WORKING PAPER 1
CHILDBEARING ON HOLD: A LITERATURE REVIEW
Roona Simpson
Centre for Research on Families and Relationships
Centre for Research on Families and Relationships
University of Edinburgh
23 Buccleuch Place
Edinburgh
EH8 9LN.
Email: Roona.Simpson@ed.ac.uk
Contents:
Page
Overview
2.
1. INTRODUCTION
3.
2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
4.
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
Rational Choice Theory
Risk Aversion Theory
Post-Materialist Values Theory
Preference Theory
Gender Equity Theory
3.
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH FERTILITY DECLINE
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
The ‘Reproductive Revolution’ and Access to Contraception
The Effects of Educational Attainment
Conflict between Parenthood and Employment
The Economic Context
The Changing Character of Intimacy and Partnership Relations
4.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
11.
19.
Appendices
REFERENCES
19.
1
Overview
Declining fertility is one aspect of various inter-related changes in household and family
structures occurring in recent decades. Fertility patterns have changed significantly since
the 1960s in most European countries; fertility has reached low, even very low levels1,
although there are important differences both between and within countries2. There is a
vast literature from across a range of academic disciplines addressing varied aspects of
fertility decline, ranging in scope from broad explanatory theories such as the Second
Demographic Transition, to studies which are country-specific and/or focus on particular
aspects or factors, for example childlessness or educational attainment.
This literature review provides an overview of the key themes and theoretical perspectives
evident in the demographic and sociological literature on fertility decline in advanced
Western societies more generally, and looks at various explanatory factors associated with
delayed childbirth more specifically. There are numerous determinants proposed in the
literature, with many factors mutually inter-related; their relative impact is thus difficult to
distinguish and/or quantify. While the strong interaction between different ‘explanatory’
factors makes any categorisation of determining factors difficult, the review looks
separately at access to contraception; educational attainment; the conflict between
employment and parenthood; the economic context; and the changing character of intimacy
and partnership relations. It concludes with a discussion of the gaps and limitations
identified in the review.
1
Demographers distinguish between three levels: i) low fertility, below replacement but at least 1.5 children
per woman; ii) very low fertility, less than 1.5 but at least 1.31; and iii) lowest low fertility, that is less than
1.31 children per woman (see Appendix 1 for comparative information for countries in the EU).
2
For example Scotland has had the lowest fertility rate within the United Kingdom for two decades (Graham
and Boyle, 2003); whereas the United Kingdom is categorised as having low fertility as a whole, Scotland’s
TFR declined to 1.47 in 2000, that is very low fertility.
2
1.
INTRODUCTION
Fertility patterns have changed significantly since the 1960s in most advanced Western
nations, with trends towards later childbearing, smaller families and an increase in
childlessness3. Described as ‘one of the most remarkable changes in social behaviour in the
twentieth century’ (Leete, 1998:3), declining fertility is one aspect of a range of
demographic changes interpreted in the literature as the outcome of various societal
changes (both structural and cultural) occurring as a result of modernisation. This process,
the timing of which is variable across countries, is termed the Second Demographic
Transition (see van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 1995)4. Whereas the decline of fertility below
replacement level5 was previously viewed as the most important feature of the transition in
the demographic literature (van de Kaa 1987) the postponement of first births is now
portrayed as the most radical transformation (see Lesthaeghe and Neele, 2000:333;
Sobotka, 2004).
Fertility postponement is related to developments such as smaller family sizes and
increased childlessness, all of which contribute to overall fertility decline6. This raises
several issues of concern in relation to demographic ageing and its socio-economic
implications (for example for social security provision), the possible decrease in labour
supply and its impact on future economic growth, and the prospect of total population
decline (see Bagavos and Martin, 2000)7. There is an extensive demographic literature on
contemporary fertility decline, with a substantial proportion addressing the specific issue of
postponement. There is also a sizeable literature within sociology considering various
3
McDonald notes that the only advanced countries that currently have replacement level fertility, the United
States and New Zealand, are ‘special cases’ explained by the higher fertility of Hispanic women and teenagers
(the United States) and Maori women in New Zealand (2000a:2) See also Dixon and Margo, 2006:37.
4
Broadly, this process implies diminishing constraints, an increase in behavioural options, increasing
individualism and a decline in tradition. The Second Demographic Transition clearly has parallels with
sociological theorising about epochal shifts in modes of behaviour in the context of late modernity, for
example Giddens’ (1991, 1992) arguments about reflexive modernisation and Beck and Beck-Gersheim’s
(1995, 2002) individualization thesis.
5
The replacement level of fertility is the level at which the population of a society, net of migration, would
remain stable. In contemporary societies this occurs with a total fertility rate of around 2.1. The total fertility
rate is a measure that expresses the mean number of children that would be born to a woman if current
patterns of fertility persisted throughout her childbearing life.
6
Some authors suggest rather that delayed childbearing constitutes a ‘postponement transition’ towards a latefertility regime (see Kohler, Billari and Ortega, 2002: 659-661).
7
Increasing concern about the possible consequences of fertility decline is evident in numerous articles and
reports commissioned by the European Union, some of which are reviewed here. The need to address fertility
decline is near universal in the literature, however a somewhat maverick position is taken by MacInnes
(2003), who dismisses concerns about the ‘myth of population ageing and catastrophic population decline’ as
‘neoconservative rhetoric’, arguing that as ageing is socially constructed, increasing standards in health and
activity mean the capacities and productivity of future elderly cannot be determined.
3
aspects of fertility decline, ranging from broad explanatory theories to small-scale studies
looking at the experience of particular statuses, such as childlessness.
This review starts with an overview of theories seeking to explain fertility decline more
generally8. The literature reviewed here includes cross-comparative studies, mainly of
advanced ‘Western’ societies; where studies have specifically addressed fertility
postponement and/or childlessness in Britain, these are identified. There is a considerable
literature focussing on specific policy recommendations to address fertility decline (see e.g.
