1
Conceptual Storage in Bilinguals and its
Effects on Creativity
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 2
2. DEFINITION OF TERMS .................................................................. 4
2.1 BILINGUALISM ................................................................................... 4
2.2 CREATIVITY ....................................................................................... 5
2.3 SEMANTIC FEATURES / CLASSICAL THEORY ...................................... 6
2.4 PROTOTYPES / PROTOTYPE THEORY .................................................. 6
3. STUDIES ON CREATIVITY IN BILINGUALS .............................. 7
2
3.1 RELEVANT STUDIES ........................................................................... 7
3.2 LINGUISTS’ EXPLANATIONS FOR ENHANCED CREATIVITY ................. 9
4. SEMANTIC ORGANIZATION IN THE BRAIN .......................... 11
4.1 COMPOUND VERSUS COORDINATE BILINGUALS .............................. 11
4.1.1 Exclusively Compound? .......................................................... 12
4.1.2 Exclusively Coordinate? .......................................................... 13
4.2 THE DUAL CODING MODEL ............................................................. 13
4.3 A SINGLE, ENHANCED, LEXICO-SEMANTIC SYSTEM........................ 15
4.3.1 The Conceptual System of Bilinguals ...................................... 15
4.3.2 Connections between Concepts and Languages...................... 17
5. WHAT MAKES BILINGUALS MORE CREATIVE? .................. 18
5.1 DOMINANCE OF CONCEPTUAL THINKING ........................................ 18
5.2 CONTEXT-FREE THINKING ............................................................... 19
5.3 CODE-SWITCHING IN INNER SPEECH ................................................ 20
6. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 21
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................... 22
1. Introduction
The effects of bilingualism on intelligence and, more generally, cognitive
abilities in bilinguals have always attracted the attention of scholars. After most
people had considered bilingualism an obstacle in cognitive processing, a
‘neutral period’ followed in which bilingualism lost some of its negative
connotations. Since the 1960s, however, scholars have been accumulating a
vast amount of evidence speaking in favour of bilingualism.1
1
For a comprehensive overview of these periods, cf. Charlotte Hoffmann, An Introduction to
Bilingualism. Longman (London, New York: 1991), p. ; or Suzanne Romaine, Bilingualism.
Blackwell (Oxford: 21995), p.108ff.
3
While studies concentrating on Intelligence Quotient2 are still
inconclusive and fail to show a direct correlation between multilingualism and
intelligence, another important aspect of intelligence clearly relates to
bilingualism. Creative thinking, also termed divergent thinking, appears to be
better developed in bilinguals, who usually outstrip monolinguals in solving
problems that call for divergent solutions.
Although linguists as well as psychologists rarely fail to inform us about
the existence of a relation between bilingualism and creativity, none of them
has – to my knowledge – given a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon.
So far, the tenor has been that bilingualism is linked to divergent thinking
because bilinguals are better able to separate content and form, and generally
achieve metalinguistic abilities earlier than their monolingual counterparts.
In this article, I would like to introduce a model that explains the
influence of bilingualism on creativity in more detail. The main argument shall
be the assumption of a non-lexical, semantic memory in which bilingual
thought takes place. Pre-linguistic and extra-linguistic perception and both (or
more) language systems contribute to the formation of this concept memory,
thus enabling a more flexible view of the world and allowing for unusual –
creative – associations. This approach makes it necessary to thoroughly look
into conceptual storage in bilinguals.
First, I shall discuss some terms and, if necessary, define them for the
sake of argument. In chapter two, I will focus on studies that show a correlation
between bilingualism and divergent thinking. Since the amount of available
surveys is vast, I will concentrate on a few that vary in choice of subjects,
method and obtained results. I will also give an overview of their respective
conclusions. Subsequently, I shall deal with lexico-semantic storage in
bilinguals, commencing with the distinction proposed by Weinreich and
concluding with an enhanced version of the model that is receiving wide
support today. In chapter five, the focus will be on the question of how
2
The notion of intelligence as shown by IQ is one of the debated issues in psychology. IQ tests,
however, largely rely on convergent tasks, i.e. each question calls for one correct solution.
4
bilinguals think and I will propose several hypotheses that can explain
enhanced creative capabilities.
2. Definition of Terms
Both expressions that I used in my title are ambiguous and can,
depending on the definition, include a smaller or wider array of features. I will
not try, however, to give a referential definition of either term, but set a
framework suitable for this paper. As this work is concerned with cognitive
processes and conceptual memory, other terms that need clarification are
semantic features theory and prototype theory. Especially the latter, although of
considerable help in understanding conceptual memory, has not been given its
due acknowledgement by linguists.
2.1 Bilingualism
Researchers have applied the label bilingualism to a number of
phenomena. In its widest sense, people would be bilingual who are capable of
producing utterances in more than one language. In its narrowest, a person
would need to have native-like competence in more than one language and
would not be recognized by either language community as an alien. It would be
plainly delusional (and not in the scope of this article) if I tried to make a
generalizing statement embracing all the varieties and degrees of bilingualism.
