This research paper has been commissioned by the International Commission on Nuclear
Non-proliferation and Disarmament, but reflects the views of the author and should not be
construed as necessarily reflecting the views of the Commission.
SPACE WEAPONS: SCIENCE FICTION, REAL THREATS
AND ARMS CONTROL OPPORTUNITIES
Alexey Arbatov
May 2009
Executive Summary
Currently, 125 countries are engaged in space activities, with many newly industrialised
countries becoming more active in this. Technology for information support in space and, in
particular, technology for imagery intelligence is possessed by a number of these states. Space
systems have become an integral part of the military potential of the armed forces of leading
countries. For developed countries it is impossible in practice and ineffective in modern
conditions to carry out military action without the use of space technology. Overall, active
military-purpose space vehicles represent about 40% of the overall number of such vehicles.
The majority of them belong to the USA, and US spending on military space programs is
significantly larger than that by all other space countries taken together. In relation to Russia,
it is 20 times greater.
The security of orbital systems, whether for military, dual purpose or civilian use, has become
a major concern. Space, due to its growing military and civilian importance, may in the near
future become a new arena for an arms race and potential military conflict. During the years
of the Cold War there was already a precedent for this when the USSR and the US were
actively developing and deploying space weapons. However, if we discount a number of
experiments, large scale militarisation of space has not yet begun in the sense of weapons
deployment and their use in space and from space.
In this context, the accumulated mass of international legal norms regulating space activity is
very important. Currently, however, due to a number of political, military–strategic and legal
constraints for such negotiations and agreements, the situation is less favourable than it was at
the end of the Cold War. The situation has become even more complicated because a number
of countries have an openly proclaimed goal of military superiority in space. At the same
time, information satellites and other non-weapon space vehicles are becoming an important
and irreplaceable component of nuclear deterrence, as well as, potentially, warfare, with the
joint use of high precision nuclear and conventional weapons. This also makes such space
vehicles an attractive target for attack with space weapons.
The new American strategic concept of “Prompt Global Strike”, which is heavily dependent
on space-based systems, has caused concern in Russia, which does not believe it is aimed
only at rogue states. As a result, Russia is developing its own counter-strike capacity aimed at
space vehicles as the most vulnerable link in the chain. However, if political relationships
between the leading powers improve, the problem of space may return to the disarmament
agenda.
Current space law forbids nuclear weapons placement and testing in orbit around the Earth,
on celestial bodies or in orbits around such bodies, though this prohibition does not have a
verification system. But current space law does not forbid placing in space any weapon that is
2
not a weapon of mass destruction. There are also no restrictions on the creation, testing and
deployment in space of anti-satellite weapons. Russia and China in 2008 presented a draft
Space Weapons Treaty, and there is some hope it will be considered by the Conference on
Disarmament in the not too distant future. To date, the US has not shown interest in such a
treaty. Some EU countries in the meantime are developing a Space Code of Conduct as an
interim security measure and this merits consideration as a first step.
While many countries wish to participate in negotiating such a treaty, its highly technical
nature suggests that it would be better to limit negotiations to a small group of space-capable
nations. Moreover, there is as yet no agreement on what systems might be included in the
definition of a space weapon—a situation made more difficult by the current early military
and technological stage of space weapon development. The 2008 Draft Treaty, moreover,
contains a number of ambiguities, and the fact is that many systems intended for other
purposes can have additional capabilities for striking space objects and thus could be
considered a weapon. Anti-ballistic missile systems being developed by the US are a
particularly egregious case in point. Agreed National Technical Means of verification will be
another contentious area in the conclusion of any treaty on the subject.
It thus seems that space without weapons may not be achievable through a single treaty, and
the negotiating process is likely to be long and fraught with complications. In this sense it
may be comparable to the process of strategic arms reductions between the US and Russia,
which began so many years ago, continues today and whose end point is still out of sight.
Two main models for achieving the desired result suggest themselves. The first is along the
lines of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, where universal bans would be applied to certain kinds
of weapons and actions, without getting into the technical detail of definitions and verification
processes. The other would be akin to existing strategic arms reductions measures, involving
a stage-by-stage progress of disarmament and verification measures, from partial to broader
and deeper, and done in considerable detail. The former approach did not produce much by
way of practical results. So the second approach might offer more possibilities and in the
early stages at least, might be based on the 2008 Chinese-Russian draft text. Nor are pious
expressions of hopes for the peaceful uses of outer space a viable basis for negotiations, but a
hard-headed analysis of the balance of asymmetric military interests of the parties must
instead be made. A balance similar to that achieved in START-1 could be obtained through
limiting or banning anti-satellite systems in exchange for prohibiting the development of
ABM systems in space.
An outright ban on anti-satellite systems wherever they are based is desirable but unlikely to
be achieved in a single step. Initial agreement might, however, be reached on a ban on the
testing of anti-satellite systems and attack anti-missile space systems. Verification could be
based on the national technical means of the parties, along with the facilitation of certain
transparency measures. Such a treaty would of necessity have a partial and selective character
due to both military and political factors, as well as technical and physical conditions, in
particular those of space as a distinct environment. However, if this first, albeit limited, step
in the non-armament of space is made through a verifiable ban on all types of anti-satellite
and space ABM testing, it will be followed by other, broader steps, and more intrusive
verification measures, as happened historically with the limitation of strategic nuclear arms.
Currently, the economic and technological superiority of the USA in space is obvious and
indisputable, but it will be challenged by more and more countries. Moreover, the concerns
about a renewed nuclear arms race on Earth will have its parallels in space. As increasing
problems confront the world, the last area needing conflict and confrontation is outer space.
States need to adopt a cooperative approach to prevent this.
3
Introduction
Currently, 125 countries are engaged in space activities. The USA and Russia are the
leaders; France China, Japan, Germany, Great Britain, Canada, The Netherlands,
Belgium and Spain are also actively engaged. The newly industrialised countries—
India, Pakistan, Argentina and Egypt—are also becoming more active. Not less than
40 of them are in one way or another engaged in programs of creation and utilisation
of space technologies for information support of weapon systems. More than 20
countries have scientific and industrial capabilities for independent development and
production of space technology and launching of space vehicles (SV), using their own
or leased delivery vehicles.
Technology for information support in space and, in particular, technology for
imagery intelligence is possessed by the USA, Russia, China, France and Japan. Great
Britain and Germany are developing such technologies. India possesses second
generation space technology for remote reconnaissance of the Earth’s surface, which
also allows the possibility of imagery intelligence, but with lesser resolution. It is
known that the United Arab Emirates have submitted orders for the manufacturing of
their own military SV.
Currently, around 780 SVs are actively operating in circumterrestrial space: 425 of
them belong to the USA, 96 to Russia and 22 to China1. By 2010–2015 the number of
in-orbit SVs will grow by more than 400. There is also a noticeable trend for the
development of multi-satellite space systems comprising small-size SVs numbering
up to hundreds of units, and capable of dual purpose functions.
Space systems have become an integral part of the military potential of the armed
forces of leading countries. For developed countries it is impossible in practice and
ineffective under modern conditions to carry out military action without the use of
space technology. Space-based systems of information support for military action
make the greatest contribution here.
More than 150 units of in-orbit information support systems are deployed
operationally or as standby units. Overall, active military-purpose SVs represent about
40% of the overall number of space vehicles. Military satellites can be placed in all
types of orbits. In numerical terms, 25% of vehicles are located in low orbits, 20% in
medium orbits and 55% in high-elliptical geostationary orbits. Russia, the USA and
the latter’s NATO allies possess military space vehicles. The majority of them belong
to the USA and the spending on military space programs by the USA is significantly
larger than that by all other space countries taken together. (In relation to Russia,
using commercial currency exchange rates, it is 20 times greater.2)
The security of orbital systems, whether for military, dual purpose or civilian use, has
become a major concern for practically all developed countries. Aside from military
space systems, an important role is played by space vehicles that are monitoring the
Earth’s surface in order to forecast natural disasters and emergency situations and to
1
2
Military-Industrial Complex. Encyclopedia. Vol. 1, Moscow 2005
Ibid
.
