Japan in Africa: Diplomacy of Continuity and Change
Seifudein Adem, PHD
Institute of Global Cultural Studies,
State University of New York at Binghamton
DRAFT
Presentation at the conference on “Africa in Contemporary International Relations:
Contexts, Stakes, Actors and Issues,” Grand Valley State University, September 21-22,
2009, Gran Rapids, MI
1

Japan in Africa: Diplomacy of Continuity and Change
Abstract
Japan’s activities in Africa are circumscribed by both its national interest and its being an integral part of the so-called Western bloc. But relations with Africa are less important for Japan in comparison to its respective relations with adjacent countries, the United
States and Europe. Despite these facts, or because of them, Japan’s diplomacy in Africa has shown consistency in its patterns— including in the periodic changes.
I.
Introduction
This essay identifies major ingredients of the diplomacy of modern Japan in the context of its shifting identities and interests as reflected in changes and continuities in various phases of Afro-Japanese relations over the past fifty years. In the next section the essay outlines broad historical sketches of the diplomatic history of modern Japan, followed by a brief statement on the worldview of the Japanese about the “international” in general, before we tackle the issues of continuity and change in Japan’s diplomacy in Africa.
II.
Diplomacy of Indifference: A History
“When Menelik II (1844-1913), Emperor of Ethiopia, heard of Japan’s victory over
Russia,” Jean-Pierre Lehmann wrote, “he expressed great satisfaction and stated that
Ethiopia, in her own way, was trying to emulate Japan’s example.” 1
The decisive battle of the Russo-Japanese war took place at Tsushima in May 1905. Given that Menelik presided over the defeat of Italy in 1896, it is a chronological impossibility for what happened in 1905 in the Far East to inspire Menelik nine years before the event. The larger point is valid nonetheless. Japan’s successes, first militarily and then technologically, had inspired the non-Western world. But Japan’s own transmutations were just only about to begin.
Re-defining its identity after defeating Russia in 1905, Japan saw itself as a nation which is on a par with European powers. The shift in identity also re-shaped the nation’s interest. If Japan was now a major power, the argument went, it ought also to act as one.
The Japanese embarked upon imitating the West in every major sphere of life. More significantly, Japan’s political class launched an imperial project named Greater East
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere by annexing Taiwan in 1895 and by colonizing weaker countries in the region. It was Japan’s self-image as major power and its felt-need for raw materials which whetted its colonial appetite. On the other hand, Western powers viewed Japanese imperialism as illegitimate, unlike their own. Japan fought back, but
Japanese colonialism came to an abrupt end when the nation surrendered after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Within a span of a little more than half a century, after emerging as a major power, Japan saw its image mutate from one of a victor to a villain and to a victim.
2

Not long after its crushing defeat in the Second World War, Japan joined again the club of industrialized nations. Against this background, Africans and people of African descent, who were under one or another form of European domination for significant portion of the century, looked to Japan for inspiration. In fact, W. E. B. Du Bois, the great African-American thinker, saw Japan at one time as the “logical leader of all colored peoples.” 2 But, as it turned out, this was a role which Japan neither assumed nor aspired for.
Japan’s diplomacy toward postcolonial Africa was informed by Japan’s historical experiences and cultural practices that have created specific but variable Japanese identities and interests over time. More often than not, Japan pursued ad hoc diplomacy in Africa even if this diplomacy sometimes boiled down to one of indifference. As we shall see in the next section, this diplomacy is also anchored in a worldview which inevitably generated a perpetual sense of vulnerability and engendered an external behavior that was designed to minimize the risk and reduce the cost of a diplomatic or political move.
III.
Theory of the “International” in Japanese Worldview
The Japanese conceptualize international relations in a certain way—like other peoples do. But given Japan is one of the few homogeneous nation-states in the world,
3 generalizations about Japanese should be more valid than those about other peoples.
Political Scientist Kosaka Masataka has thus formulated the Japanese view of the international : “Japanese conception of the international system is hierarchical: at any given time, there is a desirable rank order between any two nations, whereby one is higher, the other lower. Such a concept also manifests itself in the Japanese attitude towards themselves and other people: they are obsequious to superiors but haughty to inferiors, and excessively preoccupied with ‘self’.” 4
Mastaka is right, but he could have added that Japanese also recognize the international system as incurably anarchic with no world government capable of providing protection, order and security for states. We should bear in mind, however, that the Japanese no contradiction between the hierarchy and anarchy assumptions. In the words of the noted Japanese psychiatrist Takeo Doi, “Japanese usually do not make an issue of the fact that there is a lack of logical consistency between [two points of view].”
5
Further, Japanese assume the undesirable effects of the anarchic international system can be ameliorated through international institutions. They believe in the possibility of constructing a reasonably harmonious and stable world order.
