Cognitive and Personality
Running head: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SUSCEPTIBILITY TO FALSE MEMORY
Cognitive and Personality Differences Leading to Differential Induction of False Memories
Ari Silbermann
Cornell University
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Cognitive and Personality
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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to examine how individual differences in cognitive and personality
factors contribute to commissions of false memory. Seventy-eight Cornell University students
were tested using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm to elicit false recall. Word
lists varied in qualitative components such as concreteness and associative strength. Participants
completed a task assessing field dependence and surveys measuring mental absorption and
creativity. Results showed similar trends in false recall rates to previous studies. Findings also
revealed significant associations between creation of false memories and field dependence, less
detailed mental imagery, and lower levels of self-assessed creativity. Concreteness level was
found to be an important list-based factor in explaining how individual differences trigger false
memory creation.
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Cognitive and Personality Differences Leading to Differential Induction of False Memories
False memories can consist of either remembering items or events that never happened,
or remembering them differently from the way they actually occurred. Laboratory methods have
been successful in eliciting false memories from participants in a variety of situations (see
Roediger, 1996 for a review). Two questions dominate research on false memories: are there
specific types of tests or situations that lead to higher levels of false memory creation? Are there
individual differences that cause some people to be more susceptible to creating false memories
than others? The purpose of this study is to examine the latter of these questions in order to
reveal if there are particular differences in cognitive processing or personality traits that lead to
the reporting of more false memories, and to determine how these characteristics are associated
with qualitative errors in memory.
The Deese-Roediger-McDermott Paradigm
False memories in this study were elicited by the associative priming procedure created
for free recall by Deese (1959) and expanded by Roediger and McDermott (1995), referred to as
the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In this procedure, participants are given lists
of words containing common associates of a non-presented critical word. The non-presented
words associated with the other items in the list are called target words or critical lures. For
example, the following list converges on the missing word sweet: sour, candy, sugar, bitter,
good, taste, tooth, nice, honey, soda, chocolate, heart, cake, tart, pie. After a study period,
participants are asked to recall the words they were given. They are told to include only words
they are confident were in fact present in the lists. Despite the immediate recall, participants will
often falsely recall ‘sweet’ and describe their experience while remembering it (Roediger &
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McDermott, 1995). These researchers were able to replicate false recall of target words in other
lists as well.
The DRM paradigm is unique in that most other measures assessing false memory
include stories, visual stimuli, and persuasive information—in other words an accumulation of
detail—whereas word lists do not, at least at first glance, elicit a complex scenario to remember.
It has taken a relatively long period of time from the original introduction of this measure for it
to become a popular assessment in the study of false memory. Deese (1959) was only interested
in how associations between words affected both veridical and false recall, and not the actual
intrusions of the target words. Therefore, the fact that many of his lists elicited only few
intrusions did not affect his purposes, and he did not extensively address these intrusion findings
(Deese, 1959; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). Later, Roediger and McDermott
(1995) decided to target false memory in their research and expanded the paradigm. Since this
expansion, the DRM paradigm has been used in a multitude of studies examining various aspects
of false memory.
Theories Explaining False Memory
Reproductive vs. Reconstructive Memory
Bartlett (1932) is recognized as one of the first researchers to investigate false memory.
In his study, he instructed the participants to read and later recall a Native American folktale,
“The War of the Ghosts.” Along with numerous errors of omission in the story, subjects also
made errors of commission, in which they added material to the story to make it more coherent
(Roediger, 1996). Although his specific results have not been successfully replicated, Bartlett
made a lasting contribution by piquing people’s interest in false memory, and in making the
distinction between reproductive and reconstructive memory. Reproductive memory includes the
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accurate production of content from memory. Conversely, reconstructive memory refers to the
process of filling in absent components during the recall procedure. According to Bartlett (1932),
the process of reconstructing memory is marked by frequent errors. Bartlett also claimed that
memories of hearing stories and participating in events involve error-prone reconstruction, while
simple materials such as word lists spawn accurate, reproductive memory. However, with the
introduction of the DRM paradigm, Roediger and McDermott (1995) suggested that Bartlett’s
(1932) distinction be abandoned, and that in some way all memory is reconstructive.
Recoding
The information processing approach to cognition began in the 1950s and with it came
new ideas about false memory. Miller (1956) introduced the concept called recoding to describe
the process that receives information from the outside world in one form and subsequently
transforms and represents it in a different way internally. One of the simplest methods of
recoding is the grouping or chunking of a sequence of incoming information. Miller
demonstrated this feat by presenting the findings of Smith’s (1954) investigation regarding
techniques of repeating long strings of binary digits by mentally combining them in different
ratios. Referring to this general process Miller (1956) states, “There are many ways to do this
recoding, but probably the simplest is to group the input events, apply a new name to the group,
and then remember the new name rather than the original input events” (p. 93). Since recoding is
an active process performed by the individual, it is possible to commit errors either during
recoding or during later decoding of the information.
Activation Monitoring
False memories in the DRM paradigm may be developed by an automatic spread of
activation from presented words to critical lures (Watson, Bunting, Poole, & Conway, 2005).
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Balota et al. (1999) suggested that avoiding a false memory requires the person to differentiate
between studied words and highly activated critical lures. Therefore, false memories in this
paradigm may also be due to a failure of monitoring systems to differentiate between actual
presentation and critical word activation.
Source Monitoring
Source monitoring (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) refers to the set of processes
used to determine or attribute the origin of remembered information. The Source Monitoring
Framework (SMF) is an extension of the reality monitoring framework originally proposed by
Johnson and Raye (1981). According to the SMF, there are three important types of source
monitoring: external source monitoring, internal source monitoring, and internal-external reality
monitoring. External source monitoring refers to the discrimination among externally-derived
sources, for example, discriminating between memories of statements made by one person and
those of statements made by another person. Internal source monitoring includes distinguishing
among internally-generated sources, for example, differentiating memories of what one thought
from memories of what one said. Lastly, internal-external reality monitoring involves
discriminating memories of externally-generated information (e.g. perceived items and events)
from memories of internally-generated information (e.g. thoughts and imaginings). Memories for
perceived events tend to include more spatial, temporal, and perceptual information than do
memories for imagined events (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Therefore, a memory
containing more visual and spatial detail is likely to be judged as externally derived. Because of
this relationship, those individuals who have the tendency to have more detailed mental imagery
may more often commit a source monitoring error. In addition, conditions that promote the
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perceptual similarity of internally and externally derived events will increase the probability of
confusing the two types of sources.
Fuzzy-Trace Theory
The fuzzy-trace theory (FTT; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) is a framework for the interaction
between memory and higher reasoning processes. According to the theory, events are
simultaneously stored in verbatim and gist traces. Verbatim traces are episode or item specific
and are usually accompanied by feelings of specific recollection, whereas gist or semantic traces
elicit a sense of familiarity. Memory’s performance is based on the retrieval of both verbatim and
gist traces. Falsely remembered objects or events usually fit within the gist of experience,
whether they are associated with autobiographical memory, eyewitness testimony, or recall of
word lists (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002).
According to this theory, verbatim retrieval is more likely to occur when verbatim traces
are dominant compared to gist traces, and vice versa. Verbatim and gust traces can be expected
to have separate effects on false memory, because verbatim traces are associated with the reexperiencing of items or events in context, called recollection, while gist trace retrieval occurs
when items or events that were not originally experienced are perceived to resemble actual
experienced items. As the level of familiarity increases, “phantom recollections” can develop
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). Phantom recollections are defined by the researchers as “illusory
vivid mental reinstatements of events’ occurrence” (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002, p. 167). Therefore,
when multiple words are associated with a non-presented word, such as in the DRM paradigm,
gist retrieval would support false memory because of familiarity, while verbatim retrieval would
stifle false memory.
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Distraction
Prior studies have included stimuli to act as distractors during the memorization and
recall process. The impact that these distractors have on memory ability can be explained by the
Working Memory (WM) model. Baddeley and Hitch (1974) introduced the WM model, a
tripartite system that is comprised of the articulatory loop (AL), the visuo-spatial sketchpad
(VSSP), and an attentional component called the central executive (CE). The AL is responsible
for the verbal component of short-term memory and is thought to be constructed in two parts –
an active rehearsal process and a passive phonological store (Baddeley, 1990). While the AL has
been the focus of many studies, including those on IQ performance (Ellis & Hennelly, 1980) and
language acquisition (Gathercole & Baddeley, 1989), the VSSP is less understood as the visual
memory component of the WM model. Logie (1986) tested the VSSP by presenting irrelevant
pictures to subjects as they processed stimuli, either verbal or visual, in an attempt to later recall
the items. In the verbal processing task, participants’ performance was unaffected by the
irrelevant visual material, while this same material produced diminished results when
accompanying visual processing.
