The Role of Inner Speech in Higher Mental Processes
Anke Werani
The functions of inner speech as an essential and important process that interrelates
speaking and thinking are discussed in this article. Since the foundation of
‘Cultural-Historical Psychology’ by Vygotsky, research on the relation and
connection between thinking and speaking has become more intense. Vygotsky
assumes that the research of speaking and thinking contains the comprehension of
complex functions of human consciousness (Vygotsky, 2002). In this context,
encompassing functions of speech and functions of consciousness, the interest in
inner speech has increased. Inner speech has, however, also become an important
research area for psycholinguistic studies. It has finally become clear that the role
of speech must be better integrated in the research of thinking processes, regulation
functions, language processes, consciousness, voluntary acts and the development
of personality.
Keywords: cultural-historical psychology - speaking and thinking - inner speech genesis of inner speech - functions of inner speech
Introduction – Psycholinguistic Research: a statement
Studies on inner speech are well known but inner speech is, unfortunately, a
neglected area in psycholinguistic and psychological research. This is surprising
given that speech plays such an important role in our lives: speech is used for
communication, but from a psycholinguistic point of view, it is also used for
cognitive processes (Vygotsky, 2002; Kegel, 1977). In the integration of
communicative and cognitive processes, inner speech interconnects both processes.
The aim of this text is to expound the functions of inner speech and reflect on those
concerning communicative and cognitive processes. Due to the ability to speak and
to use language, human beings develop consciousness: a consciousness that is
intimately connected with inner speech. Furthermore, the ability to use language is
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one that organizes our behavior via two fundamental functions: orientation and
regulation. It is assumed, that inner speech is involved in speech production
processes (communicative aspects) as well as in higher mental processes (cognitive
aspects).
In no other area of psychological research is speech so central for the examination
of mental processes as in Soviet Psychology. According to Hörmann (1976) Soviet
Psychology was never psycholinguistics in the sense that it had to prove the
psychological reality of linguistic theories and models. Psycholinguistic research
was long misunderstood as an ancillary science for linguistics as well as for
psychology. Thus it is important to realize that Soviet research involves many
aspects of speech psychology which must be understood as very intensive form of
psycholinguistic research. The question is whether there are, in fact, two kinds of
psycholinguistic research: on the one hand there is a more linguistically orientated
psycholinguistic which bases on the paradigm of cognitivism (e.g. Cutler, 2005);
on the other hand psycholinguistic research is based on the speaking, thinking and
acting human being. It is important and necessary to continue the Soviet research
in a psycholinguistic way and many work was done up to now (e.g. Wertsch, 1991;
Chaiklin, 2001).
With reference to Vygotsky (1986), three aspects of Soviet Psychology essential to
psycholinguistic research will be summarized and explained
shortly1: the
keywords are speech, development and social activity. These areas always interact
and are difficult to keep separate from each other. Nevertheless, I will try to focus
on these three points first.
As mentioned above, (inner) speech is necessary for communication as well as for
cognition. (Inner) speech is an important ability central to our consciousness
(generally) as well as necessary for higher mental functions (specifically). To focus
on speech processes as a fundamental mechanism for cognitive processes is a point
of view deviating from the mainstream research of psychology which needs to be
discussed with reference to cognitive sciences. Currently, cognitive sciences form
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the bulk of psychological research. In cognitivism the different abilities of the
human brain are divided into individual areas. Speech therefore is only a part of
cognition as for example awareness, memory, problem solving and so on (see for
example Anderson, 2001). In my opinion, it is a very formalized view when one,
for example, tries to look at the process of thinking as one of data processing.
Furthermore, it is a simplification of the thinking process to present the results in
quasi cybernetic models. Speaking is nothing other than one of the cognitive
processes. Speech is not accepted as a tool for cognitive processes. It appears
problematic to regard human abilities in such an isolated way. One has to primarily
consider human beings in a holistic way, and think about what constitutes humans
(Wertsch, 1988). From my psycholinguistic perspective, it is impossible, for
example, to be aware of oneself, to be able to remember or to solve problems
without speech. The central role of inner speech is to combine communicative and
cognitive skills and, furthermore, to point out that speech is a basic part of higher
mental processes and essential for them.
