may or may not be pleasurable, it is always
anticipated.
This consummation, moreover, does not wait in consciousness for the whole
undertaking to be finished. It is anticipated throughout and is recurrently
savored with special intensity. (Dewey, LW10:55).
Aesthetic experience, “intrinsic” motivation, and interest
The anticipation of consummation is significant to our discussion because it
reveals how Dewey may have described what we call intrinsic motivation. The
field of motivation has historically considered intrinsic motivation as either related
to an innate need for developing competence ( Piaget, 1952; White, 1959), a
need for feeling self-determining or to be the locus of causation (deCharms,
1976; Deci & Ryan, 1985), or, at a more generic level, a desire to perform a task
for “its own sake” rather than for external reasons. Constructs such as the need
for competence and self-determination direct our attention to the inner needs of
the individual, while the “doing something for its own sake” perspective places
the motive for motivation somewhere in the task or object, somewhere out in the
world (Prawat, 1998). In other words, there is confusion as to whether the
source of intrinsic motivation lies in individual (needs) or the world (task).
A distinctive feature Dewey’s philosophical project was his aversion for dualistic
thinking that creates the either/or choices between individual and the world (cf.
Dewey, 1938). Dewey’s account of aesthetic experiences illustrate that what is
deeply engaging about such experiences is the unfolding drama of the give and
take between individual and world. The drama is an event, a Deweyan
“situation,” that exists only in the transaction between person and world. Literary
theorist and Deweyan scholar Louise Rosenblatt describes transaction using the
example of poetry. “The poem is not an object but an event, a lived-through
process or experience” (Rosenblatt, 1978, p. 35). The poem is evoked - it comes
into existence - during the transaction between reader and text. The idea of
transaction is central to much of Dewey’s philosophy and reflects his effort to
locate meaning in thoughtful action rather than “in the head” or “out in the world.”
One of the consequences of construing experience as “an event” is that
motivation and interest become characteristics of this special transaction, rather
than of the person or the world. Dewey encourages us to consider motivation
and interest as the energy that is the rush toward consummation. The drama of
inquiry is motivation; it is interest.
Thus, while the source of motivation may be thought of as either in the person or
in the world, we are prompted to see it also as a quality inherent to the activity.
As a result, Dewey presents a provocative vision of how motivation can be truly
“intrinsic.” All of a sudden, the well-worn phrase “learning for learning’s sake”
takes on a fuller, more tangible meaning. Similarly, Dewey shines new light on
Hidi’s well-known distinction between individual and situational interest
(Hidi,1990; Hidi & Baird, 1988). Following his emphasis on transactional nature
of aesthetic experience, Dewey embeds interest within the event of learning and
not in the individual, the setting, or some combination of the two. Interest, like
the event, is seen as a transactive entity that exists only in the interaction
between individual and setting. When we take seriously that motivation and
interest are inherent qualities of a dramatic event, we then begin to consider
more closely the nature of drama and how learning can be made more dramatic
in the same way as a great play is dramatic.
Operationalizing the opposite of control:
Qualities of transformative experience
We now leave the discussion of the role of the opposite of control in
transformative experiences and turn our attention to the challenge of making
these ideas practical for research and practice. Since transformative experience
is an interplay of the “giving out and taking in” of energy, of doing and
undergoing, we operationalize key qualities of both control and its opposite.
What would constitute evidence of either, and where might we look for evidence?
The most direct evidence might be found in participants’ descriptions of their
experiences from the “After 3” technology programs. Questions such as “Tell
me what it’s like for you when you were work on that web page” might prove
illuminating. More likely to be useful would be to encourage students to
reconstruct their experience by using a story genre. The story form may be more
likely to capture the interplay of doing and undergoing in a dramatic experience.
Key phrases to look out for might include:
Opposite: language of being acted on
e.g. I was swept away, it drew me in, it came to/hit/dawned on me, it took me
by surprise,
Control: language of intentional action by participants on the world or on
themselves, e.g. I did/made that, I decided/chose to
Anticipation and reflection
As discussed earlier, most models of accomplished learners feature the ability to
maintain a critical distance between themselves and the subject (i.e. their
behavior, phenomena in the world, their own cognitive activity). This distance
may be spatial (from a different place) or temporal (at a later time). The ability to
control requires separating individuals from whatever they are interacting. One
of the important processes afforded by this distance is reflection - i.e. stepping
back and considering what has happened (see Flavell, Garner, or Markman for
excellent treatments of executive control and metacognition).