Therefore, in this paper, I shall focus on nearly balanced bilinguals for
two reasons. First, it is important to acknowledge that bilinguals do not differ in
their cognitive processes from monolinguals. Virtually every phenomenon,
which at first glance might appear to be particular to bilingualism, is also
employed by monolinguals. Interesting in this context is a statement by Paradis,
who proposes that:
unilinguals are in fact at one end of the continuum, with multilinguals who
speak genetically unrelated languages at the other end. No function is available
to the bilingual speaker that is not already available to the unilingual,
5
unidialectal speaker. The only difference seems to be the degree of use the
speaker makes of each of the relevant cerebral systems.3
Thus, if we want to study differences in cognitive style, we must necessarily
look further into the continuum. It is only there that those differences become
apparent and observable.
Second, practically all studies that are concerned with showing greater
divergent thinking qualities in bilinguals made a point of carefully selecting
balanced bilinguals.4 This is in line with the argument mentioned above. Hardly
would an imbalanced bilingual draw a major amount of positive effects from
her weaker, possibly even subordinate, language.
At this point, I would like to dispel the suggestion that this practice is of
no value as more than half of the world’s population is bilingual, but only a
minority of them truly balanced. It is not the aim of this essay to give a
descriptive account of the status quo, but rather to show what effects
bilingualism can have.
2.2 Creativity
Creativity is the ability to solve divergent tasks, i.e. problems that do not
necessarily have a single, correct solution but allow for various possible
answers. Psychologists say that in creative problem-solving “gedanklich weit
voneinander entfernt liegende Elemente so verknüpft werden, daß das Ergebnis
als subjektiv neu empfunden wird.“5
Lambert gave a comprehensive definition in 1977 by characterizing
divergent thinking as a “distinctive cognitive style reflecting a rich imagination
and an ability to scan rapidly a host of possible solutions.”6
In this paper, I want to focus on elements from both definitions, i.e. firstly
imaginative, metaphorical and context-free thinking, and, secondly, the ability
Michel Paradis, “Generalizable Outcomes of Bilingual Aphasia Research” in: Folia
Phoniatrica et Logopaedica. 52, 2000, p.54.
4
See also chapter 3.1 in this paper.
5
Walter Edelmann, Lernpsychologie. Eine Einführung. Psychologie Verlags Union (München,
Weinheim: 21986), p.286.
6
Lambert, 1977; quoted in Romaine (1995: p.113.)
3
6
to join elements that have not been previously joined, thus creating new
conceptual relations.
2.3 Semantic Features / Classical Theory
Up to now, linguists have committed one crucial mistake: they have used
the Classical Theory found in psychology and philosophy to account for
semantic features of both lexemes and concepts. The Classical Theory argues
that a concept consists of a certain number of features. An object or process
belongs to this concept if it displays all of the defining features. Schmid sums
up the main idea behind this theory as follows:
-
Die Definition von Kategorien geschieht ausschließlich intern durch
notwendige und hinreichende Bedingungen der Kategorienzugehörigkeit.
Die Kategoriengrenzen sind klar definiert, starr und unveränderbar.
Die Kategorienmitglieder sind alle gleichwertig, da sie alle dieselben
gemeinsamen Merkmale haben.7
The problems are obvious. To use a simple example: When is a cup a
cup? According to the theory in use, a cup would be defined by a number of
features such as +HANDLE, +USED AS A CONTAINER
FOR DRINKS,
+MADE OF PORCELAIN,
etc. We can, however, easily imagine an object, made of glass, without any
handle – a Chinese tea cup for instance – that we would still refer to as a cup
rather than a glass. Sometimes, we are not even sure whether the object before
us is a cup, a bowl, or a glass. Apparently, some objects seem to be better
instances of a category than others – while these others still belong to the
category. At this point, the Prototype Theory comes to our attention.
2.4 Prototypes / Prototype Theory8
This theory suggests that there are some objects, ideas, etc. that are
especially good examples of a concept. Thus, a sparrow is prototypical for the
category birds, whereas a penguin is not. Schmid calls the prototypes of a
7
Hans-Jörg Schmid, Cottage and Co., idea, start vs. begin. Die Kategorisierung als
Grundprinyip einer differenzierten Bedeutungsbeschreibung. Max Niemeyer Verlag (Tübingen:
1993), p.8.
8
For a very detailed discussion of the Prototype Theory, see Schmid, chapter 2.
7
category “kognitive Bezugspunkte”.9 In addition, not all members of a category
are of equal status, i.e. we accept a sparrow more readily as a member of the
category of birds than a penguin. Moreover, category boundaries are not clearcut; some objects – borderline cases – might be considered as belonging to a
category or not.