Partly due to the variable and seemingly contradictory conceptions of the Japanese about the international system, and the behaviors based upon these conceptions, Japan’s foreign policy has sometimes posed serious challenges for mainstream international relations theories.
6
If one relies on standard textbooks of the discipline, the Japanese would qualify as realists, given their strong belief in international anarchy. They would qualify as liberals, too, because of the significant role institutions and norms are believed to play in the Japanese paradigm. And they would pass as social constructivists because what they see in the international scene is a set of identities, interests, and behaviors,
3

which are fluid, changing and changeable. These patterns of thought, in combination, inform Japanese foreign policy and have given rise to a system of “diplomatic” practices which sanctions seemingly convenient parts of different, and sometimes contradictory, values.
IV.
Culture and Diplomacy
Japanese culture and Japanese diplomacy are closely intertwined. Japan’s domestic cultural values heavily influence the way the country interacts with the outside world.
Japan’s low-profile diplomacy, for instance, is as much a function of its culture as it is of its history. As De Vos writes, “there are features of Japan’s cultural heritage that enable unique forms of economic and social organizational development internally but at the same time inhibit or prevent a greater contribution of Japanese to international social, economic and political community.” 7
Take also, for instance, the issue of foreign aid promotion in Japan. More than in any other major donor nation, the political class in Japan has to work hard to justify resource transfer abroad in the form of foreign economic aid. Compassion and charity are alien to
Japanese culture, and “self-help” is emphasized instead. Consequently, relations of charity and benevolence have never featured prominently in Japan’s diplomacy in Africa, a situation.
The role of culture in Japan’s diplomacy becomes also evident in situations involving some degree of conflict. Japanese tradition of conflict resolution emphasizes the formula of “victor without vanquished.” 8
In this vein, Japan was one of the few countries in the world which had refused to severe economic ties with Apartheid South Africa. Although the official justification for this was what was described as the principle of separation of politics and economics, or seikei bunri, the cultural logic behind it lay in the Japanese approach to conflict resolution.
9
This principle was in effect from 1952-1973
Japanese believed, or gave the impression, that Apartheid could not be brought to an end just by imposing economic sanctions on Pretoria and by isolating the regime. As it continued to trade with South Africa, Japan had also continued to try to cultivate better relations with the rest of Africa.
10 It was this diplomatic approach of Japan which many
Africans saw as a cynical attempt to please both sides of a conflict. But such a reading of
Japanese behavior, it can be argued, falls short of giving the full account of the behavior since it ignores the cultural foundation which undergirds it.
11 For the Japanese, the best approach to conflict involving two sides is one in which the conflict was resolved without a loss of face by either side.
12
Particularly in the case of South Africa, Japan, of course, also had a vested economic interest in relations with that country.
Seikei bunri also enabled Japan to avoid active involvement in the East-West rivalry.
After the Arab oil embargo of 1973, seikei bunri was replaced with what the Japanese called the principle of comprehensive security (sogo anzen hosho). The new principle paved the way for Japan to get involved in low-intensity diplomatic issues. But the factors which prompted the shift in Japan’s diplomacy in this case pertained both to external pressures and domestic needs. We shall focus below on the nature of these changes and continuities in Japan’s diplomacy in Africa over the past fifty years.
4

V. Change and Continuity
Physically so far apart, Africa and Japan had had limited historical contacts. But the question that arises in this case is this: why did things remain virtually the same even in the age of globalization when distance has shrunk due to technological innovations?
Physical distance was relevant in explaining the absence of major contacts between
Africa and Japan before the twentieth century. In the twentieth century, other factors also came into play. For the better half of the twentieth century, much of Africa was under the rule of European powers, which automatically meant African countries could not appear in the foreign policy radar of Japan. Roughly in the same period, Japan itself was preoccupied with its own colonial project in Asia, a project which did not extend as far as
Africa. And later, a perception also emerged that Africa was outside the sphere of influence of Japan because of the unique historical relations between Africa and
European powers and that the West was in charge de facto . Japan was passing the buck.
Japan’s diplomacy in Africa began in earnest in 1961 when the Division of African
Affairs was established in Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
13
The 1960s were also when most of the sub-Saharan African countries achieved political independence. And yet Japan’s economic interactions with Africa were still rather weak.
Since the 1960s the diplomatic objectives of Japan in Africa have changed periodically—but the changes were never clear-cut. In other words, the pursuit of strategic, economic and political objectives has remained the pillars of Japan’s diplomacy in Africa. However, the emphases have changed from time to time. One way to deal with issues of change and continuity in Japan’s diplomacy toward Africa is therefore to classify them into different phases. Although such a schema would inevitably suggest a more coherent Japan’s diplomacy in Africa than was actually the case, the schema is also suitable for highlighting which variable was emphasized and when.
1.
