Sources of Friction in Greek-Turkish Relations:
the Aegean Dispute
Olga Borou, University of Athens
and Egemen Ozalp, Sabanci University
1
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 3
Chapter One
CONFRONTATION IN THE AEGEAN ................................................................................. 6
1.Delimitation of the Continental Shelf ........................................................................................... 6
The Internationalization of the dispute .......................................................................................................... 6
The Greek and Turkish arguments ................................................................................................................ 7
2. Territorial Waters and National Airspace ................................................................................ 10
a. The extension of the Greek Territorial Sea: Right or Abuse? ................................................ 10
The view from Ankara:................................................................................................................................ 10
The view from Athens ................................................................................................................................. 12
b. The National Airspace ................................................................................................................ 14
3. The Athens Flight Information Region (FIR Athens) ............................................................. 14
4. The Military Status of the Islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea ................................................ 16
Chapter Two
NATO AND THE GREEK-TURKISH CONFLICT .............................................................. 17
Chapter Three
ATTEMPTS FOR RESOLUTION ......................................................................................... 20
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 25
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 26
2
Introduction
Conflicts are the reflections of on-going dissatisfactions in everyday life and exist in
all parts of the world. But they comprise solutions in human nature itself. Solutions require
complex analysis and improvement of diplomacy and conflict resolution techniques based
on systematic research. The Greek-Turkish conflict evolved into a network of mutual
problems since the beginning of the 20th century, which has deep social and historical
roots demanding long-term political incentives. The Aegean dispute in this crux is the
crystallization of the conflict on a geographical crossroad of security and energy matters
of Turkey and Greece, with their statuses in the international bodies to which they are
parties.
The sources of frictions in the Aegean Sea operate in a way that they provide each
other the reproducible political capital for sustainable suffering. The network of relations
is already there, like a functioning mechanism but its fuel is a mixture of xenophobia,
suspicion and historical memories of both sides full of hatred and dissatisfaction. Turks and
Greeks are inevitably realist in terms of International Relations theory; but the other side
of this rusty coin is that both societies are not alien to each other’s worlds; they have a
history of relationship, even negative. Thus, it is possible and easier to transform friction
into co-operation than confidence-building between any other societies that do not know
each other’s reflexes, by providing flow of information between the two societies; because
the fundamental need of Greeks and Turks is first of all to hear each other, which can
pave the way to new openings in economic and political relations.
Lack of circulation of information between the two societies, their national
memories, fear for each other and suspicion have high costs for both parties of the conflict
such as high defense expenditures, impact of security dilemma on policy makings and loss
of possible opportunities of being co-operating partners in the Aegean and the Balkans.
Greeks and Turks do not approach to learn each other’s culture although theirs are two of
the most valuable and historical ones; so in a chain-reaction of rapprochement, the first
step remains missing. In fact, this lose-lose situation should hasten the transformation of
sources of frictions into dynamics of co-operation for the sake of the two countries .
It is vital for both parties to sustain political will for transformation of conflicts into
common interests that requires time to build-up trust step by step between Greece and
Turkey. “Neither Rome nor any empire survived forever”1; so any state today or in future
also will not. Turkey and Greece should use their social, economic, political and natural
1
Clinton, Bill. Conference at Çırağan Palace, Istanbul: July 9th, 2002.
3
resources efficiently for their citizens’ wellbeing rather than spending their powers on
continuous artificial tensions and various possibilities of confrontation.
The Aegean dispute is deaf and blind in nature as Greece and Turkey have been
keeping different definitions for the same dissatisfaction, which they do not want to give
up and at the same moment without hearing each other’s intentions. Although Cyprus is
stressed more as the main source of friction between Greece and Turkey, especially after
the military confrontation in 1974, the Aegean dispute is not less important. They all
require harmonization of two States’ perceptions through time by diplomatic maneuvers
and further steps for co-operation on economy and education in order to support their
foreign policy incentives. Both Turkey and Greece should release their next generations
from historical standings based on fear and from their Achilles’ heel of inside politics as
well.
In March 1987 the long-running problem over the location of the continental shelf
and by extension rights to exploit potential oil reserves under the sea bed had led to a
crisis and brought the Davos Agreement to end the crisis. Although both governments
agreed in principle to pursue a series of confidence-building measures, they designed to
reduce immediate tensions in the Aegean and to provide a conflict resolution process, but
these efforts remained largely unconsummated. Relations were further strained by the end
of 1995 after the Greek parliament ratified the United Nation’s Law of Sea (LOS) Treaty2.
Turkey has not recognized the LOS Treaty, stressing that its implementation would turn 70
per cent of the Aegean into Greek sovereign territory and unacceptably restrict freedom of
navigation3.
Turkey and Greece again came back to the brink of an armed conflict on 28 January
1996, as a result of a crisis regarding the status of the Kardak / Imia Rocks4. After the
crisis, diplomatic efforts to reduce tension in the Aegean gained a new momentum and
after months of negotiations, on 4 June 1998, Turkey and Greece agreed to a limited set of
confidence-building measures (CBMs) proposed by the NATO Secretary-General Javier
Solana. Both the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Athens on 27 May 1998, and the
Guidelines for the Prevention of Accidents and Incidents on the High Seas and International
Airspaces signed in Istanbul on September 1988, oblige the two countries to respect each
2
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm
Aydan, S. Gülmen. “Negotiations and Deterrence in Asymmetrical Power Situations: The Turkish-Greek Case”.
Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean. Aydın, Mustafa & Ifantis, Kostas. (Ed.) London
and New York: Routledge, 2004. 213-244.