The opposite of control requires a reduction of the distance between subject and
object and for individuals to participate inside the activity rather than observing
from outside. The complement of reflection is anticipation. Transformative
experience requires both an anticipative and a reflective epistemological stance.
Rational meaning-making, whether inductive or deductive, is largely a reflective,
past-oriented process. By contrast, during transformative experiences, students
are motivated by a sense of anticipation of what is possible and yet to be.
Anticipation captures the pulling-forward sensation of an experience. During
transformative experiences, students are motivated by a sense of what is to
come next. Dewey writes,
In most intellectual work, in all save those flashes that are distinctly esthetic,
we have to go backwards; we have consciously to retrace previous steps and
to recall distinctly particular facts and ideas. Getting ahead in thought is
dependent upon these conscious excursions of memory into the past…. Only
when esthetic perception is interrupted (whether by lapse on the part of artist
or perceiver) are we compelled to turn back, say in seeing a play on the
stage, to ask ourselves what went before in order to get the thread of
movement. What is retained from the past is embedded within what is now
perceived and so embedded that, by its compression there, it forces the mind
to stretch forward to what is coming (Dewey, LW10: 187).
From the anticipative stance, learners allow themselves to be carried forth by an
idea or suggestion (undergoing). The realm of the possible emerges only when a
person acts “as if” something were true. “As if” is a suggestion that affords
imagination. To behave “as if” is an invitation to temporarily suspend disbelief –
to rest the critical eye so that one may dwell fully in a new experience.
Skepticism and analysis too soon disrupts the having of a new aesthetic
experience. In order to appreciate the world from a different perspective, we
have to leave our familiar post. It is impossible to see fully from two different
vistas at the same time.
It would be a mistake, however, to think that “as if” is an invitation to ignore our
past experience or to engage in idle fantasy. The critical, logical eye can not rest
forever, nor should it. This is where the anticipative and reflective stances come
together. Given that experiences change as a consequence of believing an idea
to be true, the task is to consider whether we find that new experience more or
less useful than our current experiences. Thus, from an anticipative perspective,
to learn is to fully experience the consequences (or imagine the consequences)
of being in a world as if an idea were true.
We imagine students being pulled forward in an experience. As in a good play or
story, there is a sense of drama or anticipation of what is yet to come. Like
Csikszentmihalyi's concept of "flow", students lose a sense of time and are pulled
forward in the experience, not wanting the experience to end. What might be
considered evidence for reflection and anticipation?
Anticipation: future-oriented descriptions, consideration of the possible, what
is yet to be.
E.g.: I was hoping/expecting/looking forward to, I was wondering what was
going happen next
Reflection: past-oriented descriptions, consideration of what has already
happened.
E.g.: I was doing well/poorly, I realized/figured out/saw that…
Reflection and anticipation: reflective comments that reveal, in retrospect, that
anticipation had taken place.
E.g.: it did/didn’t turn out as I was hoping/expecting, I was surprised/relieved
Transformative experience: The nature of the “self”
The role of self has figured prominently in contemporary perspectives on
motivation and learning. Terms such as “perceptions of (self) competence and
control of (self and situation),” “self-efficacy” and “self-regulation” are important
constructs in accounts of motivation and learning. One might be led to assume
that in the midst undergoing when experiencing the opposite of control that the
self disappears or is abandoned as in Zen Buddhism (see Gaskins (in press) for
an account of how Zen applies to motivation). Indeed, Dewey’s own description
of aesthetic experience seems to suggest this:
Instead of signifying being shut up within one's own private feelings and
sensations, ... experience signifies active and alert commerce with the world;
at its height it signifies complete interpenetration of self and the world of
objects and events (Dewey, LW10: 25).
