Canada Research Chair in
Citizenship and Governance
The European Union’s citizenship regime.
Political and social rights in the era of new governance
Jane Jenson
Département de science politique
Université de Montréal
jane.jenson@umontreal.ca
Short draft prepared for: Contested Meanings: Democratic Practice and Principles across
Cultural Boundaries, Workshop: 22-23 September 2005, Queen’s University Belfast, School of
Politics and International Studies.
In Western, liberal democracies public authority requires legitimation through one
principal source: the citizens of the polity. The deepest, most clearly engraved
hallmark of citizenship in our democracies is that in citizens is vested the power, by
majority, to create binding norms, to shape the socio-economic direction of the polity;
… More realistically, in citizens is vested the power to enable and habilitate
representative institutions which will exercise governance on behalf of, and for, the
citizens.
(Weiler, 1997: 502)
Introduction
There are many similarities in the citizenship and governance practised in national states and in
the European Union. In these areas the Union is not as sui generis as many might have once
believed. In political terms, the EU suffers from a crisis of representation similar to that of many
countries with cranky electorates. Voters refuse to answer the question asked in referendums,
voting on different matters all together, and usually related to domestic politics. In multilevel
governance situations they sanction the federal level of government in provincial elections or
vice versa.1 Citizens express little confidence in their elected representatives, mistrust officials,
and feel their views are not taken sufficiently into account.2 Declining turnout rates in elections
within countries mean that the traditional gap between Europarliamentary elections and domestic
elections is shrinking, even as observers track the emergence of a “European electorate”
(Perrineau, 2005).
At the same time, the European Union and national states – even those outside the Union – have
been moving closer in their thinking about social and economic policy and its governance. By
the mid-1990s national governments and international organisations recognised that
straightforward neo-liberalism had hit both an ideational and a political wall. Promised cutbacks
in state activity and massive savings in state expenditures failed to materialise and social
problems deepened. New governance practices, including offering an expanded role to
organised civil society in programme design and delivery, have been integral to what has been
termed the “modernisation of social policy,” whether these are promoted by national states, the
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the EU (Dobrowolsky and
Jenson, 2005). In the European Union, the Lisbon process “corrected” somewhat the embedded
liberalism of economic and monetary union, by providing new governance mechanisms in a
wide-range of social policy realms. These mark the success of European social policy
communities in retaking some of the space that had been ceded to exclusively economically
oriented actors (Pochet, 2005: 37-38).
In this short paper I will document the emerging citizenship regime of the European Union, with
particular attention to its rights and governance dimensions. In doing so, I will also indicate the
ways in which much that is happening about governance and rights at the European level is very
close to what is happening in national states. Moreover, in documenting the emergence of this
new citizenship regime, I will point out the ways in which the very understanding of governance
allows both the EU and national states to depart in many realms, and especially the social but not
only the social, from what Joseph Weiler asserted in the quote above to be the “the deepest, most
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2
clearly engraved hallmark of citizenship in our democracies.” So-called new governance does
not always hew to the requirement of legitimating decisions in representative institutions; they
may offer less – but sometimes they may even offer more – sites for political citizenship.
Thinking about citizenship in this way allows us, I suggest, both to reanimate discussions of
European citizenship and to recapture it from what has become the almost exclusive control of
political philosophy and a focus on the standard liberal democratic model. We will see the
European citizenship regime for what it is: a set of practices in motion, as citizenship regimes
have always been.
European citizenship in context
As Linda Bosniak (2000) writes: … the meaning of citizenship has been, and remains, highly
contested among scholars. The term has an extraordinarily broad range of uses; it is invoked to
characterize modes of participation and governance, rights and duties, identities and
commitments, and statuses.” There is no authoritative definition (Faist, 2001: 40). This said,
with some notable exceptions, discussion of European citizenship has focused on a narrow range
of issues, using a definition of citizenship limited to participation and liberal rights, that is, to the
“classical theory” (Arneil, 2005). The result is an impoverished debate.
As early as 1997 Antje Wiener urged students of the EU to move beyond the traditional and
increasingly – as she argued – outmoded understandings of citizenship (Wiener, 1997; 1998).
While some researchers accepted the challenge and examined and compared citizenship practices
with respect to rights, access and belonging, many others continue to deploy definitions of
European citizenship as being limited primarily to democratic legitimacy and human rights. The
narrowness of this conception no doubt accounts for the decline in interest in “European
citizenship” within the research community.3 It fails to reflect the real diversity of citizenship
practices that currently exist within the EU, its institutions and its Member States as well as
elsewhere.
For example, in a recent issue of Citizenship Studies devoted to traditions of citizenship in the
European Union, Ulrich Preuss and his colleagues bemoan the thin nature of EU citizenship, due
in large part to the fact that it is Member States that still confer it (Preuss, et al., 2003: 5). They
then turn to an examination of differing national practices of citizenship within the countries of
the Union. Others deploy a romantic notion of real, everyday citizenship that sets conditions on
“being a citizen” that are rarely met. For example, Victor Pérez-Dias represents an
encompassing conception of citizenship in which individuals are seen as bearers of EU
citizenship when they share a common identity, exercise a common responsibility and enjoy “the
excitement and anticipation of future common endeavour” (quoted in Lehning, 2001: 240). If
this definition were widely adopted, many federal countries would have a hard time qualifying,
and not only for the last requirement of “excitement and anticipation.” It is not unusual in
federal states for citizens to have different rights and duties, depending on their residence in one
province or another. Several states, whether federal (such as Canada) or still unitary (but
devolved, such as the United Kingdom), have substantial portions of their populations who
refuse to share a common identity, seek as many possible routes to expressing their differences in
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constitutional and non-constitutional ways, and even advocate secession, all the while carrying a
national passport.