Chesnais 1996, MacDonald 2000a, Castles 2003). This is not reviewed separately here;
however, as policy recommendations reflect particular understandings of the reasons for
fertility decline, the policy implications of specific theoretical perspectives are referred to
below.
The subsequent section considers the main determinants of delayed fertility proposed in the
literature, looking separately at access to contraception; educational attainment; the conflict
between employment and parenthood; the economic context, including the influence of
unemployment and various forms of uncertainty; and the changing character of intimacy
and partnership relations.
The concluding section discusses the gaps and limitations
identified in the literature.
This review has considered key demographic and sociological studies looking at fertility
decline. These studies were identified via a combination of online database and library
searches, and through checking reference lists at the end of each paper obtained for other
relevant publications. Key websites in the field were also examined.
2.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
This section outlines the broad theoretical perspectives underpinning explanations of
fertility decline, albeit these are often implicit. There is considerable variation in the
literature in the extent to which these theories seek to explain fertility decline, or identify
broad areas associated with it (for example, there is some disparity in the way that
institutional structures are related to fertility decline). As with the factors looked at below,
there is overlap between these theories; nevertheless, these are distinguished by the relative
With regards to fertility postponement, the focus here is on first births – while second and higher-order births
are being postponed as well, this is mostly a consequence of first-birth postponement rather than a
manifestation of change in birth intervals (Sobotka, 2004).
8
4
emphasis attributed to individual agency and social structural processes. The following
draws broadly on McDonald (2000a, 2000b), and looks separately at rational choice theory;
risk-aversion theory; post-materialist values theory; preference theory and gender equity
theory.
2.1
Rational Choice Theory
This understanding of fertility decline draws on neo-classical economic assumptions of
individuals as ‘utility maximisers’ to argue that in deciding to have a child individuals make
a ‘cost-benefit’ calculation. Thus, standard economic theory attributes the trend to below
replacement fertility to increasing levels of female education and employment increasing
the ‘opportunity costs’ of childbearing (see Becker 1991, Hotz et al. 1997). Whereas some
costs can be calculated in monetary terms, the benefits refer to psychological dimensions
that are not readily quantifiable. McDonald (2000a) suggests it is likely that the net
benefits to be gained fall as birth order rises (that is, there is more benefit to be gained from
first children, and that this decreases the more children one has); in addition, this may also
apply as people get older; accordingly, as the age of becoming a parent increases people
will be less likely to have additional children9.
Rational choice theory implies that, in
order to have a positive impact on fertility rates, the psychological benefits or economic
costs of children should be respectively increased or reduced.
Regarding benefits,
McDonald concludes that while this may not be readily amenable to policy, a general sense
that society is child-friendly may be effective.
Direct costs (actual expenditure) are
distinguishable from indirect costs (earnings foregone in bearing and caring for the child):
these latter decline as society is organised in such a way as to enable parents to combine
work and family (2000a:6).
This theory, generally presented in terms of a ‘trade off’ between work and fertility at the
level of the individual, has been widely criticised for failing to address the wider context in
which this takes place and which impact on patterns of cross-national fertility (e.g. see
9
As such this would influence the quantum rather than the likelihood of children. The role of lifetime
childlessness in fertility decline is not clear-cut in the literature. For example, McDonald states that
differences between average fertility levels across industrialised countries appear to be due less to differences
in the proportion of childless women than in the proportions of women having three or more children,
concluding that demographic research has ‘given too little attention to the numbers of children that women are
having’ (2000a:5). Sobotka similarly concludes that fertility decline appears to be driven more by declining
family size than by increasing rejection of parenthood (2004:150). Berrington however argues that the
increasing incidence of childlessness amongst recent cohorts of women in England and Wales is ‘the driving
force behind the decline in average completed family size’(2004:9).
5
Castles 2003:218). In addition, as Folbre (1994) and others have observed, families cannot
predict the future costs of children, while men and women bear these costs differently.
There are certain ontological and other assumptions implicit to rational choice theory,
primarily that of individuals as rational decision-makers with a good knowledge or
understanding of the costs and benefits to be incurred. The limitations of this view of
human nature are illustrated in the debate about the distinction between voluntary and
involuntary childlessness (see Wasoff and Carty, 2004). In the literature, involuntary
childlessness may be defined in relation to physiological factors preventing otherwise
desired childrearing; by implication, voluntary childlessness is a status chosen by the
individuals concerned. However, this distinction suggests a line between choice and fate
that is not always clear-cut:
for example, postponement may result in unintended
childlessness, or revision of original decisions to have children as people get accustomed to
a childless lifestyle and become unwilling to change their priorities. Several qualitative
studies on childlessness emphasise decision-making about childbearing is an embedded,
ongoing process, and that the ‘voluntary childless’ may display various degree of certainty
over their decision (see McAllister and Clarke 1998; Hird and Abshoff 2000). These
studies suggest ‘choice’ is a far more complex notion than rational choice theory allows.
2.2.
Risk-Aversion Theory
This theory builds in the uncertainty inherent in relation to anticipated future costs and
benefits, and assumes that where economic, social or personal futures are uncertain,
decision-makers may act to avert risk. There has been much recent academic attention to
new social risks consequent on various inter-related changes occurring as part of a shift to
post-industrial society (see Beck 1992, 1999; Giddens, 1994; Lupton, 1999; Taylor-Gooby,
2004)10. One aspect of this is an emerging literature on the extent to which risk aversion
applies to the personal sphere and impacts on whether people form partnerships or embark
on parenthood; McDonald (2000a) for example contends that young women in Japan see
marriage itself as a risk to their future employment.
10
Contemporary sociological theorising about the changing nature of risk associates this with rapidly
expanding choices and opportunities and argues that these in turn contribute to further anxiety and
uncertainty, facilitating the avoidance of long-term commitments (see Beck 1992, Bauman 2000). There is an
emerging body of empirical research examining people’s perceptions of and responses to risk in a range of
areas including intimate relationships, some of which is examined here.
