Latin America-Africa Cooperation: Brazil as a Case Study
Gladys Lechini 1
Historically, relations between Latin America and Africa have gone through periods of
rapprochement and also through mute stages. These ups and downs were and still are
closely related to domestic situations and to international and regional ones.
These relations come from the XVI Century, with the slave trade. During this shameful
period, Latin America and the Caribbean received the Africans, together with their
culture and their values, which became part of the heritage and the profile of the
different nations in the region. Since the Latin American countries’ independence,
during the XIX Century, the two regions were connected through the European
countries, and their relations had a very low profile.
This situation began to change in the XX century, this time, with the independence of
African states. Their inclusion in the post second world war international system had a
strong impact in multilateral regimes and in UN, where the Latin American states
backed up the incorporation of the new African partners, beginning a new type of
relationship.
During the 60’s and seventies, the countries of the “Third World” participated actively
in international fora, to defend their interests through concerted actions: G 77, the Non
Aligned Movement and the UN General Assembly were the privileged meeting places.
Nevertheless, during the 80’s a new period of silence covered the relations. The bilateral
synergy was weakened by the serious problems concerning the external debt which
affected development and democratic stability in the South.
1
Professor of International Relations at the National University of Rosario. Researcher at the National
Council for Scientific and Technological Research, Argentina (CONICET) Academic Advisor
CLACSO’s South-South Program. Director Institute for South-South Relations (IRESS)
1
In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War brought the end of bipolarity and diminished the
alternatives for Latin America and Africa to solve their problems and improve their
international insertion. Furthermore, the expansion of globalisation, the implementation
of neoliberal policies, and the severe economic problems faced by developing countries
dissolved any solidarity. South-South cooperation was not in the priorities of the foreign
policy agendas of the countries in both regions. Neither it was included in the speeches
of leaders, nor it was at the decision making level or in academic analysis.
The effects of globalisation made it clear that there were new winners and losers, but
also that very few winners belonged to Southern countries. This awareness, along with
the disappointment regarding the possibility that a new global system based on the socalled IFIs (International Financial Institutions) and the WTO (World Trade
Organisation) might contribute to establishing a fairer international order, led the
governments of the Global South to rethink the idea of horizontal cooperation, but this
time adopting a more selective approach in terms of players and issues, and learning
from past experiences.
“South-South Cooperation” shows that it is possible to create cooperative awareness
from the South, which may enable countries to jointly tackle their common dilemmas in
the international arena. In front of situations seen as unfair, cooperation among peers,
among those enduring the same dependency situations, would help them underpin their
negotiating capacity vis-à-vis the North, through cooperative efforts aimed at solving
issues on trade, development, and the new international economic order.
Africa and Latin America: between similarities and diversities
Before dealing with the cases under study, I will briefly comment on some similarities
between the two regions as well as on some characteristic of the horizontal relation.
2
Despite the mutual lack of knowledge of the other and the absence of communications
for various periods, it is interesting to note that the two regions have remarkable
similarities. Both have suffered from colonialism, both have fought strongly for their
independence, both have dependent and asymmetric relations with the industrialized
countries (the North) and dependent economic structures, both have undergone the
economic hardships caused by SAPs albeit at different time frames.
What makes the difference is the fact that democracy has been recovered almost twenty
five years ago in Latin America, though in Africa many countries are still struggling
with restoring democratic governance. Connected to this it can be pointed that the Latin
American region can show in this new Century elected governments with inclinations to
the left in what has been called “the new populism”.
The pattern of relations between Latin American and African states shows that Latin
American countries had been main initiators. However, South Africa has reacted to this
pattern by approaching Latin American countries, in different periods, with the same
object: to improve its international insertion through the diversification of political,
economic and strategic relations.
On the other hand, Africa’s relationship with Latin America has been characterized by
various models that reflect the continent’s diversity. These models have included the
Cuban Model, Brazilian Model, Argentinean Model, and Venezuelan Model. This
change in the norms elicited various responses. Argentina accommodated to South
Africa’s approach. Brazil, in contrast, preferred interacting with different countries.