Political philosophers have elaborated a number of sophisticated interpretations of European
citizenship, usually describing it as quite different from the stories of national citizenship. For
example, Andreas Føllesdal focuses on Union citizenship as a mechanism for “securing
trustworthiness, stable compliance and willing support among Europeans for the institutions and
practices,” (Føllesdal, 2001: 336), and is concerned that the term promises too much, because it
fails to live up to its name. For him, using the term “‘Union Citizenship’ indicates that the future
European order must satisfy democratic principles harking back at least to Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and Immanuel Kant” (Føllesdal, 2001: 323).
But harking back to Kant and Rousseau aligns the political philosopher with the on-going debate
among liberal theorists about the primacy of the demos over the nomos. Not all political theorists
insist that democratic constitution-making is the primary if not exclusive element of citizenship.
Others place a greater emphasis on the social rights (and duties) dimensions of liberal
citizenship. Barbara Arneil (2005), for example, acknowledges the “classical theory” of
citizenship as composed of two principles. One is the principle of participation – whether defined
as Schumpterianian proceduralism or democratic deliberation – and the principle of individual
rights.4 Moreover, she also reminds us of the contribution of sociologists and political scientists,
such as T.H. Marshall, who work with the concept of social rights. This element of rights has
too often been left aside by political philosophers who have confined their discussion of EU
citizenship to – and shaped much of the debate about – only the first two principles.5 The time
has come to broaden the terms, by responding Seyla Benhabib’s recent injunction (2004:143) for
a fruitful collaboration between sociological and philosophical theory because “for too long
normative political theory and the political sociology of the modern state have gone their
separate ways.” 6
Adopting an historical understanding of citizenship as a notion with contingent7 rather than
invariable content, provides a sociological rather than philosophical reading of the current
European citizenship regime and the ways in which it is adhering, as many countries are, to the
notions of governance while “modernising” social policy. We thereby observation alterations in
the principles of who participates in what institutional arrangements as well as the very space of
citizenship and the rights it confers.
The notion of citizenship regime
Beginning in the 1990s there was a clear revival of interest in citizenship. There are multiple
reasons for this attention, and they go well beyond anything happening within the EU.
Explanations come primarily from the “real world,” where there are: nationalist movements in
multinational states, including those of indigenous peoples; increasing rates of migration and of
statelessness; neoliberal challenges to the social rights described by T.H. Marshall after World
War Two; increasing attention to human rights that are not anchored by national borders; and
since September 11, 2001 mounting suspicion of naturalised citizens from countries with large
Islamic populations. To this list can be added, of course, European elites’ objective of fostering
and creating European citizenship (Wiener, 1998; Petit, 2005). This goal is expressed in the
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rights identified in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, and the extension of democratic
spaces in the draft Constitution. But, it also found in other institutional innovations, beyond those
the draft Constitution grouped under the heading of citizenship.8
For centuries, struggles over the borders and boundaries of citizenship have been at the centre of
political controversy and actions. Modern citizenship was forged and exists in the Westphalian
international system composed of modern states with identifiable borders (Wiener, 1998: 27ff.
for example). Citizenship involves recognition of and protection of rights by public authorities.
Despite a tendency in some circles to stretch the concept in several directions (for example, by
speaking of “citizens of the world” or “global citizenship”), full citizenship status has always
implied and still implies membership in a bordered community.9 Currently, immigration and
refugee flows as well as movement of persons within areas of free trade and economic
communities and nationalist movements within multinational states all raise fundamental issues
about the meaning of borders.
Broadly defined, citizenship also identifies who has rights and what those rights are, who can
participate in setting them, and therefore, who is a member of the polity. There are boundaries
of citizenship. Citizens have rights and responsibilities within the frontiers of a polity; noncitizens and denizens do not have the same. But, some citizens may also be immigrés de
l’intérieur, being nationals lacking full citizenship rights. Therefore, by shifting boundaries,
governments expand or contract the space for citizenship and – perhaps even more importantly –
for claims-making about citizenship.10 Struggles over boundaries are a way for groups
representing excluded or unrecognised categories of the population to claim and win inclusion as
full citizens. Making claims to a wider citizenship involves calling for greater voice and better
recognition, and de-legitimating existing rationales for exclusion. They are efforts to alter the
boundaries of citizenship.
The story of modern citizenship, created in national states from the 18th through the 20th century,
is one of continuous struggles over the boundaries of citizenship, that is the rights and
responsibilities that accrue to those recognised as full members of community as well as the
modes of governance that will prevail. For two hundred years, these boundaries were primarily
constructed within the borders of a national state. We now see two things occurring. One is that
many national states are engaged in redrawing the boundaries of citizenship, to correspond to
neoliberal or post-neoliberal politics, and in doing so are often set new borders, around local
spaces, for example, as notions of local governance gain popularity. Second, the EU as a nonstate has clearly announced its desire to play in the citizenship field, and therefore raising the
issue of national borders.11
The concept of citizenship regime is useful in order to capture these historically contingent
differences in practising citizenship. By citizenship regime, we mean the institutional
arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and shape concurrent policy decisions and
expenditures of states, problem definitions by states and citizens, and claims-making by
citizens.12 There are four dimensions to a citizenship regime.