4
forestall them. The role of orbital systems in supporting financial and economic
activity under conditions of globalization is extremely important because most
operations are currently carried out with the use of satellite communication and
broadcast systems.
Taking into account the fact that prevailing international relations are to a high degree
prone to conflict and that leading countries and various alliances are subject to
political and military antagonisms, and with the rapid progress in the development of
science, space, due to its growing military and civilian importance, may in the near
future become a new arena for an arms race and potential military conflict. (During
the years of Cold War there was already a precedent for this when the USSR and the
USA were actively developing and deploying space weapons).
A similar situation occurred in the past on the ground and later in the sea and airspace.
This course of events would be a natural continuation in the development of military
struggle and further broadening of military conflict areas—the course that was already
followed for thousands of years by various countries under conditions of changing
geopolitical alliances, accompanied by regular breakthroughs in science and
technology. However, such a path would represent a growing threat to international
security as well as huge financial expenditures, and is particularly undesirable under
conditions of financial and economical globalization. Already in the ’50s and ’60s of
the last century space had become a sort of “transit” area for testing weapons: initially
for nuclear testing, ballistic missile testing, and, finally, for antiballistic missile
interception systems. However, if we discount a number of experiments for creating
and then discarding anti-satellite weapons systems from active inventory by the USSR
and the USA, large scale militarisation of space has not yet begun, in the sense of
weapons deployment and their use in space and from space.
At the end of the Cold War, under the conditions of an evolving multipolar system of
international relations with intensive globalization and interdependence of the whole
world, there was a chance to interrupt the historical process of accelerating arms races
and military conflict and their transition to ever higher levels of technological
complexity, affecting new areas of human activity. The growing commercial
information and scientific value inherent in the use of space, and also its huge
facilitating role for military action on Earth (including peacekeeping operations), is
moving us in this direction, in order to achieve greater stability and facilitate the
process of disarmament. In this sense, the accumulated mass of international legal
norms regulating space activity is very important, as well as half a century’s
experience of practical negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament, including in
the area of strategic missile weapon systems and military activity in space.
Insofar as the utilisation of space is concerned, mankind is now poised at an important
historical juncture: space will either become a new arena for arms race and military
conflict, or will remain an area for peaceful and exclusively ancillary military activity,
and thus for promoting international cooperation, strategic stability and disarmament.
Important choices in this direction will apparently be made in the next decade and
perhaps even in the next few years.
5
1. The Contemporary Military and Political Environment.
The history of negotiations for banning of space weapons (including those between
the USSR and the USA at the end of the ’80s) demonstrated an incredible complexity
inherent in the banning and limitation of this type of weaponry through negotiated
agreements. Currently, due to a number of political, military–strategic and legal
constraints for such negotiations and agreements, the situation is less favourable than
it was almost 20 years ago at the end of the Cold War.
Above all, after the refusal of the USA to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) and its abandonment of the ABM Treaty at the beginning of the
current decade, there followed an almost complete dismantling of the international
disarmament treaty system. This can be demonstrated by the fact that after the 1994
START-1 Treaty, there were no new agreements in the area of disarmament that
became legally binding, if one is to exclude the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(SORT) of 2002, the status of which is very fragile and contradictory. All other
subsequent treaties and agreements were either not signed, or were signed but not
ratified, or were ratified but were not implemented in a timely manner. Some were
denounced or may be rescinded in the near future (ABM Treaty, CFE Treaty, Treaty
on Intermediate and Shorter-range Missiles).
The situation was made even more complicated because a number of countries, first
of all the USA, have military space programs aimed at building weapons for space
wars, with the openly proclaimed goal of military superiority, or under the pretext of
the impossibility of either banning or limiting such weapons systems.
At the same time, information satellites and other ancillary (non-weapon) space
vehicles are becoming an important and irreplaceable component of nuclear
deterrence, as well as military action of a new type, and, potentially, warfare with the
joint use of nuclear and conventional weapons of high precision. The possibility of
such warfare is officially proclaimed by the USA in its military doctrine and new triad
concept.
This also makes such space vehicles an attractive target for attack with space
weapons, given asymmetric defence counteraction capability in the face of
overwhelming attack capability in the hands of a potential adversary.3
In this context, the new American strategic concept of “Prompt Global Strike” is very
indicative, as it envisages striking targets in enemy countries with the use of nonnuclear strategic carriers (SLBM “Trident-2”), which is hardly possible without the
use of ancillary space technology4. It is true that Moscow is not proclaimed as being
among such adversaries. However, Moscow does not believe that such expensive nonnuclear carriers will be used against rogue countries, taking into account cost
effectiveness criteria.
3
See: N Gallagher, J. Steinbruner. Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security. American Academy of
Arts & Sciences. 2008.
4
See: E. Myanikov. Countervailing Potential of High Precision Weapons. Nuclear Proliferation. New
Technologies, Arms, and Agreements. Eds., A. Arbatov, V. Drorkina, Moscow: Moscow Carnegie
Center РОССПЭН, 2009. pp. 109-118.
6
In turn, the official military and political leadership in Russia and the community of
strategic experts have proposed as a cornerstone of a new military concept the
repelling of an “air-space” strike aimed at their own country, based on recent military
experience in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq5. Only a minority of Russian experts
have doubts about such new trends in military thinking6.
The concept of repelling an “air-space strike” implies as a major priority a strike at
the most vulnerable link in the above-mentioned threat, namely space vehicles, and
that will require antisatellite systems. Russian experts write in this vein:
“Taking into account the growing dependence of modern military forces on
space elements for their efficiency… the threat of using and the actual use of
strike capability against adversaries’ space systems may be viewed as
complementary and, in a number of cases, as an independent factor in
deterring the aggressor from using military forces… It is not excluded that
the creation of the anti-satellite weaponry possessed by the armed forces of
the Russian Federation may be the very ‘bridle’ which may deter the
realisation of excessively ambitious plans by ‘cowboys’ from the USA and
NATO.”7
And finally, greater tension in the Russian–American relationship in the aftermath of
the South Caucasus conflict in August 2008 plays a negative role. Among other things
this crisis brought to the surface grievances that have accumulated over the past
fifteen years, as well as mistrust and hostility, which were a consequence of the
growing problems in the relationship that were camouflaged by the “cosmetic”
declarations of partnership and cooperation.
However, if political relationships between the leading powers improve, and serious
negotiations for reduction and limitation of arms, particularly nuclear arms, are
renewed (and this agenda came to the forefront of world politics after a known
initiative by important American public figures) the problem of space may return to
the disarmament agenda. The subject of “non-militarisation” (or more precisely nonweaponisation) of space remains topical, which was once again demonstrated by the
testing of Chinese anti-satellite systems in 2007, the American experiment in satellite
destruction in 2008 and the collision of Russian and American satellites at the
beginning of 2009.
2. Universal Treaty Projects
Current space law forbids nuclear weapons placement, as well as placement of other
WMDs, in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or in orbits around such bodies.
It is true that this prohibition does not have a system for verification. Also banned are:
testing of nuclear weapons in space, location of military bases and military tests or
manoeuvres on celestial bodies or in orbits around them, hostile actions or the use of
force on celestial bodies and in orbits around them, deliberate scattering of debris in
orbits aimed at creating obstacles for the normal functioning of SV (provisions of the
1967 Outer Space Treaty).
5
S. Sukhanov, V. Grin’ko, V. Smirnov. Space as a Problem Armed Struggle. National Defence. 2008.
July. №7 (28) pp. 28-42.
