Notes on the Theoretical foundation for ethics
For the Five Strand approach to Religious and Values education
1
THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR ETHICS
- Natural Law and Proportionalism
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In order to be able to effectively tackle issues in applied ethics, it is essential to have a clear grasp of
central issues in theoretical ethics. There is no clear view of what ‘Christian Ethics’ involved instead there are a variety of alternative cogent positions, all of which have weaknesses as
well as strengths. These positions need to be understood prior to consideration of detailed questions
such as:
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ARE THERE ANY ABSOLUTE MORAL RULES?
DO CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONSEQUENCES DETERMINE WHAT IS RIGHT OR WRONG?
SHOULD NAZI GUARDS WHO EXTERMINATED JEWS, HOMOSEXUALS, ETC. BE CONDEMNED?
SHOULD ONE SLEEP WITH ONE'S BOY/GIRL FRIEND BEFORE GETTING MARRIED
Some people today hold that, for instance, in the sexual field, ‘anything goes’ provided other individuals
are not harmed. Others maintain that the sole purpose of sex is pleasure or, where appropriate,
procreation. However these positions taken in isolation do not take account of the long intellectual
history of debate which lies behind sexual morality nor of the psychological effects of one human being
making themselves vulnerable to another and, frequently, having this vulnerability abused. These notes
summarise the two main philosophic approaches which underlie this debate and other issues in applied
ethics which are of contemporary concern and also outline a third way which is somewhat between the
other two. It is important when discussion any moral issues to be aware of the theoretical underpinnings
to the debate and these notes attempt to clarify the underlying disagreements which give rise to
widespread divergence of approaches in many areas of applied ethics today ranging from abortion,
euthanasia, genetic engineering, IVF, divorce, crime and punishment to just war thinking.
St. THOMAS AQUINAS AND NATURAL LAW
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St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 _ 1274) was heavily influenced by Aristotle's philosophy. The writings of
Aristotle had been lost in the West and preserved amongst the Islamic scholars of the East. They were
reintroduced into Western thought shortly before Aquinas took up his position as a Professor at the
University of Paris. Aquinas was one of the greatest geniuses in the history of Christian thought and he
combined the rigour and precision of Aristotle's philosophy with the teachings of the Christian Church
and the Bible.
Aquinas considered that the first priority laid down by natural law was that the immortal self had to be
preserved. If this self gave into desires which were based on impulse and were not rational, then it
became enslaved. It was possible to deduce the natural or cardinal virtues (prudence,
temperance, fortitude and justice, taken from Aristotle) by the use of reason alone. The ten
commandments were held to be examples of natural virtues _ with the exception of keeping the
Sabbath. These natural virtues are amplified by the revealed virtues (of faith, hope and charity _ derived
from St. Paul, cf l Cor. 13. 13) and the greater the extent to which these are fostered the greater will
be the obedience to natural law.
The starting point for all advocates of natural law is to work out the PURPOSE of human life. For
Aquinas, this purpose included to live, to reproduce, to learn, or have an ordered society and to
worship God. Reason is used to find out God's plan and the purpose of human existence and this will
enable the principles of Natural Law to be arrived at.
Aquinas considered, following Aristotle, that all men will the good, but this does not mean, as might
seem to be implied, that everything that humans will is good. Human beings may seek some
apparent good, but this may not be a true good _ it may be only an apparent good because it does
not conform to the perfection of the human nature which all human beings share. Aquinas considers that
there is an 'ideal' human nature which we all have the potential to live up to or to fall away from and our
moral actions are crucial in determining where we stand in this respect. If a person does something that
is morally wrong, he or she will do this because they consider this to be a good although the possibility
of the individual being mistaken certainly exists (examples might include smoking, drinking too much or
even taking drugs).
Sin, for Aquinas, involves a falling short from the good _ it means a human being becoming less that he
or she is intended by God for him to be. To pursue an apparent good rather than the real good is
to fall short from our real potential _ it is to 'get it wrong' and to be mistaken. No_one seeks
evil for itself, it is only sought as an apparent good and therefore rests on a mistake. Sin is, however, a
theological world and there is no substantial distinction between this theological idea and acting against
reason. Aquinas says:
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'the theologian considers sins principally as an offence against God, whereas the moral philosopher
considers it as being contrary to reason' (S.T. la, llae, 71, 6, ad 5).