Cuba’s approach privileged the ideological dimension and technical cooperation.
Venezuela, the new player, is learning how to move towards Africa within de various
aspects of South-South cooperation
3
Argentina and South Africa
An analysis of the evolution of Argentine-African relationships since the independence
of these states reveals that Sub-Saharan Africa holds a low profile in Argentine foreign
priorities, given the scarce links established and the lack of continuity by the successive
Argentine governments. A combination of typical factors related to Argentina’s political
instability, to its ensuing foreign policy stance, along with changes in the international
scenario and the special situation of African countries have conditioned Argentina’s
weak and erratic ties with those countries.
Argentina’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the African states in general and South Africa in
particular may be described as an impulse-driven policy, which have varied in intensity
with the years, governments, and projects of international insertion2. The impulses are
external and usually discontinuous actions which have accounted for the
rapprochement with the African states for brief periods. These actions have set up a
pattern of relations which, regardless of its ups and downs, may be defined as erratic
and jerky. The impulses may in fact be measured through a set of indicators such as
opening embassies, sending and receiving diplomatic or trade missions, signing
agreements, through the sudden changes in the balance of trade with a given country,
and so forth.
It should be noted that foreign policy may be driven by impulses, i.e., by external
actions directed to another international player, in this case a state, which occur
throughout time. It is the continuity and contiguity of these impulses what would define
it as a policy based on a design approach. The accumulation of impulses in a given
context would entitle to speak of policy building. Otherwise, a set of isolated impulses
2
The opinions expressed in this paper are the outcome of my research at CONICET and have been
discussed in greater depth in Lechini, Gladys “Argentina y África en el espejo de Brasil. ¿Política por
impulsos o construcción de una política exterior” CLACSO, Buenos Aires, 2006.
4
usually bears no effects or consequences and gets lost in the thematic schizophrenia of
our foreign offices.
This jerky impulse-driven policy also shows a particular decision-making process.
Owing to the low priority held by African states in the policies implemented by both
civilian and military Argentine governments, the decisions made by impulse were
regarded as “routine” procedure at Palacio San Martin (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
Moreover, many of the bilateral or multilateral initiatives (within the frame of the NonAligned countries or the UN) often relied on the good will and imagination of the
argentine officials, who managed to have leeway in advancing actions or missions
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ monolithic and hierarchical structure. Hence, the
different bureaucratic bodies (“the Departments”) did not usually take a concerted
action due to the lack of strategies or policies crafted on the basis of rational criteria and
long term opportunities.
Within this scenario, and because African states were not among Argentina’s external
priorities, the gaps created in the marginal leeway available served to channel good
ideas. However, these were isolated efforts because of the Ministry officials’ turnover
hindering the follow-up and continuity of “low-profile” actions and because of the
political and economic instability of the potential partners across the Atlantic.
The
above mentioned impulse could advance in the decision-making process thanks to the
insistence of officials at different levels and could made its way up the decision-making
pyramid insofar as the action should not be “costly” in political or economic terms.
Within this rationale framework, numerous valuable reports and recommendations made
by officials accredited to African states or Buenos Aires were lost in the intricacies of
Palacio San Martín.
It might therefore be concluded that these impulses reflect the different rapprochement
5
initiatives with African states. Their intensity depended on the content-objective and
also determined their positioning in the decision-making pyramid. If the content of the
impulse agreed with the government’s policy, its intensity would grow and the decision
would be taken at the highest levels. If the impulse or the interest was minor, the
decision would be taken at the middle tier of the bureaucratic hierarchy. The relation
between the intensity of the impulse and the decision-making levels depended on where
the issue in question was placed in the overall picture. Hence most decisions would fall
within the dynamics of routine.
The most remarkable exception was the breaking-off and resumption of diplomatic
relations with South Africa, which shows that such decisions fell within the overall
policy design and were therefore taken at the highest level. The aim, however, was not
exclusively South Africa per se, but to reach other targets regarding issues seen as
relevant in the strategies deployed at the time.