All of these properties of prototypicality contradict the defining features
of the Classical Theory. Lamb enhances this theory by applying it to his own
model of a cognitive network. For him an object is identified as belonging to a
category when enough of the defining features are activated, be it through
visual, tactile, auditory or linguistic input. He further states that
[his] network model provides a straightforward explanation of prototypicality:
Prototypical exemplars of a category (like SPARROW for the category BIRD) are
those which strongly satisfy its threshold [the minimum of energy necessary to
activate a neuron cluster], while peripheral ones (like OSTRICH or PENGUIN)
satisfy the threshold only weakly.10
Apparently, this theory is by far more useful when describing actual
conceptualisation in the brain. In contrast to the Classical Theory, it is also
better able to account for semantic storage in bilinguals, as we shall see later.
3. Studies on Creativity in Bilinguals
3.1 Relevant Studies
Before I introduce individual studies, I would like to quote a recent
publication by Baker/Prys Jones on the amount and outcomes of studies related
to creativity in bilinguals:
Research on bilingualism and divergent thinking has occurred in a truly
international arena: Canada, Ireland, Mexico, Singapore and the United States,
for example. Most research findings show that bilinguals are superior to
monolinguals on their creative or divergent thinking. Such superiority is found
particularly among bilinguals whose two languages are both reasonably well
developed.11
9
Schmid (1993: p.12.)
Sydney M. Lamb, Pathways of the Brain. The Neurocognitive Basis of Language. John
Benjamins Publishing Company (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: 1998), p.155f.
11
Colin Baker; Sylvia Prys Jones, Encyclopedia of Bilingualism & Bilingual Education.
Multilingual Matters (Clevedon: 1998), p.66.
10
8
Peel and Lambert conducted the first study that clearly showed positive
effects of bilingualism on intelligence. In 1962, they chose two equally sized
groups of monolinguals and French-English balanced bilinguals. They
controlled for previously neglected variables such as social background (all
subjects were from middle class French schools in Montreal) and sex (the test
was done with a gender ratio of 6 boys : 4 girls). Eighteen variables measured
IQ; in 15 of these variables – containing both verbal and non-verbal aspects of
IQ – bilinguals scored significantly higher.12 Peal and Lambert concluded that:
Intellectually [the bilingual’s experience SR] with two language systems seems
to have left him with a mental flexibility, a superiority in concept formation, and
a more diversified set of mental abilities, in the sense that the pattern of abilities
developed by bilinguals was more heterogeneous. It is not possible to state from
the present study whether the more intelligent child became bilingual or whether
bilingualism aided his intellectual development, but there is no question about
the fact that he is superior intellectually.13
In 1970, Landry found superior creative abilities in bilinguals who had
become so by learning a second language. While at first and fourth grade levels
differences between single language learners and second language learners
were not significant, at the sixth grade the second language learners performed
better on figural fluency, figural flexibility, figural originality, verbal fluency,
verbal flexibility and verbal originality.
Sheridan Scott (1973) studied mono- and polyglots in Montreal. She
studied her subjects, who were matched for IQ-levels and social class, over a
period of seven years. They had to answer questions like ‘Think of a paper clip.
What can you do with it?’ Monolinguals tended to give straightforward answers
probably according to their experience with paper clips. Bilinguals gave many
more and unusual solutions. She, also, argued that bilinguals were better than
monolinguals in performing divergent tasks.14
Carringer (1974) tested Spanish-English bilinguals in Mexico. Using
various tests, he chose 24 monolinguals and 24 bilinguals (equal numbers of
males and females). He then administered the Torrance Tests of Creative
12
Because of its importance, accounts of the Peal/Lambert study can be found in virtually every
introductory book on bilingualism. Baker/Prys Jones (p.64) give a very detailed description.
13
Peal/Lambert, 1962, quoted in: Romaine (1995: p.112.)
14
Romaine (1995: p.113.)
9
Thinking, a standard testing set, which others, e.g. Landry, had used before. His
findings do not deviate from the other studies concerned with creativity. The
bilingual group scored higher on all measured variables.15
Doyle, Champagne, Segalovitz (1978) compared 22 bilinguals and 22
monolinguals. They task was story telling and the bilingual group showed
greater verbal fluency and expressed more concepts per story.16
3.2 Linguists’ Explanations for Enhanced Creativity
It is interesting why, although many studies have tried to show a
relationship between bilingualism and creativity, nobody has ever given a
satisfactory explanation of the relation between these two. In addition to some
comments mentioned in the previous chapter, here I would like to present a
cross-sectional overview of explanations that scholars gave to account for the
phenomenon of greater creative abilities in bilinguals. In order to show how
similar and how vague these explanations are, I will have to use some rather
extended quotations.