Although there is complete interpenetration of self and world, the self does not
dissolve. In fact, as paradoxical as it may seem, the unity of the individual and
world is accompanied by a more distinct definition of each. Dewey describes
elements can become both more integrated and distinctive during an experience:
In a work of art, different acts, episodes, occurrences melt and fuse into
unity, and yet do not disappear and lose their own character as they do so just as in a genial conversation there is a continuous interchange and
blending, and yet each speaker not only retains his own character but
manifests it more clearly than is his wont. (Dewey, LW10: 36-37).
Thus, in the process of undergoing, where the learner is experiencing the
opposite of control, the self finds a special kind of existence. In passionate
activity, there is keen consciousness of one’s self and ones’ actions without
being self-conscious. Jackson (1998) refers to writer Annie Dillard’s thoughts on
this point:
Consciousness itself does not hinder living in the present. In fact, it is only to
a heightened awareness that the great door to the present opens at all. Even
a certain amount of interior verbalization is helpful to enforce the memory of
whatever it is that is taking place. … Self-consciousness, however, does
hinder the experience of the present. It is the one instrument that unplugs all
the rest. So long as I lose myself in a tree, say, I can scent its leafy breath or
estimate its board feet of lumber, I can draw its fruits or boil tea on its
branches, and the tree stays alive. But the second I become aware of myself
at any of these activities-looking over my own shoulder, as it were-the tree
vanishes, uprooted from the spot and flung out of sight as if it had never
grown. (Dillard 1974, p. 81)
The nature of the self is difficult to describe for it seems full of paradoxes. We
identify several different qualities that characterize an awareness of self during
transformative experiences.
Event awareness vs. self or world awareness. An aesthetic experience is an
event, a coherent happening created in the transaction between the individual
and the world. Thus, participants’ attention during an experience is directed
toward the drama of the event – the dynamic interplay between self and world rather that to either what is occurring in the world, or what is going on with one’s
self.
This distinction does not really map directly on to differences between
control and its opposite since awareness of event is requires both control (doing)
and the opposite of control (undergoing). However, it does remind us that the
self is an important part of the event and raises questions about how, then,
Dewey would have us think about the role of the self when undergoing the
opposite of control.
Self-awareness vs. self-evaluative. To undergo is to suffer the consequences of
one’s actions. It is to take in the world directly with a minimum of prejudging and
filtering. Recall that this kind of direct communication with the world is vital to
Dewey’s view on how individuals can ever be transformed by their experiences.
In powerful experiences, students can imagine new ideas and let go of
themselves enough to surrender to new ideas. We suggest that in surrendering
to new ideas, students can imagine themselves as different kinds of people
during the experience. As Csikszentmihalyi (1996) writes:
In flow we are too involved in what we are doing to care about protecting the
ego. Yet after an episode of flow is over, we generally emerge from it with a
stronger self-concept; we know that we have succeeded in meeting a difficult
challenge. We might even feel that we have stepped out of the boundaries of
the ego and have become part, at least temporarily, of a larger entity. The
musician feels at one with the harmony of the cosmos, the athlete moves at
one with the team, the reader of a novel lives for a few hours in a different
reality. Paradoxically, the self expands through acts of self-forgetfulness (pg.
112-113).
In other words, when we become different kinds of people, we temporarily stop
thinking about who we have been in order to imagine ourselves in new ways.
When students are passionately engaged, they have the opportunity to try on
"possible selves" as well as the new ideas. Markus and Nurius (1986) suggest,
our self-conceptions are not confined to the present and include who we were,
who we would like to become, and who we fear becoming. Cross and Markus
(1991) write, "As individuals choose among tasks or actions and as they persist
or withdraw from these tasks or actions, they are often guided by a sense, an
image, or a conception of what is possible for them" (pg. 232). These images of
possibility are motivating and sustain students' participation in an activity. For
example, these authors contrast the motivating difference between a student who
sees herself as someone "who plays the piano" to a student who sees herself as
"a pianist", with the latter's musician self being more motivating to the student.
Powerful experiences can provide opportunities to not only imagine ideas but
also to try on possible selves and become motivated by such possibilities.