An analysis of the evolution in Argentine-South African relations identifies 4 stages:
a) A two-fold policy and equivocal relations from 1960-1983, when relations with the
then racist South Africa were developed by mutual impulses, with military-strategic
and commercial objectives3
b) A period of policy definition for a racist South Africa, with the breaking-off of
diplomatic relations by Alfonsín’s government on 22nd May 1986, concurrently
with a new design for the relations with the other African states.
c) The resumption of diplomatic relations with South Africa on 8th August 1991,
during Menem’s office, who visited the country in February 1995. This impulse is
accounted for by the president’s personality and interests rather than by the
existence of a policy design.
Lechini, Gladys, “Las relaciones Argentina-Sudáfrica desde el Proceso hasta Menem” Ediciones
CERIR, Rosario, 1995
3
6
d) This stage started in 2005 with the agreement to set up a Binational Commission,
which finally materialised in February 2007 on the occasion of Foreign Secretary
Jorge Taiana’s visit to South Africa4.
Argentina’s diplomatic relations with South Africa show some particularities which
make them different from other African states. Up to Alfonsin’s government, mutual
impulses generated a certain density of relations. The breaking-off diplomatic relations
provoked a watershed with the subsequent absence of political relations and impulses.
But bilateral trade continued in separate avenues and was not strongly influenced. The
breaking-off diplomatic relations was not an impulse as it was part of the foreign
policy’s general strategy of Argentina at that time. The objective was to recover, in the
international scenario, the credibility lost with the military governments and to defend
the Human Rights cause.
The quick re-establishment of diplomatic relations decided by Menem turned that policy
into an impulse. Even though during his administration a higher density of bilateral
relations took place, South Africa was not included among Argentina’s priorities. That
is why the external actions were transformed into a new impulse, aiming at very specific
objectives and loosing a good opportunity to build common South-South political
agendas. This impulse, with its peak during Menem’s visit to South Africa in 1995, is
much more connected with the way the president built his own image, under the
assumption that his image was the final representation of his country, which deserved a
place among the most important nations in the world.
During the 90s, the pattern of relationship developed as follows: the goal of the South
African rapprochement was to learn from the Argentine experience in the privatization
4
Foreign Secretary Jorge Taiana led the multisectoral trade mission to Pretoria comprising 43 Argentine
companies from a range of industries (biotechnology, agricultural machinery, electric machinery,
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, foods, teaching services, T&T, and auto parts).
7
process and the economic reform, and the Argentine one was to attract South African
investments in mining and to increase exports selling agricultural commodities.
With the coming of Fernando de la Rua to the presidency in Argentina (1999) and
despite the set of proposals of the Alianza that took him to power, substantial changes
were not observed either in the foreign policy or in the relations with the states of the
African continent and South Africa The political and economic internal crisis that
culminated with the president’s resignation obliged all government’s agencies to
manage the crisis, both in its domestic dimension as well as in its international
implications (Lechini, 2001).
With president Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003), certain internal stability could be
attained. However, after having declared the default, the negotiation of the foreign debt
centered almost all the energies of the external actions, showing a reactive and inertial
foreign policy.
According to Miranda (2003;69), the caretaker government’s foreign
policy was largely tied down by the Argentine situation, it was a “scenario-driven”
foreign policy. Notwithstanding this, Foreign Affairs Secretary Carlos Ruckauf sought
to innovate and spoke of conducting a foreign policy of “polygamy with the different
continents”. This odd diplomatic expression attempting to identify MERCOSUR,
Europe, Asia, and Africa as the targets of the national government’s foreign policy was
used, above all, to be distinguished from the “carnal relations” with the US, fostered by
Menem.
Since President Néstor Kirchner took office (2003), the idea of South-South cooperation
may be spotted in his discourse on foreign policy. After more than a decade of foreign
policy based on neoliberal principles, where the economy prevailed over politics and
values, multilateral sectors have called for South-South cooperation, conceived as a
space to seek new ways for promoting development and autonomy.