C
OLD
W
AR
D
IPLOMACY
(1961-1973)
This period represented a phase in which strategic objective was considered most important. Having formally inaugurated its Africa diplomacy in 1961, Japan’s immediate concern was to make sure that its dealings with Africa were in line with the geo-political strategy of the West in the continent and that it was meaningfully contributing to
America’s Cold War policies.
This was a period when Japan’s own economic development was beginning to solidify and gain momentum. Japan also laid the institutional foundations which would prove instrumental in the next phase of its diplomacy in Africa and beyond when it joined
Development Assistance Committee in 1961 and the OECD in 1964, and inaugurated
Japan Overseas Cooperation Agency in 1965.
Also important international events in this period which provided the background for
Japan’s diplomacy included the Cuban missile crisis (1962), the Vietnam War (1965), and the “Nixon shock” (1971). It must be noted the suggestion here is not that Japan completely disregarded its economic interest in this period even though economic
5

consideration has never been the primary driving force in the history of Afro-Japanese relations.
14
In other words, whatever economic interest Japan had in Africa, it took the backseat in this period. Even so, compared to the other phases of Japan’s diplomacy in
Africa, to be elaborated in the succeeding pages, this phase reflected a diplomatic orientation which was more about playing along with the West than anything else. Japan was to support the West in curbing the spread of communism in Africa.
15 In the words of
Shintaro Abe, former foreign minister of Japan, the major diplomatic objective of Japan was “to help entrench African countries in the Western camp.”
16
To gain and solidify its own legitimacy in the Western camp—that was, of course, the ultimate goal of Japan’s overall diplomacy.
2.
R
ESOURCE
D
IPLOMACY
(1974-1992)
The year 1973 was a watershed year in Japan’s diplomacy in Africa. But the relevant event took place outside of the African continent itself. The event was, of course, the socalled the 1973 oil crisis which was triggered when the ministerial meeting of OPEC decided to raise posted price of crude oil. After the decision by OPEC to hold the
Western economy hostage in this way, and subsequent events, Tokyo realized that it was imperative for Japan to diversify its energy sources and other critical raw materials. The event became a catalyst, in the words of Dennis Yasutomo, for “a globalization of
Japan’s Asia-centric aid policy, becoming the centerpiece of a “resource diplomacy” that frantically sought new sources of oil and other energy resources throughout the third world.” 17
A noticeable shift also occurred in Japan’s diplomacy in Africa, with more
Japanese economic aid going to African countries deemed important from the point of view Japan’s economic self-interest.
By 1975 Africa’s share of Japan’s crude oil import had already risen to a peak of 2.9 per cent from virtually nil until 1970.
18
William Nester has thus observed that “…with
OPEC’s quadrupling of oil prices and the fears that similar cartels would emerge among other mineral producing countries, Tokyo doubled its Africa aid to over 5 percent...”
19
In the 1980s the major recipients of Japanese aid in Africa were countries considered to be important sources of raw materials vital to Japanese industry such as copper in Zambia and Zaire, uranium in Niger, and Chromium in Madagascar; potential future sources of such raw materials, including chromium in the Sudan and oil in Gabon; or major economic markets, such as Kenya and Nigeria, capable of absorbing Japanese exports.
20
To some extent Japan’s overall trade with Africa also reflected the shifting emphasis in this period. The value of Japan’s imports from African countries jumped significantly in some of the years following the “oil shock.” 21
Japan’s increasing interest in the resources Africa had to offer was also evident from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s active involvement “in natural resources diplomacy in the early 1970s with the formation of the Diet Association of African Economic
Development in April 1970.” 22 Neither was it a coincidence that the first ever visit to
Africa by a Japanese foreign minister, Toshio Kimura, took place in 1974. Foreign
Minister Kimura’s successor Keiichi Miyazawa, who was subsequently to become prime
6

minister of Japan, later described the visit as one of “epoch-making importance in our diplomacy.”
23
Japan’s resource diplomacy in Africa in this period did not completely deflect Japan’s attention from the geo-strategic interest of the West in the continent just as Japan’s concern with the West’s Cold War strategy in the previous phase did not lead to a complete abandonment of the nation’s economic interest in Africa altogether.
24 But there was no doubt that at this time Japan was relatively less concerned about anti-communism than about diversification of the sources of its raw material supplies. Of course, Japan had also by now established itself more firmly in the Western Camp.
3.
TICAD D
IPLOMACY
(1993-2005)
TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Aid Development) is an international forum launched by Japan in 1993 to deliberate about African development.
The forum is based on twin premises of Japan’s policy-makers that “Africa needs the partnership of the developed nations” and that “Africa needs to help itself.” Tokyo has hosted four such conferences in five-year intervals.
The third phase of Japan’s diplomacy in Africa thus began with the end of the Cold
War. But, as indicated above, Japan’s post-Cold War African diplomacy commenced twenty-five years before the Cold War actually ended. If Cold War diplomacy was primarily motivated by the need for legitimacy in the Western camp and resource diplomacy was the quest for economic security of Japan, TICAD diplomacy was the outcome of the Japanese desire for a greater acceptance in the wider international community.
