Running Head: COG SCI OF RELIGION
COGNITIVE SCIENCE 266
Cognitive science of religion
The ‘naturalness-of-religion’ and ‘memetic-evolution-of-religion’ theses: two sides of the same
evolutionary coin
Aaron Gehan
3/28/2012
Running Head: COG SCI OF RELIGION
Abstract
The ‘naturalness-of-religion’ and ‘memetic-evolution-of-religion’ theses seem to interact
and overlap significantly; rather than two competing theories, they appear to be two sides of the
same evolutionary coin. The evolved cognitive mechanisms involved in religious thought often
become the selection pressures against which religious memes are tested; at the same time,
different religious cultures may provide differential benefits for those who subscribe to them and
become selection pressures that, in turn, favor the dissemination of the kinds of cognitive
mechanisms involved in those religions in the first place. Therefore, the two theories are
inextricably intertwined. As such, this paper will explore both the evolutionarily salient cognitive
mechanisms that are thought to be involved in religious and supernatural thought processes as
well as the co-evolved cultural nature of religion and superstition.
Running Head: COG SCI OF RELIGION
Introduction
For many, the supernatural seems very natural, intuitive even; around ninety percent of
the world’s population claims belief in one or more supernatural deit(y/ies). Religions have risen
and fallen, taken various forms, and effectively shaped human history in undeniable ways.
Religion has been a part of human culture for thousands of years, but only recently have efforts
been made to discern what makes religion so culturally prevalent.
For about a decade now, cognitive scientists and psychologists have been inquiring and
theorizing as to what factors in the evolutionary history and development of the human species
could explain the wide-spread affinity for the supernatural seen today. Their findings have led
most in the field of cognitive science of religion to conclude that religion is a phenomenon that
follows very naturally from the cognitive composition bestowed upon humans from our
evolutionary past, especially when combined with the presence of social and environmental
reinforcement of religious thoughts and actions. This belief that the human brain is cognitively
primed for religious/supernatural thought is referred to as the ‘naturalness-of-religion thesis’ by
Justin L. Barrett (2000).
According to Barrett (2000) , “the naturalness-of-religion thesis is currently focused on
three main issues: (1) how people represent concepts of supernatural agents; (2) how people
acquire these concepts; and (3) how they respond to these concepts through religious action such
as ritual (Barrett, 2000, p. 29).” The underlying cognitive mechanisms that result in these three
phenomena are considered to be mechanisms that evolved to solve other evolutionarily-salient
adaptive problems in the ancestral environment. Somewhat counter to this view is the conception
of religion as a sociocultural phenomenon, the result of mimetic evolution.
Running Head: COG SCI OF RELIGION
In his book, ‘The Selfish Gene,’ Richard Dawkins (1976) coined and popularized the
notion of ‘memes,’ or units of information. Memes are conceptually analogous to genes in that
they can be passed from one individual to another, undergo mutation, and be selected for by
various determinants; in other words, memes evolve. Religion can be viewed as a collection of
evolved memes; religions have slowly changed over the years according to many of the same
selection pressures that dictate the evolution of similar institutions such as government, art and
sports.
The ‘naturalness-of-religion’ and ‘memetic-evolution-of-religion’ theses seem to interact
and overlap significantly; rather than two competing theories, they appear to be two sides of the
same evolutionary coin. As such, this paper will explore both the evolutionarily salient cognitive
mechanisms that are thought to be involved in religious and supernatural thought processes as
well as the co-evolv(ed/ing) cultural nature of religion and superstition.
Admittedly, this paper is not the first to argue that the two theories work together rather
than against one another; Geertz and Markusson made a similar argument in their 2010 paper:
“to reach a fuller account of religion, the cognitive (naturalness) and memetic (unnaturalness)
hypotheses of religion must be merged” (p. 152). This paper adopts the same attitude. The
evolved cognitive mechanisms involved in religious thought often become the selection
pressures against which religious memes are tested; at the same time, different religious cultures
may provide differential benefits for those who subscribe to them and become selection
pressures that, in turn, favor the dissemination of the kinds of cognitive mechanisms involved in
those religions in the first place. Therefore, two theories are inextricably intertwined.