Thus, to be transformed by an event demands a degree of openness, honesty,
and courage. The natural tendencies to be critical, to interpret – more accurately
- to prejudge or reinterpret, and to close oneself off to things that are
uncomfortable must be suspended, at least temporarily. The transformative
event reveals something about the person and the person must, therefore, be
ready to perceive. In these situations, the self is opening rather than closing,
describing rather than evaluating, increasing rather than decreasing possibilities,
transforming rather than confirming.
opposite: describing activity, reactions, opening and expanding
control: evaluating, closing and narrowing, signifying, labeling, evaluating, or
describing what I was doing vs. what was happening
Summary: Transformation and the opposite of control
Thus far we have built on Dewey’s aesthetics and epistemology – as most fully
developed in “Art as Experience” - to suggest that to be deeply engaged in
learning, to be truly moved, requires not only control, but also the “opposite of
control.” Dewey proposed that aesthetic experience – compelling, transformative
experience – requires doing (acting on the world), reflection (standing back from
the world), and undergoing (being acted upon by the world). Furthermore,
grasping the meaning of these experiences emerges through a qualitative sense
in addition through intentional analysis and reflection. Thus, intrinsic motivation,
or what we have called transformative experience, finds a balance between
control and its opposite. We elaborated and operationalized our conception of
the “opposite of control” and now discuss how this idea helps us appreciate
heretofore unilluminated qualities of intrinsic motivation in “After 3” technology
programs.
Observations from an “After 3” program
KLICK! students spend time, voluntarily, at the computer clubhouse building
webpages,
surfing the Internet, chatting on-line, filming and editing digital movies, and
playing games. A KLICK! clubhouse is filled with networked computers,
scanners, digital cameras, laser printers, and a server, as well as the latest
software to manage and edit digital video, author web pages, and chat
interactively with other clubhouse sites around the state. At any given time, there
are numerous projects and activities going on in a clubhouse. Many KLICKers
enjoy building personal web pages, making web sites for businesses, filming and
editing digital movies, creating PowerPoint presentations, and even "burning"
their products onto CD-ROM. Several KLICK!-wide projects exist too like a
KLICK! internal newspaper called The Password Express, video game
competitions, and webpage design contests. More and more participants are
being recruited for their technology expertise to serve their local school and
community through service and training activities.
The program in a small rural school in northwest Michigan is doing particularly
well run. The room is organized and well equipped, the supervisors are
enthusiastic and generous with their time. Even more impressive is the number
of students who choose to come to this after school program and forego other
activities. They are eager to arrive, engaged while they were in the room, and
leave late. With no grades and no obvious material reward, this seemed like a
classic example of intrinsically motivated behavior. What can our discussion of
Deweyan transformative experiences add to our analysis of this situation? We
focus our analysis on three popular kinds of activities: games, on-line chat, and
webpage building.
Games: Doing, undergoing, transformation
Students playing computer games seems to suggest a prototypical example of
Csikszentmihalyi’s flow. The concentration is intense; time passes but outside
the notice of the students. Games are designed so players can find the optimum
match between the challenge of the game and the player’s skill. If flow is
optimal experience, then these gamers seem to be in the flow. The question that
comes easily to mind, however, is to what degree is optimal experience optimal
educational experience? Since transformation is synonymous with education,
and since undergoing is necessary for transformation, it is worth investigating the
nature of undergoing in these gaming activities.
In both Dewey and Csikszentmihalyi’s image of worthwhile experience, the
joining of doing and undergoing, i.e. action and consequence, plays a critical
role. In compelling experiences, action is tuned to preceding and subsequent
consequences. How the individual acts on the world and how the world acts on
the individual makes all the difference in the nature of the experience. For
example, rock climbing or winter snow camping are thrilling precisely because
the critical link between what one does and what the world does. In activities that
are less physically dramatic, such as flyfishing, the direct and immediate
connection between action and consequence is no less central to the thrill of the
experience. As in gaming, the direct link between action and consequence is
often permeated with feelings of sharpness, focus, intensity, and, paradoxically,
calm.