Japan’s aspiration for permanent membership in a reformed UN Security Council and its desire for the support of the African voting bloc were also aspects of the continuing quest for international legitimacy.
25
This meant Japan had to be able to take diplomatic initiatives and show some degree of independence from the West.
26
Just as the shift from
Cold War diplomacy to resource diplomacy did not engender a complete disregard of geo-strategic considerations in Japan’s African diplomacy, Japan’s TICAD diplomacy did not lead to its turning a blind eye on either its pro-Western policy or its economic interest.
27
TICAD diplomacy reflected Japan’s international status as well as its aspirations in that particular historical juncture. The launching of TICAD was one of the initiatives born out of Japan’s self-confidence. In the early 1990s Japan looked at itself as the “aid power,” as it became the world’s largest donor of economic development assistance.
28
Considering also Japan’s growing power at the time in different areas such as industrial production and in the service sector, others had also already floated the idea of strong probability of Pax-Nipponica .
29
“In the late 1980s and early 1990s”, writes Gilbert
Rozman, “overconfidence tilted Japanese nationalism toward expectations of becoming a great power…” 30 Japan looked supremely self-confident in this period.
31 It was also in the same period that some rightly dubbed Japan a rising “civilian power.”
32
And yet even in the final years of this phase of Afro-Japanese relations, Africa continued to have only very limited importance to Japan in economic terms. Consider, for instance, the
7

value of trade between Africa and Japan in comparison to the same between Japan and other select regions for select years in percentage:
______________________________________________________________________________________________
2001 2002 2003 2004
________________________________________________________________________________ _________________
Export/Import Export/Import Export/Import Export/Import
Africa
America
1.1
Latin &Central 4.4
1.3
2.8
1.2
3.9
1.7
2.8
1.2
3.5
1.7
2.7
1.4 1.9
3.8 3.0
Asia
Middle East
40.3
2.8
North America 31.7
42.4
12.7
20.3
43.1
2.9
30.3
43.5
12.1
19.3
46.4
3.0
26.2
44.5
13.4
17.4
48.4 45.2
2.9 13.8
23.8 15.6
_____________________________________________________________________
Source: Youko Ishida, Afurika ni gensuteraru nihon , Tokyo: Soseisha. 2008, p. 24
The data for Japan’s foreign economic aid also tells more or less the same story in absolute and relative terms.
Changes in Japan’s ODA Disbursements by Region in percentage
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Asia 49.6 46.5 62.4 63.2 54.8 56.6 60.7 53.6 42.7 36.6
Africa 12.8 12.1 11.0 9.5 10.1 11.4 8.7 8.8 10.9 10.8
Latin 11.8 10.8 6.4 7.8 8.3 9.9 8.8 7.7 5.2 4.0
America
Source: Japan’s Official Development Assistance. White Paper 2006. International
Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2007, p.
227.
In this period Japan also diversified its economic assistance to Africa. From 1993 to
2003, for instance, the sectoral breakdown of Japan’s economic aid to Africa was as follows in percentage: manufacturing (26.2), water supply (16.0), education (7.7), health
(6.4), infrastructure (40.9) and debt cancellation (2.8).
33 TICAD ushered in a period of a fairly reinvigorated Afro-Japanese relationship. TICAD IV, held in Yokohama in May
2008, attracted some 1300 journalists, including 1000 from local media and 300 from foreign ones.
34
However, Japan’s African diplomacy in this period was not limited to the hosting of mega-conferences in Tokyo and Yokohama. Japan also exhibited a degree of independence from the US and took new initiatives in other ways too. On the occasion of the G8 Okinawa summit, Japan extended invitation to the leaders of South Africa,
Algeria and Nigeria to come to Japan in 1993 for “outreach dialogue” with the G8.
35
Never before had African leaders given the opportunity to consult with the leading industrialized nations at the G8 summits. Japan’s initiative has now become virtually institutionalized and a handful of African leaders now attend G8 summit on a regular basis.
8

It was also in this period, when the West was in “diplomatic retreat from Africa,” that a Japanese sitting prime minister visited the continent for the first time.
36
In 2001,
Yoshiro Mori went to South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria. Prime Minister Mori’s successor, Junichiro Koizumi, visited Ethiopia and Ghana four years later. This was a clear statement as far as Japan was concerned that it is no longer the “reactive” state it once used to be. As it will be clear below, this phase in Afro-Japanese relations may turn out to be comparatively the most vibrant thus far in Japan’s diplomacy in Africa thus far.
37
4.
P OST -TICAD D IPLOMACY (2006~)
Officially, the TICAD process is underway, with TICAD IV having taken place in
Yokohama in May 2008. But, for all intents and purposes, Japan’s TICAD diplomacy seems to have run out of steam circa 2006.