4 Kriesberg, Louis. Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts, 1990-1991 Annual Report. Syracuse:
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1991.
3
4
other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and recognize their rights to use high seas and
international airspace of the Aegean. They have also agreed to allow NATO a role in
monitoring air sorties over the Aegean. However, similar to the previous attempts,
although both sides agreed to implement these declarations, they were not complied
with.5
The Aegean conflict is a set of four separate issues, which include: (i) the breadth
of territorial waters; (ii) delimitation of the continental shelf; (iii) militarization of the
Eastern Aegean islands and (iv) airspace related problems. This paper attempts to provide
a comprehensive picture of the Aegean dispute, describe the positions of the two parties
and propose some ways of resolution.
5
Aydan, S. Gülmen. “Negotiations and Deterrence in Asymmetrical Power Situations: The Turkish-Greek Case”.
Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean. Aydın, Mustafa & Ifantis, Kostas. (Ed.) London
and New York: Routledge, 2004. 213-244.
5
Chapter One
CONFRONTATION IN THE AEGEAN
1.Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
The Continental Shelf dispute is related to the exploitation and exploration of the
resources under the seabed and subsoil of the submarine area beyond the territorial sea,
to the point where the land mass is deemed to end. The continental shelf (CS) dispute
stems from the absence of a delimitation agreement effected between the two countries
and it has a bearing on the overall equilibrium of rights and interests in the Aegean, as it
concerns areas to be attributed to Turkey and Greece beyond the 6 mile territorial sea.
The Internationalization of the dispute
The CS issue has in the past led to tensions between Turkey and Greece. Following
scientific research activities undertaken by Turkey in 1976, Greece has made recourse to
both the United Nations Security Council and the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
On August 10, 1976, Greece addressed a communication to the President of the
Security Council requesting an urgent meeting of the Council on the ground that "following
recent repeated flagrant violations by Turkey of the sovereign rights of Greece in the
continental shelf in the Aegean, a dangerous situation has been created threatening
international peace and security." On the same day, by unilateral application, Greece
instituted proceedings in the ICJ against Turkey in "a dispute concerning the delimitation
of the continental shelf appertaining to Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea, and
concerning the respective legal rights of those States to explore and exploit the CS of the
Aegean."
Greece’s application had two parts. First, Greece requested for interim measures of
protection by virtue of Article 41 of the Statute of the ICJ.6The Court refused the Greek
request for interim protection because it did not find enough evidence of “irreparable
6
Article 41 (1) of the ICJ Statute states that “the Court shall have the power to indicated, if it considers that
circumstances so require, any provisional measure which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of
either party.”
6
prejudice” to Greece’s rights.7 Second, Greece asked the Court to review the merits of the
Shelf dispute and determine each party’s share of the continental shelf in accordance with
international law. Before delving into the merits of the dispute, the Court had to decide
whether it had jurisdiction over the case since there was no compromis of joint
application. Greece argued that both the both the Brussels Communique and the 1928
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes evidenced Turkish consent
to jurisdiction. However, the Court rejected both grounds of alleged Turkish consent. It
found that
the Brussels
Communique did not constitute a binding acceptance of
jurisdiction in cases involving Greece’s territorial status. Finding the reservation applicable
to maritime delimitation cases, the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain
the shelf dispute.
Grecce’s efforts to internationalize the dispute and find a legal settlement had,
therefore failed. But in terms of the actual substance of the dispute, no grounds had been
lost or gained. For the time being, Turkey and Greece had no other choice than to seek a
solution through negotioations8.
In conformity with the Security Council decision, and in view of the Court's
rejection of the Greek contention and claims, Turkey and Greece signed an agreement in
Bern on 11 November 1976. Under this Agreement, the parties decided to hold negotiations
with a view to reaching an agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf. They
also undertook to refrain from any initiative or act concerning the Aegean continental
shelf. 1976 Bern Agreement is still valid and its terms continue to be binding for both
countries9.
The Greek and Turkish arguments
Greece claims that the Aegean shelf dispute is legal and involves the interpretation
of conventional and customary law applicable to maritime delimitation10. As a result, the
best forum for resolution is the ICJ whose duty is the application of the rules and norms of
international law. On the contrary, Turkey favors a diplomatic settlement and contents
that the shelf dispute is of high political nature and challenges Greco-Turkish territorial
7
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection, 1976,
para.29
8 Jon M. Van Dyke, “ The Role of the Islands in Delimiting Maritime Zones; The Boundary Between Turkey and
Greece” in Dis Politika, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, Volume XIV, Nos.3-4,p.64
9Ibid.
10 According to Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, legal disputes are the conflicts
that concern the interpretation of a treaty, a question of the international law, a breach of an international
obligation, or the nature and extent of reparation. Legal conflicts are resolved by adjudication and “should as
a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice.” Charter of the United Nations,
Article 36(3).
7
and political relations11. The Turkish perception regarding the Aegean can be summarized
on the following lines:
a. The Aegean is a common sea between Turkey and Greece.
b. Both countries should respect each others legitimate rights and vital interests.
c. These freedoms at the high seas and the air space above it, which at present
both coastal states as well as third countries enjoy, should not be impaired.
d. Any acquisition of new maritime areas should be based on mutual consent and
should be fair and equitable12.
