YU, the RCA and the
Korean War Dilemma:
Treatment of the Ill Part III
By Rabbi Joshua Flug
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I.
II.
Introduction- The last few shiur outlines have discussed treatment of the ill. In this
shiur outline, we will discuss how far one must go to avoid pikuach nefesh situations.
The focus of the shiur outline will be a question that arose during the Korean war in
which the U.S. military approached the RCA and YU to provide Orthodox chaplains
to the military. While the RCA and YU were very supportive, some students
protested to Dr. Belkin who was then president of YU, claiming that military service
will certainly entail violation of Shabbos, kashrus and other areas of Halacha. Dr.
Belkin turned to R. Yosef D. Soloveitchik (1903-1993) for a response. [R.
Soloveitchik's letter appears in Community, Covenant and Commitment. Click here to
see the letter.] Additionally, we will discuss a series of cases where there is an
inconvenient way to avoid violating Shabbos. How far must one go to avoid
violating Shabbos when there is an alternative?
Is there a prohibition against entering life threatening situations on Shabbos?
a. The Beraisa states that you can't enter a ship for a d'var reshus within three days
of Shabbos. For a d'var mitzvah, one may even enter the ship on erev Shabbos.
{1}
b. The Rishonim give numerous explanations for this Beraisa:
i. Tosafos quote Rashbam (c. 1085-1158) that the Beraisa follows the
opinion of Beis Shammai that you can't initiate melacha on erev Shabbos
that will continue into Shabbos. We hold like Beis Hillel and therefore, it
is not an issue to enter a ship on erev Shabbos even for a d'var reshus. {2}
ii. Tosafos then quote the Ritzba (brother of Rash MiShantz 12th- 13th
century) that the reason for the prohibition against entering the ship is part
of the same gezeira against swimming on Shabbos which is a concern that
he make a boat on Shabbos.
iii. Rif (1013-1103)- The issue is that it takes three days for sea-sickness to
pass. We don't want someone to be sick on Shabbos because it will ruin
his oneg Shabbos. However, if it is for a d'var mitzvah we employ the
principle that one who is involved in a mitzvah is exempt from other
mitzvos. {3}
iv. R. Zerachiah HaLevi (Ba'al HaMa'or c. 1125-1186) - The reason why it is
prohibited to enter the ship is that when you are on a ship on Shabbos, you
are called on to perform tasks in order to ensure that the ship doesn't
capsize. Although it is for the purpose of pikuach nefesh, you shouldn't
put yourself in that situation for a d'var reshus because it looks as if you
are trying to violate Shabbos. If it is not within three days, the obligation
of worrying about Shabbos is not yet upon you and it doesn't appear as if
you are trying to violate Shabbos. It is only permissible to enter a
situation where you know you are going to violate Shabbos for pikuach
nefesh when you are doing it for a d'var mitzvah. {4}
c. Shulchan Aruch's psak
i. In terms of pshat in the Beraisa, Shulchan Aruch codifies Rif's
explanation.{5}
ii. Nevertheless, Shulchan Aruch accepts Ba'al HaMa'or's principle as a
halachic truth even if it is not the pshat in the beraisa. Therefore, one may
not enter a situation knowing that he is going to have to violate Shabbos
for pikuach nefesh unless it is for a d'var mitzvah. 6}
d. The Apparent Contradiction in Ba'al HaMaor's opinion:
i. Ba'al HaMaor's principle seems to contradict a comment that he makes
regarding milah:
1. We follow the opinion of Chachamim that you can only violate
Shabbos for the milah itself and not machshirei milah.
2. One of the items necessary for the milah is hot water. In the time
of Chazal, they considered it a sakanah if you don't rinse the milah
with hot water both before and after the milah.
3. The Gemara implies that if you don't have hot water for the milah,
the milah is delayed until Sunday. {7}
4. Ba'al HaMa'or discusses a case where you have enough hot water
for the pre-milah treatment but not for the post-milah treatment.
On the one hand, you can argue that you perform the milah and
then when the milah is finished, you have a situation of pikuach
nefesh and you heat water on Shabbos in order to save the infant's
life. {8}
a. This in fact is the opinion of Ramban (1194-1270). {9}
5. Ba'al HaMa'or concludes that you cannot perform the milah in this
situation because you can't perform a milah knowing that you will
have to violate Shabbos afterwards to heat the water.
