DEPARMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
2004 ELECTION PROJECT: THEMATIC STUDIES
ETHNICITY, DEMOCRACY AND GHANA’S ELECTION 2004
Alexander K. D. Frempong
kaadupong2002@yahoo.co.uk
[This article, a sequel to my “Ghana’s Election 2000: The Ethnic Undercurrents”
(Frempong 2001: 141-59), has been published as: “Ethnicity, Democracy and Ghana’s
Election 2004” in Kwame Boafo-Arthur, ed. (2006) Voting for Democracy in Ghana: The
2004 Elections in Perspective, Vol.1, Accra: Freedom Publications, pp. 157-186]
INTRODUCTION
Ghana’s current experiment at constitutional rule has taken significant strides forward.
From a flawed and very shaky start, the Fourth Republic, for the first time in the
country’s history, has witnessed four general elections in a roll. The first two elections
returned the former military ruler-turned-president, Jerry Rawlings, into power. In
another first, political power alternated in 2000 from the then ruling National
Democratic Congress (NDC) to the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) led by John
Kufuor, who was re-elected president in 2004. The success of four successive elections
has made Ghana the paragon of good governance and peaceful coexistence in a region
which over the last decade and a half has been better known for a spiral of violent
conflict.
Ethnicity however remains a major and increasing problem in Ghana. As the country
continues to consolidate its democracy, there is a growing concern that democracy is
unleashing ethnic rivalries that threaten the very gains it has conferred on the country.
Perhaps, the clearest manifestation of this dangerous trend was the post-Election 2004
bashing of the people of the Central Region. That region’s only ‘crime’ ironically, had
been the rejection of the canker-worm of ethnicity. The region, dominated by ethnic
Fantis, had voted massively for Kufuor, an ethnic Ashanti against Mills who hails from
that region and had campaigned there on the ‘virtues’ of voting for a ‘son of the soil’.
Though this may appear contrary to the conventional wisdom that the level of ethnicity
decreases with improvement in democratic governance, it also demonstrates the
complex, indeed the Janus-faced, relationship between ethnicity and democracy. The
right linkage between ethnicity and democracy is one on which opinions remain divided.
Some analysts are of the view that the multiparty system reinforces ethnicity and
impacts negatively on democracy. But others think that ethnicity has a positive link with
multiparty democracy and that democracy offers an auspicious context for the
management of ethnicity; in other words, ethnic competition is not incompatible with
democratic governance if it finds expression as group interest among other interests.
Similarly, whereas successful democratization means the establishment of regimes in
which ethnic and other interests are accommodated by peaceful means; the very
process of transition creates threatening uncertainties for some groups and opens up a
range of transitory political opportunities for ethnic entrepreneurs (Gurr 2001: 176).
Does the process of establishing more participatory and responsive political systems
necessarily have problematic consequences for ethnic mobilization and conflict?
This seemingly paradoxical situation is not restricted to Ghana. Most African
governments have had to confront the difficult task of maintaining national unity with
multiethnic, socio-culturally diverse citizenries and under circumstances in which loyalty
to one’s ethnic group takes precedence over loyalty to the nation as a whole. Indeed,
one of the major tasks for Africa’s democratization process is how to ensure that ethnic
socio-economic antagonisms are not converted into collective political action with the
potential for violence (Conteh-Morgan 1997: 94-95). The attitude of African leaders
towards ethnicity has often not been helpful. While they reject the legitimacy of ethnic
identities they at the same time rely on ethnicity to bolster their own power (Ottaway
1996: 120-121). Often, incumbent power elites try to deny that any problem related to
ethnic inequalities or antagonisms exists. The reality however is that they actually
promote the interests of their own groups while advocating impartiality (ContehMorgan 1997: 108).
This chapter examines some of the essential questions about ethnicity in Ghana: What
have been the main trends in, and character of, ethnic relations in Ghana? How can we
explain the apparent intensification of inter-ethnic antagonisms in Ghana while the
democratic experiment progresses? To what extent is it a legacy bequeathed from the
almost two-decade rule of ex-President Rawlings? What has it got to do with the Akan
perception of the ruling NPP or the ethnic background of incumbent President Kufuor?
How did all this impact on Election 2004? And what is the way forward? These issues are
examined in the context of the discourse on the relation between ethnicity, democracy
and the African state.
ISSUES OF ETHNICITY, DEMOCRACY AND THE STATE
Ethnicity
There are essentially two schools of thought on the meaning and nature of ethnicity.
The first school, the primordialists, holds that members of the same ethnic group have a
common bond that determines their personal identity and “turns the group into a
natural community of a type that is older than the modern (state)” (Van de Goor
1994:18; cited in Ake 2003: 93). This group stresses the idea of ethnic identification as a
result of inherent long-standing and usually unchanging sets of alliances which often
defy rational explanation (Smith 2000: 36). One is bound to one’s kinsmen by virtue of
some unaccountable way that is related to the very tie itself (Geertz 1963:109-110). The
instrumentalists, on the other hand, see ethnicity essentially as a means for people,
especially leaders, to pursue their own purpose such as ‘forming, mobilizing and
manipulating groups of people for political ends’ (Van de Goor 1994:18, cited in Ake
2003:-94). They explain ethnicity in terms of a variety of political, economic and
institutional structures which mobilize, alter and even create an ethnic identity in the
service of political goals (Smith 2000: 36).
The reality is that ethnicity exhibits both characteristics at the same time. Although
ethnicity may appear instrumental, it is structurally primordial, possessing an intrinsic
absolute value, involving and demanding a level of loyalty which transcends that given
to any other social group (Amoo 1997: 16). While aspects of ethnic identities are open
for change, the relevance of ethnic identities as such tends to persist over time (Buzzi
2000:4). Mare (1993:2) likens an ethnic identity to a story, a way of dealing with the
present through a sense of identity that is rooted in the past. Indeed, ethnicity has
been politicized because it can combine both instrumental and affective dimensions.
(Conteh-Morgan 1997: 99).
Ethnicity, it must be emphasized, thrives on half truths and perceptions as much as on
historical facts and is sustained by stereotypes and prejudices which help to explain why
ethnicity remains a crucial weapon for political mobilization (Frempong 2004).
Furthermore, ethnicity may exhibit a number of paradoxes: One, while ethnicity rests on
culturally specified practice and given sets of beliefs, in reality an entirely ‘pure’ group is
extremely rare. Two, ethnic groups can generate forces of moderation, constitute a
form of social capital and advance the private fortunes of their members; but they may
also occasionally engage in acts of violence, destroying wealth and discouraging the
formation of capital (Rothberg 2000; Ayoob 2001).Three, contrary to the conventional
wisdom that it is the political elite that manipulate ethnicity for their own purposes,
sometimes the elite act under pressure from the masses. How do all these complexities
tie in with democracy?
The Ethnicity-Democracy Interface
The thrust of the ethnicity-democracy debate is whether democracy alleviates or
increases ethnic conflict. Those who think the establishment of democracy ought to lead
to less conflict between ethnic groups argue that democracy is an instrument for
peaceful resolution of conflicts without having to resort to violence. In a democracy, it is
further argued, conflicts between ethnic groups can be put on the negotiating table and
solved through dialogue. If a compromise is not found through negotiations, consensus
over voting as the proper procedure to reach decisions will ensure that a solution is
found to the satisfaction of all parties concerned (Buzzi 2002: 1). For the exponents of
this position, ethnicity acts as a pole around which group members can mobilize and
compete effectively for state controlled power, economic resources, positions, contracts
awards and constitutional protection (just like any other interest group) (Rothchild
1997: 4)
Others think democracy leads to more ethnic conflict. In their view, as more people
participate in the political process and differences between ethnic groups are
articulated openly, political leaders in multiethnic societies may be tempted to use
ethnicity as a means to obtain electoral support (Buzzi 2002: 1). In a climate of
uncertainty, a policy of uniting an ethnic group against real or imagined political threat
or of whipping up ethnic animosity against another ethnic group becomes expedient.
Under the circumstances, past legacies of ethnic conflict are rehashed and intensified
(Conteh-Morgan 1997: 101 &102). Whether used defensively to thwart the ambitions
of others or offensively to achieve their own end, ethnicity is primarily a label or set of
symbolic ties that is used for political advantage (Psalidas-Perlmutter 2000: 238), and is
therefore, inherently conflictual
Perhaps the truth about the ethnicity-democracy interface lies in-between these
opposing views. Sometimes the reciprocal impact of democracy and ethnicity is
complementary and at other times opposing.
The State and Ethnicity
It is essential in any analysis of ethnicity to consider the crucial role of the state: First,
the state is the turf on which ethnic politics is played. It is the arena for interaction,
encounter, cooperation, conflict and struggle over the exercise of power and
distribution of societal resources (Conteh-Morgan 1997: 104; Udogu 2001: 3- 4).
Second, the state’s political institutions and capabilities structure ethnopolitical groups’
choices about policies to be pursued and the means to do so; whether to participate,
protest or rebel. Often the state shapes and directs the scope, intensity and even
duration of ethnopolitical conflicts (Conteh-Morgan 1997: 106; Gurr 2001: 174). Third,
when the state is viewed as a prize in the hands of a particular ethnic group, it creates
distrust and insecurity and makes it difficult for the state to be perceived as an impartial
arbiter by the other ethnic groups.
THE ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF GHANA
It is estimated that there are about ninety individual ethnic groups, but these are often
reduced to a few large groups, namely, Akan, Mole Dagbani, Ewe, Ga-Adangbe Guan,
Gurma, etc. For instance, the Akans form more than a dozen and half smaller groups
including (Ashanti, Fanti, Akim, Kwahu, Akwapim, Nzema, etc) . The Mole-Dagbanis
include (Dagbombas, Gonjas, Mamprusis, Nanumbas, etc) and the Ga-Adangbes include
(Gas, Krobos, Adas, Shais etc). Often within each broad groups there had been some
historical rivalries as well. The 2000 Population and Housing Census, identified 8 such
major ethnic groups based on language, four of which accounted for nearly 80%: Akan49.1%; Mole Dagbani-16.5%, Ewe-12.7%, Ga-Adangbe-8%, Guan-4.4%, Gurma-3.9%,
Grusi-2.8% and Man Busanga-1.1% (Ghana Statistical Service 2002; Nukunya 2003: 214)
The geographical spread of the ethnic groups has some interesting features that
impinge on electoral politics. On the one hand, each of these broad groups has its
traditional home-region(s): The Akans spread across five regions - Western, Central,
Eastern, Ashanti and Brong Ahafo; the Mole-Dagbanis cut across the Northern, Upper
East and Upper West regions; the Ewes are in southern Volta Region; the Ga-Adangbes
are in the Greater Accra and Eastern regions, and the Guan-speaking groups are
scattered in Northern, Central, Eastern and Volta regions. On the other hand, owing to
migration and other factors, several proportions of the various ethnic groups currently
live outside their traditional home-regions and are becoming increasingly vocal in
electoral terms. A few examples may suffice here:1