The shelf dispute is both legal and political. It has an extensive foundation in
international law, for Maritime law provides a clear definition of states shelf rights and
describes methods for delimiting the continental shelf between opposite and adjacent
states. What is more, the numerous shelf delimitation cases brought to the ICJ and to
Arbitration Tribunals in the past further testify for the legality of continental shelf
disputes. However, one has to bear in mind that most of the times a dispute is not devoid
of political, economic and social considerations13 .As R.Higgins emphasizes, “there is no
avoiding the essential relationship between law and policy”.14Although the Aegean shelf
dispute is both political and legal, Greece and Turkey treat these two characteristics as if
they were mutually exclusive. The reason for this is that political and legal disputes point
to different forums for resolution, and each forum serves the two parties differently.
According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the delimitation of the
continental shelf of the Aegean Sea is, from the point of view of international law, the
only existing real issue between Greece and Turkey15. The legal principles presented by
Greece are deeply grounded in conventional law and specifically in the 1958 Geneva
11
Political disputes involve the modification of the status quo rather than the interpretation of law. They are
resolved by diplomatic negotiation, and, according to Article 35 of the UN Charter, they can be referred to the
UN Security Council and General Assembly.
12http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/EuropeanCountries/EUCountries/Greece/GreeceLinks/T
he_Delimitation_of_the_Aegean_Continental_Shelf.htm
13 In 1978 the ICJ asserted that “a dispute involving two states in respect of the delimitation of their
continental shelf can hardly fail to have some political element.” ICJ Reports, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
Case, 1978, para.31
14R. Higgins, Problems and Process:International Law and How We Use It, New York, Oxford university Press
Inc., 1994, p.5
8
Convention on the Continental shelf. Tree Articles of the Geneva Convention deserve
particular attention. Article 1 provides the definition of the continental shelf and states
that islands possess their own shelf. Article 2 outlines the nature of the coastal states
rights on the continental shelf. A state is said to have sovereign and exclusive rights to
explore and exploit the continental shelf. Article 6 outlines the principles for delimiting
the continental shelf between neighboring states.16
Athens argues that the boundary of the Aegean shelf should be the median line
between the eastern Greek islands and the Anatolian coast. Equidistance should not be
applied between the Greek and Turkish continental coasts because firstly, this delimitation
ignores islands entitlement to a continental shelf and secondly, it disrupts the “political
continuum” that exists between the Greek islands and the Greek mainland. According to
Andrew Wilson, “Greece’s position contains no threat to Turkey, since her claim to the
continental shelf carries no claim to the superadjacent waters, in which Turkish and
international shipping pay move freely.”17 Thus Greece argues that the delimitation of the
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf must be effectuated on the basis of the existing geological
facts and the applicable rules of international law, and not by the application of the
principle of equity as proposed by Turkey.
Greece contends that all of its islands in the Aegean, as an integral part of Greece’s
territory and sovereign rights, are entitled to their full continental shelf rights under
international law and under the 1982 UN convention on the law of the sea (art. 121).
According to this article only the "rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf" (art.
121 para. 3)18. Moreover Greece argues that, its sovereign rights, as a coastal state, over
its Aegean Continental Shelf are inherent and exist ipso facto and ab initio, without
requiring any legal or other act of recognition. Additionally, Greece argues that the
existing geological structure of the Aegean Sea, as supported by seismotectonic,
volcanological, platetectonic and mineralogical evidence, clearly shows that its Aegean
Sea Continental Shelf constitutes a natural prolongation of its landmass.
16
David Ott, Public and International Law in the Modern World, London: Pitman Publishing, 1978, p.219
A. Wilson, “The Aegean Dispute”, in Jonathan Alford, ed. Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance, New
York, St. Martin’s Press, 1984, p.92.
18It is true that Turkey has not ratified any of the aforementioned conventions. However, it should be stressed
that the ICJ has explicitly accepted (1969, case of the north sea continental shelf) that article 1 of the 1958
Geneva convention on the continental shelf should be regarded as crystallizing rules of customary International
Law, thus accepting that the islands have a continental shelf on the same footing as land territory.
www.mfa.gr
17
9
2. Territorial Waters and National Airspace
a. The extension of the Greek Territorial Sea: Right or Abuse?
The view from Ankara:
The Aegean is a semi-enclosed Sea located in between the Turkish and Greek
mainlands and is dotted by thousands of islands, islets and rocks. Both Turkey and Greece
presently exercise a 6 nautical miles breadth of territorial waters in the Aegean which
enables almost half of this Sea and the airspace above it, being freely used as high seas
and international airspace by Turkey and Greece as well as third countries.
Under the present 6 mile breadth of territorial waters, about half of the Aegean is
high seas. The extension by Greece of her territorial waters beyond the present 6 miles in
the Aegean, will have most inequitable implications and would constitute an abuse of right
for the following reasons:
a) Such an action will turn the Aegean into a Greek Sea to the detriment of Turkey's
vital and legitimate interests. In case of an extension, in practical terms Turkey will be
locked out of the Aegean and confined to its own territorial waters. Following an
extension, neither Turkey nor any other state will be able to benefit from a diminished
proportion of high seas in the Aegean for economic, military, navigation and other
purposes.
b) Turkey's access to the high seas will be blocked and its Aegean coast will be
encircled by Greek territorial waters: Should the territorial sea be increased for instance
to 12 miles Turkey's 2820 km long coastline to the high seas will be encircled by Greek
territorial waters. Turkey's access from its west shores to the international waters of the
Aegean and similarly from the Aegean to the Mediterranean will almost be curtailed.
c)
Turkey's
military,
economic
and
scientific
interests
will
be
seriously
jeopardized:As a result of the constriction of the high seas, Turkey will not be able to
carry out any military training and exercises in the Aegean. It will lose the capability and
flexibility to organize the defense of her shores as there will be practically no international
maritime areas and airspace left. Turkish Naval units will have to cross Greek territorial
waters to enter the Aegean and to pass from the Aegean to the Mediterranean. The Aegean
will be closed to military aircraft as well. Aegean bound flights will not be possible and
Mediterranean flights will be subject to Greek permission.