Citizenship involves the expression of basic values about the responsibility mix, defining
the boundaries of state responsibilities and differentiating them from those of markets, of
families and of communities in the “welfare diamond.” The result is definition of “how
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we wish to produce welfare”, whether via purchased welfare, via the reciprocity of kin,
via collective support in communities, or via collective and public solidarity, that is state
provision and according to the principle of equality among citizens.13

Through formal recognition of particular rights and duties (civil, political, social, and
cultural; individual and collective) a citizenship regime establishes the boundaries of
inclusion and exclusion of a political community. In doing so, it identifies those entitled
to full citizenship status and those who only, in effect, hold second-class status as well as
those who are not citizens.

A citizenship regime also prescribes the governance arrangements of a polity. Among
these, we include the institutional mechanisms giving access to the state, the modes of
participation in civic life and public debates and the legitimacy of specific types of
claims-making.

Finally, a citizenship regime contributes to the definition of membership, in both the
narrow passport-holding sense of nationality and the more complicated notion of identity.
It thereby establishes the borders of the regime, identifying the insiders and outsiders.
The dimensions of a regime are never fixed once and for all in time (Jenson and Phillips, 1996).
They are subject to redefinition and transformation in accordance with the ideas and ideologies
of the times. Government choices influence how people will live together, and governments
continue to make significant and consequential choices about responsibility, community,
governing and inclusion in their actions every day. Only some of these choices fall within the
boundaries of citizenship; sometimes states assign – or leave space for – significant decisions
and outcomes to be determined by families or in markets and communities. The boundaries of
citizenship will expand or contract in consequence of the space given to other locations for
choice. More space for markets or families means less for citizenship. Therefore, the task of
analysing any citizenship regime is to identify the space for citizenship, observing its contraction
or expansion, not only with respect to rights and duties, but also in terms of governance
arrangements and definitions of membership.
Directions of change in citizenship regimes
A number of analysts have recognised and identified the parallels in the redesign of certain
dimensions of citizenship in national states and the EU. For example, Paul Magnette (and
colleagues) have identified two significant directions of change in governance, adopted in the EU
often simultaneously with the same changes in national governments. One is the increasing resort
to independent or quasi-independent executive agencies, the use of which alters significantly
patterns of accountability and transparency (Costa et al. 2003; also Flinders, 2004). A second is
the enthusiasm for “civic participation” and for involving organised civil society in policy
processes (Magnette, 2003; also Meehan, 2003; Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003). A third change
is the observation that in the areas of labour and social policy, both European institutions and
national policy regimes are moving toward labour market activation and to efforts to
“modernise” social policy to make it more proactive and less “passive” (for example, EspingAndersen, et al., 2003; Zeitlin and Pochet, 2005).
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In part, these parallels exist because of the ways in which national states, in Europe and
elsewhere, are redesigning their own citizenship regimes. They are building citizenship regimes
in which the responsibility mix assigns greater space to non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
and market-based decision-makers for well-being, in which new forms of citizen involvement in
and access to policy-making are initiated, in which rights are defined in general and flexible
ways, to be given content in decentralised processes, and finally in which the crisis of identity
and commitment are supposed to be resolved by resort to “good governance.” Janet Newman
and her colleagues (2004: 204) summarise these changes this way:
The role of the state shifts from that of ‘governing’ through direct forms of control
(hierarchical governance), to that of ‘governance’, in which the state must collaborate
with a wide range of actors in networks that cut across the public, private and
voluntary sectors, and operate across different levels of decision making. Public
administration and social policy literatures variously describe the ways in which
governments – in the UK, the USA and across much of Western Europe – have
attempted to shift the focus towards various forms of co-production with other
agencies and with citizens themselves through partnerships, community involvement
and strategies of ‘responsibilisation’.
New governance ideas and practices have influenced social citizenship and governance
initiatives widely (Saint-Martin, 2004).14
Such changes, although most often ascribed to discussions of “governance,” go well beyond
issues of accountability, participation, and so on. They are almost inevitably linked with
alterations in rights and duties and the responsibility mix more generally (as the quote from Janet
Newman makes clear). They have also been implicated in sustaining space for sub-national and
supra-national feelings of belonging, particularly in multinational states (for example, Papillon
and Turgeon, 2003). The EU is not alone in reshaping both the borders and boundaries of its to
citizenship regimes.
The Dimensions of the European Union’s Citizenship Regime
In this section I will examine the dimensions of the European citizenship regime, taking each
separately but also pointing to the interconnectedness of the design. The focus will be primarily
on the post-Amsterdam and post-Lisbon moments, although our sociological understanding of
citizenship compels recognition that some elements of EU citizenship existed well before
Maastricht.15 Moreover, the discussion of the content of citizenship will not be limited that which
the European Union officially designates as touching on “citizenship” – that is Articles I-9 and I10 of the draft Constitution. It will include under the label of citizenship the social, economic
and environmental rights that are being Europeanised as well as forms of policy-making
involving citizens that often treated under other headings.
European citizenship rights
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It is important to note the existence of citizenship rights prior to the Maastricht and Amsterdam
Treaties. Indeed, Europeans have enjoyed certain citizenship rights since the Treaty of Rome.