6
Several scholars have associated fertility decline with factors such as economic uncertainty
and an increasing individualisation of risk. For example Hoem’s (2000) empirical study
links declining fertility in Sweden with increased participation in higher education at a time
of poor economic circumstances; observing that the proportions of young women (aged 2124) receiving educational allowances rose from 14% in 1989 to 41% by 1996, she interprets
this as evidence of risk-averse behaviour (investment in future security) in a context of
widespread cut-backs in government services. Hobson and Olah (2006a) relate declining
fertility to changes in consciousness of women around the risks of economic dependency
and divorce in the context of weakening decommodifying policies introduced in response to
the effects of global economic pressures.
Lewis (2006), reporting the findings of
exploratory qualitative research on the extent to which individuals regard partnership and
childbearing as risks, similarly situates this in a context of the erosion of the traditional
family model alongside an increasing expectation of individual responsibility.
Lewis
suggests that greater fluidity in intimate relationships, which has given more choice to
individuals in partnering, has also transformed the economic dependence on men that
women have traditionally experienced from a possible source of protection into a much
more straightforward risk, risk that is exacerbated on the arrival of children.
Lewis thus recasts what might be interpreted as the pursuit of self-fulfilment in terms of a
quest for security in face of risk and uncertainty. She argues that more state support
(financial compensation for care and the provision of care services) would help reduce the
additional uncertainties that respondents experienced upon becoming parents (2006:54).
McDonald similarly argues that, rather than individual methods of dealing with risk (such
as insurance), a well-developed welfare state may be more effective at smoothing out risks
(for example, social security arrangements for job loss or health problems); he notes
however that the present direction of social and economic policy in almost all industrialised
countries is to pass risks away from the state and back on to individuals.
2.3
Post-Materialist Values Theory
Associated with the Second Demographic Transition, this perspective contends that changes
in social and demographic behaviour have been driven by the growth of values of selfrealisation, satisfaction of personal preferences, and freedom from traditional forces of
7
authority such as religion11. Several qualitative studies indicate the voluntary childless
frequently report their desire for independence, freedom and spontaneity (see Fischer 1991,
Lisle 1996, McAllister and Clarke 1998)12.
Delayed childbearing and increased
childlessness is seen as the result of fundamental social, economic and cultural
transformation which has changed the norms relating to family and reproduction. Recent
sociological work similarly contends that there has been a shift in personal values in a
‘postmodern’ context, and a resultant shifting ‘parental identity’ with consequences for
fertility decline (see Gillespie 2001, Lucas 2003, MacInnes 2003).
The theory asserts these values are associated with increases in divorce rates, cohabitation
and ex-nuptial births, more prevalent in the more liberal societies of Nordic and Englishspeaking countries than in the more traditional family cultures of, for example, Southern
Europe; the low divorce rates and low levels of cohabitation of these countries in contrast
suggest stable relationships and higher fertility rates. However, McDonald (2000a) points
to the fact that it is secular liberal societies that are experiencing higher fertility, while more
traditional ‘familistic’ societies seem less well able to reproduce themselves, as evidence
counter to the theory13. Similarly, he cites various studies in which younger women express
preferences for numbers of children well above actual behaviour (see e.g. van de Kaa 1997)
and interprets this as indicative of the influence of other factors (costs, uncertainty and the
nature of social institutions) on the number of children women have14. McDonald thus
emphasises the importance of considering low fertility as a societal phenomenon, rather
than a reflection of individual values.
This position is somewhat in contrast to the
‘preference theory’ proposed by Hakim (2003) to explain fertility decline, looked at below.
Giddens’ (1992) analyses of transformations in intimacy is an example of recent sociological theoretical
work in this area. He argues that contemporary partnerships (‘pure relationships’) are characterised by
egalitarianism and individualism, with parenthood no longer an intrinsic aspect of such relationships.
Contingent on the benefits derived by each partner (1992:58), such relationships are also characterised by
inherent instability (1992:137).
12
However, such reports could also be interpreted as a defensive strategy in response to the enduring negative
stereotyping of childless women in particular, also referred to in several studies (see Veevers 1980, Gillespie
2001).
13
Previously, countries with the highest period fertility rates were those with the most pronounced familyoriented cultural traditions and the lowest rates of women’s labour market participation; Castles (2003) refers
to the reversal of these relationships in recent decades as these relationships as ‘a world turned upside down’.
Fertility rates in Southern European countries (with the exception of Portugal) fell from the highest in Europe
in the mid-1970s to the lowest by the beginning of the 1990s (see Appendix One). Esping-Anderson refers to
the observation that familistic contexts such as Italy and Spain are seemingly counter-productive to family
formation, as ‘the great paradox of our times’ (1999:67).
14
Dixon and Margo (2006) similarly interpret ‘the baby gap’, the shortfall between stated desired numbers of
children and actual numbers born, as evidence of wider social constraints. The status of such stated
preferences however is an issue of some debate and is considered further in the concluding discussion.
11
8
2.4
Preference Theory
Hakim (2003) explicitly proposes preference theory, which emphasises personal values and
decision-making at the micro-level, as a new theoretical framework for understanding
current changes in fertility and predicting future developments.
This approach is
distinguished from prevalent economic theories and research focussing on macro-level
correlates in cross-national comparisons, which Hakim argues fails to consider ‘the social
processes and the motivations of the women and men behind these statistical measures’
(2003:351).
Hakim argues lifestyle preferences are ‘the hidden, unmeasured factor that
determines women’s behaviour to a very large extent’ (2003:366), classifying these as
adaptive, work-centred, or home-centred.
She contends this approach considers the
particular social, economic and institutional contexts within which preferences become the
primary determinant of women’s choices.
Hakim emphasises access to modern
contraception and the subsequent equal opportunities ‘revolution’ as necessary
preconditions for various others social and economic changes which produce a qualitatively
different scenario of options and opportunities for women, who now have genuine choices
regarding employment versus homemaking. She considers the implications of her theory
for responsiveness to public policy, arguing that the contemporary ‘bias against
motherhood’ ignores home-centred women, and for a revaluing of reproductive work.