The historical method suggests that the research of higher mental processes must
take into account phylogenetic and ontogenetic aspects. This means that the
historical method includes the development process in the research of higher
mental processes. Vygotsky feels confident that human consciousness has a sociohistorical origin. The historical principle also highlighted the importance of
linguistic acting and combined it with the concept of internalization (Vygotsky,
2002).
One of Vygotsky’s basic assumptions is that individual consciousness develops
through relations with others, through social activity. Human consciousness and all
other higher mental processes therefore have a social genesis. Vygotsky’s
conviction is that an individual grows up interacting with his environment and his
culture. The influence of these socio-historical aspects must always be taken into
consideration when thinking about humans and their social and mental lives.
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The aspects of speech, development and social activity must always be seen in
connection to each other. The fundamental structure of speaking – of
communication - is dialogical; in other respects, the ability to speak would not be
conceivable. The dialogical structure starts with language acquisition: the
psychological parent teaches the child to speak; otherwise, the child is not able to
acquire language. That means we are not able to learn language independently.
Life starts with social interaction in the form of dialogical speech. Vygotsky
(2002) assumes that overt speech, particularly egocentric speech, is internalized in
early childhood. All externally produced utterances are internalized, that means all
dialogical structures ‘get inside’. In a smooth transition interpsychic processes
change into intrapsychic processes. Whenever we talk to ourselves, it might be a
part of our self or an imagined partner. Mead (1967, 1968) distinguishes between
‘I’ and ‘me’ where ‘I’ is the realised self, spontaneous and creative, and ‘me’ is the
part of oneself he calls the generalized other. The generalized other is a kind of
conscience; it is the majority opinion in us with all our cultural norms and values.
This includes the internalized imagination, how others see us and what they expect
from us.
Beside these aspects of development and the fundamental assumption of
interaction, humans usurp their mental processes by cultural social signs
(Vygotsky, 2002). ‘Like a tool the sign determines the structure of the mental
process which it affects’ (Matthäus, 1988, [translation aw]). Vygotsky points out
that human create new stimuli in the process of the work activity (beyond the
stimulus-response-pattern) which he designates as signs (e.g. numbers, words,
characters). Primarily signs have a social character since they serve communication
and thus determine social behavior. First, the word is like a command for others
and is furthermore a tool to regulate one’s own behavior. Then the child assumes
this behavior for itself, which has been shown to it by others (Matthäus, 1988). In
general, all mental processes are thus always social, derived from social signs. The
sign, Vygotsky stresses, affects its meaning and not its physical condition.
Vygotsky wishes to regard all mental function and human consciousness against
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the background of social, corporate and historical results. He establishes the
historical view in psychological research just as he does the concept of
internalization. Furthermore, signs are abstract. They are detached from direct
stimuli and could focus on oneself. Hence, not only external stimuli could initiate
behavior but also intended words. Vygotsky enlarges the stimulus-response-pattern
by introducing signs as mediating elements. The signs exist outside the individuals.
The system of signs is internalized in the course of development. The relation of
speaking and thinking is based on the social contact between humans.
Internalization of speech passes through three phases: social, egocentric and the
internalized phase. In general, higher mental processes are acquired through social
activity. Through social activity individuals develop and form mental functions.
Therefore, the higher functions lie outside the individual and they occur in
interpersonal relations. These social, interpersonal relations are transformed into
intrapersonal processes; this is the idea of internalization: all humans develop from
a social to an individual human. This assumption suggests that for the study of
psychological processes not only the individual or the individual psyche has to be
taken into consideration, but also the individual concerning its cultural
environment (cp. Wertsch, 1988).
In conclusion, explanations of consciousness and abstract thinking must be
analyzed closely with linguistic abilities. It is suspected that the roots of these
complex processes are found in the social existence forms of humans.
Consequently, the key-function of language is focused, which allows prescinding
characteristics from objects, to code them, and to generalize them. The basic
difference of this opinion compared with traditional psychology is that the sources
of human consciousness are neither found in the spirit’s depths nor in the
independently dealing mechanisms of the brain. The sources of consciousness are
sought in the real relationship of humans to their reality, in their social
development, which has to do naturally with working and speaking. Social work is
inseparably joined with the consciousness development of the human being and
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characterizes the life activity of the human being that starts new behavioral forms
above all with the division of work. These new behavioral forms are independent
from elementary biological motives. Work, and therewith division of work, brings
out the formation of social behavioral motives. Exactly in the context of all these
factors, humans create new, complex motives of action.