As early as 1949, Leopold acknowledged a favourable influence of
bilingualism on the thinking process. In the case of his daughter Hildegard he
assumed that “[c]onstantly hearing the same thing referred to by different words
from two languages, she had her attention drawn to essentials, to content
instead of form.”17 In my opinion, Leopold’s statement is close to a precise
explanation. He does not, however, offer any model that would make this
separation of content and form plausible. All the following ones have been
more or less variations of that idea.
Carringer also based his study on the assumption that:
The theoretical rationale for the position that bilinguals have superior ability in
cognitive reorganization or flexibility is that the child learns to separate the
sound from the thing itself. Therefore, the bilingual is more concerned with
meaning than symbol. Also, the bilingual is able to switch from one language
system to another. Thus, he may be attempting to solve a problem in one
language, fail, then switch to another hypothesis or concept in another language.
Carringer, D, “Creative thinking abilities of a Mexican youth” in: Journal of cross-cultural
psychology. 5, 4, 1974, 492-504.
16
Hoffmann (1991: p.65.)
17
Leopold, 1949, quoted in Carringer (1974: p.493.)
15
10
[…] Skill with two languages also affects the concepts used for problem solving.
A concept in one language may be richer and have more varied meanings than
the same concept in a second language.18
After having successfully concluded his study, he was content to repeat these
notions:
bilingualism does promote creative thinking abilities and at least in part serves
to free the mind from the tyranny of words. Since the bilingual has two terms for
one referent, his attention is focused on ideas and not words, on content rather
than form, on meaning rather than symbol, and this is very important in the
intellectual process as it permits greater cognitive flexibility.19
Baker / Prys Jones slightly extend these ideas and include associations
and connotations in their explanation:
With each language go different […] ideas and beliefs, ways of thinking […]
Sometimes corresponding words in different languages have different
connotations. For example, having two (or more) words for folk dancing, one in
English the other one in, for example, Portuguese or Punjabi, will extend the
range of meanings, associations and images. When slightly different associations
are attached to each word, the bilingual may be able to think more flexibly and
creatively than a monolingual.20
Possibly because of their processing of two languages, bilinguals may have a
slightly higher probability of fruitful divergent thinking. How does this occur?
Bilinguals will have two or more words for a single object or idea. They will
have two or more ways of referring to the same content area, concept, idea or
information. The central notion is that having two or more words for the same
object or idea allows bilinguals more freedom and richness in their thinking.21
Romaine gives one more interesting, albeit vague, hypothesis. She
observes correctly that the networks in which words in each language are
connected are different in each language. Thus, a bilingual may be able to make
a connection between a word in L1 and an association connected with its
translation equivalent in L2. As an example, she says
the word for ‘school’ in Welsh (ysgol) also means ‘ladder’ […], while the
English word has no such associations. Welsh bilinguals may have mental
imagery connecting the concepts of ‘school’ and ‘ladder’, which allows them to
create metaphorical links, e.g. the school is a ladder to knowledge.22
18
Carringer (1974: p.494f.)
Carringer (1974: p.502f.)
20
Baker, Prys Jones (1998: p.7f.)
21
Baker, Prys Jones (1998: p.66f.)
22
Romaine (1995: p.114f.)
19
11
This is an interesting and challenging approach. It would definitely account for
greater divergent strategies in bilinguals if it were correct. However, semantic
priming studies and recent findings seem to contradict the idea of additional
associations due to direct lexical connections.
In summary, the following ideas have been proposed (but not explained):
-
Bilinguals seem to focus on meaning, not on form.
-
They might also be able to make use of two distinct cognitive styles
as they are able to think in two languages.
-
The different languages provide the bilingual with a host of additional
associations and connotations.
I will have a very detailed look at all these possibilities in chapter five. At
the centre of all these hypotheses is the bilingual’s lexico-semantic system. For
that reason I shall now examine conceptual representation and the linguistic
systems of bilinguals, both of which constitute the basis for thought.
4. Semantic Organization in the Brain
4.1 Compound versus Coordinate Bilinguals
Ever since Weinreich suggested the model of compound versus
coordinate and subordinate bilinguals23, researchers have been eager to either
prove his findings or to find evidence against it. Even though Weinreich
himself admitted that:
it would appear offhand that a person’s or group’s bilingualism need not be
entirely of type A [coordinate] or B [compound], since some signs of the
language may be compounded while others are not24,
linguists took his dichotomy as a basis for their research.25 De Groot recognizes
the same problem and ascertains:
23
Uriel Weinreich, Languages in Contact. Findings and Problems. Mouton & Co. (London,
The Hague, Paris: 3rd reprint1964), p. 9f.
24
Weinreich (1964: p.10.)
25
Cf. Albert / Obler; almost all of the studies they quote grouped their subjects into coordinate
and compound bilinguals, often using rather ambiguous criteria. Martin L. Albert; Lorraine K.
Obler, The Bilingual Brain. Neuropsychological and Neurolinguistic Aspects of Bilingualism.
Academic Press (New York, San Francisco, London: 1978).