38
The conditions which enabled TICAD diplomacy at the beginning of the last decade have for the most part dissipated or are non-existent today. One of these conditions was the relative decline in the international economic standing of Japan. “By the end of
1990s,” writes David Arase, “Japan was not an economic superpower, or even the dominant economic actor in Asia by some measures.”
39
Although Japan is, for some, still a civilian power, even Japanese themselves are less sure how long they should wait before revising their peace constitution.
40
Japan is no longer the major creditor nation; in fact, Japan is now the most heavily burdened state among the developed industrial countries with close to 200 percent of its GDP registered as public debt.
41
Neither was Japan the number-one aid donor it used to be only a decade ago. Although Japan lost its status as the number-one ODA donor in dollar terms in
2001
42
, the impact of drastic cut in ODA budget was slow to be felt around the world.
Most crucially, no one is seriously espousing a theory of Pax Nipponica anymore; if anything, the discourse today is about “fading Japan,” 43
or a future “Sino-Centric international system.” 44
The high-profile meeting of TICAD IV which took place in Tokyo in May 2008 notwithstanding, Japan’s diplomacy in Africa after 2006 seem much less vibrant than what was the case in the previous phase. As early as in 2005 there were predictions that
“the relative success of TICAD III may not be sufficient to lead to a TICAD IV.” 45
It is significant also that none of the three prime ministers who succeeded Junichiro Koizumi after 2005 visited Africa. Not even Prime Minister Taro Aso who was the first prime minister of Japan to have lived and worked in Africa for a relatively extended period found the time to travel to Africa.
46
Granted, these prime ministers stayed in power for a much shorter period of time than Prime Minister Koizumi had. But the fact that Japan’s diplomacy in Africa is devoid of vitality today is unmistakable.
V.
Japan, China and Africa
Japan’s activities in Africa are circumscribed by both its national interest and its being an integral part of the Western bloc. On the other hand, China’s behavior in Africa is less constrained. In fact, China pursues goals in Africa often in disregard and, at times, in
9

opposition to Western powers. Surely, Japan and China are not rivals in the same way as, for instance, China and the US are. In addition, Japan and China are not on par with each other in terms of economic power. Relations with Africa, especially in economic terms, are also less important for both China and Japan in comparison to their respective relations with adjacent countries, the United States and Europe. The two Asian powers are also perceived differently by Africans, with China enjoying a more favorable African treatment than Japan.
47
The view which is sometimes expressed in Africa portrays Japan as a crusader for eradication of malaria and China as the builder of infrastructure.
In addition to the changing Japanese public mood about “internationalization,” the seemingly low-profile Japanese diplomacy in Africa is thus taking place, against the background of accelerated Chinese activities in Africa. In 2005 China replaced Japan as the second major importer of African oil.
48
From Angola to Burundi, from Cameroon to
Central African Republic and Chad, China has become one of principal trading partners for several countries in Africa.
49
China has shown greater determination to forge stronger ties with African countries than Japan has ever done. What is more, Afro-Chinese relations are historically deeper than Afro-Japanese relations. Despite all these, Afro-Japanese relations could be more consolidated as the result of China’s greater involvement in Africa, with Africa, China and Japan reaping greater mutual (but not equal) benefit in the process.
Would Japan’s post-TICAD diplomacy in Africa be partially a reaction to what Japan sees as China’s growing influence in Africa? African leaders seem to be paying less and less attention to Japan compared to China. Tokyo was relieved when more African leaders showed up for TICAD IV in Yokohama in May 2008 in comparison to the number of African leaders who went to Shanghai two years earlier for the Afro-Chinese summit. Despite the obvious lack of public enthusiasm for massive Japanese aid to
Africa, the Japanese government also declared at the 2008 conference that Japan would double its aid to Africa by 2012, echoing a similar pledge at the first Sino-African summit in Shanghai.
50
Japan would probably become more active in Africa as a result of, or in spite of,
China’s growing influence in the continent. Japan’s ODA White paper 2007 declares this in regard to Africa: “Japan is considering a plan for advancing infrastructure development covering a wide area such as a roadway network.” 51
The message in the official government report in the succeeding year, too, is as clear as it is consistent: “In order to stimulate accelerated growth in Africa, it is important to develop regional infrastructure focused on roads and power networks.” 52
In 2007, Japan was partially justifying its development assistance to Africa on the grounds that Africa is a continent “blessed with beautiful nature, energy-filled people, and abundant resources” with “a great potential for the future.” 53
It was also stressed, “the threat of infectious diseases [in Africa]…that impacts the entire world, including Japan.” 54
The question which arises is whether this is a result of demonstration effect following China’s focus on infrastructure development in
Africa.