Finally, speaking with each other depends on at least two interlocutors: oneself and
another person. The other person could really exist, or he (they) could be imagined
through intrapsychic. The principle therefore is a dialogical structure and the
convinction that the fundamental structure of being is social. My focus is the
transition from interpsychic to intrapsychic processes. One theme is therefore the
genesis of inner speech; I will treat it at another date (Werani, in preparation). In
the following, I will expound on intrapsychological structures of human beings and
the role of inner speech. My research on inner speech always includes interpsychic
processes. Undoubtedly, inner speech is one of the most interesting themes of
psycholinguistic studies.
Functions of inner speech
Inner speech is a principal issue of psycholinguistic research. In this article I will
focus on the functions of inner speech and relate these functions to higher mental
processes. According to Wertsch (1988), Vygotsky distinguishes higher mental
processes by four characteristics: (1) internal instead of external regulation
(arbitrary), (2) consciousness, (3) social origin and social nature, (4) semiotic
mediation. The relatively autonomous cognitive system of an adult in a civilized
society is created by the collective regulation of acting. One fundamental tool for
higher mental processes is inner speech. Soviet psychologists describe inner
speech in a basic way (Vygotsky, 2002; Luria, 1982; Ananjew, 1963; Galperin,
1967a+b; Sokolov, 1972). Their point of view will be demonstrated below.
Vygotsky (2002) founded a widespread concept of inner speech. He was concerned
with the genesis of inner speech as well as its semantic and syntactic structure.2 His
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concept constitutes the background for all continuance, and therefore is
fundamental and groundbreaking for all psycholinguistic research.
Vygotsky deals with Piaget’s concept of egocentric speech. Vygotsky was able to
show that egocentric speech is a pre-stage of inner speech. Egocentric speech
increases when children are given problems and it helps them to solve problems.
‘Besides its role of accompaniment to activity and its expressive and release
functions, egocentric speech readily assumes a planning function, i.e., turns into
thought proper quiet naturally and easily.’ (Vygotsky, 1986, p 86).
It is easy to single out the functions of inner speech by Vygotsky because he
distinguishes two different situations whereby function can be deflected. First,
uttered speech represents ‘speech-for-others’; it is directed toward the social
activity, and it has a function for communication and thereby for behavioral
regulation of others. Second, inner speech is ‘speech-for-oneself’; it is directed
toward one’s own psychological activity and it becomes a function for selfregulation. Vygotsky speaks in general from a ‘mental orientation’ and about
‘becoming aware, overcoming difficulties and obstacles’. ‘It [inner speech] does
not merely accompany the child’s activity; it serves mental orientation, conscious
understanding; it helps in overcoming difficulties; it is speech for oneself,
intimately and usefully connected with the child’s thinking’ (Vygotsky, 1986, p
228).
Inner speech becomes a means for thinking; it is, according to Vygotsky, involved
in both communicative and cognitive processes and is therefore a transition from
speaking to thinking and vice versa.
Luria (1982) extended Vygotsky’s view by three aspects: (1) Investigation of inner
speech regarding its control function, (2) inclusion of neurophysiological processes
regarding psychological activity, which correspond in particular with language
disturbances after brain-damage, (3) consideration of syntax during language
acquisition (language production and reception). Luria emphasizes Vygotsky’s
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view that inner speech plays an important role for intellectual and behavioral
regulative functions.
Most important regarding inner speech is, according to Luria (1982), the volitional
act: ‘A volitional act is (…) mediated by speech. By this we mean not just external
speech as a means of communication, but also the child’s own regulative forms of
speech. A typical form of such regulative speech is the inner speech which
originates in external speech but evolves into a novel psychological formation.’
(Luria, 1982, p 106).
Luria is interested in the development of self-regulation and the function of
regulation of inner speech. The result of his research is a gradated differentiation of
this function. The basis of this development lies in the acquisition of the ability of
the child to subordinate itself to the language of the adult. ‘We have already said
that the source of self-regulative speech is the process whereby the child submits to
adults’ speech. The speech of the adult, often accompanied by pointing gestures,
brings about essential changes in the organization of the mental activity of the
child. Labeling by the mother and her pointing gestures focus the child’s
attention.’ (Luria, 1982, p 90).