Running Head: COG SCI OF RELIGION
Naturalness-of-Religion
Superstition, a very possible precursor to religion, is thought to be the result of general
cognitive mechanisms that operate to decrease the chance of making type II errors when making
inferences about situations; that is, failing to recognize a causal relationship when there is one,
which may translate to a lost opportunity or undetected threat in the immediate environment
(Abbot & Sherratt, 2011). Beck and Forstmeier (2007) also link this over-attribution of causation
to active pattern seeking mechanisms and further suggest that the desire to explain these assumed
causes may lead to the fanciful confabulations that become the memetic instantiations of the
superstitions that are passed on as belief statements. So, already a possible move from simple
cognition to supernatural meme has been outlined.
Another effect that is closely related to the over-attribution of causation in avoidance of
type II error is the 'hyperactive agent-detection device (HADD)' (Guthrie, 1980; as cited by
Barrett, 2000). The proposition of the HADD stemmed from the observation that, when
operating in a state of incomplete information, people will tend to attribute intentional agency to
otherwise unexplained phenomenon happening around them. This refers directly to the use of the
type II error avoidance technique of over-attribution of causation in order to avoid possible
predatory threats in the immediate environment; humans were, after all, a prey species for most
of our evolutionary past. Assuming that the sound in the bushes is a predator rather than the wind
or settling of branches will result in much more cautious behavior overall, a feature that is
obviously adaptive in avoiding predation. This mechanism may, however, be over-attributed to
other less-than-readily-explainable phenomenon, making for an evolved propensity to see
intentional agency in many mysterious happenings in the environment.
Running Head: COG SCI OF RELIGION
The propensity to see intentional agency in phenomenon or objects whose agenticity is
objectively questionable can be referred to as anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism is a very
common ingredient in many supernatural and religious beliefs. Anthropomorphism requires the
ability to infer agenticity in others, an ability known as theory of mind. Theory of mind allows
humans to imbue others with agenticity and approximate their specific mental states, an ability
that has been undoubtedly advantageous when navigating the social realms inherent in human
society. Machiavellian intelligence, or social intelligence, starts with this ability to conceptualize
and recognize social interaction, and being able to practice these social interactions on non-social
objects through anthropomorphism could have proven a strong advantage for those capable of it.
This may have made anthropomorphism a vital tool for honing one's social intuitions, making it
an evolutionarily advantageous trait primed for propagation.
Another advantageous trait is general pattern recognition ability. Many animals have
evolved the ability to recognize the changing of seasons because of its direct influence on the
availability and location of food and other resources. Humans undoubtedly recognized the
passing of seasons as well as many other regular astronomical happenings; however, the
changing of seasons and astronomical events are not exactly readily-explainable phenomenon,
maybe explaining why so much myth, mysticism and tradition revolve(s/d) around these events.
People's need to explain these patterns may have led to the formation of elaborate stories, myths
and legends in order to provide an explanation. These explanations also often introduce an
element of possible control of these happenings by the people themselves through ritual or
sacrifice.
Running Head: COG SCI OF RELIGION
Religion as Culturally Memetic
According to Rossano (2006), “ecstatic rituals used to facilitate social bonding,” may
have been one of the first forms of religion, emerging during the pre-Upper Paleolithic era (p.
346). It makes sense that rituals or religions that involve social cohesion would be popular, given
our very social nature and the sheer logistics of it all; very private beliefs tend to go the grave
with those who hold them, whereas socially compatible beliefs enjoy a tremendous transmission
advantage and are often widely disseminated. These rituals also often involved hallucinogenic
and psychotropic drugs that would both enhance the spiritual quality of the experiences and aid
in group cohesion by promoting the release of brain opiates (Frecska & Kulcsar, 1989; as cited in
Rossano, 2006).