If it is possible to be mistaken in the choice of good, it is obviously necessary to determine what is the
right choice of good for a human being to aim for and Aquinas sets out to explore this. In essence, this is
what discussion of natural law is about _ seeking to explore what is the right good to aim for
given that human beings have the nature which has been given to them by God. Human beings
have the ability, using their will and reason, to make deliberate moral choices (S.T., la, llae, l, l) which
Aquinas terms 'human acts' to distinguish them from those acts performed by a person which are based
on instinct. However reason must be used correctly, which leads Aquinas to talk of the 'right use of
reason' _ reason may be used to plan a murder or to decide to be virtuous, but only in the second case
is reason being used 'rightly'. This obviously raises the problem of how one determines what is the
'right' use of reason when there are genuine differences of opinion as to what is the good in a particular
situation.
For Aquinas, intention alone is not decisive. As Freddy Copleston sj says in his book 'Thomas Aquinas':
'As Augustine says, there are some things which cannot be justified by any alleged good intention...
If I steal money from a man in order to give it to someone else, my action is not justified by my good
intention... It is not possible to father on Aquinas the view that the end justifies the means... ' (p. 207)
Veritatis Splendour drew on this (1993) when it maintained that certain acts were intrinsically evil _
i.e. evil in all circumstances. This can be seen to be reflected in the Ten Commandments which
appear to lay down absolute rules which apply in all circumstances and regardless of consequences.
Indeed Natural Law, although philosophically based clearly on the work of Aristotle, can also be seen to
endorse the Ten Commandments (except the command to keep the Sunday as a holy day and the
obligation to worship God which depends on God’s existence being established). The centrality of reason
to the Natural Law approach to ethics cannot be over-estimated - indeed natural law theologians will
often maintain that there is no such subject as Christian Ethics - rather there is ethics which may be
studied by Christians or others.
In every act or proposed act, Aquinas considers that the will aims towards some end _ in other words
there is something which is considered to be a good (whether it is, in fact, a good or not). Aquinas
needs, therefore, to determine the aim or end towards which human actions are to be
directed. Aquinas' answer is, perhaps, not unexpected. Considering that he was a Christian theologian
writing from a world that was steeped in Christian thought only one final end could possibly be posited _
and that is God. However this is not an irrational faith claim as Aquinas argues elsewhere the God’s
existence can be rationally established (through the ‘Five Ways’).
It is important that Aquinas considers that all human beings share a single nature and, therefore, there
should be a single aim or objective for all human beings _ this justifies him in rejecting knowledge as an
aim (as only some people have the ability to seek this knowledge). The one thing that every person can
desire is the vision of God which is promised for the next life.
Aquinas' method is to begin with a general injunction that good is to be sought and evil avoided and
then to unpack these by means of subsidiary principles that become more and more specific. The
problem is that at each stage the judgements being made may be challenged and there may be
assumptions that govern the law that is deduced which may not be generally accepted. As an example,
one might start with the general principle of propagation and then move to monogamy (although even
this step might be challenged). One could then look at genital organs and consider their purpose _ if
their purpose is decided to be for procreation, then any use of these organs for other purposes such as
pleasure (or in genital homosexuality) would be held to be wrong because they go against the intended
purpose for these organs. However who is to define the purpose? If, as part of the function of genital
organs, one included as the purpose 'that they are intended so that two people who love each other
should be able to express their love and obtain pleasure in doing so and that propagation might thereby
take place' then one might rule out masturbation and homosexuality, but not sexual foreplay or even
adultery. Other definitions might give different purposes.
Aquinas believed that human beings have a fixed, uniform nature _ this led him to maintain that there
was a fixed natural law (subject to the differentiation between primary and secondary precepts above).
