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Mankind Quarterly 41 (2), 2000, 193-210
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MAKING THE
MOST OF THE HUMAN CONDITION
BJØRN GRINDE
National Institute of Public Health, Norway
P.O. Box 4404 Torshov, N-0403 Oslo, Norway.
E-mail: bjorn.grinde@folkehelsa.no
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Human social behavior is driven by emotions that involve agreeable and punishing
sensations. We are inclined to be nice because kindness feels good while misconduct is
disturbing. This evolutionary strategy laid down in humans is forceful and flexible, and it can
be exploited to the benefit of mankind. Thus biological restraints does not necessarily block
the creation of a more gregarious society. One problem, however, is that we live under
conditions different from those to which our genes are adapted. The situation causes a
deterioration in social behavior because it involves stress and because it is suboptimal for our
innate cooperative inclinations.
In an attempt to optimize behavioral fitness, evolution balances the advantages of solitary
living against the advantages of interacting with others. In typical social species there is also a
balance between selfish and altruistic traits. The behavioral adaptation, however, is specific to
a particular environment. It is generally assumed that forcing animals to live under conditions
different from those for which their genes are designed causes stress and aberrant behavior
(Moberg, 1985).
The human species presumably adapted to a rare mixture of pair-bonding within small
bands or tribes and to a stone age way of life. Our genes are not designed for modern society.
This mismatch, between the environment of evolutionary adaptation and present conditions,
may help explain why aggressive and anti-social conduct is such a severe problem.
Our intellect, and the concomitant measure of free will, has made humans the most
versatile animal on earth, but survival does not necessarily mean that we thrive under any and
all circumstances. There is a price to be paid for stretching the limits. Habituation and culture
can divert behavior in many directions, but all paths are not equally serviceable. Present
conditions of living is a source of stress, a more optimal environment might reduce the stress
and thereby alleviate various behavioural problems.
I shall use the acronym DEG (Discord between Environment and Genes) for the negative
aspects of the mismatch between what the genes are adjusted to and the actual conditions of
living for a species. The population density of the cities is one example of human DEG. The
density affects the number of people with whom we are forced to interact, the way society is
organized, as well as several other features of life that contribute to the DEG situation. In the
stone age tribe, members had lifelong companionship with a small group of individuals. In the
age of the nuclear family, many people seem to lack a sense of belonging. The presence of
friends and affiliates does not offer complete compensation for the social security of the tribe.
A social species
Dawkins (1976) has stated: “Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which
individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect
little help from biological nature”. I disagree, we have powerful innate social tendencies, and
the human mind is designed with a fair amount of generosity. For recent treaties supporting
this claim see: Wilson (1993), Wright (1994), Waal (1996) and Ridley (1996). Yet, social
behavior may very well be an Achilles heel for modern society.
As pointed out by Damon (1999), feelings such as empathy and companionship are
present from a very early age. Newborns cry when they hear others cry and show signs of
pleasure at happy sounds such as cooing and laughter. By the second year of life, children
commonly console peers or parents in distress. Although the emotional disposition to help
appears to be present, the means of helping others effectively must be learned and refined
through social experience. Unfortunately, it seems as if the capacity for empathy tends to
stagnate, or even diminish, as we age. While we appear to be born with the inclination to form
close ties with those surrounding us, as we grow up, and constantly are bombarded with
strangers, the "us versus them" feelings become more dominant.
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I believe that by understanding the biology of human behavior, and particularly the innate
tendencies that social interactions are based on, we stand a better chance of alleviating social
problems. The question is how to make the most of the human condition. Before I address this
question, I shall briefly describe some relevant aspects concerning the evolution of human
social behavior.
Categories of Social Behavior
Many species of animals display social behavior (Wilson, 1975). The various forms of
cooperative behavior are divided into categories reflecting different evolutionary mechanisms.
In the case of mutualism both parts benefit. It is sufficient, however, that the provider can
expect to get a return at some later point, referred to as reciprocity; or that the act carries
neither cost nor benefit for the provider, but helps the other part, byproduct mutualism.
These categories of cooperative behavior are easy to explain in evolutionary terms. The
more difficult behavior to account for is altruism, that is, behavior where the provider loses
fitness.
Altruism is generally explained as resulting from either kin selection, that is behavior
benefiting blood relatives and thus the genes they share with the provider; or group selection.
The notion of group selection is controversial. Proponents, such as Sober & Wilson (1998),
believe evolutionary theory allows unselfish behavior benefiting the group to evolve. It is,
however, difficult to find good examples; because groups usually include kin, and because
behavior that appears altruistic actually may bring personal benefits in the long run.