This approach can be seen as one example of an increasing interest in changing values and
attitudes in the demographic and sociological literature (see e.g. Lesthaeghe 1995; Mason
and Jensen 1995; Leete 1998; McRae 1999; Castles 2003; Lucas 2003; MacInnes 2003,
2005). However, Hakim’s analysis presents preferences as fixed attributes of an individual,
with little attention given to explaining the differences between women, or how preferences
may change over time. In addition, this fails to consider the iterative relationship between
an individual’s preferences/attitudes and the experiences their specific social context
affords them. For example, a study by Santow and Brecher (1998) on southern European
migrants in Australia demonstrates fertility decline preceding changes in traditional family
values. A study by Bernhardt (1988, cited in Sobotka, 2004:18) shows that an increase of
part-time work in Sweden in the 1970s gave rise to a ‘combination strategy’ of part-time
employment and childrearing, a strategy which became common after the birth of a first
child and was equally pursued by women who previously tended to stay at home and those
who had worked full-time. While women and/or couples may choose their preferred mix
9
of fertility and employment in light of their own aspirations, these are shaped in the context
of prevailing social values. As Castles argues, these can and do change: for example, the
view of childbearing and female employment as inimical prevalent in the postwar decades
is actually an ‘historical aberration’ (Castles, 2003: 218).
Empirical analyses (Hakim 2005) of attitudinal data from across Europe, North America
and New Zealand) aimed at testing the importance of attitudes/values between parents and
the childless15 found differences to be less pronounced than expected, although greater
between childless women and mothers than between men (for whom careers and income
earning remain central life priorities, whether fathers or not). The proportion of individuals
classified as ‘ambivalent’ about parenthood varied considerably across countries, and
differed by sex (for example, a third of British women and a quarter of British men remain
undecided at age 30). Despite adopting different personal choices, there was widespread
support for family policies across parental statuses, and the study concluded that policy can
influence the behaviour of the ambivalent group and the size of families.
2.5
Gender Equity Theory
McDonald (2000a, 2000b) considers the importance of gender equity in fertility decline,
arguing that low birthrates are an outcome of high levels of gender equity in individualoriented institutions, combined with persisting gender inequality within the family.
He
contends that whereas assumptions of a ‘male breadwinner’ model have been challenged by
increasing opportunities for women in areas such as education and the market (such that
these social institutions are now characterised by a high degree of gender equity) this model
still underpins family-oriented social institutions (e.g. family services, the tax system, the
family itself)16.
This study distinguishes the ‘voluntary childfree’, those who definitely do not want children, who are
consistently negative on all questions about children, and ‘uncertain childless’ by those who are gave an
uncertain or ambivalent reply on at least one question concerning the desire to have children. ‘Parents’ were
classified as those with children and those who plan to have children (my italics). Given the debate about
defining voluntary childlessness (see 2.1 above), this classification raises various issues. It presents these
preferences as static, and assumes future outcomes from stated preferences. As noted above, previous
research has identified a gap between preferences re childbearing, and realised fertility; classifying together
those who state a desire to have children with actual parents ignores differences between these groups
(including in attitudes and values) which may impact on the likelihood of going on to have children.
16
There is an extensive literature from a variety of disciplines demonstrating the slow pace of change in the
gendered division of labour, outwith the remit of this review; however, the ongoing lack of gender parity is
emphasised in some studies considering patterns of partnership and fertility decline. Hobson and Olah (2006a)
for example, drawing on Lewis’s (2001) notion of the ‘one and a half adult’ worker model replacing the
traditional breadwinner/caregiver model, observe that even the Nordic countries are characterised by a ‘one
and a third’ model.
15
10
Other scholars looking at fertility decline also address the issue of ‘domestic democracy’,
for example through time-budget surveys which clearly indicate women’s continuing
domestic responsibility (e.g. Joshi 1998; Esping-Anderson 1999). As Joshi notes, in ‘the
private arena of home life, at least among young adults, the ideology of sex equality runs
ahead of practice’ (1998:177). This poses a dilemma for women, who may increasingly
perceive their family role as incompatible with individual aspirations. Gender equity theory
proposes that the more traditional a society is with regard to its family system, the greater is
the level of incoherence between social institutions and the lower its fertility.
As
McDonald argues, if women are provided with opportunities near to equivalent to those of
men in education and employment but these are severely curtailed by having children, then,
on average, women will restrict the number of children (2000a:10, see also Chesnais 1996,
Esping-Anderson 1999).
While McDonald acknowledges family organisation is
fundamental to cultural identity and thus ‘revolutionary change is rarely a possibility’
(2000a:1), he argues this theory supports policy recommendations such as gender-neutral
tax-transfer policies, and support of workers with family responsibilities regardless of
gender. He emphasises however that it is not so much the nature of policies that matter but
the nature of society as a whole (for example gender equity policies will be rendered
ineffective if unemployment rates for young people are high) (2000a:21).
3.
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH FERTILITY DECLINE
This section reviews findings on the determinants of fertility decline, and draws on the
work of Sobotka (2004). Within the demographic literature, several authors seeking to
explain this propose a complex of determinants17. However, many factors are mutually
inter-related, and their relative impact may be difficult to quantify: for example, prolonged
education may delay the transition to economic independence, but may also influence
fertility indirectly, through increased career opportunities or a less traditional or family17
To illustrate, Lesthaeghe (2001:17-18) lists seven general and seven country-specific factors accounting for
new patterns of fertility:
General: 1) increased female education and economic autonomy; 2) rising high consumption aspirations
creating the need for a second household income and fostering female labour force participation; 3) increased
investments in career developments by both men and women, alongside increased competition in the
workplace; 4) rising ‘post-materialist’ traits such as self-actualisation and freedom of choice; 5) a greater
emphasis on quality of life and rising taste for leisure; 6) a retreat from irreversible commitments and a desire
for maintaining an ‘open future’; 7) rising probabilities of separation and divorce.