10
Furthermore, Turkey will not be able to engage in activities such as scientific
research, fishing, sponge-diving in the Aegean beyond its territorial sea without Greek
approval.
d) Greece will gain unjustified advantage in delimitation of other maritime
jurisdiction areas. Since the issue of territorial waters is very much interrelated with other
Aegean disputes such as the delimitation of the continental shelf, exclusive economic
zone, air space related problems, etc., expansion of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean
will have a direct impact on the settlement of these issues.
The consequences of any extension of the Greek territorial waters in essence, are
not limited to the internationally recognized navigational rights and freedoms as presented
by Greece but extend far beyond that.
The 12 mile limit envisaged in Article 3 of LOS Convention19 is neither compulsory
nor a limit to be applied automatically. It is the maximum breadth that may be applied if
conditions allow. Article 3 should only be applicable together with article 300 of the said
Convention which reads as follows:
"States, Parties......shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized
in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right"
Article 300 therefore poses a clear limitation for states in exercising the rights
derived from the Convention.
The extension of the territorial sea by Greece beyond 6 miles, in total disregard of
the special characteristics of the Aegean and of the inherent historical rights that each of
the coastal states have on it and in a manner to deprive Turkey of its legitimate rights
would clearly and unequivocally constitute an abuse of right.
At the same time, article 15 of the Convention also brings obligation for states to
take into consideration the historic title and the special circumstances as far as the
delimitation of territorial waters is concerned.
Turkey, therefore, has long been advocating that any acquisition of new maritime
areas in the Aegean (territorial waters, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone,
19
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm
11
fisheries zone etc.) should be fair, equitable and based on the mutual consent of both
Turkey and Greece.
Therefore, any unilateral action aiming at enlarging maritime jurisdiction areas in
the Aegean should not be allowed for the aforementioned reasons. In fact, both Turkey
and Greece have committed themselves to refrain from unilateral acts in the Aegean by
the Madrid Declaration of 1997. It is worth mentioning that the Madrid Declaration is a
guiding document for Turkey and Greece which should be respected unreservedly by both
countries. The Declaration contains a commitment to refrain from unilateral acts which is
directly related to the preservation of the 6 miles territorial waters. It is not by
coincidence that the first principle of the Madrid Declaration underlines that both sides
will refrain from unilateral acts since the opposite will upset the balance established by
the Lausanne Treaty of 1923.
Adherence to the principles included in the Madrid Declaration of 8 July 1997 and
particularly to the commitment to the present breadth of territorial waters which
constitutes the core of all Aegean problems will no doubt have a positive impact on the
settlement of these problems20.
The view from Athens
Greece has maintained six nautical miles of territorial sea since 1936. As soon as
Turkey expanded her claims on the continental shelf, Greece started considering the
possibility of extending her territorial seas to twelve nautical miles an act, which had
already been adopted by many countries and was later incorporated in the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea21.
The delimitation of the lateral limits of the territorial waters of a coastal State is
ruled by Art. 3 of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). The language of
this Article confirms, in a very clear manner, the principle that the coastal State has the
right unilaterally to decide when and to what extent it is going to apply the 12-mile limit.
Consequently, there is no obligation for the coastal State to ask for the approval of any
neighboring State in order to establish the breadth of its territorial sea22. Besides this,
Greece claims that Turkey is bound by the Convention for it has become a customary rule
20http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/EuropeanCountries/EUCountries/Greece/GreeceLinks/T
erritorial_Waters.htm
21 According to article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea “every State has the right to
establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from the
baselines determined in accordance with this convention.”
22 Even the European Union in a plan presented by the Commission in the 27 th of April (1978) was calling its
member states to apply the 12-mile limit. Journal Official des Communautes, C146, 21, Juillet. 1978. p.11
12
of International Law due to the consistent state practice to that end23. What is more,
Turkey’s territorial seas in the Aegean are also six nautical miles but they extend to twelve
in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.
The Turkish allegations are not compatible with the International Law and practice.
The Law of the Sea does not mention or insinuate that the 12-mile limit right differentiates
depending on the special circumstances that exist in each sea (provided that there is
enough implementation space). It is undeniable that the Aegean Sea falls under the
definition of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas laid down in Article 122 of the 1982 LOS
Convention but it is also indisputable that the Convention does not contain any special
rules on questions such as delimitation or navigation for enclosed seas24.
Greece claims that if she were to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles and thus
deprive the southern entrances of the Aegean basin of the high seas corridors, the freedom
of navigation would be preserved to the extent that the innovatory transit passage would
come into play. What is more Greece, as a maritime country, is highly interested in the
freedom of navigation and could never
set obstacles to international navigation.25 A
possible extension of the Greek territorial waters to 12 miles would settle yet two facets
of the Aegean dispute, namely the problematic width of Greek airspace and the
continental shelf delimitation dispute.
Concerning the “Greek lake” argument, one could understand better if Turkey
objected specifically to a12-mile territorial sea around certain islands such as Lesvos,
Chios, Samos, Ikaria or Rhodes, which would be somehow “interposed” between the
Turkish territorial sea and the high seas. However, Turkey adopts a maximalist approach
contesting the Greek right to 12 miles in the Aegean Sea as a whole, that is to say even in
areas where a Greek 12 mile territorial sea cannot be deemed to affect directly Turkish
interests (for example along the eastern Peloponnesian coast, Souda base or Cape Sounion)
23
H. Athanasopoulos, Greece, Turkey and the Aegean Sea, A Case Study in International Law, McFarland, 2001,
p.70.