55
On the other hand, a recent Japanese government official publication re-affirms:
“Japan plans to focus on cooperation with international organizations and developed
10

nations.” 56
Specifically, with respect to TICAD IV held in Yokohama in May 2008, the report states: “Japan…consulted donor countries and aid organizations as well as multilateral organizations to a great extent in making outcome such as the Yokohama
Declaration.” 57
It is also to be remembered that the key institutions of the liberal international order (such as the UNDP, UN Office of Special Advisor on Africa and the
World Bank) are key organizers of TICAD. But the Japanese and the Chinese approach in this respect could not be more different. China sees the Bretton Woods institutions as less than legitimate because of the way they were created, because of what were created and because of by and for whom they were created.
In general Japanese are closely observing what the Chinese are doing in Africa. It is therefore conceivable that China’s approach in Africa, depending upon the nature of its outcomes and level of its success, could therefore stimulate Japan in Africa as well.
VI.
Conclusion
As the only non-European nation to successfully industrialize, as an active participant, at least initially, and sympathetic supporter of the Afro-Asian group, on the other hand,
Africa looked to Japan not only as an example-setter but also as a genuine partner in development. But Japan had also to aggressively and creatively pursue its self-interest in order to be able to foot its huge import bill. At times Japan’s drive for economic security has also inevitably run in the opposite course with the wishes of many African states.
Until now Japan has been not only the first non-European country to successfully industrialize but also it has been the only non-European economic power-house. For ideological reasons, however, modern Japan has hitherto closely aligned itself with the
West, with its policies toward Africa dovetailing that of the West. But the rise of China adds to the rank of successfully industrialized nations of non-European stock, but, and perhaps more significantly, China is emerging as a major Asian power whose ideology is not in sync with that of Japan and the West in general.
A debate is taking place in Africa now about whether China is a neocolonial power in the making or a genuine partner in Africa’s development.
58 Less intense though the debate was, Afro-Japanese relations had also posed a similar question.
59
The tentative answers we get from studying the history of Afro-Japanese relations is that it is the degree of convergence of interests rather than intentions of major powers which decidedly influence the outcome of their engagement with Africa. At least at the moment one can see a greater convergence of interest between Africa and China than between
Africa and Japan.
But the trajectory of Afro-Japanese relations could still change to some extent—and at any time. The end of half a century of virtually uninterrupted rule of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan on August 30, 2009 is expected to have repercussions for Japan’s foreign policies in general—including its diplomacy toward Africa. And already there are some hopeful signs. The Vice President of the victorious Party (DPJ) said this much as early as two weeks before the election: “US President Obama and
Secretary of State Clinton have both visited Africa. Chinese President Hu Jintao has also
11

visited Africa four times [since becoming President]. We would like to increase the attention paid by Japan to Africa.” 60
Notes
1 Jean-Pierre Lehmann, The Roots of Modern Japan (London: Macmillan, 1982), p 312.
2 Quoted in Marc Gallicchio. The African-American Encounter with Japan and China ,
(Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), p. 71.
3 The population of Japan in 2006 was 127 million and 756 thousand. What is interesting about 2006 is that it was the first time the number of death was larger than the number of birth.
See UN Demographic Yearbook. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. New York: UN
Publications, 2008, p. 98. For recent data pertaining to foreigners in Japan see http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/070516-1.pdf
(accessed March 3, 2009); one study estimated the number of “non-Japanese Japanese” at the turn of this century at 4-6 million: Ainu (25,000);
Koreans (700,000-1 million); Chinese (200,000); children of mixed ancestry (10,000-25,000);
“foreigners” (150,000-200,000). Another author adds to this, Okinawanas (1.6 million); and
Burakumin (2-3 million). See David B. Willis and Stephen Murphy-Shingematsu (eds.)
Transcultural Japan: At the Borderlands of Race, Gender and Identity (London and New York:
Routledge, 2008), p. 12.
4 Masataka Kosaka, “The International Economic Policy of Japan” in Robert A. Scalpino
(ed.), The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan ( Berkeley & Los Angeles: Univ. of Calif. Press,
1977), p. 223.
5 Takeo Doi relates the attitude in regard to dichotomous and opposing concepts in Japanese worldview to two Japanese cultural words, Omote (visible side) and Ura (invisible side). See
Takeo Doi, The Anatomy of Self: The Individual Versus Society (Tokyo: Kodansha International,
1985), p. 29.
6 For a brief but more focused elaboration of this see Seifudein Adem, “Japan and the Iraq
War”, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies , 2, 2, 2008, pp. 209-221.
7 G. De Vos, “Japan’s International Future”, in the Proceedings of the Second Tsukuba
International Symposium, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba City, Japan, p. 45.
8 For a discussion of this subject in a slightly different context see Seifudein Adem, “Cultures of Political Recycling and Conflict Resolution in Japan: Any Lessons for Africa?”
African and
Asian Studies , 4, 4, 2005, pp. 3-31.