The construction of the edifice has been long, undertaken in a piecemeal fashion and often
promenading under another name altogether, such as worker mobility, the single market,
institutional reform and so on. Just as in national stories of citizenship, rights were guaranteed
over time, and often targeted to particular categories of the population before becoming
universal.
The Treaty of Rome and subsequent directives and judicial decisions provided rights to
European workers, guaranteed by Community institutions.16 For the most part, as many have
noted, these were rights arising from the Community’s mission to create a common market and
economic space, and therefore the rights recognised were linked to employment. Article 118 of
the Treaty of Rome guaranteeing freedom of movement recognised a traditional civil right, to
use T.H. Marshall’s typology, and provided the foundation for decisions of the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) dealing with residence, the administration of justice and ownership of
immovable property for workers moving within the Community. In addition, very quickly the
ECJ established that the Treaty gave a common legal right to all individual nationals, that is the
right to expect, and duty to ensure, that states comply with Community law. While these were
rights “of” Europeans, the mechanism to guarantee them was regulation of Member States
behaviour according to certain legal principles.
Non-discrimination emerged as the most important of these legal principles. Regulations
outlawed discrimination against migrant workers’ access to insurance-based social benefits and
social assistance based on nationality. Discrimination on the basis of sex was targeted in Article
119 of the Treaty of Rome and provided the legal basis for five important Directives in the 1970s
and 1980s.17 Then in the 1990s the Social Dialogue process generated Directives guaranteeing
parental leave and leave for family reasons, establishing the burden of proof in cases of
discrimination, and extending protections to part-time work.
Additionally, and beyond the principle of non-discrimination, there were rights guaranteed by
Directives on consultation over redundancy plans and protection of employment conditions when
business is transferred. The Single European Act of 1987 required consultation and protection in
situations of risk and hazard at work. Young workers and older workers were also targeted in the
1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. Social Dialogue and the
Maastricht Treaty brought movement toward protections on working conditions and workers’
rights of consultation.
Again, prior to the treaty recognition of Union citizenship, decisions conferred political rights
and recognition of membership. Citizenship as such entered Europe’s political discourse in the
early 1970s, fully 20 years before the Amsterdam Treaty, and focussed initially on to two “policy
packages,” those of voting rights for Community citizens and a passport union (Wiener, 1997:
530). The 1976 Council decision guaranteed direct universal suffrage in European elections
scheduled for 1979. A Council resolution on the European passport came in 1981 (Weiner,
1997: 538). Both actions were emanations of concerns, expressed much earlier, about the need to
foster feelings of belonging to the Community, also undertaken in the field of education (Petit,
2005). In other words, well before the formal consolidation of European citizenship in Treaty
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forms, we can observe a slow construction of rights, including democratic rights of participation,
social and civil rights.
Concerned to counter criticisms about the narrowness of the Single Market project as well as the
so-called democratic deficit, European institutions consecrated formal citizenship status in two
steps (Warleigh in Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001: 21-22). Article 8 of the Treaty on European
Union of 1992 signed at Maastricht awarded all nationals of Member States the complementary
status of Union citizenship, and opened a new constitutional channel for collective participation,
via the Committee of the Regions (Meehan, 2000: 7). A flurry of initiatives, studies and
interventions marked the period between Maastricht and Amsterdam (Weiner, 1997: Table 1,
546). Citizenship was confirmed as a personal status at Amsterdam, conferred new rights:
increased freedom of movement, the right of European citizens to vote and stand in local
elections as well as European elections in a Member State other than their own; right to petition
an Ombudsman and the European Parliament; right to democratic protection by another Member
State in third countries when one’s own state is not present. The Treaty also located European
citizenship via a reference to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.
All of this immediately generated a “citizenship industry” about how to characterize the
European situation – thick or thin, anaemic or full-bodied, limited or full of potential.18
Unfortunately, too often these debates are confined to the content of Amsterdam, rather than the
fuller list of rights mentioned here. Indeed, the Union itself tends to cut “citizenship” off from
the very civil rights and social rights that have long shaped its interventions to protect a space for
citizenship within the market institutions itself has actively shaped.19
The responsibility mix
This is not the place to rehearse again debates about the teleology of the EU: a “Europe of the
bankers,” an “ever wider union,” and so on. Suffice it to say that the initial criticisms of the
citizenship provisions of the treaties were correct. After reviewing the work of many critics,
Thomas Faist summarised the situation at the end of the 1990s (2001: 38): “… rapid economic
integration is not accompanied by an equivalent adaptation of social policies and legislation. …
Correspondingly, the Union citizenship created by the Treaty of Maastricht is not considered to
be an effective step in creating and maintaining substantive social rights.” The Union’s own
interventions around social and economic rights still primarily took a regulatory form and were
targeted to categories, securing, for example, mutual recognition of social security contributions
of migrant workers from EU Member States, equal treatment of men and women in occupational
life, and some standards for working conditions and health and safety. Primarily, as we have
noted, they provided safeguards for the free movement of labour. The result was an asymmetry
of market-making and market correcting mechanisms that attracted the scorn of, among others,
Wolfgang Streeck and Fritz Scarpf (quoted in Faist, 2001).