Learning from this effective methodology, Quinn and McConnell (1996) divided their
participants into a rote instruction condition and a visual mnemonic condition. Those in the rote
instruction group were told to commit words to memory by mentally adding each word to the
one heard previously. Those in the visual mnemonic group were told to learn a list of pegwords
(one is bun, two is shoe, etc.) and to use them to create a visual image of each word heard (for
example, if a participant’s pegword for one is bun and the first word presented is lion, they
would imagine a lion eating a bun as a strategy for remembering the word). During word
presentation, Quinn and McConnell (1996) matched the timing of the item being said with the
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presentation of a visual image (similar to Logie, 1986). However, there were two distinct types
of images displayed. The researchers called one type dynamic visual noise because the change in
the display was constant and evenly distributed. The other type, displays consisting of line
drawings that changed both inconsistently and randomly, was designed to engage attentional
mechanisms. They found that the latter, irrelevant line drawings disrupted memory performance
in participants in both conditions (rote and visual mnemonic instruction). The more intriguing
finding was that dynamic visual noise only disrupted recall in the visual mnemonic group. These
results suggest that the attentional disruption of the line drawings affects the overall CE, and the
effect therefore trickles down to both slave systems, the AL and the VSSP. Nevertheless, it
seems that the VSSP is specifically susceptible to irrelevant dynamic visual noise. This idea is
supported by the finding that rote learning ability, handled in the AL, is undisrupted by dynamic
visual noise. Hence, in this condition, unlike the visual mnemonic condition, the AL was able to
make up for any interference in the VSSP.
Individual Differences in Susceptibility to False Memory
Despite the great amount of research being conducted with the DRM paradigm, relatively
few studies have looked into whether individual differences in young adults affect the likelihood
of false memories using this measure (Marmurek & Hamilton, 2000; Winograd, Peluso, &
Glover, 1998). Nevertheless, the studies that have been conducted have revealed that certain
cognitive and personality characteristics may be involved in the process of committing errors in
memory.
Absorption & Mental Imagery
In their work on memory and consciousness, Jacoby, Kelley, and Dywan (1989)
hypothesized that the ease with which a person is able to bring vivid events to mind increases the
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probability that the person will attribute it to being a memory. This theory is similar to that of
Horselenberg, Merckelbach, van Breukelen, and Wessel, (2004), which states that individuals
with high fantasy proneness, dissociation, and/or absorption could be susceptible to false
memories because they misinterpret their detailed imagery as true memories.
Tellegen and Atkinson (1974) define absorption as the tendency for an individual to have
periods of complete attention that fully utilize one’s representational resources, including
perception and imagination. The authors claim that absorption results in both a heightened and
an altered sense of reality. In order to assess individual differences in absorption, the researchers
created the Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS). Participants are asked to assess their agreement
with each of the 34 items on the scale (e.g. “When I listen to music I can get so caught up in it
that I don’t notice anything else”, “Sometimes images come to me without the slightest effort on
my part”). The higher an individual scores on the TAS, the greater the person’s capacity for
mental absorption.
The TAS and other related measures of mental imagery have been important in assessing
individual differences in susceptibility to false memory. For example, Platt, Lacey, Iobst, and
Finkelman (1998) tested participants’ memories at 6, 12, and 18 months following the O.J.
Simpson criminal trial verdict, coupled with administration of the TAS. The investigators found
that higher scores on the TAS (higher mental absorption) were associated with lower
autobiographical memory accuracy. They concluded that subjects were not inaccurate because
they did not remember the event, but rather because their memory of the event was distorted.
Additionally, because the test for memory accuracy was performed as much as a year prior to the
TAS testing, the authors argued that the relationship found between to two variables seemed to
be consistent over time, under the assumption that the TAS measures a trait rather than a state. In
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a similar study, Hyman and Pentland (1996) asked participants to attempt to recall childhood
events. Based on information from the parents of the participants, subjects were interviewed
about several true events and one false event. During a separate session, the TAS and a similar
measure of vividness of mental imagery, the Creative Imagination Scale (CIS; Wilson & Barber,
1978), were administered to groups of participants. Their results showed that higher imagery
levels increased the probability of creating false memories. In addition, scores on the TAS and
CIS were positively associated with each other.
Findings by Dobson and Markham (1993) also support the hypothesis that more detailed
imagers are more susceptible to false memories. They presented subjects of high and low visual
imagery, measured by Marks’ (1973) Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ), with a
short film followed by text passages describing the events of the film. Only some of the passages
were true. Participants were then asked whether certain information came from the film only,
from the text only, presented in both, or not presented at all. The researchers found that lowimagery participants made more correct discriminations than high-imagery participants. They
suggest that this result was due to the high-imagery group’s tendency to attribute pictorial images
sparked by the recognition test statements to the film because their images included a lot of
visual detail. This error represents a mistake in source monitoring (Johnson, Hashtroudi, &
Lindsay, 1993).
Despite the research demonstrating a link between higher levels of imagery and instances
of false memory, some investigators have claimed that imagery can be advantageous to the
remembering process. Jacoby, Levi, and Steinbach (1992) present the distinction between datadriven processing and conceptually-driven processing. In the memory context, data-driven
processing refers to the mechanism that analyzes a stimulus input, while conceptually-driven
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processing includes the processing of contextual information and situational knowledge. These
latter areas are where false memories are more likely to occur. Stimuli involving lower levels of
analysis, such as written letters and words utilize more data-driven processing and usually do not
require a high degree of conceptually-driven processing. Therefore, the probability of internallyderiving a false memory, such as producing a critical lure not presented in a word list in the
DRM paradigm, may be reduced when encoding processes are limited to data-driven processing.
In this case, more detailed imagers may commit less errors of false memory, because stimuli
usually associated with concept-driven processing are limited.
In order to test the hypothesis that detailed imagery has both positive and negative effects
on false memory, Marmurek and Hamilton (2000) utilized mental imagery as both an individual
difference and an experimental variable using DRM paradigm word lists presented in an auditory
modality. The investigators divided the participants into three groups: a referential imaging
(concept-driven) group, a font imaging (data-driven encoding) group, and a control group. Each
group was instructed to use different study techniques to remember the word list items. Those in
the referential imaging group were instructed to form a mental image that they felt was closely
associated to each word on the list. This instruction is similar to that told to the visual mnemonic
group in the study by Quinn and McConnell (1996). For the font imaging group, a picture
displaying three sets of the alphabet, each in a different font, was presented in the front of the
room. For each word, the participant was asked to picture the item written in one of the three
fonts being shown, designated randomly by the instructor. The control group received no
instructions regarding how to study the words. Following the word lists, a picture test was given
to assess mental imagery ability. Their results showed that referential imaging led to higher rates
of both correct and false recall when compared to font imaging techniques. Moreover, this
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pattern was only significant for good imagers. In addition, font imaging led to fewer false recalls
for more detailed imagers compared to less detailed imagers. In fact, the overall proportion of
recalling non-presented target words was lower for more detailed imagers than for less detailed
imagers, a borderline significant finding. Therefore, these results support the theory of Jacoby,
Levi, and Steinbach (1992) claiming that when encoding processes are data-driven, in this case
font imaging of words, more detailed imagers are more successful.
Roediger and McDermott (1995) suggest that associative processes may lead to the
production of false memories. Instruction to imagine referents may elicit false recall if the mental
images contain perceptual details that are consistent with the non-presented word. Susceptibility
to creating false memories may then be a function of the ability to generate imaginative details.
According to this formulation, less detailed imagers would be less likely to produce perceptual
information that would eventually lead to associative-based source monitoring failures (Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). On the other hand, more detailed imagers may be superior than
less detailed imagers at imagining words presented in a visual modality because these stimuli
would not lead to the formation of perceptual details, and are limited to data-driven processing
(Marmurek & Hamilton, 2000). The focus for these detailed imagers remains solely on
remembering the actual presented words.
Prior false memory research has been conducted under the assumption that imagery is an
undifferentiated construct, classifying individuals as either good or bad imagers. Blajenkova,
Kozhevnikov, and Motes (2006) offer two distinct subsystems that process and encode visual
information in different ways: object imagery and spatial imagery. Object imagery includes the
representations of literal appearances of objects in terms of their precise form, size, and color.