Despite attaining “optimal performance” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), Dewey would
question the extent that doing and undergoing of gaming leads to a
transformation of perception or meaning. We begin by re-examining what we
have been labeling the doing and undergoing of gaming does, in fact,
corresponds to the highly particular meanings that Dewey had in mind.
For Dewey, doing is planful, rather than reflexive, activity. Arcade style games,
subversively known as “twitch games,” require action based more on reflex and
speed than thought and intent. To take one’s time to plan and reflect is often
antithetical to good gaming strategy. Similarly, undergoing is active
transformation, rather than passive reception. Watching TV is often a nontransformative activity, not because the TV acts on the person, not because the
person just sits there, but because there is usually no undergoing in any real
sense.
Unfortunately, there is often not much to be gained, by anyone under any
circumstance, from computer games. The potential for transformation, for deep
undergoing, is simply not part of the game’s basic substance. Unlike important
works of art, well-made television shows, or good teaching, the intent and design
of many games is to merely engage, rather than engage by transforming, the
audience.
For those games that do offer the potential for transformation through worthwhile
ideas, the important question concerns how the nature of the student-game
interaction works for and against the creating of a transformative experience. As
mentioned earlier, undergoing can be painful or at least difficult and, as such, it
can be aversive. To meet with a new idea, a strange way of seeing familiar
things, is the beginning of the drama of aesthetic experiences. One comes upon
an idea and gets a sense of the possibility of a new way of seeing things.
Dwelling on this sense takes time, honesty, and courage. Then, to act upon this
sense, to explore the possibility by doing something also requires openness and
willingness. The inquiry of ideas and new possibilities constitutes the drama of
the aesthetic experience.
Does the typical game experience offer these opportunities? Perhaps. While
there may be important ideas and there may be action and consequence, it is
critical to consider to what degree these elements are interconnected with and
interdependent on each other. Too frequently, the drama (action and
consequence) of the game has little to do with the unfolding inquiry – i.e. the
exploration and subsequent development - of the idea.
Our analysis, so far, suggests that while playing computer games are designed
to tightly co-join action/consequence and, thus, lead to intense “flow”
experiences, there is question as to whether students are transformed by these
activities. On the one hand, there seems to be little in the way of “substance” in
the games that could function as the basis for transformative experience. On the
other hand, if we direct our analysis away from the details of the game, away
from the students’ pointing and clicking on the screen, and toward the nature of
the students themselves as they play the game, we might feel differently about
whether students are transformed or not. What did we see when we tried to
characterized the nature of the “self” in these students?
As these students engage in the action of the game, they have to behave in ways
that may be new for them. Sometimes, the game require students to be ultra
aggressive, destructive, and ruthless - it’s kill or be killed, man. In other sportsoriented games, students must take on the role of superstar players. One
student player claims to imagine himself as the player asking himself what he
would do in certain situations and then trying to play as he would - or as Michael
Jordan would - or as another of his many basketball heroes might. Despite the
incredible pretense required by both of these games situations (e.g. I am Rambo,
or I am Michael Jordan), students slip into these roles willingly and without
apparent self-consciousness – we have seen neither fleeting glimpses of
embarrassment nor overblown displays of machismo. Thus, while they played,
students’ selves were transformed. They let themselves undergo, more or less
completely, and became different.
Thus, the issue of games and transformation is not so clear. If thinking, feeling,
and acting constitute a large part of who we are, then it did seem as if students
were transformed for awhile. What is less clear is the distinction between
temporary and enduring transformation. Does the students’ malevolent and
destructive ways carry outward beyond the game? Most of us would like to think
that these behaviors are context specific, that students know the difference
between the world of games and the world they live in. Turkle (1995) comes up
with a similar conclusion in her discussion of multi-user domains (MUD) where
individuals take on new identities, ways of talking, and “acting” in cyberspace
and, yet, go on to live fairly normal lives in the outside world.
This position becomes easily problematic, however, as we think about the
educative potential of technology. Just as we believe that sphere of influence of
games is limited, we also believe in the boundless educative potential of
computer programs. Our hopeful rhetoric asserts that computers can provide
powerful transformative experiences to educate all students. The confusion and
paradox of these two positions is obvious.