Ewes formed significant proportions of the populations of most of the five Akan
regions – 15.9% in Eastern, 5.9% in Western, 4.7% in Central and 3.1% in
Ashanti.

Three out of every twenty (15.7%) of the population in Brong Ahafo, 7.7% in
Ashanti and 4.7% in Western are of Mole-Dagbani descent.

There are more Akans (39.7%) in the Greater Accra Region than the indigenous
Ga-Adangbes (29.6%).
This leaves none of the regions ethnically homogenous; yet in the Volta and Central
regions where Ewes and Fantis are the respective dominant groups, the impression is
often created as if there are no other ethnic groups in those regions.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF ETHNICITY
Ghana’s 1969 and 1979 Constitutions, contained provisions aimed at curbing ethnicity in
electoral politics. Leadership and membership of political parties are not to be restricted
to any particular ethnic group or region. Names, symbols, colour or motto should not
have exclusive or particular sectional significance or connotation. Nor should parties be
formed for the sole purpose of seeking the welfare, advancement or interests of
members of any particular group.2 The 1992 Constitution went further in the manner it
sought to deal with the issue of ethnicity and/or regionalism in a democratic state. For
instance, each political party is to have a national character, and membership is not to
be based on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional divisions; the members of the
national executive committee of a political party must be chosen from all regions of
The percentages used in these examples extracted from Ghana’s 2000 Population and Housing Census.
See also The Daily Dispatch, (Accra) 13 & 14 September 2005
2
See Articles 35(1), 42(5), of the 1969 and 1979 Constitutions respectively
1
Ghana.3 But these elaborate provisions have hardly succeeded in curbing the ethnic
hype that has preceded every election in the Fourth Republic.
HISTORY OF ETHNICITY AND ELECTORAL POLITICS
Ethnicity has remained an important ingredient in the recipe of Ghana’s electoral
politics, but it has waxed and waned during different periods of the country’s history.
Ethnic tensions were high in the 1950s in the run-up to independence when ethnic- and
regional-based parties emerged to contest Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention People’s
Party (CPP) (Frempong 2001: 145). The CPP soon after independence passed the
Avoidance of Discrimination Act to prohibit the formation of political parties on ethnic,
regional or religious lines. This forced the sectarian groups to merge into the United
Party (UP). By the time of its overthrow in February 1966 the CPP had succeeded in
reducing ethnic politics to the barest minimum. However a series of events over the
three years of the military ruling council, the National Liberation Council (NLC) reversed
the situation.
By the time of the 1969 Election, ethnicity had again become a major issue. The
unfortunate legacy of that election was that the ruling NLC itself was split along the
Akan-Ewe divide in its support for the two leading parties the Progress Party (PP) and
National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) whose respective leaders, K. A. Busia and K. A.
Gbedemah came from those two ethnic groups. The election results apparently
confirmed that divide.4 The politics of the Busia era deepened the Akan-Ewe rivalry
further and Victor Owusu’s ‘inward-looking’ diatribe has remained the political burden
that presidential candidates of the Danquah-Busia tradition continue to bear.
3
Articles 55(4) and 55 (9) of the 1992 Constitution. Other related articles are 17(2), 35(1), 35(5), 35(6),
35(9), 41, and 55(7).
4
In the five Akan-speaking regions of Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central, Eastern and Western, the PP won 78
out of the 85 seats. In those five regions, NAL won only 4 in the non-Akan speaking Krobo areas. On the
other hand NAL won 14 out of the 16 seats in the Volta region and the PP-2.
Over the decade of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) rule (1982-1992),
there were serious allegations of Ewe domination of the government and all its agencies
and ethnic and regional discontent ran high though muted owing to the culture of
silence imposed by that regime (Bening 1999: 342; Lent & Nugent 2000: 22). Not
surprisingly, under Rawlings some Ashantis contemplated Ashanti secession or at least
the revival of the federal dream of the National Liberation Movement (NLM) days
(Bening 1999: 363).
The Ashanti-Ewe rivalry has prevailed in the Fourth Republic largely because the leading
political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party
(NPP) have been associated with the two ethnic groups.5 The emergence of Vice
President Mills, a Fanti from the Central Region, as the NDC flag-bearer in 2000
introduced a new twist to the ethnic dynamics of the electoral politics of that year. It
turned out to be a contest among the three largest groups- Ashantis, Ewes and Fantis.6
The results of the first round of the 2000 presidential elections proved a clear
identification of the two dominant parties with the Akan/Non-Akan divide. The NPP in
addition to winning Ashanti (74.8%), for the first time in the Fourth Republic also won
the four other Akan regions of Eastern (55.0%), Brong Ahafo (50.6%), Western (50.5%),
and Central (49.7%). The NDC retained its hold of four Non-Akan regions of Volta
(86.2%), Upper West (62.3%), Upper East (52.1%) and Northern (50.7%) (Extracted from
Ephson 2003: 152).
The only exception to this rule was Greater Accra which is
traditionally Non-Akan but also the most cosmopolitan region. The NPP won that region
by 52.5%.
The presidential run-off between Kufuor and Mills led to increased ethnic undertones.
The NDC after tasting defeat in the first round went all out to play the ethnic card
5
For details of how this rivalry played out in the 1992 and 1996 elections see Frempong 2001: 146-148)
(Frempong 2001: 156). But the broad picture, ethnically speaking, did not change in the
run-off. The NPP retained the five Akan regions and Greater Accra and lost the other
four Non-Akan regions. But the most intriguing aspect of the presidential run-off
apparently escaped several observers, given the furore that surrounded the Central
Region vote in 2004. NDC presidential candidate Mills was defeated by NPP’s Kufuor in
sixteen out of the then seventeen constituencies in his home region. The only one he
won in the run-off was the Mfantseman East constituency.
ETHNIC POLITICS AND KUFUOR’S FIRST TERM
The first term of the NPP government provided a useful background for analyzing the
ethnic dynamics of Ghana’s Election 2004. For several reasons, the ascendancy of
Kufuor, an Ashanti, to the presidency and his Akan-associated NPP to power in 2001 was
going to impact seriously on the ethnic politics of the country. First, more than even in
1969, the NPP victory was dependent on the Akan support. Second, Ashanti is not only a
group with a historical legacy of dominance but also remains the single dominant ethnic
group, numerically speaking, not only within the Akan group but nationwide with14.8%
of the national population (2000 Population and Housing Census: 5). Third, the myth
that an Ashanti would never be elected president was broken and those who subscribed
to mythology were anticipating its implications (Frempong 2001). Fourth, an Ashanti
president assumed power after an era in which Ashantis were perceived to have been
targeted for destruction by the previous regime. The Ewes, as one would expect, were
apprehensive of their fate when for the first time in twenty years their son will not be in
the Castle, neither his ‘anointed’ successor. For the Gas who have been ‘coached’ to be
suspicious of Ashantis and their hegemonic instincts, they were waiting to see what was