8
In this sense, a number of initiatives such as the South America – Arab Countries
Summit (held in Brasilia in May 2005), the Africa-Latin America Summit (held in
Abuja on 30th November 2006), and the relaunching of the Zone for Peace and
Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) in Luanda, in June 2007, have been
adequate international political forums to show Argentina’s intentions regarding SouthSouth issues. Likewise, with regard to multilateral trade within the WTO, Argentina
followed its MERCOSUR partner, Brazil, in promoting common positions and joint
negotiations among G20 and NAMA-11 countries.
The discourse emphasis on South-South cooperation was also reflected in the
relationships with South Africa. In fact, on the occasion of his visit during a multilateral
mission in 2007, Foreign Secretary Jorge Taiana stated that “Argentina and South
Africa have started to build a new strategic relationship which will surely become a
South-South cooperation model” (…) “to Argentina’s foreign policy and administration,
this is a very significant visit since Argentine-South African relations are a top priority
for Argentina’s foreign policy and for South-South cooperation and relationships. We
share the same principles and values. We share the principle of multilateralism as a way
of solving problems in the international community”5.
However, regarding bilateral relations, the South-South option is still focused from a
commercialist/pragmatic perspective. Although Latin America’s regional economic
conditions favour an increase in South-South cooperation, it seems that the President
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are having difficulty developing policies beyond the
Atlantic. The missions sent and received show a more commercial than political
content, which proves there is still a lot to do in this sense, as evidenced in the
“Taiana described the trade and political mission to South Africa as successful”. Press Release No 056,
28th February 2007. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade, and Worship website:
http://www.mrecic.gov.ar/portal/prensa/prensa.php?buscar=02/2007
5
9
unsuccessful meeting between Kirchner and Mbeki when the latter did not visit
Argentina during his Latin American tour in 2005.
However, a Binational Commission began to take shape as a result of a preliminary
meeting held in Pretoria in 2006 and the subsequent visit of Minister Jorge Taiana, in
February 2007, to attend the first meeting of the Binational Commission. The following
one is to be held in Buenos Aires in December 2008.
BRAZIL’S AFRICAN POLICY
Brazil’s relations with African states are different from those of Argentina’s, because
Brazil constructed an African Policy in the framework of a global strategy of Brazil’s
integration into the world. Although in the 60s both countries began to design strategies
for the new African states, with Argentina even taking the lead, throughout the years
their approaches showed different features. Brazil designed and implemented a set of
political and diplomatic actions aiming at building a “critical mass” of commonalities
and Argentina created a spasmodic-like relation.
Though Brazil’s African Policy was characterized by Brazilian academics as a diffuse
process, it turns to be coherent in comparison with Argentina’s impulses. Impulses in
Brazil were “cumulative” and made possible the existence of certain density of relations
between Brazil and Africa, in what can be considered an “incremental policy”. Unlike
Argentina, impulses were generated at the upper levels of the decision making process.
Thus, Brazil’s Foreign Policy shows much more continuities than Argentina’s, even
with the changes of regimes (democratic and military regimes occurred in both
countries). In this context, Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) was able to
maintain a great level of independence, still with different governments, in comparison
with Argentina. With all possible nuances, there is a certain continuity in the designs
and implementation of Brazil’s Foreign Policy connected with the internal development
10
project (National development through imports substitution).
As African states had a place in Brazil’s foreign design, political actions resulted in the
construction of an African policy. That explains the higher density of diplomatic and,
later, commercial relations. The rapprochement had a political nature -in the context of
South-South relations- and a pragmatic commercial nature, due to the interest in
diversifying trading partners. It was justified with principles -the development of SouthSouth solidarity- and belonged to a global strategy: to have an international presence
through the diversification of external relations and the building of alliances with the
new states in the South. This way Brazil would have a say in global issues. Perhaps
these new relations can also be explained due to the impossibility, at that stage, to have
better ones with Latin American states and particularly with Argentina, owing to the
hypothesis of conflict between both countries’ military governments.
Even though Brazilian officials resorted to a “cultural speech” or a “cultural diplomacy”
reminding Brazil’s African heritage -it is the country with the biggest African
population out of Africa- new actions were necessary in order to convince the African
states of Brasilia’s intentions. Embassies were opened and high level missions were
sent. Technical and academic cooperation was developed and research centers were
opened. The seventies were called the “golden period” of Brazilian-African relations.