Country-specific: 1) geographical mobility of young adults in tertiary education; 2) lack or availability of
state subsidies for students (fellowships, housing, transport subsidies); 3) flexibility of the labour market; 4)
youth unemployment; 5) minimum income guarantees; 6) costs and availability of housing, to meet household
needs at various stages of family formation; 7) contraceptive availability and methods mix, access to abortion.
11
centred value orientation.
Some determinant impact differently on men and women,
different birth-cohorts and sub-populations, or their impact may change over time, while the
strong interaction between different ‘explanatory’ factors makes identifying and
categorising ‘causes’ of fertility decline particularly difficult. Furthermore, understandings
of the role various factors play are influenced by underlying theoretical perspectives.
3.1
The ‘Reproductive Revolution’ and Access to Contraception
The spread of access to modern contraception and, to a lesser extent, the legalisation of
abortion are identified in the literature as important determinants of fertility
postponement18.
There are broadly two approaches as to their impact: one views
contraception mostly as a technical factor addressing the demand for birth control (see
Castles 2003), while the other sees it as instrumental to broader behavioural and cultural
change (see e.g. Presser, 200119).
Much of the literature emphasises the importance of contraception in facilitating the late
start of fertility20, and this view is supported by evidence from several country-specific
studies: for example, in Spain a dramatic increase in usage occurred in 1978 following the
removal of a ban on contraception, and rapid postponement of fertility started in 1980 (see
Castro Martin 1992; Sobotka 2004). Contraceptive use has been associated with prolonging
the interval between marriage and first birth in Britain (see Murphy 1992, 1993). Murphy
argues that the diffusion of the contraceptive pill was the main determinant of the fertility
change between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s.
As noted above, some of the literature links modern contraception with a change in norms
and values. Those utilising the concept of the Second Demographic Transition emphasise
the catalytic role of efficient contraception in the behavioural and cultural changes
characterising this process.
Van de Kaa for example attributes changing partnership
patterns more generally, for example the spread of cohabitation and the delay and decline of
18
These arguments apply also to technologies affording women greater flexibility in family planning (for
example the freezing of eggs and embryos), potentially allowing women to delay becoming a mother at an age
beyond that which they would be naturally fertile.
19
Presser focuses on women, arguing that changing notions of concepts of time, resulting from the greater
ability that recent cohorts of women have to control the timing of events over the life course, are an important
factor explaining low fertility in industrial societies.
20
There also appears to be a link between inadequate contraceptive use, especially amongst teenagers, and a
high proportion of ‘unwanted’ or ‘mistimed’ births among very young women, evident both in England and
Wales and the United States (Sobotka 2004, see also Frejka 2004).
12
marriage, to the freedom from unwanted pregnancy afforded by contraception (1994:114).
Sobotka (2004) observes that the widespread use of modern contraception means having
children usually requires a conscious decision to discontinue pill use, an important reversal
of the previous status quo wherein contraceptive efforts focused mainly on preventing
additional pregnancies after the couple reached their desired family size. As such, he
suggests that the increasing level of contraceptive use may further reduce the incidence of
unintended pregnancies in some Western countries (particularly Ireland, the United
Kingdom and the United States, as well as in most of the post-communist societies),
consequently leading to an additional fertility postponement (2004:28).
Within the sociological literature, Hakim (2003) and McInnes (2005) particularly
emphasise the necessary character of the ‘reproductive revolution’21. For Hakim, modern
contraceptive methods crucially shift control over reproduction to women; she argues the
social and psychological significance of this, in terms of a sense of autonomy, responsibility
and personal freedom for women, is generally overlooked by male demographers (with
exceptions, e.g. Murphy 1993).
She characterises the reproductive revolution as a
precondition of the similarly revolutionary ‘equal opportunities’ developments which in
turn enabled other changes, for example in the labour market, allowing more women the
possibility of acting on their preferences re childbearing.
MacInnes (2005) similarly
emphasises the ‘reproductive revolution’ as the progenitor, rather than the outcome, of
social change.
3.2
Educational Attainment
Much of the literature identifies educational attainment as a factor associated with fertility
decline generally, and fertility postponement in particular.
In recent decades post-
secondary education has undergone a massive expansion, and young adults throughout
Europe have spent an increasing proportion of time in education, with tertiary education
constituting the main route to stable employment, adequate income and career development
(Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002).
Women especially have benefited from this
development, and now form more than half of the graduate/postgraduate students in a
majority of European countries (Sobotka 2004).
This expansion impacts on fertility
directly, with the period of study evidently incompatible with family formation. Prolonged
21
MacInnes (2005) does not use this term to refer to the advent of modern contraceptive methods in recent
decades, but to a wide-ranging concept encompassing various societal developments occurring over several
centuries.
13
education (during which students usually lack adequate resources, both income and
housing, and future employment conditions are uncertain) also delays the transition to
economic independence (Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002), and several studies demonstrate
‘being-in education’ strongly reduces the likelihood of having a first child (see e.g.
Blossfield 1995; Hoem 2000).
As well as delay attributable to time spent in education, this influences the timing of
parenthood in various other ways. That this is seen as particularly the case for women is
indicated by the numerous studies investigating the influence of education on fertility
decline which focus on women. Substantial differences in first birth timing according to the
level of education are evident across all developed societies, with highly educated women
postponing childbearing to a larger extent than women with less education, who often
continue having children at early ages (Sobotka 2004:13, see also Gustaffson at al. 2002).
Several country-specific studies demonstrate that the increasing educational level explains a
significant proportion of the increase in the mean age of first birth over time (see e.g. Beets
et al. 2001 for Holland; Martin 2000 for the US; Meron and Widmer 2002 for France; Joshi
2002 for the UK).
Educational level is clearly linked to the other factors considered in this section. Higher
education enhances the position of individuals in the labour market, hence increasing the
‘opportunity costs’ of childbearing22. Values and preferences are also distinguished by
educational level. Some scholars link these with changing partnership patterns, with less
traditional living arrangements such as cohabitation associated with delayed parenthood,
statuses initially predominant amongst people with higher education. In addition, highly
educated women are likely to seek more egalitarian relationships and develop higher
standards concerning a potential partner’s qualities in terms of education and income;
leading to delayed union formation and marriage (Oppenheimer 1994), these increased
standards may contribute to further postponement of childbearing.