I think it is an important step in language acquisition that the child no longer only
directs its attention coincidentally toward new attractions that appear but also is
directed by the speech of adults. This development, directing the child’s attention
through adult’s speech, begins with linguistically accompanied gestures and ends
in directing the child’s attention by linguistic gestures. Due to the language of the
adult, a restructuring of the child’s attention thus occurs. Language evokes an
orientation reflex (Luria, 1982, quotes here Bronstein and Bruner (1973)). The
mother connects the word with an object; thus, the reaction of the child takes a
specific form. The word of the adult becomes the regulator of the child’s behavior.
The organization of its behavior thus lifted onto a qualitatively higher level by the
word. This reaction can be reinforced when the adult strengthens his linguistic
expression by an action (e.g. the investigator not only names the object, but acts
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with it). However, the dullness of the action consistently prevents their linguistic
subordination. The regulating influence of speech is overridden, to a certain extent,
by the accomplished action.
The child has to subordinate its behavior to an adult’s verbal commands (Luria,
1982). It acquires a system of verbal instructions and begins to use these
instructions for the regulation of its own behavior. Then the structure between the
child and the adult changes fundamentally, with the commands becoming
intrapsychological and internalized. The child achieves a new level of behavioral
regulation – that of self-regulation. The child starts to regulate its behavior through
its own speech. The ability of self-regulation is realized through expanded speech,
which gradually turns inward and becomes inner speech.
Luria pointed out the emergency of language: language deepens and enriches one’s
direct perception and forms consciousness. In this case words are also involved in
building up mental processes (Luria & Judowitsch, 1970).
According to Luria this development could be summarized as follows: ‘… the
subordination of an act to verbal instruction is by no means simple and does not
emerge suddenly. Volitional acts, subordinated to the oral instruction of an adult,
develop gradually’ (Luria, 1982, p 96). Inner speech acquires in the course of
development an adjustment factor for all kinds of mental and applied acts. Speech
belongs to nearly all basic functions of human activity. Speech is involved in
acting and affords a new point of entry to the area of mental activity (Luria &
Judowitsch, 1970).
Inner speech is a substantial condition for the development of higher mental
processes and for thinking. On the one hand, thinking develops from action. On the
other hand, thinking functions more logically, if actions and uttered speech can be
internalized, abstracted and generalized. Luria assumes that inner speech has a
special status between uttered speech and thinking. It establishes a relationship
between thought and word, and mediates between thinking and speaking.
Furthermore, inner speech is involved in all language-dependent and language9
accompanying mental processes. Luria & Judowitsch (1970) explicate this
assumption as follows: ‘inner speech is involved in nearly all types of human
mental activity’ (p. 60, [translation aw]).
According to thinking processes, Luria (1992) agrees with Vygotsky’s and
Galperin’s phases of internalization: Thinking starts with a long range of external
acts, passing through the phase of uttered speech to the phase of unfolded inner
speech, which allows for the regulation of searching processes. Finally, these
processes achieve a phase of internalization, shortening and condensation of the
external searching processes.
Luria argues, apart from these genetic and functional aspects, with the allocation of
internal speaking to brain-anatomical areas. He is interested, which cerebral
mechanisms underlie the conscious volitional acts in humans - the question of the
cerebral organization of the volitional act.
Luria enriches his considerations of inner speech using two research areas. First, he
focuses on the development of inner speech in growing children. Second, he is
interested in neuropsychological phenomena, especially in aphasic patients (cp.
Werani, 2003b). Both introduce new aspects for a theory of inner speech. Very
important is Luria’s work about the regulative function of inner speech. Thus he
moves Vygotsky’s assumption (mental orientation is the most important process of
inner speech) a step forward. Luria therefore feels confident that inner speech is a
substantial precondition for the development of higher mental nervous activities
and for thinking. He regarded inner speech as a relevant engine for all further
mental activity.
Ananjew (1963) states his own theory of inner speech in the context of his theory
on the psychology of sensual realization. Apart from the control-function of inner
speech he singles out that inner speech is important for the development of
personality. Ananjew understands inner speech as a form of verbal thinking and
verbal-logical memory, rejecting the one sided opinion that inner speech is only
intellectual.3
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Inner speech is the result of internal motivation and moral self-awareness of the
particular personality. From this point of view, inner speech is a mechanism of
consciousness. ‘Through inner speech, all connections of the personality are
presented; therefore it is one of the general mechanisms of consciousness which
changes depending on the different levels of self-development, and the changes of
the objective content of activity.’ (Ananjew, 1963, S. 333, [translation aw]). That
means inner speech changes according to the different levels of self-development.