9 William Nester ,
Nester, “The Third World in Japanese Foreign Policy’, in K. Newland
(ed.), The International Relations of Japan (Macmillan, London , 1990), p. 72.
10 “Japan’s statements at the UN”, observed Sunday Agbi, “reveals, undoubtedly, a revulsion of feelings against racism and apartheid in South Africa, but she was not willing to do anything that would injure the sensibilities of the South African government.” See Sunday O. Agbi,
Japanese Relations with Africa , 1868-1978 (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press), p. 32.
11 Heiginbotham and Samuels called the latest version of ‘seikei bunri’ the strategy of ‘double hedging’. See Eric Heiginbotham and Richard F. Samuels, “Japan’s Dual Hedge,”
Foreign
Affairs , 2002, 81, 5, 111.
12 Tokyo pursued similar policies not only in Africa but also more recently in Iraq,
Afghanistan and Indonesia, among other places. See Seifudein Adem, “Japan and the Iraq War:
Cultural and Theoretical Perspectives”,
International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies , 2,
2, 2008, pp. 209-221.
12

13 For detailed and authoritative account of the institutional evolution of Japan’s diplomacy in
Africa see Jun Morikawa, Japan: Big Business and Diplomacy ( London: Hurst , 1997).
14 Before 1973,” writes William Nester, “Japanese aid to Africa was never as much as 3 per cent of its total foreign aid.” William Nester, “The Third World in Japanese Foreign Policy’, in K.
Newland (ed.), The International Relations of Japan (Macmillan, London , 1990), p. 94.
15 For insights about US foreign policy during this period see Hanes Walton Jr., Robert L.
Stevenson and James B. Rosser Sr. (eds.) The African Foreign Policy of Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger: A Documentary Analysis ( Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007).
16 Quoted in Jun Morikawa, Japan: Big Business and Diplomacy (London: Hurst, 1997), p.
10.
17 Dennis T. Yasutomo, “Why Aid? Japan as an ‘Aid Great Power’,” Pacific Affairs , 62, 4, pp. 492-493.
18 Japan 1988, (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1989), p. 65 .
19 William Nester, “The Third World in Japanese Foreign Policy,” in K. Newland (ed.), The
International Relations of Japan (Macmillan, London, 1990), p. 94.
20 Peter J. Schrader et al., “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American,
Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows,” World Politics , 50, 2, 1998, p. 301. (PDF Internet).
21 For details see Jun Morikawa, Japan and Africa: Big Business and Diplomacy (London:
Hurst & Co. 1997, p. 67.
22 Jun Morikawa, Japan and Africa: Big Business and Diplomacy (London: Hurst & Co.
1997, p. 63.
23 Quoted in J. Oweye, Japan’s Policy in Africa (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press), p. 37
24 Inada has observed, for instance, that: “the increase in the Japanese economic aid to Sudan and Somalia [in the 1980s] was a reaction to the growing activities of the Soviet Union in
Ethiopia.” Juichi Inada, “Japan’s Aid Diplomacy: Economic, Political or Strategic?” in Kathleen
Newland (ed.) The International Relations of Japan (London Macmillan, 1990), p. 106.
25 There are 53 countries in Africa, accounting for nearly 30% of all the countries in the world; they carry considerable weight in the decision-making in the international for a, where in many cases voting is carried on a one-country-one-vote basis. In particular, since the establishment of the African Union (AU), Africa increasingly tends to vote as a single bloc, which further adds to Africa’s influence. See Diplomatic Bluebook 2006. Ministry of Foreign
Affairs , Japan (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2006), p. 120
26 See Seifudein Adem, “Emerging trends in Japan-Africa Relations,” African Studies
Quarterly , 6, 1, pp. 15, 2001.
27 In fact, even though TICAD was Japan’s idea, Japan also consults with about its diplomacy with the World ban and the UN. These organizations were actually co-sponsors of some of the
TICAD meetings. The Declaration of TICAD II issued in 1998 in part reads: “African countries will agree on and implement economic and structural reform programs supported by the Bretton
Woods institutions…” See The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Tokyo 1998. “African
Development Towards the 21 st Century: The Tokyo Agenda for Action”. As adopted on October
21, 1998. Internet source: www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad2/agenda21.html
Accessed
01/04/29
28 Dennis T. Yasutomo, “Why Aid? Japan as an ‘Aid Great Power’”, Pacific Affairs , 62, 4, pp. 490-503. Japan became the world’s largest bilateral aid donor in 1989. Japan remained the the top ODA donor in dollar terms from 1991 to 2001…” See David Arase, “Introduction,”
13

David Arase (ed.)
Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions
(London and New
York: Routledge, 2005), p. 1.
29 Ezra Vogel, “Pax Nipponica?” Foreign Affairs , 64, 4, 1986, 752-767.
30 Glibert Rozman,“Japan’s Quest for Great Power Identity”, Orbis ,. 46, 1, 2002. [Online]
31 The decade was dubbed the lost decade in Japan due to political and economic difficulties the nation encountered in the decade. But such characterization was retrospective rather than prospective . See M. Yoichi, Years of Trial: Japan in the 1990s (Tokyo: Japan Echo, 2000).