24 “At the most, Article 123 provides for a loosely defined duty of co-operation and co-ordination among
bordering states, and this exclusively in matters of conservation and exploitation of living resources, the
protection of the marine environment, and scientific research programmes”. George P. Politakis,1995, p.508
25 Alexis Heraclidis, Greece and the Danger from the East, Athens, Polis, 2001, p.213-214.
13
b. The National Airspace
In accordance with International Law (Articles 1 and 2 of the Chicago Convention of
1944 on Civil Aviation) the sovereign airspace of a state is the airspace above its territory
and its territorial waters. For the time being, Greece has fixed the lateral limits of its
territorial sea in two different ways: a 6-mile territorial sea, for general purposes,
established by Law in 1936, with a 10-mile territorial sea, established by Decree in 1931
for aviation and air policing purposes. Following this arrangement, the lateral limits of
Greece's national airspace were legally defined at 10 n.m., with reference to the
delimitation of a special zone of territorial sea of 10 n.m., serving the requirements of
aviation and air police.
The reason for this "double" arrangement was Greece's policy of facilitating the
freedom of navigation at that time. Indeed, in 1931, quite in conformity with international
law, Greece could have created a 10-nautical mile territorial zone of general application.
However, Greece refrained from doing so out of liberalism towards maritime navigation. In
defiance of any legal and historical fact, Turkey questions the lateral limits of Greece's
national airspace, defined as 10 n.m., despite the fact that Turkey itself has respected the
above-mentioned status for 44 consecutive years (from 1931 to 1975)26.
3. The Athens Flight Information Region (FIR Athens)
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)27 constitutes the regulatory
framework for the international legal status of airspace. It has the objective to facilitate,
direct and provide communications to civil and commercial international air traffic28.
Airspace, national and international, has been divided into nine Air Navigation Regions,
each one including several Flight Information Regions (FIRs), submitted to the jurisdiction
of the states of the Region. As a principle, each member state would be assigned an area
of responsibility (FIR), within which the competent national authority exercises the control
of air traffic, while providing flight information and search and rescue services. A nation
control of its FIR does not mean an act of sovereignty29.
The delimitation of the Athens Flight Information Region was agreed to at the
Regional Air Navigation Meetings of 1950 in Istanbul, 1952 in Paris and 1958 in Geneva. The
26
www.mfa.gr
The creation of the ICAO was provided by the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed on December
7, 1944 in Chicago.
28 H. Athanasopoulos, Greece , Turkey and the Aegean Sea: A Case Study in International Law, McFarland,2001,
p.74
29 www.mfa.gr
27
14
ICAO Council unanimously approved the decisions of these meetings. Turkey participated
in all these Meetings and fully accepted their decisions concerning the delimitation of the
Athens FIR, the boundary between Athinai (Athens) and Istanbul FIR included. The Athens
FIR covers Greek national airspace as well as certain areas of international airspace 30. In
accordance with the ICAO regulations and with international practice, all aircraft, civil and
military alike, must submit proper notification before crossing the FIR boundary.
Nevertheless, in August 1974, Turkey arbitrarily issued NOTAM 714 (Notice to Airmen) by which it unilaterally extended its area of responsibility up to the middle of the
Aegean, within the Athens FIR31. Greece then had to declare that part of the Aegean a
dangerous area (NOTAM 1157). The ICAO addressed an appeal to both countries to put an
end to the situation, without success at the time. Finally, in 1980, Ankara withdrew
NOTAM 714, when it realized that it was prejudicial to its interests and especially to its
tourist industry. Nevertheless, Turkey continues the policy of committing numerous
infringements of the Air Traffic Regulations within the Athens FIR and, even worse, an
increasing number of violations of Greek National Airspace over sea and land in the
Aegean, by the unauthorized penetrations of her military aircraft, on the pretext that the
Chicago Convention does not concern military aircraft. On top of that, Turkey tries to
persuade the ICAO to amend the international legal status of airspace in the Aegean by
altering the air corridors in it.
The Greek position is that the ICAO provisions and decisions must be fully
respected. In this framework, reasons of safety of international air-traffic demand that
Turkish warplanes submit flight plans when entering the Athens FIR. The Greek Air Force,
in accordance with ICAO provisions, intercepts for identification purposes every unknown
aircraft that enters the Athinai FIR without proper notification, as mentioned above.
Turkish commentators argue that Greece is abusing her responsibility for the Athens
FIR in an attempt to reduce the international airspace within the Aegean, as if it were a
sovereign right, and it advances her claims towards a 12nm territorial sea limit by
default32. Turkey has two main targets. First, Turkey tries to persuade the ICAO over the
ineffectuality of the Greek FIR by frequently conducting violations, military exercises and
by modernizing her FIR’s in order to attract the ICAO’s attention and interest.Second,
Turkey wants to throw a clearly international issue into the “Greek-Turkish bilateral issues
basket”. In this framework, if Greece and Turkey ended in a negotiation’s table over the
30A.Yokaris,
The Flight Information Regions: The international legal status of the Athinai FIR, EKEM, Ant.N.
Sakkoulas, p.11-13.