What is to be said, then, of the influence of media/technology on students’ lives?
We seem to hope there is an influence, but only a positive one. Is this a tenable
position? Can we have it both ways? The question of whether or not technology
transforms seems misguided. We should skip that question and instead move to
more productive questions such as when and how much can games transform,
and how can we increase the likelihood that transformation will occur.
Chat rooms: Anticipating a transformed self
Another popular activity we observed in this "After 3" program was on-line chat.
Students had found various “teen” sites and were busily exchanging notes back
and forth. We watched over their shoulders as they chatted and noticed that the
“conversation” in the chatrooms did not seem to make a whole lot of sense.
Much chat consisted of short phrases, often in slang or coded language. An
excerpt from a chat between members of different KLICK! clubhouses:
'Da Man: What up all?
Firebaby: What are you guys going to write about this week?
Lisa: BARF!!!!
'Da Man: Who 'da man????
Terry: dry cleaner web site
'Da Man: Who talked about the movie they were making last week?
Firebaby: We're making web pages for a realty company.
Lisa: BARF!!!!
What is to be made of this, particularly in light of our discussion of the opposite of
control? To begin, on-line chatting is what might be considered highly motivated
behavior. Students voluntarily choose this activity (here choice is a quality of
motivated activity, not its cause as it is more often portrayed), their engagement
is sustained and focused, and their engagement is not contingent on any
apparent extrinsic rewards.
One student described how, depending on her mood, she would either adopt a
different personality for her web chatting telling lies about herself, her likes and
dislikes, even her geographic location, age, and gender. Other times she would
be completely honest with her chatters telling them exactly who she was
sometimes offering a great deal of personal information. It seemed as if the
element of meeting new people, experimenting with various identities, and not
knowing what was true and what was fake was most exciting.
The technology of chatrooms affords participants the opportunity to interact with
others without the constraints inherent in face-to-face communication.
Considerations such as a student’s physical appearance, outward dress, peer
groups, and personal history are all ambiguous, fabricated, or unavailable.
Thus, in chatrooms, the nature of students’ self is central to the activity. From an
observer’s notes:
At KLICK! Summer Leadership Camp I watched as two kids who had become
friends on-line met in person for the first time. One was from a small, rural
school - the other a large urban school. One was black - the other white.
You could see it on their faces when they met…'You're Jasmine!' and 'This
can't be Racquelle!' I had to wonder if these two ever would have connected if
not for chat" (quote from observer).
In some sense, they are more self-conscious as they have to think about whom
they want to be. In another, they can be less self-conscious as they are liberated
from usual physical or social cues that prompt self-consciousness. To make
progress on this issue, it is useful to combine ideas from the discussion of self
with reflection/anticipation distinction. Hence, the difference might be described
by the difference between a reflective and anticipative stance toward the self. In
a reflective stance, students’ attention is directed toward whom they’ve been and
what that has to do with what is presently taking place. In an anticipative stance,
attention is directed on who students would like to become and what that has to
do with what is presently taking place ( Cross & Marcus, 1991; Marcus & Nurius,
1986; Packard, 1999).
The difference is not absolute. Dewey would have us remember that how we
think about the future is grounded largely, but not entirely, in our past
experiences. The difference is one of perspective and interpretation: the present
can be a product derived from what has preceded it, or the present can be an
idea to be tried out, a possibility to be explored.
Our observations suggest that students are creating modified (not completely
different) selves for the chat environment. The modified self is an idea, a
possibility to be tested. They venture out by choosing a name, saying
something, interacting with others. Then, they see how the world responds. It is
out of their hands as they wait for responses. They are not interacting with old
friends who know them, who respond in predictable ways. In ways that confirm
who they are or have been. In the chat world, they open themselves to new
experiences. They relinquish the familiar, the comfortable, the control.
Web page building: Finding coherence, rather than control
Web page design and construction is another popular activity at the KLICK! sites.
Web authoring is a common "starter activity" within KLICK! and is considered to
be a fundamental activity for "KLICK! technology literacy." Surveys from the first
year of the program indicate that 70% of all KLICK! kids have engaged in some
degree of web authoring, planning, and construction. Not only were students
designing personal pages, but also pages for others. For example, in the
particular site we observed, students were investing large amounts of time and
energy building pages for local businesses.