Spatial imagery refers to relatively abstract representations of the spatial relations among objects,
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locations of objects in space, and movements of objects. A study by Farah, Hammond, Levine,
and Calvanio (1988) defends these classifications by demonstrating that these two imagery
systems are anatomically and neurologically distinct. Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn, and Shephard
(2005) found that those who prefer to use verbal-analytical information over imagery, called
verbalizers, typically performed at an ‘intermediate’ level on imagery tasks, while visualizers
(those who prefer to process information visually) could be divided into two groups: those who
excelled on spatial imagery tasks (such as mental rotation) and those that performed well on
object imagery tasks (such as the degraded picture test). From these results, the authors
concluded that object imagers encoded and processed images holistically, as a single perceptual
unit, whereas spatial imagers encoded and processed images analytically, part by part.
Another issue concerns interpretation of the TAS in its entirety as representing capacity
for imagery. It is clear from an examination of the items that some involve increased sensory and
emotional responsiveness to stimuli, either external (“I can be deeply moved by a sunset”) or
internal stimuli (“If I wish I can imagine (or daydream) some things so vividly that they hold my
attention as a good movie or a story does”), while others involve something that can be best
called extrasensory perception or perhaps an error in sensorial monitoring of the environment
(“At times I somehow feel the presence of someone who is not physically there”). Though the
differences between these two types of items are clear, there has been relatively little effort to
analyze the factor structure of the scale, in part because the focus of research examining this
scale has been on its relationship to hypnotizability; for the purpose of detecting degrees of
hypnotizability, the Tellegen Absorption Scale in its entirety works very well, probably because
hypnotizability involves both heightened sensory responsiveness coupled with a form of error
monitoring to determine what is and what is not real. However, for the purposes of remembering
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lists, it may be that the ability to become completely engaged in an external stimulus is critical to
short term memory as tested by word lists, and difficulty in distinguishing what is real from what
is not may be detrimental.
Field Dependence
Another individual difference researchers have targeted as a potential contributor to
susceptibility to creating false memories is field dependence. The concept of field dependence
stemmed from the articulated versus global field approach, which emerged from research on
individual differences in perceptual and intellectual functioning (Witkin, Goodenough, &
Oltman, 1979; Witkin & Goodenough, 1981). Measures to test field dependence include the rodand-frame test (RFT), the body-adjustment test (BAT), and the rotating-room test (RRT). All of
these measures assess differences in perception of orientation. For each of these tests,
participants vary in the extent to which they refer to the external visual field or to the body itself
to locate the true upright. Strategies for determining true upright are consistent across tests,
supporting the idea that these individual reference points are related to cognition. From these
contrasting strategies, the terms field dependence and field independence were established. The
differentiation theory states that less differentiated individuals approach the world in a global,
field dependent style, while more differentiated people approach the world in an analytical, field
independent manner (Witkin, Goodenough, & Oltman, 1979). Later research revealed that
locating the upright was found to be related to the separation of an organized field from the
whole (Witkin, Goodenough, & Oltman, 1979). The embedded-figures test (EFT) was
introduced in order to test the ability to separate organized fields from the whole. In this test
participants are asked to find, or “disembed,” a simple figure within a complex design (Witkin,
1950). Disembedding ability in this context was related to structuring competence (Witkin,
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Goodenough, & Oltman, 1979). For example, a common aspect of each of these tests is that the
individual is forced to restructure their perceptions or symbolic representations in order to meet
the requirements of the task. Results revealed that field independent people are better at
successfully completing these measures and are therefore seen as superior at cognitive
restructuring ability when compared to field dependent individuals.
Another measure of field dependence was created by Piaget and Inhelder (1956). The
investigators initially developed the water-level task to test utilization of the horizontal
coordinate system within a spatial network. The task includes a display of bottles each tilted at
different angles. Participants are either told that the bottles are filled halfway with water, or that
the level of water is indicated by a dot marked on each bottle. Then, participants are instructed to
draw a line representing the water level in each bottle. Although the authors had originally
proposed that this ability developed between ages 8 and 9, the Piagetian water-level task has
frequently been used to measure, and has found conceptual deficits in, the spatial perceptions of
college students (e.g. Thomas, Jamison, & Hummel, 1973; Kenyon, 1984; Rebelsky, 1964).
Even with a horizontal line drawn below each bottle (Morris, 1971), or a superimposed grid on
the task stimuli (Kelly & Kelly, 1977), large numbers of subjects continue to fail the task.
Representation of the horizontal coordinate, measured by the Piagetian water-level task, depends
on overcoming the influence of the direct visual field and involves restructuring, a cognitive
ability that has been linked to the field dependence-independence variable (Witkin &
Goodenough, 1981). Generating a mental representation is a key skill in the component-skills
analysis model of water-level task performance (Kalichman, 1988). Furthermore, disembedding
skills in this test mediate the generation of a mental image by determining the position of the
container relative to its context. In fact, performance on the water-level task has been found to be
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associated with RFT performance (Willemsen, Buchholz, Budrow, & Geannacopulos, 1973), and
the relationship among the water-level task and the RFT have caused some researchers to assume
that the two measures are assessing the same construct (Abravanel & Gingold, 1977; DeLisi,
1983). Successful performance on the water-level task is associated with the field independence
trait, while failure to indicate the true horizontal indicates field dependence.
Field dependence-independence is an individual difference that affects cognition and
structuring of mental images. With respect to false memory susceptibility, Witkin, Goodenough,
and Oltman (1979) address self-nonself segregation in their differentiation theory by claiming
that field independent (FI) individuals are better able to separate the self from the nonself than
the field dependent (FD) individuals. This means that FI individuals usually rely more on
internally generated information, while FD individuals rely more on externally derived
information. This distinction has important implications in source monitoring effects. According
to this theory, FD individuals should be expected to confuse the origins of memories more often
than FI individuals. In order to assess participants’ memory, Durso, Reardon, and Jolly (1985)
presented subjects with a series of sentences, some of which were complete and some of which
had an obvious final word omitted. They were then asked to complete the latter sentences types
by thinking of the missing word. Field dependence was then assessed using the Group Embedded
Figures Tests (GEFT; Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 1971). Following this test, participants
were presented with a recognition task in the form of a word list. They were instructed to
delineate the source of each word as “thought,” “heard,” or “new”, depending on if they believed
the words were omitted words, non-omitted words, or novel, irrelevant words. The researchers
found that FI participants were more accurate at identifying the origin of their memories than
were FD participants, indicating better source monitoring of memories.
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Characteristics of Lists as Contributors to False Memory
The interaction between individual differences and measures used to elicit false memory
may provide important answers to the field of false memory study. Initially, Roediger and
McDermott (1995) examined instances of false recall by collapsing the results across all the lists
used in the study, a method used by most researchers to follow. Unfortunately, this practice
assumes that every list has the same effect on the production of false memory. In order to test
this assumption, Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott (1999) then attempted to discover
differences between lists in eliciting false recall by finding norms of 36 DRM paradigm word
lists. Analyzing the question further, Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo (2001) examined
qualitative characteristics of both individual word lists and their respective critical, nonpresented words to assess their relationship to false recall rates. Interestingly, but not
surprisingly, the authors found that the lists varied considerably on a number of different
variables.
With respect to the word lists used in this study, Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott
(1999) found that false recall ranged from 65% for the list associated with the non-presented
word window, 54% for the list structured around sweet, down to 10% for the list around king.
Starting with Deese (1959), a number of researchers have explored the characteristics of the
word lists themselves (Deese, 1959; McEvoy, Nelson, & Komatsu, 1999; Roediger, Watson,
McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). Deese (1959) defined interitem associative strength as the average
relative frequency with which all items in a list tend to elicit all other items in the same list as
free associates. Deese’s other contribution to the concepts involving word list characteristics was
mean backward associative strength (BAS), the average tendency for words in the study list to
elicit the critical item on a free association test. McEvoy, Nelson, and Komatsu (1999) were the
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first researchers after Deese to look at list-based factors underlying false memory creation. They
reported that lists with high interitem associative strength yielded lower false recall of critical
words relative to lists with lower interitem associative strength, whereas lists with high mean
BAS yielded greater false recall than those with lower BAS. In other words, associative
connections among presented words in each list decrease the probability of false recall, while
associative connections from list words to the critical lure increase the probability of false
memories. Their findings support those of Deese (1959).