12
Nevertheless, many a paper on bilingual word representation starts by posing the
question in strict either or terms and concludes by opting in favour of one or the
other structural possibility26
4.1.1 Exclusively Compound?
Weinreich’s distinction is obviously of a theoretical nature. An
exclusively compounding system is not practicable, as most words do not have
exact translation equivalents in the other language and vice versa. Any bilingual
dictionary shows that assumption to be true for we rarely find one translation
for an item; more so, if we look up one of the offered translations in the other
language, we are likely to find new translations in L1 that have quite a different
meaning from our original word. De Groot puts it even more generally by
saying “that formal translation equivalents seldom, if ever, share all aspects of
their meaning.”27
I can easily demonstrate the problem by means of a small diagram. 28 One
can easily notice that rather concrete objects, such as TREE, share virtually all of
their features. A reason for this lies in the fact that those objects share extralinguistic, e.g. visual, auditory or tactile, qualities. As soon as abstract ideas
come into play, however, the semantic value of lexemes and to some extent
concepts themselves can be quite different and include more or less features in
comparison with the assumed ‘translation equivalent’.
TREE
– BAUM
MIND
–
GEIST
Annette M.B. de Groot, „Word Type Effects in Bilingual Processing Tasks: Support for a
Mixed-Representational System” in: Schreuder, Robert; Weltem, Bert, The Bilingual Lexicon.
Benjamins (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: 1993), p.30.
27
Schreuder, Welthem (1993: p.35.)
28
Cf. de Groot (1993: p.30)
26
13
A bilingual with a fully compounded conceptual system would have to make
generous concessions to her language systems up to the point when
communication becomes impaired.
A more general problem of Weinreich’s (and other linguists’)
understanding of the connection between concept and lexeme is that they define
lexemes as linguistic manifestations of a concept. They are not! A concept is a
much more rich entity incorporating various sensory, motory and cognitive
elements. Each concept connects to a variety of lexemes that have the function
of evoking a similar concept in the cognitive network of an interlocutor.
4.1.2 Exclusively Coordinate?
Neither could there be a solely coordinate bilingual. Having a complete
conceptual system for each language does not agree with the principle of
kognitive Ökonomie29. The human brain rather generalizes and makes
abstractions in order to save capacity. Generalization and categorization are
processes that start at pre-linguistic age and that work in bilinguals just like in
monolinguals. Thus, our brain does not allow a strict separation of concepts nor
would this separation be reasonable in terms of cognitive economy. There are
various studies in support of this common sense notion; I will speak of them
later.
4.2 The Dual Coding Model
A new, more workable theory needed to be developed. From the seventies
on, researchers have been pondering the possibility of a (at least partially)
unified conceptual system, with several language specific linguistic systems.
Scholars developed the idea because an abundant number of studies30 showed
that bilinguals process their languages on one semantic basis.
One good example is semantic priming. A word takes a certain time to be
recognized and processed. This time decreases if the word is preceded by a
29
30
Schmid (1993: p.21.)
See Albert / Obler (1978) for a collection of studies showing semantic processing.
14
semantically related word. Experiments with bilinguals have shown that
semantic priming also works cross-linguistically. A Japanese-English bilingual,
for instance, processes the English word monk faster if it is preceded by the
Japanese word tera (temple). Another example is Stroop-testing. Here, subjects
are shown words representing colours, such as blue, which are written in ink of
a colour not matching the colour word, e.g. red. When required to name the
colour of the ink, not paying attention to the word, measurable interference
occurs, either in the form of extended time it takes to process the word or even
in actually making mistakes. Bilinguals exhibit the same kind of interference
when presented with words in LY although the whole test is conducted in LX.
Albert and Obler, still somewhat unsure of their findings, expressed their
hypotheses thus:
then we must assume that all the subjects had a compound linguistic system
and/or that they had a single prelinguistic cognitive system that would express
itself through either of the two languages.31
In the multilinguals, as a rule, the frequent language switching involved true
chaining of association. This would imply a unified cognition system with
output in any language possible […]32
On the basis of this evidence and additional results showing dual
processing as far as language specific levels, i.e. sounds, syntax, lexemes, etc.)
are concerned,33 the dual coding model has gained ground.
Scholars, for example Kroll and de Groot, have suggested that a unified
conceptual system might only exist for concrete terms, which usually
incorporate the same semantic features34 across languages; abstract concepts,
however, will still be stored as language specific ones. De Groot objects:
if corresponding but non-equivalent L1 and L2 words were acquired
simultaneously and only the overlapping parts of their meanings stored in a
compound conceptual representation, the unique parts of their meanings would
be lost.35
31
Albert/Obler (1978: p.50.)
Albert/Obler (1978: p.55.)
33
Evidence for language specific processing can be found in Grosjean (1982: p.266.)