At the same time that critics railed against the emphasis on market-making without social rights,
however, there was already movement within the institutions of the Union to protect and extend
Social Europe, and to therefore assure the boundaries of European social rights, protecting them
from market mechanisms (Teague, 2000). The clearest expression was the institutionalisation of
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the European employment strategy (EES), begun at Amsterdam and extended via the
Luxembourg process. The main objective of the EU’s employment strategy, as that of all
employment policies since at least Keynes, is to ensure its contribution to economic growth. Yet,
this contribution was to be made in a way that ensures protections as well as incentives to
increase employment. Thus, equal opportunities for women became a pillar alongside
employability, adaptability, entrepreneurship, and these four were supplemented by additional
strategic elements, following from the analysis of the needs of the current labour market. These
include shared responsibility for ensuring quality of work and emphasis on life-long learning.
Eventually, too, the very status of the EES was upgraded, to mimic certain aspects of economic
policy coordination. The Employment Committee plays the same role for the Labour and Social
Affairs Council that the Economic Policy Committee plays for Ecofin, and both report
simultaneously to the spring European Council. Over the 1990s, as well, a somewhat
subterranean but steady policy movement brought social inclusion and poverty under the EU’s
umbrella of attention (Pochet, 2000).
This is not, in other words, the “American social model” of minimalist labour rights, “any job is
a good job,” and relegation of employment policy to the cupboard in order to free up market
forces. In both cases, as well as other policy areas, the innovation what allowed the boundaries
of citizenship to be redrawn, involved the invention of the open method of coordination as a new
tool in the governance arsenal of the EU. What has come to be labelled the “Lisbon strategy”
has two goals: to improve European competitiveness and to coordinate European methods of
social protection. Initiatives can be loosely characterised as either “competitiveness-fostering”
or “welfare fostering”, with the first bringing an emphasis on the information society, research
and development policy, internal market, and macro-economic policy and the second bringing
talk of the renewed European social model, involving investing in people, activation, education,
employment policy, sustainable pensions, actions against poverty and social exclusion, and so on
(Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004: 189-90).
Implemented as a second-best method when Member States refused more stringent and limiting
ways of doing, all targets have been not met (Zeitlin and Pochet, 2005). As the report from
Notre Europe puts it: (Collignon, et al., 2005: 4):
The Lisbon strategy defined a series of targets to be met by Member States by 2010.
These targets concern areas such as social policy, education, lifelong learning, R&D,
social cohesion, employment, general macroeconomic indicators, the environment
among others. Using the very indicators worked out in the framework of the Lisbon
strategy, one can but note that it is not delivering the expected results. In its recent
report, the task force chaired by Wim Kok argued that “much needs to be done in
order to prevent Lisbon from becoming a synonym for missed objectives and failed
promises”.
Such evaluations, and the assessment of the strategy provided by the spring 2005 European
Council, are important of course. They reflect the difficulties of meeting similar objectives
across the Union. My interest in the Lisbon strategy is different, however. Indeed the efforts
spent on it and on its reforms represent the extent which there is, within the institutions of the
EU, a place for a discourse on social citizenship, for the notion that the Member States should be
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10
seeking to pursue common objectives as they confront the thorny problems of contemporary
economies and societies. Applying this criterion to the Lisbon strategy provides an indicator of
the extent to which the space for citizenship has – or has not – been opened. While neither the
EES nor the poverty and social inclusion commitments announced at Luxembourg, Lisbon, and
after generated European social rights in the strict sense (because such rights remain within
national competence), it would also be a mistake to ignore their effects in coordinating a
response to the pressures to reduce the space for social citizenship within the responsibility mix.
Obviously, this responsibility mix is different from that established by national governments in
the heyday of the trente glorieuses. Social investment is not social protection. A trampoline into
employment is not a safety net for hard times. Nonetheless, both do provide a space of
citizenship, in which market rules are not the norm. The fears of those who saw only an
economic project, only a wider but not deeper Europe in the making must recognise that the
Lisbon strategy has maintained a space for the legitimacy of discourses about social rights and
duties. Indeed, as innumerable pronouncements tell us, social policy does not follow economic
policy but, as long as it is modernised, it is a necessary grounding for economic policy.
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge the extent to which the social agendas since
Lisbon are reconfiguring the responsibility mix in another way. The Directives of the 1970s, the
equality opportunities unit and child care expert network in the 1980s and 1990s provided
reasonably solid grounding for reworking the family corner of the welfare diamond. Child care,
both parental care of new-borns and non-parental care of pre-school children is no longer left
exclusively to the family’s responsibility. Recognition of the so-called new social risks by
national governments in the OECD world as well as by Union has generated pressure for both
improved parental leaves and for childcare (Jenson and Saint-Martin, forthcoming; EspingAndersen et al., 2003). Multiple institutions urge public support to relieve families of some of
the responsibilities assigned to them in previous times. In addition, recognising the logical
consequence of an activation strategy that promotes an increased female labour force
participation rate, the 2002 Barcelona European Council agreed that: “Member States should
remove disincentives to female labour force participation and strive, taking into account the
demand for childcare facilities and in line with national patterns of provision, to provide
childcare by 2010 to at least 90% of children between 3 years old and the mandatory school age
and at least 33% of children under 3 years of age” (Plantenga and Siegel, 2004: 1-1).
This commitment, if met, would mark a significant rearrangement of the welfare diamond from
its post-1945 shape, in which decisions about child-bearing and raising were essentially a family
matter, even in states in which generous family allowances provided income supplements. Just
as welfare reforms in most countries provide significant disincentives for women to substitute
child care for employment, so too does the Lisbon strategy. But, as the Barcelona targets make
clear, there is also recognition of the need for greater public support for child care, if women are
to be citizen-workers much the same as men.