The relation with South Africa showed varied edges. As in the case of Argentina, the
African states always claimed for the breaking-off relations with the racist government.
Nonetheless, Brazil did not need to appeal to such a drastic action to show its
commitment towards African states and South Africa’s people. This could be explained
by the fact that Brazil had generated such a density of relations that a shadow of a doubt
was not left regarding Brazilian intentions.
The evolution of Brazil’s policy towards South Africa, in the most general framework
11
of Brazilian-African relations, also showed oscillations. Nevertehless, a lower profile
was being defined according to the improvement of Brazilian’s relations with African
states and the deterioration of South Africa´s domestic situation. Therefore, South
Africa´s domestic policy became a participant variable in the development of Brasilia’s
relations with Pretoria. As in the Argentine case, the strongest impulse stemmed from
South Africa with the “outward policy”, holding strategic and commercial objectives.
In the bilateral relation Brasilia gave tepid answers to South African impulses -till the
middle of the seventies- which were understood by the academics as ambiguities
(Vilalva, Gala: 2001:55), hesitancies (Penna, 2001), oscillations, contradictions
(Saraiva, 1996) or ambivalences. Thus, the policy towards South Africa presented
oscillations as a consequence of the difference between principles and specific interests
as a feasible adaptation of the clear and continuous objectives of the national
development. With the oscillations Brazil tried to separate the approach to Black Africa
from the traditional friendship with South Africa. Vilalva and Gala (2001:40) illustrate
this with the image of “duas portas de abertura para a Africa: a porta negra e a porta
branca”, being the idea clearly unfolded in the divergent opinions between Delfim
Neto, theTreasury Minister and Gibson Barboza, the Foreign Minister.
With the return to democracy in Brazil, Sarney’s government passed the so-called
Sarney Decree of 1985 which gathered new prohibitions with previous ones, banning
cultural and sports exchanges and oil, arms and military equipment exports. This
decision, as well as the breaking off diplomatic relations that would be implemented by
Argentina the following year, were the answer of both Latin American governments now democratic- to the aggravation of the repression of South African White
government, not only within the country but also in the Southern African region.
12
Brazilian policy towards SA after 1994
During the 90s the Brazilian-African “honeymoon” showed its limits. The Foreign
Policy suffered some changes, particularly because of the end of the import substitution
model and the new neoliberal orthodoxy implemented by Brasilia. And even though
diversification of external relations continued to be the objective in order to increase
power in the international system, the scenario moved from Africa to Latin America and
MERCOSUR. Furthermore, economic domestic problems, in Brazil and in the African
states, contributed to the decline in the transatlantic relationship and the cooperative
dreams vanished due to “afropesimism”.
At that time, the “grand strategy” turned into a “selective policy”, fostering relations
with those countries in conditions to reply to Brazil’s new requirements. The SouthSouth cooperation of the 70s turned into “strategic partnership”. Within this framework,
diplomatic and political relations with the new South Africa became increasingly
relevant. From having no policies towards Pretoria – particularly after the Sarney
Decree- Brazil moved forward to consider South Africa as a Strategic Partner -in varied
issue areas and particularly in the multilateral arena. The level of the exchanged visits
gives an account of the relevance granted to the bilateral relation 6. President Cardoso’s
visit to South Africa (1996) and the subsequent signing of eight bilateral agreements
showed the increasing importance of these new ties. The strategy had two legs. The
political dimension referred to the possibility of developing cooperative efforts in
multilateral negotiations. The economic dimension aimed to foster the existing
6
On May, 1995, Foreign Minister Lampreia traveled to South Africa and he also accompanied the
President on November 25-28 of the following year. Also crossed the Atlantic: Vice-President Marco
Maciel (1999) and again Foreign Minister Lampreia (March 1-3, 2000). While from the South African
counterparts traveled to Brasilia Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo (1995); Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad
(1996); Vice-President Thabo Mbeki and Industry and Trade Minister Alec Erwin (1997); President
Nelson Mandela (July 21- 22, 1998) and President Mbeki (December 12-15, 2000).