34
I am using the term ‚semantic features’ here because the mentioned linguists base their
assumptions on the Classical Theory. I shall, however, soon refer to the Prototype theory.
35
De Groot (1993: p.47.)
32
15
Yes, if one applies the Classical Theory to the conceptual memory of a person,
then this objection and others are reasonable. If a bilingual just left out
‘semantic features’ unique to one language, she would certainly overextend the
possible range of meaning for this concept. If she, alternatively, encloses all the
features of all her languages, then the concept would be narrowed down,
excluding phenomena of both languages. There must be a better way to
describe a human’s conceptual system.
4.3 A Single, Enhanced, Lexico-Semantic System
4.3.1 The Conceptual System of Bilinguals
At this point, I would like to suggest a variation of the dual coding model.
Linguists have often overestimated the role of language in the conceptual
system. As mentioned above, a concept is actually much more than the
cognitive representation of a lexeme: it consists of visual, auditory, tactile and
kinaesthetic elements, all of which are acquired pre- or extra-linguistically.
Language, however, does serve as an important means of categorizing and
concept formation in the form of linguistic input. In addition, most of our
concepts have one or more lexemes assigned to them, which we chose
according to context and intention.
As far as bilinguals are concerned, they will have roughly the same
conceptual systems as monolinguals do. Like monoglots, they perceive and
categorize the world according to visual, auditory, tactile and kinaesthetic
aspects. Nevertheless, they do differ in two aspects. Firstly, due to historical
and cultural reasons, concepts might be differently organized in two languages.
A good example is that of Arabic, which does not have a word for CAMEL, but a
much finer distinction at a lower level. Similarly, the Aborigines of Australia
have no common term for SAND (but many, lower level terms), the Inuit do not
know
SNOW,
etc. The examples are plenty and from both the area of concrete
objects and abstract concepts. A bilingual does not lose any of these concepts
16
but rather has a wider range of concepts available. The following diagram36
should make this clear:
conceptual system of a
bilingual
lexical system of the
bilingual’s language X
lexical system of the
bilingual’s language Y
We can see that the two languages conceptualise a category differently.
Language X even leaves out one level and has a direct connection from a hyperordinate concept to the base level. In the bilingual’s conceptual system,
however, all the distinctions are present.
The second difference is a possible fuzziness of categories (actually quite
the opposite of the first one, but nevertheless present.) Although the concepts of
two languages are the same in respect to prototypical instances, they might
show slight variation in category boundaries – a notion perfectly in line with the
Prototype Theory. In the words of Rosch, the founder of this theory:
Because the prototypes are probably physiologically determined, for such
categories the content as well as the form of categories should be universal, and
only the category boundaries are expected to vary with culture.37
In proof of that, Romaine cites some studies that showed a semantic shift
(colour categories in this case) in bilinguals. They indicated that “bilinguals
differed systematically from monolingual norms” and that “the boundaries of
color areas mapped by bilinguals were less stable than those mapped by
monolinguals. The total areas mapped by bilinguals were also larger.”38
We actually have to accept the fact that bilinguals have both a more
refined and a fuzzier network of concepts. Nevertheless, we must also be aware
that these discrepancies are not of an overwhelming importance and in actual
36
Full circles denote a lexicalised concept in the lexical systems. Solid lines an existent
connection. Empty circles and dotted lines show a non-existent distinction or connection
respectively.
37
Rosch (1977), quoted in: Schmid (1993: p.22.)
17
communication usually go unnoticed. They play a crucial role in flexible
thinking, however. In line with Paradis’ idea of a continuum, we can assume
that the variations increase with differences in language family, typology and
cultural background.
4.3.2 Connections between Concepts and Languages
Now that we have found out that bilinguals have one conceptual memory
in many ways similar to that of monolinguals, the question arises how they can
use two or more languages that are differently mapped to concepts. I will base
the answer on the network system introduced by Lamb 39, which, even though
he designed it for monolingual speech processing, is readily applicable to all
bilingual phenomena as well. As an example, I will use the English lexemes
swim and float and the German ones schwimmen, treiben and schweben. They
all refer to the same conceptual area, but are differently connected to them.
Conceptual
Lexical
ANIMATE BEING,
PROPELLING ITSELF
OVER WATER
schwimmen
OBJECT, FLOATING ON
WATER
to swim
treiben
OBJECT, FLOATING IN
AIR
to float
schweben
This diagram easily demonstrates that the connection between lexemes
and concepts in bilinguals works in the same fashion as the connection of
synonyms to a concept does in monolinguals.
Whenever a bilingual ‘chooses’ a language, an impulse is sent that blocks
the connection from the conceptual level to lexemes of the other language.
Because of imperfect timing, insufficient level of the pulse, etc., interference
might occur.
38
Romaine (1995: 106.)
Cf. Lamb (1998) and Donald McKay, “Cross-Language Facilitation, Semantic Blindness, and
the Relation between Language and Memory: A Reply to Altarriba and Soltano” in: Memory
and Cognition November, 1996, 712-718.