It may be argued that human beings do not have a single human nature and that the moral law
may vary over time _ in this case the whole idea of natural law may be challenged. As an example, if
there is held to be a single human nature then all human beings 'should' (according to their nature if it
is 'correctly' ordered) be heterosexually inclined. If, therefore, someone was homosexually inclined (say
due to a difference in genetic make up) then this would e a disorder in their nature _ their nature would
be 'faulty' in that it was not what it 'should' be. This is one reason why Roman Catholic approaches to
homosexuality tend to be fairly clear cut _ although Catholic theologians draw a distinction between an
inclination which may, for instance, be due to faulty genetic make up and practising homosexuality
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which is due to a free decision and is therefore morally blameworthy. Against this it may be held that
there is no single human nature _ that some people are, for instance, homosexually inclined and others
are not and this in itself is neither right or wrong. In this case the issue may be more about how
individuals should use their sexuality given their make up rather than conformity to a specific human
nature.
The Natural Law approach to morality is much more flexible than is generally supposed. M.J. Longford
('The Good and the True _ An introduction to Christian ethics' (SCM Press, 1985) pps 204) puts it like
this:
'It is true that Aquinas did also appear to hold some absolute moral rules, such as the one that
disallowed lying... but this is not what is stressed in the account of natural law... His overall position is
that there are what are called 'primary precepts' which are exceedingly general (such as the duty to
worship God, and to love one's neighbour) and 'secondary precepts', which are more specific such as the
duty to have only one husband or wife. However, the secondary precepts all have to be interpreted in
the context of the situation, and it is here that the flexibility of natural law arises. At one point
(Aquinas) argues as follows: 'The first principles of natural law are altogether unalterable. But
its secondary precepts... though they are unalterable
in the majority of cases... can
nevertheless be changed on some particular and rare occasions...'... Aquinas argues 'The more
you descend into the details the more it appears how the general rule admits of exceptions, so that you
have to hedge it with cautions and qualifications.'
This is an important qualification and shows that there may be more flexibility in the natural law
approach than is often supposed. Aquinas is suitably modest when making claims about the ability of
moral philosophers to determine which actions should be performed in particular situations. However
Aquinas is firm in the view that there IS an absolute natural law: Disagreements occur because of the
difficulty of determining this.
PROPORTIONALISM
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However situation ethics can provide a corrective to taking the natural law approach too literally.
Perhaps what is needed is a middle way - this some Catholic theologians are seeking under the heading
of PROPORTIONALISM. Proportionalists attach considerable importance to the tradition of the Church,
although do not think that appeal to tradition can ever be final in moral matters. Proportionalism holds
that there are certain moral rules and it can never be right to go against these unless there is a
proportionate reason which would justify it. The proportionate reason would be grounded in the
particular situation, but the situation must generate a reason which is sufficiently strong to overturn
what would otherwise be a firm rule. On this basis, moral laws derived from the natural law or similar
approach may be firm guidelines which should never be ignored unless it is absolutely clear that, in the
particular situation, this is justified by a proportionate reason.
The position of proportionalism is well put in John Macquarrie's 'A new Dictionary of Christian Ethics' (p.
392):
‘Perhaps the most divisive debate in contemporary Catholic moral theology concerns the
existence and grounding of universally binding moral norms. The Scholastic moral theology
of the manuals held that certain acts were intrinsically evil on the basis of the act itself,
independent of the intention, circumstances and consequences. Revisionists maintain that
the evil in acts such as contraception or even direct killing is not moral evil but... premoral
evil which can be justified for a proportionate reason.'
The distinction between pre-moral and moral evil is central to the proportionalist position. Bernard Hoose
in 'Proportionalism' (p.51) says that 'An evil like pain, death or mutilation is, in itself, pre-moral
or non-moral, and should never be described as 'moral'. It is the act as a whole which is
either tight or wrong, and it is the person, or the person in his or her acting, who is morally
good or morally bad.' A distinction has to be made between acts which are good and acts which are
right - and this distinction, proportionalists maintain, is often not made. A person may have a good
intention but may be able to achieve that intention only through an act which is considered to be, in
itself, evil. The proportionalists hold that it is possible for an action, in itself, to be wrong, whilst based
on the actual situation in which the action is done the action may be morally right.
The American proportionalist, Philip Keane, puts the position quite clearly:
'When a truly proportionate reason is present in an action so that the action is morally good, the
human will is clearly not morally intending the premoral evil in the action, even if the premoral evil
must be done as a means to the premoral good. Hence proportionate reason is ultimately a more
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accurate indicator of what the person is actually doing in a complex human action than is the external
relationship of the various premoral aspects of the action.’