in store for them just like the Northerners who had once more given massive support to
the NDC. Even among the Akans, the other subgroups were not too sure how they
would fare under an Ashanti President. Against this background therefore an initial task
that faced the Kufour administration was how to allay those fears.
6
See Frempong 2001: 148-155 for the ethnic undercurrents of the Election 2000
On the other hand, the NPP victory was celebrated across the country as liberation from
the authoritarianism and culture of silence of the PNDC era which were always lurking
under the NDC with Rawlings still in power. But a sense of liberation often comes with
its excess baggage; a dilemma aptly captured by Conteh-Morgan:
The tight control over the political sector by an authoritarian power elite discourages open expression
of ethno-politics. On the other hand, a reduction in repression or authoritarianism can instigate ethnic
political competition or instigate ethnic political movements that tend to undermine democratization
efforts (Conteh-Morgan 1997: 102).
Thus, whereas over the nearly-two-decade Rawlings era, there were pained silence and
angry grumblings about what was perceived as a deliberate policy to promote Ewes, in
the more liberalized atmosphere of the Kufuor era, people (including those formerly in
government) were going to be more open and vocal about perceived or real attempts to
favour Ashantis in particular and Akans in general. How well or badly was the Kufuor
government going to strike the delicate balance on such a slippery turf of ethnicized
politics?
Ministerial and Other Government Appointments
The first major task the Kufuor presidency faced was related to ministerial
appointments. Given the pattern of voting, the Non-Akans were going to be very
sensitive to these appointments.
The first set of sector ministers (19 cabinet and 7 non-cabinet) produced 18 Akans (a
third of which were Ashantis), and 8 Non-Akans ( 3 Mole Dagbanis, 2 Ewes and 3 Gas). In
regional terms, all, except the Upper West Region, were represented. The 30 deputy
ministers were shared equally between Akans and Non-Akans. Two of the cabinet
ministers were close relations of the President- his younger brother, Kwame AddoKufuor and his brother-in-law, J. H. Mensah, who would have made the cabinet in their
own right under any NPP president. The reality, The Dispatch (19 March 2004, p.8)
revealed, did not show a steep imbalance in favour of Ashantis or even Akans in general
when compared with the 2000 population census, but in matters of ethnicity,
perceptions are often more dangerous than the facts. It is therefore not surprising that
the perception out there has been that more top positions are held not only by ethnic
Ashantis but by the president’s close relations. The cliché making rounds was that
‘Nyebro’ of the Rawlings’ era has been replaced by ‘Me Nua Osanteni’- my ‘Ewe brother’
for my ‘Ashanti brother’.
The initial exclusion of the Upper West from the cabinet provided unnecessary
ammunition for cultural entrepreneurs. It brought back bad memories of the exclusion
of Ewes from the Busia government.7 The President’s initial handling of the matter was
the first demonstration of how nervous the NPP government was going to be towards
accusations of ethnic favouritism. Kufuor had explained at the first ‘People’s Assembly’
that he could not find somebody suitable at that point in time from the Upper West.
This muddied the waters further and hardly removed the perception of disrespect when
Prof. Kasim Kassanga, a deputy minister, was later promoted to the cabinet.8
The Volta Region
The Kufuor Administration throughout its first term sought to allay the fears of the
Voltarians who had given him the least vote in 2000. His government completed the
Keta Sea Defence project and gave the region its fair share of development projects; but
suspicion of the NPP government in the region lingered. Constant reference had been
made to the fact that there are too few Voltarians in the Kufuor government.9 The
7
It was also somewhat ironic for an area that had had historical association with the Danquah-Busia/United
Party (UP) tradition. S. D. Dombo , for example was the deputy leader of the UP and a minister together
with Jato Kaleo and B. K. Adama in the Busia government. There is no doubt however that in the Fourth
Republic the NDC had asserted its dominance in the region,
8
There have also been allegations of instances where people have lost their jobs, or asked to proceed on
leave based on where they came from; issues allegedly more related with ethnicity than inefficiency (The
Chronicle, 20 October 2004: 6), and the added perception that most of their replacements have been
Ashantis or Akans. In a similar vein, the predominance of Ewes as heads of the security agencies changed
to people with Akan or Guan sounding names on top (Ghanaweb/The Chronicle , 31 January 2005).
9
The then Food and Agriculture Minister, Courage Quashigah, at an award ceremony by a media house for
his outstanding performance as a minister, admitted the dilemma of an Ewe minister in an NPP
government. He revealed that while his Ewe kinsmen saw him as a sell-out, he had never been fully
accepted by his Akan party colleagues. This dilemma became manifest in April 2004, when Quarshigah,
was reported to have expressed regret about the attitude of some Ewe communities which for political
perceived bad blood between Rawlings and Kufuor seemed to have worsened matters.
How were these going to impact on Election 2004?
Claims of Ashanti Superiority and Anti-Ashanti Sentiments
It is significant that at his first meeting with the Asantehene at the Manhyia Palace in
2001, President Kufuor had counseled Ashantis to avoid any conduct that would create
the perception as if he was president only for Ashantis or that his was an Ashanti
government (Ghana Palaver, 10-12 August 2004: 1& 8). It was from this perspective that
a series of press conferences and paid adverts extolling Asante superiority did not help
the cause of the President in allaying the fears of other ethnic groups. A group calling
itself, the Asante United Front (AUF) had warned against ‘attacks on Asante customary
law and usage and the discussion of the Golden Stool and its occupant, the Asantehene,
in public’ and had intimated that it was ‘mobilizing Asante Force to counter any such
attacks on Asante’ (The Chronicle, 16 July 2003, pp.4-5).
In another development, a press conference by one Kwame Arhin extolling Asante
history led to a series of paid advertisements and articles in which the Ashantis, Akyems
and Gas tried to undo each other in terms of the greatness and superiority of their
respective ethnic groups (The Chronicle, 9 September 2003; Daily Graphic, 16 October
2003, pp 12 7 21; The Chronicle, 26 November 2003, pp1 & 8). The fact is that the
publications and their rebuttals and rejoinders were full of half-, if not, un-truths. They
had twisted historical records to suit their biased and self-serving agenda.
This growing perception of Ashanti ethnic hegemony in the country led to increased
anti-Ashanti sentiments particularly among the Gas:

References have been made to the many official visitors to the country who paid
courtesy calls on the Asantehene in Kumasi at the expense of the Ga Mantse, the
traditional custodian of the capital city.
reasons refused to use amenities provided by the government and also turned their backs on initiatives
intended to improve their economic status.(The Evening News, 19 April 2004, p. 1).

When in 2002, the Director–General of Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC)
was removed by the National Media Commission for unexplained reasons Ga
opinion leaders protested that he had been sacked by the government because
he was a Ga and had established Obonu FM, a Ga local radio station. This was
irrespective of the fact that his successor, Eva Lokko was also a Ga.