Nevertheless, not all lists follow these rules. For example, McEvoy, Nelson, and
Komatsu (1999) reported that the king list has a relatively high BAS, which means that it should
elicit high levels of false recall. Nevertheless, norms found by Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott
(1999) convey the opposite, revealing that the king list elicited the lowest false recall rate. In
order to try and discover other variables that may explain these relationships further, Roediger,
Watson, McDermott, and Gallo (2001) examined critical word length, word frequency,
concreteness, and forward associative strength, in addition to interitem associative strength and
mean BAS. Word length was defined as the number of letters in each critical item and was
representative of the relative distinctness of each word form. Word frequency was taken from the
Kučera and Francis (1967) norms and was defined as the number of cases found in print per
million words. Concreteness ratings, representing the tangibility of each critical item, were
obtained from the word association norms of Nelson et al. (1999) and were scaled from 1-7 (1 =
least concrete to 7 = most concrete). Interitem associative strength and mean BAS were defined
in the same way as in previous studies (Deese, 1959; McEvoy, Nelson, & Komatsu, 1999).
Forward association strength, a new list variable, was defined as the strength of associative
connections from the critical word to the study words, a process that can be interpreted as the
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inverse of that explaining mean BAS. Veridical recall was measured using the average
probability of correctly recalling of the studied words. The researchers found that critical word
length was negatively correlated with false recall. The longer the critical word, and therefore the
more distinct it is, the less likely it is to elicit false recall. The authors suggest that the higher
level of distinctiveness may contribute by simplifying the monitoring process during retrieval. In
addition, they found that mean BAS was the strongest correlate of false recall, consistent with
previous findings (Deese, 1959; McEvoy, Nelson, & Komatsu, 1999).
Testing Modality
After considering individual differences and list-based factors as possible elements
influencing false recall using word lists, the final issue to take into account is testing modality.
The traditional DRM paradigm methodology outlined by Roediger and McDermott (1995)
includes group testing by reading the words aloud at a rate of one word per 1.5 seconds. Many
authors have reported a dramatic reduction of false memory rates when switching from an
auditory study presentation to a visual study presentation (Smith & Hunt, 1998; Gallo,
McDermott, Percer, & Roediger, 2001; Kellogg, 2001). For instance, Robinson and Roediger
(1997) tested participants using a computer, which displayed each word on the screen for two
seconds. They reported probabilities of overall false recall at .31 for 15-word lists, compared
with a false recall rate of .55 for 15-word lists reported by Roediger and McDermott (1995).
Smith and Hunt (1998) suggest that visual presentation of list words allows for more distinctive
item-specific processing than does auditory processing. Participants are better able to discern
between visual events (in this case, studied list words) and internally derived events (critical
lures) than between auditory events (hearing list words) and internally derived events (critical
lures). This relationship supports Johnson and Raye’s (1981) claim that visual presentation leads
Cognitive and Personality 21
to better reality monitoring. It also relates to Marmurek and Hamilton’s (2000) study results
showing that data-limited encoding leads to less false recall.
Rationale for the Current Study
The purpose of this study is to investigate how individual differences in cognition and
personality cause some people to be more susceptible to creating false memories than others. In
addition, another goal of the present research is to examine how these differences are related to
qualitative dissimilarities of DRM paradigm word lists, using norms for individual lists found by
previous researchers (Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1999; Roediger, Watson, McDermott,
and Gallo, 2001). False recall was assessed using three DRM paradigm word lists (list items
associated with critical lures king, sweet, and window). Words were presented visually, but
unlike the computer method (Robinson and Roediger, 1997), participants were able to study all
15 items at the same time. A distractor task was included between list presentation and word
recall. Individual differences in absorption and mental imagery were tested using the TAS, and
field dependence was measured using the water-level test. Lastly, no prior studies have examined
the relationship between levels of creativity and false memory creation in this type of paradigm.
Therefore, another aim of the current study is to uncover any possible relationship between these
two variables. Creativity in this study was measured using the Creative Personality Scale (CPS;
Goncy & Waehler, 2006).
It is hypothesized that the overall false recall rates for each list will follow the same trend
as found by Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott (1999) found, with the window list eliciting the
highest level of false recall, followed by the sweet list, and then finally the king list.
Nevertheless, because of this study’s administration in the visual modality, it is expected that
these false recall rates be lower than those found by Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott (1999).
Cognitive and Personality 22
Despite the previous research demonstrating how higher levels of imagery increase false
memory, this research has been limited to recall of actual events (Hyman & Pentland, 1996;
Platt, Lacey, Iobst, & Finkelman, 1998). Since the current study involves word lists, and
therefore data-driven processing (Jacoby, Levi, & Steinbach, 1992), it is hypothesized that false
recall will be associated with lower scores on the TAS, replicating previous results (Marmurek &
Hamilton, 2000). Based on the theory of Witkin, Goodenough, and Oltman (1979) which states
that FD individuals are more likely to confuse the origins of their memories, and on the similar
results of Durso, Reardon, and Jolly (1985), it is hypothesized that FD participants will exhibit
more false recall than FI participants.
Method
Participants
The final sample for this study consisted of 78 Cornell University undergraduate and
graduate students, including 24 males and 54 females. Participants ranged in age from 19-28 (M
= 20.4 years, SD = 1.5 years). An additional 44 subjects took part in the study, but were not
included in the final sample because of their previous experience with similar word lists and
procedures. The procedure took place during a regular meeting of the class, Nutritional Science
341, Human Anatomy and Physiology on May 2, 2007 in Martha Van Rensselaer Hall, room
166. Students were informed of the voluntary study beforehand, and received extra credit for
their participation. The University Committee on Human Subjects approved the methods for this
study.
Materials
Word Lists
Cognitive and Personality 23
Three word lists from the appendix of Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) article, used in
their second experiment, were included in this study. Each list consisted of 15 words most
commonly related to one critical but non-presented word (king, sweet, and window). These lists
were based on materials outlined in Deese’s (1959) article and were originally created from
Russell and Jenkin’s (1954) word association norms. Lists were presented visually with all 15
items displayed on one page. Words were double-spaced and printed in the center of the page.
Blank pages were used for the list recall portion (See Appendix). In between list presentation and
recall, an image from the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Morgan & Murray, 1935; Murray,
1943) was shown. Each list corresponded with the same TAT picture, but the lists were
presented in different orders. Three separate versions of these materials were used for
counterbalancing purposes.
In order to decide which DRM paradigm word lists to use in this study, it was important
to look at the norms of list-based factors outlined by Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo
(2001) (See Table 2). The three lists varied greatly in false recall rates, with the window list
having the highest rate of false recall. In addition, the veridical recall rate was similar across all
three lists, allowing for the focus to of the variability between lists to be on false recall.
Individual Differences Measures
The test for field dependence-independence was modified from a version of the waterlevel task created by Piaget & Inhelder (1967). In addition, the questionnaire included the CPS
(Goncy & Waehler, 2006), and the TAS (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). A comprehensive
demographics survey was included at the conclusion of the other measures (See Appendix).
The field dependence-independence assessment used in this study was designed to study
participants’ capability of organizing space within a Euclidean reference system (Piaget &
Cognitive and Personality 24
Inhelder, 1967). In this study, participants were shown a drawing of 7 bottles attached to a wall
above a horizontal line, indicating a “counter.” The bottles were depicted as tilted at various
angles with respect to the line representing the counter. A dot on each bottle represented the
height of the water level. Participants had to draw a line showing the level of water in the bottles
at the height of the dot.
The CPS was designed by Goncy and Waehler (2006) in their study assessing the
relationship between creative personality traits and musical experience. It consists of 30
statements measuring creativity (e.g. “I find many solutions to one problem,” “I enjoy novel
challenges in my life”). For the current study, two items from the CPS were omitted and phrasing
was slightly changed to others based on discussions of the clarity of the scale with other
researchers in the laboratory.
The TAS is a measure originally consisting of 34 items used to assess the extent to which
individuals become immersed in everyday activities (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). Following
feedback from other researchers, 4 items were eliminated because of their ambiguous
construction.
Procedure
Participants were tested as a group during a regular class meeting. Materials were sealed
and participants were instructed not to open them until a signal had been given. One of three
different versions of the materials was assigned to each participant so that no participants seated
next to each other received the same version.