3.3
Parenthood and Employment
Debates about the conflict between career aspirations and motherhood predominate in the
demographic literature, with discussion on the difficulty of reconciling the two ‘careers’ of
employment and fertility focusing on women. Traditionally seen as incompatible (a view
22
As noted above, while this is underplayed in some of the literature, this is particularly the case for women.
14
supported by neo-classical economic analyses of family formation, e.g. Becker 1991), this
argument has been challenged by the ‘positive turn’ taking place in many countries in the
mid to late-1980s, where higher fertility was associated with higher female labour force
participation (see Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Castles 2003; Billari and Kohler 2004).
Several scholars suggest birth timing and spacing may be key strategies individuals adopt to
balance work and family responsibilities (e.g. Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000:282). However,
there is little distinction made between childbearing and childrearing, with women’s
retention of responsibility for the latter and consequent greater burden of ‘opportunity
costs’ for the most part unquestioned.
In discussing this factor, many authors emphasise the importance of country-specific
institutional contexts, such as family and welfare provision, employment policies and, to a
lesser extent, gender equality, as hindering or facilitating childbearing and employment
compatibility. This appears to be a more recent concern in the literature: Hobson and Olah
(2006b) observe that, while women’s labour force participation was built into demographic
models as opportunity costs for women’s fertility decisions, social policy incentives and
constraints were not, and that it is only recently that the role of social policies/institutions in
shaping fertility decisions has been considered. Authors taking a welfare regime approach
identify Conservative (Continental) and ‘Familistic’ (Southern European) welfare regimes
as having a negative impact on fertility, both on timing and quantity, by reducing the
opportunity for women to have an independent career; this is in terms both of specific
policies (including family benefits/childcare provision/labour flexibility) and cultural norms
(see Esping-Anderson 1999; Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Castles 2003).
Much of the literature addresses part-time or flexible employment as a strategy facilitating
the combination of work/childrearing amongst women. The availability of childcare is
identified as enabling women to combine employment with having children, and the
variation in provision across Europe (in terms of cost, availability, public/private provision)
is highlighted by various authors (see Esping Anderson 1999; Castles 2003). There are
several studies analysing the lack of childcare provision as a factor facilitating fertility
postponement (see e..g Kreyenfeld 2002 comparing East/West Germany; del Boca 2002, on
the effects of childcare and part-time work opportunities for women in Italy).
The level of income for women, related to age/duration of employment, is also proposed as
a factor in fertility postponement. The economic perspective of lifetime income provides a
15
very strong rationale for late motherhood23. Some scholars argue that strong employment
prospects for women are now an important precondition for family formation (e.g. see
Castles 2003). Sobotka (2004) observes this factor is also related to a ‘consumptionsmoothing’ motive, which assumes that couples aims at maximising increasing income over
time in conjunction with the postponement of childbearing. Several empirical studies find
that an increase in women’s wages is associated with first birth postponement (see e.g. de
Cooman, Ermisch and Joshi 1987 on England and Wales; Heckman and Walker 1990 on
Sweden). Joshi (2002), in a study considering women in Britain, analysed the life-time
earnings of different categories or women and found that fertility postponement could
reduce the ‘motherhood penalty’.
This was particularly the case for women with a
university degree: assuming maternity leave is fully paid, the model showed no loss in
earning associated with first birth at age 30 (2002:455).
3.4
The Economic Context
Many authors draw attention to the impact of global restructuring and welfare state
retrenchment on the demographic patterns of recent decades.
Alongside this, several
emphasise the importance of stable employment as an important precondition for
parenthood; this is identified by some as particularly important for men, with less stable
employment/declining relative earnings of young men being argued as a factor in marriage
postponement (Oppenheimer 1994).
High unemployment rates, concentrated amongst
young people, combined with precarious job security and legislation protecting ‘insiders’
on the labour market, have been identified as factors contributing to fertility postponement
in Southern Europe (see Bagavos and Martin, 2000; Sobotka 2004).
Employment opportunities and levels of unemployment are identified by several authors as
influencing childbearing decisions, both directly in terms of economic status and also more
generally by levels of well-being and existential security. Unemployment is analysed in
most studies as increasing economic uncertainty and discouraging young people from union
formation and parenthood (see Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002; Prioux 2003). Hobson and
Olah (2006a) interpret the association between precipitous declines in female employment
A recent study on women’s lifetime incomes (Rake 2000) calculates the income loss associated with
motherhood, differentiated by educational/employment status. Using a series of hypothetical individuals, the
income costs of motherhood were shown to vary substantially according to the educational level of the
mother, with the illustrative graduate mother experiencing a significantly smaller income loss than her lowskilled counterpart. Nevertheless, as Joshi notes, although well-educated women experience the least loss of
earnings in motherhood, they are the most likely to postpone or avoid it (2002:28).
23
16
and fertility rates in transition economies such as Hungary and Poland, countries where
women have been highly integrated into paid work, ars paradigm cases of ‘birthstrikes’, a
reaction against a loss of jobs and uncertain labour market futures24.
Unemployment is associated with instability and uncertainty, at both the societal and
individual level. As mentioned previously, much contemporary sociological theorising has
argued that high levels of uncertainty are conducive to the postponement of partnership and
parenthood.
However, Sobotka suggests this conjecture is not fully supported by the
empirical findings: rather, ‘the available evidence suggests that the influence of uncertainty
on first birth timings differs in time, across countries, by type of uncertainty, and has a
different impact upon various population groups’ (2004:21). For example, the study by de
Cooman, Ermisch and Joshi (1987) analysing fertility in England and Wales concluded that
fertility reactions to economic change varied by stage in family formation, with labour
market conditions influencing timing rather than the quantum of fertility.
