Karla López de Nava
PS311
Week 9
Framing violence: The political function of riots in Northern India
Why do caste and communal riots persist in India? Why have Hindu-Muslim conflicts
become endemic? Do these conflicts present a serious threat to Indian national unity? These
are the questions that Paul R. Brass explores in his book, Theft of an Idol1. By carefully
studying the information collected on five incidents that occurred in Northern India, Brass
narrates the different discourses, interpretations, representations and framings that
politicians, villagers, police officers and local authorities attach to a riot, and the reasons
that lie beneath the “labeling” of riots. Most importantly, he identifies the use of violence as
a political weapon. The purpose of this paper is to briefly summarize Brass’ most important
findings and the contribution that his analysis makes to the ethnic violence literature.
Brass uses case study research to explain the persistent occurrence of riots in India.
Focusing on five incidents that took place in the state of Uttar Pradesh, he explains why
they were interpreted in different ways, and why some of these riots managed to capture
national media coverage, while others, even though they may have merited national
attention, did not.
There are five events that Brass identifies as the precipitating incidents of the riots:
1. The theft of an Idol in the district of Aligarh.
2. The “alleged” rape of a girl in the district of Meerut.
3. A bus runs over a woman in Narayanpur.
1
Paul R. Brass, Theft of an Idol. Princeton University Press.1997
1
4. A brawl between police and villagers of a backward caste in Gonda district.
5. The demolition of a mosque in Ayodhya.
His main argument is that the “official” versions of the caste and communal riots are
constructions that are usually far removed from the actual events that originated the
incident. The reason for this gap is that the framing of riots benefits political parties and
dominant political ideologies.2 This labeling is useful to win political support and justify
the exercise of state authority. A case in point is the Narayanpur incident that originated
when an old woman was run over by a bus.3 The event evolved into a violent confrontation
between police and villagers (mostly Muslims and Harijans4); some of the latter were
severely beaten and put in jail. This violent episode was conveniently used by Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi to attack the local opposition-run government. She accused the
government of inefficiency and pointed to its inability to control a brutal police force intent
on attacking “weaker sectors” of society. In the end, the local government was removed,
and the Congress Party rose to power. This incident was not of the communal (Hindus
versus Mulsims) type, but it was surrounded, as Hindu- Muslim and other ethnic riots are,
by politician’s discourses5 that aim to attack, discredit and blame their political opponents
in order to gain some sort of political advantage. Thus, politicians appeal to religious
sentiment and ethnic identity to gain a broader base of support, and they use riots as perfect
2
Although Brass mentions that most of the actors involved in the riot, including the villagers, have incentives
for playing their part, there are few “innocent” victims.
3
The woman was the grandmother of two children. After she was killed, the villagers demanded that the bus
driver pay a financial compensation to the children. The driver failed to pay, so the villagers stop another bus
driver. The police arrive at the scene, things get violent, and the struggle erupts.
4
Scheduled castes.
5
There are different discourses depending on the type of riot. Some examples of discourses are: the discourse
of caste and community, the discourse of law and order, the discourse of profit, and the religion discourse,
among others.
2
opportunities to do so. Every group has a different interpretation of the incidents. Their aim
is to frame the incidents to their own advantage.
But why are some places more prone to riots than others? Brass contends that cities that
have an institutionalized riot system are more likely to experience endemic riots. He defines
an institutionalized riot system as an informal network of persons who maintain communal,
racial and other ethnic relations in a state of tension. At the center of the network are what
Brass calls “the fire tenders or riot professionals,” i.e., people whose primary function is to
always keep the tension alive, and in some cases transform small incidents into categorical
riots, and groups trained in the use of weapons (police, for example). Brass mentions that
there are some special circumstances that favor the emergence of riots: before and during
elections, and during movements of mass mobilizations, especially when the political
balance between contending forces appears to be changing; that is, when political
opportunities are such that a riot increases the support for a political movement, or
decreases the support for another. In this view, riots are partially planned, although some
groups try to make them look spontaneous.
Brass compares the riots as a super production in which different actors with particular
goals and incentives interact6. Some of the actors may decide to enter into coalitions, such
as the one made sometimes by the police force and a political party. But every actor knows
the role he is supposed to play. Every actor has its truthful version of the final outcome, so
in the end, all that is left are multiple and subjective interpretations. There are no truths, just
beliefs.
6
This riot system theory sounds almost like a simultaneous game, where every player has certain incentives,
an expected utility function, and acts upon the expectations he has of how the rest of the players will act.
3
Concerning the question of why some riots get national media coverage and others do
not, Brass argues that the transformation of riots into categorical events only takes place
when this step provides political advantage for some political party or parties: “What
matters is who stands to gain and who stands to lose from publicizing such events”7
Brass concludes that not only do the different discourses and framings become a
substitute for authorities’ inaction, but that they also become the means of perpetuating the
same riot system. Discourses only call to attention the politically useful riots, but leave all
the other incidents of violence unattended.
Summarizing Brass’ argument, it is apparent that the struggle of discourses is a struggle
for power, and some of these discourses or framings empower some individuals, and at the
same time, weaken others. This is the reason why so many interpretations emerge from one
unique event and, most importantly, this is why certain groups have an incentive to
instigate or perpetuate riots. The two most important factors that favor the perpetuation of
violence are: an institutionalized riot system and the actions of the local administrative
authorities.
With his narrative, Brass establishes some of the elements that contribute to the
perpetuation of violence. Although he never explains what causes the violence in the first
place. That is, he never asserts why and how institutionalized riot systems arise. Still, he
describes in a compelling way the political manipulation of violence, especially near
elections or when there is a change in the political balance. His detailed analysis also helps
to distinguish the different power relations that lurk behind the discourses and
contextualizations.
7
Paul R. Brass, Theft of an Idol.
4
Even though his narrative does not analyze the origins of the institutionalized riot
system, it succeeds in explaining the function of violence as a strong political weapon,
thereby providing an explanation of why some riots are turn into categorical events, while
others are left in the dark.
He also presents a clear picture of how politicians can
manipulate existing cleavages to gain political support.
5