Governance arrangements
Much ink continues to be devoted the democratic limits of European citizenship. And it may
seem that almost as much has gone to presenting the potential and limits of new governance
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forms offering an alternative to the standard model of liberal democracy and its institutions in the
EU, a non-state polity with pretensions of drawing closer to its citizens. Recent adaptations in the
European citizenship regime have explicitly targeted issues of governance, often without
provoking the hoped-for resonance among European citizens, it must be said. There have been
two routes into the governance discussion: via the OMC and via the 2001 White Paper on
European Governance.
The open method of coordination emerged during the years in which EU governance was under
the microscope, and it was intended to be a means not only to address social policy content but
also to improve the democratic quality of the decision-making process itself. Emerging through
the 1990s, the Lisbon Council consolidated20 the OMC as “an important tool to improve
transparency and democratic participation.” This is to be achieved, in particular, by “varied
forms of partnership” among the Union and Member States, regional and local institutions, social
partners and civil society (quoted in de la Porte and Nanz, 2004: 267). The OMC proposes, in
other words, to make visible the route to representation for European citizens that has existed for
decades in more or less recognised form as consultation, network participation and lobbying (for
example, Jachtenfuchs et al, 1998; Warleigh, 2000). It promised to formalise their involvement
in and representation by civil society organisations and social partners, as well as their national
and local governments in new institutional spaces.21
Governance as presented in the OMC is to be iterative, based on a learning process, one that
involves learning from peers (best practice) as well as assessment by them (peer review). Again
according to the European Council in 2000, the OMC is supposed “to organize a learning
process at European level in order to stimulate exchange and the emulation of best practices and
in order to help member states improve their own national policies” (quoted in de la Porte and
Nanz, 2000: 268), a process which is expected to lead to convergence on common priorities.
The OMC replicates, in other words, the new governance emphasis on decentralisation and
networking, on partnership with civil society, including private and third sector involvement, and
on alternatives to liberal democratic representation. It also reproduces the ideas about process.
The hope was that it would bolster the legitimacy of the EU, just as national states hoped new
governance promises would increase the legitimacy of their policy choices and new practices
both in neoliberal and post-neoliberal times.
These themes – transparency, participation, circulation of ideas and learning – initially generated
a great wave of enthusiasm for the OMC as an expression of deliberative democracy. Optimism
before the fact has been tempered by empirical analyses of the implementation of the OMC. The
longest experience has been with the EES, which actually began to use the method of
coordination before the Lisbon Council. It too appears to be the area in which hopes for
democratic forms have been most realised (de la Porte and Nanz, 2004). Overall, however,
observers have concluded that the OMC is not a mechanism that either fully responds to the
principles of deliberative democracy or can overcome the democratic deficit. If anything, it has
produced more attention to coordination of policies (and the space for social citizenship) than for
democracy.
Although bursting the balloon of enthusiasm for its deliberative democracy potential, the OMC
does represent a significant shift in thinking about how to provide access to participation for
The EU’s changing citizenship regime
12
organized civil society. The method represents an innovation, departing from the previous
methods of regulation or redistribution via the Community method as well as classic
intergovernmentalism. It is still “primarily a bureaucratic exercise” (Collignon, et al., 2005: 11),
as is policy-making everywhere of course. It by no means provides full democratic participation,
but it does hold open the door to participation by social partners and by some NGOs, both those
traditionally involved in employment matters, such as unions, and newer ones such as the
European Anti-poverty Network (EAPN) and the European Older People’s Platform (de la Porte
and Nanz, 2004: 283; Pochet, 2002; Collignon, 2005: 10).
Results are mixed, as they in national experiments (Saint-Martin, 2004). Nonetheless, the
formalisation of new governance in the OMC must be seen as evidence that the EU citizenship
regime will in the future depart from the standard liberal democratic model, just as so many
national states have in recent years.
The 2001 White Paper on European Governance [COM(2001) 428] is the second location for a
detailed discussion of European governance. In it participation is identified as one of the five
principles of good governance, along with openness, accountability, effectiveness and coherence.
Improved participation is supposed to enhance both the efficiency and legitimacy of European
governance by responding “to the expectations of the Union’s citizens,” helping “connect Europe
with its citizens,” leading to a “less top-down approach,” and making the policy process “more
inclusive and accountable.” All this, in turn, should “create more confidence” in European
institutions and generate “a sense of belonging to Europe” (Magnette, 2003: 147). It is, in other
words, clearly a document about the design of the European citizenship regime (Jenson and
Saint-Martin, 2003).
This focus on participation represents an important shift in the discourse of and about the
European Union (Magnette, 2003: 147-48). The emphasis on participation grounds the White
Paper’s claim to offer a vision of the institutions of modern governance and represents a vision
of citizenship that departs from inter-governmentalism. The White Paper declares that “it is time
to recognise that the Union has moved from a diplomatic to a democratic process, with policies
that reach deep into national societies and daily life.” The focus is particularly on “a stronger
interaction with regional and local governments and civil society,” via “a more systematic
dialogue with representatives of regional and local governments”; flexibility in implementation
of Community legislation; minimum standards for consultation; “partnership arrangements” for
consultation beyond the minimum standards, in return for guarantees of representativity.