The literature on the effects of labour market conditions on fertility postponement is
somewhat inconsistent, and it is difficult to drawn any overarching conclusions. While at
the societal level worsening economic and employment conditions are usually associated
with reduced fertility, improving labour market conditions for women may also lead to
postponement. As Sobotka observes, there is still very little understanding as to how
particular types of uncertainty affect individual decision-making on fertility timing and
quantum, and how this decision-making is shaped by class-specific resources and
aspirations (2004:22). As discussed further in the concluding section, there also appears to
be little consideration in the demographic literature of the way in which such decisionmaking is also influenced by gender.
3.5
The Changing Character of Intimacy and Partnership Relations
There is an extensive and varied literature considering the changing character of intimacy
generally25; this review considers those works which considers these changes in relation to
fertility postponement.
Various inter-related trends have resulted in a profound
24
However, it has also been suggested that unemployment may motivate women to take advantage of
economic inactivity and opt for childbearing instead of competing for scarce jobs. In countries with
established welfare systems and generous family support arrangements, unemployment benefits may provide
sufficient replacement for earned income and enhance the motivation for childbearing (Sobotka 2004).
25
For a review of recent sociological scholarship on intimacy, see Jamieson 1998.
17
transformation in household and family structures in recent decades, including the delay
and decline in marriage, increasing divorce rates, the rise in cohabitation, the separation of
sex and marriage and marriage and reproduction (resulting in both childless marriages and
non-marital fertility), and ‘unconventional’ living arrangements including extended periods
of solo living. As noted above, these changes are attributed by several scholars to shifts in
societal norms and values, conceptualised broadly as the Second Demographic Transition.
Here, it is transformations in ways of relating, rather than the changing family and
household structures per se, which are argued as having profound consequences for fertility
levels: for example, van de Kaa (2004) contends that whereas in the traditional family
children were an expected outcome of marital union, in a contemporary context parenthood
has become a ‘derivative’ of the individuals’ quest for self-fulfilment.
However, as
discussed further in the concluding summary, interpreting statistics on demographic change
and attributing motivations to such general concepts as individualisation is problematic.
There is empirical data supporting ideas that more complex partnership patterns are
associated with late entry into parenthood. For example, a study analysing FFS data on
men and women in Sweden found transition to parenthood strongly influenced by previous
partnership experiences, amongst other factors. Those with longer previous union
experiences (at least 3 years for men, 5 years for women) have significantly lower first birth
intensity at higher ages in Sweden than those with none or short experience (Olah, 2005).
Other changes, including the increasing education and labour attachment of women, have also
influenced partnership and parenthood decision-making, as noted above: some scholars interpret
this in terms of women’s greater independence allowing them to set higher standards in relation
to partnership (see Oppenheimer 1994), with consequent delay and decline in marriage rates, and
higher marital instability.
For example, analysis of the 1993 FFS Survey in the Netherlands
indicates 30% of women who eventually wanted to have a child and were still childless after age
30 mentioned ‘not having a suitable partner’ as a reason for postponing childbearing (see
Bouwens, Beets and Schippers 1996:8). Other research indicates that gender role attitudes do
influence fertility intentions. Research in the US suggests that voluntary childless women are
more likely to hold egalitarian attitudes towards women’s roles and the importance of women’s
paid work outside the home (Houseknecht, 1987). Research by Berrington (2004) finds that
women with more egalitarian attitudes about women’s paid work outside the home are
significantly less likely to intend to start a family.
18
Other studies argue that men have shown an increasing tendency to withdraw from binding
commitments and parenthood in particular (Lethaeghe 1995; Goldscheider and Kaufman
1996). Goldscheider and Kaufman relate this in part to increased standards for parenthood,
wherein children and fatherhood are viewed primarily as responsibility and obligation
(1996:90)26. Related arguments emphasise high consumer aspirations, which imply the
need for two incomes in a household, and may fuel delay of marriage and childbearing.
Goldscheider and Kaufman (1996) for example contend that men frequently attach
excessive importance of consumer goods, which can get priority over family formation.
Sobotka considers the diminishing relative importance of childbearing in partnership
unions, which he contends implies a postponement of first birth towards late reproductive
ages and is an important factor ‘often neglected by commentators on delayed parenthood’
(Sobotka, 2004:25). There are now studies which seek to explain the desire to have
children (see e.g. Morgan, and Berkowitz King, 2001), suggesting an interesting reversal of
a previous ‘default position’ in which childbearing was assumed as natural or an intrinsic
aspect of partnership (for example, qualitative studies looking at the stigmatisation of
childlessness refer to ‘mandatory motherhood’ (Fischer, 1991) or a ‘parenthood
prescription’ (Veever, 1980).
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
This section briefly addresses some of the gaps and limitations identified in the preceding
review of literature on fertility decline. Some scholars have been critical of the limited
number of variables generally used in demographic modelling, given the extensive range of
economic, social, and cultural factors that could conceivably affect fertility (see Watkins
1993).
In addition, the complex relationship between factors means identifying their
relative impact can be extremely difficult. Various factors might be associated, however
the causal relationship between these is also often a matter of interpretation.
Thus,
increasing female employment and changes in the status of women may be both ‘cause and
effect’ (Hakim, 2003), as can the association of early childbearing with educational
disadvantage and unstable partnership (Joshi and Wright, 2004). While poorer women have
children earlier, it is not clear whether poverty causes high fertility or vice versa (Dixon and
Margo, 2006). Using longitudinal survey data can elucidate causality in term of timing of
26
Recent sociological works similarly address changing parental identity as a factor in fertility decline (see.
Lucas 2003; MacInnes 2003, 2005).
19
events, however cannot capture ‘indirect’ effects such as attitudinal change brought about
by education for example.