32 See, for instance, Hanns W. Maul, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers”,
Foreign Affairs , 69, 5, 1990, 91-106.
33 Youko Ishida, Afurika ni gensuteraru nihon , Tokyo: Soseisha, 2008, p. 138.
34 Tomohiko Taniguchi, Deputy Press Secretary of Japanese Foreign Ministry told Xinhua
Tuesday. “Conference for African development to start in Japan” Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/27/content_8264369.htm
accessed: May 28, 2008.
35 See Seifudein Adem, “Emerging Trends in Japan-Africa Relations,” Africa Studies
Quarterly , 5(2): 4. [online] URL: http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i12a4.htm
36 For a useful discussion of this issue in the context of US policy toward Africa see Ali A.
Mazrui, The African Predicament and the American Experience: A Tale of Two Edens (Westport,
Connecticut, London: Praeger, 2004), Chapter 2.
37 See Seifudein Adem, “Africa in Japanese Diplomatic Thought,” Journal of Black Studies ,
2008, http://jbs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/0021934708319522v1 .
38 This is the case despite the fact that some numerical indicators seem to indicate not only the continuation but even the consolidation of the “spirit” of TICAD, such as the rise in Japan’s bilateral ODA to sub-Saharan Africa from US $849.91 million in 2001 to US$2544. 54 million in
2006; 38 and to US $ 1,753 million in 2007. See Japan’s Development Assistance White Paper
2008. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2009), p. 110
39 David Arase, “Introduction,” David Arase (ed.) Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and
New Directions (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 3.
40 See Gregory Clark, “First Ban the Hawks, Then the Bomb”, The Japan Times , August 26,
2009, p. 13.
41 Mikka Pineda, “A New Deal”, Time , August 31, 2009, p. 21.
42 David Arase, “Introduction,” David Arase (ed.)
Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and
New Directions (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 1.
43 See Rana Foroohar, “Japan is Fading”, Newsweek , August 24 & 31, 2009, pp. 29-31.
44 See Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York and London: W. W. Norton,
2008); and Parag Khanna, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order
(New York: Random House, 2008) (Advance Reader’s Edition)
45 Howard Lehman, “Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy to Africa since the Tokyo International
Conference on African Development”, Pacific Affairs , 78, 3, p. 442.
46 Taro Aso, Jiyu to Hanei no Ko , Tokyo: Gentosha, 2007, p. 252.
47 Seifudein Adem, “Japan and China in Africa: Some Comparative Observations”, in
Kawabena Akurang-Parry (ed .), China in Africa (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press), Forthcoming.
See also Seifudein Adem, “The Paradox of China’s Policy in Africa”, Paper Presented at ISA-
BRIA Joint Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, July 22-24, 2009.
48 “ Hisane Msaki, “Japan Takes on China in Africa”, Asia Times Online , August 15, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/HH15Dh01.html accessed May 24 , 2008
49 Africa South of the Sahara 2009, 38 th Edition, London: Routledge, 2008, various pages.
14

50 See
Japan’s ODA White Paper 2008, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Tokyo: Urban Connections,
2009),p. 16 . Also see
“Japan to double development aid to Africa over 5 years as China raises profile” International Herald Tribune , May 20, 2008, source: http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/05/20/asia/AS-GEN-Japan-Africa-Development-Aid.php
accessed may 29, 2008
51 Japan’s ODA White Paper 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Tokyo: Urban Connections,
2008), p. 63.
52 Japan’s ODA White Paper 2008, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Tokyo: Urban Connections,
2009), p. 29.
53 Japan’s ODA White Paper 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Tokyo: Urban Connections,
2008), p. 61.
54 Japan’s ODA White Paper 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo: Urban Connections,
2008), p. 61.
55 It need to be noted, however, that despite Chinese heavy emphasis on infrastructural development in Africa, Japan’s record, too, is not much different. More than forty per cent of
Japan’s official economic aid to Africa between 1993 and 2003 was invested in the infrastructure sector . Youko Ishida, Afurika ni gensuteraru nihon (Tokyo: Soseisha, 2008), p. 138.
56 Japan’s ODA White Paper 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo: Urban Connections,
2008), p. 63
57 Japan’s ODA White Paper 2008 , Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo: Urban Connections,
2009), p. 63p. 25
58 See for instance Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu (eds.), Crouching Tiger and Hidden
Dragon? Africa and China (Cape Town: University of KwaZulu Natal Press, 2008).
59 Seifudein Adem (ed.) Japan: A Model and Partner , Leiden: Brill, 2006.
60 Shingetsu Institute, News Release from the DPJ Website, email received on August 30,
2009.
15