A central focus of Ananjew’s research is the connection between inner speech and
personality.
Apart from functions of speech, Ananjew is concerned with the function of
writing. From his point of view, inner speech depends on the particular speech
modality, i.e. speaking, listening, writing or reading. Depending on the modality in
which speech activity unfolds the form of inner speech changes. According to
Ananjew, reading and writing have a substantial influence on the training of inner
speech. Ananjew was a critic of Vygotsky in general; here he criticizes Vygotsky’s
one-sided orientation concerning (oral) uttered speech.
Ananjew uses pathological phenomena to confirm his assumption like Luria.
Regarding speaking and writing, inner speech indicates that humans who are less
literate, exhibit specific inner speech characteristics.
Ananjew, however, does not only distinguish between speaking and writing, but
also between speech production and perception. Thus, he points out, for example,
that during listening and reading the subtext is characteristic. By subtext he means
the translation into one’s own semantic structure using a concrete meaning of an
unfamiliar statement made by someone else. Such a translation depends on the
intellectual development and the basic attitude of the listener and reader (Ananjew,
1963).
Apart from the four linguistic modalities, Ananjew concentrates on further facets
of inner speech. The diverse transitions in connection with the individual
modalities lead to the assumption of an extremely complex process. Ananjew
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summarizes as follows: ‘Speaking and listening, reading and writing are not only
different forms of speaking, but also different ways that the speaker expresses his
personality. Therefore, the forms of inner speech, its mechanisms and phases of
processes, are always specific, and depend namely on the particular speech
activity’ (Ananjew, 1963, p 352; [translation aw]).
Ananjew agrees with Vygotsky on the fact that inner speech has a planning
function. This function refers to uttered speech as well as to acting. Inner speech
stands in close proximity to uttered speech. Furthermore, the phaseal character of
inner speech while speaking or acting represents a transition from the unconscious
to the conscious. Through this phaseal process the sense of linguistic thinking does
not always become immediately conscious. On this account the sense of a thought
often could not be expressed immediately, neither spoken nor written. In this way
Ananjew explains ‘expression difficulties ‘. In his opinion it is a matter of
contradictions between uttered and inner speech. If there are direct expressions in
the initial phase of inner speech, this will result in spurious actions such as
concealing, a slip of the tongue or a writing error (Ananjew, 1963).
In conclusion, Ananjew introduces some extending elements to the theory of inner
speech. The strong ideological adjustment, that is to say Ananjew’s extremely
mechanistic assumption, is certainly problematic, marked by his ignoring the
idealistic view. This expresses itself mainly in the criticism of Vygotsky. Ananjew
accuses Vygotsky of a too rationalistic approach, or a too cognitive approach.
According to Ananjew the sensual aspects can not be excluded, but rather represent
a fundamental point of view. Among the theory extending aspects, for example, the
consideration of the four modalities ranks highly (speaking, hearing, writing,
reading). Ananjew assumes that the structure of inner speech depends on the
modality used and exhibits thus another structure. The spoken word differs from
the written word because of the different underlying inner speech processes. This is
an important point if you think about the development and the formation of inner
speech. The frequently used oral system always depends on the situation, the
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current context. For the written modality the context must first be unfolded. This
requires a much more pronounced and differentiated linguistic form. Thus, written
language is rightfully regarded as the form with the greatest possible influence on
inner speech. I think it is very important to consider the influence of literacy on the
development of inner speech for each individual person.
However, speaking and writing is only one side of the speech process. Ananjew
also mentions the receptive side of listening and reading. As with speaking, each
individual’s level of literacy influences the receptive processes, listening and
reading. However, I want to stress the dynamic process of inner speech. Depending
on the modality and the linguistic level, inner speech adapts to these conditions.
Ananjew’s observations open up the research in the theoretical formation of inner
speech in two further directions. First, the assumption that inner speech has
different functions in each modality offers a new look at the research on speech
processing. Second, the opinion that inner speech is involved in the development
of personality connects it to personality research and leads to the interesting
question of whether (inner) speech influences the development of personality.
Further research must be done in both areas. Finally, Ananjew describes inner
speech as a ‘general expression of the personality’ and concomitantly ‘the basic
attitude of life’ (convictions, needs, interests, taste, inclinations etc.) (Ananjew,
1963, p 353, [translation aw]). The Soviet imprint is without a doubt present here
in that speech is the defining element which makes humans human and which
affects all higher mental processes.