Although many different factors might be discussed (e.g. authenticity of the task,
connection and participation with a broader community), we direct our analysis
toward the role of undergoing and the opposite of control to understand why
building web pages is engaging. Conventional perspectives would cite this
activity as a good example of how mastery and its attainment are inherently
motivating. Constructs such as mastery learning, achievement motivation, and
mastery goal orientation all emerge from the assumption that doing well at a task
is and should be worthwhile in itself. Furthermore, in Weiner (1986) and others’
image of the ideal learner, the perception that one can control and perform with
competence in a situation is at the foundation. Thus, it can be proposed that
students find web-page building compelling because they feel a high, or at least
an increasing, degree of control, competence, mastery, or achievement.
These two students’ comments seem to reflect the need for mastery and control:
I like building web pages because you can do whatever you want. I can
change the background, add pictures, and make links to anything else I want.
Whenever I build a website I feel so good about it. It's such a good feeling to
be able to stand back and say, 'I made that' or 'this website looks that way
and does these things because I made it that way.' That's a cool feeling. I
feel good about myself.
In our analysis, however, we see these comments as evidence for something
different. We believe Dewey would hesitate to equate intrinsic motivation with
mastery because it tends to emphasize external, rather than internal and external
qualities, of experience. Dewey would find the concept of mastery, from many
perspectives, to be narrowly instrumental: that is, the value of mastery is often
derived from the practical matters it enables. Mastery enables us to do certain
things that, in turn, are valuable.
Dewey contends that education should not only enable students to accomplish
things, but also to accomplish things in a certain way. The beautiful, the good,
and the meaningful are all qualities bound to the internal, as well as the external,
nature of an activity. If the goal of education were simply to help people
accomplish things, then not much attention need be paid to the nature
experience within the doing and accomplishing. However, as we have pointed
out, Dewey insists on the value of both in aesthetic experiences. Thus, while
two objects - one artistic, one merely technically proficient - may appear the
same, the experience that yielded them would be different. For Dewey, this is a
difference that matters.
As for other perspectives that predispose human beings with an innate need for
mastery, Dewey would likely argue that mastery emerges not from within the
individual, but from the interaction between individual and world. Dewey would
probably take a similar tact when considering the current emphasis on control as
a central quality in intrinsic motivation. As discussed earlier, the concept of
control places the individual outside and separate from the world. By contrast, at
the heart of Dewey’s aesthetics, the individual is connected in doing and
undergoing with the world. We argue that the essence of intrinsic motivation – its
value, if you prefer - can be found in the intimacy of this connection.
Dewey would remind us that the basis of the aesthetic experience, whether
engaged in creating or appreciating art, scientific problem solving, or web-page
design, is the development and anticipation of unity: the forming of a whole from
disparate parts. In other words, in an experience we look forward to a sense of
increased coherence (Prawat, in press). Coherence or unity is the basis of
meaning, ethics, aesthetics, and spirituality; its absence is the basis for
confusion, discord, and loss. Thus, people seek coherence, wholeness, and
unity, not just control. The experience of developing coherence is felt as an
expanding of one’s capacity as a human being. To be able to live more fully to
one’s potential, not the perception of control or mastery, exhilarates. Dewey
makes this point clearly:
Experience to the degree that it is experience is heightened vitality. (Dewey,
LW10: 19).
Look at some other comments from students. Although they may be seen as
evidence of control and mastery, they can also be seen as evidence for the thrill
of creating, an activity imbued with the striving for greater coherence.
Creating something is what I love. I get to make my pages look however I
want. That's what's cool .
I was hired by a Nature Center to build them a web site. It was cool because
they didn't really know anything about computers and they let me totally
design the site. I got to decide how it would look, what features it should have
- they just told me what words to write.
The technology of web-building facilitates this feeling of development and growth.
To take part in this transformation of what they are capable of – which means a
transformation of both who they are and the world around them – is the “raison
d’être” of web-page building. One student described most exciting things about
webpage building as the opportunities to create something of his own design and
to fiddle around with features and appearances until he found a combination of
effects, options, and styles that suited both him and the needs of the web site.