6. This statement seems to contradict his ruling regarding entering the
ship. With regards to entering the ship, as long as it is a d'var
mitzvah, you can enter into a situation of pikuach nefesh. Why
then is it prohibited to perform milah, a mitzvah which itself is
docheh Shabbos, simply because you will have to violate Shabbos
for pikuach nefesh?
e. R. Soloveitchik's analysis of Ba'al HaMa'or's opinion.
i. Providing chaplains to the military certainly constitutes a d'var mitzvah
and therefore, based on Ba'al HaMa'or's comment regarding entering a
ship, one can allow entering into a chaplaincy knowing that one would
have to violate Halacha for the purpose of pikuach nefesh. However,
Ba'al HaMa'or's comment regarding milah implies that you can't enter a
situation of pikuach nefesh even for a d'var mitzvah.
ii. R. Soloveitchik provides three solutions to this problem:
1. In the case of entering the ship, the question is whether it is
permissible to enter before Shabbos. In the case of the milah, the
situation is created on Shabbos itself. When you create the
situation while the issur is actively in effect, it is worse and is not
permissible even for a d'var mitzvah.
2. Mahari Ben Lev notes that it is only permissible to enter the boat if
there is a doubt as to whether one will have to violate Shabbos. If
one is certain that he will have to violate Shabbos, it is prohibited
to enter the boat (This answer is not given to resolve the
contradiction, but its ramifications are addressed). {10} As such it
III.
is possible that the reason why Ba'al HaMaor prohibits the milah is
that it is certain that one would have to heat the water after the
milah.
3. Ba'al HaMaor implies that milah is a unique case because there is a
specific exclusion of machshirei milah on Shabbos. As such, if
one of the necessary preparations for the milah is missing, you
can't initiate a milah. Even though in other areas of Shabbos one
could argue that you can enter a situation of pikuach nefesh for a
d'var mitzvah, milah is different because it is specifically excluded.
iii. Applications to the case at hand
1. If the question is whether you enter the situation during the time of
the prohibition or not, that would certainly be helpful for Shabbos
purposes because nobody enlists on Shabbos itself. However, it
does not help for areas of kashrus and other negative prohibitions
that have no set time.
2. If the question is whether there will certainly be a violation of the
Torah for pikuach nefesh, it would be prohibited to enlist because
the assumption is that inevitably you will have to violate some
prohibition for pikuach nefesh.
3. If the question is whether we are dealing with milah or other areas
of Halacha, there is no prohibition to enlist as a chaplain.
iv. R. Soloveitchik favored the third approach in understanding Ba'al
HaMaor's position and therefore concluded that it was a mitzvah to enlist
as a chaplain.
How far must one go in order to avoid a situation of pikuach nefesh?
a. There are a number of psakim of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (1910-1995)
quoted in Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasa with a common theme:
i. If a choleh needs a candle, you can light a candle, even if there is a candle
available at the neighbor's house, if removing the candle from the
neighbor will cause the neighbor distress. {11}
ii. If a choleh needs food on Shabbos, you can cook for the choleh even if a
neighbor has the necessary food, but taking the food from the neighbor
will cause them to have no hot food on Shabbos. {12}
iii. It is permissible to phone an ambulance on Shabbos, even though the
choleh has a neighbor who can drive, but by driving he will be away from
his home the entire Shabbos (because he can't drive back). {13}
iv. If electric wires fall in a public area, it is permissible to call the electric
company even though you can prevent any danger by standing near the
wires and warning people to stay away. {14}
b. Rav Pinchas Epstein (former Dayan of the Eidah Charedis) questions these
rulings: In all of these cases, there is an obligation on the part of the one who has
the means to save the life of another individual. Why then should we even factor
in his inconvenience in making decisions? He should have to inconvenience
himself in order to save someone else's life?
c. R. Shlomo Zalman's response: (The teshuva is printed in Minchas Shlomo, no. 7,
which can be found by clicking here)
i. Whether pikuach nefesh on Shabbos is hutrah or dechuyah, there is no
aveirah involved when one violates Shabbos to save a life. Therefore, if
someone is in a life threatening situation and there are two means of
alleviating the situation, one which involves melacha and the other
involves less melacha or no melacha at all, but comes at the expense of
something else, you can choose either option because both are permissible.
{15}
ii. There are a number of applications to this idea. R. Shlomo Zalman uses
the fact that we are not machmir for these applications as proof to this
idea.
1. We don't find any obligation for someone who is instructed by a
physician to eat on Yom Kippur to hook himself up to an IV so
that he can fulfill the physician's orders and still fast on Yom
Kippur. The fact that we don't do this is proof that there is no
obligation to find an alternative means when that means comes
with an expense.