Many examples of possible altruistic behavior, particularly those where group selection is
suggested, may preferably be labeled as "apparent altruism", as this term does not require the
conduct to be truly unselfish. Cases that are easily explained by kin selection do presumably
reflect true altruism.
The Human Touch: The Addition of Moral
Human social interactions are sometimes hard to explain within the general framework
described above. This is particularly true for real or apparent altruistic acts; there is more
generosity than can easily be accounted for by kin or group selection.
Various rationales have been suggested to justify an innate component in such behavior.
For example, while it was originally assumed that evolution of mutual aid would only be
possible in the case of tight partnership or close kinship (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981),
computer simulations indicate that aiding others can improve the provider’s fitness even if the
recipients do not return the help (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). The simulations add evidence to
the evolutionary feasibility of indirect reciprocity, as exemplified by the act of helping others
for the purpose of improving status and reputation and thereby expecting future help from a
third part. The idea seems to fit well with observed human behavior; we are deeply concerned
about our reputations and want to be seen as virtuous, a feature that according to Ridley
(1996) helps explain an almost irrational inclination to collaborate. Another trait that may
have added to our cooperative tendencies is the evolution of docility, that is, we are receptive
to social influence and tend to submit to the will of the group or its leaders (Simon, 1990).
Attributes such as those suggested above help explain what we refer to as moral. Moral is
a quality of human behavior that for many people stands as a key feature separating us from
other animals. Actually we are not necessarily the only species with moral inclinations.
Waal (1996) suggests two requirements for the evolution of this quality: The group must
depend on each other for subsistence and defense, and there must be a need to cooperate in
the presence of disparate individual interests. Waal's observations of primates indicate that
behavioral traits reminiscent of moral may be present in other species, particularly in the
chimpanzee.
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In evolutionary terms, moral may be "diagnosed" as based on kin and group selection
with a distinct contribution from direct and indirect reciprocity. Reciprocity has presumably
been instrumental in adding the feelings of fairness and justice to the human psyche.
The Evolution of Cooperative Behavior in Human
The only other species of apes with complex social interactions are the chimpanzees,
particularly the bonobo chimpanzees who apparently evolved sexual play as a way of
maintaining social bonds (Waal, 1995).
The chimpanzees are believed to represent the last lineage to diverge from our forebears
(Horai et al., 1995). Thus although social behavior is common among monkeys, it was
probably not typical for the lineage leading towards apes and humans (Foley, 1989; Garber,
1991). A parsimonious explanation would be that social tendencies evolved as a response to
the increase in predatory pressure that presumably occurred as our ancestors moved from the
canopy to a more vulnerable setting on the ground. Among the other apes, gorillas adapted to
the same problem by growing bigger and stronger, while orangutans and gibbons still spend
most of their time in trees.
According to this model evolution had only 5 – 6 million years to install social behavior
in chimpanzees and hominids. Particular in our lineage, the process was probably boosted by
other factors such as the need for extended infant care and the advantages of hunting in
groups.
Social behavior in primates presumably relies on a mixture of instincts and emotional
motivation. As a novel evolutionary entity, human social life may have been tailored to a
somewhat different pattern from that of social monkeys. More specifically, it seems likely that
the emotionally-based strategy has been more important in the evolution of human
cooperative behavior.
Towards a Model for Improving Sociability
Human behavior can be modulated relatively easily, yet our versatility is restricted by vague
limits set by the genes. I shall use a pendulum as an analogy to illustrate the relationship
between innate dispositions and how we can modulate cooperative behavior.
In this analogy, moving the pendulum to the right reflects an increase in gregariousness,
while movement to the left implies more conflict and aggression. The position of the
pendulum depends on two factors. One is gravity, which is analogous to the pull of the genes.
However, the direction of the field of gravity depends on the conditions under which we are
living. In a natural environment the gravity pulls straight down. In this case the levels of
respectively aggressive or cooperative behavior mirror the balance evolution has brought to
our genes, thus the natural default position implies a fair share of both selfish and nasty
behavior. The other factor is how we are able to manage human behavioral resources.
When living in DEG conditions, the field of gravity, and thus the pendulum, is tilted
towards aggression. I believe modern societies are troubled by this predicament. The large
number of humans probably aggravates the problem, as a high population density presumably
is socially demanding. The latter statement implies that to function satisfactorily modern
societies actually require an increase in altruism beyond the default value in a natural
environment.