In May 2002, the Asantehene had to postpone indefinitely and at the last
minute, the official launch in Accra, of a well advertised Otumfuo Education Fund
‘due to unforeseen circumstances.’ This turned out to be a tactical retreat to
forestall inter-ethnic violence that was looming between Gas and Asantes.10 In
2003, similar clouds surrounded the invitation of the Asantehene as a Special
Guest of Honour to the celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the MensahSarbah Hall of the University of Ghana over the issue of ‘entry visa’.
This insistent on the royal protocol of ‘entry permit’ in the case of the Asantehene
raised a number of questions: Why had the Ga traditional authorities not been so
insistent in the many instances where other chiefs had trooped to Accra to hold
consultation with the government or to announce funerals? Why was it that past and
even the present Asantehene did not face such resistance under the Rawlings regime? Is
it not because of the fact that an Ashanti is now president?
Another dimension of the anti-Ashanti sentiments related to the fifth anniversary of
Otumfuo Osei Tutu II. On 9 May 2004, the Asantehene rounded off the commemoration
of the fifth anniversary of his ascendancy to the Golden Stool with the Addaekese
festival which attracted both national and international attention. But this was
rubbished by some non-Ashanti social commentators who wondered what was special
about a fifth anniversary when other chiefs who had spent more than three decades on
their stools were not celebrating? Others wondered why the Asantehene timed his
10
Ga traditional authorities had vehemently protested against the visit on grounds that it was a violation of
the protocols governing royal visits. Hardliners were ready to disrupt the launch because in their view the
Asantehene had not sought the prior consent of the Ga Mantse –an expression of disdain for the Gas and
symbol of subjugation of sorts. (Democracy Watch Vol. 1 No. 3 August 2000 pp. 3-4). Though the
ceremony to coincide with the third anniversary of the 9 May 2001 Accra Stadium
Disaster (The Chronicle , 12 May 2004, p. 2).11
A further case in point was the confusion which surrounded the acquisition of the World
Bank loan/grant under the Promoting Partnership with Traditional Authorities Project
PPTAP). An article in the Ghana Palaver had in the middle of 2003 revealed, with an
obvious partisan and ethnic slant, that the NPP government had contracted a five
million-dollar loan from the World Bank exclusively for Asanteman and Akim Abuakwa
Traditional Councils. The paper had run a banner headline on Monday, 30 June 2003:
“Hurray All Hail the Era of Ashanti Initiatives…NPP’s $5million Ethnic Agenda Loan.” The
uproar that followed the publication should be expected since indigenes from the two
traditional areas dominated the Kufuor cabinet.12
Ethnic Slant to Actions of State Institutions
Even more dangerous for the fledging democracy had been the increasing attempts to
hype the actions of the police and the courts in ethno-partisan terms. Two examples will
suffice:

IGP and Ga Chiefs: On 7 April 2004, the Inspector General of Police Nana OwusuNsiah began what was scheduled to become a nationwide tour of meeting
traditional rulers. At the first meeting with chiefs in the Greater Accra Region,
IGP Nana Owusu-Nsiah, himself a chief, advised them not to meddle in partisan
organizers claimed the necessary consultations had been made, they took the line of least resistance when
the opposition would not abate.
11
It was also not for nothing that an independent newspaper had side by side, on its front page, the day
after the Addaekese two articles, the one about the grand durbar which the president attended and the other,
a festival by the chiefs and people of Nchumuru in the Volta Region which no government official attended
even though they reportedly gave the president three months notice (The Chronicle, 10 May 2004, p. 1).
12
The fact of the matter was that after the Asantehene had interacted with World Bank officials in 1999, the
initial $5million loan was signed on behalf of the NDC government by NDC Finance Minister Kwame
Peprah under the World Bank’s Country Assistance Programme for 2000-2003.The facility was to cater for
education, health, heritage preservation and capacity-building. The Kufuor government only worked for it
to be converted into a grant. But the NPP government did not make this public until Palaver, either with
limited facts or for mischief, revealed it in a more damaging manner. Thus such a development-oriented
facility was allowed to be tainted by the soiled hands of ethnic politics.
politics but to uphold their unique position in society (The Chronicle, 7 April
2004, pp.4-5). This seemingly innocuous advice soon attracted a Daily Graphic
feature article entitled ‘Tribal Politics Should Be Avoided’, from a well known
senior citizen with half-Ga origins, K. B.Asante, which ironically tended to inflame
tribal passions (Daily Graphic, 19 April 2004, p. 7). The writer had likened the
encounter between the IGP and the Ga chiefs to one between a headmaster and
his students and had wondered if the IGP could assemble chiefs in Ashanti and
give them such a lecture? The particular reference to Ashanti chiefs in this
context was worrying as it was a confirmation of the phenomenon of
“Asantephobia” (or is it Asantemania?) that seemed to be engulfing the whole
country. Indeed another writer, an Ashanti, I.K. Gyasi, had questioned the
motive behind the reference to Ashanti chiefs and had argued that the earlier
writer had either assumed that the IGP, a Brong, was an Ashanti or it was a
deliberate ploy to cause mischief. (The Chronicle, 27 April 2004, p. 2)