2. We don't find an obligation for a woman who is in her ninth month
of pregnancy to rent a room near the hospital so that she doesn't
have to violate Shabbos if she ends up going to the hospital on
Shabbos. If there were an obligation to avoid violation of Shabbos
even at monetary expense, all women in their ninth month would
be required to rent a hotel room near the hospital, even if it is very
expensive. {16}
a. Mishna Berurah does note that a woman in her ninth month
should prepare her belongings before Shabbos in order to
minimize violation of Shabbos. {17} R. Shlomo Zalman
thinks that this is an added stringency. {18}
iii. There is a comment of R. Avraham Gombiner (c.1633-1683) which
seems to contradict this ruling:
1. R. Yosef Karo (1488-1575) in Shulchan Aruch rules that if
enemies come to surround a city, even if their stated intention is to
steal money, you can consider it pikuach nefesh because they are
prepared to kill those who try to defend their money. {19}
2. Magen Avraham questions Shulchan Aruch's ruling: Why not just
let them take the money and then there is no need to violate
Shabbos? Magen Avraham answers that in reality, a private
individual should do that. However, here we are dealing with the
entire community and there will inevitably be someone who won't
be able to resist his need to defend his money. Therefore, we can
violate Shabbos to save that individual. {20}
3. According to Magen Avraham, it seems that one who is in a
situation of pikuach nefesh and there is an alternative means to
avoid violation of Shabbos that comes at some expense, one should
choose the alternative means.
iv. R. Shlomo Zalman questions Magen Avraham's position from the case of
haba b'machteres.
1. The Torah states that if someone is digging a tunnel into a house to
rob a house, it is permissible to neutralize him, even using lethal
means. {21} This is because we assume that the property owner is
going to try to defend his money and the thief is prepared to kill
anyone who tries to stop him. {22}
2. The Beraisa states that this applies even on Shabbos. {23} R.
Shlomo Zalman notes that the chiddush of stating that this applies
even on Shabbos is that one could have argued that on Shabbos, it
is preferable to give up your money rather than to neutralize the
thief on Shabbos. Nevertheless, it is permissible to defend your
money despite the fact that you have two alternatives. First, you
can neutralize him. Second, you can allow him to take your
money. The explanation is that the Torah permits you to neutralize
him and therefore, you don't have to find an alternative means if it
is going to come at some other expense, i.e. your property. The
same principle should be applied to pikuach nefesh on Shabbos.
Since it is permissible to violate Shabbos for pikuach nefesh, one
does not have to find alternative means that will minimize the issur
when those means come at the expense of something else. {24}
v. R. Shlomo Zalman's dilemma:
1. Suppose you had the following situation: Reuven threatens Shimon
on Shabbos to either give Reuven his money or pick a fruit from a
tree and if not Reuven will kill Shimon. Because Reuven has
threatened Shimon, Shimon has the right to neutralize Reuven,
similar to the case of haba b'machteres and the ruling of Shulchan
Aruch. However, in this situation, Shimon can spare Reuven's life
by simply picking the fruit off of the tree. Yet, this solution has its
own problem in that if there is a choice of picking a fruit from a
tree or giving up one's money, one must give up his money rather
than pick the fruit. How then can he pick the fruit, when he should
be giving the money? But then, once you assert that you have to
give up the money in order to avoid picking the fruit, you should
be able to kill Reuven? [The schematic for this dilemma is in the
source sheet. {25}]
2. According to Magen Avraham, this is not a dilemma because he
would say to give up the money.
3. Nevertheless, R. Shlomo Zalman thinks that there is a solution to
this dilemma. It depends on Shimon's intention. If he intends to
neutralize Reuven given no other option, then one can view
picking the fruit as a means of saving Reuven's life and stopping
his pursuit of Shimon. However, if Shimon has no option of
neutralizing Reuven and his only real choice is to give up the
money, then he may not pick the fruit instead, because he is not
doing so in order to save Reuven but rather to save his own money.
{26}
vi. R. Shlomo Zalman's conclusion:
1. R. Shlomo Zalman initially suggests that the dispute between
Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avraham is contingent on the dispute
between Ramban and Ba'al HaMaor regarding milah (mentioned in
the previous section). According to Ramban, you can enter into a
situation where you will be forced to violate Shabbos because of
pikuach nefesh. According to the Ba'al HaMaor, it is prohibited in
certain situations. Similarly, one can suggest that Shulchan Aruch
follows the same line of thinking as Ramban that there is no
problem to be in a situation of pikuach nefesh and therefore, one
does not need to find alternative means to get out of them. Magen
Avraham follows Ba'al HaMaor's opinion that one should try to
avoid them. R. Shlomo Zalman rejects this for two reasons:
a. Ba'al HaMaor seems to agree that on a D'oraisa level, there
is no requirement to avoid the situation. Magen Avraham
implies that even on a D'oraisa level, one must avoid these
situations.
b. Ba'al HaMaor only prohibits getting into this situation.
Magen Avraham requires you to get out of the situation.