It is possible to alleviate the problem. We can try to change our way of living towards
what our genes are adapted to, and thus tilt the field of gravity, but it is also possible to pull
the pendulum away from its point of equilibrium towards benevolence. As previously pointed
out, we have a potent innate register of cooperative tendencies that can be stimulated. This is
a question of managing our innate behavioral resources. There are, however, limitations as to
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how far from equilibrium we can expect to hold the pendulum. The further it is pulled, the
more energy is required to retain it.
The problem of aggressive behavior differs significantly between various cultural
settings, as exemplified by the crime rates of Tokyo compared to those of New York, or by
comparing traditional societies such as the Trobrianders and the Yanomamö (Keesing, 1981).
Humans have a recent common ancestry and are relatively homogenous in genetic terms
(Cann et al., 1987; Horai et al., 1995), thus the observed differences are presumably due
primarily to cultural and environmental factors rather than genetic variation between the
various subpopulations. Certain ways of organizing human social life appear to be more
appropriate for peaceful coexistence. In other words, it is possible to move the pendulum. The
two options for doing so are discussed below.
Improving the Conditions of Living
Observations of animals indicate that the stress associated with living in a suboptimal
environment tends to impair social interactions (Moberg, 1985). In the pendulum analogy I
propose that stress associated with DEG conditions also has an impact on aggressive and antisocial behavior in humans. The idea makes intuitive sense when it comes to the more
fundamental requirements of life. They say a hungry man is an angry man. When people are
discontented or stressed, wrath and related feelings move closer to the surface.
I believe the principle of reducing aggression by reducing DEG can be extended to other,
less obvious, factors. Promoting exercise, designing ergonomic chairs, and creating green
lungs in the cities are subtle ways of adjusting life to our genetic constitution. Even if the
results of many of the suggested adjustments is negligible individually, the combined
reduction in DEG may be sufficient to yield an impact on life quality and behavior.
Based on the biological perspective, it is tempting to suggest that when we invented the
farm, we ate the apple and were forever expelled from paradise. The drastic changes in human
conditions of living started with the development of agriculture. From then on the gap
between our genetic constitution and the way of living widened. Moreover, the early farming
presumably required more labor than hunting and gathering, and the extra effort did not even
improve diet ( Eaton et al., 1996).
It is not practical to bring human society back to the tribal way of life, neither is this a
desired goal. Our technological standard of living depends on a high population density, and
thus DEG conditions. What is natural is not necessarily good; leprosy is the natural
consequence of an infection with Mycobacterium leprae, the use of antibiotics to stop the
infection is not.
I assume most people will judge the advantages of industrialized society to outweigh
possible disadvantages. However, that does not preclude the notion that DEG conditions are
associated with an element of stress, and that it is possible to alleviate part of the stress within
the general framework of industrialized society. Thus I do believe an understanding of the
environment of evolutionary adaptation, and our concomitant innate behavioral tendencies, is
valuable information; as in certain regards it may be beneficial to approximate that
environment. It should be possible to decrease the level of stress by reducing the discord
between environment and genes and to organize society in a way that caters more to our
innate social tendencies. That is, in terms of the pendulum analogy, to move the field of
gravity.
Within historical times no society has totally avoided the DEG problem. For the last
several thousand years even the remaining hunter-gatherers have lived in suboptimal
environments, either because they have been squeezed into marginal regions, or because their
territories have become too densely populated. The notion that a natural environment fosters
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less aggression is therefore difficult to test by comparing the descriptions of various cultures,
yet there are interesting observations to be made.
It is possible to induce strong social affiliations that unite populations much larger than
those of traditional tribes. Japan offers an noteworthy example. The country is (or was) a
society governed by moral rather than law, as illustrated by the observation that the United
States has five times as many lawyers per capita (Clark, 1983). In Japan, factories and offices
are organized as "tribal units" with close-knit people who pledge to help and care for each
other. The country even managed to create a hierarchy of tribes with a god-like emperor
leading a supertribe.
Obligations are presumably more likely to be heeded if they are enforced by moral rather
than law, as it is often possible to escape the police while it is more difficult to avoid a guilty
conscience. Japan exploited this presumption, the country relied on tribal feelings, that is
moral rules, rather than paragraphs. The country functioned as an oversized tribal society. I
believe the feature helped Japan achieve certain goals.