Word Lists
Participants were told that they would be tested on their memory for word lists. When the
signal was given, they opened the materials packet to the first list. Each word list was presented
Cognitive and Personality 25
for 30 seconds, after which participants were instructed to turn to the next page which displayed
an image from the TAT. They were then given instructions to write a story explaining what was
happening in the image. They were given two minutes to complete this task. Participants then
turned to the next page and were allowed one minute for free recall of the word list. They were
told to record all the words they could remember from the list, but to only write down those that
they felt confident were present in the lists (i.e. they were told not to guess). These instructions
are in accordance with those of Roediger and McDermott (1995). A question asking if the
participant had ever had prior experience with word lists similar to the ones used in the study
was included on the final list’s recall page. Students not taking part in the study helped to
monitor that all participants were obeying the timing instructions and not returning to previous
pages in the materials packet.
Individual Differences Measures
After completing the first, timed portion of the study, participants were told that they
could complete the rest of the materials at their own pace. From this point on all three versions of
materials were identical. The first measure was the water-levels task assessing field dependenceindependence. Participants were asked to draw a line to illustrate the water level in each bottle.
This test was followed by the questionnaire section which included the TAS (Tellegen &
Atkinson, 1974), the CPS (Goncy & Waehler, 2006), and the demographics survey. Items on the
CPS and TAS were intermixed and administered as a single scale (See Appendix). Participants’
responses for these measures were given on a four-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all like me to 4
= Exactly like me). When participants had completed the questionnaire, they were asked to turn
in all materials and exit the room quietly. All participants finished the study within the class time
period of 50 minutes.
Cognitive and Personality 26
Data Analysis
Data were analyzed using the statistical analysis software JMP® 5.0.1 created by the
SAS institute located in Cary, NC.
Results
Overall rates of false recall
False recall rates found for king, sweet, and window are included in Table 1. The total
rate of false recall, or the probability of recalling at least one critical item, was 66%. Since the
total number of participants recalling king was only 4, the corresponding list was omitted from
further analyses, with the exception of veridical recall rates. It is interesting to note, however,
that every participant who recalled king also recalled both sweet and window. There was no sex
difference found in false recall rates. Additionally, there were no effects of the order of
presentation of the lists on false recall.
Overall rates of veridical recall
The rate of veridical recall was similar across the king and sweet lists, but was found to
be lower for the window list (See Table 1).
Field dependence
The overall rate of field dependence was 28%. Twenty-two percent of females were
found to be field dependent, while 40% of males were found to be field dependent. Despite this
discrepancy, there was no significant sex difference for this cognitive style.
Relationship of field dependence to recall
Falsely recalling the word window was significantly associated with field dependence,
χ2(1, N = 78) = 4.65, p = 0.03. Furthermore, regardless of any other false memory commission,
wrongly remembering the word window was related to being field dependent. Field dependence
Cognitive and Personality 27
was also related to the veridical recall for each list. Differences in the number of correct items
recalled for the king list (M = 1.3, SD = 0.7) revealed that those who were field dependent had
much lower veridical recall, t(34) = 2.00, p = 0.05. This trend was replicated in the differences
between field dependent and field independent participants for both the sweet list (M = 1.3, SD =
0.5), t(49) = 2.87, p < 0.01 and the window list (M = 2.2, SD = 0.5), t(40) = 4.60, p < 0.01.
Relationship of Tellegen absorption score and factor scores to recall
There were no significant associations found between overall TAS score and the
tendency to falsely recall critical items.
Entrancement
Examination of the relationship of individual items of the Tellegen Absorption Scale to
the false recall of sweet and window revealed that a number of items served to distinguish those
who “recalled” sweet but no item differentiated people who did or did not “recall” window. The
scores for these items were combined to form a scale that we have called Entrancement, based on
the content of the items involved. These included:

When I look at clouds I usually see figures, such as animals or people.

If I wish I can imagine (or daydream) some things so vividly that they hold my attention
as a good movie or story does.

When I listen to music I can get so caught up in it that I don't notice anything else.

It is sometimes possible for me to be completely immersed in nature or in art and to feel
as if my whole state of consciousness has somehow been temporarily altered.

I can sometimes recall past experiences in my life so vividly that it is almost like living
them again.

While acting in a play I think I could really feel the emotions of the character and
'become' her/him for the time-being, forgetting both myself and the audience.

I often take delight in small things (like the five-pointed star shape that appears when you
cut an apple across the core or the colors in soap bubbles).
Cognitive and Personality 28

I can be deeply moved by a sunset.

I like to watch cloud shapes change in the sky.

Sometimes I can change noise into music by the way I listen to it.
The value for Cronbach’s alpha for these items together was 0.825, and removal of any of
the items diminished that value, as did addition of any other items from the TAS. We therefore
considered these items to constitute a scale we have called entrancement. As can be noted from
the item content, these items involve absorption into sensory input together with the ability to
call up that same experience through memory and imagination.
Relationship of creativity score to entrancement
Self-assessed creativity and entrancement scores were highly correlated, r2(76) = .27, p <
.0001. No sex difference was found for creativity scores.
Relationship of creativity score to recall
Participants who did not have any false recall had significantly higher scores for selfassessed creativity (16.0±0.5) than did those who had one or more false recalls (13.3±0.5)
(p=0.023).
Relationship of field dependence to self-assessed creativity
Participants who were field dependent had significantly lower creativity scores than did
people who were field independent (13±0.5 versus 15±0.3, t(78)=2.919, p=0.0046.
Relationship of personality scores to recall of sweet and window
Since the purpose of this study was to discover differences in individual susceptibility to
creating false memories as they relate to different list-based factors, it was important to analyze
the results after separating the sample into the following three groups (See Table 3):
Cognitive and Personality 29

Those who falsely recalled both sweet and window versus those who did not commit any
errors in memory

Those who only falsely recalled sweet versus those with no false recall

Those who only falsely recalled window versus those with no false recall
Using this method, it was possible to uncover any individual differences in cognition and
personality that may relate to list-specific origins of false memory.
Recalling sweet & window vs. neither
These analyses draw attention to the characteristics of those participants recording both
critical, non-presented items (n = 19) as opposed to those recalling no false items (n = 26). Field
dependence was significantly associated with falsely recalling both sweet and window compared
with no false recall, χ2 (1, N = 59) = 4.11, p = 0.04. Those committing both errors in memory
were therefore more likely to be field dependent. Creativity scores for these groups also yielded
significant differences (M = 1.6, SD = 0.8). Those participants mentioning both critical items
scored lower on the CPS than those showing no false recall, t(43) = 2.04, p = 0.05, displaying
less creative characteristics.
Recalling sweet vs. neither
Analyses for these groups distinguish those committing errors only on the sweet list (n =
14) from those recalling no critical items (n = 26). Entrancement scores were significantly lower
for the group falsely recalling the critical word sweet (mean ± SEM: 25±2 versus 31±2, t(38) =
3.143, p = 0.0032). Therefore, those only recalling sweet (and not window) scored significantly
lower on the entrancement scale of the TAS compared with those who did not error in memory.
Additionally, the difference in creativity scores (14±1 versus 16±0.5) revealed a significant
association between recalling sweet and lower creativity, t(38) = 2.05, p = 0.0473).
Cognitive and Personality 30
Recalling window vs. neither
For those who only falsely recalled window but not sweet (n = 19), field dependence
remained significant, χ2 (1, N = 78) = 4.07, p = 0.04. This false memory group also exhibited a
significant difference in creativity scores (14±0.5 versus 16±0.5) based on the CPS, with the
recording of the critical word associated with lower self-assessed levels of creativity, t(45) =
2.936, p = 0.0052, but no difference in entrancement.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate how individual differences in cognition and
personality are related to list-based factors of the DRM paradigm in causing susceptibility to the
creation of false memories. In order to achieve this goal, three word lists originally used by
Roediger and McDermott (1995) were presented to participants to elicit false memory. Piaget
and Inhelder’s (1956) water-level task tested field dependence and the TAS and CPS assessed
absorption and creativity, respectively. Using the list-based factors taken from the norms of
previous researchers (Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1999; Roediger, Watson, McDermott,
and Gallo, 2001), significant associations were found between individual differences in cognition
and personality.
False Memory
Results supported the hypothesis that false recall rates would reflect the same trend as
previous research. The word king was recalled falsely the least frequently, while the word
window was falsely recalled the most frequently, with the rate of sweet inclusion falling in
between (See Table 1).