An important issue is the way in which gender is utilised in the literature. On occasion this
is conflated with sex and presented as a fixed attribute of individuals, rather than one aspect
of identity that is, crucially, relational. Several authors have drawn attention to the
problematic consideration of gender in demography (eg Watkins 1993, Biddlecom and
Greene 2000), however the limitations identified also apply to some sociological work. The
focus of many studies on women has been noted above; while this may be for pragmatic
reasons to do with reliability of data on births, this emphasis can reinforce a view of women
as primarily reproductive. In addition, this fails to address the way in which preferences
and decision-making around parenthood may be negotiated at the level of the couple. In
some studies there is insufficient attention paid to the influence of gender, for example
MacInnes (2003, 2005),in arguing that parental identity is undergoing change, downplays
continuing differences in the practices undertaken by mothers and fathers. As mentioned
above, arguments about part-time work as a means of reconciling employment and care do
not address adequately women’s enduring responsibilities for care, despite wider changes in
education and employment. The association of egalitarian attitudes towards gender roles
with fertility intentions (Houseknecht 1987, Berrington 2004) indicate the importance of
research considering gender inequalities in both the private and public sphere.
As stated above, there has been much attention to explanations of fertility decline in terms
of broad theories such as the Second Demographic Transition and Individualisation theses,
arguing that wider macro-level changes have meant an increase in choice and values such
as personal autonomy. Shifts in values and motivations however cannot be simply ‘read
off’ from statistics on demographic change. While such theories imply that individual
choices and preferences are to some extent an outcome of wider societal changes, the rather
broad sweep character of much of this literature means there is a failure in adequately
considering the iterative relationship between individual preferences and the particular
social and historic context in which these are shaped. It is also important to consider the
subjective meanings ascribed by actors to those choices in order to better understand
motivations of behaviour: practices are culturally specific and cannot be fully understood
without reference to the meanings people attribute to them. Demographic studies such as
those outlined above, often based on analysis of large scale surveys are necessary to provide
20
information on what is going on in relation to fertility decline, however is not sufficient to
understand why this is occurring. Comparative aggregate data at the national level for
example can provide information on aspects such as ‘regime clusters’ which may relate to
institutional variations. However these data are unable to address fertility motivations and
expectations. As such, this supports previous calls for research which incorporates a focus
on the social mechanisms of demographic phenomena that are not amenable to survey
measurement (see e.g. Greenhalgh 1990) as well as on individual actors and their own goals
(see e.g. Mason and Jensen, 1995).
This raises issues of the epistemological and ontological assumptions underlying much
research on fertility decline.
Riley and McCarthy claim that no field has had more
influence on demography than economics (2003: 85), and certainly much of the literature
assumes this discipline’s central tenet of reasoned action and conception of individuals as
rational, knowledgeable decision-makers. This is also evident in sociological work, for
example preference theory, which relates individual behaviour to the wider social context in
so far as this enables or constrains innate preferences. Such tenets are challenged by
postmodern theoretical scholarship arguing that subjectivities are socially constituted, fluid
and open to change, a conception that draws attention to the need to focus on particular
historical and social contexts (see Irwin 2000, 2005).
These conceptions question
assumptions that there is an unproblematic relationship between what people say and what
they think or do, illustrated in debates about the discrepancies between stated fertility
intentions and actual behaviour.
As noted above, some interpret this ‘baby gap’ as
demonstrating an unmet fertility need and a lack of support to enable desired children (e.g.
McDonald 2000a, Dixon and Margo 2006). Others view this as indicative more of the
somewhat problematic status of attitudes (e.g. Simons 1978) or as failing to give adequate
consideration to the way in which these may be impacted by competing preferences and/or
subsequent life events (Smallwood and Jeffries, 2003:23). In contrast, an interpretavist
account would consider such statements in part as a particular construction of identity. To
illustrate, whereas several studies interviewing childless women note their emphasis on
freedom, rather than assuming this reflects a literal truth and concluding that childless
women prioritise autonomy, such statements may be interpreted as retrospective
rationalisation and/or a defensive strategy designed to rebut potentially stigmatising subject
positioning. These theoretical perspectives highlight the importance of considering issues
of identity and changing subjectivities in order to more fully understand fertility behaviour.
21
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APPENDIX 1: Total Fertility Rates, European Union 1994 - 2004*
1994
2004
Low Fertility (Classifications refer to 2004)
Turkey
N/A
2.20 (e)
Iceland
2.14
2.03
Ireland
1.85
1.99 (e)
France
1.66
1.90 (p)
Finland
1.85
1.80
Norway
1.86
1.81
Denmark
1.81
1.78
Sweden
1.88
1.75
Netherlands
1.57
1.73
United Kingdom
1.74
1.74 (e)
Luxembourg
1.72
1.70
Belgium
1.56
1.64 (e)
Very Low Fertility
Cyprus
2.23
1.49 (p)
Austria
1.47
1.42
Portugal
1.44
1.42 (e)
Estonia
1.37
1.40 (e)
Malta
1.89
1.37
Germany
1.24
1.37 (e)
Croatia
1.52
1.35
Italy
1.21
1.33
Spain
1.21
1.32 (e)
Lowest Low Fertility
Greece
1.35
1.29 (e)
Romania
1.42
1.29
Bulgaria
1.37
1.29
Hungary
1.65
1.28
Lithuania
1.57
1.26
Slovakia
1.66
1.25
Latvia
1.39
1.24
Czech Republic
1.44
1.23
Poland
1.80
1.23
Slovenia
1.32
1.22 (e)
Source: European Commission (2006)
Eurostat Indicators
* Latest year for which figures available
(e) estimated value
(p) provisional value
30
APPENDIX 2:
Britain
Charts Illustrating Changes Over Time In Childbearing In
Completed Family Size for Selected Birth Cohorts
England and Wales
25
Percentage
20
15
10
5
0
1920
1940
1945
1950
1955
1959
Birth Cohorts
No Children
One child
Four or more
Source: ONS Birth Statistics 2004, Series FMl No 33, Tables 10.2 and 10.5
* Includes births at ages over 45
Fertility Rates by Age of Mother: 1971 - 2003
LiveB irths per 1,000 women
180
160
1971
140
1981
120
1991
100
2001
80
2003
60
40
20
0
Under 20
20–24
25–29
30–34
35–39
40–44
Source: Social Trends 35, ONS 2005
31