Assault on Brong Chiefs: The NDC-friendly Ghana Palaver in a back page article
entitled “‘Assault’ on Brong Ahafo Chiefs Continues” sought to give a politicoethnic twist to a series of chiefs from the Brong Ahafo Region who over the
period of the Kufuor Administration had had a blush with the judicial courts.
That article had ended with the question which was increasingly becoming an
anti- Asante slogan: ‘Can anybody imagine such systematic and systemic politicojudicial ‘assault on Ashanti region chiefs under President J. A. Kufuor?’ (Ghana
Palaver, 27 April 2004, p. 8)13
Were the law enforcement agencies to allow the chiefs to go Scot free over matters
some of which bordered on criminality? Did the author imply that it was the
government which ordered the Courts to try these chiefs? Clearly, the motive of that
article was to incite Brong animosity against an Ashanti President, against the
13
The article cited six cases which included Agyewodin Adu Gyamfi Ampem, Paramount Chief of
Achirensua, appointed Chairman of Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology Council app
by the NDC government and Nana Kwadwo Nyarko III, Paramount Chief of Prang and a member of the
Council of State in the NDC era.
background of the traditional rivalry between the two ethnic groups which the NDC had
exploited to its advantage in previous elections.
ETHNICITY AND ELECTION 2004
Ethno-Electoral Issues
Early in 2004, tell-tale signs emerged about how intensive and ‘bloodily’ the ethnic card
was going to be played in that year’s election. The following were some of the signs:
“Gas in NPP are Fools” Diatribe
The perception of the NPP government being one of close relations of the president
assumed wider ramifications during the election year.14 The clearest manifestation of
this was E.T Mensah’s ‘Gas in NPP are Fools’ diatribe. The NDC MP for Ningo-Prampram,
at a meeting with party faithful at Teshie in Accra, reportedly chastised native Gas who
supported the NPP. This was allegedly because Gas had been marginalized in the Kufuor
administration. He reportedly asked his Teshie audience how many Gas were in the NPP
government and emphasized that when it came to appointments, eight out of every ten
were filled with personalities from the current president’s hometown and specifically his
family men (The Daily Dispatch, 5 April 2004, p.8).
Psalidas-Perlmutter (2000: 238) has emphasized that ethnic activists and political
entrepreneurs often operate by reinforcing group fears of physical insecurity and
cultural domination and as political memories, myths and emotions magnify these fears,
they can produce a toxic brew of distrust and suspicion (Conteh-Morgan 1997: 99). The
diatribe attributed to the MP for Ningo/Prampram and the resultant furore had most of
these ingredients of cultural entrepreneurship. First, the MP vehemently denied the
report until a tape recording of the event was played. Second, the statement was spiced
14
For instance, in the Effutu Constituency in the Central Region, there was confusion following the NPP
parliamentary primary, largely because the winner, bore the President’s surname and was believed to be his
relation.. Things went so bad that the prospective candidate had to withdraw for a fresh primary to be
conducted. Kofi Wayo, a defected 2000 NPP parliamentary candidate for Ayawaso East, described the
with half-truths.15 Third, in an effort to repair the damage caused by Mensah’s diatribe
and perhaps to balance the politicized-ethnic equation, it soon appeared in an NDCfriendly newspaper that the NPP MP for Nsuta Kwamang, Osei-Prempeh, had in a radio
programme some months earlier alluded to the fact that the people in Kumasi
(Ashantis) were more enlightened than those in Accra (Gas) (Crusading Guide 8-14 April
2004, pp. 1 & 3).
Apart from the tensed atmosphere that such accusations and counter-accusations
generated, they tended to divert attention from the major social, economic and political
issues on which the elections were supposed to be fought.
Sympathizing With or Exploiting the Dead King?
Another politico-ethnic issue which was always going to have its repercussions on
Election 2004 was the Dagbon crisis. Ever since the untimely death on the Ya Na, Yakubu
Andani II, in March 2002, the Dagbon crisis, the largely intra-family (Andani-Abudu) feud
with a long history of partisan political undertones, had remained a festering wound.
The Andanis have traditionally supported CPP and in the Fourth Republic, NDC; while
their half-brothers, the Abudus have been associated with the UP tradition whose
offshoot is the ruling NPP. Worse still, at the time of the crisis there was a long chain of
Abudus in the top hierarchy of the security apparatus, and indeed, the interior ministry
of the NPP government. The Interior Minister at the time, Malik Alhassan Yakubu, was
also the MP for Yendi. Under the circumstances, whatever the NPP government did16
could not shake off the perception that either by omission or commission it facilitated
the gruesome murder.
Kufuor administration as a family government and accused the president of being only interested in giving
jobs to his family members who are no better than other Ghanaians.( The Chronicle 20 April 2004: 7)
15
He indicated that it was former president Rawlings who created both the Greater Accra and Upper West
Regions (The Daily Dispatch, 5 April 2004, pp1&8). The truth of the matter however is that while the
Upper West region was created under the PNDC, the Greater Accra Region came into existence more than
a decade before Rawlings first assumed the reins of power in 1979.
16
The actions of the NPP government included a long-running state of emergency, a commission of
enquiry, a committee of eminent chiefs and a monthly budget of 6 billion cedis (Accra Daily Mail,
30January 2004: 1-3)
The opposition NDC served early notice of fishing in the muddy ethnic waters of Dagbon
in the election year. In January 2004, T-shirts bearing NDC symbols and the portrait of
the late Ya Na, were on sale in Dagbon. In a radio discussion, an NDC MP, Twumasi
Appiah, indicated that it should be taken to mean the NDC’s way of sympathizing with
the dead king. NDC flagbearer Mills promised, on assumption of office, to set up a new
and truly non-partisan, professionally competent and independent Presidential
Commission to re-open investigations claiming that it was unacceptable for an act of
daylight murder to be classified as war (Ghana Palaver, 19-22 March 2004: 2).
Dagbon also had its ripples within the ruling NPP. A section in the party had argued that,
as an Abudu, Vice President Aliu Mahama would be a liability to the NPP ticket if he was
retained as running mate by President Kufuor in Election 2004. NPP’s opponents had a
field day reading several meanings into the matter. Ghana Palaver (23-26 July 2004: 8)
reported that a strong anti-Aliu Mahama lobby had developed in the NPP dedicated to
ensuring that the Vice President was dropped as a running mate to President Kufuor;
that the real agenda of the group, made up mostly of Ashantis, was to make sure that
Aliu would not be around as Vice President in 2008 should President Kufuor win in order
to make a bid for the presidency.17 The twist in the tale however was that the same
article raised a series of issues virtually incriminating the Vice President in the murder of
the Ya Na and ended up raising the Andani-Abudu rivalry to the highest pitch.
Otumfuo’s Dynamism, Kufuor’s Headache
It is a real irony of fate that the dynamism and foresight of the Asantehene would
remain a major source of controversy for the first Ashanti president of the Republic. In
the election year of 2004, Otumfuo and his initiatives became big electoral issues,
perhaps no less controversial than the Dagbon crisis. In July 2004, the Asantehene, in
The paper cleverly claimed further Aliu’s presence would disturb a carefully worked out scenario
designed to consolidate the Ashanti dominance of the NPP by putting up Trade Minister Alan Kyeremateng
as NPP presidential candidate in 2008. (Ghana Palaver, 23-26 July 2004: 8)
17
furtherance of the Promoting Partnership with Traditional Authorities Project (PPTAP),
earlier referred to, was granted $30million by the World Bank to undertake water and
other sanitation projects in Central, Volta, Brong Ahafo and Ashanti regions (Daily
Guide, 27 July 2004: 1 & 12). Instead of commending this rare initiative, the extension of
the project to other regions was given ethnic-tainted interpretations (The Chronicle, 14
August 2004: 2; Daily Guide, 27 July 2004: 1 &12). It was alleged, among other things,
that the Asantehene had not consulted the chiefs in the areas concerned or the National
House of Chiefs. Also, the effort was perceived as a political ploy to win votes in those
regions that were unlikely to vote for the NPP in 2004. Otumfuo’s public responses to
the above and other misconceptions about the project, and his caution that
ethnocentricism tended to frustrate those who were genuinely interested in the
country’s development, could do little to erase those misperceptions (The Ghanaian
Times, 27 July 2004: 1 & 3).
Sometimes the opposition-friendly media stretched the accusation of ethnocentricism
too far. But by persisting in such slanted reportage, it became difficult for the NPP
government to deny semblance of favouritism and the perception lingered on.18 The
biggest orchestration of all was the Ghana Palaver’s 5 November 2004 publication of an
alleged discovery of plans by the Kufuor administration on its re-election to make the
Asantehene King of Ghana and make Kufuor Prime Minister. Funny as this might seem
on reflection, the paper cleverly, if not maliciously, outlined a purported stage-by-stage
plan to achieve this on Ghana’s 45th Republican anniversary on 1 July 2005.19
18
For instance, the Ghana Palaver (10-12 August 2004: 1 & 8) alluded to the fact that on their visits to
the Castle, the seat of government, the Otumfuo and his retinue were received in the air-conditioned
presidential lounge, while the new Nayir, Naa Boahugu Abudula of Mamprusi was received in the open air
garden. Secondly, citing a Daily Graphic report of 24 July 2004, the Palaver further drew attention to the
fact that Ashanti Region was the first to benefit 10 billion cedis from the Youth Fund disbursed as loans to
skilled youth.
19
The alleged plan included the suspension of the current constitution and the crafting of a new one by the
NPP using its 2/3-majority in parliament. And to give credence to the story, references were made to
Asantehene’s role in the two Ghana Expo fairs in Britain and US, and a purported instruction from the
President to all Ghanaian companies to make regular and handsome cash donations to the Manhyia Place
before they are considered for contracts.
An earlier incident that had also turned the scales of ethnocentricism against the NPP
was Agyare Koi-Larbi’s open letter to the president in July 2004. The NPP MP for
Akropong had drawn attention to what he perceived to be a threat to the cohesion of
the country by the government’s selective projection of chiefs; the Asantehene and
Okyehene were cited (Statesman, 28 July 2004: 3). Koi-Larbi became an instant ‘darling
boy’ of the opposition.20
NPP Government’s Response
The Kufuor government appeared persistently overwhelmed by the accusations of
ethnocentrism and so its response has generally been piecemeal, incoherent and
counter-productive:

In November 2003, Information Minister Nana Akomea in the process of
condemning cultural entrepreneurs following the ethnic press war earlier
referred to, had introduced inaccuracies/biases of his own (The Statesman, 18
November 2003).

In the heat of the election campaign, Vice President Mahama was compelled to
break his silence on the Dagbon crisis, because according to him, some
detractors were determined to use the unfortunate incident to score cheap
political points (Daily Graphic 10 August 2004: 5). But the Vice President did so,
after more than two years, at a meeting with the Zongo community in Takoradi
in the Western Region, as it were, far away from the ‘crime scene.’ Even then,
he argued rather mildly that it did not make sense to him that a government
which wants peace and progress would engage in or condone an action that
undermines the very conditions it is working for.
20
Capitalizing on the political windfall, the opposition cleverly emphasized that the outgoing MP was only
drawing attention to the ‘reality’ of the enhanced profile of the Asantehene over and above other chiefs in
the country. Koi-Larbi was hailed as a thorough-bred Danquah-Busiaist whose father was one of the
martyrs of that political tradition and praised for his bravery in raising the issue of ethnocentrism in his own
party. The opposition then called on the NPP to see Koi-Larbi’s letter as a timely caution to avoid feeding
into the perception of Ashanti dominance (Ghana Palaver, 10-12 August 2004: 1& 8). Ironically, when the
same MP during Rawlings’ second term raised issues about ethnicity within the security agencies on the
floor of Parliament, he was chastised by the then ruling NDC.

In a similar vein, the President had not visited Yendi since the Ya Na had died and
as the electoral campaign got underway, ‘To Visit, or Not To Visit Yendi’, became
a major electoral issue. As a face-saving device, the President declared he would
visit Yendi but would not campaign there while the dead king remained
unburied. Such a lame response again brought up the question of what the
government’s reaction would have been had the murder occurred in Ashanti.
That in turn, attracted the retort that such a dastardly act would not happen in
Manhyia Palace (Daily Guide, 12 July 2004: 14).