Particular qualities of webpage building deserve attention. As mentioned in a
previous section, the computer technology helps to bring action with
consequence in close connection. Students can try things, click the “Preview in
Browser” button, and see what happens. Upon seeing what happens, they can
then try something new in response. The linking of action and consequence is
due directly to the ease of alternating between the webpage editor and browser.
This critical quality enables the transformative activity to flow and development,
to build toward consummation. If action and consequence were to become
disjoint, then hypotheses could not be tested, and results could not be responded
to. The activity would cease to rush along as an unfolding event as it was
drained of dramatic tension and would crumble into a series of loosely
sequenced occurrences. The computer technology (hardware and software)
allow ready pursuit of questions such as “will it work” and “what happens if…?”
Similarly, unlike many “real-life” activities, technology activities such as webpage
construction incur virtually no material costs to students. The cost of doing
something repeatedly or slowly is the same as doing something once or quickly.
Therefore, reducing the constraints of having to perform efficiently and correctly
opens up the possibilities for exploration and risk taking. One student
commented, "That's what's so cool about computers. If you make a mistake you
can just change it - it's so easy." Thus, the emphasis shifts from getting it right
(attaining mastery) to getting better (increasing capacity). As the cost of making
errors is reduced and students are more willing to make errors, they are more
willing to suffer the consequences of their actions. In other words, they are more
willing to experience the opposite of control and to undergo the influence of the
world.
Conclusion: An expanded view of control, learning, and technology
The central role of control and choice in the rationale of various “After 3”
programs is based on the assumption that students will be most motivated when
given opportunities to pursue activities that interest them. Our discussion of
Dewey suggests that interest is not only something students bring to a situation,
but is a quality inherent to the situation itself. For Dewey, the important kind of
interest is that which emerges in the drama of the activity, rather than that which
is brought and external to the experience. In aesthetic experiences, the
development and anticipation of greater coherence and capacity is inherently
interesting.
In this light, whether students choose initially to engage in an activity or not is, to
some extent, unrelated to the intrinsic qualities of the experience. The issue of
control and choice is more salient when as individuals consider whether or not to
continue in an experience as it emerges – that is, the extent that they choose to
open themselves, to take in, to suffer, to experience the opposite of control. In
very few cases is the undergoing an inevitable feature of a situation. There is
always choice and control about whether one wishes to be transformed by in an
experience.
Thus, our Deweyan analysis of "After 3" programs has generated an alternative
perspective for considering the role of control in learning. Yes, these programs
do offer students control over the activities they engage, but there are more
interesting issues of control to consider. To begin, giving students choice of what
they do has little to do with technology – many other instructional programs
feature student choice and have nothing to do with technology. By contrast, the
interesting issues about control that we conclude with has everything to do with
technology. Technologies such as games, on-line chat, and webpage building
enable students to control the intensity and rate of undergoing. In technology
environments, students can stop, start, go faster or slower – they can control the
relationship between action and consequence, and between doing and
undergoing, to a greater degree than in “real” life environments. From the notes
of an observer watching a student, who likes to experiment with different
identities while chatting on-line:
Sometimes this student would quit chatting with people who make her
uncomfortable. One of her on-line friends kept asking her about boys - she
didn't want to talk about boys so she just quit.
To undergo the consequences of one’s actions is not easy. To relinquish control
in the process of opening oneself fully is a risk. It is a risk, however, that must be
taken if any real learning is to occur. Uncertainty and risk are key to
transformation, drama, inquiry, and creativity. By the same token, uncertainty is
at the dark heart of confusion and fear. Technology helps students with this
apparent paradox by providing both the opportunities for risk-taking and the
ability to manage this risk. The chat and game technologies create environments
to take the risk of undergoing intense, potentially transformative, experiences.
Students can pause, leave, and begin again if the experience becomes too
intense or aversive. While it may be true some students may never fully engage
in deep experiences because technology allows them to exit so readily, it is also
true that many students may never consider engaging deeply unless they had
these “technological reassurances.”
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