39
18
5. What Makes Bilinguals More Creative?
Now, that I have tried to clarify how concepts and languages are stored in
the bilingual brain and how lexical, semantic and conceptual representations
interact with each other, we can turn to the question of bilingual thinking. For
them to be more creative, they must be able to make unusual connections
possibly drawing on a wider array of concepts, metaphors and language- or
culture-specific connotations and associations. Even though I structured this
part into different subchapters, it must be understood that all of the following
mechanisms cooperate in the bilingual collectively enhancing her divergent
abilities. Likewise, I want to highlight again that all these devices are present in
the monolingual, too – only to a lesser extent.
5.1 Dominance of Conceptual Thinking
I would like to suggest that thinking processes work on at least two levels.
One of these is a linguistic one. We can employ what Lamb refers to as the
“inner speech loop”40; contemplating thoughts by speaking inner sentences,
listening to them, rephrasing them, etc. Most people are not even aware of the
existence of any other means of thought and freely express that by asking oftenheard questions such as ‘In what language do you think?” The single most
important disadvantage of this method is that it forces us to think in the
structures of our language. This approach is likely to be patterned and, as it is a
conscious process, slow.
The other, non-linguistic one is a subconscious, conceptual approach.
Without major interference from language, the human brain connects concepts
– even if this connection were an unusual one – not paying attention to
standards, restrictions or sense. Conceptual thinking plays an important role in
the creative process as described by psychologists. Edelmann suggests:
Dabei [the so-called incubation, part of the creative process] vollzieht sich eine
nicht in Sprache übersetzte, sondern anschauliche oder symbolhafte
Neuorganisation [sic] von Erfahrungen und Versuchen.41
40
41
Cf. Lamb (1998)
Edelmann (1986: p.287)
19
I would like to argue that in bilinguals this mode of cognitive activity is
better developed than in monolinguals. This is so because polyglots need to
‘switch to conceptual mode’ much more often than monoglots. Whenever they
acquire a translation equivalent, whenever they translate more than single
words, whenever they code-switch, they employ their conceptual storage
system. Of course, monolinguals do this as well, e.g. when using synonyms or
metaphors; but, again, bilinguals do it much more often.
An exemplary study that impressively shows the dominance of
conceptual processing in bilinguals was conducted in South Africa where
Afrikaans-English bilinguals had to judge whether, for example, cap was more
like can or hat. The researchers matched every bilingual with a one
monolingual of each of the respective languages. The outcome was surprising:
the majority of bilinguals chose a semantic approach, i.e. they chose hat in the
example, whereas only one of the monolinguals did so to a significant extent.42
Apparently, this conceptual thinking is what Leopold and others meant
when they suggested that a bilingual’s attention was “drawn to essentials, to
content rather than form.”43
5.2 Context-Free Thinking
If the hypothesis of the previous chapter is correct, then we can draw
another conclusion at this point. As I showed in chapter four, conceptual
representations, whatever form they might take, have connections to lexical
labels, but are independent from them otherwise. Thus, we can neglect
linguistic context, including connotations44, when referring solely to concepts.
This way we can explain the outcomes of studies that asked subjects to
think of all possible uses for an object. More concretely: we usually encounter a
lexeme such as paper clip45 in a linguistic context, i.e. we associate it with
other lexemes like fix, attach, office or paperwork. Its conceptual representation
42
Albert, Obler (1978: p.72)
See chapter 3.2.
44
Lamb impressively shows that a concept is purely denotative. It is the lexeme only that
carries the connotative element. Lamb (1998: p.188)
43
20
on the other hand might represent the object as what it actually is: A LENGTH OF
WIRE, BENT INTO A PARTICULAR SHAPE, COMMONLY USED TO ATTACH SHEETS OF
PAPER TO EACH OTHER,
etc.46
From here, conceptual thinking can extend the possible range of uses for
this object by far. The paper clip, so specialized in use, has now all the qualities
of a piece of wire and could be used as a lock pick, it is made of metal and can
become a conductor of electricity, etc. This cognitive flexibility is perfectly in
line with our definition of creativity. Of course, creative monolinguals do
nothing else; it is only that a bilingual has much more ‘practice’ in focusing on
the conceptual qualities of an object.
5.3 Code-Switching in Inner Speech
Language is an important means of categorizing our view of the world.47
Carringer proposed that a bilingual might try to solve a problem in one
language and – if she fails – in the other one afterwards.48 In my opinion, it is
not very likely that a bilingual consciously does so. Given the abundance of
code switching in actual speech of polyglots, however, there is no reason to
assume that bilinguals do not code-switch in their inner speech loop. On the
contrary, as there are no socio-linguistic restrictions of any kind in inner
speech, plentiful code switching in inner speech seems highly plausible.