2. R. Shlomo Zalman suggests that Magen Avraham is consistent
with his own opinion in codifying the opinion of Mahari Ben Lev
(previous section) that when there is definitely going to be a
violation of Shabbos, it is prohibited to enter a ship even for a d'var
mitzvah. {27} One sees from Magen Avraham that he is of the
opinion that pikuach nefesh situations must be avoided at all costs.
3. R. Shlomo Zalman then shows that although poskim quote Magen
Avraham regarding Mahari Ben Lev's psak, it may be an added
stringency and therefore, one may be lenient regarding the case of
the siege.
‫‪ .1‬גמ' שבת יט‪.‬‬
‫‪ .5‬שלחן ערוך או"ח רמח‪:‬ב‬
‫‪ .6‬שלחן ערוך או"ח רמח‪:‬ד‬
‫‪ .2‬תוספות עירובין מג‪ .‬ד"ה הלכה‬
‫פסק רשב"ם דמותר ליכנס בספינה מבע"י בערב שבת‬
‫אפילו שהספינה הולכת חוץ לתחום בשבת דספינה ממילא‬
‫אזלא ואיהו לא מידי עביד ובלבד שלא יצא חוץ לספינה‬
‫והספינה כולה כארבע אמות והא דתניא סוף פ"ק דשבת‬
‫(דף יט‪ ).‬אין מפליגין בספינה פחות משלשה ימים אתיא‬
‫כב"ש דלא שרו לעשות מלאכה בערב שבת אלא בכדי‬
‫שיעשו מבעוד יום אבל לב"ה דשרו עם השמש אע"פ‬
‫שהמלאכה נעשית בשבת שרי ‪ ...‬וטעם שאסור ליכנס‬
‫בספינה אומר ריצב"א משום דדמי לשט בנהר ואסור‬
‫גזירה שמא יעשה חבית של שייטין אי נמי שמא ינהיג‬
‫הספינה והוי כמוליכה ארבע אמות בכרמלית‪.‬‬
‫‪ .7‬עירובין סז‪:‬‬
‫ההוא ינוקא דאשתפיך חמימיה אמר להו רבה נייתו ליה‬
‫חמימי מגו ביתאי אמר ליה אביי והא לא ערבינן אמר‬
‫ליה נסמוך אשיתוף אמר ליה הא לא שתפינן נימרו ליה‬
‫לנכרי ליתי ליה אמר אביי בעי לאותביה למר ולא‬
‫שבקן רב יוסף דאמר רב [יוסף אמר רב] כהנא כי הוינן‬
‫בי רב יהודה הוה אמר לן בדאורייתא מותבינן תיובתא‬
‫והדר עבדינן מעשה בדרבנן עבדינן מעשה והדר‬
‫מותבינן תיובתא‪.‬‬
‫‪ .3‬רי"ף שבת ז‪:‬‬
‫‪ .8‬בעל המאור שבת נג‪:‬‬
‫‪ .4‬בעל המאור שבת ז‪:‬‬
‫‪ .9‬רמב"ן שבת קלד‪:‬‬
‫‪ .13‬שמירת שבת כהלכתה מ‪:‬עב‬
‫‪ .14‬שמירת שבת כהלכתה מא‪:‬כב‬
‫‪ .15‬מנחת שלמה ס' ז‬
‫‪ .11‬שו"ת מהריב"ל ב‪:‬נג‬
‫‪ .11‬שמירת שבת כהלכתה לב‪:‬סה‬
‫‪ .16‬מנחת שלמה ס' ז‬
‫‪ .12‬שמירת שבת כהלכתה לב‪:‬עד‬
‫‪ .17‬משנה ברורה של‪:‬א‬
‫ולכן מן הראוי לאשה שהגיעה לחודש טי"ת להזמין בכל‬
‫ע"ש כל הדברים הנצרכים לה דשמא יזדמן לידתה בשבת‬
‫ולא תצטרך תצטרך לחלל שבת‪.‬‬
‫‪ .18‬מנחת שלמה ס' ז‬
‫‪ .24‬מנחת שלמה ס' ז‬
‫‪ .19‬שלחן ערוך אורח חיים שכט‪:‬ז‬
‫‪ .21‬מגן אברהם שכט‪:‬ה‬
‫‪ .21‬שמות כב‪:‬א‬
‫‪ .25‬בעיית הרב שלמה זלמן אויערבך‬
‫‪ .22‬גמ' סנהדרין עב‪.‬‬
‫‪ .23‬סנהדרין עב‪:‬‬
‫‪ .26‬מנחת שלמה ס' ז‬
‫‪ .27‬מגן אברהם רמח‪:‬יד‬