Galperin (1967a und b, 1972) is concerned with the development of inner speech
in the context of his learning theory. He assumes that the inner speech functions
serve to regulate behavior and create intellectual activities. Galperin is interested in
the investigation of internalization processes, or in other words how mental
activities are built-on by inner speech. He founded the theory of stage-wise
development of mental activities. Galperin distinguishes between three phases of
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action: (1) the provision of a basis for orientation, (2) the actual proceedings
(which include the different stages), (3) control action.
He assumes that the basic condition for all psychological activity is the orientation
of the individual. The actual proceedings consist of five stages which can be
summarized as follows: Each mental activity emanates from a material or
materialized action. These outside material actions are accompanied by speaking
and finally go on to the stage of unfolded speaking. If this unfolded stage is
reached, speaking is shortened and internalized. Inner speech serves to organize
complicated intellectual activities which Galperin called mental actions. Mental
actions are to a certain extent basic modules of the intellectual activity of humans.
Mental actions result, according to Galperin, from shortened speech. Thoughts are
embodied by inner speech processes. The function of mental activity consists of
understanding outside activities and regulating the corresponding behavior. Mental
actions become possible through inner speech and so do thinking. The control
phase is the concluding action phase (Galperin, 1972).
In my opinion, Galperin’s theory is particularly interesting in the context of
learning theories. His representation of the development through stages of mental
actions describes an extremely plausible model of internalization. He explains how
inner speech could be formed by uttered speech. Acting with an instructor, a good
insight into action, and the correct linguistic designation of the actions lead to an
internal form, favoring the automation of actions. Galperin’s theory argues clearly
for the fact that uttered speech forms inner speech and hence thinking and acting.
Furthermore, Galperin gives a reference to the fact that shortened speech first leads
uttered speech and then inner speech towards automated as well as mental actions,
and thus thinking. One interpretation could lead to the assumption that thinking is
non-linguistic because thinking is based on internalized automated actions. This is
possible, but if one encounters difficulties, it will be feasible to return to an earlier
stage; e.g. the learner verbalizes his thinking or starts acting with a material object.
Furthermore, the instructor can perform the action using earlier stages while
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speaking to the learner. This seems to be a key place: the way of speaking seems to
be a criterion to form humans authorized to act.
The question arises, of what practical use these findings are. This applies in
particular to language acquisition, i.e. considerations must be given to the way in
which children learn to speak, learn to communicate and learn to internalize speech
in such a manner that it can be made usable for thinking. To a certain extent the
optimization of inner speech during language acquisition must be considered.
Galperin’s theory lends itself well here because the process going from the
material action through uttered speech to inner speech adapts closely to the process
of language acquisition.
In fact, to assume that inner speech is a process makes it difficult to observe and to
describe. However, from my point of view, thoughts represent the complete
evaporation of the word. In the reverse direction, a condensation occurs analogous
to thoughts being put into words; the unconscious elements of internal mental
processes are of a non-linguistic kind. Speech, in particular inner speech, provides
a basis to make mental content conscious.
Finally, Sokolov (1971, 1972) has a somewhat different view on inner speech. He
distinguishes between inner speech, which serves as a tool for thinking, and
unfolded inner speech (inner talking), which is relevant for speech production and
comprehension. Thus, Sokolov connects inner speech not only with thinking, but
also with speech processing. He states that the study of inner speech has been
predominantly theoretical in character, touching on the general issues related to the
genesis of inner speech and its syntactic and semantic structure. 4 Sokolov himself
was highly interested in an empirical study of inner speech.
Sokolov agrees with Vygotsky when he defines inner speech as speaking to
oneself. In short inner speech is a tool for thinking: to a certain extent inner speech
organizes thinking, supports its purposeful character and serves the logical
completion of thinking. Above all, inner speech serves the logical arrangement of
thinking. ‘According to Vygotsky, in all its principal attributes and aspects 15
genetic, structural, and functional - inner speech is a very special and unique
psychological phenomenon: it is ‘the living process of the birth of thought in the
word’ and, such, reflects an extremely complex relationship between thinking and
speech, their paradoxical unity’ (Sokolov, 1972, p. 46).
