1.
Discussion Questions: A Theory of Justice sections 33-35, 39-40
33. Equal Liberty of Conscience
(1) how strong is the contractualist argument for equal liberty of conscience? is Rawls right that
even if probabilities favor one's being in the majority, the willingness of parties to gamble and
adopt unequal liberty shows that they do not take seriously the convictions they ostensibly want
to act on?
(2) explain Mill's arguments for free institutions and the refutation of those arguments?
(3) on p. 181-2 Rawls repeats a move that he has made before: he asserts that there is something
wrong with the insecurity of leaving liberty to a social calculus. what exactly is wrong with this?
what , if anything, is wrong with people knowing or believing that this has been done?
(4) on 182 Rawls also remarks, in effect, that inconsistency is the tribute utilitarianism pays to our
confidence in the principle of equal liberty. is he right about this?
34. Toleration and the Common Interest
(1) should we be concerned that the state does not concern itself with religious and philosophical
doctrines?
(2) note that on 187 Rawls says liberty of conscience can be limited only for the sake of public
order. the expectation that the exercise of religious liberty must be based on evidence and ways
of reasoning acceptable to all. what is the intuitive basis of this requirement? Rawls says that
this requirement is based on the principles of justice. would the requirement be adopted in the
original position? on p. 188, this requirement seems to be extended to other liberties as well.
should it be?
(3) is Rawls correct that in justice as fairness, religious tolerance is not based on either necessity or
skepticism? how, if at all, does this tell in favor of justice as fairness?
(4) is Rawls correct that there is a difference between the way Aquinas and the Protestant
reformers justified religious intolerance on the one hand, and the way Locke and Rousseau did so
on the other? is this difference an important one?
35. Toleration of the Intolerant
(1) what questions need to be distinguished in discussing the toleration of the intolerant?
(2) is it correct that an intolerant sect has no grounds for complaint when denied equal liberty?
(3) is Rawls's response to the consistent intolerant person (191) compelling?
(4) why and under what conditions should the intolerant be tolerated? when not and why not?
(5) explain why the liberty of the intolerant is not restricted in order to maximize liberty.
(6) on p. 193 Rawls says that "the differences among [people] are profound and no one knows
how to reconcile them by reason". Is the second conjunct true? What role does it play in the
argument?
2.
(7) what does it mean to say that the principles adopted in the original position are a "pact of
reconciliation between diverse religious and moral beliefs"? does this mean that they are a
compromise? why or why not? are they a modus vivendi? why or why not?
39. The Priority of Liberty Defined
(1) has Rawls successully navigated “an appropriate path between dogmatism and intolerance on
one side, and reductionism which regards religion and morality as mere preferences on the
other” (214)? why or why not?
(2) what is the priority of liberty?
(3) what two kinds of circumstances justify a restriction of liberty?
(4) what is the problem of paternalism? under what conditions may some individuals act on
behalf of others? is Rawls’s discussion of these conditions exhaustive, or does he leave some out?
what about cases in which agents either lack full information or lack the expertise to make use of
information in their possession?
40. The Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness
(1) in explicating the Kantian interpretation, why is it a mistake to emphasize the generality and
universalizability of principles?
(2) does the contract tradition reach its high point in Kant and Rousseau?
(3) exactly how does acting on the principles chosen in the original position express one’s nature
as a rational being who is the free equal of her fellows?
(4) are the principles of justice categorical imperatives in Kant’s sense?
(5) why don’t the parties in the original position adopt principles heteronomously, since they
choose based on their desire for primary goods? would they act any more (or less)
heteronomously if they were moved by a desire for pleasure instead? why or why not?
(6) in light of the Kantian interpretation, does the assumption of mutual disinterest in the original
position now seem even more reasonable?
(7) what does Rawls mean by suggesting that the original position is the point of view from
which noumenal selves see the world?
(8) on p. 225 Rawls says “the desire to act justly derives in part from the desire to express most
fully what we are or can be”. do (phenomenal) persons who act on this desire act
heteronomously? why or why not? how is this desire related to the motive of reciprocity, which
we have seen is central to Rawls’s account of moral motivation? is this desire to be thought of as
primitive? as universally possessed?
(9) are moderate scarcity and some competing claims the sort of facts about our nature which do
not render choices in the original position heteronomous? how are facts of this sort to be
distinguished from facts which would render that choice heteronomous if they were the basis for
it? is the fact of religious and philosophical pluralism such a fact? why or why not?