13
commercial potentialities7.
Comparing the preparatory works, the mission’s development and its subsequent results
with the visit of president Menem to South Africa the previous year, both government’s
intentions towards South Africa appeared obvious: a high political-diplomatic profile
and an outline of commercial diplomacy in the case of Brazil, and in the case of
Argentina, a presidential strong urge to be in the limelight.
Anyway, Brazil’s bilateral relations with South Africa did not end with the visit of
Cardoso. Moreover, they were deepened to conclude on December 13, 2000, during
Mbeki’s state visit to Brazil, with the signing of the South Africa and Brazil Joint
Commission Agreement8, which was put into practice with the subsequent bilateral
meetings in Brasilia (2002) and Pretoria (2003).
In this context, it is interesting to highlight
that Cardoso and Lampreia laid the
foundations of a relation to which the new President Lula da Silva (2003) and his
Foreign Minister Celso Amorim would continue deepening and expanding . The change
of government promoted the deepening of relations with Africa and especially with
South Africa, not only at the level of discourse but with specific actions. In all
statements the re-launching of Brazil’s African policy was emphasized.
President Lula and his foreign minister have gone to Africa in eight opportunities. South
Africa still occupies the most important place, as a “spearhead” to develop a more solid
relation with the other states of Africa. This was proved in his first trip in 2003, when
he chose Pretoria for a visit. The identification and establishment of synergies and the
7
Brazil is South Africa's biggest trading partner in Latin America. Major South African exports to Brazil
include precious and semi-precious stones and metal, anthracite and coal, iron and steel, miscellaneous
chemical products, organic chemicals, aluminum, nickel, synthetic fibers, machinery and mechanical
appliances, paper and paperboard. Brazilian exports to South Africa have steadily increased. Major
Brazilian exports consist of vehicles and components, aircraft, machinery, mineral fuels, electrical
machinery, animal and vegetable fats and oils, meat, ores, slag and ashes, organic chemicals and tobacco.
8
The first step in order to establish a Joint Commission between the two countries was taken during
President Mbeki’s visit to Brazil on September, 1997, when it was suggested the establishment of an
"institutional mechanism" to deepen South African-Brazilian relations.
14
managerial and political strategic convergence between both countries were pointed
out9. In 2006, on February, during Lula’s fourth tour to Africa he went to South Africa
again10. Being the Brazilian president who traveled more to South Africa and Africa,
during his seventh trip he stopped in South Africa to participate at the IBSA Summit
(India Brazil and South Africa) in october 2007.
But Lula’s active presence in Africa is only one sign of Brazil’s African policy. Since
the beginning of his administration he has received more than a dozen of heads of
African states11 and African top level officials. During his administration more than 160
bilateral agreements with the African states were signed12 . On the other hand, Brazil’s
trade with Africa have increased dramatically during the “Lula years”, from US$ 5
billions in 2002 to 20 billions in 200713. Brazil’s present foreign trade with Africa
represents 7% of its trade with the whole world.
What it is also interesting to note is that giving priority to the relations with South
Africa, Brazil combines its bilateral diplomacy with its multilateral one, as will be seen
with the cases of MERCOSUR-SACU and IBSA.
Commercial Multilateralism
Together with the intensification of bilateral relations with the now democratic South
Africa, the negotiations for the signing of a Free Trade Agreement between
MERCOSUR and SADC - though finally it was signed between MERCOSUR and
SACU - started during Cardoso’s administration.
9
The cooperation comprises specific areas such as agricultural processing, industrial technology,
biodiversity, biotechnology, energy, clean technologies, information and communication technologies,
material research, space science and astronomy.
10
In November of the same year he attended the Heads of State Summit Africa -South America, in Abuja.
11
In 2004 Lula Da Silva met Mohammed VI, from Morocco and Joaquim Chissano.from Mozambique.
In 2005 Brasilia was visited by the presidents of Algeria, South Africa, Congo, Gambia, Nigeria and
Cabo Verde, in 2007 by the president of Senegal and by Libya’s Prime Minister and in 2008 by the
President of Equatorial Guinea.