In the opinion of Sokolov, inner speech is a highly dynamic structure which
changes steadily in the course of development. Apart from the shortened structure,
inner speech is becoming increasingly more coded. ‘Internal speech organizes and
directs this thought, maintains its purposive character and leads to a logical
completion of the whole process. It is a form of speech, which possesses a highly
dynamic and changeable structure and is adapted to the performance of the
functions of thinking’ (Sokolov, 1971, S. 90f).
Sokolov (1971, 1972) directs his empirical research toward inner speech and quiet
reading. During these activities he made electromyographic measurements. He
assumes that inner speech is accompanied by weak motor speech activation, and
with this observation he has introduced research into the linguistic mechanism of
thinking. In summary, his investigations have shown intensified motor speech
impulses, where the subject has had to accomplish new and complex tasks (e.g.
complex problem solving). A reduction of motor speech impulses was observed, if
the thinking processes had already been generalized and automated. Sokolov
concluded that these action potentials measured at the speech organs are typical for
the linguistic character of thinking processes. A further interesting observation was
that during an excessively demanding mental task, when the subject was, for
example, unable to solve a problem, the motor speech impulses decreased abruptly.
According to Sokolov inner speech represents an important basic mechanism for
thinking processes. The functions of inner speech embody a precise selection,
generalization and storage of sensor information. Thinking and speaking are
nevertheless to be equated, because thinking is based on a constant interaction
between verbal and sensory information; but in a certain way, thinking exceeds
speaking.
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In summary, Sokolov represents, as regards inner speech, the motor-kinesthetic
hypotheses, which he seeks to support with his electromyographic investigations.
His findings are extremely important for inner speech research because he was able
to show that the electromyographic potential depends on several factors, such as if
the task is novel or very complex. Furthermore, it is of interest that the
electromyographic potentials do not increase continuously, but rather rise and fall.
These findings attest to the fact that inner speech not only rises according to the
complexity of the task, but also falls or stays at the same level, if the task is
excessively complex for the subject. It becomes evident that inner speech is not a
by-product of thinking, but rather an active mechanism which regulates and
organizes thinking.
Sokolov`s issue is of course that he assigned a large range of possible applications
for inner speech. Beside shortened inner speech, which is regarded as a tool for
thinking and particularly for the logical arrangement of thinking, unfolded inner
speech is responsible for speaking, articulation, and therefore closer to parts of
general speech processing.
Conclusion
A substantial merit not to say the merit of the Soviet psychology is to emphasize
the meaning of linguistic processes for all further mental functions. Specifically,
the functions of inner speech can be sized up as follows. Inner speech has
functional references to both the communicative mediated speaking aspects and the
cognitive mediated thinking aspects. Inner speech seems to be a link between
communicative and cognitive abilities. The summary of the functions of inner
speech, as described by the different authors, is arranged in table 1.
The communicative aspects move into focus, if questions about the genesis of
inner speech are asked. According to Vygotsky, the first function of speech is
communication in order to regulate social acting. Therefore, communication plays
a central role because, in short, speaking develops out of social speech acts. This
communicative structure is fundamental for language acquisition: without a
17
dialogical structure we are not able to acquire speech. Uttered (common) speech is
internalized and thus transforms into inner speech. Social acting means that the
psychological parents is responsive to the expressions of the child, and tries to
perceive their intention.5 The psychological parent carries out the regulative
function of speech and thus the regularization of behavior through the use of
words. The word thereby attains a qualitatively higher level. The child acquires a
system of verbal instructions, which it can use to regulate its behavior. These
processes of development finally lead the child to self-regulation (Luria). Thus, the
dialogical structure of (uttered) communication plays a fundamental role; inner
speech develops out of internalized communicative acts. We are not able to
mention speaking in another way; speech consists of speaking to other people as
well as speaking to oneself. In construing this idea precisely, learning does not
seem to be possible without this dialogical principle. Dialogues not only take place
between interlocutors, but also as soliloquists (speech is also addressed to an
internalized, imagined being) or in discourse between readers and books. Dialogue
is thereby a fundamental element of social interaction and it exists from birth.
It is expected that the internalized form becomes richer, and it alternates between
the learning perspective and the perspective of teaching. Galperin, for example,
closely links the development of inner speech to communication between
instructor and learner. Furthermore, communicative aspects in language production
and reception are attributed to the relevant functions of inner speech (Ananjew,
Sokolov).