31 This line coincides with the continental shelf claims. E Dousi, The Turkish Contestations: Legal and Political
Aspects, Defence Analysis Institute, Athens, 2001, p.26
32 www.mfa.gr
15
FIR issue and Greece decided to make a trade-off , then there is high probability that the
ICAO would be in favor of such an agreement, making the Turkish visions a reality.
4. The Military Status of the Islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea
One of the basic issues between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea is the
demilitarized status of the Eastern Aegean Islands. The Eastern Aegean Islands are
demilitarized by several international agreements which impose legal obligations binding
upon Greece. The legal instruments setting up a demilitarized status for the Eastern
Aegean Islands can be summarized from an historical perspective as follows :
a) 1913 Treaty of London: The future of the Eastern Aegean Islands have been left
to the decision of Six Powers in Article 5 of the Treaty of London.
b) 1914 Decision of Six Powers: The islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, Lesvos, Chios,
Samos, and Ikaria and others under Greek occupation as of 1914 were ceded to Greece by
the 1914 Decision of Six Powers (England, France, Russia, Germany, Italy and AustriaHungary) on the condition that they should be kept demilitarized.
c) 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty: In Article 12 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty the 1914
Decision of Six Powers was confirmed. Article 13 of the Laussane Treaty stipulated the
modalities of the demilitarization for the islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria. It
imposed certain restrictions related to the presence of military forces and establishment
of fortifications which Greece undertook as a contractual obligation to observe stemming
from this Treaty.
The Convention of the Turkish Straits annexed to the Lausanne Treaty further
defined the demilitarized status of the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace. It stipulated a
stricter regime for these islands, due to their vital importance to the security of Turkey by
virtue of their close proximity to the Turkish Straits.
d) 1936 Montreux Convention: The Montreux Convention did not bring any change to
the demilitarized status of these Islands. With the Protocol annexed to the said
Convention, the demilitarized status of the Turkish Straits has been lifted to ensure the
16
security of Turkey. In the Montreux Convention there is no clause regarding the
militarization of the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace.
e) 1947 Paris Peace Treaty: The demilitarized status of Eastern Aegean Islands was
once again confirmed in 1947 long after the Lausanne Treaty. The "Dodecanese Islands"
namely Stampalia, Rhodes, Calki, Scarpanto, Casos, Psikopis, Msiros, Calimnos, Leros,
Patmos, Lipsos, Symi, Cos and Castellorizo were ceded to Greece on the explicit condition
that they must remain demilitarized (Annex 6).
The demilitarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands was due to the overriding
importance of these islands for Turkey's security. In fact, there is a direct linkage between
the possession of sovereignty over those islands and their demilitarized status. Greece, in
this respect, cannot unilaterally reverse this status under any pretext. However, despite
the protests of Turkey, Greece has been militarizing Eastern Aegean Islands since the
1960's in contravention of her contractual obligations. These acts of Greece have become a
vital dispute between the two countries.
From a mere point of view to respect international law, it should be underlined that
Greece also introduced a reservation to the compulsory jurisdiction of International Court
of Justice on the matters deriving from military measures concerning her "national security
interests" when she accepted the Court’s jurisdiction in 1993. In so doing, Greece aims to
prevent a dispute concerning the militarization of the islands to be referred to the
International Court of Justice33.
Chapter Two
NATO AND THE GREEK-TURKISH CONFLICT
NATO continues to build closer cooperation on common security concerns with the
European Union and with states in Europe, including Russia, Ukraine and the states of
Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as with states of the Mediterranean and the Broader
Middle East. Today, we have taken decisions aimed at strengthening these relationships
further in order to cooperate effectively in addressing the challenges of the 21st century.
-NATO Istanbul Summit34-
33http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/EuropeanCountries/EUCountries/Greece/GreeceLinks/Mi
litarization_Of_Eastern_Aegean_Islands.htm
34 http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-097e.htm
17
The meanings of security, defense and national interests have changed. By the end
of the Cold War, NATO’s legitimacy, tasks, capabilities and new roles have been discussed
widely that the Alliance is transforming and expanding its tasks to new parts of the world
depending on the changing dynamics of international relations. After the dissolution of the
Soviet threat, the strategic importance of the Alliance shifted to the Balkan-eastern
Mediterranean zone where Greek-Turkish interaction takes place. The importance of
Eastern Mediterranean, Greek islands, Turkey’s military contribution to NATO with her
geo-strategic importance and the question of what happens to NATO’s credibility in the
international arena if two of its members fight against each other, are vital issues that
demand mutual attention of Greece and Turkey.
The formation of the notion of European security, Turkey’s membership or strategic
partnership to the European Union and NATO’s expanding roles, put much more emphasis
on solidarity and harmonization of related policies between two members of the NATO,
Greece and Turkey.
Greece’s long standing objective within the NATO alliance is to play a stabilizing
role in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, it is restructuring and
upgrading its armed forces in response to the new security environment and to various
potential instabilities. The aim is to achieve a cost-effective, flexible and efficient force
structure which can ensure a robust defense of the national territory (mainly from the
Turkish threat), and contribute to NATO and regional stability. However, it is not clear
that Greece can do both. NATO is encouraging Greece to boost its land forces for use in
the Balkans. The logic of the Turkish threat is emphasis by Greece on air and naval forces.
Moreover, the modernization of the Greek armed forces is expected to result in a
more efficient Greek participation in missions undertaken by the NATO alliance. Since
1991, Greece has demonstrated its commitment to the new NATO dogma by its
participation in the Implementation Force or Stabilizing Force in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR) and in
Kosovo (KFOR). However, the five-year modernization plan also has the dual aim of facing
the imminent threat from its neighbor and NATO ‘ally’ Turkey35.