Another socially salient function religion plays in societies is to create a group of people
with a shared vision of the world, a vision that most often sets them apart from the rest of the
world as being special in some way. This creates very stark lines of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group.’
Those within the faith view themselves as united. The religions that foster this unity and social
cohesion best also tend to be the ones that specify a common enemy of all who follow the faith.
With a common enemy comes greater unity and social cohesion within the group. While this
tends to benefit the followers by creating a strong social support structure, it also has the effect of
creating an explicit, institutionally defined discord between two large groups of people; these are
the things war is made of, and may prove detrimental in the long run.
Similar to creating a common enemy and with a coinciding time of emergence, during the
pre-Upper Paleolithic era, is the act of moralistic aggression and the subsequent social
cooperation by way of social scrutiny; that is, the punishment of perceived cheaters by a group of
people who are in agreement that the social contract has been breached in some way (Rossano,
Running Head: COG SCI OF RELIGION
2007). Rossano does not see the coincidence of moral aggression and social scrutiny with the
emergence of the first forms of religion as a mere coincidence; rather he argues that, “these traits
represent a ‘supernaturalizing’ of social scrutiny which helped tip the balance away from
individualism and toward community” (p. 3). He goes on to assert that by instantiating a policy
of supernatural-policing, our ancestors found a way to externalized an ever-vigilant, omniscient
super-ego in order to encourage cooperation and group cohesion through a shared sense of
morality and social code of ethics. This Rossano sees as a large part of the move away from
individualistic living strategies towards a more egalitarian society, this being a hugely
advantageous adaptation for the species as a whole (p. 3).
Earlier in this paper it was posited that superstition tends to be a reaction to situations
where there is less than optimal information, but yet another instigation of superstition may be a
lack of control over a situation. Superstition is often seen when the odds are against the
possibility of success, as can be seen in gambling and sports such as baseball; when going up to
bat, players tend to become very superstitious and will do anything that they feel might help their
odds of success; however, when going out to field the ball, the same players may be completely
fine without their superstitious rituals. This could be because the odds are so stacked against
them when hitting, and so much in their favor when fielding.
The same instigation of superstitious behavior can be seen in the second stage of the
evolution of religion (Upper-Paleolithic era) which Rossano (2006) notes as being, “marked by
the emergence of shamanistic healing rituals” (p. 346). When faced with illness, our ancestors
had little in the way of medicine and therefore little control over the situation compared to
today’s technologies. In these types of situations, humans tend to become very superstitious and
will try anything they think might help. During this stage of religious evolution, shaman or
Running Head: COG SCI OF RELIGION
medicine men offer the only possibility of control over such situations and therefore become
very important parts of their societies. It is during this time that we see some transition from
egalitarian to transegalitarian hunter-gatherers (p. 346).
Ever since humans have lived in groups, there have been leaders and subordinates. In
such cases, it could be said that certain religious concepts may become very useful for the
leaders. Any ritual that promises some element of control over other-wise uncontrollable
circumstances, like the weather, creates the illusion that the leaders who oversee the rituals are in
charge. But, the leaders get the best of both worlds in this situation since they have the illusion of
control and yet when things don't go their way, they can easily point the finger at the people of
the group/tribe; they can claim that it is the lack of faith or sacrifice of the people that is angering
the gods and causing them such dismay. So leaders are granted the illusion of power over things
they do not control, while maintaining the option of redirecting responsibility back at the group
when things don't go well. This is a very good reason for leaders to encourage ritualistic belief
structures.
The third stage of religious evolution (Upper-Paleolithic era), according to Rossano
(2006), “the cave art, elaborate burials, and other artifacts associated with the UP represent the
first evidence of ancestor worship and the emergence of theological narratives of the
supernatural.” Ancestor worship/honoring is a rather ubiquitous trend amongst world religions.