12
Between 1960-2002, 172 agreements were signed.
13 SECEX, Development, Industry and Foreign Trade Ministry, Brazil.
15
From the South African point of view, the association across the South Atlantic was part
of its foreign agenda, and its interest was proved with actions like the visit of president
Mandela to Ushuaia, during MERCOSUR Summit on July 24, 1998. Furthermore, on
the occasion of a new MERCOSUR Summit on December 14, 2000, in Florianopolis,
Brazil, the Project for an Agreement for the creation of a Free Trade Area between
MERCOSUR and South Africa was signed, with the presence of the new South African
president Thabo Mbeki.
As a proof of Latin America’s intentions, the first combined commercial mission of
businessmen of Mercosur’s four partners was sent to South Africa to promote products
abroad14. At the same time, this mission constituted a challenge and a “test case” for the
process of regional integration, as the combined commercial promotion offers a window
of opportunities that would fulfill a Mercosur’s foundation aim: to integrate in order to
compete in the world15. However and despite the strong initial step, the following
negotiations have been slow, due to the difficulties to agree which sectors would benefit
from reductions.
By selecting South Africa, the Brazilian government went a step further from the
traditional strategies adopted in its quest for a new African policy and a strengthening of
the foreign relations established by Mercosur. Such choice suggests the inclusion of
South Africa in a trilateral strategy (known as South-South-South diplomatic encounter)
which includes India as well. Several international meetings attended by representatives
from the three countries at the highest level lead to the creation of IBSA, in Brasilia on
June 6, 2003, with the presence of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Celso
14
Representatives of 35 Brazilian enterprises, 24 Argentinean and 15 Uruguayan traveled to South
Africa, while there was a minimal participation of Paraguay, with the presence of its chargé d’ affaires.
Mercosur’s delegation totalized 74 companies, 10 institutions and 91 people.
15
It should be highlighted that Argentine exports to South Africa consist mainly on food and agricultural
products which are generally commercialized by multinational companies that decide where and how to
sell according to their analysis of global markets. But, in Brazilian exports industrialized products prevail,
with an important participation of enterprises such as Embraer (airplanes) and Daymler Benz (automobile
industry).
16
Amorim, of South Africa, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma and of India, Jaswanth Sinha.
Since then, the Heads of State of the three countries have met in Brasilia (2006),
Pretoria (2007) and New Delhi (2008)16.
Final reflections
In this new century, the model that implies the automatic and exclusive alignment with
the central countries is beginning to show its flaws. The debate of a new development
model for the countries of the South
should not be postponed, despite domestic
problems. The model imposed in the 1990s brought about, at least in Latin America, a
marked inclination in the academic works on international relations. This tendency
marginalized options in relation to, for example, African issues, which were labelled
idle, not pertinent, weak or of no avail. Two factors contributed to consolidating such
trend: a) the association between knowledge and power; i.e., “let us produce knowledge
for the ruling power spaces”; b) the conditioning of the financial facilities that support
these works. With this particular orientation, the doors to new ways of thinking about
Latin America’s international insertion were closed.
Therefore, this is not a work with the pretention of closing a chapter which may have
proven the weaknesses of Argentina’s foreign policy towards Africa and South Africa
or the brightness of Brazilia’s international insertion. On the contrary, a cluster of
different issues should be addressed and fresh perspectives for the development of
various new research lines of “variable geometry” should be envisioned; the
international scenarios where the regionalization and globalization processes occur
should be more profitably used.
A Strategic Cooperation developing cooperative partnerships should be built by our
16
For more on IBSA see Lechini, Gladys Middle Powers: IBSA and the new South-South Cooperation, in
NACLA Report on the Americas, New York, Vol 40, Nr 5, September-October 2007, pages 28-32.
17
governments, supported and shored up by the interweaving of interests in civil society.
This cooperation built on policies resulting from shared values, ideas, and principles
should produce a spillover effect on other areas such as trade and investment, defence
and security, and on civil society institutions.
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