6
V. Dvorkin. What is Air-Space Defence? Independent Military Review. 3rd of March 2007. pp. 4.
7
S. Sukhanov, V. Grin’ko, V. Smirnov. Space as a Problem of Armed Struggle. National Defence.
2008. July. №7 (28) pp. 42.
7
At the same time, current space law does not forbid placing in space any weapon that
is not a weapon of mass destruction. There are also no restrictions on the creation,
testing and deployment in space of anti-satellite weapons. When the USA in 2002 left
the ABM Treaty, the creation, testing and deployment in space of space-based ABM
systems or their components became unrestricted. The following are permitted by
default: anti-ABM means and systems, as well as means of active and passive defence
of satellites; creation and deployment in space of means of optical-electronic (laser)
and radioelectronic jamming; implementation of any kind of applied military
experiments related to space, with the exception of means for hostile action against
the natural environment.
On the 12th of February 2008 the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of
China jointly introduced at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva a draft Treaty for
the prevention of deployment of weapons in space and against the application of force
or the threat of use of force in relation to space objects. Prior to this, these problems
were discussed in this forum for more than five years.
The suggestion to start developing a universal treaty regarding the non-placement in
space of any kind of weapon, non-use of force or the threat of force in relation to
space projects, and also the introduction of the moratorium on deployment in space of
military equipment until such an agreement is reached, was proposed in the speech of
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation during the 56th session of
UNGA on the 24th of September 2001. A document entitled “Potential Elements for
Future International and Legal Arrangements Preventing the Deployment of Weapons
in Space, the Application of Force or the Threat of Force in Relation to Space
Objects” was presented on behalf of the Russian Federation and the USA at the
Disarmament Conference in Geneva on the 27th of June 2002. In 2004–2005, Russia
and China tabled at the Disarmament Conference materials covering the norms of
International Law governing military space activities. In 2008, a Draft Treaty on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Weapons in Space was introduced as a research
mandate so that in future, under more favourable conditions, these negotiations could
be transferred to the Committee on Disarmament.
The document’s preamble says that space plays a growing role, and that states have
research and exploitation rights in space for peaceful purposes. As a concrete
measure, Article 1 defines the concept of space as “space around the Earth 100 km
above ocean level”. This definition is not new and is contained in the legislation of a
number of countries. In the Russian interpretation of international space law, the
division between air and space at the level of 100–110 km above the ocean has long
been established.
In addition, by extension of recognised legal practice, the term “space object” is
defined as “any device intended for functioning in space and put into orbit around any
celestial body or present in orbit around any celestial body, or on any celestial body,
with the exception of the Earth, or leaving an orbit around any celestial body towards
that celestial body, or moving from any celestial body to another celestial body, or
placed in space in any other manner”. At the same time, a distinction is being made
between two kinds of space objects: an object intended for launch and placed under
national jurisdiction; and an object which has acquired first and second space
8
acceleration speeds prior to entry into space. In the latter case the space object finds
itself under the norms of international space law.
For the purposes of the Treaty, the term “space weapon” is defined as “any device
placed in space, and based on any physical principle, specially created or re-equipped
for destruction, damage or impairment of normal functioning of objects in space, on
Earth, or in its airspace, as well as for destruction of populations or components of the
biosphere that are important for people, or for harming them”. It is stipulated that a
weapon is regarded as being “placed” in space if it performs at least one turn in
circumterrestrial orbit or follows a part of this orbit with a later departure from it, or is
permanently placed somewhere in space. Therefore, ballistic missiles of various types
are excluded, as they are put into space in order to complete a combat task (such as
interception of a satellite or a ballistic missile and its warheads) and transit through
space, but are not placed in circumterrestrial orbits.
The document contains definitions of the terms “application of force” and “threat of
force”. By the terms “application of force” or “threat of force” is meant any hostile
action against space objects, directed in particular towards their destruction, damage
or temporary or permanent disruption of normal functioning, intentional change of
orbit parameters, or threat of such an action.
In accordance with Article II of this new Draft Space Weapons Treaty, all
participating states are obliged to not put in Earth orbit any objects with any types of
weapons; not to station such weapons on celestial bodies and not to place such
weapons in space in any other fashion; not to resort to force or the threat of force in
relation to any space objects, and not to aid or encourage other states, group of states
or international organisations to take part in activities that are banned by the Treaty.
Compliance with the Space Weapons Treaty must become the subject of an additional
protocol. It is indicated that “to ensure confidence in compliance with the statutes of
the Treaty and to provide transparency and strengthen trust regarding space activities,
participating states will implement, on a voluntary basis, unless other arrangements
prevail, agreed measures for trust building”. (Article VI).
In order to peacefully dissolve disputes regarding the application and interpretation of
the Space Weapons Treaty provisions, it is envisaged that an executive organisation
should be set up under the Treaty. In case of dispute, interested parties would initially
carry out joint consultations in order to resolve the dispute through negotiation and
cooperation. In cases when interested parties do not come to agreement after
consultations, the dispute may be introduced by an interested participating state for
discussion by the executive organisation under the Treaty, providing the necessary
justification for this (Article VII).
The proposed Space Weapons Treaty reiterates in many cases the provisions of the
Outer Space Treaty of 1967 ( “Treaty on principles governing the activities of states
in their exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies”), which was signed on the 27th of January 1967 in Moscow, Washington and
9
London.8 This universal Treaty became the foundation for governing military activity
in space, but in its disarmament aspect its prohibitions covered only weapons of mass
destruction (above all, nuclear). The Draft Space Weapons Treaty of 2008 borrowed
these principles but extended them to other types of weapons as well.
The Russian–Chinese initiative for this Draft Treaty was generally welcomed by the
international community, with the exception of the USA’s Republican
Administration. In particular, Germany proclaimed that it intends to take a
constructive part in the discussion of the Draft Treaty and that it supports the adoption
of the new document with binding effect for weapons control in space. At the same
time Germany, as well as other members of the European Union, regard as a priority
the discussion and adoption of a Space Conduct Code for States as a means for
improving security in this area, recognising that political conditions are not yet right
for the acceptance of a full-scale Agreement banning weapons in space. (The Code is
being developed within the framework of the European Union, and in future it is
proposed to be presented for discussion at the Conference on Disarmament).
Acting on behalf of the Group of 219, Syria supported the Draft Treaty. The initiative
to begin working on the Draft was also supported by Kazakhstan and the rest of the
CIS States, and also by The Netherlands, Romania and other countries.
The negative position taken by Washington in relation to the Russian–Chinese Draft
was perhaps determined by its lack of willingness to tie its hands in the development
of military programs in space. Actually, the USA showed an interest only in the
discussion of certain transparency measures and trust building for the resolution of
some problems connected with the utilisation of space.
The new initiative of the RF–PRC once again confirmed the joint approach by these
two countries to this strategic problem. Obviously, such a confluence of interests is
based on concerns over the American strategic ABM program, and above all the fact
that it is space-based, which in theory may undermine the Chinese nuclear deterrence
potential, and cause diminution of the Russian potential.
It is also notable that the subject of the Treaty covers only weapons that are placed in
space, while weapons in “Earth-Space” class are not covered, despite their rapid
development and the possibility that they may be militarily deployed in the forseeable
future. Instead of this, only space-based ABM systems are covered, as well as antisatellite systems, and devices of “Space-Earth” class that are envisaged in the more
remote future (if they will be developed at all).