The hypothesis that false recall rates would be lower in the current study than previous
studies (Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1999) presenting DRM list words in the auditory
Cognitive and Personality 31
modality was also supported by the results. These findings support the claim made by Smith and
Hunt (1998) that visual presentation of items help participants distinguish between externally
generated events (list items) and internally derived events (critical, non-presented items).
Furthermore, the results support the source monitoring theory of Johnson, Hashtroudi, and
Lindsay (1993) that states that visual presentation aids participants in distinguishing the source
of their memories.
False recall rates in the current study were greater than those found in previous studies
using visual modalities (Robinson & Roediger, 1997). The major difference in the methodology
between these two visual presentations is the number of items presented at one time. Robinson &
Roediger (1997) displayed each word, one at a time, on a computer screen, whereas in the
current study all 15 list items were presented at one time. Theories about the functions of the
articulatory loop (AL) have important implications regarding this difference (Baddeley & Hitch,
1974). If participants are forced to study 15 items at once, there will be competition in the AL for
the rehearsal and storage of each item. It is possible that by seeing all the items at once,
participants felt that they needed to group words in order to remember them more effectively.
Furthermore, by viewing them at one time, the common association may become more apparent,
and subjects may group the items based around the association (Miller, 1956). In the case of the
current study, this recoding process led to falsely recalling the target word at higher rates than
those found in other studies using visual modalities.
Imagery
There were no overall associations found between false recall and Tellegen Absorption
Scale scores (TAS). Former studies relating detailed imagery levels to false memory creation
have used actual events and suggested information to test memory (Hyman & Pentland, 1996;
Cognitive and Personality 32
Platt, Lacey, Iobst, & Finkelman, 1998) rather than word lists. These events are conceptually
driven as opposed to the word lists in the current study, which are remembered (presumably)
using data-driven processes associated with list learning. It is therefore unsurprising that no
positive association was found between overall TAS scores and false recall. This conclusion
supports the theory Jacoby, Levi, and Steinbach (1992) that states that when encoding processes
are data-driven more detailed imagers are more successful.
Marmurek and Hamilton (2000) found that when encoding processes are limited to datadriven processing, more detailed imagers exhibit less false recall. These findings led to our
hypothesis that lower levels of imagery would be related to higher false recall rates. This claim
was supported by results from the sweet list, if we consider that the variable entrancement
involves sensory imagery, especially if we include auditory experiences as “images.”
Dissociation is a highly discussed correlate of memory suggestibility (Wright &
Livingston-Raper, 2002), but this research has not extended much into methodology using the
DRM. A previous study by Winograd, Peluso, and Glover (1998) used DRM paradigm word lists
and the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), but found that results
from these two measures were uncorrelated. Similarly, Wright, Startup, and Mathews (2005)
found no significant correlation between DRM paradigm false memories and dissociation. To the
extent that the entrancement scale reflects a degree of dissociative experience (as reflected in the
items that indicate complete involvement in a sensory experience to the exclusion of all other
experience), an association was found in the current study.
It is useful to examine what differences exist between methodologies that would explain
these contrasting findings. The DRM procedure requires the participant to err in two distinct
processes. First, the subject must generate a memory for a critical item that is not even presented.
Cognitive and Personality 33
Second, they must misattribute the source of this memory (source monitoring error; Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Procedures involving suggested events only require the
misattribution of the source in order to elicit false memory. In order to explain the relationship,
Wright, Startup, and Mathews (2005) claim that dissociation is positively related to
misattribution, but not to the generation of the items, and therefore only affects tasks that require
solely misattribution. In fact, the researchers state that it may be the case that the process of
generating a memory is negatively correlated with dissociation. If this relationship is strong
enough, the overall correlation between dissociation and false memory may be negative. The
finding that lower entrancement scores are significantly associated with false recall of the word
sweet supports this argument. But why is it that only the sweet list displays this relationship and
not the window list? Sweet has the lowest measure of tangibility, assessed using a concreteness
scale by Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo (2001), whereas window has one of the
highest (See Table 2). In fact, window has one of the highest concreteness ratings of all of the
word lists analyzed by these investigators. The combination of lower entrancement scores and a
less tangible critical word elicits a positive correlation, while with the presentation of a more
tangible lure, those participants with lower entrancement scores are more likely to realize that the
actual critical item was not presented in the list.
Field Dependence
Prior research revealed that FD individuals are more likely to confuse the origin of their
memories (Witkin, Goodenough, & Oltman, 1979; Durso, Reardon, & Jolly, 1985). The current
findings partially support the hypothesis that FD participants would show greater false recall in
the list learning paradigm. Field dependence was most positively associated with falsely
recalling the word window, but less than significant correlations were found for recalling sweet.
Cognitive and Personality 34
Therefore, it is important to consider what differentiates the window list from the other lists. An
important distinction is in concreteness, or level of tangibility of the critical words. Window has
the highest concreteness level of the three lists (Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001).
While studying these words, it is more likely that participants are imagining a window based on
the tangibility of the item, as noted above. This imagining is related to Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn,
and Shephard’s (2005) definitions of spatial versus object imagery. Spatial imagers tend to
perceive stimuli analytically, piecewise, whereas object imagers perceive stimuli holistically as a
single object. Relating this to the field dependence-independence trait, Wilson, Goodenough, and
Oltman’s (1979) differentiation theory states that FD individuals are more global in their
approach, while FI individuals are more analytic. It is therefore possible that when looking at a
list of highly concrete, or tangible, items, those that are FD and therefore more object imagers
are more likely to imagine and remember the target word if it completes the image. For example,
in the case of the window list, when presented with a list of its parts (i.e. ledge, sill, pane, glass,
frame, sash, screen, etc.), those tending to imagine stimuli holistically will commonly recall
window. On the other hand, those individuals analyzing objects part by part, FI individuals, will
more often not recall window. Because the sweet list has a lower level of concreteness, the same
relationship was not found.
Creativity
Prior to the current study, no research had been conducted to examine the relationship
between self-assessed creativity and false recall in the DRM paradigm. In addition, most prior
studies relating creativity and memory have looked to investigate the influence of working
memory and cerebellum function on creativity (e.g. Mumford & Caughron, 2007). The current
study, however, sought to examine the opposite – how creativity levels affect memory. A priori,
Cognitive and Personality 35
one might guess that recalling a non-existent word is a creative act. However, creativity level, as
measured by the CPS, was the only factor significantly associated with false recall in all three
groups: those recalling sweet and window, those only recalling sweet, and those only recalling
window. In all three instances, creativity scores were lower for those creating false memories.
The creators of the CPS stated that a major construct of creativity that the questionnaire targeted
was problem solving (Goncy & Waehler, 2006). It is possible that those individuals who assess
themselves as better problem solvers use more analytic processes than their counterparts. This
presumption is supported by the observation that people who were field dependent had
significantly lower creativity scores than did people who were field independent. Furthermore,
analysis and observation are both key elements of effective problem solving, and would also lead
individuals to realize the absence of a critical lure in a word list.
Limitations
There were several limitations in the current study that are important to consider when
analyzing the findings. These drawbacks are related to the methodology as well as to the sample.
It is possible that the TAT image was acting as more than just a distractor. With the
negative connotations associated with these pictures, it is possible that they instilled negative
emotions or stress in the participants prior to the recall task. This negative affect may influence
the way in which participants encode information. Encoding can be accomplished in either of
two ways: item-specific processing or relational processing (Hunt & Einstein, 1981; Hunt &
McDaniel, 1993). Item-specific processing involves encoding items by their specific features and
distinctive qualities. Relational processing involves encoding items as they relate to other
concepts. While both types of processing may have their advantages, item-specific processing in
the current study would be expected to lead to lower levels of false recall. The affect-as-
Cognitive and Personality 36
information hypothesis (Clore et al., 2001) predicts that affective cues experienced during tasks
help determine whether or not an individual utilizes item-specific or relational processing.
Positive affective cues are thought to encourage relational processing, while negative cues result
mostly in item-specific processing. Storbeck and Clore (2005) used music to induce positive or
negative moods, and found that individuals in negative moods were significantly less likely to
recall critical lures than individuals in positive moods (and in the control group). These findings
relate to Brainerd and Reyna’s (1995) Fuzzy Trace Theory, which suggests that true recall comes
from verbatim retrieval while false recall stems from gist retrieval. Storbeck and Clore (2005)
suggest that negative moods reduce relational processing and in turn impair gist processing.
Therefore, if the TAT images were inducing negative affective cues, it is possible that false
recall rates found in the current study were relatively lower than if a neutral or positive image
was used. Nevertheless, false recall rates for the current study were lower than those in studies
conducted in auditory modalities and higher than those in studies conducted with different visual
presentations, supporting the original hypotheses.