Presidential Spokesman Kwabena Agyapong had reportedly, described Koi-Larbi
as ‘a person with bitterness in him perhaps because he was not given any
ministerial appointment… and that if he had performed well he would have gone
for re-election’ (Ghana Palaver, 10-12 August 2004: 1& 8). Clearly, the
accusation of the MP’s failure to develop his area was misplaced, since under the
1992 Constitution, the focus of local development was the District Assembly and
not the MP. The attack also depicted the NPP government as intolerant of
internal criticism. Not surprisingly, the opposition projected Koi-Larbi as a true
democrat who was being persecuted for speaking his mind. However, given the
impending elections, a memorandum to the president and party hierarchy
instead of an open letter could have served the party better.

President Kufuor chose to comment on accusations of ethnocentricism leveled
against the government during a courtesy call on him by the Asantehene and
perhaps inadvertently ended up reinforcing the views of the cynics. The
President had made reference to the Asantehene’s advocacy role in Ghana’s
effort to reach the completion point of the HIPC Initiative. That was capitalized
on by the cynics as a manifestation of his alleged ‘King of Ghana’ status. To them,
the Asantehene was usurping the powers of the President and Finance Minister.
Thus, his endeavours to salvage Ghanaians from their predicaments were
cleverly twisted and turned into a vicious charge of ethnocentricism, nepotism
and hegemonic intentions (Daily Graphic 27 July 2004 : 1 & 3; Daily Guide, 27
July 2004: 1 &12).
It must be emphasized that the impact of the media in this regard was great, especially
where FM stations have proliferated, featuring newspaper review programmes, phoneins and other programmes on the elections.
Pre-Election Ethnic Dynamics in the Regions
In the months leading to the elections there were intriguing regional developments
with ethnic undertones which either threatened or favoured the NPP’s re-election
bid:

In the Ashanti Region, the NPP slogan was ‘Operation 39’, meaning, it was going
to win all the seats in the party’s stronghold at both the presidential and
parliamentary polls.21 The assumption, in ethnic terms was that with an Ashanti
as an incumbent president, it was inconceivable that a constituency in the
Ashanti Region would vote against the NPP. The NDC while accepting its
underdog status in the region claimed that it would cause an upset by winning at
least ten parliamentary seats and 40% of the presidential vote. The situation in
the two constituencies the NPP lost in 2000- New Edubiase and Ejura
Sekyedumase- remained ethnically interesting. In New Edubiase in 2000, the NPP
had chosen an Ewe, Francis Dorpenyoh, in the hope of attracting the large Ewe
settler vote (Frempong 2001: 155). When he failed against NDC’s Theresa Baffoe,
he was appointed the DCE for the area in preparation for the 2004 contest. The
NDC in 2004 countered Dorpenyoh’s incumbency advantage as a DCE with an
Ewe candidate, Ernest Kofi Yakah, to set the stage for a ‘battle of Ewes in
Ashanti.’ In the other NDC ‘safe seat’ of Ejura-Sekyedumase, the NDC had
replaced its Ashanti incumbent, Sampson Atakora, with a northerner, Alhaji Issifu
Pangabu Mohammed, in its bit to retain the northern settler support. In the
Kumasi metropolis itself, the re-demarcation of constituencies had created in the
Asawase Constituency, a strong northern settler presence which posed a serious
threat to the NPP. Was the NDC candidate, Gibril Mohammed, going to cause an
upset against the well-resourced Akan NPP candidate, Patricia Appiagyei, in this
battle in which all the four other candidates were of northern descent?

In the Volta Region, the NPP had proclaimed turning the NDC’s electoral ‘World
Bank’ into a ‘rural bank’ and predicted 40% of the regional vote for the
incumbent president and at least seven parliamentary seats. A number of factors
might have accounted for this overconfidence on the part of the NPP. In 2000,
the NDC had maintained its hold on the Volta Region in part because it had
hyped the rumour that if the NPP came to power Voltarians would be driven
away to Togo and would need visas to enter Ghana. After four years in power,
the NPP had brought considerable developments to the region and there was no
sign of the purported expulsion order. In fact, the NPP parliamentary candidate
for South Dayi, E. K. Mallet, had argued that it would be unethical for the people
of Volta Region to refuse to vote for President Kufuor because in spite of the
region’s abysmal electoral support for the NPP government, it had been
magnanimous (Daily Guide, 11 November 2004: 7). In addition, the NPP had
among its parliamentary candidates well known politicians, at least four
ministers; while several of the NDC third term MPs had either stood aside or had
been defeated in the primaries and replaced by lesser known candidates. But the
dilemma which confronted the NPP in the Volta Region was aptly captured by
Kufuor’s passionate appeal in Ho to Voltarians to trust the NPP soon after he had
reportedly been hooted at as his entourage passed through Akatsi by people
allegedly dressed in NDC colours (Daily Graphic, 1 October 2004: 13). Had the
four years of NPP rule sufficiently allayed the Ewe suspicion of an Ashanti
President? Had the people in the region been convinced adequately enough that
the NDC was not going to recapture power in 2004?
21
The implication here was that the NPP was going to retain its thirty one seats and win the six newly
created constituencies in addition to the two it lost to the NDC in 2000

In 2000, the Brong Ahafo had produced one of the most surprising results in
both the parliamentary and presidential polls. From 61.7% presidential vote and
17 out of 21 seats for the NDC in 1996, the region in 2000 gave the NPP 50.6%
and 14 seats. How was this ‘electoral chameleon’ of a region with traditional
discontent for Ashanti hegemony going to vote after four years of an Ashanti in
the Presidency?

Like Brong Ahafo, Greater Accra had made an electoral u-turn in 2000, replacing
its 1996 sixty-four percent presidential vote and 13 seats out of 22 for the NDC
with 52.5% and 16 seats for the NPP. The NPP had won surprise victories in
several of the traditional NDC strongholds in the region.22 But with the increased
anti-Ashanti sentiments among the indigenous Gas, could the NPP retain those
seats and make further in-roads in 2004?

In the Eastern Region, the NPP appeared to have no problem retaining its seats
in the predominantly Akan constituencies. It therefore concentrated its efforts in
winning for the first time the non-Akan speaking Krobo areas and the settler
dominated Afram Plains, Fanteakwa and Upper West Akim.

The Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions all appeared solidly for the
NDC as the NPP struggled to retain the few seats from previous elections with
the albatross of the Dagbon crisis hanging around its neck.

The Central Region presented the most intriguing scenario of all. It had refused
in 2000 to allow itself to be turned into the second electoral World Bank, for the
NDC in spite of Mills’ “son of the soil status”. With Mills still in the saddle for the
NDC, it seemed the region was not going to reject its own for a second time. At
the same time the NPP had for strategic reasons taken the region as one byeelection constituency and given it a special attention in terms of development.