This is a remarkable departure from the Soviet position of the ’80s, which was not
completely realistic, although it was all-encompassing. This is possibly based on the
fact that China, and possibly Russia, are working on the development of ground-based
anti-satellite systems as a means of asymmetric response to the potential space-based
ABM being developed by the USA. It is also possible that the ancillary space
equipment supporting the USA’s ABM, as well as their potential for waging high
8
See: Space and Law. Moscow. IPAN, 1980; Existing International Agreements and the Prevention of
Placement of Weapons in Space (CD/1789, 22nd of May 2006)
9
The Group is made up of non-aligned and neutral States of diverse political orientation.
10
technology warfare of the new type with the massive utilisation of high precision long
range non-nuclear weapons, may become open to attack.
It is also notable that problems of verification, which are most important and most
difficult in relation to military systems in space, are avoided by referral to an
additional protocol and voluntary trust measures. However, the possibility of
verification (which, by the way, is much more achievable in relationship to groundbased space weapons) plays an absolutely key part in deciding what may and what
may not be banned or limited during the first stage of negotiation, as happened, for
example, in the history of negotiations on the START-1 and START-2 Treaties.
The multilateral nature of the array of countries wishing to participate in the proposed
drafting of such a Treaty gives rise to serious doubts. The highly complex
technological systems that are involved are military and strategic in nature and are
known only to a few states, and questions related to them are of an exceptionally
sensitive nature. So any hope for practical negotiations on these problems in a
multilateral format based on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is hardly justified. A more
practical format would involve two or, at most, three parties (RF–USA–PRC), and
seems more practical, at least at the initial stage.
3. Defining the Subject of Negotiation
The long-term experience of initiatives and negotiations of this problem indicates that
there are many ambiguities and differences in interpretation regarding the very subject
of the Agreement. In other words, the fundamental and basic task of defining the
subject of negotiations is far from being resolved.
Among specialists it is more or less accepted that by “space weapons” or “space
arms” (SA) are meant weapons that are created and tested for their strike capability on
any targets, and that are used from space objects (that is, objects that have completed
at least one full turn in circumterrestrial orbit (other celestial bodies and their orbits
are not mentioned so far)), as well as weapons that are created and tested for their
attack capability on space objects (that is, objects that have completed at least one full
turn in circumterrestrial orbit).
A simpler and less strict definition of space weapon means a weapon that is both a
space object and is also intended to destroy space objects. This wide interpretation of
the term “offensive space weapons” was used in the Soviet Union as a subject for
legal negotiations on banning them in the early to mid-80s as part of its fight against
the American SDI program. In other words, space weapons were defined by the
targets they intended to strike, or through the place where the weapons themselves
were based. It is particularly important to differentiate the concept of space object
from an object in space. The latter term could refer to any object launched into space
or flying through space, but not completing at least one full term in circumterrestrial
orbit. If such a differentiation is not maintained, than all medium range and
intercontinental range ballistic missiles could be regarded as space weapons, as well
as all systems of anti-missile defence with a height of interception exceeding 100 km;
such systems have been built by many states and are subjects of other negotiations,
agreements or draft proposals. However, the above-mentioned consensus does not
11
fully resolve the problem. Moreover, a distinction along the principle of “one turn”
creates, from a technical point of view, a great deal of uncertainty
A particularly striking example of the vagueness of this distinction is presented by the
so-called “fractional orbital missile”. This system was created in the USSR during the
’60s and was based on the heavy ICBM (RT-36 ORB) type intended to strike the
USA from the Southern azimuth, not covered by Missile Warning Systems radar
locators that were directed towards the main missile threat areas in the North, West,
and East. This ICBM was supposed to strike its target not along the normal quickest
ballistic trajectory above the North Pole, but to enter a circumterrestrial orbit and,
having effected an incomplete turn through the Southern Polar circle, to come down
from orbit and strike USA territory. This system was banned by the SALT–2 Treaty
of 1979 and then by the SNF–1 Treaty (Article V, para 18, c).
From a formal, legal point of view, the fractional orbital missile is not a space weapon
and it does not become a space weapon after its launch into orbit because it is not
designed to complete a full turn around the Earth. In this sense, it is comparable to
any ICBM or SLBM. But from a technical point of view nothing prevents this missile
from completing the turn after being launched into space or completing a number of
turns around the Earth before leaving its orbit and striking the target. Used in this
way, this system would be functioning as a space object and must be considered a
space weapon.
In other words, two different weapon classes—strategic ballistic missiles and
offensive space weapons of the “Space–Earth” class—are divided not by any
technical differences, but only by an extra half hour’s flight in circumterrestrial orbit.
Although fractional orbital missiles are banned by the START–1 Treaty, the terms of
this Treaty will expire in December 2009. Moreover, the Treaty bans the use of
nuclear-armed fractional orbital missiles (or those carrying any types of WMD), but
not those with conventional munitions. Thus, such a system can in theory be created
and tested during an incomplete turn around the Earth and, at the same time, not be
covered by either START–1, or any other definition of space weapon, including the
RF–PRC Draft of 2008. But in reality it will be able to fulfil the function of a space
weapon of “Space–Earth” class.
A similar situation exists with the projected American Falcon system, a space bomber
put into orbit and then lowered from it in order to attack targets on the ground. This
project is still in an early stage of development, and is surrounded by many financial
and technical doubts. But if these doubts are resolved and the system is tested on an
incomplete turn around the Earth, then it will also not fall under any existing
definition of a space weapon (including that of the Draft Space Weapons Treaty of
2008), and thus will not be the subject of any negotiations.
As regards the speed and height of orbits and trajectories, there is a large and
impenetrable grey area between ballistic missiles, anti-missiles, ABM anti-missiles,
and satellites. Thus the technical characteristics of anti-satellite and anti-missile
intercept systems are similar in many respects, giving them a dual purpose. The same
can be said of ABM intercepting missiles, anti-satellite systems, and offensive
ballistic missiles. (Soviet anti-missile systems during the ’60s–70s and the Chinese
2007 system possessed, as their basis, the technology of the offensive ballistic
12
missile.) Ancillary ABM, anti-satellite, and Missile Warning Systems (MWS),
whether space, ground, or sea-based, also have a multi-purpose character.
Additionally, space weapons are subject to their own peculiar paradox insofar as some
such weapon types were created in the past and have now been removed from active
commission, or liquidated unilaterally, while others are at a rather early stage of
development. On the one hand, this gives hope that new weapons will be banned
before they are tested and actively deployed; but this may be extremely difficult, both
in the military strategic sense (because of their variety, asymmetry and the different
roles they play in the defence policies of different states), and also because of the
complexity of their verification (more on this later).
On the other hand, the current early military and technological stage of space weapon
development itself makes it extremely difficult to define the subject of negotiations,
bans or limitations. In fact, the currently used definition of space weapons is
formulated with reference to where they are based (space) and/or where targets are
located (space) rather than concrete technical characteristics. A useful analogy would
be to imagine how difficult disarmament measures would be if their subject would be
defined as, for example, “any sea-based weapon or weapon used for attacking marine
targets”.
In the past, successful disarmament negotiations were always based on fixed and
concrete (or mutually understood) weapons systems’ technical characteristics and
agreed definitions of their kinds and types. For example, the Treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE), signed in 1990, defines as one of the major subjects of the
agreement the tank, as a “self-propelled armoured combat vehicle that has high fire
power, generally due to its main cannon, with a high initial velocity of shells for an
attack, with direct aim, needed to inflict damage on armoured and other targets,
having high mobility over irregular terrain, and a high level of protection... Military
tanks are fully-tracked armoured combat vehicles, with a dry weight not less than 16.5
metrical tonnes and armed with cannon with a calibre of no less than 75 millimeters,
and having a 360-degree horizontal angle of turn. Additionally, any wheel-based
armoured combat vehicles coming into operation that comply with all the other
above-mentioned criteria will also be considered as combat tanks.” (Article III, para.