Thus, a bilingual has the unique opportunity to draw on two registers of
connotations, metaphors, linguistic structure, etc. Consequently, the polyglot
can make full use of her enhanced linguistic and conceptual system introduced
in chapter 4.3.1. This process of inner code-switching can well account for
phenomena such as better story telling which I described in chapter 3.1.
45
Cf. the study by Sheridan Scott mentioned in chapter 3.1.
It is easy to project this way of seeing a lexeme to others. A can of beer would then be a
hollow cylinder of metal, maybe colourful, etc. A brick is seen as a heavy, cubical object, etc.
47
This view is quite close to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. There was, however, favourable
evidence for it (to some extent) in a study by Aneta Pavlenko, who compared conceptualisation
and lexicalisation in English and Russian. Cf. Aneta Pavlenko, “Bilingualism and Cognition:
Concepts in the Mental Lexicon” in: Cornell working papers in linguistics 14, 1996, 39-73.
46
21
6. Conclusion
Undoubtedly, bilinguals command creative abilities that are superior to
those of monolinguals. Hesitatingly and vaguely, scholars have been explaining
this by the tendency in polyglots to focus on content rather than meaning.
Although bilinguals have not a single cognitive device that is not available to
monolinguals, some of their cognitive abilities seem better developed,
furthering their cognitive flexibility in tasks calling for divergent solutions.
I have proposed a model of bilingual lexico-semantical storage that
contains one multi-modal (i.e. visual, tactile, auditory, cognitive and
kinaesthetic) conceptual system. This system is based on prototypes which
allow for fuzzy edges, extension of meaning and constant change. Apart from
being fuzzy in comparison to monolinguals due to some generalization, their
conceptual system is also more finely structured – combining conceptual
distinctions of all languages. The conceptual memory is connected to the lexical
system of the polyglot in a fashion comparable to that of monoglots, who have
various synonyms connected to their concepts.
On this basis, I argued that bilinguals use their conceptual system more
often than monolinguals do, because various bilingual functions, such as
translation, acquisition of new translation equivalents, etc., require a switch to
the conceptual level. On the conceptual level, however, thinking works
subconsciously, faster, and in a less restricted manner than it does in innerspeech mode. Likewise, bilinguals can shed off a lexeme with all its contextual
connections, connotations and associations, etc. and work with the raw concept
instead. This non-lexical concept is more apt to be used abstractly and in
unusual, i.e. creative, ways.
I have also shown that inner code switching in bilinguals, a very plausible
concept, enables them to make use of two or more language systems with all
their
various
associations,
connotations,
metaphorical uses.
48
Cf. Carringer’s explanation in chapter 3.2.
lexical
interconnections
and
22
Finally, I should like to refer back to the hypotheses of chapter 3.2. Yes, a
bilingual seems to concentrate on meaning rather than context. Yes, the
bilingual has more associations and connotations available. In addition, the
conceptual system of bilinguals might be more detailed and at the same time
not as fossilized as that of monolinguals.
7. Bibliography
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Neurolinguistic Aspects of Bilingualism. Academic Press (New York, San
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Baker, Colin; Prys Jones, Sylvia, Encyclopedia of Bilingualism & Bilingual Education.
Multilingual Matters (Clevedon: 1998).
Carringer, D, “Creative thinking abilities of a Mexican youth” in: Journal of crosscultural psychology. 5, 4, 1974, 492-504.
Edelmann, Walter, Lernpsychologie. Eine Einführung. Psychologie Verlags Union
(München, Weinheim: 21986).
Grosjean, François, Life with two Languages. An Introduction to Bilingualism. Harvard
University Press (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: 1982).
Hoffmann, Charlotte, An Introduction to Bilingualism. Longman (London, New York:
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Lamb, Sydney M., Pathways of the Brain. The Neurocognitive Basis of Language.
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McKay, Donald, “Cross-Language Facilitation, Semantic Blindness, and the Relation
between Language and Memory: A Reply to Altarriba and Soltano” in: Memory
and Cognition November, 1996, 712-718.
23
Paradis, Michel, “Generalizable Outcomes of Bilingual Aphasia Research” in: Folia
Phoniatrica et Logopaedica 52, 2000, 54-64.
Pavlenko, Aneta, “Bilingualism and Cognition: Concepts in the Mental Lexicon” in:
Cornell working papers in linguistics 14, 1996, 39-73.
Romaine, Suzanne, Bilingualism. Blackwell (Oxford: 21995).
Schmid, Hans-Jörg, Cottage and Co., idea, start vs. begin. Die Kategorisierung als
Grundprinyip einer differenzierten Bedeutungsbeschreibung. Max Niemeyer
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Schreuder, Robert; Weltem, Bert, The Bilingual Lexicon. Benjamins (Amsterdam,
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Weinreich, Uriel, Languages in Contact. Findings and Problems. Mouton & Co.
(London, The Hague, Paris: 3rd reprint1964).
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