As with respect to every action of the Union, critics quickly emerged, pointing out the limits as
well as the dangers of the White Paper (for example, Höreth, 2002; Scarpf, 2001). Again, my
goal is not to arbitrate. Rather, it is to signal that the proposals of the White Paper, many of
which were pre-figured in the OMC and others revived in the Constitution, mark a shift in the
Union’s understanding of its own citizenship regime. While one may raise questions about
whether the governance provisions of the citizenship regime envisioned is sufficiently
democratic, sufficiently functional, sufficiently legitimate or whatever, there is no doubt that the
White Paper did propose, and even marked, a move toward a vision of governance that fit well
with the possibilities of the EU’s multilevel institutions and its existing citizenship practices with
respect to consultation with civil society. And this is not surprising, because “the instruments of
The EU’s changing citizenship regime
13
participation promoted by the White Paper correspond to a general and long-term evolution of
citizenship practices in the Western world” (Magnette, 2003: 151), as we have seen above. In
that sense, and as much as the OMC, the White Paper positioned the EU quite close to national
states, because they themselves are becoming more like the European Union in their citizenship
practices with respect to governance.
For its part the draft Constitution tended to treat governance within the standard liberal model,
much to the disappointment of those who wished to see more about civil society in it. The article
of the draft Constitution dealing with social policy coordination did not mention participation of
organized civil society or other actors (de la Porte and Nanz, 2004: 268). Of course, the draft
hewed to the long-standing EU principle of subsidarity, and there too reflected a common idea in
citizenship regime of many countries, that is the need to devolve policy choices to the subnational and local level, in the name of good governance.
Definition of membership
This dimension of the European Union’s citizenship regime continues to cause it significant
problems, as it has for decades (Wiener, 1998). Efforts to foster feelings of belonging have been
wide-ranging. Everything from passport union to the symbols of Europe identified in the draft
Constitution, from mobility rights to educational mobility, from democratic rights to social
protections have been tried, but European citizens remain stubbornly under-enthusiastic about
the EU. This is hardly surprising, of course, at a time when plural identities and competing
identity claims characterise politics in many places. Small nations seek to break the bonds of
“national unity,” whether in Europe or North America. Claimants for recognition of dispersed
nations, such as the Roma and indigenous populations in the Americas challenge states to modify
their citizenship regimes (Yashar, 1999; Jenson and Papillon, 2000). Urban regions and local
regions are presented as reasonable locales for citizenship practice and with which to identify
(Beauregard and Bounds, 2000, for example).
Because the challenge is endemic to any citizenship regime under conditions of redefinition it
constitutes a very large matter, one that merits its own discussion. I will not treat it here, in
which my goal has been to document the shifts in the first three dimensions of the regime. The
consequences for the fourth are large and not surprisingly so, give the extent to which the other
three are in flux.
Concluding remarks
This paper had two goals. One was to re-open a discussion about European citizenship, taking it
beyond the confines of considerations of legitimacy and civil and political rights. This is where
and how citizenship is now being primarily considered, both within the EU’s institutions and in
political theory. My goal was to relocate under the rubric of citizenship the actions of the Union
that since 1957 have opened space for shared social rights and a plurality of routes to
representation. In doing so, the goal was to draw into the tent of a discourse on European
citizenship considerations of institutions such as the post-Lisbon processes of coordination in
employment and social policy fields, the actions of NGOs in Brussels and elsewhere, and the
many steps towards a “modernised” Social Europe.
The EU’s changing citizenship regime
14
A second goal was to document the extent to which the changes in this European citizenship
regime mimic similar processes of reform in national states and this well beyond Europe.
Discussions of governance and of modernised social citizenship have moved in similar directions
in many places. They emphasise, as the EU has, involvement of civil society organisations in
design and delivery of policy, decentralisation of decision-making, reliance on public-private and
state-society partnerships, and validation of expertise. They involve, in other words, a remaking
of citizenship regimes and practices in many locales.
Such changes of course merit normative attention. But, before they can be assessed, it is
important to recognise them for what they are. They are much less examples of a sui generis
“European” experience than they are the shape of citizenship to come. It is as such that they can
and should be engaged.
Notes
1
For example, the Liberal Party of Canada, now only heading a minority government, believes that it lost up to 10
seats in the key province of Ontario in the 2004 election because the provincial government, headed by the Ontario
Liberals (a separate party albeit with a similar name), reneged on one its election promises and imposed a
surcharge on health care (a provincial responsibility under the Canadian constitution).
2
See for example the comparative overviews in Norris (1999) and Dehousse (2002). For a direct discussion of
European elections and referendums see Perrineau (2005). For another national case see Howe et al. (2005).
3
Albeit an indicator with limited accuracy, a search on Google Scholar reveals the heyday of “European
citizenship” to have been, not surprisingly, between 1997 and 2000. Two books were published in 2001, albeit
based on work collected earlier (Eder and Gieson, 2001; Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001). For overviews of the
discussions of European citizenship see an early paper (Warleigh, 1998) and a more recent one (Preuss, et al.,
2003).
4
Sometimes these principles are distinguished this way: “the right to have rights” (to use Hannah Arendt’s famous
formulation” versus a package of individual rights, both for civil protections and for democratic participation.
5
Indeed, it is most often when the analytic focus turns to social citizenship that the discussion broadens and
becomes more historical. See, for example, Faist (2001).