1, C).
Partly on objective grounds, nothing of the kind can be found in relation to space
weapons.
It is obvious that in the RF–PRC Draft of 2008, space weapons are defined more
narrowly; ground-based systems (and also sea and air-based) are not included, with
only space-based systems being considered. On the one hand, this makes things easier
because the complicated problem of distinguishing between the existing ABM
systems (strategic and “theatre of operation”) and anti-satellite use of offensive
ICBMs and MRBMs is bypassed. However, on the other hand, actual Soviet and
American anti-satellite systems of “Earth–Space” class already created and tested in
the past, as well as strategically attractive anti-satellite systems currently being
developed (or intended for future development) by the USA, PRC and possibly Russia
and other countries, are being omitted from consideration.
13
It is such systems in particular that, very likely, will be capable in the foreseeable
future of posing a greater threat to satellites in high orbits of up to 1,000 km or more.
Currently, a significant percentage of multi-purpose satellites and piloted vehicles are
placed or will be placed in such orbits, including satellites used for electronic and
optical and radio-electronic intelligence, communications, meteorology, anti-missile
defence (SBIR-LOW), and also space weapons on high elliptical orbits on a perigee
section above Antarctica (and used for purposes such as communications and MWS).
It is more than likely that space military stations for anti-satellite, anti-missile defence
and “Space–Earth” class weapons (if they ever appear) will also be placed in orbits of
this range.
To a lesser extent, such anti-satellite systems with an interception range of up to 1,000
km will be a threat to satellites in higher orbits, including geosynchronous and semigeosynchronous orbits, which are used for communication, MWS, and navigation
(GPS, GLONASS, “Galileo”). It is also possible that in the foreseeable future there
may be systems created, with ground, sea or air launch, intended for placement of
anti-satellite systems in their appropriate orbits for satellite interception, or placed
near their target at an earlier point (“space mines”). Taking into account the
complexities of verification, the Draft Treaty of 2008, even in its second version, does
not seem to be very effective, since anti-satellite systems are left completely outside
the Treaty. The same can be said of the projected air, ground, or sea-based laser
systems that can strike and damage satellites in high orbits with a fair degree of
efficiency.
Aside from these omissions, the 2008 Draft Treaty contains many ambiguities in its
definitions of a “weapon in space”. As was noted earlier, in the document a space
weapon was said to be “any device, placed in space, and based on any physical
principle, specially created or re-equipped for the destruction, damage or the
impairment of normal functioning of objects in space, on Earth or in its air space, as
well as for the destruction of population, components of the biosphere important for
the existence of humans, or for harming them”.
A question arises: what is meant by “specially created or re-equipped”; what are the
attributes around which such a designation can be assigned, and how? For example,
can it be said that a space vehicle shall be banned if it is intended to be reusable and
was especially created, among other purposes, for the capture, repair, and removal
from orbit of satellites? It is even less clear what is meant by “biosphere components”
and their “destruction and harming”; could it be applied, for example, to the
destruction of the ozone layer that is caused by every space launch, or to the
destruction of one’s own obsolete satellites and their removal from orbit and descent
into the ocean? The formula “the destruction, damage or impairment of normal
functioning of objects in space” causes almost as many uncertainties. There are many
ways in which functioning of space vehicles can be disrupted, because space systems
themselves and the environment in which they are placed are so varied. In order to
directly strike a space vehicle one can use conventional (explosive), kinetic (impactdetonated), nuclear and laser weapons. For jamming purposes one can use lasers,
beam, X-ray and UHF weapons as sources of electronic warfare.
During times of peace, states do not intentionally interfere with the normal
functioning of space vehicles belonging to other countries. However, under conditions
14
of military conflict one cannot seriously expect anyone to honour bans against
creating interference, for example, for enemy systems such as GLONASS,
NAVSTAR or Galileo—the main systems providing support for precision-guided
weapons. It is also difficult under such circumstances to avoid attempts to disrupt the
functioning of other space systems intended for military, dual, and commercial
purposes, as well as ground-based centres for collection and transmission
(retransmission) of information and guidance for space vehicles. It is also not clear
whether one can consider as “creation of interference with normal functioning,” laser
or radio locator illumination of satellites from Earth or from space for the purpose of
identification, for example. It can in theory be possible, and of mutual interest in
terms of preventing an uncontrollable escalation of conflict, to agree not to attack at
least the early missile warning systems (similar to the agreements existing between
some countries not to attack nuclear power stations).
However, it would be very hard to agree on banning such systems if it is justified as a
means of restraint against their creation and use by other countries. This is even more
the case since many types of weapons usually have a multi-purpose use, and their
development, testing, deployment and use are not limited by any international treaties
or agreements. Among such weapons one can name, for example, laser, kinetic,
electromagnetic, beam, and other weapons of similar nature.
The banning of combat systems that are based on directed energy transmission,
primarily lasers, is particularly complicated. They can be used for striking aircraft,
satellites, ballistic missiles and their elements during flight, and also for the detection,
probing and identification of ground, underwater and space objects, as well as for
targeting other weapon systems and, in future, for the rapid transfer of immense
amounts of information, i.e. for communications. Theoretically, effectiveness of lasers
may be limited (thereby separating attack systems from ancillary purpose systems) by
the ratio of power illumination to the area of the ray’s cross-section (joules/steredian),
which is an indicator integrating a laser’s energy and the area of its mirror reflector.
But to come to an agreement regarding such limitations would be a complex
undertaking if we take into account the different types of lasers (“pumping” methods)
and the diverse areas through which they may pass (space, atmosphere). For example,
a laser that does not have destructive potential in a dense atmosphere may be an
effective weapon against satellites in space at long distances, or for striking booster
stages of ballistic missiles at a shorter range when they leave the atmosphere, or
missile warheads in space at a short distance.
Taking into account distance to target, space-based lasers may be more or less
effective as anti-satellite weapons. However, when one considers military stations
moving along orbits, as well as their possible targets, and the possibility of orbit
change, then the limitation of the technical characteristics of laser weapons is very
hard to translate into the limitation of their military capabilities. This is another aspect
that differentiates such systems from, say, the practice of limiting nuclear arms as a
subject of various negotiations, where technical characteristics within the various
limits could define the range of their action, and when banning overseas missile
locations would reliably separate strategic systems from weapons of medium range
and their operational and tactical designation. (Thus, for ICBMs, the range was
defined as above 5,500 km, for MRBM—from 1,000 to 5,500 km, for shorter-range
15
missiles—from 500 to 1,000 km, for SLBM, ALCM, SLCM—a range of 600 km and
above, and so on).
The creation, testing and utilisation of weapons and the
the functioning of ground-based space system facilities
practically impossible to ban, because practically all
nuclear weapon systems, means of electronic warfare
physical principles, can be considered such weapons.
creation of interference with
for managing information is
offensive conventional and
and systems based on new
Many systems that are intended for other purposes can have ancillary (additional)
capabilities for striking space objects: offensive ballistic missiles of various classes,
fractional orbital ballistic missiles, pilotless or piloted space vehicles.
The most complicated case of “overlapping” is created by ABM systems, however
based, that hold immanent (“inborn”) anti-satellite potential in orbits of approximately
up to 1,000 km. Apart from being capable of intercepting missiles at an early stage of
their boost phase trajectory and the final phase of their entry into the atmosphere,
targets for ABM systems traverse the same space in which the majority of space
vehicles are rotating in orbits with an apogee of up to 1,000 km. Satellites on these
orbits move somewhat faster than the final rocket stages and warheads (around 8 km
per second and 5–7 km per second respectively)—otherwise they represent easier
interception targets.