For the Western Region, it has traditionally voted like the Central Region, except
for the CPP’s dominance in first president Nkrumah’s Nzema district.
The Electoral Verdict
Election 2004 confirmed the dominance of the NPP and the NDC. The two parties won
between them more than 97% of the presidential vote with the remainder going to the
Grand Coalition and the CPP. In the case of the parliamentary seats the two major
parties won a total of 222 parliamentary seats leaving eight for the PNC-(4), CPP-(3) and
one independent. Four other parties contested but won no seats.23
Table 9.1: Regional Breakdown of Election 2004 Results for NPP and NDC
Presidential
Presidential
Parliament
Parliament
NPP (%)
NDC (%)
NPP (Seats)
NDC (Seats)
Western
56.64
40.89
12
8
Central
58.57
46.37
16
2
Eastern
60.27
38.38
22
6
Ashanti
74.61
24.06
36
3
Brong Ahafo
51.96
46.05
14
10
Greater Accra
51.9
46.3
16
11
Subtotal
58.99
40.3
116
40
Volta
14.6
83.83
1
21
Northern
36.2
56.94
8
17
Upper East
31.66
53.9
2
9
Upper West
36.23
56.67
1
7
Subtotal
28.59
62.84
12
54
TOTAL
52.45
44.64
128
94
Source: IEA Governance Newsletter, January 2005 and Electoral Commission, 2004
Parliamentary and Presidential Results, December 2004
22
Those constituencies included Ashaiman, Dade Kotopon, Klottey-Korle, Krowor, Odododiodoo,
Ledzokuku
23
These were Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE), National Reform Party (NRP), Great
Consolidated People’s Party (GCPP) and Democratic People’s Party (DPP)
A careful analysis of the results of Election 2004 (Table 9.1 above) clearly indicates that
in broad terms they were not different from Election 2000. The results confirmed the
Akan/Non-Akan pattern of the previous contest. In the presidential poll, the NPP won
the same six regions it had won in 2000 – Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central, Eastern,
Western and Greater Accra. The situation was similar at the parliamentary level except
that in 2000, the NDC had narrowly won majority of seats in Central and Western. With
the exception of Greater Accra, the other five regions have between 52% and 82% of
the population being Akan (See Table 9.2 below). Interestingly, Greater Accra with
about 40% Akans has more Akans than the Eastern Region and about the same number
as Brong Ahafo Region (Table 9.2). Indeed, there are more Akans (39.7%) in Greater
Accra than Ga-Adangbes- the indigenous inhabitants of the region- who constitute
29.6% of the population(Jonah 2005: 3; 2000 Population and Housing Census: 22). The
NPP’s share of the presidential vote in the six regions ranged between 51% and 75%. In
the 5 Akan regions, the NPP garnered 100 of its 128 total parliamentary seats.
The reverse was the case in those regions that the NPP lost. Volta, Northern, Upper East
and Upper West, on the average gave less than 30% of their presidential votes to the
incumbent president; and in those four regions the NPP could garner only 12
parliamentary seats, less than 10% of its size in parliament. It must be emphasized that
in none of the four regions do Akans form more than 11% of the regional population.
Table 9.2: Percentage of AKANS in the Ten Regions of Ghana
Region
Total Population
Akan Population
% Akan
Western
1,774,037
1,388,738
78.28
Central
1,474,584
1,208,608
81.96
Greater Accra
2,679,991
1,065,509
39.7
Eastern
1,980,719
1,031,498
52.08
Ashanti
3,154,862
2,458,088
77.91
Brong Ahafo
1,705,612
1,069,744
62.71
Volta
1,525,744
129,384
8.48
Northern
1,740,700
174,469
10.02
Upper East
851,537
19,186
2.25
Upper West
548,807
17,524
3.19
Source: 2000 Population and Housing Census, pp.22-23; cited in Jonah 2005:3
On its part, the NDC won no Akan region but had between 56% and 84% of the regional
presidential votes in the four Non-Akan regions that it won. More than 60% of NDC
parliamentary seats (54 out of 94) also came from the four Non-Akan regions. At the
presidential level, the best NDC performance in the Akan regions was 46.37% in the
Central Region, the home of its presidential candidate.
The analysis of the Akan/Non-Akan divide could be stretched further in terms of the
settler factor. In Ashanti Region, the only three seats the NPP lost to the NDC at both
parliamentary and presidential levels were Asawase, New Edubiase, and Ejura
Sekyedumase, well known for their significant Non-Akan settler communities. Indeed for
the latter two the NDC had dominated throughout the four elections since 1992. It is
also note worthy that in Ashanti, the 24% presidential vote for the NDC reflects closely
23% Non-Akan regional population (Table 9.2). The Eastern Region provides another
test case in this respect. Three of the six constituencies that the NDC won at both levels
were non-Akan- Yilo, Upper Manya and Lower Manya- Krobo. The other three, Upper
West Akim, Afram Plains South and Afram Plains North are Non-Akan settler-dominated.
And in Brong Ahafo, NDC took three of the four constituencies that share borders with
the Northern Region- Kintampo North, Pru and Sene. The only exception was Tain
(formerly Wenchi West) which the NPP captured for the first time in 2004.
The respective traditional dominance of the NPP and NDC in the Ashanti and the Volta
regions remained virtually intact. In Ashanti, the NPP won 36 out of 39 seats in both
polls. In the Volta Region, the NDC won 21 out of 22. The NPP only managed to win its
first seat in the Fourth Republic. Significantly, the Nkwanta North constituency is the
farthest from the Ewe-dominated south and, ironically, its parliamentary candidate one
of the least resourced. All the four high profile and better resourced minister-cumparliamentary candidates in Akan, Ketu North, Biakoye and Ho West, lost miserably in
spite of all the pre-election hype; perhaps a confirmation of the notion that in the Volta
Region, membership of NPP is seen as a sell-out. All that incumbent President Kufour
could get for his special efforts to court the region was 3.1% increase in the votes from
11.5% in the 2000 run-off to 14.6% in 2004. He had lost in all the 22 constituencies to
Mills and scored less than 10% in 12 constituencies.
The three northern regions retained their support for the NDC which won 33 of the
possible 49 seats and between 53% and 57% of the presidential vote. In Tamale South,
the prominent NPP candidate, Mustapha Idris, lost heavily to young Iddrisu Haruna but
this apparent ‘Dagbon fallout’ was balanced by Malik Yakubu’s surprise retention of the
Yendi seat.
It was also ethnically significant that the CPP and the PNC won two seats each in the
respective home districts of their founders/godfathers ex-presidents Kwame Nkrumah
and Hilla Limann – Ellembelle and Evalue Gwira (Western Region) in the case of the
former and for the latter, Sisalla East and West (Upper West Region)
Central Region: Heroes or Villians?
What appeared to be the surprise package in Election 2004 was the Central Region vote.
The NDC flag-bearer Mills trailed the incumbent president 46.37% to 58.57%, a
significant 12.2% in the former’s home region. Indeed, Mills lost in all the 19
constituencies except two - his home constituency, Mfatseman East and newly created
Twifo-Atti Morkwaa Constituency. At the parliamentary level, the NDC lost 8 seats,24
and found its previous regional parliamentary majority reduced to only two seats. Other
aspects of this electoral ‘Tsunami’ made the matter more intriguing. The NDC flagbearer
had improved his 2000 performance from 20.1% to 24.1% in the ‘lion’s den’ of Ashanti
Region where the incumbent President had his 2000 run-off vote of 79.9% reduced to
74.6%. Mills also performed better in the five other regions that the NPP won than he
did in the 2000 run-off except the Central Region (Electoral Commission, 2000 & 2004).
The reactions to the Central Region vote were charged with emotions and in the process
threw up several issues related to the Ethnicity-Democracy interface. Instead of
applauding the non-ethnic performance of the Central Region and the moderating
influence it had on the ethnic divide there were anti-Fanti bashing. Ironically, Ashantis
and Ewes who voted largely on primordial lines were spared the scorn.

Sections of the Fante community in Kumasi reportedly witnessed widespread
incidents of taunting in the settler dominated suburbs of Oforikrom, Anloga and
Aboabo. According to The Chronicle, NDC supporters –mainly Ewes and
Northerners - were insistent that ‘Fantes are concert people and foolish for not
voting for their own.’ And that they should go and perform at the National
Theatre that the NDC built for them (Ghanaweb/ The Chronicle, 10 December
2004).25

In Accra NDC women activists felt the party needed to ‘storm the Central Region
and shake the place in a way for Fantis to see their mistake’. Others even
suggested, perhaps comically, that Mills renounced his Fanti ancestry and
naturalize as an Ewe (Ghanaweb/ GNA 10 December 2004).

Other commentaries, sometimes from well educated people, described the vote
in very unsavoury terms such as ‘a collective and vicious Fanti betrayal’, ‘a
24
NDC lost seven seats to NPP (Abura-Asebu-Kwamankese, Agona East, Awutu-Senya, Effutu, Gomoa
West, Hemang Lower Denkyira and Mfantseman West) and one, Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem
(KEEA), to the CPP.
25
This alleged taunt was particularly interesting given the political capital that the NDC made in 2000 of
Kufour’s reported ‘Fantes are Jokers’ statement. Was it an admission of the truth or a sign of frustration?
political dagger’, a ‘thrust in the heart of their own’ (Ghanaweb 16 December
2004).
The emotions aside, a major factor that accounted for the rejection of Mills in the
Central Region was the Rawlings ‘baggage’. Doubts about Mills’ ability to shake off
Rawlings and be his own man that caused his defeat in the region in 2000 remained
(Frempong 2001: 158). This perception manifested in several ways:

Mills did himself a great disservice by adopting ‘Sankofa’ as his initial campaign
slogan. It was difficult explaining that it did not mean a return to atrocities of the
Rawlings era. ‘For A Better Ghana’- the party’s election manifesto arrived rather
too late.