Another limitation to the current study is the homogeneity of the sample. The current
sample included Cornell University students enrolled in a course about human anatomy and
physiology. Therefore, the majority of the students in this class were pursuing a scientific major
and 60% designated themselves as pre-med. Subjects with scientific training have been found to
score similarly as a group in several cognitive styles, including field dependence and imagery.
For example, scientists and those with scientific training have been found to be more field
independent than subjects in nonscientific occupations or training programs, regardless of sex
(Kalichman, 1986). Additionally, Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn, and Shephard (2005) found that
scientists are more likely to be classified as spatial imagers as opposed to object imagers, tending
Cognitive and Personality 37
to perceive and encode images analytically. Nevertheless, even if FI and spatial imagery rates are
higher in this sample, within-group analyses should still uncover important associations between
these measures and list-based factors contributing to false memory creations. Also, although
males made up only 31% of the sample population, no significant sex differences were found for
any measure.
The findings of the current study are also limited because only three DRM paradigm
word lists were used. In order to be able to further validate the results, more lists should have
been included. This would have provided more data related to false recall in addition to further
evidence of potential list-based and cognitive factors that contribute to the susceptibility to
creating false memories. Unfortunately, the study was limited by the amount of time allotted for
the class, and it was necessary to design the materials and procedures accordingly.
Suggestions for Future Research
Findings from the current study suggest many directions for future research in the field of
false memory. The Object-Spatial Imagers Questionnaire (OSIQ; Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, &
Motes, 2006) was designed to classify individuals based on their visual preferences. In their
study, the authors found that object imagers encoded and processed images holistically while
spatial imagers were more analytic. The current study makes the argument that field dependent
individuals may therefore be viewed as object imagers, and that this type of perception leads to
greater false recall for lists with more tangible items. Therefore, further research would benefit
from a study including measures for false memory, field dependence, and the OSIQ.
In addition, in order to both replicate and expand upon the results of the current study,
future research should include more DRM paradigm word lists. By adding more lists,
investigators will be able to further examine the relationships between list-based factors and their
Cognitive and Personality 38
associations with cognitive and personality characteristics. More specifically, lists with target
words of varying degrees of concreteness will provide additional information about its role in
helping to predict false memory creation.
The relationship between creativity and false recall should be explored further. This was
the first study to look at the association between self-assessed creativity and performance on the
DRM paradigm. Lower creativity scores were significantly related to all three categories of false
recall. Future research should consider measuring creativity using different scales and
determining if its inverse relationship with the creation of false memories remains significant.
Cognitive and Personality 39
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Cognitive and Personality 47
Appendix
First, thank you for participating in this study!
The study consists of three parts:
1. You will first be asked to complete a series of exercises about memory and
imagination/storytelling.
2. Next, you will have your taste and smell sensitivity tested.
3. In the final part you will fill out a questionnaire concerning how you see the
world, how you find your memory works, and in which you will give some
demographic information.
Again, thanks so much for your participation!
Please wait for the signal to begin.
Cognitive and Personality 48
Please memorize the words on the list below.
You will be asked about them later.
Do not go to the next page until you have been given the signal!
Word list
Queen
England
Crown
Prince
George
Dictator
Palace
Throne
Chess
Rule
Subjects
Monarch
Royal
Leader
Reign
=> Please wait for the signal to go on to the next page. <=
Cognitive and Personality 49
In the space below, write a short story about what is happening in this picture.
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
=> Please wait for the signal to go on to the next page. <=
Cognitive and Personality 50
In the space below, write down the words you memorized
in the FIRST list:
Cognitive and Personality 51
Please memorize the words on the list below.
You will be asked about them later.
Do not go to the next page until you have been given the signal!
Word list
Sour
Candy
Sugar
Bitter
Good
Taste
Tooth
Nice
Honey
Soda
Chocolate
Heart
Cake
Tart
Pie
=> Please wait for the signal to go on to the next page. <=
Cognitive and Personality 52
In the space below, write a short story about what is happening in this picture.
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
=> Please wait for the signal to go on to the next page. <=
Cognitive and Personality 53
In the space below, write down the words you memorized
in the SECOND list:
Cognitive and Personality 54
Please memorize the words on the list below.
You will be asked about them later.
Do not go to the next page until you have been given the signal!
Door
Glass
Pane
Shade
Ledge
Sill
House
Open
Curtain
Frame
View
Breeze
Sash
Screen
Shutter
=> Please wait for the signal to go on to the next page. <=
Cognitive and Personality 55
In the space below, tell a short story about what is happening in this picture.
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
=> Please wait for the signal to go on to the next page. <=
Cognitive and Personality 56
In the space below, write down the words you memorized
in the THIRD list:
Have you had experience with word lists similar to the ones used in this study?
Yes
=> Please wait for the signal to go on to the next page. <=
No
Cognitive and Personality 57
Part IV. Water levels:
The image below diagrams a series of clear glass bottles. Imagine that they are attached to a
wall, above a horizontal counter, indicated by the black bar. They are all partially filled with
water. The level of water in each bottle is as high as the dot next to the bottle.
Draw a line showing the level of water in each bottle, so that the line touches the dot.
In which direction(s) did you draw the water levels (circle your answer)?
Towards the dot (left to right)
Away from the dot (right to left)
Once you have completed this exercise, please go on to the next page.
Both directions
Cognitive and Personality 58
Questionnaire Part I. First, something about your attitudes and behaviors ~
Using the following scale, indicate to what extent each of the following is typical of you:
1. Not at all like me
2. Slightly like me
3. Moderately like me
4. Exactly like me
_____ I can be greatly moved by eloquent or poetic language.
_____ When reading a book, I can become so involved that I forget my surroundings and feel as if
I were taking part in the story.
_____ Sometimes I feel as if my mind could envelop the whole world.
_____ When I look at clouds I usually see figures, such as animals or people.
_____ If I wish I can imagine (or daydream) some things so vividly that they hold my attention as a
good movie or story does.
_____ Textures—such as wool, sand, or wood—sometimes remind me of colors or music.
_____ When I listen to music I can get so caught up in it that I don't notice anything else.
_____ I feel I do not have much freedom to choose the actions in my life.
_____ If I wish I can imagine that my body is so heavy that I could not move it if I wanted to.
_____ The crackle and flames of a wood fire stimulate my imagination.
_____ It is sometimes possible for me to be completely immersed in nature or in art and to feel as
if my whole state of consciousness has somehow been temporarily altered.
_____ I am able to wander off into my own thoughts while doing a routine task and actually forget
that I am doing the task, and then find a few minutes later that I have completed it.
_____ I can sometimes recall past experiences in my life so vividly that it is almost like living them
again.
_____ While acting in a play I think I could really feel the emotions of the character and 'become'
her/him for the time-being, forgetting both myself and the audience.
_____ Some of my most vivid memories are called up by scents and smells.
_____ I think that I am intelligent.
Cognitive and Personality 59
Indicate to what extent each of the following is typical of you:
1. Not at all like me
2. Slightly like me
3. Moderately like me
4. Exactly like me
_____ I have low confidence in myself.
_____ I would not describe myself as an independent thinker.
_____ I am a risk-taker.
_____ I enjoy novel challenges in my life.
_____ My thoughts often occur as visual images rather than words.
_____ I do not consider myself a complex thinker.
_____ I often take delight in small things (like the five-pointed star shape that appears when you
cut an apple across the core or the colors in soap bubbles).
_____ When listening to organ music or other powerful music, I sometimes feel as if I am being
lifted into the air.
_____ Some music reminds me of pictures or changing color patterns.
_____ I find myself capable of handling a variety of situations.
_____ My views are generally more extreme than those of my peers.
_____ I often have "physical memories"; for example, after I've been swimming I may still feel as if
I'm in the water.
_____ People who know me would describe me as creative.
_____ The sound of a voice can be so fascinating to me that I can just go on listening to it.
_____ Most decisions I make in my life are objective and clear-cut.
_____ I find that different odors have different colors.
_____ I think I am a unique individual among my friends.
_____ I can be deeply moved by a sunset.
_____ I solve problems the same way other people do.
Cognitive and Personality 60
Indicate to what extent each of the following is typical of you:
5. Not at all like me
6. Slightly like me
7. Moderately like me
8. Exactly like me
_____ I am not involved in many activities.
_____ My ideas are rarely different from those of my peers.
_____ I am resourceful.
_____ I can be critical of other people’s work.
_____ When I have to make a decision, I tend to mull things over, weighing all the possibilities.
_____ I try to find many solutions to one problem.
_____ I am not a humorous person.
_____ If I stare at a picture and then look away from it, I can sometimes "see" an image of the
picture almost as if I were still looking at it.