This may go back to the human mind’s propensity for anthropomorphism; or, perhaps it points to
the possibility of social-subconscious recognition of the importance of learning from those who
lived before you. The wisdom of elders has been important to societies for thousands of years,
perhaps ancestor worship and communication is simply an extension of this general psychosocial
pattern.
Running Head: COG SCI OF RELIGION
Theological narratives of the supernatural that are constructed to explain observed
patterns, or anything that is not readily-explainable, become memes. As memes, these various
explanations of the world are then subject to selection based on the cognitive predispositions of
those considering them. Boyer (2003) outlined the various features that determine the
transmission advantage a religious or supernatural concept (meme) will have. Boyer observes
that supernatural concepts tend to be a combination of everyday concepts with features that
otherwise violate the norms for that concept's 'domain' or type. Boyer uses the concept of a
talking tree to demonstrate a straight-forward case of adding features that violate the original
concept's archetypical domain (p. 119). Barrett (2000), while citing an earlier paper by Boyer
(2000), identifies three domains of knowledge in which these violations can occur: psychology,
biology, and physics; along with five ontological categories with which these violations can be
made: people, animals, plants, artifacts, and natural, non-living things (p. 31).
Barrett (2000) notes that, “the vast majority of supernatural concepts that become part of
cultural knowledge,” can be represented as combinations of these three knowledge domains with
the five ontological categories; a three by five matrix of the supernatural (p. 31). Boyer (2000)
also noted that concepts that commit these violations are more memorable and therefore enjoy a
memetic transmission advantage over concepts in which there is no violation of assumptions;
however, if they are too counterintuitive, they may be reduced to a less counterintuitive version
during on-line processing in order to reason with them as would be done with normal concepts
(Barrett, 1998; Barrett & Keil, 1996; as cited in Barret, 2000). So, it appears that counterintuitive
concepts that are “minimally counterintuitive” are both most memorable and most useful during
on-line processing (Barrett, 2000, p. 30).
Running Head: COG SCI OF RELIGION
Barrett also notes, while citing Boyer (2000) that the most common religious concepts to
come out of this matrix are intentional agents of some kind. This seems highly relevant to
ancestor worship and, again, seems to refer back to the HADD covered earlier. The more
successful religious concepts are the ones that satisfy our innate tendencies to see intentional
agency in our surroundings; so the HADD, as an evolved cognitive mechanism, has become a
selection pressure against which supernatural and religious memes are tested. One way the
HADD may contribute to the memorability and transmission advantages of religious concepts
that include intentional agency is by way of confirmation bias. Confirmation bias occurs when
evidence for a certain proposition is skewed in favor of the proposition by over-emphasizing
supporting evidence and down-playing evidence against it. In the case of supernatural agency,
the HADD would serve to emphasize the possibility of agency at any given time, therefore
reinforcing the apparent probability of the proposition.
Another instance of confirmation bias common in religion is regarding the effectiveness
of rituals or prayers. Those who truly believe that their rituals and prayers will be answered by
attentive supernatural beings will often see evidence of these answers even if none is present.
Sometimes the logic is loaded so that no matter what happens, it can be considered an answer;
the bumper-sticker-esque saying, “God answers all prayers, just sometimes the answer is 'No',” is
an example of creating a bulletproof logic that cannot be debunked. But, as pointed out by Boyer
(2003), “There are many irrefutable statements that no-one believes; what makes some of them
plausible to some people is what we need to explain” (p. 120).
Conclusion
It should be clear from this paper that, like other social institutions, religion evolved to
meet the psychosocial needs of those involved and as such reflects these needs in its
Running Head: COG SCI OF RELIGION
composition. By further evaluating the structure of religion, it may be possible to gain more
insight into the cognitive mechanisms that underpin the basic propensities for supernatural
thought and the formation of religions as both personal belief systems and social institutions. In
closing, I find it necessary to point out the divine irony (pun intended) that the modern religions
that so staunchly deny evolution owe their very existence to evolutionary processes; although I
suppose anyone who denies evolution is thrust into the same state of irony, but I digress.
Running Head: COG SCI OF RELIGION
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