As a rule, space vehicles are larger in size and are somewhat fragile (particularly their
solar batteries, communication aerials and electric and optical sensors). It is most
important that satellites move along predictable orbits and can be followed over a
long period of time, which facilitates targeting. A satellite interception point can be
programmed many days and even weeks in advance, while the time of arrival for
ballistic missiles is 7–30 minutes, depending on their class, type and trajectory.
Finally, as opposed to ballistic missiles, space vehicles do not represent a massive
targeting complex and are not combined with false targets and other means of defence
against ABM.
Of course, there are various means by which space systems can be made more
durable: by taking organisational and technical measures for increasing space vehicle
protection and ground-based centres from attack factors of various physical nature, by
duplicating the most important space vehicles, by placing in orbit standby or “sleeper”
satellites, by preparation of delivery vehicles and satellites for quick replacement of
vehicles that have been disabled, etc. However, such measures are often linked to
considerable expenditures of time and money.
4. Special Features of Verification in Space
In disarmament practice, agreement on verification is the most important and
inviolable condition. Historically, only the creation of a national technical means of
verificaton (NTMV), mainly involving the use of space reconnaissance satellites, had
permitted the conclusion of SALT-1 in 1972. At the same time, one cannot elevate the
importance of technical verification capabilities to the level of an absolute imperative.
As mutual trust grew and there was a movement towards radical measures of
disarmament, NTMVs were augmented by transparency measures, trust and
16
cooperation, on-site inspections (including the removal of missile cones and counting
of warheads), continual monitoring of facilities, etc. In this way, such agreements as
CFE (1990), CWC (1992), START–1 (1994) and CTBT (1996) were without
precedent. By contrast, the SORT Treaty of 2002 is not functioning in full measure
because it is not backed up by a verification system and rules for counting items under
limitation (nuclear munitions).
As applied to space weapons, the dialectical progress of disarmament and verification
is also fully possible. However, it would be naive to expect breakthroughs in the
initial stages. This is exacerbated by the new nature and specificity of the subject
under negotiation. In the majority of former and existing Treaties for disarmament,
the centre of gravity for verification measures was placed at the deployment stage and
the operational stage of weapons systems (ABM Treaty, START–1, Treaty on
Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles, SFE, CWC). The Outer Space Treaty of
1967 is also related to this phase (as regards the non-placement of WMDs), but it does
not envisage any verification measures. To a much lesser degree verification measures
in the above-mentioned disarmament Treaties extend to the weapons’ systems testing
stage (in relation to CFE it does not extend at all). START–1 is an exception because
missile testing is tightly controlled (including a ban on encryption of telemetric
information) and also the CTBT, which is fully relevant to testing. Insofar as the
establishment stages are concerned, that is, the development of weapons systems prior
to the testing stage, it is not covered by any Treaty, except for the CWC and BTWC,
while the latter was not finally supported by a verification system. It is true that the
ABM Treaty banned the “creation” of a number of ABM systems, but parties could
not come to a final agreement regarding this term, and that manifested itself rather
dramatically in the course of debates between the USSR and USA—and also within
the USA—in relation to their SDI program in the first half of the ’80s.
As opposed to this historical experience, space weapons will be the most difficult to
ban and to limit at their deployment and operational stages, particularly where
deployment in space is concerned, as it is in the Draft Space Weapons Treaty of 2008.
To identify, through the use of NTMVs, banned satellites with weapons on board
among approximately 700 space vehicles that are currently rotating in various orbits,
would be exceptionally difficult. It could be even more difficult to prove that they are
subject to a Treaty without their inspection in space or their being brought down to
Earth (even if the Treaty could determine the technical characteristics of banned
systems, and not just where they are based and where their possible targets are
located).
This can also apply to future compact satellites used as a means of inspection of space
vehicles in all orbits. Such on-site space inspection, as well as bringing vehicles down
to Earth, is in many cases not technically possible, as well as being dangerous and,
more likely than not, unacceptable for states because of military or commercial
secrecy. Additionally, the creation of such systems and means of verification may of
itself be interpreted as a type of anti-satellite weapon or combat operation.
Verification on space launching pads before the launch also seems improbable in the
foreseeable future because of military and commercial secrecy. By the way, this
question was touched upon at the end of the ’80s during the USSR–USA negotiations
on space weapons, in relation to a ban on orbital ABM systems. It was acknowledged
17
at that time that such verification methods would be overly intrusive and practically
impossible to implement for technical reasons (the necessity of opening containers
with the payload, and its identification before being installed on a space vehicle). It is
possible that in the context of radical disarmament measures and abandonment of
military confrontation, such measures of pre-launch inspection could in time become
possible for the verification of space disarmament. But at this stage they seem
unrealistic, in particular regarding the RF–PRC Draft Treaty of 2008. As regards land,
air, and sea-based space weapons that are most likely to appear in the foreseeable
future (but not addressed by the RF–PRC Draft), even here the picture is mixed. The
banning or limitation of such systems as were deployed by the Soviet Union in the
’70–80s (and experimental missiles tested by China against satellites in 2007) would
not be difficult if their technical characteristics and locations could be agreed upon,
using methods applied by the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles and
START-1.
However, as applied to the aircraft-based systems of the type deployed during the ’80s
by the USA (F15 SRAM–Altair) and the Soviet development of anti-satellite systems
based on the MiG–31 fighter plane, the verification of bans on their deployment
would be extremely difficult due to the dual purpose and massive numbers of such
aircraft in operation, as well as the small size of intercepting missiles that may be
stored in any airfield’s storage facilities. Of course, such satellite systems possess
special systems for targeting and navigation, but their banning would interfere in the
overall ground-based infrastructure of space complexes, and would therefore be
unrealistic. Limitation of quantity of such systems is a more achievable goal, but
requires wide transparency and agreement on the functional differences between
aircraft and missiles, facilitation of verification measures, agreed locations for antisatellite systems, as well as the possible acceptance of rights of inspection upon
suspicion (with brief notification) of other airforce bases of the parties.
A ban or limitation on the deployment of presently developed aircraft-based laser
systems and upgraded sea-based missile systems (such as the US missile of the
“Standard-3” type that was launched from a cruiser and used to down an obsolete
American satellite in 2008) would be extremely difficult due to their widely varying
technical characteristics and their dual purpose as a means of anti-missile and antisatellite defence (see Table 1).
Thus a major feature of space weapons, and especially orbit-based weapons,
separating them from any other kind of weapon that up to the present time has been
the subject of disarmament Treaties, is the fact that it is exceptionally hard, if not
impossible, to forbid or limit the relevant kinds and types of armed forces after their
operational deployment by the state. This is based both on their complexity of
verification and also on the great variety of their technical characteristics, possible
designation, and use. At the same time, the specificity of space weapons, as regards
their base, as well as the location of their targets, permits significant limitation of their
development through limits on full-scale testing.
18
Table 1: Possibilities for Verification of Space Weapons at Different Stages of Their Life
Cycles
Cycle
Detonation on Contact
Systems
Attack Space
Weapons
Research and
Development
Testing with
Target
Destruction
Testing
without
Target
Destruction
Operational
Deployment
Space object
1
3
1
1
Object in space
1
3
2
3
Ground-based
1
3
2
3
Air-based
1
3
2
2
Sea-based
1
3
2
2
1
3
1
1
Directed energy
weapon
Notes:
1
Verification impossible
2
Limited possibilities for verification
3
Sufficient possibilities for verification
5. Outlook for Limitation and Banning of Weapons in Space
It seems that the idea of weapons-free outer space cannot be achieved in a single blow
by one universal Treaty. Space is a new area for a potential arms race and military
conflict, and stakes by various countries in this area are exceptionally high in the
military, scientific, and commercial senses. All weapon systems are currently in their
early development stage, the technologies are exceptionally complex, multifunctional, expensive, and are cloaked in complete secrecy. Methods of verification
and monitoring are exceptionally difficult. Thus, if space disarmament and limitation
measures are initiated in a practical format at some stage, it will be a complicated,
long, and multi-stage process rather comparable to the limitation and reduction of
strategic weapons, and not to the CWC or BTWC.