Greece has been characterized as a strategically located, medium-sized power
which managed to be an integral part of the western multilateral institutions such as NATO
and the EU. Given the new role of NATO in the post Cold-War era, Greece has managed to
35
Moustakis, Fotios. The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003.
18
meet the challenges and the engagements of the new NATO whose main objective is to
provide the values of collective defense and collective security to its members.
A half century after Turkey joined the NATO, many of the geo-political facts that
justified its accession still hold. Even though there were new crisis of confidence and trust
which created strains in the alliance the bonds between Turkey and NATO are secure,
especially after the active role that Turkey played during the Gulf War. Throughout the
Cold War period, Turkey’s geo-strategic location and the size of its armed forces,
constituted an important contribution to NATO’s strategy of deterrence.
Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean stem partly from the geographical
peculiarities of the region, and partly from the respective historical perceptions of the
disputants. Contrary to what many Greeks believe, the conflict according to the Turks
arises not because Turkey challenges Greek sovereignty over the Aegean, but Greece
utilizes the Aegean islands in order to achieve complete sovereignty over the entire
Aegean. Various Greek advances in the Aegean since the 1930s are viewed by the Turks as
manifestations of a revisionist policy36.
Turkey’s value to the Alliance was significantly enhanced via the use of major
installations. İncirlik base still provides basing for US tactical fighter bombers; Sinop,
electromagnetic
monitoring;
Kargaburun,
radio
navigation;
Belbasi,
seismic
data
collection; Yumurtalik and İskenderun, contingency storage of war reserve materials,
ammunition and fuel and Pirinclik, radar warning and space monitoring. Along with
numerous secondary facilities, which include fourteen NATO Air Defence Ground
Environment early warning sites. NATO and US officials regarded Turkish military bases as
being of significant value for NATO contingencies. Turkey has the second-largest army in
the Alliance37.
Within the new European architecture, Turkey’s growing importance is clearly
related to its central location within regions of high instability and conflict. The 2004
NATO Summit in Istanbul reiterated Turkey’s importance for the alliance due to its
centrality in enormous geographical regions and its military contributions and culturalhistorical relations with the extended geographies pronounced under NATO tasks. Besides,
since 1991 Turkey has participated in NATO operations in the Bosnian crisis and in Kosovo,
many western policy analysts and Turkish strategic planners perceive Turkey as a regional
power capable of forging peace in a wider conflict zone. The southern flank of NATO
36
37
Ibid.
Ibid.
19
presents the alliance with a range of challenges potentially more critical than those that
NATO faces in other regions within Europe38.
A possible Greek-Turkish confrontation is detrimental to the stability of the Balkan
region and the cohesion of NATO. Despite current western rhetoric NATO membership does
not itself create a pluralistic security community for all its members39. Greece’s and
Turkey’s defense and foreign policy establishments have been shaped mainly by a realist
world view. The mutual suspicion and hostility between them has remained unaffected by
the end of the Cold War.
Chapter Three
ATTEMPTS FOR RESOLUTION
Turkey and Greece have long-standing common issues of suffering, which demands
to be dissolved in common interests of two countries for the sake of both themselves and
of the international organizations of which they are members of. The vital points and
current/possible opportunities in the Turkish-Greek conflict, particularly in the Aegean
Dispute are as follows:

The regulatory effect of the EU

The Role of UN, international grounds on which Greece and Turkey
can act cooperatively

Shifts in foreign policy makings of countries, AK Party government’s
quantum-leap in Turkey and its interest in conflict resolution tools for foreign
policy.

Increasing role of second-track diplomacy and civil-society in Greece
and Turkey.
In an international system where fear and distrust of other states is the normal
state of affairs, the issue of relative power is of vital importance, and it is difficult to
measure that. “What seems sufficient to one state’s defence will seem, and will often be,
offensive to its neighbours. Because neighbors wish to remain autonomous and secure,
they will react by trying to strengthen their own positions. States can trigger these
38
Bac, Meltem Muftuler. Turkey’s Relations With a Changing Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1997.
39 Moustakis, Fotios. The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003.
20
reactions even if they have no expansionist inclinations. This is the security dilemma” 40.
Greece and Turkey have been suffering political, economical and cultural reflections of
security dilemma. They are the two NATO members whose defense expenditures are too
high with “5.5 per cent of GNP, $5 billion per annum for Greece, and approximately 4.5
per cent of GNP, $8-10billion for Turkey41. These resources, with human capital and
historical interaction of cultures can be turned to account by canalizing them to common
educational programs and foundations.
Civil society organizations and second-track diplomacy should be enhanced to
provide support of the public opinions and enough space for diplomatic maneuvers for
political authorities. Although language is the base of civilization, the way to transfer
knowledge and a key to enable one who is interested in the background of a culture, and
Greek and Turkish are two means of reaching a rich political, philosophical and cultural
legacy; Turks and Greeks do not know each other’s language, so their sensitivities as well.
Nevertheless, common educational foundations / graduate programs in at least three
languages (Greek, Turkish and English) is a pre-requisite of neighbor generations in the 21st
century whether Turkey becomes an EU member or not.