Regarding the cognitive aspects, inner speech is a powerful entity between
thinking and speaking; here inner speech is regarded close to all cognitive
processes. This is shown in expressions, in which inner speech is generally
accepted as being necessary for thinking (Vygotsky) or more specifically as a tool
for thinking (Galperin, Sokolov). Inner speech also plays a role in the organization
of complex intellectual activities (Galperin). It is a form of the verbal-logical
memory, which is qualified by special convictions, world views and by the moral
18
self-confidence (Ananjew). A very central function of inner speech can be
summarized by regularization. Inner speech serves in the orientation (Vygotsky),
the self-regulation (regulation of behavior) as well as in the control of intellectual
and behavioral elements (Luria, Galperin). Inner speech is needed for becoming
conscious of difficulties (reflection) and for overcoming them (problem solving)
(Vygotsky, Luria). However, regarding these planning processes inner speech
assumes another substantial function (Ananjew). Inner speech is involved in the
formation of our consciousness (Luria), that is closely connected with the
formation of volitional acts and the personality (Luria, Ananjew).
This highly shortened final representation of the functions of inner speech make
clear that inner speech and higher mental processes are closely connected. Inner
speech is an important phenomenon which must be considered in the research of
higher mental processes. Inner speech is an instrument for thinking as well as an
instrument for regulation. Regulation refers to aspects such as orientation,
apperception, reflection, regulation of behavior, planning, and problem solving.
Furthermore, inner speech affects all aspects of language processing (production
and reception). And finally inner speech is responsible for the formation of
consciousness, volitional acts and personality.
Vygotsky could be considered as the founder of the studies of inner speech. His
fundamental ideas about inner speech were later revisited and further developed by
his pupils. The continuation and advancement of the Soviet school should, in my
opinion, be a priority of psycholinguistic research. This would present a challenge
in three different research areas: First, the continuation of theoretical arguments
regarding the role of linguistic processes in all cognitive functions (e.g. a closer
interlocking of linguistic and cognitive processes). Second, the empirical study of
inner speech as key to understanding cognitive processing. Third, the practiceoriented transfer of research results (e.g. the formation of language in a common
manner, and the optimization of inner speech in a special way); each case should
be related to the needs and the development of the individual.
19
Author
Functions of inner speech
Vygotsk
 Mental orientation
y
 Realization and effort of difficulties/constraints
 Speak for oneself
 Thought
Luria
 Enrichment of the direct apperception
 Direct attention (orientation)
 Self-regulation (regulation of all mental and
behavioral action)
 Regulation (particularly intellectual and behavioral
elements)
 Connector between thought and word
 Formation of consciousness
 Formation of volitional acts
Ananjew
 Common mechanism of consciousness, closely
connected with personality and development of
personality
 A kind of verbal-logical memory, affected by
special convictions, world views and the moral selfconsciousness.
 Function of planning
 Formation of speech (speaking, listening) and
writing (writing and reading) as well as language
production and reception.
Galperin
 Instrument of thinking
 Create complex intellectual activities (= mental
action)
20
 Regulations of behavior
Sokolov
 Instrument of thinking (abbreviated inner speech)
 Language comprehension and production (unfolded
inner speech (inner talking))
 Fundamental mechanism for thinking: precise
selection, generalization und storage of sensory
information.
Summar
The involvement of inner speech with higher mental
y
processes contains:
by
Werani
 Instrument of thinking
 Regulation (containing: orientation, apperception,
reflection,
regulation
of
behavior,
planning,
problem solving)
 Language processing (containing: production, and
reception)
 Formation of consciousness
 Formation of volitional acts
 Formation of personality
Table 1: Summary of the functions of inner speech.
References
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Footnotes
1
For an introduction to “Cultural-Historical Psychology” see for example
Wertsch (1988), Keiler (1997, 2002) or Werani (2003a).
2
Structure and genesis of inner speech is not the issue of this article.
3
Ananjew defeats a purely abstract and formalistic way of treatment of inner
speech (in particular Vygotskys view, which it rejects as purely rationalistic
hypothesis).
4
Sokolov agrees with the work of Vygotsky, Ananjew and Blonski, and with
their opinion that inner speech plays an important role for linguistic thinking and
for linguistic-logical memory.
5
The term social acting is chosen in differentiation to Vygotsky’s term social
speech, because the child does not use social speech in the beginning. It is the
psychological parent, which fulfils the social acting by speaking and interpreting
the situation.
24