_____ I am a very cautious person.
_____ I like to watch cloud shapes change in the sky.
_____ I solve problems in creative ways.
_____ I sometimes "step outside" my usual self and experience an entirely different state of being.
_____ I put others before myself.
_____ I am not particularly good at problem solving.
_____ I can often somehow sense the presence of another person before I actually see or hear
her/him.
_____ Different colors have distinctive and special meanings for me.
_____ I do well at connecting many different parts of my life.
_____ Sometimes I can change noise into music by the way I listen to it.
_____ I don’t have much spontaneity in my life.
_____ I often know what someone is going to say before he or she says it.
Cognitive and Personality 61
Indicate to what extent each of the following is typical of you:
9. Not at all like me
10. Slightly like me
11. Moderately like me
12. Exactly like me
_____ At times I somehow feel the presence of someone who is not physically there.
_____ I am generally creative in my work.
_____ Sometimes images come to me without the slightest effort on my part.
_____ I am a very conventional person.
_____ I have a wide assortment of interests and activities.
Cognitive and Personality 62
Part II. Next, a little bit about your day and your sleep:
Overall, what percentage of time have you been feeling in the following moods today?
In a bad mood
_______%
A little low or irritable
_______%
In a mildly pleasant mood
_______%
In a very good mood
_______%
SUM
100 %
Last night, how many hours of actual sleep did you get? ______ What time did you go to sleep?
________
Was the amount of sleep you got last night typical? Yes
If not, do you usually get:
More sleep
How tired do you feel right now?
Very tired
Somewhat tired
No
Less sleep
Not tired, but not wide awake
Do you consume caffeine (e.g. coffee, tea, soda, caffeine pills)?
If yes:
How long ago did you last have caffeine?
Less than 1hour 1 hour 2 hours 3 hours 4 hours
Yes
Wide awake
No
5 hours
More than 5 hours ago
When in the day do you usually consume caffeine (please circle all that apply)?
Morning
Midday
Afternoon
Evening
What form of caffeine do you consume (please circle all that apply)?
Coffee
Tea
Soda
Pills
Other (please specify) _____________
How satisfied are you with your health these days?
Very satisfied
Satisfied
Not very satisfied
Not at all satisfied
How stressed do you feel about emotional issues in your life (i.e. due to relationship problems, family
problems etc.)?
Very stressed
Stressed
Not very stressed
Not at all stressed
How stressed do you feel about academic issues in your life (i.e. upcoming exams, papers etc.)?
Very stressed
Stressed
Not very stressed
Not at all stressed
How stressed do you feel about physical issues in your life (i.e. health, amount of exercise)?
Very stressed
Stressed
Not very stressed
Not at all stressed
Cognitive and Personality 63
Part III. Finally, some information about who you are…
Month of birth: ____________ Year of birth: ___________
Sex: Male Female
Major: __________________ College: __________________
Future occupation – please be
specific:__________________________________________________
Are you pre-med? Yes No
If you are pre-med, what specialty interests you the most? __________________________
Height (inches): ______feet______ inches
Weight (pounds):_________
How physically active are you?
Very
Moderately
Slightly
Not at all
If you participate in physical activity, for which of the following reasons do you participate?
(circle all that apply): Health Recreation To lose weight Other: ______________
If you play a sport, please specify: Varsity Intramural Club
How would you rate your taste perception?
How would you rate your smell perception?
Excellent
Excellent
Very good
Very good
Good
Good
Fair
Fair
Poor
Poor
What is your handedness?
Right-Handed
Mostly Right-Handed
Ambidextrous Mostly Left-Handed
Left-Handed
Do you play a musical instrument? Yes No If yes, which instrument(s):____________________
How would you rate your proficiency at this instrument (or your best instrument if you play more than
one? Expert Intermediate Beginner
Do you do puzzles? Yes No
If yes, what kinds of puzzles? ______________________________________________________
How often do you do them? __________________
Do you smoke? Yes No
If yes, what do you smoke (e.g. cigarettes, cigars)? _____________________________
How often do you usually smoke? Daily 2-3 times/week Once a week < Once/week
Did you smoke today? Yes No
Did you drink alcohol (including alcohol in medications) yesterday?
Did you drink alcohol (including alcohol in medications) today?
Yes
Yes
No
No
Have you ever done binge drinking (defined as drinking over an extended period of time, usually
two or more days, during which you repeatedly consume alcohol to the point of intoxication, and
give up your usual activities and obligations)? Yes No
Do have a cold or nasal congestion today?
Yes No
Are you currently taking any prescription medications? Yes No
If yes, which ones? __________________________________________________
Cognitive and Personality 64
Are you currently taking over the counter medications (i.e. aspirin, Claritin, ibuprofen)? Yes
If yes, which ones? __________________________________________________
Do you take nutritional supplements (for example vitamin pills, calcium, protein shakes)? Yes
If yes, which ones? __________________________________________________
No
No
Do you find that these medications affect your sense of taste and/or smell? Yes No
If yes, in what way do they affect your sense of taste or smell?
________________________________________________________________________
Do you often have the feeling of having a dry mouth? Yes
No
Do you have any kind of allergy? Yes No
If yes, what kind(s) do you have?
___________________________________________________
Do you currently have nasal polyps? Yes
No Have you had them in the past?
Yes
No
Are you on a specific diet (i.e. vegetarian, Atkins, Kosher, South Beach, etc.)? Yes No
If yes, please specify? __________________________________________________
Have you ever sustained a head injury (for example from a car accident or snowboarding)? Yes No
If yes, please specify: __________________________________________________
Were you unconscious? Yes No
Circle all the groups or areas of the world from which your ancestors came:
Pacific Islands China Korea Japan Southeast Asia India/Pakistan/Afghanistan Central
Asia Israel Ashkenazim Sephardim Middle East North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
Turkey Caucasus Greece Italy Spain Portugal France Belgium Ireland
United Kingdom
Netherlands Denmark Norway Sweden Iceland Finland
Latvia/Lithuania/Estonia Russia Poland Germany Austria Switzerland Hungary
Czech Republic Slovakia Bulgaria Romania Moldavia Ukraine Pre-Columbian America
Was English the first language you learned? Yes No
If not, at what age did you start learning English? ________
What language did you learn first? ______________
Can you read and write in this language? Yes No
For women:
What was the date of the start of your last menstrual period?________________________
Do you use oral contraceptives? Yes No
How many periods have you had in the past 6 months?____________________________
Are your periods regular or irregular?__________________________________________
THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR COMPLETING THIS STUDY!!!
Cognitive and Personality 65
Author Note
Ari Silbermann, Undergraduate in the Department of Human Development, Cornell
University. This study was conducted as fulfillment of an undergraduate honors program. I
would like to thank Dr. Virginia Utermohlen for her guidance in overseeing this project. I would
also like to thank Drs. Marienella Casasola and Stephen Ceci for their additional comments and
support, and to all of the students participating in this study.
Correspondence regarding this manuscript should be addressed to Ari Silbermann,
Department of Human Development, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853. Electronic mail can
be sent to abs57@cornell.edu
Cognitive and Personality 66
Table 1
Rates of False Recall and Veridical Recall for Three DRM Paradigm Word Lists
______________________________________________________________________________
Word List
False Recall
Veridical Recall
______________________________________________________________________________
King
.05
.706
Sweet
.42
.703
Window
.49
.568
______________________________________________________________________________
Cognitive and Personality 67
Table 2
Word List Norms from Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo (2001)
______________________________________________________________________________
Word List
False Recall
Concreteness
BAS
Connectivity
Veridical Recall
______________________________________________________________________________
King
.10
5.54
.230
2.07
.650
Sweet
.54
4.53
.172
2.07
.630
Window
.65
6.27
.184
0.67
.630
_____________________________________________________________________________
Cognitive and Personality 68
Table 3
Breakdown of Total Sample (N=78) by False Recall Responses of Sweet and Window
______________________________________________________________________________
Recalled Window
Did Not Recall Window
Total
Recalled Sweet
19
14
33
Did Not Recall Sweet
19
26
45
Total
38
40
78
______________________________________________________________________________