The people of the region saw how Rawlings wanted to push his will on Kufuor
and wondered what he would do if Mills, who had promised to consult him 24
hours a day, were elected. The slogan ‘Vote for Mills and You Get Rawlings Free’
resonated well in Central Region.

At several stops during his campaign in the Central Region, Mills talked tough
and the more he did so the more he became cast in the mould of his mentor and
the more he confirmed the view that he was paving the way for his former boss.
In addition, Mills stance as a Fanti Warrior in the region did not fit into the image
of ‘the prince of peace’ (Asomdwiehene) he was projecting nationally (Daily
Graphic, 17 December 2004 p.14).

Some of the utterances of Rawlings were not only scaring but also insulting. His ‘I
will be Back’ speech at the launch of the NDC campaign in Cape Coast confirmed
their lingering fears. And his rumblings about the quality of drinking water in
Dunkwa brought back sad memories of his previous call on the people of Cape
Coast to learn the hygienic consciousness of the cat (Ghanaweb/The Chronicle 15
December 2004).
In a sarcastic sense, the people of Central Region felt by voting against Mills they were
releasing him from the political ramshackle of Rawlings
Central Region proved by its vote that its loyalties are not tied to primordial relations,
but to exigencies of the time and for strategic calculations. A careful analysis of the
voting pattern in the region since the Second Republic clearly confirms this view.26
The picture is even more interesting particularly at the presidential level in the Fourth
Republic. In 1992, Rawlings got 66.5%, though a number of the presidential candidates
were from the Central Region. In 1996 when none of the presidential candidates was
from the region, Rawlings’ vote reduced by 10.8% to 55.7%. The 43.7% that Mills got in
the first round in 2000 represented another 12% reduction on the NDC’s 1996 vote. On
the other hand, the NPP’s 26% in 1992 climbed up by 16.9% to 42.9% in 1996. In the
first round in 2000, with three other sons of the region in the race, the ‘stranger’ Kufuor
bagged 49.7%. In the run-off, the region did its ethnic worst by again giving Kufuor
60.3% and Mills 39.7% and damned the consequences.
It should be clear therefore that the 58.8% of the vote that the Central Region gave
Kufuor was consistent with its voting tradition. Simply put, the hope that the NDC
banked on the region was, to all intents and purposes, a false one. And I have no doubt
that the Central Region will vote at the next election the way it will, depending on how
things go over the next four years. In my opinion, none was as objective as the Central
Region vote. It portrayed a high level of maturity and civility, a better appreciation of
democracy and independent-mindedness that must be applauded rather than
condemned. The voters in Central region were democratic heroes rather than the ethnic
villains that they were made to appear.
In 1969, the region gave all its 15 seats to Busia’s Progress Party (PP) (Boahen 1975: 235, 238; Badu &
Larvie 1996:6). In 1979, neither the Popular Front Party (PFP) nor the United National Convention (UNC)
that belonged to the Danquah-Busia tradition could win a single seat. Rather the seats were shared almost
equally between the Nkrumahist People’s National Party (PNP) and the Action Congress Party (ACP), the
party of home boy, Frank Bernasko (Badu & Larvie 1996:9).
26
LESSONS
Several lessons can be distilled from this study; some of them positive others negative:

Election 2004, in spite of the apparent Akan/Non-Akan divide, confirmed that
legislative and presidential victories often require appeals across ethnic groups
to gain a minimum wining coalition. Clearly, Kufuor’s re-election would have
been in jeopardy without the support, however little, of the Non-Akan regions,
and so would have been the NPP parliamentary majority without the twenty
eight seats won from those five Non-Akan regions.

The Central Region vote showed the beauty of a free exercise of universal adult
suffrage, that Ghanaians must not vote for candidates merely because they
come from their home-village, town, district or region. It is therefore a blight on
democracy when people are ridiculed publicly for exercising their right in a
particular way, more so when as in the case of the Central Region, they were
doing the proper thing-rejecting ethnicity in favour of what they felt was in their
best socioeconomic interest.

It has also been confirmed by this study that ethnicity remains at the root of the
electoral process in Ghana, particularly as a tool of mobilizing grassroots
support. At the same time, pushing the ethnic card is one of the easiest ways to
inflame passions and arouse emotional responses. Analysing issues with tainted
ethnic goggles does not give room for objectivity; rather it beclouds people’s
sense of judgment and poisons the political atmosphere. Are we not heading for
a situation in which any critic of the Kufuor administration is automatically
branded an Ewe and NDC and any supporter an Ashanti and NPP?. But is the NPP
equal to Ashanti and the NDC synonymous with Ewe in a country whose
Constitution demands in Article 55 (4) that “Every political party shall have a
national character, and membership shall not be based on ethnic, religious,
regional and other sectional divisions”?

Election 2004 confirmed further that not even ethnicity, or any other factor
alone, can determine the outcome of elections. Other factors like region, level of
literacy and rural-urban ratio, poverty, unemployment, and government
performance (governance deficit or dividend) all work together to determine the
final outcome of the vote.

Unless democratic regimes can build a sense of overriding societal interests as a
whole, they are not likely to provide an effective bulwark against parochial
interests over the long term. A consensus vision of democracy, incorporating
various power sharing arrangements may be necessary to reassure weaker
parties about their security and the protection of their interests. Political actors,
therefore, should be prepared to live by and uphold democratic rules on
participation, transparency accountability and respect for diversity.

The emerging situation where even matters of national interests such as national
reconciliation, national health insurance, education, funding development
projects, tend to take ethnic and/or partisan interpretation does not augur well
for democracy. Such ethnic politics takes place at the expense of national ideals
and interests and spawns hatred, witch hunting, lack of inter-ethnic trust, ethnic
clashes, etc, which in turn, not only threaten to split the nation but also
endanger the security of individuals and their property

Freedom of expression can either make or mar democratic consolidation. The
media in particular could be an effective tool of civic education and the
management of peaceful inter-ethnic co-existence; if misused, the media could
inflame ethnic passions. Several examples of slanted reporting cited in this study
demonstrate the dangers that irresponsible journalism pose especially during
elections.
Overall, election processes in Ghana, despite their emphasis on individual choice and
the possibility of cross party voting, remain vulnerable to elite manipulation along
ethnic lines especially where elites play upon latent fears that members hold about
their group’s security and economic well being.
CONCLUSION
It is evident from the Ghanaian situation that democracy does not automatically and
necessarily lead to fewer ethnic conflicts; and that, ethnicity is a reality that can be
mobilized for electoral purposes. Therefore:

There is the need for sensitivity towards the interests and demands of various
ethnic groups as well as coherence and consistency in the manner in which
ethnic demands are addressed. Indeed, the success of the democratic
experiment in defusing ethnic tensions will depend on the speed with which
ethnic issues are recognized and attended to. It is important to enhance the
equitable distribution of national resources and transparent approach to the
recruitment into the civil and all other public services.

It must be emphasized that successful democratization requires continuous
interaction among interest groups over time. As elites reciprocate and political
exchanges occur, trust can develop among the various parties. But where some
elements of the political elite ignore the norm of moderation and engage in
efforts to outbid each other, the effect is increased ethnic tensions, particularly
as elections approach and the stakes in politics rise.

Leaders should as well encourage parties based on policies that transcend ethnic
conglomeration and ensure that they become instruments of public education
and not weapons of ethnic politics.

Democracy calls for civic education programmes in and out of school on
fundamental issues which affect the essence of interdependence and peaceful
co-existence between the ethnic groups. Civic education should develop,
conscientize and empower Ghanaians to appreciate and cope with social and
cultural diversities, without conflict. It should therefore be the duty of every
citizen to put up a national frontage and minimize the negative consequences of
ethnicity.

There is a further need for a shared history of cooperation through
intermarriages and common infrastructures which bring mutual dependence.
This will lead to the development of mutual sensitivity and the desire towards a
common peaceful future. A lot too can be achieved in ethnic relations through
policies that seek to deconstruct myths, stereotypes and prejudices through the
creative use of public discourse and humour.

Cultural diversity should not be seen as barrier to national unity and peaceful coexistence. We are born of different ethnic groups we cannot change; but I
refuse to believe that because our ethnic groups have different backgrounds,
culture and customs, we cannot build a Ghanaian nation.
All said and done, since we cannot wish away the fact that Ghana is a nation of many
peoples and traditions, the country can only operate at its harmonious best when the
various cultures, traditions, languages and histories of all those peoples are reflected in
the project of nation-building.
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