It is a basic tenet in psychology that we are inclined to underestimate the power of social
and situational forces on human behavior, a bias Ross (1977) termed the fundamental
attribution error. We tend to think of people as good or bad, rather than considering the
situation as instrumental in creating good or bad conduct. Our social nature suggests that
people are good if the circumstances are right. Acts of aggression tend to emanate from
particular situations or stimuli, while kindness is more spontaneous. I believe DEG conditions
both decrease the threshold for aggression and inhibit kindness.
Stimulating Geniality
It is possible to improve social behavior without decreasing DEG. In the pendulum analogy
this is equivalent to pulling the pendulum.
Thanks to the social sciences we know a lot about how to stimulate geniality, therefore,
although we presumably live under conditions quite different from those we are adapted to,
present behavior is not necessarily that bad. In most countries these skills are actively
exploited for the purpose of improving cooperative behavior. Of course the human mind also
carries a strong component of selfishness, thus there are limits as to how much altruism we
can excite.
The mass media and the school system offer excellent opportunities to influence vast
populations. Religion is another important agent. It is conceivable that we have an innate
tendency towards religiousness that evolved primarily for the purpose of promoting
cooperative behavior (Richerson & Boyd, 1989; Grinde, 1998). Most religious movements are
expected to assist in pulling the pendulum in the direction of benevolence. Religion no doubt
carriers a strong momentum, although its impact should benefit by adjusting the religious
doctrines to scientific knowledge on human nature (Cattell, 1987).
The biological perspective can help us understand and improve the available tools. Based
on behavioral biology it is, for example, possible to explain why it is more potent to display
pictures of children rather than adults in an attempt to stimulate generosity. We readily get
involved with other people's children, while we are more reserved when it comes to unknown
adults, thus we prefer to believe it is children who benefit from our favors.
The Pleasure of Kindness
Altruistic and other forms of cooperative behavior have evolved independently in various
animal lineages. The advantages may be similar, but the mechanisms employed by the
nervous system differ. In insects the function is instinctive, or hard-wired, while the
mammalian lineage added an emotional strategy for influencing behavior.
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Emotions involve sensations. The sensations tend to have positive or negative
connotations because their typical purpose is to induce us either to take an opportunity or to
avoid endangering ourselves (Nesse, 1991). Thus the terms "rewards" and "punishments" can
be used for the currency the mind offers to coerce us to follow the path of behavior designed
by evolution.
All mammalian brains create positive and negative sensations. I believe, however, that
the sensations are stronger in humans than in any other animal as a consequence of our “free
will”. Concomitant with our improved mental functions we gained an unprecedented level of
conscious control of behavior. For the genes such freedom is a two-edged sword: an ant will
always follow the scripture as it is written in the genes, whereas a human may choose to take
actions that are not in the genes' interest, as exemplified by the recent decline in birth rates.
In order to ensure that human behavior did not stray too much from what was adaptive
under the circumstances that humans evolved, I believe evolution made the human lineage
rely more heavily on positive and negative sensations. In other words, intense rewards are an
evolutionary strategy designed by the genes to retain their influence on human behavior. They
are meant to counterbalance our freedom. As for the decline in birth rates, if it had not been
for the invention of contraceptives, the intensity of the pleasures associated with sexual
activity would have kept the babies coming.
The combination of powerful sensations and the importance placed on cooperative
behavior suggest that humans are highly rewarded for geniality.
Socializing for Health and Happiness
I have previously used the concept of rewards delivered by the brain as a basis for discussing
human quality of life (Grinde, 1996). Briefly, quality of life depends, to some extent, on
adjusting conditions of living to suit our inborn tendencies (in order to avoid the stress or
strain of a suboptimal environment), and on pursuing agreeable sensations offered by the
brain while avoiding punishing sensations. What I refer to as Darwinian happiness is a
measure of quality of life based on these principles.
I believe Darwinian happiness is relevant for the present discussion on how to encourage
cooperative behavior for the following reason: If people can be convinced that kindness
improves their quality of life (by generating pleasant sensations) then behavior should move
in that direction.
It should be pointed out that in the present context the terms reward and punishment have
unusual attributes. Sadness, for example, may be rewarding. This may be counterintuitive, but
does explain why people flock to movies known to make them cry. To understand the
apparent paradox, it is important to distinguish between a harmful event and the associated
response; the former is something to be avoided, the latter is a natural emotion.