Part of the issue here is whether psychological intention is to be distinguished from moral intention.
Surely a doctor who amputates a limb to save a person's life has to remove the limb. But does he or she
morally intend the evil in the amputation?' (Theological Studies, 42 (1981): 275)
Proportionalists seek the right thing to do in the particular circumstances. Unlike advocates of situation
ethics, they affirm that there are nonmoral goods and evils, but they maintain that the circumstances
need to be taken into account in deciding whether a nonmoral evil is also a moral evil. Killing, theft or
contraception (if one is a Catholic) MAY be morally good in certain circumstances. As Bernard Hoose puts
it:
'If what is morally good is what is morally right and what is morally bad is what is morally wrong,
we shall have to revise an awful lot of our thinking in moral matters. Some of the people who burned
heretics were probably morally good in such actions. Are we to assume, therefore, that the burning of
heretics was morally right? Must rich benefactors seeking admiration stop giving money to the poor?
Surely they should change their attitude, but continue to give their money.' (p. 63)
Those who advocate Situation Ethics and supporters of Proportionalism both maintain that agape is the
only criterion for moral goodness or badness. HOWEVER PROPORTIONALISM REFUSES TO ACCEPT THE
SITUATION ETHICIST'S VIEW THAT LOVE CAN MADE AN ACTION RIGHT. Hoose says:
' An action born of love can be wrong, while an action not resulting from love can be right' (p. 63)
Proportionalists have a problem in determining how one calculates whether there is a proportionate
reason which would morally justify performing a (non-morally) evil act. On the face of it, one needs
something rather like the Utilitarian hedonistic calculus to try to calculate proportionality - yet this
approach is resisted by many proportionalists. A variety of methods have been suggested but it is hard
to avoid the conclusion that the choice lies between a form a calculus, which seems unworkable just as
the hedonistic calculus was unworkable, and individual intuition as to the ranking of various goods which
may be too individualistic and opens the door to every person making their own decisions about whether
to depart from Natural Law. Bernard Hoose maintains that the judgement is made taking the
consequences into account but without any formal method of calculation but this could be seen to imply
an appeal to some form of basic intuition and the issue then arises as to how one knows one is justified
in invoking a proportionate reason in a particular case. Generally we will know that there is no
proportionate reason that will justify lying, theft, etc. and the proportionalist affirms this. However the
proportionalist maintains that there MAY be such reasons and the individual will recognise the situation
when it occurs. He or she weighs up the intrinsic evil of lying, theft, etc. and balances this against the
consequences.
Proportionalism has for long been in use in Catholic moral thinking in the issue of Just War, but as long
as it remains condemned by the Vatican (as was re-confirmed in the document 'Veritatis Splendor'
issued in October 1993) it is unlikely to make significant progress within the Church in other areas. It is
understandable why Proportionalism should be condemned by the Catholic Church as it challenges a
clear, deontological approach to ethics which some hold can be derived from the Natural law tradition.
By emphasising the role of individual conscience it also undermines the idea that there are certain
actions which are ‘intrinsically evil’ in all circumstances.
What the above positions do not take into account are the psychological effects of, for instance,
sexuality and the extent to which we are whole human beings - our sexuality cannot be separated from
other parts of our identity as human beings. In being physically close to another human being we trust
them with a very central part of ourselves and if we do not regard this as of any importance then there
is a real danger that multiple sexual partners may lead to us being devalued as human beings. The
religious perspective on sexuality maintains that human beings are too important for that - we are not
mere pleasure objects - we are children of God capable of great love, self-sacrifice and vulnerability.
Human sexuality has a central role to play in understanding ourselves as human beings but we should
not underestimate its importance nor should we treat ourselves, as individuals, with less seriousness
than we deserve. Multiple sexual partners or sex outside the confines of a permanent, committed
relationship may lead to us being devalued as persons and this is a slippery slope from which it may be
difficult to recover and to recapture our integrity, our identity and our sense of self-worth. This is not
sufficiently recognised in either of the approaches outlined above.
Dr. Peter Vardy,
Vice-Principal,
Heythrop College,
University of London