The RF–PRC Draft Treaty of 2008 brought some positive results, but only in the
political and propaganda arena, and not in the sense of practical disarmament. The
effort was not entirely wasted, however, particularly since until that point the official
US policy remained militantly destructive. But even if, after the change of the US
administration in 2009, Washington’s position will change in a constructive direction
and weapons-free space becomes a task for practical negotiations, including the
cardinal problems of verification, even then this path will be fraught with many
complications, not only for the USA, but also for Russia and China.
19
There are historical precedents for this in the experience of transition from debates in
the UN on universal and full nuclear disarmament, to negotiations about concrete
ABM systems and strategic ballistic missiles, in the framework of SALT-1 at the end
of 60s. It is instructive to recall that after two decades of heated polemics during all
the international forums, the US Defense Secretary at that time, Robert McNamara, at
the meeting in Glasboro in 1967 proposed to then USSR Prime Minster Alexey
Kosygin initiation of the Arms Limitation Process with a mutual renunciation of
ABM, upon which he received a categorical refusal. The argument behind this was
that ABM was a morally justified system for protecting the population from nuclear
weapons. Later, the positions of both sides were periodically altered and became
diametrically opposed, both on ABM and on other questions relating to strategic
weapons. Such was the beginning of an extensive negotiating process, accompanied
by successes and failures, a process which is not finished even today and the end of
which is still out of sight.
The analysis of half a century of military and technological development of space
systems, concepts of their use, and also the experience of negotiations and agreements
in this area, allow us to delineate conditionally two main models for regulating space
activity through Treaty processes. One of them is based on the Outer Space Treaty of
1967, and it envisages universal bans on certain kinds of weapons and types of
actions, without getting into the technical detail of defining the subject of the
agreement, verification measures, exchange of data, exceptions from the rule, and
mutually agreed understanding. Another model that is also deeply involved with the
subject matter of space is based on Treaties for ABN, SALT-1, Treaty on Medium
and Shorter Range Missiles and SART-1, including thorough reconciliation of all the
above-mentioned questions, and a stage-by-stage progress of disarmament measures
and verification, from partial to broader and deeper.
Soviet proposals in multilateral forums and bilateral negotiations with the USA during
the ’80s, and Russian initiatives during the current decade (including joint initiatives
with other countries), were based on the first model. Considering the non-constructive
line taken by Washington, these diplomatic actions brought certain political and
propaganda dividends to Russia, but have not brought about substantial results in the
form of legally binding Treaties. If the USA position changes and negotiations
become more practical, then the approach to this problem will, most likely, change.
It seems that in terms of the subject of negotiations, it would be wise to move, at least
at the first stage, both from the USSR’s position during the 80s, and also from the
recent proposals by Russia and China in Geneva. More specifically, the subject of
negotiations must be narrowed and not involve the attempt, as it did 20 years ago, to
universally ban all systems of “Earth–Space”, “Space–Earth” and “Space–Space”
classes, technical features of which are not clear, not least the possibility of
verification of these agreements.
It is unlikely that vague exhortations to prevent militarisation of space could be used
as the basis for such negotiations. It is useful to recall that the practical basis for
strategic arms Treaties was found not in mutual wishes for peace of the countries
concerned, but in the balance of asymmetric military interests of the parties. Thus,
START–1 became possible because the USA was interested in limiting the growth of
20
Soviet ballistic missiles, while the USSR was interested in limiting ABM systems.
The START–2 Treaty was based on the USA’s interest in limiting Soviet missiles
with dispersal (MIRV) warheads, and on the USSR’s desire to limit American cruise
missiles. The START–1 Treaty embodied in itself a compromise between the
reduction of heavy ICBMs, limitation of ground-based mobile missiles possessed by
the USSR, and the reduction and limitation of the superior American sea and airbased strategic forces.
Following the same logic in space, an obvious balance between the practical interests
of the parties could be reached through banning and strict limitation of anti-satellite
systems in exchange for the refusal to develop ABM in space, that is, attack systems
(interceptors) based in space. The first would be useful to the USA, and the second to
Russia and the PRC. Within such a negotiating format, the technical intersection
between ABM and anti-satellite systems, which makes it difficult to ban one without
banning the other, could facilitate measures for their limitation or joint prohibition.
For such practical negotiations to be successful, it would be very important to reach
agreement on a definition of the subject of the agreement, and to develop realistic and
durable measures of verification and transparency. Also, the correct choice of stages
and the format of the negotiating process would be important. Currently, anti-satellite
systems are the most developed and visible in a technical sense, while space-based
ABM systems belong to a more remote future (10–15 years ahead) and the outlook for
their establishment still remains somewhat cloudy. This is even more true of systems
of the “Space–Earth” class. It will be rather difficult to agree in aggregate about all of
them, due to the different nature of separate subjects of the agreement. In this light, it
would make sense for Moscow and Washington to take into account the historical
experience of such a dialogue between the USSR and USA in the ’70s and ’80s, and
also to take into account the initiatives of independent experts from different
countries.
A ban on the deployment of anti-satellite systems based anywhere would be desirable,
but is unlikely to be achievable. As was noted earlier, it would be difficult to verify
such bans in space by realistically available methods; while on Earth experimental
missile systems of this class are currently deployed perhaps only by China (it is
possible that because of this, the joint RF–PRC Draft of 2008 involved only space
systems). Both Russia and the USA have decommissioned or put into cold storage
previous systems, while the new ones being developed are dual purpose, such as the
American anti-missiles of the GBI (Ground Based Interceptor) or “IGES-Standard”
type. Instead of banning the deployment as an indirect solution to this problem, the
initial agreement could instead concentrate on a ban on the testing of anti-satellite
systems and attack anti-missile space systems. This would mean banning testing by
actually striking a target satellite or a ballistic missile and its elements along their
flight trajectory, as was done by the USSR in the ’60s–80s, by the USA in the ’80s,
and by China in 2007. Such tests are much easier to verify as regards the
consequences of the interception (the creation of multiple fragments). Verification of
this Agreement could be based on the national technical verification systems of the
parties, along with, as would be desirable, the facilitation of certain transparency
measures. For example, it would be necessary to confirm and to broaden the existing
notification format about all missile launches, including space launches, and to
include in this format any actions and experiments with destructive action towards
21
space objects. Such a ban, aside from its significance as an arms limitation measure,
could also be important for the safety of space use for peaceful purposes, which is
being increasingly threatened by the growing amount of “space debris”. The
destruction of obsolete satellites, if there is a threat of uncontrolled descent, must be
carried out under the observation of another party or parties, with sufficient
information being provided, in order not to arouse suspicions regarding the conduct of
testing of secret anti-satellite systems, as was the case with the American interception
of a space vehicle in 2008. Docking operations with satellites for peaceful purposes
must be regulated as regards the speed of their approach, be subject to prior
notification, and also be conducted under observation by another party or parties.
The initial Treaty could have a time limitation (say, a ten year framework, with the
possibility of extension), which would be less than the projected time of arrival of a
technically feasible space-based ABM system. As in any other such Treaty, it would
contain an article regarding withdrawal from the Treaty in cases where the “higher
interests” of any of the parties was threatened. Russia (and, if it acceded, the PRC)
could make a unilateral declaration that they would consider as such a circumstance
the creation of an American space-based ABM system or “Space–Earth” class
systems. This could serve as an additional element of deterrence, considering the
USA’s interest in limiting anti-satellite systems to a maximum extent, if such a
limitation could be effectively verified.
