#5-204
To Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer
August 14, 1945 Radio No. WAR-49550. [Washington, D.C.]
Top Secret
From Marshall to Wedemeyer for his eyes only.
I have read all of your recent messages including the Generalissimo’s plan
and your plan for action in China upon the surrender of Japan. Your proposal
that we give China first priority over Japan and Korea will not be acceptable. At
the present time it appears that the maximum you can hope to receive in the way
of U.S. troops on the China coast for a considerable period of time will be two
divisions and it is not clear now whether or not sizeable portions of these
divisions can be provided with the necessary shipping in the very near future. 1
You will receive authoritative statements on these matters in a short time from
the War Department.
Meanwhile I ask you to consider several other possibilities repeat
possibilities. It is possible that a sizeable quantity of Japanese shipping might be
concentrated at some point off Japan, taken over by our Navy and escorted to
some point on the China coast to effect the rapid evacuation of Japanese troops.
This evacuation, say from Canton, might be on a shuttle temporary basis to
Formosa which would greatly increase the capability of shipping to remove
Japanese troops from the mainland of China. If the evacuation was in the
Shanghai region it would probably have to go direct to Japan which involves
considerable turnaround time and therefore is delayed accordingly. It might be
that certain islands off the Shanghai coast might be utilized by the concentration
of Japanese troops providing some supplies could be landed there for their use.
This brings up the possibility of sending some Japanese ships to Saigon to load
rice to meet the critical situation which will develop as Japanese troops
concentrate towards the coast.
U.S. Naval influence will be very remote off Tientsin because ships of
more than 18 foot draft cannot cross the bar to get into the river 35 miles from
Tientsin. It is for that reason that I made a preliminary suggestion of Tsingtao as
a point of contact. Evacuations from Tsingtao might be carried out by Japanese
shipping direct to Japan or possibly even to southern Korea in order to shorten
the turnaround. From there they would eventually go over to the homeland by
ferry.
Please consider all these permutations and combinations which have for
their purpose the influence of the presence of the U.S. flag and some gun power
despite the small amount of shipping available for this purpose, the evacuation of
as much of the interior of China as rapidly as possible by Japanese troops under
Japanese control and the further evacuation of troops from China itself by the
most effective use of captured shipping.
Document Copy Text Source: George C. Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, Selected
Materials, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia.
Document Format: Typed radio message.
1. Chiang Kai-shek had requested a total of five U.S. divisions: two in the Taku-TientsinPeking area, two in the Shanghai-Nanking area, and one in the Canton area.
(Wedemeyer to Marshall, Radio No. CFB-4317, August 11, 1945, NA/RG 165 [P&O,
336 China, Sec. 1-B-3].)
Recommended Citation: The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland and Sharon
Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic
version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 5, “The Finest Soldier,” January 1,
1945–January 7, 1947 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp.
275–276.