The loss of a spouse may be tragic for the genes, but as misfortunes occasionally occur,
the genes have prepared the brain to cope with the problem. Once your spouse is gone, the
genes are best served by implementing a mechanism that helps you master the situation. As
discussed by Archer (1999), grief is a natural, innate response that is evoked by particular
circumstances. To the extent that grief is adaptive, in that it helps you overcome a loss, the
brain should encourage you to entertain this feeling. It should provide a “reward” in the form
of an agreeable sensation associated with the grief.
Similarly, fear is there to make you cautious, not unhappy; thus as long as you feel that
you are in control, you can enjoy a roller coaster or a speeding motorcycle. A dangerous
situation that you are capable of handling should induce a pleasant sensation, because a
positive mood is instrumental for survival, which helps explain why people enjoy an
"adrenaline kick".
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Our social connections are probably one of the most potent sources for rewarding
sensations. Furthermore, an inadequate social life implies a large dose of DEG. Thus the
assumption made by Myers & Diener (1997), that provided the basic needs are met, the most
significant external factor influencing the happiness of people is their social life, comes as no
surprise. Humans are indeed a social species. It is important to get along with family and
friends.
Actually socializing appears to be of prime importance, not just in man, but in other
social mammals as well. The more socially-savvy or socially-affiliating personality styles
obtain long and successful lives (Williams & Nesse, 1996; Sapolsky, 1998).
Rewarding Sensations can be Exploited
Even if social inclinations and moral are accepted as inherent qualities, it is not obvious why
humans so easily can be induced to help total strangers. We willingly help people on the
opposite side of the globe. Such altruistic acts can, however, be explained by considering a
phenomenon related to the evolutionary reliance on rewarding sensations for guiding human
behavior. The rewards imply that we are in a position to fool or cheat the genes for our own
personal benefit, and in actual behavior we happily do deceive our genes. I shall refer to this
observation as the "dupe-the-genes" tendency.
One obvious example of this tendency relates to procreation. As pointed out above,
sexual activity involves intense pleasures. Humans evolved in the absence of contraceptives,
thus it was not necessary for our desires to be aimed at the actual fertilization, it was sufficient
to induce us to have intercourse. As a consequence, all rewards connected with the act of
procreation are available even when we are consciously aware of not contributing to this end
at all. Thus you are in a position to deceive your genes for the purpose of improving your
Darwinian happiness. This is because human conditions of living have changed more rapidly
than the process of evolution can adjust.
The dupe-the-gene inclination explains why certain genetically maladaptive behavioral
patterns can persist. The important point for the present discussion is that what is maladaptive
for the genes, may be beneficial for society. For example, by using condoms we both
counteract the population boom and elude a variety of germs. I believe the effect is even more
valuable as it applies to altruism.
During hominid evolution the tribe was the obvious group with which to associate. It was
therefore not necessary to strictly confine support to individuals with particular qualifications,
such as "only those I see at least one hour each day", or "only those who sleep around the
same camp fire". Thus the genes are not prepared for the possibility of donating resources to
people with whom we never interact. The implication is that the rewards associated with
kindness are available even when we help strangers. Modern societies could not exist without
the dupe-the-genes effect as it relates to social interactions.
Pets offer an even more extreme example of the effect. The rewards obtained by
affectionate relationships are sufficiently unspecific to be available even when associating
with members of other species. The popularity of pet animals suggests that there is a rich
surplus of generosity and a need for affiliation, and that present society is not organized in a
way that concentrate these desires on fellow humans. For the sake of society it might be
preferable if the rewards were harvested while dealing with members of our own species.
The rewarding sensations associated with geniality may be the most valuable attribute of
human nature, an attribute that should be nurtured. We can be induced to feel solidarity with,
and thus derive rewards from helping, any group that we are able to mentally associate with,
which theoretically includes not only the entire species, but the complete biosphere. However,
the usual ways of soliciting help may at some point bounce against the selfish component of
human nature, as exemplified by the concept of compassion fatigue (Link et al., 1995).
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Furthermore, as discussed by Jamieson (1995), group identity is important for effective
altruistic behavior, and it is difficult to achieve group identity on a global scale.
The combined forces of moral inclinations, religion, and the pleasant sensations
associated with gregariousness should offer a foundation for the creation of a more
harmonious society; if only we could curb aggression.
Is Rage Rewarding?
Aggression can be very important for your genes, you should expect a large reward for
crushing an enemy. People do indeed delight in combat, as exemplified by the heaven of
Norse mythology: The dream of an afterlife was a place where you were allowed to fight all
day. Thus aggressive behavior is to be expected, and it may even improve your life quality
when measured as Darwinian happiness. Yet the biological perspective offers some
resolution.