6
See also Bellamy (in Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001: 43), who puts it this way: “Historically, the processes of statemaking, constitutionalism and the development of citizenship have gone hand in hand, reflecting not only external
pressures, notably war, but also internal political struggles amongst citizens themselves. Most normative
citizenship theorists and many legal and political scientists have discounted these factors. They have either seen
them as a matter for historians and political sociologists or fallen back on an implicit teleology derived from a
Whiggish reading of Marshall….”
7
Others have emphasised this historical contingency, of course. Working with two dimensions of the citizenship
regime, Elizabeth Meehan (2000: 4) writes: “… there are good grounds for treating the overlap of citizenship and
nationality as a matter of historical contingency and not as an analytically necessary connection. In short,
nationality is a legal identity from which no rights need arise, though obligations might—as is obvious when
nationals are called ‘subjects’. Conversely, citizenship is a practice, or a form of belonging, resting on a set of
legal, social and participatory entitlements which may be conferred, and sometimes are, irrespective of
nationality—or denied, as in the case of women and some religious and ethnic minorities, regardless of
nationality.”
The EU’s changing citizenship regime
15
8
Title II of the draft Constitution affirms European citizenship, linking it to fundamental rights (art. I-9) and
participation, diplomatic and mobility rights (art. I-10).
9
To say it is “bordered” does not mean that the community will be correspond to the frontiers of sovereignty (see
also Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001: 5-6; Bosniak, 2000). It is simply to say that, for the moment, the notion of
world citizenship remains little more than a liberal universalist ideal.
Elizabeth Meehan (2000: 5) provides a classic example of the immigrée de l’intérieur: “In late 19th century
America, the Supreme Court ruled that a woman was, indeed, an American citizen but that being a citizen did not
necessarily carry the right to vote. This empties the classical conception of ‘citizen’ of part of its core meaning ….”
This example also makes clear that such internal contradictions provided space for claims-making that would
eventually result in female suffrage. In the United States as well as Britain and other liberal regimes, rethinking
this contradiction had consequences beyond political rights. Including women as citizens also meant redefining the
very notion of “the citizen” as self-reliant, and not in receipt of state support. Women’s suffrage and notions of the
legitimacy of social rights emerged in tandem in liberal welfare regimes.
10
11
The factor that makes borders of important are the practices of the American Empire, intensified since 2001, in
which traditional practices of international law have been set aside. In turn, other countries have had to consider
the ways in which they will respect the rights of their own citizens, whether naturalized or not, when their ethnic
community has been disproportionately associated with illegal acts. The UK announcements in summer 2005 of
new rules for treating sojourners and citizens is only one example. Canada has had to confront the same issue in a
number of high profile cases relating to naturalized citizens deported by the US to Middle Eastern countries and
particularly Syria. The Canadian security services appear to have been complicit in these cases.
12
This notion of regime builds on that proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990), but with different content. The notion
of responsibility mix is also similar the “welfare triangle” used by Esping-Andersen et al. (2003). Instead of using
the triplet state/market/family, I prefer to use the image of the “welfare diamond” of
state/market/family/community.
13
For more on the welfare diamond, and its difference from the welfare triangle, see Jenson, 2004.
14
In his article, in contrast, Paul Magnette offers a more limited view of the concept of governance. Drawing on the
work of Majone and of Héritier, he focuses on regulators and the involvement of civil society, as well as the notion
of legitimation via multi-level governance (Magnette, 2003: 145). As the quote from Newman et al. suggests, the
concept has been used much more broadly by those working on national states, with partnerships in service
delivery being as important as partnerships in decision-making. See also Elizabeth Meehan’s summary (2003: 2):
“Analysts of governance focus on a range of new arrangements and practices. These include the fragmentation or
sharing of public power amongst different tiers of regulation such as the European Union (EU), state governments
and sub-state governments. Secondly, they point to other arrangements encouraging policies to be formulated and
implemented away from the centre; the ‘hollowing out’ of the state through the ‘agentization’ of government and
the privatization of the provision of utilities and services …. Thirdly, analysts note an increasing reliance on
partnerships, networks and novel forms of consultation or dialogue that are at the heart of ‘Third Way’ thinking
about policy design and delivery.”
For example, Elizabeth Meehan correctly points out that the Treaty of Rome’s guarantee of freedom of movement
is similar in many ways to a civil right in Marshallian terms (2000: 7).
15
16
These paragraphs draw on Meehan (2000).
17
The five Directives increased the scope of equal pay; extended the right of equality into conditions of
employment; applied the principle to statutory and occupational social security schemes; and gave comparable
benefits and protections to self-employed women. In addition, a 1992 Directive protects pregnant workers and
guarantees levels of maternity benefits.
The EU’s changing citizenship regime
16
18
For overviews of the debate see Warleigh (in Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001) and Preuss et al. (2003).
See, for example, the FAQ about the Constitution on the Europa site, as well as the content of the “citizenship”
articles of the draft.
19
As the Preface to the special issue of the European Journal of Public Policy (2004: 181) described it, “the OMC
generally follows these steps: common guidelines, goals and/or benchmarks are set up by the Council; member
states develop annual action plans to achieve the goals; these plans are monitored and evaluated collectively in a
peer review process; finally, guidelines are reviewed and overall results assessed.”
20
21
Of course the OMC did not invent the routes to representation for organised interests. Indeed, the emergence of
NGOs and their involvement in European policy networks has been on-going for decades, and they can be seen as
key actors in citizenship practice, facing both opportunities for and limits to their influence (Warleigh, 2000).
The EU’s changing citizenship regime
17
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