The format of the agreement could, in the first stage, include the USA, Russia and, as
would be desirable, the PRC, and envisage the possibility of future accession by any
other country. It would be necessary to create a permanent joint commission for the
management and resolution of disputes (such a commission could be linked to the
centre for the exchange of missile launch data). The advantages of such a Treaty
would be:
 The prevention of creation and modernisation of the most advanced
class of space weapons—anti-satellite—independently of its physical
principles and forms of deployment;
 Relative simplicity of verification, with emphasis on National
Technical Means of verification in combination with minimal
transparency and facilitation measures;
 Slowdown in the development of space ABM as regards its attack
elements;
 Prevention of experiments causing formation of space debris,
threatening the space vehicles of all countries;
 The early involvement of the PRC (and later of other countries) at a
new stage in the process of strategic arms limitation;
 A slowdown at an early stage in the development of any anti-satellite
systems that are capable of attacking the most important satellites for
MWS, navigation, communication, and monitoring.
At the same time, the proposed Treaty would not be without shortcomings, some of
them quite material. Among them in particular would be:
 The possibility of indirect testing and deployment of anti-satellite
systems through testing and deployment of variously-based ABM
systems (with the exception of space systems);
22







The possibility of preserving anti-satellite potential, without specific
testing, on the basis of ICBM, SLBM, fractional orbital missiles (after
the expiry of START-1), and medium range missiles (for China), with
a guaranteed strike capability against satellites by nuclear explosion
(which would knock out of action all space vehicles within reach,
including one’s own);
The possibility of secret deployment in peacetime or during a pre-war
period of “space mines” without testing and without a guaranteed
capability for striking satellites, above all, on geostationary orbit;
The possibility of secret rehearsal of anti-satellite operations of low
intensity with the use of piloted and pilotless vehicles through
approach, locking and descent from the orbit of space vehicles that
became obsolete or requiring repairs;
The possibility of the secret testing of weapons with directed energy
beaming (laser, beam), and means of electronic warfare for disrupting
the function of satellites without their physical destruction;
The possibility of creation of a space attack weapon of the “Space–
Earth” class, including on the basis of fractional orbital missiles,
multiple-use spaceships and other, at this stage hypothetical,
technologies and operational ideas;
The impossibility of the purposeful creation of anti-satellite weapons
as an asymmetrical response to the development of new systems and
methods of non-nuclear military action, including the use of long-range
guided precision weapons supported by space information systems;
The impossibility of a direct response to the hypothetical systems of
“Space-Earth” class, if they ever eventuate.
While accepting the existence of the problems indicated, one must at the same time
emphasise the advantages of the proposed version that may well outweigh its
shortcomings. Moreover, it seems that as the first practical step in preventing the
armament of space, this version is relatively more realistic, both from the point of
view of its mutual military and strategic acceptability, and also with the view of the
more concrete nature of the military and technological parameters of the subject of the
Treaty, and the possibilities of its verification.
The Treaty proposed above will of necessity have a partial and selective character due
to both military and political reasons, as well as the objective technical and physical
circumstances, in particular those of space as a distinct environment. Incidentally, the
same thing occurred with the interim SALT–1 Treaty of 1972, and with the SALT–2
Treaty of 1979. However, without passing through these natural stages of
disarmament, parties would never have reached the unprecedented universal
reduction, limitation, and transparency measures obtained by the START–1 Treaty
twenty years later. If this first, albeit limited, step in the area of the non-armament of
space is made through a verifiable ban on all types of anti-satellite and space ABM
testing, it will be followed by other, broader steps, and more intrusive verification
measures, as happened historically with the limitation of strategic nuclear arms.
With the change in 2008 of the American administration, and under conditions of the
deepening world financial and economic crisis, the outlook for expensive and highly
complex strategic ABM systems, and even more for its space version, is becoming
23
highly doubtful. To a even greater extent the same could be said about weapons of the
“Space-Earth” class.
And finally, the main argument supporting the suggested Treaty is linked to the
absence of realistic alternatives to the prevention of anti-satellite systems and space
ABM through the prohibition of their full-scale testing. It seems that such an
alternative lies not in the realisation of previous proposals by the USSR, and maybe
not even in the Russian–Chinese Draft of 2008 which could be looked upon more as a
gesture of goodwill. In reality, the alternative lies in the continuing absence of any
legal Treaty limitations on space armament, and in the gradual transformation of outer
space into an area of military competition and potential military conflicts.
***
Currently, the economic and technological superiority of the USA in space is obvious
and indisputable. However, if a space arms race is initiated, it will inevitably be
joined by other countries, above all China, Russia, India, Brazil, Japan, and later
possibly Iran, Pakistan, and others. As a result, the USA, despite its superiority in
space, may lose more than all the rest because, in their military and civilian activities,
they more than anyone else depend on the security of space vehicles. Historically, this
is what happened with nuclear weapons and missile technology, where the USA
initially had a monopoly or superiority, but now they see the proliferation of such
weapons as the main threat to their own security.
In the long term, the growing threat of an arms race and, even more so, space
conflicts, will inevitably lead to the “vertical” and “horizontal” proliferation of
missiles and nuclear weapons, and to the irreversible crisis of the whole nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Additionally, outer space (which does not
have natural borders and natural shelters) through its saturation by weapons, will
present a grave threat from the point of view of accidents, incidents, false alarms, and
navigational system failures.
Having entered the era of globalisation, the world is confronting ever new security
problems that cannot be resolved on a unilateral basis, and even less through the use
of military force. In order to resolve these tasks, it is absolutely necessary that leading
powers and all responsible states in the world are engaged in concerted action,
including cooperation in the use of outer space to fight proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, control of international terrorism, the fostering of multilateral
peacekeeping operations, verification of radical disarmament steps, promotion of
effective measures in relation to climate and ecology as a whole, and the provision of
a secure supply of energy and food.
For this to happen, it is imperative to develop international agreements without delay,
to prevent the arming of outer space. As Napoleon I said, “Great politics are only
common sense applied to great things”. The first step on this path can be the urgent
adoption of outer space code of conduct, in which states shall voluntary adhere to
general principles of the peaceful and co-operative use of outer space. A Draft for
such a Code was proposed at the end of 2008 by the Council of the European Union
under the title “Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities”. One of its
provisions proclaims “the freedom of access to, exploration and use of outer space
24
and exploitation of space objects for peaceful purposes without interference, fully
respecting the security, safety and integrity of space objects in orbit”.
Another article proclaims the consent of States “to take all the appropriate measures
and cooperate in good faith to prevent harmful interference in outer space
activities”10. It also says that states shall “refrain from any intentional acts that will or
might bring about, directly or indirectly, the damage or destruction of space objects”.
In order to implement the above goals, states that sign the Code “express
determination” to exchange information, on an annual basis, regarding “national space
policies and strategies, including basic objectives for security and defence related
activities”11.
It is true that in this Draft there is no attempt to limit the creation, testing or
deployment of any weapons systems that could be used against outer space objects or
from outer space against objects in space and on Earth. The main concepts and terms
are also not defined. Therefore, the next step must be in the transition towards
development of legally binding Treaties, one version of which was presented in this
paper, and which may pave the way for a regime of space utilisation based only on the
interests of universal security.
10
Council of the European Union. Brussels, 3 December 2008. Annex II. Draft Code of Conduct for
outer Space Activities. (http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17175.en08.pdf)
11
Ibid.