While it may be adaptive for the individual to help others in the absence of obvious cues,
there are good reasons not to evoke aggression apart from in situations where it is definitely
called for. A struggle may easily be destructive for both parties. The evolutionary answer to
this problem has been to impose restraints. We try to avoid fights. While we are easily
induced to feel compassion when we see a picture of a starving child, we are less likely to get
angry at a picture of a combative man.
There is another reason why we should avoid hostility. In evolutionary terms, anger is
presumably an ancient feature. I believe that while our gregarious instincts are powered
primarily by rewards, anger is more hard-wired as it reflects responses that date further back.
Thus, although both combat and compassion can elicit rewards, the latter would be expected
to be more potent in this respect. We are happier hugging each other than hitting each other.
Unfortunately we are not designed to maximize our Darwinian happiness, but tend to
follow the various drives and emotions as they happen to arise, whether they are spurred by
rewards or non-rewarding urges. Even if hugging does more for your happiness, the desire to
hit somebody can be at least as powerful. When the right button is pushed, we have a
propensity to oblige. Anger is a deep-rooted response that requires a great effort on the part of
our free will to curb.
There is another severe obstacle in our quest for limiting aggressive behavior. As judged
by the number of people getting killed or maimed, the main problem is not the spontaneous
rage of the individual, but rather the more premeditated attacks by gangs or armies. The
power of our social instincts, combined with the enforcement of laws, tends to restrain the
individual, but when participation in violence becomes part of the group’s policy, the same
instincts boosts aggression. Fighting “the others” is not only socially acceptable, but may be
strongly encouraged, and warfare caters to the rewards associated with our social instincts.
The problem of group violence does not contradict the assumption that by making people
more aware of the principle of Darwinian happiness, it is possible to move the pendulum
towards benevolent behavior. Warfare may be a difficult target in this respect, whereas it
should be easier to restrain the petty quarreling and hostility going on between individuals;
but then the aggregated effect of many individual conflicts may be one of the factors that
leads to group violence.
Concluding Remarks
Dugatkin (1999) has recently discussed the question of using knowledge on innate social
tendencies to foster cooperation in humans, but is criticized for serving cheap sociology and
promoting nepotism (Excoffier, 1999).
Apparently some people automatically judge the notion that humans possess innate
tendencies of behavior as biological reductionism, and as reflecting dubious political intent.
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True, the idea of adjusting society to human nature can be misused for various political ends,
yet I believe that deeming our current knowledge on human behavioral biology as irrelevant,
or of no practical value for society, is a grave mistake.
I would not be surprised if some readers disagree with the notion that present society in
certain respects is worse off than stone age tribes. It should be stressed that my discussion on
how to improve society does not depend on society being in a sordid state, many countries
appear to do quite well. Statistics of crime, violence and psychological distress suggest,
however, that even in the countries considered successful, there is room for improvements.
Even those who live in peace and affluence are often discontent, and a large fraction of the
worlds population has to cope with poverty and famine or are victims of crime and war.
This is sad, particularly as the extensive reward mechanisms in the human brain suggests
we could be the happiest species on earth. As the mammalian default state of mind
presumably is one of content, humans may actually be one of the species with the lowest
score of Darwinian happiness. Moving the pendulum towards the side of compassion should
improve conditions, but it is a formidable assignment.
For many years we have tried to compensate for the detrimental aspects of industrialized
society. A central political dogma has been to create sustainable development, that is, to make
sure our industry does not deplete resources or destroy the environment. This is important, but
stimulating cooperation and adapting society to human nature may be equally important
principles for improving the conditions of mankind.
It is, however, a difficult mission. Our great feats of engineering, from building the
pyramids to sending a man to the moon, are the easy tasks; the real challenge lies in dealing
with human nature. The question is whether evolution has bestowed us with the mental tools
required to handle this challenge. We possess properties that can be used to create a paradise,
incidentally we also possess properties that can turn the entire planet into a biological refuse
dump.
Evolution never stops. Thus the human pool of genes, including the genes that balance
our caring and offensive tendencies, will eventually change. Unfortunately we cannot expect
evolution to come to our rescue, not only is the process too slow, it is probably not even
heading in the right direction. Our species was shaped by a powerful selection for intelligence
and sociability, but in many contemporary societies these forces are probably not operating.
Intelligence may no longer correlate with number of children, and we are not bred to compete
with angels. Thus, if we cannot improve the conditions of present civilization, we are unlikely
to do any better in the future.
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