The EU, standing on the Acquis Communitare, functions as a regulatory mechanism
and the EU law, regulations, directives, etc. have binding effects on Member States’ laws
and actions. Europe is also trying to establish its own security and foreign policy which
requires not only harmonization of national laws but also harmonization of Member State’s
foreign policies, perceptions of and reactions to international developments. The
enhancement of EU’s foreign policy and security tasks inevitably entails the decrease of a
possible confrontation between Turkey and Greece even if Turkey would not be a member
of the Union, because the results and political, social, economical and also strategic costs
of such a confrontation shall increase a lot. Throughout the EU integration process, search
of common interests and co-operative policies are inevitable for Greece and Turkey, not
necessarily because of good will but owing to the mechanism of which they are a part of
(Turkey is willing to be).
The UN is another common ground where Turkey and Greece can act and feel need
to act together especially after the shifting dynamics of international relations in the 21st
40
Barry R. Posen. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”. Ethnic Conflict and International Security.
Brown, Michael. (Ed). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. p.116.
41 Dokos, Thanos. P. “Tension-Rduction and Confidence-Building in the Aegean”. Aydın, Mustafa & Ifantis,
Kostas. (Ed.) London and New York: Routledge, 2004. 123-145.
21
century towards US’ unilateral acts on world politics. However, the UN is not interested
much in what happens between its members like it matters for the EU.
Changes in foreign policy makings of countries and the tools of diplomacy vary
according to governments’ perceptions. Since 2002, AKP government in Turkey started a
quantum-leap in Turkish foreign policy which “relied on a combination of traditional
diplomatic and conflict resolution tools. The combination can be referred to as a balanced
one: 59 % to 41 %”42. However traditional diplomatic toolbox still had a slightly larger share
in comparison to CR tools, AKP government has a vital initiative towards a more active
foreign policy including resolution of conflicts concerning Greece and Turkey’s EU bid.
A research on AKP Government’s Foreign Policy, a content analysis, shows the shifts
in Turkish Foreign Policy for the period from November 2002 to December 2004. The data
used was composed of the statements and intentions of AKP, which were made public
through mainstream newspapers and websites. A total of 1873 entries were codified and
categorized with the aim of examining the toolbox AKP applied while conducting its foreign
policy. The same data was also categorized along the issues it dealt with.
1200
1000
800
Column A Traditional
Diplomacy
Column B Conflict
Resolution
600
400
200
0
Traditional vs CR
42
Ozalp, E. & Bozbag, F.M. & Ersoy, M. & Karaege, M. & Kesler, A. & Agirdir, Y. & Paker, D. & Tezel, A. O.
AKP Government’s Foreign Policy: Content Analysis, Final Project for the Course: Foreing Policy and Conflict
Resolution, 2004-2005.
22
From the total of 1873 entries, 1106 entries fall into Column A Traditional
Diplomacy, whereby 760 entries were codified under Column B Conflict Resolution43.
Negotiation
300
Mediation/Arbitration
250
Interactive Conflict
Resolution
CR Training
200
150
Economic Aid
100
Investing in
Institutions
Bilateral Cooperative
Programs
Political Incentives
50
0
Conflict Resolution
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
46,1%
43
21,8%
20,9%
CR TRAINING
ECONOMIC AID
POLITICAL INCENTIVES
0,3%
BILATERAL
COOPERATIVE
PROGRAMS
0,0%
2,4%
INVESTING IN
INSTITUTIONS
0,3%
INTERACTIVE CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
MEDIATION/ARBITRATION
8,3%
NEGOTIATION
50,0%
45,0%
40,0%
35,0%
30,0%
25,0%
20,0%
15,0%
10,0%
5,0%
0,0%
Ibid.
23
25,5%
30,0%
28,1%
ISSUES PERCENTAGE CHART
18,0%
25,0%
20,0%
5,0%
0,8%
ASIA
OTHERS
0,3%
CAUCASUS/ASIA
1,9%
0,7%
CAUCASUS
TERRORISM
1,1%
ARMENIA
IRAQ
0,4%
BALKANS
7,9%
0,6%
RUSSIA
CYPRUS/EU
CYPRUS/GREECE
CYPRUS
EU
0,0%
MIDDLE EAST
1,1%
EU/GREECE
1,7%
GREECE
0,4%
2,2%
0,2%
IMF
USA
0,5%
5,0%
NATO
10,0%
3,6%
15,0%
The importance of the EU, Cyprus issue with regards to Turkey’s EU membership,
and its relations with Greece have an important amount in the total issues, which can
pave the way to new partnerships between Greece and Turkey by confidence-building
measures as first steps if there is political will.
24
Conclusions
The tradition of enmity between Turks and Greeks is powerful, has a history and
requires long-term policies. Their respective security and foreign policies have suffered
from traits, which made positive engagement and rapprochement difficult if not possible.
These included a total lack of trust, a general state of misinformation about each other,
the existence of nationalist-oriented education, populist media, and overemphasis on
rights rather than interests44. Conflicts on the Aegean Sea firstly demand a common
understanding of dissatisfactions of each other by giving up taking care of national
interests only by trying to argue on status quo but looking for mergence of those interests
in a win-win situation.
Trust requires repetition of positive policies to make both societies comfortable
that the policies are not for once but are steps of a progress towards co-operation in the
Aegean Sea. However Turks and Greeks share the same geography and a historical
interaction of cultures, they do not share language, psychological background of each
other. Empathy-building seems to be a crucial task to hasten the conflict resolution
process, which demands long-term, planned initiatives from both parties. In a famous
Spanish saying: “Traveler, there are no roads. Roads are made by walking”45. These are not
only necessary for Greek and Turkish societies but also for the stability of regions with
which Greece and Turkey are in interaction.
44
45
Moustakis, Fotios. The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003.
Kissenger, Henry. Diplomacy, New York: Touchstone Book, 1994.
25
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27
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